Europe's 2027 political risk: fragmentation, policy gridlock, and bond market volatility
Summary
Economists Giovanni Zani and Esther Gupta argue that Europe's political landscape is shifting toward nationalist parties, but this shift is heterogeneous rather than a uniform swing to extremes. They contend that while decision-making is slowing due to fragmentation, explicit EU exit agendas have disappeared, with support for the Euro at historical highs. Strategist Arby Ashani notes that French political uncertainty is driving volatility in French-German bond spreads, which are expected to remain elevated in 2027. The speakers emphasize that political risks will affect medium-term potential growth and competitiveness rather than causing immediate recession, with the ECB playing a critical role in managing financial stress.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 1:02
Introduction and Political Landscape Overview
Host Imogen Bachra introduces the episode's focus on Europe's electoral supercycle and its market implications for 2027. Economist Giovanni Zani begins by characterizing the political shift as heterogeneous rather than a uniform swing to extremes, citing economic insecurity and migration concerns as drivers.
- 1:02 – 6:41
Heterogeneity of Far-Right Parties and EU Integration
Zani argues that while nationalist parties are gaining ground, they are divided on key issues like Ukraine and the Euro. He notes that explicit opposition to EU membership has become less viable, with support for the Euro at historical highs, shifting the narrative toward reshaping the EU from within rather than dismantling it.
- 6:41 – 8:31
Vulnerable EU Policies and Decision-Making Speed
Zani identifies policies requiring unanimity, such as the multi-year EU budget and sanctions, as vulnerable to blocking minorities. Economist Esther Gupta adds that political fragmentation slows decision-making on competitiveness and energy security, which is critical in an uncertain geopolitical environment.
- 8:31 – 12:25
Impact on European Growth and Potential
Zani states that 2027 growth drivers include fiscal expansion in Germany and investment in defense and AI, with political risks affecting medium-term potential growth rather than immediate GDP. Gupta agrees, framing the situation as an adaptation to geopolitical competition rather than a recession story.
- 12:25 – 15:13
Electoral Systems and Political Outcomes
Zani explains how different electoral systems translate vote shares into power differently, noting that proportional systems in Germany and Spain dilute extremist influence, while France's two-round system can produce significant political discontinuity even with low vote shares.
- 15:13 – 20:28
French Political Scenarios and Market Implications
Zani outlines three scenarios for France: a presidential majority, cohabitation, or continued fragmentation, with the latter being the current base case. He emphasizes that fragmentation constrains both radical policies and fiscal consolidation, creating uncertainty that markets are pricing via a risk premium.
- 20:28 – 22:18
ECB Role and Lagarde's Departure
Zani asserts the ECB has robust tools to manage stress and that the institution is more important than the person, though Lagarde's departure in 2027 is noted. He suggests contagion to Italy or Spain would be limited and that the ECB can act to prevent systemic dysfunction.
- 22:18 – 30:14
Rates Markets and OAT-Bund Spreads
Strategist Arby Ashani discusses how French bond underperformance has affected German bonds and derivatives. He predicts 10-year OAT-Bund spreads will remain elevated and volatile in 2027, tightening only gradually as political risk is assessed, with the ECB's response to fiscal risks being a key variable.
Claims worth verifying
Giovanni Zani claims the shift towards nationalist parties is driven by economic insecurity, migration, distrust of established parties, and social media propaganda, rather than a universal swing to extremes.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:09
How to verify: Primary source: Giovanni Zani's public statements or NetWest Markets research reports from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against election results and polling data from European countries during this period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Zani states that the German AfD remains constrained by other parties' unwillingness to form coalitions and the proportional political system, with the next federal election due in 2029.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:02
How to verify: Primary source: German federal election schedule (officially scheduled for 2026, but Zani cites 2026 as the next *due* election in the context of the transcript's timeline or potential extension); verify against German Basic Law and coalition formation records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Zani asserts that far-right parties in the European Parliament sit in different groups and have fundamentally different views on Ukraine, the Euro, and EU borrowing.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:43
How to verify: Primary source: European Parliament group affiliations and voting records from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against party manifestos of identified far-right parties. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Zani claims that explicit EU exit agendas have disappeared because voters do not support them after Brexit, and support for the Euro is at historical high levels.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·5:13
How to verify: Primary source: Eurobarometer polls on EU and Euro support from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against public opinion surveys and referendum outcomes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Zani argues that nationalist governments have a greater capacity to block new innovations than to undo existing European integration measures.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:26
How to verify: Primary source: EU legislative records and voting patterns on new initiatives vs. existing treaties from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against political science analyses of EU decision-making. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Esther Gupta states that Europe is entering a period requiring significant changes in competitiveness, supply chain resilience, and energy security, making decision-making speed valuable.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:08
How to verify: Primary source: Esther Gupta's public statements or NetWest Markets research reports from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against EU policy documents on competitiveness and energy security. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Zani expects a more transactional and intergovernmental Europe rather than a federal one, noting that blocking has costs and retaliation risks.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·10:24
How to verify: Primary source: Giovanni Zani's public statements or NetWest Markets research reports from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against EU institutional reform proposals and political rhetoric. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Zani explains that proportional electoral systems help integrate and dilute extremist messages, whereas France's two-round system can give full majority to a party with less than 25% of the vote.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·12:45
How to verify: Primary source: Electoral law texts for Germany, Spain, and France; verify against historical election results and seat allocation data from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Arby Ashani states that French bonds have significantly underperformed in 2026 due to priced-in election risk, affecting German bonds and derivatives.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·22:25
How to verify: Primary source: Bond yield data for French OATs and German Bunds from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against market reports and derivative pricing data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ashani predicts 10-year OAT-Bund spreads will remain elevated and volatile in 2027, tightening only gradually as political risk is assessed.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·25:34
How to verify: Primary source: Arby Ashani's public statements or NetWest Markets research reports from 2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19; verify against historical spread volatility and market forecasts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Eurozone public opinion polls on EU membership and Euro support (e.g., Eurobarometer).
- Check German coalition formation rules and AfD's current polling numbers relative to 2029 election timeline.
- Review ECB's balance sheet tools and historical intervention precedents for peripheral bond spreads.
- Analyze 10-year OAT-Bund spread historical volatility and current levels against political event calendars.
- Assess EU budget unanimity rules and recent sanctions voting records for blocking minority potential.
- Examine French electoral system mechanics and recent election results for majority thresholds.
- Monitor German fiscal expansion plans and defense/AI investment commitments in official budget documents.
- Check ECB leadership transition timeline and Lagarde's departure date relative to 2027 market expectations.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Imogen Bachra: Hello, I'm Imogen Backra, and welcome to our special Year Ahead podcast series from NetWest Markets. Across this series, I'll be joined by colleagues from our strategy team to explore some of the big themes we think will shape markets in the year ahead. In today's episode, we're focusing on Europe's electoral supercycle. Is this going to lead to breakdown, gridlock, or just more of the same for the EU? And how much is this going to drive markets in 2027?
0:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
0:25Imogen Bachra: joined by our chief euro area economist, Giovanni Zani, European economist Esther Gupta, and our European rate strategist Arby Ashani to discuss all of that and more. So let's get into that. Okay, Gio, I'm gonna start with you and and let's just kind of set the political scene, seen, I guess, in Europe. I think it's well understood by now that this year we've seen a rise. in popularity both on the far right, but also in some cases on the far left in Europe. Why is that? And is this a universal story that we're seeing all across Europe?
1:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay. Um I wouldn't describe this as a as a kind of universal swing to the extremes. There
1:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
1:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): certainly a a durable shift towards um national nationalist parties in parts of Europe, driven by a mixture of economic insecurity, migration,
1:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
1:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): distrust of established parties, and also increasingly dissatisfactions that persist even when the economic cycle is improving. So that's probably driven by social media and propaganda too. But I would say that the picture in Europe is actually very uh it's hetogeneous. Um, you have Itzadi, for example, that has already gone through all the possible political permutation with you know governments of all colors of all sorts. Uh then you have Germany with h IFD uh a concern, but
2:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh I
2:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): IFD remains constrained by the other parties' unwillingness to forge coalitions, by the fact that no German proportional political system avoids some kind of concentration of power most of the time and the fact also that basically elections are only due in 2029. Um Spain looks more like a a a centre-right center right shift. Uh if the polls are right, we will see uh at the end of this month. With the far right Vox uh potentially involved, but you know, as a as a junior partner in government. France is right now the the genuinely potentially more disruptive case, and we'll discuss that later. But I would say that there will there have been surprises also on the other side, for example, with Hungary early this year, with Serbia recently. So I would say that less than a homogeneous black wave, we m are talking of a persistent fragmentation of the old established political parties.
3:11Imogen Bachra: Yeah, we'll we'll come back onto France, but both it's from a kind of political perspective. but also also the markets angle later. But staying first on kind of Europe as a whole, I guess. You know, you talk about this not being a homogeneous wave of of European far right, but how similar would you say the the far right across countries are? And where do the most important differences lie that might have implications for the future of the EU and the policy making, etc.
3:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, it's interesting because it's not only the fact that the the black wave is not homogeneous, but I would say that also within the far right uh parties, I mean this label actually has very different uh ramifications. For example, there are three different far right parties in the European Parliament. They sit in in different places and they have quite different views, uh fundamentally different views on Ukraine,
4:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
4:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on the Euro, on
4:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
4:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know common EU borrowing and on how aggressively they uh they want to challenge the uh the EU institutions.
4:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um you know some
4:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): want to reform Europe, others just weaken Brussels to reclaim some uh national control. And there is still a very small, I would say, by now, group that is properly a Euroskeptic or even outright anti uh EU. They they do not automatically translate into a coherent, let's say, uh European blocking coalition.
4:50Imogen Bachra: If these parties do continue to gain influence despite them not forming a kind of coherent bloc, what does that actually mean for the future direction of the EU? You know, are we talking about opposition to the EU or the institutions, or are we just talking about attempts to reshape shape particular aspects of the EU framework from within?
5:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that the the narrative is
5:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
5:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): increasingly moving to reshaping it from within. Uh although it's not always for a real uh belief but it's you know for for political calculation because if you think about the the old uh EU exit kind of agenda, that's that's completely gone. Also because the voters are not supporting the idea anymore. You know, after having seen Brexit and and I think that you know that there is a general awareness that uh Europe as a whole is the only uh credible level to deal with you know Russia, China, uh the US. So we we're we're in this kind of new world. And so the support for the Euro and for the EU has actually uh uh increased and it's at historical high levels. So making the explicit uh exit politics uh a much uh harder sell for the electorate. So um yeah the agenda is more about trying to return some powers to national capitals, Of uh resisting further common
6:23borrowing and integration in some cases,
6:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
6:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in France is asserting national preference. So all this can of course slow EU progress, and that's that's an issue. But it's uh I would say it's much harder to dismantle what already exists, basically.
6:41Imogen Bachra: With that in mind then, which EU policies do you see as most vulnerable to growing nationalist influence? And do Joe, you you answer the first, but then Asta, I'm interested in in hearing your view as well.
6:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean there are a lot of policies, but I would say that for a lot of policies you need unanimity or at least a a broad consensus. Uh and that's where of course policies can be most vulnerable. So for example the the multi-year EU budget that it's been discussed right now, it should be voted by the end of next year. but it seems that the uh European Council is trying to finalize the deal as soon as possible because of French elections, etc. Um, decision on new EU resources or you know common financing, uh sanction to uh Ukraine,
7:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
7:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): foreign policy, treaty change. I mean these are these are the the LM. elements that are clearly most uh vulnerable to uh a blocking uh minority of countries. So nationalist governments are much greater capacity to block innovations rather than undo what Europe has already done.
7:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
7:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): completely I think agree with Gio here, but I think the only thing I'd add here is that the timing matters because um Europe is entering a period where it needs to make pretty significant changes
8:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
8:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): decisions around competitiveness, supply chain resilience, and energy security. And of course, a blocking minority doesn't necessarily reverse existing policies, but of course it can slow slowdown down in new initiatives. And in the world that we are operating, which is a lot more uncertain. the speed of decision making becomes increasingly valuable.
8:31Imogen Bachra: I guess that begs the question then. Does this change your European growth outlet for twenty twenty seven and beyond?
8:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, the aggregate level not not dramatically so. I mean uh two thousand and twenty seven uh growth drivers will be fiscal expansion in Germany, what happens to energy prices? and the execution of the planned investment programs everywhere in Europe about defence, about AI, etc.
9:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
9:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah, politics matters uh more for the for the medium term. And
9:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
9:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know what Asta has just said is completely right. I mean the risk uh is to Europe's potential growth and of the decision capacity of growing in the future for the uh reforms that may not affect immediately 2027 and you know there's no issue of these political events driving recession or or similar things. Yeah, it's more a question for the medium minimum term, I'd say.
9:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And I agree with you that this isn't really a decision. recession story. I think more of this like an adaptation story. Because Europe is trying to adjust uh to a world of greater geopolitical competition, notably from China, higher defence spending and more resilient supply chains. And of course the political fragmentation um doesn't necessarily stop these adjustments, but as I said, it can make them a lot more slower. which is why, as Rio mentioned, the implications are probably more about potential growth than about 2027 GDP growth numbers.
10:11Imogen Bachra: Okay. That that makes sense. What about though if we think of the implication of nationalist parties becoming stronger simultaneously across several major countries? Does that matter more?
10:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would expect a more transactional and kind of more intergovernmental Europe instead of a federal one.
10:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So
10:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): more complex decision making but not an outright uh dysfunctional union, let's say. Because of course, you know, you can block, but blocking has a cost. So the countries that veto something important to uh Germany or France, uh then they of course risk retaliation. when they need agreement on their own priorities. And this is actually happening right now on Ukraine funding. The other thing to say is that yeah, it it is a problem for Europe in this kind of highly changing phase with new technology, with with new models uh for for the the economy and for the industrial production system. setting. But I would say that uh even if the EU wide agreement fails, there are ways to deal through bilateral arrangement, through the coalition of the willing uh uh or what's uh in the EU treaty is called an ends cooperation. And So if you think about the euro for example, the currency, it was uh it was created by a subset of
11:39of countries, not everybody wanted to go ahead, as we know, and and still not everybody is on board, but still the Euro uh is there. I would say that obstruction of new EU measures would not automatically stop uh uh everything. And that's again true for Ukraine uh funding as well as it is true for major decisions. For example, on defense. this coalition of the wheeling uh doesn't include some of the EU countries, but then uh you have UK and Canada and other non EU nations on board. So I would say more frictions, more bargaining, uh less integration at the margin, but not a complete situation of block or or breakup.
12:25Imogen Bachra: Okay. How much of this story is just about the differences in electoral systems? Imagining a scenario where you had the same level of support for nationalist parties across France, across Germany, Italy and Spain, could it be that those systems would translate into political power in in very different ways?
12:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
12:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's it's very important. I mean the same twenty five or thirty percent vote share for a uh uh you know for extremist parties uh can produce uh uh radically different political outcomes depending on the political systems and the system that seems to cope better in a sense are those that that have a propor proportional uh rule because that's a way in a sense to compose pose these differences and to kind of integrate and dilute what is the most extremist message. For example it's very difficult for AFD to uh you know translate its role into into federal power. And and for Spain we
13:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
13:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can see box supporting
13:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
13:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and and having some bargaining power within a coalition with the the centre right party, the Partido Popular uh but you know it will be like an influence rather than imposing a uh extremist view. Um and it's for example has already demonstrated that you know coalition constraints how you can deal and how
13:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
13:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): moderate in
13:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
13:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a certain sense once you're once you're in government with with such a coalition. France's situation is a bit different because uh of the two round presidential election, a two round system overall that basically can give uh the full majority in the end to a party that has uh like twenty five or even less percent. And so it can produce uh a significant political discontinuity continuity
14:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
14:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the in the UK as well I guess. Um but in in France um it will be especially the case if we end up with this far right versus far left candidate, which is right now what the polls are saying. The other thing for France, it's a bit more complex, is that the presidency does not automatically translate into uh policy power because uh a new president would still need a workable parliamentary majority.
14:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
14:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which by the way looks very difficult to secure at this time round. And right now, for example, the parliament is is very fragmented. Um
15:00Imogen Bachra: When we think about the months ahead, you know, into the first half of twenty twenty seven, is there a plausible route to a stable governing majority in France, or should we expect this political fragmentation to continue?
15:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think there there is still uh a possible route, but I also think that it's too early to say. I mean new candidates are expected uh in the coming weeks. We just had uh the French uh charismatic uh judo champion announcing his running. So
15:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
15:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know that there is a route to a stable government, but right now I would not make it the the base case scenario. There are basically three possibilities, you know, combining the presidential uh winner with the majority in parliament.
15:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
15:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the first one is that we have a presidential majority also in parliament, and will uh mean that it will be easier to implement policies.
15:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
15:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but you know, who knows
16:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
16:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what these policies will be. The second one is cohabitation, where the president is,
16:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
16:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a sense, less important than the Prime Minister because the Parliament is the most important one in terms of policy. And that will drive policies and fiscal developments. And the other third solution is the uh continuation of the fragmentation.
16:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
16:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with no clearer policy framework. So I would say that the interesting point for markets
16:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
16:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that uh fragmentation cuts both ways. In a sense, it it constrains the more radical policies, uh which is reassuring to some extent, but it also constrains the uh fiscal consolidation because there will would be uncertainty and inability to act. act. So I would say France has this this political problem that is more important than the economic or the fiscal problem. And so the capacity to stabilise the debt trajectory will be key and the the fragmentation assumption that is the one that we should have now is something that
17:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
17:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not reassuring market and that's why you have the premium today. But we have still six months, and frankly, anything can happen.
17:20Imogen Bachra: Yeah. Six months always feels like a long time, but particularly in these markets, feels like an exceptionally long time. And as you say, anything could happen. So thinking about next year in France, we have the presidential election, as you've talked about, we have the legislative election, but also potentially a constitutional reference. referendum. So three key votes. Which matter most next year?
17:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the presidential election gets the headlines, uh, and I would certainly expect
17:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
17:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know market volatility if we end up with a Le Pen-Mélenchon Mélenchon uh duo. But I guess that for Marquez, uh I would almost treat the presidential election and and the likely successive legislative election as a as a two stage event. It's just one event in two parts. So the presidency tells you the intended direction of policy and and the the leadership. But as I said, the Parliament is what really matters in terms of being able to implement the program. So we will need to see what is the majority in parliament to know what would be French policy, French attitude towards fiscal development. A president with a majority has a far greater greater capacity to put in place the radical policies, but the uh co-habitation or the fragmentation. fragmented assembly uh imposes uh constraints or even a totally different set of policies and maybe some confusion that the
18:59markets will have to assess at a later stage. So in that sense the presidential election will not be the uh end of the story. I guess that the uncertainty
19:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
19:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in most cases, we'll see, but in most cases will continue. towards uh the the second half of of next year. You mentioned uh the referendum. Yes, both Le Pen and Mélenchon uh are looking for a constitutional referendum to put in place basically their uh reforms because otherwise they're not compatible with the constitution, they're not compatible with uh the EU law. uh framework. So uh if that happens, it will be very difficult to uh put through a referendum because you you need supermajorities, etc. etc. But the shock or initial event coming from the presidency vote will then be followed likely by the parliamentary one and then you will have the a third round. So it's gonna be a a long story.
20:03Imogen Bachra: Lots to look forward to next year, then.
20:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
20:08Imogen Bachra: guess from a markets perspective, the other theme that we've been grappling with a lot when it comes to France, particularly this year, is the role of the ECB. You know, what stabilizing role can it play? And I guess importantly, we're recording this just after it has been confirmed, although it was well telegraphed before. that Lagarde will be stepping down in twenty twenty seven. So does her departure as the president of the ECB change the role that the ECB might be able to play to you?
20:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean first on the on the ECB role in uh
20:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
20:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an episode of of market stress, let's say. I think that the ECB has a very important role to play. I think that it also has the the tools, uh, much more than in the previous you know, financial crisis, sovereign crisis in Europe. I would say that it's not gonna be a a just a France specific shock, clearly, because of the size of France, but to become a really systemic, you know, concern about Euro area, uh complete uh Mayhem, etcetera, I think that's that's less the case. Um and I think that contagion to, for example, Italy or Spain uh will be there to some extent but will not be uh indiscriminate and that DCB can act to uh deal with that. By the way, not just with the TPI, there's this a much broader set of instruments, but that will be another discussion. Um
21:43Lagarde. Um, I think that the institution is more important than the person, especially a DCB, given the structure, given the fact that it's uh representing uh a still uh not completely formed foreign uh union. I actually think that Lagarde could matter more for French politics in some shape or form. Although of course I don't know what could be uh her role at this stage.
22:11Imogen Bachra: Okay, let's move on to the market side of things then and Arbius I want to bring you in here. How relevant is all of this going to be as a theme for rates markets in twenty twenty seven do you think?
22:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah the uh electoral cycle will matter for uh rates markets uh next year with uh France being the main test. Um French bonds have uh significantly underperformed this year as uh investors have priced in a large OAT uh risk premium ahead of next year's eventual election. This premium has, you know, affected other government bond markets. Uh German bonds um have outperformed as a French French risks have increased, whilst Belgium, Italy and Spain have seen some selling pressures as well when French risks have increased. It has also affected derivatives markets with a richer German bond top spreads and a higher European rate volatility. Um So I think how this uh risk premium uh evolves next year will matter for markets through two different channels. Uh the first is that the uh election will test whether uh political and fiscal risks can remain uh drivers of uh government bond yields, um, especially at the long end of the curve. Um, high inflation, strong growth and elevated bond supply have pushed uh a global bond
23:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
23:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): town premium premia higher in in in uh recent years. Um and the markets have pushed town premia higher uh especially for French bonds this year given elevated French uh fiscal uh risks. Second, um it will test how the E T B responds should uh French fiscal risks uh increase. I mean um E T B has tools to uh address market dysfunction.
23:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
24:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): either at the front end should monetary policy uh become non-uniform or at the back end
24:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
24:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): should country spreads uh experience contagion. Higher likelihood of these tools being deployed uh would certainly move uh European rates. The election, branch election could tell us where the uh ECB uh draws a line uh between uh solvent risk uh repricing uh and fragmentation that uh warrants uh intervention.
24:27Imogen Bachra: Again, let's bring this discussion back to France. I guess that's been the major theme in in recent weeks and we expect that to continue to be the kind of focus of European political risk as geo has run through in twenty twenty seven. So do you expect that to be the major theme for markets as well, um, into the elections next year?
24:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, uh risk uh premiums um typically fades uh into political events. as uncertainty narrows, but our France is likely to be different uh next year. The uh presidential election may not resolve the uh uncertainty and as markets will need to assess whether the new president can secure
25:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
25:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a workable uh parliamentary majority and govern uh effectively. Um so I think this can keep French risk elevated into and after the um election next year.
25:15Imogen Bachra: What does that risk look like then in terms of OAT bond spreads? And well, let's just think about 10-year uh French Germany bond spreads. Earlier this year we were talking about 90 to 100 basis points kind of being an extreme uh version of risk premium being priced. But is that the new normal? Is that kind of where we settle next year, do you think?
25:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So I think that the um 10-year ten year um OAT bund uh spread. is going to remain uh elevated um and volatile. Um fundamentally it's hard to argue for a significantly wider spread given that fundamentals for France are not um particularly bad.
25:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
25:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they have a fiscal deficit problem, but the debt uh interest costs, as the IMF has noted, uh mean that higher uh long end rates uh really only affect new debt uh issuance. So I think the case uh for next year is that the uh spread will tighten, but uh only uh gradually throughout the year and it'll be volatile. So we look for a tighter spread, passage of political risk uh should compress that. Uh if there is higher likelihood of more moderate fiscal policies eventually being realized, that could help. compress the spread, but be expected to stay fairly volatile throughout the year and only compress gradually.
26:32Imogen Bachra: Thinking about that volatility then and the risk that presents to the broader European rates complex, is is there a risk that this uh focus in France spreads to other countries where, particularly, I guess, those countries where, you know, parties on the left or the right are gaining ground? I mean, so far. to a certain extent, the kind of contagion risk has been relatively well contained in twenty twenty six, but do you see that changing in twenty twenty seven?
27:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yep, I think markets could actually focus on uh Germany, uh, where there is strong support for the uh AFD. Uh regional elections in Germany uh take place around the French uh presidential election
27:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
27:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and that could bring uh French fiscal policy into German political debate, uh, especially given Chancellor Mertz's uh weak popularity. If the next French president uh pursues a loose fiscal policy and catches with Brussels, uh any German uh opposition could harden uh towards potential ECB uh support. So if you get a tougher German stance, uh it may make uh ECB supports more politically difficult and it could uh drive markets through high volatility and through
27:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
27:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): bunds um outperforming versus OETs, but this is still more of a risk case, uh I would say.
27:52Imogen Bachra: I think maybe just to complete the kind of markets discussion as well, just a few comments from my side on FX, because I think that kind of renewed political, fiscal risk contagion, however we want to think about it, is one of the most important tail risks for the Euro as as we enter 2027. But it isn't the only one. I guess energy remains Europe's clearest structural asymmetric vulnerability. We've also got China's transformation from an export destination to industrial competitor, adding another structural challenge. But when we think about the outlook for the euro, it's probably important to consider that there's a difference between identifying vulnerabilities and identifying reasons for further depreciation. It feels like the bar for sustained weakness in the Euro is now higher because many of these vulnerabilities are already well understood and increasingly reflected in the price. You know, we've seen um sustained weakness over the last couple. of weeks or months really, um, as we've seen this political risk being priced more clearly in France. For the year ahead, I think that leaves us with quite a nuanced view for the Euro. We're looking at Euro dollar at 118 by end 2027, but a lot of that is about a weaker dollar and then a diversification away from dollar assets rather than, you know,
29:11particularly compelling Euro area fundamentals. But it remains that there's not significant drivers of further depreciation on the Euro side because a lot of that is already priced. That said, against high carry EN and commodity currencies, we think the Euro is likely to find a considerably tougher going next year. Okay. That's all for this episode of our year ahead series. It sounds like there's plenty to consider in terms of EU's electoral super cycle next year, but perhaps it's not the kind of breakdown of the EU that the market may worry about. That said, uh I think France remains the clearest political risk as we enter 2027 and could be the key driver, particularly in the first half of the year, of both European rates uh but also FX. Uh Thank you all for joining me. Thank you to our listeners for listening in. I'm Imogen Bakra and we'll be back with another conversation exploring the key themes likely to matter in the year ahead soon.