Bondcast - The Rates Podcast

Guests discuss fiscal policy's growing impact on markets and the shift to fiscal prominence in 2027

33 min Listen to the original
Fiscal PolicyGovernment BondsMacroeconomicsFXPublic DebtInterest Rates

Summary

Giovanni Zani and Paul Robson analyze how legacy shocks, structural spending, and higher refinancing rates are driving deficits. Zani argues that debt-to-GDP is an insufficient metric, advocating for analysis of primary balances, maturity, and political capacity. He distinguishes the current environment as 'fiscal prominence' rather than dominance, noting central banks still prioritize price stability. Paul Robson adds that fiscal policy increasingly drives FX via risk premiums, highlighting resilience in Nordic and Swiss markets. The hosts warn of UK fiscal risks and discuss how AI investment creates a transition phase requiring fiscal containment.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Ranking countries solely on debt-to-GDP is the wrong approach; investors should instead analyze primary balances, interest costs, debt maturity, external balances, political capacity, and the broader wealth of nations.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 3:20

  2. 2
    The problem is the direction of travel and also this kind of fact that persistent uh large deficits are difficult to deal with when you have a political fragmented situation, and so the credibility of the fiscal adjustment uh to be is is not very clear, is not seen. So that that's the the main issue for France.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 4:23

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 3:00

    Introduction and Fiscal Drivers

    Imogen Bachra introduces the topic of fiscal policy's growing impact on markets, joined by Giovanni Zani and Paul Robson. Zani identifies three forces driving higher deficits: legacy shocks, new structural spending (defense, energy, tech), and refinancing at higher rates.

  2. 3:00 – 6:55

    Country-Specific Fiscal Health

    Zani argues against using debt-to-GDP alone, emphasizing primary balances, maturity, and political capacity. He highlights France's political fragmentation as a key risk, while noting the US has offsetting strengths like reserve currency status and deep markets.

  3. 6:55 – 13:52

    Fiscal Solutions and AI Impact

    Zani discusses the difficulty of spending cuts due to political protection of new sectors. He notes AI offers a productivity boost but requires upfront investment, creating a transition phase where costs precede benefits, necessitating fiscal containment.

  4. 13:52 – 16:29

    National Wealth as a Buffer

    Zani suggests assessing the asset side of the balance sheet, noting national wealth has grown faster than public debt. He proposes mobilizing private wealth through retail bonds or productive investment to support fiscal resilience.

  5. 16:29 – 17:50

    Fiscal Prominence vs. Dominance

    Zani characterizes the current environment as 'fiscal prominence' rather than dominance, as central banks maintain price stability mandates despite high deficits. He cites US deficits at 8.5% of GDP and France at 5% as key drivers.

  6. 17:50 – 24:49

    FX Implications and Currency Performance

    Paul Robson explains that fiscal policy increasingly drives FX via risk premiums and portfolio flows. He notes the UK's resilience despite yield spikes, attributing it to cross-market performance, while highlighting strong fiscal positions in Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

  7. 24:49 – 29:58

    Rates Outlook and Curve Dynamics

    Bachra argues fiscal risks support a 'new normal' of higher yields in 2027. She discusses 'Operation Twist' strategies to shorten debt maturity, noting the UK has less room to maneuver than the US or Euro area due to its already short weighted average maturity.

  8. 29:58 – 33:22

    UK Fiscal Risks and US Inflation

    Bachra warns of potential UK fiscal risk migration, citing high debt servicing costs and upcoming fiscal events. She contrasts this with the US, where higher yields are driven more by monetary policy tolerating inflation than solely fiscal factors.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
US dollarUSDcurrencyneutralchallenges the the dollar resilience that we've seen over the last eighteen months. The dollar has been um stronger than we expected.
Canadian dollarCADcurrencyneutralSo Australia, CAD, New Zealand, but it seems front and centre for the Euro sterling and the dollar.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Debt and deficit dynamics are reaching new highs in a non-war, non-epidemic period.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:15

How to verify: Check IMF World Economic Outlook or national treasury data for debt-to-GDP and deficit trends for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

France's primary fiscal concern is political fragmentation undermining credible adjustment, not debt level or external balance.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·4:03

How to verify: Review French government budget proposals and political coalition stability reports from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US has a larger deficit and shorter maturity than France, but is offset by reserve currency status and deep markets.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·4:59

How to verify: Compare US Treasury maturity distribution and deficit data against French data via Treasury.gov and Bercy.fr. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

AI investment requires upfront costs that increase borrowing needs before productivity benefits materialize.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·11:30

How to verify: Review OECD or IMF studies on AI investment cycles and productivity lag effects (e.g., OECD AI Policy Observatory). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

US deficit is 8.5% of GDP and France's is 5%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·16:51

How to verify: Check IMF WEO October 2026 or national finance ministry reports for 2026 deficit figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The UK's longs bucket makes up only 6% of issuance, down from one-third.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:18

How to verify: Check UK Debt Management Office (DMO) refunding announcements and issuance data for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US Treasury did not announce stopping issuance of 20-year or 30-year debt in the recent refunding announcement.

Imogen Bachra ·28:43

How to verify: Review US Treasury Refunding Announcement for the relevant period (late 2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The UK is borrowing more today to fund interest costs than France and the US.

Imogen Bachra ·30:58

How to verify: Compare UK DMO, US Treasury, and French BTFM data on net borrowing vs. interest payments for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

France's external balance position is okay.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·4:03

How to verify: Check IMF Balance of Payments data for France for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Spain looks benign or positive after difficult times 10 years ago.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·5:39

How to verify: Review IMF Country Reports for Spain for 2026, comparing current fiscal metrics to 2026 levels. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Review the Draghi report on growth-conscious fiscal adjustment to understand the argument against indiscriminate consolidation.
  • Check primary balance data and debt maturity profiles for France, the US, and the UK from IMF or OECD databases.
  • Verify AI investment expenditure trends and productivity forecasts to assess the 'transition phase' costs versus benefits.
  • Analyze central bank mandates and recent policy statements to confirm the distinction between fiscal prominence and dominance.
  • Review UK debt servicing cost projections and upcoming fiscal events from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).
  • Compare FX performance and risk premiums for Nordic and Swiss currencies against UK and US counterparts.
  • Assess the impact of refinancing at higher rates on sovereign bond supply and yield curves for major economies.
Full transcriptexpand

0:00Imogen Bachra: Hello, I'm Imogen Backra, and welcome to our special Year Ahead podcast series from Network's Markets. Across this series, I'll be joined by colleagues from our strategy team to explore some of the big themes we think will shape markets in the year ahead. Today we're discussing fiscal policy. We're coming out of a year where government spending, taxation, and borrowing have increasingly been important parts of the economic outlook with potentially significant implications for growth, inflation, and interest rates. So, what should we be watching from the major fiscal events ahead? And how could decisions made by governments ultimately feed through to inflation and markets? I'm delighted today to be joined by our chief euro area economist, Giovanni Zani.

0:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hello.

0:39Imogen Bachra: And head of G10 FX Strategy for EMIA Paul Robson to discuss all of this and more. Let's get into it. Okay, let's start with the big picture. At different points this year and to varying degrees, markets have become quite concerned by the fiscal backdrop in some countries. Gio, how and why has that fiscal situation gotten so much worse for some countries recently?

1:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think the markets are and and rightfully so becoming more sensitive on fiscal developments generally. just because we're touching new highs in terms of debt and deficit dynamics in like a non-war, non-epidemic kind of period. And this is driven by three forces. The first one is clearly that governments are carrying the uh legacy of the repeated shocks and a larger deficit of the recent past. The second one is that there are new uh structural commitments, defense, energy resilience, technology, etc. And the third one is that the kind of

1:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you

1:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know, word where rates were low and post uh great financial crisis, well, this word has disappeared, and so the debt issued at very low coupons is now gradually being refinanced. at at higher rates. So we are in a kind of high intensity fiscal context, and and markets react nervously to any innovation that looks like it could derail this kind of fragile fiscal equilibrium that defines the current fiscal sustainability. So of course there are there are ways out, right? Growth expectation may have uh risen with AI. there is some inflation. Uh nations are also much richer. That's that's an important point. But but the frictions and the adjustments, well, all these things might be quite fainful and and markets have basically noticed it.

2:40Imogen Bachra: Yeah, markets have definitely noticed, and of course, currently it feels like they're noticing most of these frictions in France. But maybe we should take a minute. just to compare and contrast some of the important indicators across developed countries. You know, it's obvious to kind of look at the level of debt or the level of deficit in any country and kind of pick that that particular country out as being in a worse fiscal situation than others. But away from France, or even just touching on France as well, where else is flashing warning signs? And actually, where looks a bit more benign, would you say?

3:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): As you said, ranking countries on debt to GDP or just deficits is definitely the wrong approach. You need to look at primary balances, at interest cost, debt maturity, uh external balances, and also things like political capacity, right? And I think also increasingly you have to look at the broader wealth of nations. So the asset side, not just the debt side of the of the equation. Comparing countries, if you look at the Euro area aggregates, it looks actually relatively healthy on all those metrics. But of course, there are a lot of differences within the Euro Eurasia, area, and France is the clearest concern, as you mentioned. Although I again it's not, I mean, debt is high, but you know, it's it's higher, for example, in in the US or in other places. The external balance position of France is okay. Uh, they have a relatively long debt maturity. So that side is not uh uh very special to France.

4:23The problem is the direction of travel and also this kind of fact that persistent uh large deficits are difficult to deal with when you have a political fragmented situation, and so the credibility of the fiscal adjustment uh to be is is not very clear, is not seen. So that that's the the main issue for France. The the US has, for example, debt ratio that is similar to France as has a as has a much larger uh deficit. has a even a twin deficit, also an external current account deficit, and shorter maturity, um substantial financing needs.

5:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh

5:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): but that's offset by other very powerful uh uh elements. Uh so there's the stronger potential growth, the very deep capital markets, and the dollar reserve currency status, as we all know. Uh The UK benefits from longer maturity but has big inflation linked exposure, twin deficit like the US. So I think it creates a very particular and complex interaction between inflation, yields, and the currency.

5:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If

5:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you look at Italy, which has been seen as the highest uh debt uh country for a long time, actually the all these other metrics. uh are relatively more comfortable. Spain looks now you know benign or even positive after having gone through very difficult times 10 years ago. Germany has the greatest fiscal space, and so the question now is uh how much they spent and how successful is their implementation. So I would say that there are very different fragilities. different risk, different position for all these countries. And so that the fiscal uh fault line for 2027 uh isn't simply a question of high debt versus low debt. Uh it's a question of growth with AI, balance sheet buffers, offers political capacity to to deal with the the fiscal constraints. uh basically and that's why France with the political situation in place is one of the key recognizable risks for twenty twenty seven.

6:36Imogen Bachra: Yeah I think we'll we'll return to those kind of country by country differences at at the end of the podcast when we start to think about what this implies for markets both from an FX and a rates perspective in twenty 2027. twenty seven. But first just think thinking about, you know, what solutions some of these governments might have where they are struggling with fiscal discipline. I mean traditionally we would think about spending cuts and and higher taxes as kind of the obvious escape valve if you like. But how workable does that actually feel as a solution as we head had into 2027?

7:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Well I would say that classic fiscal discipline has to be part of the solution,

7:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): has

7:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to be part of the answer. But as we know, it's politically much harder than in previous consolidation cycles just because of the you know the large spending categories now have strong political protection. And actually we need to spend so it's not just a a a a question of fiscal consolidation. it's a question of getting the right element, including growth of the uh debt uh sustainability uh equation. So the composition also of any fiscal adjustment matters. So if you cut productive investment that's that's you know okay we'll we'll will cut your deficit today, but you know weaken growth and the tax uh base of tomorrow And you know, the Draghi report was very clear on that, especially for Europe, but I would say it's very clear also on what the the US and China are doing, in the sense that the the the spending for growth is at this moment in time with this new technology that is you know changing a lot of things is very important. So I would say that

8:23the indiscriminate consolidation is not the right or the only solution and you need a credible growth conscious adjustment.

8:34Imogen Bachra: Let's think about that growth conscious adjustment then, because we obviously have the kind of current backdrop as we enter twenty twenty seven of still high inflation combined with better than expected nominal growth. So could the combination of those two things prove to be the escape valve that some of these governments need?

8:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So I would I would say a qualified yes, in the sense that I w I would try to separate the two. Nominal growth, of course, has to be uh actually the the greatest part of the solution, I think. But inflation alone is not a durable solution. A stronger real growth is is the cleanest route. because, of course, it increases revenues and also the denominator of the of the debt ratio. But of course, I mean growth is also associated with uh higher real rates, and so it's not just a full uh fiscal free lunch if you want. Inflation can initially improve the arithmetic because you know tax revenues tend to rise

9:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): before.

9:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the effective interest rate effect on the on the entire debt stock, but that the latter eventually adjust. And when you had historical episodes like after the Second World War where you had this effect of of inflation eroding uh the debts, it was also accompanied with fiscal risk of repression uh and government borrowing at costs cost uh that were uh prevented to fully adjust to to the inflation side. So that's something that's I I don't see in the current uh global globally integrated capital markets context. Uh and then for example we we mentioned inflation linkers. In the case of the UK, I think it would be much more difficult to use inflation as a way to bring that that down. So nominal growth helps and it helps more when it's about real expansion and and productivity.

10:33Imogen Bachra: I just wanted to re refer back to something that you said kind of in your opening remarks. You know, you talked about the increased spending needs that that we're seeing recently, uh related to a number of different factors. But one of the things you talked about was, you know, this need for higher tech spending. And of course the intersection of private borrowing when it comes to AI and public borrowing in terms of the fiscal backdrop has been a key theme driving markets this year. So how relevant do you think the kind of AI narrative is when we're considering fiscal risks? It's obviously on the one hand you have the potential support to the great outlet. but on the other hand, the kind of debt funded capital expenditure creates an even more challenging environment for sovereigns who are competing for the same finite pool of capital. How do those two things balance out, do you think, in twenty twenty seven?

11:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): As you say, on the positive side, you have stronger productivity that could raise potential growth and then uh help a lot on the R minus G differential that is the the key one for for debt sustainability. And I would say that it's something that you cannot not engage with because it's a it's a global phenomenon. And as you implicitly said, I mean this is also rising interest rates anyway. So that's what was one point in a draggy uh argument recently. He said basically we have anyway uh the higher interest rate impact from AI, from this a big investment drive to squeeze out this productivity story. And if we don't engage with that, if we don't also get the growth side of the story, we will just get the negative of higher interest rate and that will be a problem for our our debt sustainability and in general for our economy. The problem is that many of the cost

12:32of this technology arrive before the benefits in terms of productivity. So, of course, you you have the investment drive that will boost demand, and that's also part of the story. So we need to go through that, and that's that's also a positive element. But then we need to get the productivity. If you listen to the OECD, that has done some studies, or if you look to the CEO of Anthropic, it's an incredible boost to productivity and to growth that is awaiting us. No, the sunny uplines, uh it's gonna be fantastic. I I think that it's definitely something

13:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that

13:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): has to be taken into account. But at the same time we should not fully capitalize on unproven AI dividend too early. I'm sure that AI will eventually improve fiscal sustainability, but this investment required and this transition phase means that we also need the kind of fiscal discipline and and fiscal uh at least uh containment.

13:32Imogen Bachra: Picking up on something else that you referred to kind of in your opening remarks, you know, when we focus on I think particularly through from a markets perspective, when we're focused on fiscal risks or, you know, fiscal sustainability, we are purely thinking about the kind of debt side of the balance sheet. You know, we talk a lot about debt levels, about deficits, about the trajectory of these indicators, etc., et cetera, etc. et cetera. But I guess that totally ignores the asset side of the equation as as you referred to earlier. So, you know, how much should we be factoring that in when we discuss and assess fiscal sustainability? And how does that compare across countries?

14:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Looking at assets, it's not completely new, of course. And some of the taxation is already related to wealth. But the reality is that we concentrate on this increasing increase in debt and the debt ratio to GDP, and and we don't see that on the asset side this ratio has increased much faster and it's much uh higher. So the the wealth of nations is so much higher than this kind of public debt. Then of course you cannot say that the private wealth can match public uh debts debt like in a in a leaner way. Of course, there are many ways actually to mobilize and to use these kind of assets that we have, and that wealth can support fiscal resilience through various channels. Of course, one is to broaden the potential tax base, but you can also use this wealth to provide domestic savings that can better channel uh the um

15:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

15:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): support to the government by you know incentivizing retail bonds like Italy did or Portugal did, or by channeling them into a productive investment that raised future outputs and revenues as well. So the fact that you have so much money in deposits uh that are clearly not focusing in the most advanced and risky and potentially with higher benefits in the context of AI and new technologies, etc. So if we manage to do that, then the capacity of AI to become an element of this fiscal adjustment, of this kind of higher productivity, I think will be increased. increase. So I'm not saying that all this national wealth is the is solution. relative to all the rest, but it's definitely an additional buffer that can be part of the solution as well.

16:09Imogen Bachra: Okay. Finally then, before we move on to markets, you used the term a few minutes ago about fiscal dominance. How would you characterize, I guess, the fiscal backdrop as we head into 2027? twenty twenty seven. As you sort of alluded earlier to the fact that it's perhaps not quite fiscal dominance. So is is fiscal prominence a better way of thinking about it?

16:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. The question has been has been raised quite a lot, I think, in in discussions with clients, etc. I think that for now I I would call it more fiscal prominence rather than fiscal dominance. Because it's true that fiscal policy is much larger than it used to be. The deficit in the US is eight point five percent of uh GDP in China as well, uh five percent in in France. Uh it's it's a key driver of growth. When we're doing estimates, we have to consider fiscal policy. It's important for bond supply, it's important for the term premia, for market differentiation in a way that it wasn't the case before. But that doesn't mean that monetary policy has become subordinate to a fiscal policy. You have true fiscal dominance when the fiscal pressure are so high that central banks are basically under pressure to deviate from their price stability mandate.

17:31Imogen Bachra: Thank you, Gio. Let's switch over then and and just think about the market implications of all of this. Paul, let let's start with FX. I mean, I guess the big question is how do you see this playing out for FX in 2027? We've seen fiscal risks spilling over into FX to to varying degrees this year. You know, we've had some sharp weakening in in the Euro in in recent months as we've seen kind of spread widening in uh French Germany bond spreads. But we had periods earlier this year, for example, where the rates market was very concerned about UK fiscal risks around the time of the May local elections and the crowning of Andy Burnham as as the new prime minister. But that didn't really spill over into FX. You know, we saw actually quite a resilient pound. So how relevant do you see fiscal policy as the driver of FX in 2027, or will it remain quite nuanced as it has been in 2026?

18:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,

18:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think it's um increasingly going to be an important driver of global currency markets. As you say, it's not linear. It's not always the main character in the sort of movie or play. Sometimes it it steps up and it's more dominant, sometimes it it sort of slips back. But currencies as I always maintained, are the most important relative performance. And I think that actually answers a little bit of your question about the guilt performance and how sterling actually held up remarkably well actually. Even for myself, who tends to be a little bit more sort of glass heart half full, even I was surprised that sort of guilt yields go up a 10 ten year uh in a straight line by hundred a basis points and uh Sterling performed relatively well. Obviously it was the cross market that was more important. I think for global currency markets there's a couple of things you can draw out from what Giovanni has just set out. I think he did an excellent job looking at the the various drivers. You mentioned it also global tightening cycle at a time when debt levels are high, growth is weak, and you've got that competition for finite supply of global savings. And it it's where the

19:50portfolio money shifts round to where yields are most uh appropriate. And as the money flows around the world, our currencies will move. And I I think it's just going to be much more central. We don't often lead with fiscal policy in currencies. It tends to be the front end, not sort of long end yields. I think it's increasingly important because it's clearer than ever the sort of haves and have nots, the the good students versus the bad students, the ones that have saved for a rainy day. If you just pick out someone like Norway or Sweden or Switzerland, they've got very strong fiscal positions. And I think that's also a very important point for currencies. It's not always about the ones that are in the worst position. Sometimes we have to think more clearly about the ones that are in a good position, because that gives them an opportunity to loosen policy to help growth at a time when developed economies are facing structural challenges. And that's exactly what we're saying. And and also in terms of defence. They can loosen fiscal policy to increase defence spending without having to make deeper cuts in services that undermines growth as well. And I think that matters as well. As you quite rightly

21:09pointed out in terms of France and in the past the UK, we're seeing increased increasing episodes where the correlation between long end yields goes from positive to negative. And that just gives you confidence that it can be an important driver going forward. Fiscal policy also I think plays to the fiscal risk premium because it's increasingly difficult to see how a number of countries can regain debt sustainability given their political mandates. And with that uncertainty comes a greater risk premium. And the currency is just an easy way and liquid way of articulating that. If you have a complicated portfolio of government bonds, you've got curbs, steep, steepness, all these kinds of trends. trades, front end, short end. Well, if you're worried about the risk premium, you can just sell the currency. And it's liquid and easy. So you do get this immediate impact when sometimes the other asset classes don't move. Before when we're judging

22:19it on currencies, then it is important to think about the the cross-market cross market performance. One way of thinking about it, it's the sort of cleaner shirt in the laundry basket, for example. You know, there there's lots of countries that have similar issues and they come to the fore. And and this year it seems to the light has been shone away from the UK. And I'm sure that that's something that you'll uh talk about in a a few moments. But and that can move backwards and forwards. And it may well be that it it goes on to other currencies as well. But also just one final point. Obviously, some of the biggest debtors who are running the biggest deficits, so the US is a global reserve currency. When we think about the impact of the midterms, you might now get a situation where you get a a more balanced fiscal stimulus in the the US. US exceptionism growth starts to pull back slightly and other countries do a little bit better. Um and it'll be interesting to see whether that's finally challenges the the dollar resilience that we've seen over the last eighteen months. The dollar has been um stronger than we expected. And but without the help of looser fiscal policy, even when you're running such massive deficits, I just find

23:35it very difficult to to square even with a global reserve currency status. Nevertheless, a lower, less powerful stimulus to the US, I think might weaken. For the UK, I think fiscal policy might be one of those slow burners. At some point, either the cross-market performance becomes a greater focus, or that the level of yield gets to a point where people start to worry about the actual level and not the cross-market. cross market. And that is what Giovanni was talking about in terms of growth, long-term growth versus what you're funding your debt at when you've got 100% of GDP. So I think it's gonna be important. Currencies that might do better on fiscal policy, like things like Norway, Sweden, Swiss franc, others probably aren't are going to be so focused. So Australia, CAD, New Zealand, but it seems front and centre for the Euro sterling and the dollar.

24:29Imogen Bachra: Thank you, Paul. I think I would reflect a lot of those points actually in the rate side of the equation as well. So perhaps I don't need to say as much as I was going to, because I think you and Gia covered um really most of the important points. I think when we think about the impact of fiscal risks for rates markets next year, I mean clearly, Paul, you talked about fiscal not always being the kind of key driver of FX, but of course it's it's always as prominent or certainly for the last couple of years has has been one of, if not the most prominent theme frequently driving rates markets. I think for for rates generally, it probably won't surprise anyone, given what you've just heard from both Gio and Paul and our base case heading into 2027, that you know whether we want to describe it as fiscal prominence or even fiscal dominance, but as a theme, fiscal risks are going to support higher yields in 2027. And that's not to say that yields outright need to be significantly higher than current levels. But really, the key takeaway here is that this is a new normal in most cases at this higher level of yields, i.e., it's going to be very difficult to return back to what

25:47we previously considered a kind of normal level, maybe at the end of 2025 and early 2026. And that's not just about fiscal risks, of course. You know, this isn't a theme that's operating in isolation as we enter 2027. There's a lot else going. on in terms of the inflation outlook, central bank reaction functions, etc., etc. All of those things, AI, of course, as well, all of these things we're exploring in more detail in other podcasts. But we don't think that 2026 is particularly exceptional when we think about the outright level of yield. And in fact, um, you know, across the UK, across the US and the Euro area we have higher yield targets you know for guilts for treasuries and for bunds by the end of 2027 than what we have currently I think maybe the the other interesting point when we think about rates markets is it sort of refers back to a lot of what Paul says is about how and where these fiscal risks matter the most. How in the sense of where on the curve this matters? You know, traditionally we would always think about fiscal risks as playing out most obviously, I guess, through a sort of a steeper curve. As we enter 2027, that actually isn't the obvious way of playing these fiscal risks.

27:07It's no longer clear that governments will be looking to fund this across the curve in the way that they have previously. You know, we're seeing lots of discussion at the moment. The UK is already further ahead in this process, but lots of discussion around Operation Twist or however we want to talk about it, but this idea that governments are increasingly going to look to be um shortening the weighted average maturity of their debt and funding more of this at the front end of the curve. Of course, in theory, that sort of in the near term protects the long end from these fiscal risks. But as Geo talked about, this just adds to your near-term refinancing risk. And you might argue in aggregate over a very long time horizon. That just gives you a cyclical risk to your debt profile. And therefore, in in totality, it sort of evens out because you sort of benefit in a falling rate environment and it costs in a higher rate environment. But we are currently in a rising rate environment. And so the risks point to the downside rather than being positive risks of that. There's more scope in some countries to do that than others. I think we're talking about it most prominently in the Euro area. You know, we're looking at what the AFT might do in France, for example, in terms of shrinking the weighted average maturity of their debt.

28:24There was high expectations for what the US Treasury might announce in the refunding announcement just gone in terms of where they might look to issue on the curve. In the end, I would say it disappointed kind of consensus in terms of they didn't make any statements around, you know, not issuing 20-year or 30-year debt anymore. But there's more that that could be done in terms of the buybacks, for example, they could increase the size. of those. They could do a you know bigger maturity transformation that way without cutting off a potential issuance point when there's so much more issuance to be done. The country that I worry about most is the UK, because they have much less space than other countries to be able to do this operation twist, partly because they've they've made a lot of progress already. The longs bucket in the UK makes up such a small percentage. of issuance compared to what it used to. It used to be, you

29:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,

29:18Imogen Bachra: sort of third of the overall issuance basket, and now it's down to just six percent. So the UK has, you know, the positive is that it's been well ahead of its peers in in this process. The negative is that it's kind of running out of road in terms of how much further Whether it can protect that long end of the curve, just as other countries might start getting going. I think the way that we think about how fiscal risks matter in the rates market next year, in terms of how it shapes the curve, is going to be different to how we've considered them previously. And then to Paul's point, you know, there's a big question about where is this going to matter the most? You know, we see obvious concerns at the moment in France, we see obvious concerns in the US, and we see really quite a lack of fiscal premium being priced in the UK. It's certainly to steal Paul's phrase being seen as the cleanest shirt in the laundry basket, which is a real narrative shift for the UK. To steal another one of Paul's phrases, we've gone from being a real fiscal problem child to now seemingly a fiscal poster child. I don't think that's necessarily the right assessment. I think that fiscal risks remain very elevated in the UK to what Giovanni was saying earlier about it being more than just looking at, you know, the level of debt and the level of deficit. Of course, on

30:38those metrics, the UK looks slightly more favourable than somewhere like the US and France. But its debt servicing costs remain quite concerning, especially at this outright level of yield. You know, the UK is borrowing more. today essentially to to fund its interest costs, which is, I think, a bit more worrying than the kind of state of play of interest costs in France and in the US. So I think there could be pockets of time next year where fiscal risks migrate back to the UK, away from France, away from the US. And that could drive some cross cross-market market underperformance of the UK. Not necessarily overall outright. You know, if you look at our yield forecast across the US and compare that to the UK, for example, by the end of the year, we see US Treasury yields rising further. But I think when there could be episodes of fiscal risks rising in the UK, when we see things like potentially around the 10-year growth plan being published, uh potentially around the Milburn review, which is looking at youth unemployment, potentially around the next. fiscal event in the spring. You know, all of these events that might point to the need for more investment funded by more borrowing to improve the growth outlook in the UK, that could bring back a return of fiscal risk premium. Like I say, in the U US, we do have higher yield and steeper Deeper curve

31:57targets for the end of the year, but that goes beyond just our fiscal risk. views. A lot of that is about the monetary policy view, this idea that the Fed will kind of implicitly tolerate a higher inflation target to protect the growth side of their mandate. That will allow a significant amount of inflation premia

32:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to

32:18Imogen Bachra: be built back into the curve. So the fiscal risk story in the US, I would say, isn't the main driver of why we see higher yields in and steeper curves, but it certainly plays into this view that we are just in an environment of a new normal. And these higher yields that we've gotten used to in 2026 are here to stay in 2027. And of course, those higher yields have knock on effects negatively from a fiscal perspective when we think about those debt servicing costs. Okay, let's end things there. I think if there's one thing to take away from today's podcast, it's that fiscal policy cannot be viewed in isolation. We have decisions on tax, spending, and borrowing that all have the potential to shape the path for growth and inflation and in turn influence the choices facing central banks and financial markets in 2027. Thank you for listening. Thank you to Geo and Paul for joining me. I'm Imogen Backra and we'll be back with another conversation. exploring the themes likely to matter in the year ahead.

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