Democratic midterm gains, BOE hawkish pivot, and UK fiscal risks dominate rates discussion
Summary
Speakers analyze how Democratic midterm wins may slow AI build-out via state-level regulation while gridlock prevents major fiscal stimulus. They detail the Bank of England's hawkish 25bps rate hike and 5% peak rate implication, contrasting it with market mispricing. The discussion shifts to UK fiscal risks, noting the recent budget failed to alleviate gilt concerns, with potential catalysts including a general election and upcoming reviews.
Episode sections
- 0:09 – 5:03
US Midterm Election Results and AI Regulation
Discussion on Democratic sweep, gridlock, and state-level AI regulation risks impacting tech stocks.
- 5:03 – 10:27
Middle East War and Energy Prices
Analysis of election impact on Middle East escalation risk, energy prices, and fixed income rally.
- 10:27 – 13:34
Fiscal Policy and Gridlock
Davidfield argues gridlock prevents stimulus but not consolidation, leading to increased spending on priorities.
- 13:34 – 17:32
2028 Presidential Election Outlook
Caution on midterms as predictors; note of potential Democratic Senate majority in 2028.
- 17:32 – 30:18
Bank of England Rate Decision and Hawkish Pivot
Backgrade details BOE 25bps hike, 8-1 vote, and 5% peak rate implication; Bailey on Middle East peace.
- 30:18 – 32:36
Client Sentiment and UK Market Pricing
Davidfield reports shift in client sentiment; Backgrade notes potential mispricing of flat UK rate profile.
- 32:36 – 34:53
Post-Budget Fiscal Assessment
Discussion on UK budget's 98 measures failing to move markets; elevated debt servicing costs.
- 34:53 – 35:42
Upcoming Fiscal Catalysts
Identification of Milburn review, Burnham's plan, and spring budget as potential repricing events.
- 35:42 – 37:18
General Election Probability
Speaker estimates 10-15% chance of UK general election next year, contrasting with betting markets.
Claims worth verifying
Democrats won decisively in the midterms, flipping many governor seats and winning across the board.
Unidentified speaker ·1:56
How to verify: Check official US midterm election results for governor races and congressional seats from November 2026.
President Trump has significant veto power, creating gridlock that limits federal AI regulation.
Unidentified speaker ·2:27
How to verify: Review US Constitution Article I Section 7 regarding presidential veto powers and current congressional composition.
Several Democratic governors campaigned on slowing AI build-out or imposing moratoria on data centers.
Unidentified speaker ·3:00
How to verify: Review campaign platforms and policy statements of Democratic gubernatorial candidates in key states from the 2026 election cycle.
The BOE voted 8-1 to raise rates by 25 basis points, with all nine members voting for a hike.
Unidentified speaker ·18:23
How to verify: Check the Bank of England Monetary Policy Report and meeting minutes for November 2026.
The BOE's scenarios imply a peak policy rate of 5%.
Unidentified speaker ·22:26
How to verify: Analyze the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Report published in November 2026, specifically the optimal policy projections.
In September, BOE Chief Economist Hugh Pill expressed skepticism about the need for the 100bps tightening the market was pricing in.
Unidentified speaker ·22:53
How to verify: Search for transcripts or news reports of Hugh Pill's comments at the IMF in Bangkok in mid-October 2026.
BOE Governor Bailey stated in September that an end to the Middle East war was required to get rate cuts back on the table.
Unidentified speaker ·26:13
How to verify: Review transcripts of Governor Bailey's press conference in September 2026.
Obama won re-election in 2012 after Democrats lost heavily in the 2010 midterms.
Unidentified speaker ·14:26
How to verify: Check historical US presidential and midterm election results.
Trump almost won re-election in 2020 after Republicans lost heavily in the 2018 midterms.
Unidentified speaker ·14:34
How to verify: Check historical US presidential and midterm election results.
Democrats could hold 54-56 Senate seats in 2028 based on current allocations and the 2028 Senate map.
Unidentified speaker ·15:50
How to verify: Review the current US Senate composition and the 2028 Senate election schedule/map.
The UK budget contained 98 policy measures.
Speaker 1 ·33:02
How to verify: Check the official UK government budget document or press release from the Chancellor of the Exchequer released around the time of the podcast (Nov 2026).
The speaker revised their target for 10-year UK gilts up to 5.25% due to fiscal concerns.
Speaker 1 ·34:03
How to verify: Review DYORfunds' published research notes or strategy reports from before November 2026 for gilt yield targets.
Betting market odds for a UK general election next year are around 33%.
Speaker 1 ·36:17
How to verify: Check major UK bookmakers' (e.g., Bet365, William Hill) or betting exchange (e.g., Betfair) odds for the next UK general election date.
The speaker estimates the chance of a UK election next year at 10-15%.
Speaker 1 ·36:06
How to verify: Review DYORfunds' internal client communications or strategy notes for their specific probability assessment.
Client consensus estimates the likelihood of a UK election next year at 20-25%.
Speaker 1 ·36:35
How to verify: Review DYORfunds' client meeting summaries or consensus surveys from the week of the podcast.
The Milburn review is expected to be released at the end of the year and focuses on youth unemployment.
Speaker 1 ·34:57
How to verify: Check UK government announcements or news reports regarding the 'Milburn review' and its scope/timeline.
Burnham's 10-year growth plan is still to be published.
Speaker 1 ·35:04
How to verify: Check official publications from London Mayor Sadiq Burnham (or relevant official if name is ASR error for Sadiq Khan) for the release of a 10-year growth plan.
The UK spending review was planned for early next year but looks delayed.
Speaker 1 ·35:12
How to verify: Check UK Treasury announcements regarding the schedule for the Spending Review.
Do your own research
- Verify state-level AI regulation proposals in Democratic-governed states (e.g., data center moratoria).
- Review Bank of England Monetary Policy Report for explicit peak rate scenarios and voting records.
- Analyze UK Treasury debt servicing cost projections and fiscal consolidation forecasts in the recent budget documents.
- Check betting market odds vs. analyst consensus for UK general election probability.
- Assess tech stock performance correlation with state-level regulatory announcements.
- Review historical midterm vs. presidential election outcomes for turnout and ballot composition differences.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:01
- Unidentified speaker: Hello and welcome to Bobcast, a podcast series where we discuss our views on the latest themes and events shaping rates markets.
- 0:09
- Unidentified speaker: I'm Imogen Backgrade and I'm joined today by global market specialist Brian Davidfield.
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker: We're recording this on Thursday straight after the BOE and of course as the market is dealing with um uh pricing the impact of the midterm election results this week in the US.
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker: So uh perhaps let's start there, Brian.
- 0:28
- Unidentified speaker: I think given that we're recording this on Thursday, um everyone is probably familiar with the results, or at least if you're not, then maybe the rest of the content of this podcast isn't for you anyway.
- 0:38
- Unidentified speaker: So I don't think we need to run through um the results in detail, but perhaps just think about um what it implies for I guess the major issues that the market was focused on heading into the election.
- 0:51
- Unidentified speaker: Perhaps first and foremost, then the the question that's top of mind is what does this blue sweep mean from an AI, and I guess through a market lens tech stock perspective?
- 1:06
- Unidentified speaker: Sure.
- 1:06
- Unidentified speaker: Thanks very much for having me, Imogen.
- 1:08
- Unidentified speaker: So, you know, if you go back to our preview episode from a few weeks ago, uh we talked about three pillars of how this uh election could impact markets.
- 1:17
- Unidentified speaker: The first was AI, and we'll come to the other two: Middle East and uh the Iran War and fiscal policy later.
- 1:24
- Unidentified speaker: But the big one was AI.
- 1:26
- Unidentified speaker: And this question around a more cautious stance uh on the at least the speed of AI build out uh was certainly front of mind for investors in our discussions around the midterm election.
- 1:39
- Unidentified speaker: It certainly felt like the factor that was going to move the markets the most in the event that Democrats outperformed sharply.
- 1:45
- Unidentified speaker: And I think the post-mortem on the election was that the markets expected a sweep, but they didn't expect this, which was Democrats not only winning decisively, they basically won everything.
- 1:56
- Unidentified speaker: They won across the board significant uh majorities, and they also flipped a lot of governor seats.
- 2:03
- Unidentified speaker: And in our preview discussion, Imogen, we spoke about how state and local races matter just as much as congressional races on this issue.
- 2:12
- Unidentified speaker: Because at the congressional side, Democrats are gonna run into a brick wall in terms of trying to push uh more skeptical pace AI regulation, harder, harsher AI regulation.
- 2:24
- Unidentified speaker: They're gonna run into a problem, which is President Trump.
- 2:27
- Unidentified speaker: His veto power is still quite significant in this case.
- 2:31
- Unidentified speaker: And so we have gridlock in Congress now.
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker: We don't have democratic united governments, and so their ability to change regulation is going to be quite limited from the federal side.
- 2:42
- Unidentified speaker: You can think about the governor as effectively the president of your state.
- 2:46
- Unidentified speaker: And so when those state houses changed, it's almost like having a new executive within those states.
- 2:52
- Unidentified speaker: And so the Democrats outperformed significantly on Tuesday, and they won a lot of key governor races.
- 2:59
- Unidentified speaker: And several of those governors uh were running campaigns that effectively included policies like slowing or limiting the speed of AI build-out, outright moratoria on new approvals for data centers.
- 3:11
- Unidentified speaker: And so what we discussed in our uh preview call was Congress flipping to Democrats is probably not enough.
- 3:19
- Unidentified speaker: You would also need them to outperform significantly enough to basically sweep through these uh governor elections.
- 3:24
- Unidentified speaker: And that's effectively what happened.
- 3:26
- Unidentified speaker: And I think it's why we've seen equity underperformance in tech as the first order impact.
- 3:32
- Unidentified speaker: And again, I think this was the market space case that you would get Democratic majorities.
- 3:38
- Unidentified speaker: But where the big surprise has been has been just how strong that outperformance was for Democrats, and perception matters as much as reality, because I think what the markets have taken away from this, both on AI and Iran, is that Democrats ran a campaign on AI skepticism, slowing AI build out, reducing the speed, adding regulation, and that proved to be a winning strategy.
- 4:03
- Unidentified speaker: Now, was that the main factor?
- 4:05
- Unidentified speaker: Was that a side factor?
- 4:07
- Unidentified speaker: Was it a modest factor?
- 4:08
- Unidentified speaker: Only time will tell.
- 4:10
- Unidentified speaker: But at a minimum, the scale of this win was so dramatic that you almost wonder if the Republicans have to consider whether they changed their approach to AI as well.
- 4:19
- Unidentified speaker: That if you just continue to basically ignore the will of the voters on this issue, then you could run into problems in future elections.
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker: And of course, we all look ahead to 2028.
- 4:29
- Unidentified speaker: And so I think that's why the scale of this reaction has been quite a bit more dramatic, because the scale of the victory for Democrats maybe sends a bigger message to the ruling party about how voters feel about AI.
- 4:42
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and I think that's filtered through into market expectations directionally consistent with what we thought in this scenario, but maybe harsher uh than we had expected.
- 4:52
- Unidentified speaker: I want to come back to what you said about the race in 2028 a little bit later, but first thinking about other themes that have really been driving the kind of post-midters market response.
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker: Of course, the um the other element to uh the results is what this might mean for the war in the Middle East.
- 5:10
- Unidentified speaker: And the market has certainly interpreted this as you know, the the Republicans will look to find an off-ramp.
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker: Energy prices are lower, um, fixed income has rallied, of course, like you say, part of that is the kind of impact or the knock-on effect of what we're seeing in the equity markets as a result of the Democrats we and what that means for AI.
- 5:31
- Unidentified speaker: But uh markets have definitely made their mind up about what they think this might mean for um the war in the Middle East and therefore on inflation and energy prices.
- 5:41
- Unidentified speaker: What's your assessment on what the likely impact of this is?
- 5:45
- Unidentified speaker: You know, I think the impact here is very similar to what we just discussed with AI, which is there's the reality and then there's the perception.
- 5:54
- Unidentified speaker: The reality is that Democrats, I think, are still very limited in what they can mechanically do to end the war, to force the president to move uh to a different stance.
- 6:04
- Unidentified speaker: But the perception matters, and the message to the Republican Party was very clear on this point that voters are frustrated with higher energy prices, they were frustrated with the war, and they came out and they sent a very uh decisive message uh to the president on this issue.
- 6:20
- Unidentified speaker: The question we have to come back to is is the president listening to that message?
- 6:25
- Unidentified speaker: Because the president now is a lame duck president, and he is still the commander-in-chief, and he remains in the the executive branch, has significant control of foreign policy.
- 6:34
- Unidentified speaker: Uh and so we're still trying to read the president's mind, and that it's still the president who ultimately makes the final call in terms of our approach in foreign policy.
- 6:46
- Unidentified speaker: That includes things like tariffs, that includes things like um uh you know conflicts in this in this one in particular.
- 6:53
- Unidentified speaker: And so I think a similar dynamic in the market has come through here, as with AI, which is there's no mechanical change that's forced on the congressional level, but there's a perception change that the party has to see the writing on the wall.
- 7:07
- Unidentified speaker: And so the market has internalized this in both a negative direction for AI and a positive way in terms of the Iran war ending.
- 7:15
- Unidentified speaker: In both cases, you know, perception and reality don't always meet.
- 7:18
- Unidentified speaker: And with President Trump, it's always a question of does he believe that he needs to change his stance on the war in order to placate what the voters are telling him, or does he feel like his view is justified, his stance is justified uh regardless of how the voters voted.
- 7:38
- Unidentified speaker: And so I think that's really where the rubber meets the road here is that ultimately it remains in the president's purview, and the possibility of escalation still remains, even though the voters have given, I think, a decisive vote uh against the potential for escalation.
- 7:54
- Unidentified speaker: There's been a lot of moon music over the last few days about a potential return to an MOU, certainly some speculation in the media.
- 8:00
- Unidentified speaker: There's also been some speculation in the media, and now President, I'll just start by saying President Trump himself denied this speculation.
- 8:07
- Unidentified speaker: But there's been some speculation about changes in the cabinet, specifically some of the leadership in the military complex, things like the secret people like the Secretary of War, for example, that they might be on uh potentially on the way out.
- 8:18
- Unidentified speaker: Um, that could be quite significant and maybe tells us something about the president's approach.
- 8:22
- Unidentified speaker: Maybe it is changing, maybe it is softening in the direction of trying to push for, say, a memorandum of understanding uh or uh some sort of steady state in Iran that allows for the strait to reopen and for energy prices to move lower.
- 8:35
- Unidentified speaker: Certainly, uh Vice President Vance's post on social media basically laying it out very bluntly, he thinks they lost the war, they lost the election because of the war.
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker: I think it makes it very clear uh to me where the vice president stands on this.
- 8:47
- Unidentified speaker: But ultimately it depends on where the president is.
- 8:50
- Unidentified speaker: And so what we have been telling investors throughout this process leading up to the vote is it's a reasonable thing to assume that the will of the voters will push Trump into a direction that will uh move away from escalation.
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker: But that assumption relies on President Trump uh seeing that same message and being willing to adjust it in that way.
- 9:13
- Unidentified speaker: Plenty of people that we spoke to before the election felt the exact opposite that the president would be emboldened to escalate in the event of a uh in the event of a loss where he loses his majorities.
- 9:24
- Unidentified speaker: Um and you know, there is no uh there's no mechanical way of preventing that either.
- 9:29
- Unidentified speaker: And so I think the market's assumption here is probably the right one, uh, that it would be very difficult for the president and his team to justify escalation after these results.
- 9:39
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, but that assumption is one that will be tested in coming days and weeks.
- 9:42
- Unidentified speaker: Uh so we'll see where that goes.
- 9:44
- Unidentified speaker: But certainly the market's view has been exactly as you said, uh, lower energy prices and uh with greater risk of de-escalation rather than re-escalation.
- 9:53
- Unidentified speaker: Which I think has been a welcome shift at least.
- 9:56
- Unidentified speaker: Okay.
- 9:57
- Unidentified speaker: The final, I guess, I mean, there's there's so much that we could talk about with with these election results, but to in an attempt to keep it uh brief, I guess the final point that markets were focused on into the election, but certainly hasn't really featured as a driver of the post-election market moves, or really much of the kind of narrative and discussion post-election uh relates to what this might mean from a fiscal policy perspective.
- 10:27
- Unidentified speaker: Is this relevant?
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker: Is this important, or not does it not materially alter the path either towards fiscal consolidation or um fiscal expansion for you?
- 10:39
- Unidentified speaker: So it is important, but as you mentioned, it certainly further down the list of priorities uh in the immediate aftermath.
- 10:47
- Unidentified speaker: And I think the reason is because I think the market, this was the one where I think the market was probably best prepared for, uh, which is that under gridlock scenario, fiscal policy risks don't get better, but they also don't get materially worse.
- 11:02
- Unidentified speaker: And so I think the the market's sort of general read on this, I think it's been the right one, which is that the fact that we move to gridlock means that you sort of clip the tail risk of significant new fiscal stimulus, say, for example, the $5,000 stimulus check idea, um, the ability for Republicans to push through partisan stimulus via reconciliation, that gets cut off.
- 11:25
- Unidentified speaker: But at the same token, you know, we talked about this a lot in our preview call, but Democrats did not run on a platform of fiscal consolidation.
- 11:33
- Unidentified speaker: And often the way you work through gridlock during uh pain point moments, things like debt ceiling negotiations, budget negotiations, oftentimes the way you work through those is by spending more on both sides' priorities rather than cutting on both sides' priorities.
- 11:49
- Unidentified speaker: So, say if the Republicans want additional military spending and Democrats want more healthcare spending, then the way you resolve a difference in a gridlock is that both sides end up spending more.
- 11:59
- Unidentified speaker: And so I don't see a really clear path towards fiscal consolidation here.
- 12:03
- Unidentified speaker: And as a result, some of those concerns on fiscal policy, I think, are still very much there.
- 12:09
- Unidentified speaker: Maybe, maybe where the more relevant immediate term issue is, is that one of the reasons why we're so worried about fiscal policy is because of debt refinancing costs.
- 12:18
- Unidentified speaker: And a lot of that comes down to where yields are, where the Fed is.
- 12:22
- Unidentified speaker: And we have seen a pretty substantial rally in US and global fixed income.
- 12:26
- Unidentified speaker: Now it's not for the reasons that, you know, it I don't think that's a reflection at all of markets' belief that fiscal policy has gotten any more sustainable.
- 12:36
- Unidentified speaker: But it does matter that in the same way that higher yields are a vicious cycle for these debt and deficit dynamics, lower yields, however you can get them, uh end up being good news, um, albeit maybe not uh maybe not sustainable good news from a long-term debt and deficit perspective.
- 12:53
- Unidentified speaker: So I don't think we are out of the woods in any sense in terms of uh, say, uh a dramatic change in the consolidation direction for fiscal policy.
- 13:03
- Unidentified speaker: Certainly some will look ahead to 2028 and think this is maybe the start of uh you know pushing the Democrats towards potentially claiming power in 2028.
- 13:12
- Unidentified speaker: Uh and that obviously had would have quite significant uh potential changes for fiscal policy looking ahead.
- 13:18
- Unidentified speaker: But again, that's so far down the road when we have immediate changes in market expectation for the war in AI to contend with the maybe we should just pick up then a little bit more in terms of what what this means for 2028.
- 13:34
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, this was a hugely decisive victory for the Democrats.
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker: Is you know, presumably uh two years is is a long time away in in any environment, but it feels even longer in kind of current market and geopolitical conditions.
- 13:49
- Unidentified speaker: But they must feel fairly confident now heading into the final two years of of this presidency.
- 13:57
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, so I would say there's probably um a couple of things to think about.
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker: First, uh a word of warning, which is that midterm election results aren't particularly good predictors of presidential year.
- 14:10
- Unidentified speaker: So you think about the last couple of midterm cycles.
- 14:13
- Unidentified speaker: Um midterms tend to be driven by backlash against the ruling party.
- 14:17
- Unidentified speaker: And because the president's not on the ballot, turnout tends to be lower.
- 14:21
- Unidentified speaker: When you add back in the presidential turnout, things change quite dramatically.
- 14:26
- Unidentified speaker: So uh President Obama in 2012 won re-election despite getting uh the Democratic Party getting blown out in 2010 midterms.
- 14:34
- Unidentified speaker: President Trump almost won re-election in 2020 despite getting blown out in 2018 midterms.
- 14:40
- Unidentified speaker: And so you don't have a ton of, you can't just sit here today and say Democrats are a shoe-in for majorities two years from now because they perform so well today.
- 14:49
- Unidentified speaker: That's very tempting to say because of the scale of the outperformance.
- 14:53
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, but you shouldn't just make that assumption uh blindly.
- 14:57
- Unidentified speaker: There are some in the market who will look at the scale of the performance and see the broadening of the coalition in the Democratic Party and make assumptions about who the next nominee will be for president from the party.
- 15:08
- Unidentified speaker: There's a bigger question around if the party will move towards its sort of more left democratic socialist wing or whether whether a centrist will outperform.
- 15:16
- Unidentified speaker: Uh certainly today you'd feel more comfortable with the idea of a centrist doing well.
- 15:21
- Unidentified speaker: A lot of the sort of high-profile centrists within the Democratic Party did very well.
- 15:26
- Unidentified speaker: But to be fair, a lot of Democrats all over the country did very well.
- 15:29
- Unidentified speaker: So it's probably too early to make definitive claims there either.
- 15:32
- Unidentified speaker: A last point to think about this is way in the distance, but depending on how the Alaska and Mississippi Senate races are called, the Democrats could go into the 2028 presidential election with a massive lead in the Senate majority, perhaps an unassailable lead in the Senate.
- 15:50
- Unidentified speaker: So they're looking at potentially having 56 seats in the Senate as it stands today.
- 15:55
- Unidentified speaker: Um, at a minimum, you're talking about maybe 54 or 55.
- 16:00
- Unidentified speaker: If you look at the 2028 Senate map, the way too early look, there's not a ton of obvious sources of potential pickup for Republicans.
- 16:09
- Unidentified speaker: A lot of the open seats on the Democratic side are going to be in what we presume are safe seats.
- 16:14
- Unidentified speaker: Now, after last night, after uh Tuesday night, maybe we shouldn't assume that any seat is safe anymore.
- 16:21
- Unidentified speaker: That the kinds of seats that we assume are safe for Republicans in perpetuity were the kinds of seats that were lost on Tuesday night.
- 16:28
- Unidentified speaker: So maybe we shouldn't make any assumptions.
- 16:31
- Unidentified speaker: But it will be very difficult for Republicans to win back majorities in the Senate in 2028 based on how much ground they lost this year.
- 16:41
- Unidentified speaker: And so one of the things we can maybe look ahead to in 2028 is the risk of Republicans regaining full control in 2028, even if they win the presidential election, is probably a lot less today than it was just uh 48 hours ago, because the scale of wins in the Senate they would need to take back that majority is so much larger than we assumed.
- 17:03
- Unidentified speaker: Even if you thought the Democrats would win a majority, you're probably talking about 51 or 52 seats as a maybe a best case scenario for Democrats.
- 17:10
- Unidentified speaker: They're gonna well outperform that.
- 17:12
- Unidentified speaker: And so it just creates this much larger uh potential uh hurdle for Republicans in 2028 to maybe take back the Senate, which of course feeds through to the risk of uh retain regaining full control uh in the next presidential election.
- 17:26
- Unidentified speaker: So I think we've covered a lot of ground on the US and the election.
- 17:29
- Unidentified speaker: Maybe let's turn over to the UK.
- 17:32
- Unidentified speaker: Uh we are recording this with the Bank of England fresh in our minds.
- 17:35
- Unidentified speaker: We just had the decision from the Bank of England.
- 17:37
- Unidentified speaker: Imogen, what are you thinking about uh the BOE decision and how did it jive with your expectations coming in to the decision?
- 17:44
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, to be honest, it was a fairly surprising meeting.
- 17:47
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, they delivered a 25 basis point rate hike, which was very much as expected.
- 17:52
- Unidentified speaker: Um, regular listeners will know that that's been our base case for a long time now.
- 17:56
- Unidentified speaker: We put a November hike in our forecast back in March.
- 18:00
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and it hasn't always been market's base case, but but pretty much, you know, for a long while now the market has been almost fully pricing a November hike.
- 18:09
- Unidentified speaker: So the hike was delivered very much as expected, but almost everything else in terms of the vote, in terms of the guidance, uh, and particularly in terms of the kind of forecasts around the scenarios were very hawkish.
- 18:23
- Unidentified speaker: So the vote came at 8-1.
- 18:25
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but that importantly was a descent for a 50 basis point rate hike, i.e., all nine members voted in favour um of hiking rates, which was a big departure, particularly when you read some of the commentary from um the more dovish members just six weeks ago at the September meeting talking about rates being sufficiently restrictive and not needing to tighten policy any further.
- 18:48
- Unidentified speaker: So that was the first surprise.
- 18:51
- Unidentified speaker: Um the next surprise was really the way in which the uh sort of commentary and the guidance had changed.
- 19:00
- Unidentified speaker: You know, for a long time the BOE had this sort of inherently dovish view and they had incrementally shifted a bit more hawkish in terms of recognizing the upside risks to inflation um from global influences, you know, broadly from higher energy prices.
- 19:18
- Unidentified speaker: But they retained this quite benign view of domestically driven inflationary pressures.
- 19:25
- Unidentified speaker: You know, they still had this view of an economy that had a significant enough output gap, um, you know, significant enough weakness in the labour market uh that meant that they wouldn't need to tighten rates, or certainly that they wouldn't see the sorts of second-round effects that you might usually expect to be associated with the kind of energy cost shock that we're seeing, um, were the economy on stronger footing.
- 19:53
- Unidentified speaker: It felt like a bit of a rewrite of their view in this set of minutes and guidance and within the monetary policy report.
- 20:00
- Unidentified speaker: You know, they acknowledged the fact that there was saying it's strong, I think, is going too far, but a stronger than they had previously expected labour market.
- 20:11
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, we all know that, you know, nominal GDP has held up much better than expected over the last couple of months.
- 20:17
- Unidentified speaker: There's been upside surprises on um, you know, both on the labour market side and on the economic data side.
- 20:23
- Unidentified speaker: So it really felt like they were starting to acknowledge the much greater risk of potential second-round effects from the strength in the domestic economy that they'd been quite uh reticent, or even I would say pushed back on a little bit before.
- 20:41
- Unidentified speaker: Um a couple of things that I would really call out within the NPR and within the commentary, uh, certainly within the press conference, that I think are worth noting.
- 20:51
- Unidentified speaker: Um the first was that they updated their scenarios.
- 20:54
- Unidentified speaker: So uh back when the war began, the um NPC published their scenarios for the first time.
- 21:00
- Unidentified speaker: It was a way of kind of signalling to the market their framework, the way that they were thinking about the potential outcomes of the war in the Middle East and what their reaction functions might be in those scenarios.
- 21:11
- Unidentified speaker: Um, so they've you know sort of published a weak demand scenario, a central scenario, and an adverse scenario.
- 21:18
- Unidentified speaker: And by their own admission, the adverse scenario uh is the sort of scenario where you don't get a path towards uh peace in the Middle East.
- 21:27
- Unidentified speaker: And now, you know, I know we've talked about the way that the market's kind of reassessed its expectations for that in the last 24, 48 hours, but it still doesn't feel like that is a particularly unlikely scenario.
- 21:40
- Unidentified speaker: I think we still need to have that um in our minds as a potential.
- 21:44
- Unidentified speaker: But nonetheless, uh the distinction between the scenarios here actually isn't that important because the key point is that within their the data that they provided around these scenarios, they provided a rate path which they themselves called the optimal policy projection, i.e., if inflation evolves in the way that they have um designed in these three scenarios, and you get the kind of growth outlook that they're talking about across these three different scenarios, what is the optimal policy response for the Bank of England to deliver in each of those three?
- 22:19
- Unidentified speaker: And across all three, the peak in policy rates was higher than current market pricing.
- 22:26
- Unidentified speaker: In all three, that peak in the policy rate got to 5%.
- 22:30
- Unidentified speaker: Now, that is a very implicit endorsement of current market pricing.
- 22:37
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, actually, if you read that literally, they're telling you that the market isn't pricing in enough, um, which is quite a departure from where we were just a few weeks ago.
- 22:45
- Unidentified speaker: You know, in mid-October, we had chief economist Hugh Pill, he's been one of the most hawkish members of the MPC over the last couple of months.
- 22:53
- Unidentified speaker: He was the first one, if you remember, back in um April that voted for a rate hike.
- 22:58
- Unidentified speaker: You know, he said, I think it was on the sidelines of the M IMF in Bangkok, he said, um, I presume in a response to a question, but essentially that he would be skeptical that they would need to deliver on the bank rate tightening that the market is pricing in, i.e., he's skeptical that they really need that 100 basis points that the market has in.
- 23:20
- Unidentified speaker: So there's there was real, real hawkish, implicit endorsement of um current market pricing within the forecast assumptions.
- 23:30
- Unidentified speaker: Bailey also followed up with sort of explicitly endorsing the market pricing of the path for bank rate in the press conference.
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker: He was pushed on this idea that the BOE was, through their guidance, signalling that this was a kind of two-hike cycle undone.
- 23:47
- Unidentified speaker: So the hike that they've delivered today, uh, won again in the future, you know, potentially as early as December, but potentially a little bit later than that, and then remaining on hold, which, as we know, is quite different to what the market's pricing.
- 24:00
- Unidentified speaker: For a long time, we've been pricing um, you know, a sort of peak in rates closer to 475, if not higher, prior to this most recent fall in energy prices.
- 24:10
- Unidentified speaker: And yet Bailey said that whilst the market pricing doesn't necessarily reflect most people's base case, it does reflect an upside risk premium.
- 24:19
- Unidentified speaker: And he said he felt like that was a fair assessment of the current conditions.
- 24:23
- Unidentified speaker: So, again, a another endorsement of what for a long time has been pitched as a very hawkish set of market data.
- 24:31
- Unidentified speaker: Um I think comparing as well some comments that Governor Bailey made to September to November really highlights just how much of a hawkish shift there was in today's meeting.
- 24:42
- Unidentified speaker: Um, he he was asked, because they were talking a lot about, of course, the you know, what might happen in the Middle East, and of course, the Bank of England sort of voted um on this rate decision yesterday on Wednesday.
- 24:55
- Unidentified speaker: They would have set the forecast and done a lot of the underlying analysis related to the scenarios, etc., well before the outcome of the midterm elections and well before they'd seen the latest fall in energy prices.
- 25:07
- Unidentified speaker: Um that was a bit of a topic of discussion, you know, to what extent is this guidance really outdated because the narrative has already shifted so severely.
- 25:16
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but in that topic of discussion, Bailey was clear to point out that, of course, a resolution in the Middle East would be very helpful from an inflation perspective.
- 25:26
- Unidentified speaker: It wasn't actually the only thing when we think about global influences on energy prices that were driving them high.
- 25:33
- Unidentified speaker: You know, he highlighted Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the impact that that's having on gas prices.
- 25:38
- Unidentified speaker: He highlighted crack spreads, the fact that, you know, we're we have seen uh throughout this year a kind of at points a recovery in wholesale energy prices that hasn't been translated into the refined products.
- 25:49
- Unidentified speaker: He highlighted that China's reduced their exports of refined products to the rest of the world.
- 25:54
- Unidentified speaker: And so, you know, he was he was almost saying that resolution in the Middle East would be necessary, but not strictly a sufficient condition for them to think that they don't need to deliver further tightening.
- 26:07
- Unidentified speaker: Now I want to compare that to what he said in response to a question in September because that is significantly different.
- 26:13
- Unidentified speaker: He was asked in September what would it take to get rate cuts back on the table?
- 26:19
- Unidentified speaker: This was only six weeks ago, and he said essentially an end to the war in the Middle East.
- 26:24
- Unidentified speaker: So there's a big shift, I think, in the way that they're thinking about the uh you know distribution of outcomes for um for interest rates ahead.
- 26:35
- Unidentified speaker: Now, with all that in mind, it's probably worth uttering a kind of word of caution about the Bank of England.
- 26:43
- Unidentified speaker: This wouldn't be the first time, even in this cycle, even in this you know, period of higher inflation, that they have made quite a hawkish pivot and then rolled back on that quite quickly.
- 26:57
- Unidentified speaker: You know, they did the same thing back in April uh and then by July had pivoted very dovishly again.
- 27:03
- Unidentified speaker: So we haven't actually changed our base case call.
- 27:08
- Unidentified speaker: We still only have one follow-up hike in our central scenario in February, so taking rates to a peak of four and a quarter.
- 27:17
- Unidentified speaker: But I think the risks around that forecast are certainly to the upside now, and actually it's a pretty finely balanced call, I think, about whether they, you know, that peak rate or that terminal rate is actually four and a quarter or four and a half percent.
- 27:34
- Unidentified speaker: And again, it's probably at this stage a close call, whether they go in December or not.
- 27:41
- Unidentified speaker: Of course, you know, as Bailey pointed out, by December we'll have another set of data.
- 27:45
- Unidentified speaker: We'll also have more clarity on whether there is a path to peace in the near term in the Middle East.
- 27:50
- Unidentified speaker: But um, you know, it's it's possible that should we get better data and should it look like there is progress in the Middle East, that they could completely dial back on a lot of this hawkishness in December.
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker: We don't rule that out.
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker: But as it stands, I think, you know, for a while we've been talking about the fact that market pricing, although it's much more hawkish than what most people's base cases, doesn't really feel implausible.
- 28:15
- Unidentified speaker: And I think that today's MPC just just kind of reinforces that view.
- 28:21
- Unidentified speaker: The final point I would make around market pricing is what what I think looks most mispriced now is not about where markets get to in terms of that peak.
- 28:30
- Unidentified speaker: You know, like I say, we have base case of four and a quarter, risks of four and a half, but market pricing of a peak of kind of 475 or a little bit higher is not outside of the realm of possibility.
- 28:42
- Unidentified speaker: What looks more odd to me is that the market isn't pricing in any um easing beyond that.
- 28:49
- Unidentified speaker: And I think if anything, you know, if you think as a result of today's um Bank of England meeting that maybe they deliver a little bit more tightening or we get to that peak a little bit quicker, the more confident that you can be that they can actually remove some of that tightening, uh perhaps more quickly or you know, at a faster pace or earlier than we were expecting, you know, into early 2028.
- 29:10
- Unidentified speaker: Of course, 2028 is a long time away.
- 29:13
- Unidentified speaker: Lots can happen between now and then.
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker: But the market is pricing in a really flat profile for bank rate beyond kind of the Q3 of 2027.
- 29:22
- Unidentified speaker: And that's what looks like a bigger miss pricing to me.
- 29:25
- Unidentified speaker: I think as we get closer to what we think might be the peak in early 2027, uh, we can more clearly price a pivot in markets, and that will be removing some of the tightening that that is currently priced.
- 29:39
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, that's a really good breakdown, Image.
- 29:41
- Unidentified speaker: And honestly, it's uh you know quite a lot of surprises within an expected decision, right?
- 29:47
- Unidentified speaker: Maybe the tone of that, of course, being different, the way it interacts with market pricing, the discussions around market pricing just feels like a very different, uh, a different take uh from the Bank of England, even with uh this decision being widely expected.
- 30:02
- Unidentified speaker: Super interesting.
- 30:02
- Unidentified speaker: And of course, you know, with everything going on in the US and the big moves in markets today, Sterling, of course, sits unchanged versus the dollar through all of this, uh, which maybe reflects how the market's focus is elsewhere.
- 30:13
- Unidentified speaker: But it's a really an interesting one, and uh I thought that was a really good breakdown uh for the Bank of England.
- 30:18
- Unidentified speaker: I do want to ask about what um investors are telling you about what they're thinking about the UK and guilt markets, because I know you've been on the road uh meeting with clients, talking to clients both post-budget, but also before the Bank of England decision.
- 30:32
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, what are you hearing and what are you what's your sense of the consensus and what sort of the top views are uh from your discussions?
- 30:38
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, we've been on the road a bit this week, um sort of London-based, mostly real money clients rather than than fast money, but I don't know that that's an important distinction in terms of um their views.
- 30:52
- Unidentified speaker: I would say there were three key takeaways.
- 30:55
- Unidentified speaker: The first related to the BOE.
- 30:56
- Unidentified speaker: Now, of course, these meetings were pre-BOE.
- 30:59
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but like I was saying earlier, we have had this hawkish view on the Bank of England pretty much all year.
- 31:07
- Unidentified speaker: You know, back in March we put in rate hikes in November and in February.
- 31:12
- Unidentified speaker: All through the early part of the summer, we were by far and away the most hawkish people that it felt like clients were speaking to.
- 31:20
- Unidentified speaker: You know, it's at times it was sort of like they just were in disbelief that we could think that the Bank of England would be hiking uh once, let alone twice, um, by the early part of 2027.
- 31:32
- Unidentified speaker: And that conversation evolved through the summer.
- 31:34
- Unidentified speaker: You know, it went from being all about the UK's economy being too weak to sort of withstand hikes, particularly focused on weakness in the labour market, to then the pushback shifting to, okay, the economy's actually not so weak anymore, the labour market's okay, but this is an inherently dovish Bank of England, and they're just not going to deliver that degree of tightening.
- 31:54
- Unidentified speaker: There was a real marked shift in the conversations this week that was a bit sort of like, well, why are you only forecasting two rate hikes then?
- 32:02
- Unidentified speaker: You know, if this if this is what you think about the evolution of inflation and the risk that it exists not just from higher energy prices, but higher food prices potentially, um, from domestic demand, you know, why would the Bank of England only hike twice?
- 32:15
- Unidentified speaker: And I guess um today's uh meeting sort of pushed us a little bit further in that direction in assuming that actually maybe the risks are that they go three times or or perhaps more.
- 32:25
- Unidentified speaker: But you know, there's there was a uh stark difference in the conversations that we've been having this week versus what we were having through the summer where it felt like two hikes was was impossible.
- 32:36
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and now two hikes felt to some I think implausible, but but in the sort of dovish direction uh rather than the hawkish direction.
- 32:45
- Unidentified speaker: Um it was a set up as a round of post-budget meetings, although the budget in the end, um, as we uh heard from the webinar recording that we put out as the Boncast episode last week wasn't the kind of market mover that we thought it might be.
- 33:02
- Unidentified speaker: And despite 98 policy measures being announced, uh there wasn't really much for us as strategists or even economists to get particularly excited about.
- 33:12
- Unidentified speaker: But it did highlight for us, and this is what I alluded to in in last week's episode, it did highlight to us the ongoing uh medium-term risks around the UK's fiscal outlook.
- 33:23
- Unidentified speaker: You know, we talked about debt servicing costs still being very elevated.
- 33:26
- Unidentified speaker: That's something that you referred to uh with regard to the US as well, Brian, and and the fact that the the fiscal forecast, what's giving the market so much comfort around the UK's fiscal consolidation, you know, the forecasts underpinning that consolidation appear to be quite optimistic.
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker: Now, for a long time, we've been quite concerned about uh the fiscal backdrop in in the UK.
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker: I think, in fact, I've bored myself and probably also lots of people listening to this podcast around, you know, just how dire the fiscal situation is.
- 33:58
- Unidentified speaker: It's been the kind of key driver of our very, very long held bearish view in the UK.
- 34:03
- Unidentified speaker: It was why we revised up our target to five and a quarter for 10-year guilts.
- 34:08
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and it's been a long-standing theme for us.
- 34:11
- Unidentified speaker: For a while, that's had quite a bit of pushback, and even in the kind of weeks leading up to the budget, we got quite a lot of pushback around that view, or particularly a sense of, well, the UK is not as bad as France or the US.
- 34:23
- Unidentified speaker: So we're just sort of more concerned about fiscal risks more acutely in those countries.
- 34:28
- Unidentified speaker: Whereas I would say this week it feels like there's been more of an acknowledgement or an acceptance around the medium-term fiscal risks in the UK.
- 34:38
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, but the questions were very much what what is the catalyst to trigger a kind of repricing of this fiscal risk premium, which is a fair pushback because I think, you know, we were of the view that the budget could be that event and it didn't turn out to be.
- 34:53
- Unidentified speaker: There's still some fiscal events on the calendar that I would be watching out for.
- 34:57
- Unidentified speaker: We get the Milburn review, we think at the end of this year that's about um, you know, looking into youth unemployment and ways to fix that.
- 35:04
- Unidentified speaker: We've got Burnham's 10-year growth plan um still to be published.
- 35:09
- Unidentified speaker: We have a spending review at some point.
- 35:12
- Unidentified speaker: It was planned for early the early part of next year, but looks like it might be delayed a little bit.
- 35:18
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and then of course we have you know the next key fiscal event will be the budget in the spring next year.
- 35:23
- Unidentified speaker: So there are potential catalysts um on the calendar that that could be a moment of reckoning for for UK fiscal risks, but it did feel like there was a kind of migration of views that that seemed to be a bit more concerned about the UK's fiscal position than than we've had over the last couple of months.
- 35:42
- Unidentified speaker: And perhaps that leads nicely on to the third and final point I'd make that was a question that came up in every single meeting what do you expect or what do you think the odds are of a general election?
- 35:53
- Unidentified speaker: And I think if we're thinking about catalysts for a repricing of uh potential fiscal risks in the UK, that would be the most obvious one to me, although I should highlight that that is not our current base case.
- 36:06
- Unidentified speaker: Um, I think we would sit at the more unlikely end of the spectrum, probably closer to a sort of 10 to 15% chance of a UK election next year.
- 36:17
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, current betting market odds have it around 33%-ish chance of a UK general election next year, and I would say consensus from the meetings and and the client conversations we've had this week is probably in the middle of those two, maybe 20-ish percent, 20-25% likelihood.
- 36:35
- Unidentified speaker: So it's certainly not anybody's base case, but it feels like something that is very much on people's radars, and I think it's a discussion topic that we are going to come back to time and time again over the next couple of weeks and months.
- 36:48
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, and I have no doubt something that we will talk about uh in depth on this podcast in due course.
- 36:55
- Unidentified speaker: That's probably enough for today.
- 36:57
- Unidentified speaker: We've rambled on for long enough.
- 36:59
- Unidentified speaker: Thank you, Brian, for joining me.
- 37:01
- Unidentified speaker: Thank you to our listeners for listening in.
- 37:04
- Unidentified speaker: Uh, this will be our last boncast for a couple of weeks as we prepare for our year ahead.
- 37:10
- Unidentified speaker: The outlet will be published in a couple of weeks, and then we'll be back with a year ahead episode of Boncast at some point in November.