Robin Wigglesworth warns AI debt shift and regulatory decline pose risks to global stability
Summary
Robin Wigglesworth argues the bond market is the true engine of the global economy but receives insufficient attention. He compares the current AI boom to 19th-century railway manias, noting a shift from equity to debt financing in 2026. Wigglesworth criticizes the 'evisceration' of US financial regulators like the SEC and CFTC. He identifies UK and France as high-risk sovereign debt cases due to structural deficits. Wigglesworth suggests advanced economies will manage debt through inflation and financial repression rather than default.
Key takeaways
- 1 Similar to the railway boom, AI companies are now using 'off-balance sheet financing structures' and creative instruments once conventional bonds are exhausted, increasing systemic opacity.
Robin Wigglesworth · 12:22
- 2 Wigglesworth describes the current state of US financial regulation as 'deliberate political kneecapping' of the CFTC and SEC, noting an 'astonishingly steep' decline in enforcement actions over the past two years.
Robin Wigglesworth · 17:35
Episode sections
- 0:03 – 3:19
Introduction and Book Overview
Mark Sobel introduces Robin Wigglesworth, author of 'A Fabulous Debt', discussing the bond market's historical importance versus the stock market's visibility. Wigglesworth explains his motivation to highlight the bond market as the true engine of the global economy.
- 3:19 – 5:47
Historical Origins: The Venetian Bond
Wigglesworth recounts the 1171 Venetian war loan against Constantinople, which became a perpetual 5% bond after Venice lost the war. This event birthed tradable debt instruments and double-entry accounting.
- 5:47 – 9:16
Jay Cook and the Panic of 1873
The discussion shifts to Jay Cook, an American investment banker who financed the Civil War and later collapsed due to overcommitment to transcontinental railway bonds, triggering the Panic of 1873 and the longest US economic downturn at the time.
- 9:16 – 12:48
AI vs. Railway Bubbles and Debt Financing
Wigglesworth compares the current AI boom to the 19th-century railway boom. He notes a critical difference: while railways were debt-financed, AI was initially equity/cash-flow funded. However, in 2026, AI financing has shifted significantly toward debt, raising concerns similar to historical railway manias.
- 12:48 – 19:22
Regulatory Capture and Enforcement Decline
Wigglesworth expresses concern over the 'evisceration' of the CFTC and SEC, citing a steep decline in enforcement actions. He argues this signals a 'free-for-all' and deliberate political inaction, rather than just regulatory failure.
- 19:22 – 25:38
Sovereign Debt Risks: UK and France
The speakers discuss advanced economy debt. Wigglesworth identifies the UK and France as worrying cases due to structural deficits and low growth. He notes France has had no budget surplus in 52 years and faces political polarization, while the UK has a massive current account deficit.
- 25:38 – 32:20
Ferguson's Law and US Fiscal Health
Wigglesworth discusses 'Ferguson's Law,' which states that when debt servicing exceeds defense spending, a great power declines. He notes the US violated this in 2024. He argues the US remains resilient due to its status as the provider of the world's primary risk-free asset, despite high deficits.
- 32:20 – 34:36
Conclusion and Regulatory Optimism
Wigglesworth concludes that while the financial system is more robust post-2008, regulators must maintain vigilance. He believes lessons have been learned but warns that human nature will eventually lead to forgetting them.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| AmazonAMZN | equity | neutral | free cash flows of the big AI hyperscalers primarily. So the Amazons, the Alphabets, the Metas, and they make so much money on YouTube and book sales and WhatsApp or whatever. That was unconcerned. But this year, 2026, is the year where the AI boom definitely starts having more of a debt-fueled debt fueled |
| AlphabetGOOGL | equity | neutral | free cash flows of the big AI hyperscalers primarily. So the Amazons, the Alphabets, the Metas, and they make so much money on YouTube and book sales and WhatsApp or whatever. That was unconcerned. But this year, 2026, is the year where the AI boom definitely starts having more of a debt-fueled debt fueled |
| Meta PlatformsMETA | equity | neutral | free cash flows of the big AI hyperscalers primarily. So the Amazons, the Alphabets, the Metas, and they make so much money on YouTube and book sales and WhatsApp or whatever. That was unconcerned. But this year, 2026, is the year where the AI boom definitely starts having more of a debt-fueled debt fueled |
| US dollarUSD | currency | neutral | worried about their exposure to America, to America. American corporate bonds, to market treasuries, American agency bonds, American equities, the the US dollar in general. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The bond market is the 'true engine of the global economy' and has outgrown the stock market and banking system in size and importance.
Robin Wigglesworth ·2:03
How to verify: Check OMFIF podcast transcript [2:03]; verify against global debt market size data from IIF or BIS (2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The very first bond was issued by Venice in 1171 as a war loan against Constantinople, which became perpetual because Venice lost the war.
Robin Wigglesworth ·3:46
How to verify: Check Robin Wigglesworth's book 'A Fabulous Debt' (2026); verify historical records of Venetian debt from 1171 via historical archives or academic sources. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Venetian bond paid 5% a year and became tradable, allowing it to be used as dowry or collateral.
Robin Wigglesworth ·4:27
How to verify: Check Robin Wigglesworth's book 'A Fabulous Debt' (2026); verify historical financial instruments of Venice via historical finance texts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Jay Cook's bank collapsed in 1873 due to overcommitment to transcontinental railway bonds, causing the longest economic downturn in US history at that time.
Robin Wigglesworth ·7:45
How to verify: Check historical records of the Panic of 1873 via US Treasury historical data or academic economic history sources. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In 2026, the AI boom has shifted to being primarily debt-fueled, with companies borrowing $500-600 billion more than expected.
Robin Wigglesworth ·11:42
How to verify: Check 2026 corporate bond issuance data from Bloomberg or Refinitiv; verify AI capex/debt trends from major tech company 10-Q/10-K filings (2026-08-19 to 2026-11-19). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe CFTC and SEC are experiencing 'deliberate political kneecapping' with an 'astonishingly steep' decline in enforcement actions over the past two years.
Robin Wigglesworth ·16:54
How to verify: Check SEC and CFTC annual enforcement reports for 2026-2026; compare enforcement action counts year-over-year. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceFrance has not had a budget surplus in 52 years.
Robin Wigglesworth ·23:51
How to verify: Check French Ministry of Finance budget data for 2026-2026; verify against OECD or IMF government finance statistics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The US violated 'Ferguson's Law' in 2024, where debt servicing exceeded defense spending.
Robin Wigglesworth ·26:40
How to verify: Check US Treasury debt servicing costs and DoD budget for 2024; verify against Neil Ferguson's definition of the law. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The ECB will 'blink' to prevent a serious crisis in France to save the Eurozone project.
Robin Wigglesworth ·24:51
How to verify: Check ECB policy statements and bond purchase programs (APP/PEPP) for France in 2026; verify against ECB meeting minutes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Scott Bessent has suggested growth will boom with AI productivity, bringing the deficit down to 3% of GDP.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·30:53
How to verify: Check Scott Bessent's public statements or policy proposals in 2026; verify against US CBO deficit projections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify SEC and CFTC enforcement action statistics from the past two years using official agency annual reports or enforcement databases.
- Check AI hyperscaler (Amazon, Alphabet, Meta) capital expenditure plans and debt issuance filings (10-Q/10-K) for 2026 to assess the shift from cash-flow to debt financing.
- Review UK and France government budget documents for current account deficits and budget surplus/deficit history.
- Investigate 'off-balance sheet' financing structures used by major AI infrastructure companies by examining footnotes in quarterly earnings reports.
- Research 'Ferguson's Law' and compare US debt servicing costs to defense spending data from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
- Analyze the impact of 'financial repression' and inflation on bond yields using historical data from similar periods in US or European history.
- Check for political polarization impacts on French and UK fiscal policy by reviewing recent election platforms and legislative proposals.
Full transcriptexpand
0:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hello and welcome to Invested, the Omfiff podcast, where we bring you thoughtful conversations on the forces shaping global finance economics and public policy in a rapidly evolving world. We'll go beyond the headlines to unpack the ideas, trends, and decisions influencing markets and institutions worldwide. My name is Mark Silbel, Vice Chair and Chief Economist at Omfith. Today I have the true delight to be joined by Robin Wigglesworth, a patriotic Norwegian with the most quintessential sounding British name. Robin is the editor of Alphaville, the Financial Times Financial Blog. He has been a leading financial journalist serving inter alia in prior positions as U.S. markets editor and capital markets correspondent for the FT. He is a prolific author. He previously wrote Trillions, a book. on passive investing and how it was reshaping markets. And more up my alley, he just completed A Fabulous Debt: The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World. It's a fantastic and easily readable book. I recommend it to all. I hope Robin gets rich off the royalties, and I hope you'll confirm that you had no hand in the blowout in French bond yields in attempting to boost your book sales.
1:16On a personal note, I've had the pleasure of penning a few pieces for Alphaville. Robin has masterfully taken my terse, turgid, and pedanic scribbles and magically converted them into lucid, legible, and intelligible prose, impossibly making my trivial thoughts seem almost interesting. That is testimony to his artistry and brilliance, which is on full display in his latest book. So welcome, Robin.
1:41Robin Wigglesworth: Well, that was very kind of you to say, Mark, but I did not have to do a lot of work with your prose. So I think you're being unduly harsh on yourself there.
1:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, let's move on. And let's dig in and talk about your latest book. So what prompted you to write Fabulous Debt without giving away the plot and reducing future readership? What's your central theme you want readers to take away?
2:03Robin Wigglesworth: I guess it's the magnificence of the bond market. As I'm sure you've also noticed over the years that the stock market gets an undue amount of attention among politicians, among the public. And I I think that's that's wrong. The bond market is the true engine of the global economy. And I think we sometimes realize that to our regret in times like 2008 and in 2020, maybe we will soon realize it again. I just think it is so important. And a lot of what I do as a journalist is take stuff that I think is incredibly important, but not enough people realize it's important and try to make it vibrant and interesting and fascinating, explain to people why they should care. And when I was doing a fabulous debt, I realized realize also the history is so much more vivid and fascinating. than I ever thought. So when you have both those things, it's both important and colorful. Hopefully you've got yourself a decent book or a topic to dig into.
2:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. And one of the things I really enjoyed about the book was the walk down the historical memory lane. And it kind of shows that a lot of the themes we see in financial markets were happening hundreds of years ago. Uh, What's your most favorite or memory memorable, let's say, success and bust story in the book? And I'm gonna put one constraint on you. If you cite the Dutch Bond at the end of the book, you have to say its name in Dutch five times.
3:27Robin Wigglesworth: Okay, well, and my Dutch is pretty atrocious, so I'm not even gonna try that. Maybe later. Uh, that's a great question. So I do this history, financial history podcast with my colleague Gillian Pett, and one of the jokey uh workshop titles we had was that this has all happened before. Just to show that in finance, quite a lot of these things do go in cycles. As as Twain said, history doesn't repeat itself, but it certainly does rhyme. I guess my favorite, because it's a bit of calamity and triumph, is actually the birth of the bond. The very first bond issued by Venice in eleven 1171. seventy-one. We don't know how much they issued, it would have been quite big. for the time, but it was fascinating, and it's both a triumph and a calamity because it was issued as a war loan. Really, a forcible war tax, a wealth tax on its citizens to pay for a war against its liege Constantinople. And it ended up being a calamity because Venice lost that war. Because they lost that war, they weren't able to repay their citizens. So that forced war tax.
4:27slash loan just became permanent. And the doge who had issued this bond, this tineering bond, it was called the Pristiti, he was murdered by his own citizens for this disaster. But the bond kept paying 5% a year because it was structured as a loan. And although it was supposed to be short-term, it ended up being perpetual, and they made the receipts tradable. And then suddenly you had this incredible. financial instrument that could always pay that 5%, even if it wasn't repaid. It was a piece of paper that paid 5% a year, and you can buy and sell it. And for the Venetians, you could give it as part of a dowry, you could endow a church with it, or you could use this collateral trade. They discovered the magic of frankly financialization. nationalization. And I think that's why it became this this calamity actually became a testament to the commercial. genius of the Venetians. They also meant to things like double ledger accounting, for example. And I think that's just delightful that quite often, even in misfortune, there is something good that can come out of it. And sometimes in misfortune can birth a two hundred trillion dollar market. So I think that's pretty powerful.
5:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Great. So you covered your success and your bus story all in one. Well then I'll ask you about personalities you wrote about in your book. Who's your favorite for good and who's your favorite for evil? Or is is this a one-off also?
5:47Robin Wigglesworth: No, this sounds probably completely nihilistic. I don't really believe in good or evil. Uh and I like my heroes with flaws and I I like my scoundrels with good sides as well. I'm happy to talk about more bus because I mean the bus are more interesting. I mean, you and I, you lived and worked through so many of them, but as we've talked about, those are so much more revealing. As a financial journalist, crises are unbelievably fascinating. You just grow personally and professionally so much through them. But all the personalities, I mean, there were lots of people that ask me who I would want to interview that isn't around with us. So there are characters like Michael Milken and Lewis Ranieri. For various reasons, they didn't or couldn't talk to me for this. book. But there are other people that passed away long ago that I would have loved to talk because I thought they were just fascinating, complex human beings. And probably one of them, a sort of a, I guess I'll do another hero and villain here now, is Jay Cook, America's first big investment banker. Almost single single-handedly handedly helped keep the North finance through the American Civil War. I mean, genuinely did God's work. I'd say, in in helping the North defeat the South, and emerged as the Titanic American financier of his generation, of almost any generation. And eventually, you know, he he'd made his fortune. He was America's most famous man, he was arguably more powerful than the president, several
7:06presidents. But then he got sucked into the mania for railway bonds, barns, especially the transcontinental railways that emerged after the American Civil War, which again, I'd say almost like as a hero figure, you know, these were monumental national projects that were very symbolically important to America after the Civil War. I mean, unifying the country with railways, but also financially and economically, it transformed America completely. So I think that was that was actually a hugely valuable thing. But he took leave of his senses, censors. he became overcommitted to. one particular transcontinental railway and especially, and essentially the bank collapsed when a financial crisis really first started in Europe. It's also one of the first examples of a true global financial crisis that emanated from the financial sector and ricocheted across the Atlantic with both factors feeding into each other. And eventually Jay Cook and Co. they had have to shut their doors and cause the panic of 1873, which still to this day caused the longest economic downturn in American history. I think he's just a fascinating character because he was an ardent abolitionist at a time, but even before the Civil War, he financed a lot of abolitionist causes, but he also wouldn't let colored people, as he put it, go on his some of his tramway lines. He grew up in rural Ohio venerating one of the
8:25local Native American. tribes there. He named his estate after the chief who'd be friended. He was saw of himself as a great friend of Native Americans. But, you know, of course the railways he helped finance trampled through many of their tribal lands. I mean they murdered lots of people. So I think he was very complex and he lived in this palatial estate just unbelievably ostentatious and a little bit kitsch really. So fake Roman ruins, the whole works. But the only thing he really enjoyed doing was fly fishing and talking to priests about theology. That was his favourite pastime. In his biography, he's got I think at least one full chapter just on fly fishing and many on theology. And his wife gets mentioned twice. So he was just an interesting character. And I I like interesting characters. So yes, I guess accidentally I have given you both a hero and a villain. at the same time again.
9:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
9:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thank you for that. I was thinking about whether you were gonna pick him. Um you mentioned the 1873 crisis. It was recently written up in a book by Rikwata Ahmed called 1873. Yep. Your mention of railways is quite relevant for today because whenever there are discussions about AI and could it be a bubble or a bust, everybody uh um makes analogies back to the railway period in the United States.
9:42Robin Wigglesworth: No, it's a natural parallel. And the 1873 is a tremendous book. I think it's probably one of the favorite books I've read in 2026. I think the parallels are obvious and a little bit unnerving. Sometimes for positive reasons as well, I guess. The mad bad thing that we sometimes forget is that the optimal number of financial crises might not be zero, that they are somewhat ingrained in how we act as humans. And we occasionally need people to take leave of their senses and throw money at the hot new thing. Whether it's railways, canals, telegraph, cable, the internet, and now maybe AI, because over time, investors might lose money and maybe the downturn And causes an economic disaster. But over time, that tends to be how we make these big leaks leaps forward. And the railway is, I think, the best example of AI. And I don't actually think AI could be transformative. It probably is going to be transformative. But I think we underplay how enormous the railway was and how much it transformed the world. I think if AI crews even half as
10:43transformed as railways did, then I think we'd be very happy. The downside is, of course, sometimes a technology can be transformed. transformative. It can be truly as revolutionary as the optimists even say. And it can still cause quite a lot of financial and economic volatility along the way. So railways caused several crashes in different countries at different times, but the big one was after 1873. When I almost glibly say that financial crises, crisis, we need them occasionally. I don't think that should discount how painful they can also be for a lot of people. And I think I worry about that now. I I would say I wasn't that worried about AI and railway parallels up until recently, because what was unusual with the railway boom was that it was primarily financed by debt, by bonds, especially in the US. And nobody went more railway mad than the Americans. The AI boom was until fairly recently primarily financed with the prodigious free cash flows of the big AI hyperscalers primarily. So the Amazons, the Alphabets, the Metas, and they make so much money on YouTube and book sales and WhatsApp or whatever. That was unconcerned. But this year, 2026, is the year where the AI boom definitely starts having more of a debt-fueled debt fueled
12:02component. to it. And in fact, that has become the more dominant factor, I'd say, now, as the companies are basically using up all their free cash flows already. They are borrowing more, I think, to the tune of five, six hundred billion dollars this year, but another several trillion on top of that, in I think suboptimal Optimal off off-balance balance sheet financing structures that are more creative. Also, somewhat similar to what we saw. with a railway boom. That once companies weren't able to issue any more conventional bonds, they started issuing railway trunk bonds, mortgage bonds, anything else. They they became more and more creative in raising financing. And that is really what we really started to see in 2026. And that makes me feel a little bit uncomfortable, I have to admit.
12:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a good segue. I was hearing SPVs in my brain while listening to special purpose vehicles. So um both of us lived through the global financial crisis. Here, I'll I'll focus on one of my hobby horses. So in the run up to the crisis, the regulators told us we're on top of the markets, we do proper due diligence and supervision. We need light touch regulation, we know what we're doing, and we're independent. Go leave us alone, uh, other people. You know, my view is a failed society, they didn't understand the opacity and complexity of instruments, they didn't understand the funding vehicles, they didn't understand the interconnectedness between financial and non-financial institutions. That's probably a bit of a biased statement, but I'm okay with it. But given your research on your book and your own experiences and your historical studies. how on top of their jobs are regulators and supervisors? Well, to put it in a clutch of questions to let you give a free flow of consciousness, you know, do they get captured too easily? Are markets so innovative that they can't keep up? Do they underestimate leverage?
13:56Robin Wigglesworth: All of the above, really, yeah. I don't think regulators are as bad as people think. I think the problem is it's it's an action problem rather than a knowledge problem. And I would say that certainly I think 2008 was such an earth-shattering experience for all of us involved, and frankly, people that came after us as well, that I actually think we have learned some lessons. I think we're gonna forget them eventually, but I don't think we've forgotten them completely yet. And I do think that what is interesting with the current AI. frenzy and the mania, and really what's everything, and whether it's private credit or AI or whatever hot craze there is going on, I think there are far more and louder contrarian voices now when there was in 2007 and 2006, as far as I remember. And frankly, also in the let's say 1870s as well, when the railways were really taking over, because people who see them transforming the world. So I think there is more caution. And even
14:56the most preposterously Panglossian AI optimists out there will talk about how they think this is a bubble. It is quite telling that like a Sam Altman, a Jeff Bezos, they all say, Oh, we think this is a bubble. We just think that we want to be the winners, we're just kind of it's a self-reinforcing sort of investment. cycle almost. That everybody's doing it because everybody's doing it, and you want to do it quicker and faster and better and harder than everybody else. But I don't think anybody's doing it gauntlessly. I'm sure there'll be some people doing stupid things, so it always is. But I am somewhat encouraged by the fact that this is not a bubble that is entirely untethered from reality. let's say, with a few maybe uh exceptions. And when I think about the job that regulates that, this is very hard because when you talk to people at let's say the Federal Reserve or the Treasury or the IMF or even some of the financial regulators, they know about all these things. They read the Wall Street Journal, they read the Financial Times, they read Bloomberg, they talk to people all the time. People do send them in tips all the time. It's just what do you do about it? What tools do you really have? Do you really want to lean in on these things? Because all sorts of things have seen mad 10 years ago and ended up not being a disaster. And will we have
16:15both of us, Mark, live through over a decade now of a lot of different aspects of finance being the next 2008? two thousand eight. It's the next subprime. And really, look, I mean, I've lost track of them, but just off the top of my head, short volatility, auto loans, student loans, private credit, Eurozone government debt, all sorts of things that's going to be triggered the next big downtown. And they haven't really, they've caused some volatility, but that's the part and parcel of financial markets. But I do think there is a genuine issue with narrowly financial regulation in the US right now. I am and I'll try not to mince my words too much, but I am profoundly concerned at the evisceration really of the CFTC and the SEC. Now I've always thought that the Americas sort of approach to financial regulation being so balkanized and so split up and the Fed and Treasury and oh OF, far everybody does different bits and the CFTC and this SEC don't really talk to each other that much most of the time. So it's been suboptimal. But generally speaking, because these agencies have been staffed by good people that want to do a good job. And they do an imperfect job, but so everybody does an imperfect job. But I think that it's generally been the the spirit and the mind has been willing and they've been pointing in the
17:35right direction. Now it does feel like there is this almost deliberate political kneecapping of those bodies. It goes beyond just the naked decline in enforcement actions we're seeing over the past couple of years. That decline is is astonishingly steep. But it goes beyond that. It's and I don't think there's any less mouthfeasance now than there were a few years ago, even if even if you take away just some of the record-keeping enforcement actions. that were maybe a little bit um over the top.
18:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
18:07Robin Wigglesworth: it's just like the signal that it sends that it's a free-for-all. I mean, I see quite a lot of things that I think in a previous era, by previous era, I don't mean a previous generation, I just mean two years ago, would not happen at mainstream Wall Street institutions, not the spivier side of things. So I do worry about that. I don't think that is particularly helpful to ordinary Americans. There's always a case for like regulation has run amok and maybe puts too much of a kibosh on entrepreneurial spirits and a sense of experimentation. I can have that argument, but I think now it's definitely gone to the point where there is deliberate inaction. Action. And I do think that is unhelpful. And it's not really just an American problem because the sized importance of American capital markets, everybody in the world is investors are there, and and you know what happens in America usually doesn't stay there. But I I think that is worrisome. And now I'm not talking about the big systemic risk like ONU 2008. I think those are impossible for regulators to know about. And even if they knew about it, impossible to act
19:11forcibly forcefully on beforehand. I'm talking about the more humdrum mainstream things of just keeping markets slightly honest.
19:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And uh the Fed board apparently was cutting 30% of a super reg staff. And um anyway, whenever I thought about the US regulatory structure, I always think of Mario Draghi's analogy between the Euro and a bumblebee, that it shouldn't be able to fly, but somehow it does. We'll see if. it continues to fly. Well, let's move on to another mega theme. You know, you mentioned both of us have gone through a lot of crises, emerging market crises, but now they're better run than the advanced economies. And advanced economy debt is booming. Now, the US and France, as far as I'm concerned, are in a race for the worst run situation. I'd give the nod to France, but Italy, Japan, the UK, you know, how worried should we be now and in the medium and long term about this burgeoning debt? And you know, this relates to some of the historical examples you cite. And I guess the question that's always on my mind is: how are we going to get out of this mess? You know, will our political class have a kumbaya Ya moment and pursue rational adjustment policies, or will inflation and financial repression? do the trick? And
20:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
20:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): guess there's always default as an option, although Alexander Hamilton will roll over in his grave at the thought. How do we how do we get out of this?
20:37Robin Wigglesworth: I think you you have the solution. I mean, solution is a very grandiose term for muddling through, but I think it is a mix of tax increases, some spending cuts, financial repression, and inflation. There are uninfluenced. unintended and intended consequences of all those things. There are no good options, but there are certainly less bad ones. I think defaults with any major advanced economy is cataclysmic. Even if France or UK or Japan, for the US, it's the it's the end of the world as we know it, to paraphrase RAM. R A M. I'm less worried than most people are. The red thread that runs through my book is this sense that how debt skulls, as I call them, they've always been around. There's there's this innate human skepticism of debt that is entirely natural, but at least in the sovereign space, tends to be wrong or overdone. But although I am less worried than almost everybody else I No, know, I am I always joking I'm three times as worried as I used to be, or maybe five times as worried as I was. Let's say if I was one percent worried before and now three to five percent. Uh and it is because of these issues you talk about. I actually cut a mention of specifically France in the last chapter of my uh my book, A Families Debt, talks about how much debt is too much debt, because the bond mark is fundamentally it's a technology, it's a
21:57financial technology that allows us to borrow more efficiently. And we humans are very bad at abusing our technology. technologies. And it's natural to fear that we are now in the process of doing so again. The US is what I deal with. But then I basically conclude that I think the US is fundamentally foreign or its fate is very much in its own hands. I'm more relaxed by the US, certainly, than many other countries. France and the UK, I I in an earlier draft, I specifically single out as countries that do worry me. I cut it out in the final draft because it felt like a bit of an arbitrary drive-by shooting. And I felt it it deserved more unpicking than a sort of a random throwaway line or two at the end of a book. But the UK has a massive current account and budget deficit. It has a stubborn problem with debt. It also has a problem with growth. So I think this the combination of financial factors there is is very unhelpful. But I think the UK has some advantages. It is entirely monetarily sovereign. In extremis, the Bank of England can do a lot of things. It's amazing what you can do if you can create money, uh, the money you owe. I also think Britain does actually they don't grow as quickly as the US does, for example, or or many others of those emerging markets you mentioned, but it does have some growth. It's just not as much as they should have or would like.
23:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
23:15Robin Wigglesworth: I also think that the Brits have shown throughout history a willingness to do even very painful things when they need to. Maybe not until they have to, but they have shown it. So the UK spent almost five percent of GDP servicing its debts in nineteen eighty.
23:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
23:31Robin Wigglesworth: that's when Margaret Thatcher came into power and things started to change a bit afterwards, and obviously interest rates started falling as well. So this was a global thing that benefited the U.S. UK. France is the one that, and I don't want to be too mean, I love the country, I love the people, but I think there it's both a problem of growth. They have had even less growth than than the UK in in recent years and decades, even worse financial dynamics to a certain extent. They haven't had a budget surplus for 52 years. That makes the Americans seem fiscally conservative. For a long time, that budget deficit was actually not necessarily that big, but it has definitely gone quite big now. And I worry that the political system is entirely almost it's almost impossible to contemplate them just getting down to the rules that they themselves have set for deficits without major societal upheaval. French people strike for fun. I I love the country, but it's just very difficult to see how they get out of this. And now you have a loop. looming presidential economy that will very likely pit far right against far left, both of which have very unorthodox views on French debts, French membership of the Eurozone, and so on. France is the one that worries me. Against that, I do think if push comes to shove, the ECBU is quite happy to see the French government feel the heat. Certainly this government and the next government. I think when it comes down to it, the ECB
24:51will blink because this isn't Greece, this isn't even Spain or even Italy. This is France. This is politically the chorus of the core, not just for the Eurozone, but for the whole European project. It would mean the end of the European Central Bank. I think they will do whatever it takes on steroids asteroids to prevent something serious happening in France.
25:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
25:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): agree with that. And uh I did a podcast about two, three weeks ago with uh Mahmoud Predon, who's quite the European uh ECB expert, and uh we went through some of that. Well I don't want to keep you too long, so I have two other questions for you. Uh you know I should say I like this term scold. I'm not an old style German person, but I am a scold. Oh,
25:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
25:34Robin Wigglesworth: think a bit of that scoldiness, we all have it in us. It's it's innate.
25:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
25:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that leads me to ask you Does your book's review of history have any lessons for whether or how well a major power, not that I have any in mind, with ramshackle finances can continue to project global power?
25:53Robin Wigglesworth: Yes, because some of these things are it's a bit like the proverbial coyote from first those
25:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): countries when you're yeah,
26:00Robin Wigglesworth: why do you coyote? He can run over the cliff and say something. stay suspended in the air for a long time, even after the ground beneath him is given away. So Britain was able to project global power and appear like a global power and have a global reserve currency for long after really the underlying fundamentals had radically shifted from under its feet. There's a lot of talk now, of course, about the Ferguson's law. So it's coined by Neil Ferguson, but he named it after Adam Ferguson, a Scottish philosopher. who noted that one of the main causes of the ruin of great nations was government debt. And that is true with some asterisks. And Neil Ferguson turned this into a law that says that when a country spends more on servicing its debts than defence, it marks the the decline of an imperial or a great power. And of course, this is particularly pertinent now because. America in 2024 violated Folkes Law for the first time in a century and is in violation of it still and probably will for the next five years almost inexorably, unavoidably, unless it suddenly jacks up defense spending radically, and then of course it might actually worsen the underlying fiscal dynamics. And I think in favor of this law, what I like about it is that it captures the fact that debt to GDP is a bit of a nothing burger ratio. I don't actually think that it is helpful
27:20whatsoever to understand how indebted a country, the real burden of it, the real problem. I think debt servicing to GDP or debt servicing to revenues is a better measure of the real burden of that debt. And I think, you know, Neil Ferguson Fogesny cares about America's a superpower, so military spending is very evocative. But I think you can just see it as a manifestation of spending more money or servicing debt than aircraft carriers, battleships, schools, hospitals, sewage, infrastructure, roads, whatever. America is facing this slow erosion of its fiscal health as the budget deficit stays extremely high and it is refinancing very cheap treasury bonds that were issued in the 2010s and then in the post-COVID era with far more expensive debt now. I mean, even if the budget deficit was close to zero, its borrowing costs would mechanically increase a little bit now. And of course the budget deficit is very, very far from zero. So I think it's very natural to fear that.
28:20Now, against that, calling it a Ferguson's law is is a bit of a a marketing gimmick. I don't think it's a law. it's not even a rule of thumb. There are examples from the Netherlands, for example, where they also violated Ferguson's law and declined, and Great Britain, for example, and Tsaris, Russia. But there are also many examples of it not happening and a country declined. And also examples of where the engorged spending on a military actually causes the underlying erosion as well, because it depletes fiscal. health. I think the US has vastly more borrowing capacity than almost anybody, probably even you, I think, Mark, actually think. I think, but that therein lies the danger that the very advantages that America has, not just as a monetarily sovereign nation like a Canada or UK, or Euro to some extent France, but the unique advantages that America has as the provider of the world's favorite risk-free asset, even if sometimes we use inverted commas around risk-free, it won't face any checks from the bond market, not the same types of checks from the bond market that other mother countries might have. It might face higher borrowing costs and bond yields will go up and they might go down. We don't know. But I think America will continue to inflate its debt burden more and more year after year. with
29:39very little political willingness to do anything about it on either side of the aisle and no external checks on it either. Because I mean, even despite the shocks we've seen over the past year, the fact that the Europeans, the Asians do, they just can't stop buying treasuries is remarkable. I've lost track of how many big institutional investors I've talked to around the year who talk about being worried about their exposure to America, to America. American corporate bonds, to market treasuries, American agency bonds, American equities, the the US dollar in general. And when you see what they actually do, they do nothing. And I think that's kind of baked in the cake. I actually don't think by now it would take something cataclysmic, like a a World War Three or something, to really shape the system. So I think we'll just be in this kind of position for the next ten, 10, twenty, 20, thirty 30 years really. And we'll be having this conversation in 20 years' time, let's say, and America's debts are twice what they are, and we're still worrying about uh inevitable reckoning at some point.
30:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I hope you're wrong on that. I don't like bad policy and uh dysfunction and crowding out and and whatnot. But uh okay, I'm gonna ask you, interject one more question, 30 second answer, and then I'll get to the last question. You kind of brought it on yourself, which is uh, you know. Scott Bessent, he's been saying that, you know, growth will boom with the AI productivity increases, it'll bring the deficit down to three percent of GDP. You know, he's engaged in upping short term issuance, buyback initiatives, this yen intervention. Are those effective?
31:09Robin Wigglesworth: They are within reason. reasons. So typically we see throughout history over the centuries I studied study the bond market, you
31:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): see
31:14Robin Wigglesworth: in the very same pattern, like typically wars cause a massive inflation of government debts. And then they don't necessarily I mean they start paying it back. There's just a little bit of fiscal rectitude afterwards. So you pay it back in years of plenty. Same with financial crises or economic downturns, government debts go up and then they shrink backwards. Not necessarily nominal terms, to us, but relative to the size of GDP. And this is what happens. happened in America after World War II. America didn't really have a huge amount of, I mean, obviously military spending fell a lot after World War II, but it didn't start sort of running austerity. It just grew into its debts. It is the favored way of doing so. But it's of course the easy thing to hand wave it towards if you're a politician. it We'll will grow into it. I think the crucial thing is a certain amount of fiscal rectitude. or discipline combined with some growth, and maybe in some extreme cases, financial repression and inflation, which I think are completely viable policy choices, is the combination you want to aim for. Not putting all the weight on one of those factors, because that can be dangerous. But a combination of those could work.
32:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. Last question. Do you have any final words of wisdom that you would wish to impart to a officialdom based on your book?
32:29Robin Wigglesworth: Uh understand the intricacies of, I guess, not just the global bond market, the global debt system. I mean, we know this through history. Credit is the lifeblood of any modern economy, any economy, really, even pre-modern economy. And I still sometimes feel that the delicate interplay between bonds, repo, derivatives, the whole jammery jammerie is. such a complex system that no one person can understand it. But collectively, I'd like to see maybe more people in officialdom understanding it. Though I would say, broadly speaking, when I talk to and I think people at the Fed, at the Treasury, at finance ministries and central banks around the world, since 2008, there's a radically finer understanding of these things. I talk to people at those institutions who blow me away by their knowledge. And sometimes they're very specialized, but at least they don't mix up their specialization with a lack of understanding of other things. They are still aware of this interplay. So they might know one tiny part of it, but they understand how it reacts with stuff that's a colleagues domain. And that I think I get the impression wasn't as as true in 2006, 2007. So I I tend to be more. optimistic than most people. I think we have learned a lot of lessons. We have done a pretty good job of making the financial system better after 2008.
33:48I just don't think the job is finished. I don't think it ever will be finished. And at some point we will forget those lessons because that's just how we're wired.
33:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. A concluding note from an optimistic Norwegian. So we've had a great conversation today with Robin Wigglesworth, author of A Fabulous Depth, The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World. It's a great book. Go out and read it. And thank you for joining us today.
34:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
34:12Robin Wigglesworth: thanks for having me, Mark. I absolutely loved it. It's a privilege.
34:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thank you for joining us for another episode of Invested.
34:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
34:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you found today's conversation engaging, make sure to stay tuned for more thought-provoking discussions on finance, economics, and policy. by subscribing to our channel on Spotify, Apple Music, or wherever you find podcasts.