Bondcast - The Rates Podcast

NatWest analysts forecast sticky inflation delaying rate cuts until 2028-2029 and predict range-bound FX in 2027

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Inflation ForecastCentral Bank PolicyFX MarketsWage DynamicsChinese ExportsAI Impact

Summary

NatWest Markets analysts Ross Walker, Stuart Sparks, and Brian Dangerfield discuss inflation and monetary policy outlooks for 2027. Walker forecasts US and Euro area inflation will reach targets by late 2028, while UK inflation may not hit targets until 2029 due to persistent domestic pressures and wage growth. The panel highlights fading disinflation from Chinese exports and rising food prices driven by weather and insurance costs. Sparks notes potential shifts in Fed frameworks toward tolerating higher inflation to support growth. The group predicts major central banks will finish tightening by mid-2027, leading to range-bound FX markets driven by absolute carry rather than policy divergence.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    running at above 6%, you know, twice the wage inflation in the private sector. So I think the public sector, both through a sort of macroeconomic level fiscal stimulus, but also more through the sort of microeconomics, public sector pay, procurement, that also seems to be fueling inflation at the moment.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 8:56

  2. 2
    our starting point in most advanced economies is that nominal wage inflation rates are probably still a little bit north of CPI target. consistent rates. Now they have been trending down, but typically we're seeing some leveling out, stabilization.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 14:08

  3. 3
    The first one of those probably is driven by the energy shock. Whether we get the second one is probably much more about services inflation and and what's happening in the labour market.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 15:39

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 1:01

    Introduction and Inflation Forecast

    Imogen Bachra introduces guests Ross Walker, Stuart Sparks, and Brian Dangerfield from NatWest Markets. Walker forecasts US and Euro area inflation targets by late 2028, with UK reaching targets in 2029.

  2. 1:01 – 5:50

    Domestic Inflation Drivers and Energy

    Walker explains core consumer goods inflation pickup and elevated wage growth keeping services inflation high, driven by a resilient labor market.

  3. 5:50 – 10:00

    Food Prices and Fiscal Policy

    Walker discusses adverse weather and insurance costs feeding into food inflation, and highlights excessive government deficits fueling public sector wage inflation.

  4. 10:00 – 13:33

    Chinese Export Inflation and Global Supply Chains

    Walker argues the disinflationary effect of cheap Chinese exports is fading as China moves up the value chain, preventing sub-1% core goods inflation.

  5. 13:33 – 16:24

    Labor Market and Wage Dynamics

    Walker states nominal wage inflation remains above target-consistent levels, predicting a moderate pickup that will influence policy rates for ECB and BOE.

  6. 16:24 – 20:46

    AI Impact on Inflation

    Walker views AI as marginally inflationary near-term due to CapEx costs, warning that a disorderly bubble burst could trigger a recession.

  7. 20:46 – 23:33

    Central Bank Policy Outlook (ECB/BOE)

    Walker expects ECB and BOE to deliver two more quarter-point hikes each, with terminal rates at 3% and 4.5% respectively, and cuts unlikely until 2028.

  8. 23:33 – 36:15

    Fed Framework Changes and Task Forces

    Sparks discusses Fed task forces, noting Chair Warsh may tolerate higher inflation to support growth, potentially shifting focus from strict PCE targeting.

  9. 36:15 – 37:26

    Shift in Central Bank Inflation Tolerance and Policy Execution

    Speaker 1 argues central banks may tolerate near-term inflation to secure AI investment and debt sustainability, prioritizing long-term growth.

  10. 37:26 – 38:04

    FX Market Dynamics and Central Bank Differentiation

    Bachra notes FX remained calm in 2026 due to lack of rate differentiation despite fixed income volatility, questioning if this continues in 2027.

  11. 38:04 – 40:26

    Global Drivers vs. Local Differentiation in FX

    Speaker 2 explains 2026 FX calmness was due to global factors moving markets in lockstep, predicting 2027 differentiation based on local growth and AI exposure.

  12. 40:26 – 42:07

    Central Bank Tightening Cycles and Carry Positions

    Speaker 2 predicts major central banks finish tightening by mid-2027, with currency performance depending on absolute carry positions favoring AUD and NOK.

  13. 42:07 – 43:12

    Safe Haven Currencies: Bank of Japan vs. SNB

    Speaker 2 highlights BoJ expected to hike rates multiple times in 2027, while SNB keeps rates at zero, creating unique carry dynamics.

  14. 43:12 – 44:44

    Range-Bound FX Conditions in 2027

    Speaker 2 concludes 2027 will likely see range-bound FX conditions, with investors focusing on absolute differentials rather than policy divergence.

Claims worth verifying

NatWest Markets forecasts US and Euro area inflation to reach target-consistent levels towards the end of 2028.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:14

How to verify: Check NatWest Markets 'Year Ahead 2026' report or press releases from late 2026 for their inflation forecast tables. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

UK inflation is unlikely to reach target-consistent levels until 2029.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:17

How to verify: Check NatWest Markets 'Year Ahead 2026' report for UK-specific inflation projections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Energy components are less than 10% of the CPI basket in advanced economies.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:49

How to verify: Verify against Eurostat, BEA, or ONS CPI component weights for the US, Eurozone, and UK. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Core consumer goods inflation has picked up to significantly above average levels versus previous cycles.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·3:09

How to verify: Compare current Core Goods CPI data from BEA/Eurostat against historical averages from the same period in prior cycles. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

UK public sector wage inflation is running at above 6%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·8:56

How to verify: Check UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) data for public sector average earnings growth for late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Lithium prices are a powerful statistical driver of Chinese export inflation.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·10:37

How to verify: Review NatWest Markets internal modeling documentation or published research on Chinese export inflation drivers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Fed has set up five task forces to review different areas of its operational framework.

Imogen Bachra ·23:54

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve press releases or statements from Chair Warsh regarding the establishment of task forces in late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Recent work from the San Francisco Fed suggests about a third of inflation is supply-side, a third demand-side, and a third ambiguous.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·24:45

How to verify: Search for San Francisco Fed Economic Letter or working papers from late 2026 discussing inflation decomposition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Greg Mankiw has written on the possibility of thinking beyond simply consumer price inflation, including nominal wages.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·27:46

How to verify: Search for academic publications or articles by Greg Mankiw on 'stability price index' or nominal wage inclusion in inflation targeting. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Thomas Sargent has written on monetary policy choices when the growth rate of debt exceeds the growth rate of the economy.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:15

How to verify: Search for Nobel laureate Thomas Sargent's recent publications or speeches on debt monetization and inflation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 1 claims central banks may adopt a more patient view of inflation to support AI investment and debt sustainability, reducing the risk of aggressive monetization.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:34

How to verify: Review central bank policy statements, meeting minutes, or speeches from major central banks (Fed, ECB, BoE) in 2026-2026 for explicit mentions of 'AI investment', 'debt sustainability', or 'patient view of inflation' as policy drivers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Imogen Bachra asserts that FX markets were 'relatively well behaved' and 'calmed' in 2026 despite volatile fixed income markets due to a lack of change in relative rates.

Imogen Bachra ·37:36

How to verify: Compare historical volatility data for major FX pairs (e.g., Bloomberg FX Volatility Index) against fixed income volatility (e.g., MOVE Index) for the period Jan-Dec 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 2 claims that in 2026, global factors like energy prices moved markets 'in lockstep' across economies, limiting FX differentiation.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·38:24

How to verify: Analyze the correlation between global energy price indices (e.g., Brent Crude) and FX movements across major economies in 2026, and compare with the correlation of domestic inflation differentials. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 2 forecasts that most major central banks will be done with tightening by the end of the first half of 2027 and enter a prolonged pause.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·40:26

How to verify: Track central bank rate decisions and forward guidance from Jan-Jun 2026 to confirm if tightening cycles ended and pauses began. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 2 identifies the Australian dollar and Norwegian krona as among the strongest currencies in 2026 due to being 'early tighteners'.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·41:06

How to verify: Review 2026 FX performance data for AUD and NOK against major currencies (USD, EUR) to verify outperformance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 2 claims the Bank of Japan is expected to hike rates multiple times in 2027.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·42:29

How to verify: Check Bank of Japan policy decisions and rate hike announcements during 2027. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 2 claims the SNB is expected to leave rates at extremely low levels, effectively zero interest rates, in 2027.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·42:49

How to verify: Check Swiss National Bank policy decisions and rate announcements during 2026 to confirm if rates remained at or near zero. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 2 predicts 2027 FX markets will be 'range bound' with limited monetary policy differentiation driving trends.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·43:32

How to verify: Analyze the trading range of major FX pairs (e.g., EUR/USD, USD/JPY) throughout 2026 and assess the correlation with central bank policy divergence. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify US and Euro area CPI/PCE data trends against late 2028 target dates using Federal Reserve and ECB statistical releases.
  • Check UK ONS data for public sector vs private sector wage growth rates to confirm the 6% vs 3% divergence claim.
  • Analyze lithium spot prices and Chinese export inflation data to assess the fading disinflationary effect of Chinese goods.
  • Review Federal Reserve meeting minutes and speeches for evidence of shifting inflation tolerance or framework changes.
  • Compare 2026 FX volatility indices (CBOE FX Vol) against fixed income volatility (MOVE Index) to validate claims about FX calmness.
  • Track central bank rate decisions from Jan-Jun 2027 to verify the prediction of a mid-2027 end to tightening cycles.
  • Check Bank of Japan and SNB policy statements for 2027 guidance on rate hikes and zero-interest rate policies.
  • Analyze 2026 FX returns for AUD and NOK against USD/EUR to verify their status as 'early tighteners' with strong carry positions.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Imogen Bachra: Hello, I'm Imogen Backra, and welcome to our year ahead 2027 podcast series from NetWest Markets. In this episode, we're turning to monetary policy. After several years in which the inflation and interest rate outlook has shifted dramatically, the question now is what comes next? How persistent could inflation prove in 2027? How might central banks
0:20
Imogen Bachra: respond if price pressures remain stubborn? And what potentially important changes of the Fed could change the way that policymakers think about inflation itself.
0:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
0:29
Imogen Bachra: joined today by Ross Walker, our head of global economics.
0:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hello.
0:34
Imogen Bachra: Stuart Sparks, our head of US rate strategy.
0:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi
0:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there.
0:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
0:38
Imogen Bachra: Brian Dangerfield, head of GTNFX Strategy in the US.
0:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi,
0:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Imogen. Thanks for having me.
0:44
Imogen Bachra: And together we'll look at what all of this could mean for interest rates, currencies, and markets in the year ahead.
0:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
0:50
Imogen Bachra: Ross. let's start with you. Uh and perhaps with the big question that I opened the podcast with, which is really, will inflation ever get back to target and when?
1:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
1:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we think it will, and the short answer is for the US in the Euro area, uh we're forecasting target type levels at the back end of two 2027, thousand and twenty
1:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): seven,
1:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): twenty twenty-eight. eight. But But for the UK, we think
1:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this
1:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): will
1:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): slip
1:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): into two
1:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): thousand and twenty nine.
1:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's a little bit more domestically
1:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): generated inflation and stickiness there. Now, of course, all of this is highly contingent upon energy price moves. And inevitably, as we try to write the year ahead, we've had these huge swings, particularly in crude oil prices, surging urging through September and October and then falling back in November, helped, of course,
1:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): by the US midterm elections. So additional uncertainty on those those energy impulses. But I think our underlying inflation story, the domestic inflation story, is essentially the same, that there has been more persistent price pressure than policymakers and markets expected in
2:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 2026. And those forces are probably gonna hang around for much of the coming year.
2:09
Imogen Bachra: Let's dig into some of those price pressures then. A huge part of the inflation story in 2026 is has been about the higher for longer energy prices. But are there other factors at play and how much
2:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
2:27
Imogen Bachra: there regional differentiation in terms of those other factors?
2:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So on the the other factors, energy, of course, the size of the moves, the volatility tends to get most of the attention. But ultimately, for advanced economies, energy components are you know less than than 10% of the the CPI basket. So
2:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
2:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a persistent inflation problem. a persistent overshoot, you need spillovers. But this is where I think the story, certainly in 2026, there was a bit of complacency and wider price pressures were underestimated. You know, we're seeing, for example, inflation in core consumer goods picking up to significantly
3:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): above average levels versus previous cycles. So traditionally advanced. economies have relied upon global disinflation, cheaper consumer goods flowing in from Asia or other parts of the world, to arithmetically offset
3:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): higher domestic inflation. This was the story of the Great Moderation, where strong growth but inflation at target. Inflation was only at target courtesy of global disinflation. Well that has has not only faded, but we've seen a sizable rebound in core consumer goods inflation. Obviously, energy costs are part of that story,
3:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): supply chain disruptions, tariffs, other interference in the the production and distribution process. Food inflation is is going to be fascinating next year. It it's it's typically been more benign, I think, through twenty twenty six or since the the Middle East conflict began than than most forecasters
4:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): expected. But I think we're now seeing in a number of markets signs of a a turning point, an upturn. And you know, related to that of course and what's often the focus for domestic inflation, services inflation, there I think labor markets, you know, have proved more resilient than than was feared in the earlier phases of the
4:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Middle East conflict. I think expectations that we would see a more aggressive, uh more aggressive job shedding haven't really materialized. It's it's a sort of low-higher, low-fire labor market. You know, turnover is quite low. It's not surprising that we've seen hiring freezes in the context of much higher energy and interest rate
4:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): costs. But I think the the underlying resilience of the economy, perspective. persuades us that we could probably see some moderate pickup in wage inflation in a number of economies. And not to the sort of levels we saw in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but to levels that are still consistent with inflation, CPI inflation overshooting its target.
5:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So there is this broader base story, but no, I think the more interesting inflation dynamics are beyond those energy components. It's a about these indirect and second-round effects in areas like food, but core consumer goods as well. And of course, the labour market and domestic services inflation will ultimately be what determines how
5:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): much higher interest rates, policy rates need to go.
5:30
Imogen Bachra: Let's dig into some of those factors a Is little bit more then. You mentioned first about food price inflation. How concerned are you about that in the year ahead? And also, how do weather-related concerns really feed into that risk? I think as we head into the winter, that's perhaps one of the inflation risks that is becoming
5:50
Imogen Bachra: most talked about.
5:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The adverse weather dimension is interesting because we had, you know, in many parts of the world, we had a
5:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): very uh wet spring, then a very hot, dry summer. So, you know, a lot of, in theory, in principle, a lot of damage to um the supply of crops. But thus far, we we've not seen food inflation really taking off, or at least not as much as had been feared. The weather dimension that we look at in our
6:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): year-ahead report, you know, we're seeing obviously more reported incidents of adverse. weather events. That's that's not particularly surprising. But what I think is fascinating is is the scale of the increase in the insurance costs relating to adverse weather events.
6:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And of course, you see that obviously directly in the CPI basket. Insurance inflation has has typically been running at relatively elevated levels, but also this feedback loop into um into into food inflation. And we think that is going to be a bigger story in in 2027.
6:57
Imogen Bachra: What about also on the fiscal policy side? There's a varying degrees of ability and willingness for fiscal consolidation across a lot of governments and economies. That's one of the themes that we've talked about a lot in twenty 2026. twenty six and we talk about it a lot in the pages of our report for this year ahead.
7:17
Imogen Bachra: And in fact, there is also a special Year Ahead podcast episode dedicated to that as well. So perhaps we don't need to dig too much into the detail there. But how is that feeding into our views around inflation globally into 2027 and beyond?
7:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Well, at the most sort of macroeconomic level, we still have governments running excessive.
7:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): deficits. There is still a fiscal laxity. And although there are promises of fiscal consolidation, in reality, I think fiscal consolidation varies between not very much and not at all. In the case of the UK, you have a government that has presented three budgets, each of which have shown
7:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): there is a fiscal consolidation in a spreadsheet. in several years' time. But each of those budgets has brought a fiscal stimulus in the current year and the coming year. So not only are we not leveling out, we're not consolidating, there is still sort of ongoing fiscal stimulus. So this stimulus is occurring in many economies, I think with
8:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): with less slack than was believed, I think output gaps are generally smaller than most policymakers seem to expect heading into to this year. So you're applying a stimulus to to economies that simply don't need it.
8:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Public spending itself in is is often inherently more inflationary. You know, if we look at, say, the UK economy, the deflators on government consumption have been in recent years significantly higher than on, say, household consumption. or business investment. We see wage inflation in the public sector in the UK
8:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): running at above 6%, you know, twice the wage inflation in the private sector. So I think the public sector, both through a sort of macroeconomic level fiscal stimulus, but also more through the sort of microeconomics, public sector pay, procurement, that also seems to be fueling inflation at the moment. So central bank. banks are often a little bit
9:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): coy in
9:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): dealing with this. You know, they have a monetary policy mandate. They don't like to wade too much into political territory. But the extent of the public sector inflation that's being generated at the moment, I think, is getting to the point where
9:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this is forcing a policy response, even if in presenting, in and explaining their decisions, central banks don't dwell too heavily. on this.
9:40
Imogen Bachra: You mentioned in your sort of opening remarks, you talked about we no longer have kind of goods price disinflation as a result of globalization and and changes in the supply chain, where China's moving up the export value chain and exporting far fewer ultra cheap goods than it does in the past. So how relevant
10:00
Imogen Bachra: is that to your inflation outlook?
10:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, this is this is a big part of the core consumer goods uh inflation pressures that we mentioned at the start of this discussion. Modeling this stuff is is notoriously difficult, but we've
10:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
10:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a sort of model of Chinese export inflation. So we're taking Making various inputs that you would expect, you know, energy costs, but also some of those. key components for various sort of Chinese exports. So, for example, electric vehicles, lithium prices is a quite a big powerful, statistically powerful driver of
10:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Chinese export inflation measures.
10:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
10:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): essentially, this is telling us that the upswing we've seen in Chinese export inflation this year, which has been much stronger than most expected, although we think we're at a turning point. and that export inflation is coming down, we think it is still going to average above what we've seen in recent years. So, in other words, the idea that we very quickly in
10:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): advanced economies revert to
11:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): these low sort of sub 1%, half a percent year over year rates of core consumer goods inflation feels unlikely from a basic import price.
11:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): dynamic. Now of course part of this is that that China is is moving up the value add chain. The question therefore is to what extent can other economies plug that that gap? And and you know maybe there will be more supply more quickly than than we expect on on
11:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): our central case. And and you know there you might if you were being optimistic, you might point to the way that the speed with which firms managed to adapt to, say, US tariffs in the earlier part of this year, the way supply chains were reoriented and so on. I think the problem is that part of the reason the
11:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): disinflationary dynamic from China was so powerful and so persistent was that there was an entire economic policy.
12:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): model
12:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): put
12:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in place to support that. You know, financing for targeted industries, subsidies for certain products, and so on. It was very sort of orchestrated. And we can debate the extent to which this was beneficial for the Chinese themselves, and to an extent sort of working on the cheap for the rest of the world. But the rest of the world did
12:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): benefit from that disinflation. And we suspect that at the very least, it will take a bit longer for other economies in Asia or perhaps Africa to
12:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): become part of that supply chain for some of the more basic consumer goods. So we we don't see core consumer goods inflation accelerating a great deal, to be clear, but we see the levels of inflation running consistently above one percent, one and a half percent year over year. rate. So above where,
12:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
12:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): versus say the great moderation years, you know, where inflation was running and helping to sort of arithmetically lower all CPI down in advanced economies. It's something to watch. Uh we just as I say, our conclusion is we would caution against assuming that we very quickly revert to those those favorable global disinflationary trends. Aaron
13:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
13:14
Imogen Bachra: Just picking up on the final point that you referred to then in some of your opening remarks around the labor market and how the evolution of of those kind of feeds into the way that we think about potential changes to wage setting behavior. I mean, how relevant is that in 2027 for the inflation outlet?
13:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
13:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Well ultimately your services inflation measures are driven not only but pretty principally by wage inflation. Wage costs will, in many cases, be services providers, single largest cost. Wage inflation was obviously very high, and again, higher than expected following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and for several
13:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): years. Now, obviously, you had several things going on at that time: the reopening from COVID lockdowns and bigger supply chain challenges.
14:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Faster
14:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): reversion to
14:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): equilibrium levels of output provided a sort of complication that we probably aren't wrestling with this time. Nevertheless, you know, our starting point in most advanced economies is that nominal wage inflation rates are probably still a little bit north of CPI target.
14:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): consistent rates. Now they have been trending down, but typically we're seeing some leveling out, stabilization. And with the energy shock still to fully impact headline CPI, you know, which we see peaking in the early part of next year, we think there is going to be some uplift, further uplift uh for wages. And and
14:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you know, the next three to six months is typically the key time of the year for for wage deals being negotiated and then implemented. So that peak in inflation from a a wage inflation perspective is not helpful. And the wage inflation numbers we're looking at are not, you know, especially high. And as I say, compared to
15:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 2022-2023, they look they look quite benign. But I think we're at rates still where it's difficult to conclude with confidence that these are these are target consistent rates. The energy shock is is the main focus for central banks and for markets around near-term monetary policy. But the domestic inflation part of this,
15:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think, is probably a little bit underplayed, and that's where I think there are, therefore, some some upside risks. And you know, we've got for the UK and the Eurozone two more quarter point rises in policy rates.
15:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): The first one of those probably is driven by the energy shock. Whether we get the second one is probably much more about services inflation and and what's happening in the labour market.
15:50
Imogen Bachra: You talked then about markets being focused on the sort of energy outlook or the energy component of inflation rather than the domestically driven part of the inflation story. I would argue that throughout this year, the other market focus, not always from an inflation perspective, but a key market focus has been about
16:10
Imogen Bachra: AI and the impact that that can have on economic variables. So I think it might be a little bit remiss of us to be hosting a a podcast in 2026 talking about 2027 to not mention that. Very briefly, how
16:24
Imogen Bachra: how relevant do you think the AI story is for your inflation forecast in 2027 and beyond?
16:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): For the coming year, I I'm not sure it's it's either that significant or it's so difficult to disentangle a purer AI impact from other influences. You know, obviously over time, to the extent that AI can drive genuine
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): sustained productivity gains, then on balance it will be it will be helpful from an inflation perspective. Potential rates of of growth can pick up. In the near term, though, the emphasis is more inflationary, whether it's the cost of data centers, the investment costs, personnel that needs to be
17:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): hired, to um you know, work in these these areas. these So from a simple demand perspective, CapEx expenditure has been, particularly in the US, very elevated. And and so there's the there's a demand dimension which I think is probably more immediate and more relevant than the supply one. Medium term, yep, I mean
17:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this could be completely revolutionary, but as I say, for for twenty 2027, twenty seven, I there's a lot of noise around this, but
17:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
17:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know and on balance, I think it's it's it's adding to the upside inflation risks, but it feels to me more marginal than some of the other factors that we've discussed.
17:48
Imogen Bachra: Okay. We have spent a lot of time uh talking about uh the potential upside risks to inflation that I think you've laid out the case quite clearly for those that stem beyond just the upside risk that that wholesale energy. prices present.
18:05
Imogen Bachra: Where might we be wrong? Is there anything that could actually bring inflation down over the near term, even if it's potentially a tail risk scenario?
18:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So I think most immediately
18:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the labour market and the wage round, if it turns out that
18:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
18:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, despite higher spot inflation and despite despite in some cases real incomes turning negative again, we we don't see a sort of higher nominal wage response, perhaps because you know corporate profitability is under more pressure. And then that's more of a European story than a US one.
18:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You know, the way the wage round might just be a little bit softer than expected, and we see wage inflation rate. rates more quickly gravitate down to CPI target consistent levels. You know, that wouldn't take something sort of radically different versus our central case, but I we're not really seeing that in the survey data, which tend to suggest
19:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): both hiring intentions and and wage settlements are beginning to gain just a little bit of upside traction. But the labour market could yet tilt this in a fairly gentle, orderly way. The other scenario is that you get something much less orderly and and economies fall into a deeper, more protracted recession. So
19:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): whether this is uh you know the AI bubble bursting or you know financial sector problems, you know, private credit say, a lot of these markets are quite opaque, you're getting tentative evidence here and there of pressure in certain funds. There's a sort of broader sort of recession risk story. But
19:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the recession story doesn't feel like something that's going to come through a more conventional real economy channel. It will be, as I say, something maybe sort of centered in in financial markets, equity markets. But if we were to sort of have a disorderly bursting of the AI bubble, you know, a period of recession,
20:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a period where unemployment did rise and remain at higher levels for a period, you know, that would, I think, clearly change the labour market and inflationary dynamics. But making predictions around the timing of any recession triggered by an AI correction or stock market correction is is notoriously
20:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): difficult. So it's something you're you're certainly watching you're on you're on the lookout for, but it's it's difficult to get timing-wise.
20:30
Imogen Bachra: And then if we bring this on to the central bank reaction function, I mean you sort of mentioned just then that we've got two more hypes in from the BOE, potentially two more from the ECB. But can you just give a bit more detail around that and then I'll come to Stuart in terms of the Fed view?
20:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, so obviously central bank reaction functions this year were changed.
20:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): by the energy shock, and we think that is still the near-term driver. The interesting question, with given how much, particularly oil prices, to some extent natural gas prices have fallen back this month, is are we going to see another sort of rapid central banker U-turn? You know,
21:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we've just gone through um various policy meetings and so
21:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on.
21:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): certainly the BOE pivoted much more hawkishly than we we thought they would. But even, you know, that November monetary policy report, the policy guidance, there was a real heightened sense of urgency and hawkishness there. So I remain wary about the communication and the scope for overinterpreting what central
21:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): banks may be saying and and what what they might actually deliver. But but two quarter point rises from each feels like a reasonably secure central case at this point. I'd be very surprised if we didn't get one more quarter point rise, and as I say, driven principally by these near term energy
21:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): forces and concerns about second round effects. But then we have a labor market wage round to to get through less of a problem, I think. for the ECB, given slightly softer demand and the more structured corporatist nature of the wage setting process there. But yeah, two two
22:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): quarter point rises. So for the ECB, that would that would get us to our three percent terminal rate, uh, and for the Bank of England, four and a half. I think for the BOE, that's more obviously. That policy setting is more obviously and in restrictive territory. And maybe once there is clearer evidence that UK inflation, domestic inflation
22:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is back under control, markets can begin to price in some removal of that policy restriction. But I think that market process is probably for the latter part of next year an actual policy delivery of rate cuts is more. likely to be a a twenty twenty eight story.
22:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So a little bit more for central banks to do. Um and and of course big questions across the Atlantic in the US with the various policy reviews underway and in recent days and weeks. So obviously what happens in the States will have some bearing on Bank of England and and ECB as well.
23:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You're
23:14
Imogen Bachra: doing right. my job for me, Ross, because that has provided the perfect segue into uh passing on to Stuart and and just and thinking about what that policy outlook could look like in the US. I mean, this year, Stuart, you know, markets have had to contend with not only a new Fed chair, but one that seems fairly intent on making
23:33
Imogen Bachra: operational changes at the Fed. Some of those have already happened with regard to uh ultimately not submitting dots for the dot plot, changing the way they think about forward guidance. But it seems like there are more changes to come. He set up five task forces to review different areas of the Fed's operational framework.
23:54
Imogen Bachra: So I guess, in just by way of a brief overview, how relevant do you think those task forces are are going to be in assessing the Fed's new reaction function and which of those are you most focused on?
24:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I I mean I think that the the inflation uh frameworks task force is the one that has has garnered the most attention, at least internally. Uh and i I I think there's every reason to expect as as the underlying uh economic reality changes and evolves that uh policy will evolve as
24:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well. Uh and uh the outlook for the Fed, I think, is determined by a good bit of tension in policy. And I think the the market has been uh uh reasonably confident that supply side inflation uh uh you know should be transitory. There is a has been uh some recent work from the San Francisco Fed
24:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that uh suggested that about a third of inflation is coming from the supply side, a third is coming from the demand side, and a third is ambiguous. So if if you are the Fed, there is some temptation to continue to look through inflation or to be less aggressive on the margin uh in hopes that that demand side
25:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): inflation itself could be transitory, i.e., that the investment wave for AI is is going through the markets, but will not last forever. And I think the the the difficulty here is that investment is is obviously uh extraordinarily important with respect to future potential growth. The
25:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): productivity gains that uh Chair Wars had had cited in his candidacy period you know can only be realized if if that sort of uh activity is tolerated. And what we can see historically is that when the economy has been in recession, the the highest beta sector, so to speak, has
25:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): been in corporate investment. When the economy goes into recession, uh corporate investment falls um you know quite strongly. And so the the risk for chair wars, I think, uh is that in in tightening aggressively to push inflation back to the two 2% percent target, that he could actually choke off some of that investment
26:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with very
26:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): profound long-term implications. And so there is, I think, some background pressure to continue to tolerate inflation, or at least to tighten at a very deliberate pace. And that's how we interpreted the skip in October. Latest view is is that uh we will see a December hike. and
26:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a March hike. And I think there's uh some chance that uh if you've seen recent Fed comments, that that March hike could be brought forward. That still speaks to the the inflation picture uh that we see in the SEP, the dot plot, as it were. I've referred to this as the immaculate disinflation, where unemployment stays at about
26:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 4.1%, four point one percent, but inflation returns to target within the policy range. relevant horizon. The pressure again though is to do less rather than more. And so it with respect to the task forces, we have an open eye and open ear uh for potential changes in how the Fed thinks and acts
27:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh that might be conducive to uh a further period of of uh let's say patience with respect. uh uh to underlying inflation. The the first um you know issue is is there's every reason to think the Fed will be open-minded uh uh about how it expresses its inflation target.
27:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Historically, it has been, of course, in in consumption goods inflation, the um PCE. The the personnel on the inflation frameworks committee, uh you know, not coincidentally, uh um, have done very dramatic work or very influential work over the last decades uh on this and and other topics. So
27:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Greg Mankew is is uh is a well-known economist that has been in the public sector, public sector roles before, and he has written on the possibility of of thinking beyond simply consumer price inflation. And then I think that we've heard some intimations of this from Chair Warsh. talking about overall price stability vis-a-vis
28:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): consumer price, price stability. And what Mankew's work suggests is that maybe the economy as a whole could benefit if we have a broader construction of price pressures rather than just consumer prices. And the example and in the work that he has done has been in nominal wages. So instead of
28:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just selecting a price index corresponding to the a consumption basket, um he asks the question is what if we what if we uh include such things as nominal wage gains? That's a price. And we apply weights in such a way um that we minimize uh overall economic volatility. When you go through these
28:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exercises, you see that, well, um it it actually makes a lot of sense to put a high weight on such things as nominal wages. And um they call this a stability price index. But the point is that if they're not targeting consumer prices directly, and I think there's you know some probability of this, that on average you can see some slippage
29:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from a very strict two percent target. But the idea is that there's flexibility and there is the ability to, for example, you know, let the current and and in investment wave go through without interference, to the extent that uh more broadly speaking, the price of labor, uh even potentially asset prices are are somewhat
29:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stable. Uh you note I I mentioned uh nominal wages. I think there's a another sort of avenue of thought that uh the Fed might alternatively target other nominal aggregates, say, you know, nominal GDP. And I think all of these are important because it de-emphasizes, again, uh a strict definition of
29:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): consumer uh price inflation. If you're targeting a nominal aggregate, then you you distinguish less between uh what is the inflation component and what is the real component. And rather, for the example of say nominal GDP targeting, you're worried about total spending. And from quarter to quarter, you care less
30:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on the margin as to whether that is a real effect or if that is an inflation effect. And I think the market would see these sorts of changes in thought process as greater tolerance for inflation. And that has been the recurrent theme in our work over the last year. They might not change
30:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the definition of price to better. stability for PCE from 2% to 3%. But to the extent that they are talking about other tools, other ways of thinking about inflation across the broader economy, all of these I think would be on balance, dovish innovations. And so when we look at the year
30:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ahead for yields, I think that one scenario that we're very sensitive to.
30:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that perhaps the Fed progresses to another one, two, even three uh rate hikes. Um, but evidence on the slope of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation suggests to to push inflation lower that would require a very large sacrifice in terms of higher unemployment.
31:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the scenario which figures very heavily in our thinking. is that rates go up. Perhaps growth begins to slow on the margin. Again, it seems to be accelerating, if anything, at the moment. But if growth begins to slow on the margin, yet inflation is sticky high, what will the Fed do? Can the Fed choose to induce a
31:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): recession to tame inflation? And so as we think about potential innovations, I I don't think it requires. the kind of nuclear alternative, the the the change in the underlying uh uh um growth rate of uh PCE or core PCE. It's it's the the softer changes, the
31:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): more methodological changes which could de-emphasize the strict definition uh in deference to a a broader policy goal. And um potential growth is extraordinarily important. It it figures into everything. It figures uh into debt sustainability, for example. And so, you know, I again our view
32:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for the rate market is that investors will be challenged with a a a Fed that is on the margin perhaps more tolerant, even if for a very specific reason of inflation than then the very strict 2% two percent construction might suggest.
32:28
Imogen Bachra: You mentioned there that it's important for how we think about debt sustainability. If we're thinking about a Fed that is perhaps more tolerant of higher inflation than it has been in the past and therefore, like you say, is a dovish innovation in the way that we think about the outlook for rates, does that temper the extent to which
32:48
Imogen Bachra: you are worried about the kind of fiscal risk premia that might be priced into the curve in 2027, given that we're talking about an all else equal, less concerning rate outlook from a debt sustainability perception? Or is that the case? But then this idea that there
33:08
Imogen Bachra: needs to be more inflation term premia built into the curve just offsets that loss of, to some extent, fiscal risk premium. premia.
33:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I mean, uh, you know, looking at the the fiscal outlook and and particularly in light of the the political change that we've experienced, it's hard to imagine uh the political will surfacing for serious consolidation. Uh you know, we go from one electoral cycle to the next. So We've had the midterms, and now we should be thinking strategically
33:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in terms of the 2008 president. presidential election. And it's hard to imagine taking into that the argument to the voting public that we're going to really uh tighten our belt and reduce uh you know fiscal pressure. Um rather, I think it leads to the same sort of conclusion as as our
33:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): earlier analysis, uh in that uh a little bit of inflation, a polite amount of inflation uh makes fiscal decisions much easier. And some of the other work uh done by members of the inflation uh you know frameworks uh task force is relevant here. Thomas Sargent is a Nobel laureate, and he's
34:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): written specifically on monetary policy choices when the growth rate of debt exceeds the growth rate of the economy, and you can get some straight strange results there. If tighter policy today and that sort of construction can actually lead to higher inflation in the future, to the
34:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): extent that ultimately the debt must be monetized. And so the fiscal and the inflation, inflationary outlook are are very deeply related. You can look at inflation as an alternative means of financing the fiscal. decisions that are you know made by the government. And again,
34:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's uh every reason to think that on the margin, it is politically more expedient to allow uh uh you know modestly higher inflation on the margin. Uh you know again it doesn't mean five percent, but it might mean three percent. And you know, to the extent that the policy tools change, so they're not chained to this two percent 2%
35:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): number, uh, you know, that task could could be easier. And so I think what we see in terms of curve flattening and long evaluations is is a market that is still very much fixed within uh the the old paradigm. Uh um, you know, a static set of exogenously dictated uh parameters for
35:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): monetary policy. Uh, but again, uh uh on the margin as the economy evolves, it makes sense that those parameters might evolve themselves. And the presence of these task forces and the personnel on these task forces tells us that these very important issues are being discussed.
35:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think that we should always expect central bank uh gradualism, Uh uh, you know, a a surprise announcement. of a major change is unlikely. But uh we should also consider that you know Chair Wars is looking forward to changing the meeting alignment or the meeting purposes to where you have a couple of meetings uh you
36:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know per year dedicated exclusively to strategy. And so all of these things might be seen as a window for a gradual change in how policy is conceived uh and executed. And I think it's it's uh very much the case that on the margin, changes will be in a more tolerant or or perhaps
36:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): patient view of inflation. You know, again, for very long term goals. But the issue here is being instead of pennywise, pound foolish, as it might be to induce recession to choke out inflation, but perhaps to be penny pity foolish and pound wise, perhaps it's a better idea to tolerate some inflation in the near term, to get that AI
36:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investment, to get faster potential growth, to improve debt sustainability over time, ultimately um to reduce the risk that a a more aggressive monetization could be necessary.
37:06
Imogen Bachra: Okay. Thank you, Stuart. Brian, let's zoom out a bit here then. We've we've talked a lot in this podcast already about upside risk. risks to inflation. We've talked in detail about the potential for a slightly changed Fed reaction function. How does this feed into your FEX views in the year ahead? I
37:26
Imogen Bachra: mean, reconsidering inflation expectations and the central bank reaction function in 2026 has been one of, if not the key driver of rates markets.
37:36
Imogen Bachra: But the lack of change in relative rates has probably meant that the spillover into FX has actually been quite limited. So whilst we've had a very volatile year in fixed income, that hasn't been the case in FX. Do you expect that dynamic to continue in 2027, or how important will monetary policy be as a driver of
37:56
Imogen Bachra: FX next year?
37:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, thanks very much, Imogen. So you're you're exactly right that when you look at the difference between headline volatility
38:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and interest rate market volatility, even equity market volatility, when you compare that to FX in 2026, in hindsight, FX was relatively well behaved, relatively be calmed. And I think it was primarily because of that relative dynamic that a lot of the global factors that uh Roth discussed on inflation,
38:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): things like higher energy prices, of course. more recently some signs of lower energy prices, but changes in energy prices and how markets internalize those have been taking place more in lockstep rather than differentiated. Similarly, in a lot of economies, these challenges related to fiscal policy, that as these yields have gone up,
38:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): markets have internalized some of that higher uh refinancing cost uh into global yield pressures. And that's been something that certainly across major economies has been consistent. And of course, in foreign exchange markets, what we're often looking for is differentiation between economies, differentiation between relative policies, and you do certainly see signs of
39:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that. There is certainly space for that differentiation to come through in 2027 in certain economies. Things like where is local growth performing the best, who has say, for example, high linkages to uh AI-related pressures, whether it be coming from additional spending or eventually potentially disinflation
39:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): way down the road. Things like who is more exposed to energy shortages and other factors. And so it's not to say that there's no space for differentiation across major economies, but I think the broad broader point has been that a lot of our expectations for 2027 hinge on this idea
39:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that for the most part, we're going to see central bank expectations moving together based on these global drivers. You'll have periods of where, if, for example, energy prices are rising, markets are becoming more concerned about inflation, that's going to be pushing a lot of these interest rates up together, albeit maybe by differentiated amount. amounts, which can create those
40:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): divergences. You know, as we look ahead to 2027, one thing that I see across major central banks is that the scale of the tightening is very uncertain in most of these economies. We think somewhere between one and two interest rate hikes more to come is the right level in a lot of these economies. But I think most agree that risks
40:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there are to the upside.
40:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But as
40:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I look ahead to next year, I see at the end of the first half of 2027, most of the major central banks are likely to be done with their tightening cycles and entering a prolonged period of pause from there. And so maybe we'd enter a situation into the back half of next year where
40:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): relative policy changes, monetary policy becomes maybe a lesser driver. because everyone ends up effectively on hold. And oftentimes, when you head into an environment where this mid-cycle tightening adjustment comes to its end, what might end up mattering for currency markets is where central banks fall on the league table
41:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of absolute carry. So for example, some of the strongest currencies in 2026 were those who were relatively early tighteners and those that tightened aggressively and put themselves towards the more enviable side of the carry position table, things like Australian dollar and uh and Norwegian krona, for example. Those that have been relative
41:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): laggards have been among the underperformers, although it hasn't necessarily been a one-to-one.
41:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
41:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so one thing that we're watching next year is that these currencies that had been relatively higher. hikers and moved faster, moved to higher levels, have been
41:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): supported during that period.
41:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But if we head
41:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): into a
41:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): period where
41:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): most
41:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): central
41:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): banks are unchanged, it might
41:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): matter
41:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
41:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): just if those levels are changing, but where we've ended up on that carry differential. Because I think if we're heading into an environment where investors are not seeing a ton of room for differentiation,
41:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
41:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): maybe that
41:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): absolute position
41:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): holding
42:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): those higher yielding currencies ends
42:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): up being something.
42:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's attractive.
42:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Some notable
42:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): exceptions here when we're thinking about carry.
42:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You know,
42:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
42:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Bank of Japan and the SNB
42:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
42:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): moving on their own pace, on their own path, just given where they're coming from on the inflation side, where they're coming from on the growth side. Uh certainly on the currency side, uh, these two currencies are two traditional safe havens. And it's not often you can say this, but the bank of Japan, you know, has
42:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): been for a very long time the standard bearer of low and negative interest rates. That's just no longer the case now with the Bank of Japan, one of several central banks we expect to hike multiple times in 2027. The S and B, by contrast, is expected to leave rates at extremely low levels. They're effectively the final standard bearer for zero interest
42:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): rates in the developed world. And so as we think about relative safe havens and shifting expectations around that, there's a potential carry story here between the safe havens of Yen and Swiss that we think is interesting going into next year. So just to summarize a couple of the things we're thinking here is that we do see further tightening in a lot of central banks. In some cases, the markets are
43:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): hawkishly dispositioned versus our versus our base case.
43:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
43:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's an understandable disposition, right? I think everyone agrees that the risk reward around our base case probably leans to the hawkish direction. So in that case, we don't see a ton of differentiation as a major driver for FX markets. I think we're looking ahead to 2027 as a a year that looks somewhat similar to 2026,
43:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): where uh monetary policy differentiation maybe isn't that big uh driver of markets that creates significant. trending markets instead maybe more range bound sort sorts of conditions where you're considering uh trying to be careful around positioning, picking your spots in FX trading, uh, and really focused on those absolute differentials.
43:51
Imogen Bachra: Thank you, Brian. Okay. I think that's all for this episode of I Year Ahead 2027 series. I think if there's a key takeaway from this recording, it's the persistence of inflation pressures that extend beyond just risks from energy prices. We've got different
44:11
Imogen Bachra: economic conditions across the major economies, but also potentially significant changes in the way that the central banks, particularly in the US, respond. And all of these shape the path ahead for uh rates uh but um for markets as well. Thank you. to all of you for joining me to discuss all of this. Thank you to our listeners
44:31
Imogen Bachra: for listening in. I'm Imogen Backgra, and we'll be back with another conversation exploring the themes likely to shape 2027 in our year-ahead series.
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