Warren Buffett details USAir write-down, 'fat wallet' growth limits, and look-through earnings in 1994 letter
Summary
Warren Buffett identifies his $358 million USAir preferred stock investment as his biggest mistake, citing sloppy analysis and hubris in a deregulated airline industry. He explains that Berkshire's net worth grew 13.9% in 1994 but warns that future returns will not match the past due to the 'fat wallet' problem caused by the firm's $11.9 billion size. The letter highlights the divergence between book value and intrinsic value using the Scott Fetzer example, where earnings doubled despite declining book value. Buffett also introduces 'look-through earnings' as a more accurate performance metric, calculating $1.03 billion for 1994. Finally, he critiques standard stock options for misaligning management incentives and praises retiring CEOs Dan Burke and Carl Reichart.
Key takeaways
- 1 Buffett categorizes the USAir investment as an 'unforced error' caused by sloppy analysis and hubris, specifically failing to focus on the unsustainable cost structure of a high-cost airline in a deregulated environment.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:21
- 2 Retiring CEOs Dan Burke and Carl Reichart are praised for leaving their companies in 'outstanding hands' despite tough industry conditions, highlighting the importance of succession planning.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 5:18
- 3 To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank, or depository.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 6:24
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 4:11
Mistake Du Jour: USAir Preferred Stock Write-Down
Warren Buffett identifies the $358 million purchase of USAir preferred stock as his biggest mistake, citing sloppy analysis and hubris. He explains that deregulation exposed high-cost airlines to low-cost competitors, leading to a fundamental economic rule where costs must fall or face extinction. The investment was written down to $89.5 million (25 cents on the dollar) by year-end 1994.
- 4:11 – 5:18
Accounting Treatment and Board Resignation
Buffett details the GAAP accounting impact, noting a $269 million non-cash charge to the income statement in Q4 1994 because the decline was deemed other-than-temporary. He announces that he and Charlie Munger will not stand for reelection to USAir's board, though they remain available for consultation.
- 5:18 – 6:43
Retiring CEOs and Shareholder Contributions
The letter honors retiring CEOs Dan Burke of Capital Cities/ABC and Carl Reichart of Wells Fargo for their leadership during tough industry conditions. It highlights that 95.7% of eligible shares participated in the 1994 shareholder-designated contributions program, totaling $10.4 million for 3,300 charities.
- 6:43 – 11:58
Acquisition Criteria and Annual Meeting Logistics
Berkshire made only one minor acquisition in 1994, a small retail shoe chain. Buffett discusses the need for shareholder authorization to issue preferred stock for future rapid acquisitions. He provides detailed logistics for the 1995 annual meeting, including a new venue (Holiday Convention Center), hotel recommendations, and events like a baseball game and visits to Nebraska Furniture Mart.
- 11:58 – 14:02
Performance Review and the 'Fat Wallet' Problem
Berkshire's net worth grew $1.45 billion (13.9%) in 1994, capping 30 years of 23% compounded annual returns. Buffett warns that future performance will not match the past because Berkshire's $11.9 billion net worth is too large to deploy effectively in small opportunities, requiring a minimum $100 million deployment.
- 14:02 – 17:11
Investment Philosophy and Macro Forecasts
Buffett rejects political and economic forecasts as distractions, citing the unpredictable events of the last 30 years that did not derail Ben Graham's principles. He emphasizes sticking to the 'happy zone' of investable opportunities and promises that shareholder fortunes will mirror his own, with personal wealth heavily concentrated in Berkshire shares.
- 17:11 – 19:02
Partial Ownership of Great Businesses
The letter highlights the importance of partial ownership in high-quality businesses like Coca-Cola, Gillette, and Wells Fargo. It notes that Berkshire's 7.8% stake in Coca-Cola generated nearly $200 million in earnings, while its 13% stake in Wells Fargo generated $100 million, illustrating the value of owning 'rare gems' rather than 100% of mediocre businesses.
- 19:02 – 32:01
Book Value vs. Intrinsic Value: The Scott Fetzer Example
Buffett uses Scott Fetzer to illustrate the divergence between book value and intrinsic value. Since its 1986 acquisition, Scott Fetzer's book value declined from $173 million to $94 million due to amortization of the acquisition premium, while its earnings doubled. This demonstrates that carrying value can fall while intrinsic value rises significantly.
- 32:01 – 34:14
Corporate Acquisitions and CEO Psychology
The speaker argues that most major acquisitions benefit acquirer management and bankers but reduce acquirer shareholder wealth because the acquirer typically pays more than the intrinsic value received. This behavior is driven by CEOs with abundant 'animal spirits' and ego, who are often encouraged by advisors to make deals to fit in with peers.
- 34:14 – 36:49
Berkshire Compensation Philosophy
Berkshire compensates managers like Ralph Schey based on their specific unit's results rather than Berkshire's overall performance to avoid capricious rewards. The system uses a 'money's not free' approach with high hurdle rates for capital, ensuring alignment by penalizing substandard returns on incremental investment.
- 36:49 – 39:36
Stock Options and Misalignment
Standard stock options are criticized as misaligned because they do not adjust for retained earnings building company wealth, allowing managers to gain even if they 'tread water.' The speaker notes that such plans often act as 'heads I win, tails you lose' arrangements for management.
- 39:36 – 43:21
Sources of Reported Earnings
Operating earnings before tax rose to $839 million from $643 million, with insurance underwriting leading the way. However, total earnings were pulled down by a $269 million write-down on USAir preferred stock and a decline in gains from securities sales.
- 43:21 – 46:05
Look-Through Earnings Calculation
Look-through earnings, which the speaker believes more accurately portray Berkshire's performance, consist of reported operating earnings plus the share of undistributed operating earnings of major investees, less hypothetical taxes. For 1994, total look-through earnings were $1.03 billion, up from $841 million in 1993.
- 46:05 – 1:01:47
Insurance Float and Cost of Funds
Float is defined as money held but not owned, arising from prepaid premiums and delayed claim payments. The business is profitable if the cost of float (underwriting loss) is less than the cost of other funds; in 1994, the cost of float was negative, meaning it was a source of profit.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| COCA COLA COKO | equity | neutral | Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express. |
| AMERICAN EXPRESS COAXP | equity | neutral | Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The $358 million purchase of USAir preferred stock resulted in a dividend suspension in September 1994 and a write-down to $89.5 million (25 cents on the dollar) by year-end 1994.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Section on 'Mistake Du Jour' or 'Investments'; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-95-000014. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire Hathaway's net worth grew $1.45 billion, or 13.9%, in 1994, capping thirty years of 23% compounded returns.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·11:58
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Letter from the Chairman; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-95-000014. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire's net worth was $11.9 billion in 1994, compared to about $22 million when Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett began managing the company.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·13:02
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Letter from the Chairman; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-95-000014. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire holds a 7.8% ownership stake in Coca-Cola, which earned a little less than a penny per 8-ounce serving in 1994.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·17:49
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Section on 'Investments'; Coca-Cola 2026 10-K filing on SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire holds a 13% ownership stake in Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank that earned about $100 million in 1994.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·18:14
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Section on 'Investments'; Wells Fargo 2026 10-K filing on SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceScott Fetzer was purchased by Berkshire at the beginning of 1986 for $315.2 million, which had $172.6 million of book value at the time.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·23:40
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Section on 'Scott Fetzer'; Berkshire Hathaway 1986 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Scott Fetzer's book value declined from $173 million at the start of Berkshire's ownership to $94 million at the end of 1994, while earnings rose from $40 million to $79 million.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·24:26
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Section on 'Scott Fetzer'; Scott Fetzer financial statements or Berkshire's consolidated financials. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked fourth on the 1993 Fortune 500 list, behind Silco, LTV, and Gaylord Container, which emerged from bankruptcy.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:54
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Section on 'Scott Fetzer'; Fortune 500 2026 list; SEC filings for LTV, Silco, and Gaylord Container. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe shareholder-designated contributions program received $10.4 million in contributions from 95.7% of eligible shares, benefiting 3,300 charities.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·5:45
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 1994 Annual Report, Section on 'Shareholder-Designated Contributions'; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-95-000014. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire's pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million, with employment growing from 5,000 to 22,000 employees.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·16:55
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Financial Statements; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-95-000014. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMost major acquisitions reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent, because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than it receives.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:01
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, page 18 (Acquisitions section). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire's operating earnings before tax rose to $839 million from $643 million, and after taxes and minority interest to $606 million from $478 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:50
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 10-K filing, Consolidated Statements of Income. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceLook-through earnings for 1994 were $1.03 billion, up from $841 million in 1993.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:46
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Look-Through Earnings section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Undistributed operating earnings of major investees came to $492 million, with Coca-Cola leading at $116 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:05
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Look-Through Earnings section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire's float grew from about $17 million in 1967 to $3.06 billion in 1994.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·47:34
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Insurance Operations section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In 1984, the cost of float was almost 19%, against a government bond yield of about 11.5%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·47:54
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Insurance Operations section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire's common stockholdings had a market value at year-end of about $13.97 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·54:09
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 10-K filing, Schedule of Investments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire sold ten million shares of Cap Cities at $63 in late 1993, and the price was $85.25 at year-end 1994.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:01:02
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Mistake du Jour section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire purchased Cap Cities stock at $17.25 in 1986.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:01:15
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Mistake du Jour section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Read the full 1994 Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter to verify the $358 million USAir purchase and $269 million write-down figures.
- Check GAAP accounting standards for 'other-than-temporary impairment' to understand the non-cash charge mechanics described.
- Verify Berkshire's 1994 net worth growth of $1.45 billion (13.9%) against the company's 1994 10-K filing.
- Review the Scott Fetzer acquisition details to confirm the divergence between book value decline and earnings growth.
- Calculate look-through earnings using the formula provided: reported operating earnings + share of undistributed investee earnings - hypothetical taxes.
- Analyze the cost of float for Berkshire's insurance subsidiaries to assess if underwriting losses were negative as claimed.
- Compare standard stock option accounting rules from the 1990s to the current FASB standards to understand the misalignment critique.
- Check the performance of USAir (later US Airways) stock post-1994 to validate the 'extinction' risk thesis for high-cost carriers.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Egregious as it is,
0:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
0:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cap City's decision earns only a silver medal. Top honors go to a mistake I made five years ago that fully ripened in 1994, our $358 million purchase of US Air preferred stock, on which the dividend was suspended in September. In the nineteen ninety annual report, I correctly described this deal as an unforced Forced error, meaning that I was neither pushed into the investment nor misled by anyone when making it. Rather, I think this was a case of sloppy analysis, a lapse that may have been caused by the fact that we were buying a senior security or by hubris. Whatever the reason, the mistake was large. Before this purchase, I simply failed to focus on the problems that would inevitably beset a carrier whose costs were both high and extremely difficult to lower. In earlier years, these life-threatening life threatening costs posed few problems. Airlines were then protected from competition by regulation, and carriers could absorb high costs because they could pass them along by way of fares that were also high. When deregulation came along, it did not immediately change the picture.
1:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): capacity of low cost carriers was so small that the high cost lines could, in large part, maintain Maintained their existing fare structures. During this period, with the longer longer-term term problems largely invisible, but slowly metastasizing, the costs that were non-sustainable became further embedded.
1:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
1:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the seat capacity of the low-cost operators expanded, their fares began to force the old-line high-cost airlines to cut their own.
1:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): day of reckoning for these airlines could be delayed by infusions of capital such as ours into US air, but eventually a fundamental rule of economics prevailed. In an unregulated commodity business of the a company must lower its costs to competitive levels or face extinction. This principle should have been obvious to your chairman,
1:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
1:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I missed
1:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
1:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Seth Schofield, CEO of US Air, has worked diligently to correct the company's historical cost problems, but to date, has not managed to do so. In part, this is because he has had to deal with a moving target, the result of certain major carriers having
2:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to be able to do that.
2:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): obtained labor concessions and other carriers having benefited from fresh start costs that came out of bankruptcy proceedings.
2:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
2:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Herb Kelleher, CEO of Southwest Airlines, has said, bankruptcy court for airlines has become a health spa. Additionally, it should be no surprise to anyone that those airline employees who contractually receive above market salaries will resist any reduction in these as long as their checks continue to reach. clear. Despite this difficult situation, US Air may yet achieve the cost reductions it needs to maintain its viability long term,
2:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
2:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it is far from sure that will happen. Accordingly, we wrote our US Air investment down to eighty nine point five million dollars twenty five cents on the dollar at year end nineteen 1994. ninety four. This valuation reflects both a possibility that our preferred will have its value fully or largely restored, and an opposite possibility that the stock will eventually become worthless. Whatever the outcome, we will heed a prime rule of investing. You don't have to make it back the way that you lost
3:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
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4:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
4:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accounting effects of our US Air write down are complicated. Under GAAP accounting, insurance companies are required to carry all stocks on their balance sheets at estimated market value. Therefore, at the end of last year's third quarter, we were carrying our US Air preferred. at $89.5 million, or 25% of cost. In other words, our net worth was at that time reflecting a value for US Air that was far below our $358 million cost.
4:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
4:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the fourth quarter, we concluded that the decline in value was in accounting terms other than temporary. and that judgment required us to send the write down of two hundred sixty nine million dollars through our income statement. The amount will have no other fourth quarter effect. That is, it will not reduce our net worth because the diminution of value had already been reflected. Charlie and I will not stand for reelection to U.S. Air's board at the upcoming annual meeting. Should Seth wish to consult with us, however, we will be pleased to be of any help that we can. can. Two CEOs who have done great things for Berkshire shareholders retired last year, Dan Burke of Capital Cities ABC, and Carl Reichart of Wells Fargo. Dan and Carl encountered very tough industry conditions in recent years, but their skill as managers allowed the businesses they ran to emerge from these periods with record earnings, added luster, and bright prospects. Additionally, Dan and Carl prepared well for their departure and left their companies in outstanding hands.
5:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
5:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): owe them our gratitude. About 95.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1994 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $10.4 million, and 3,300 charities were recipients. Every year, a few shareholders miss participating in the program because they either do not have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed for its return. Since we don't make exceptions when requirements aren't met, we urge that both new shareholders and old read the description of our shareholder designated contributions program that appears later in this report. report. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank, or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31st, 1995 will be ineligible for the 1995 program.
6:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
6:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made only one minor acquisition during 1994, nineteen ninety-four, a small retail shoe chain, but our interest in finding good. candidates remains as keen as ever. The criteria we employ for purchases or mergers is detailed in the appendix to this report. Last spring, we offered to merge with a large family controlled business on terms that included a Berkshire convertible preferred stock. Though we failed to reach an agreement, this episode made me realize that we needed to ask our shareholders to authorize preferred shares in case we wanted in the future to move quickly. if a similar acquisition opportunity were to appear. Accordingly, our proxy presents a proposal that you authorize a large amount of preferred stock, which will be issuable on terms set by the board of directors.
7:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
7:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can be sure that Charlie and I will not use these shares without being completely satisfied that we are receiving as much an intrinsic value as we are giving. Charlie and I hope you can come to the annual meeting and at a new site. Last year, we slightly overran the Orpheum Theater's seating capacity of two thousand seven hundred and fifty, and therefore we will assemble at nine thirty in the morning on Monday, may first, nineteen ninety five, at the Holiday Convention Center. The main ballroom at the center can handle three thousand three hundred, and if need be, we will have audio and video equipment in an adjacent room capable of handling another. one thousand people.
8:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Last
8:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year we displayed some of Berkshire's products at the meeting, and as a result sold about eight hundred pounds of candy, five hundred seven pairs of shoes, and over twelve thousand dollars of world books and related publications. All these goods will be available again this year. Though we like to think of the meeting as a spiritual experience, we must remember that even the least secular of religions includes the ritual of the collection plate. Our cover color this year is a salute to Nebraska's football coach Tom Osborne and his cornhuskers, the country's top college team. I urge you to wear husker red to the annual meeting and promise you that at least fifty percent of your managerial duo will be
8:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a good one.
8:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in appropriate attire.
8:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
8:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations for the meeting, as we expect a large crowd. Those of you who like to be downtown, about six miles from the center, may wish to stay at the Radison Redick Tower, a small hotel of eighty eight rooms, but a nice one, or at the much larger Red Lion Hotel a few blocks away. In the vicinity of the center are the Holiday Inn, the Homewood Suites and the Hampton Inn. Another recommended spot is the Marriott, whose West Omaha location is about one hundred yards from Borsheim's and a ten minute drive from the center. There will be buses at the Marriott that will leave at eight forty five and nine o'clock for the meeting and return after it ends.
9:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
9:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. A good sized parking area is available at the center, while those who stay at the Holiday Inn, Homewood Suites, and Hampton Inn will be able to walk to the meeting. As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart in Borsheim's after the meeting, and to take you from there to hotels or the airport Report later. I hope you make a special effort to visit the Nebraska Furniture Mart because it has opened the Mega Martin. Mart, a true retailing marvel that sells electronics, appliances, computers, compact discs, cameras, and audio equipment. Sales have been sensational since the opening, and you will be amazed by both the variety of products available and their display on the floor.
10:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
10:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Megamart, adjacent to the Furniture Mart's main store, is on our sixty-four-acre sixty four acre site about two miles north of the center. The stores are open for from ten in the morning to nine at night on Fridays, ten to six on Saturdays, and noon to six on Sundays. When you're there, be sure to say hello to misses B, who at one hundred one will be hard at work in our misses B's warehouse. She never misses a day at the store. Or for that matter, an hour. Borshimes Oorshimes normally is closed on Sunday, but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to six in the evening on Sunday. This is always a special day, and we will try to have a few surprises. Usually this is the biggest sales day of the year, so for more reasons than one, Charlie and I hope to see you there.
11:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
11:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Saturday evening, april twenty ninth, there will be a baseball game at Rosenblatt Stadium between the Omaha Royals and the Buffalo Bisons. The Buffalo team is owned by my friends, Mindy and Bob Rich Jr., and I'm hoping they will attend. If so, I will try to entice Bob into a one-pitch duel on the mound. Bob is a capitalist's Randy Johnson. Young, strong, and athletic, and not the sort of fellow you want to face early in the season.
11:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
11:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I will need plenty of vocal support.
11:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
11:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game. About 1,400 one thousand four hundred shareholders attended the event last year. Opening the game that night, I had my stuff. and threw a strike that the scoreboard reported at eight miles per hour. What many fans missed was that I shook off the catcher's call for my fastball and instead delivered my changeup. This year it will be all smoke. Warren E Buffett, Chairman of the Board, March seventh, nineteen ninety five. To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated.
11:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
11:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gain in net worth during nineteen ninety four was one point four five billion dollars. or thirteen point nine percent. Over the last thirty years, that is, since present management took over, our per share book value has grown from nineteen dollars to ten thousand eighty three dollars or at a rate of twenty three percent compounded annually. Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman, and my partner, and I, make few predictions.
12:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One.
12:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we will confidently offer, however, is that the future performance of Berkshire won't come close to matching the performance of the past. The problem is not that what has worked in the past will cease to work in the future. To the contrary, we believe that our formula, the purchase at sensible prices of businesses that have good underlying economics and are run by honest and able people will is certain to produce reasonable success. We expect therefore to keep on doing well.
12:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
12:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fat wallet, however, is the enemy of superior investment results,
13:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
13:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire now has a net worth of eleven point nine billion dollars compared to about twenty-two million dollars when Charlie and I began to manage the company. Though there are as many good businesses as ever, it is useless for us to make purchases that are inconsequential in relation to Berkshire's capital. As Charlie regularly reminds me, if something is not worth doing at all, it's not worth doing well. We now consider a security for purchase only if we believe we can deploy at least one $100 hundred million dollars in it. Given that minimum, Berkshire's investment. universe has shrunk dramatically. Nevertheless, we will stick with the approach that got us here and try not to relax our standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My Life, explains why. My argument is
13:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
13:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be a good hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. It's the first rule in the book. If I have to bite at stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a three hundred forty four hitter. I might only be a two hundred fifty hitter. Charlie and I agree, and we'll try to wait for opportunities that are well within our own happy zone. We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. Thirty years ago, no one could have foreseen between the huge expansion of the Vietnam War, wage and price controls, two oil shocks, and the resignation of a president, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a one day drop in the Dow of five hundred eight points, or Treasury bill yields fluctuating between two point eight percent and seventeen point four percent. But surprise,
14:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): none
14:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of these blockbuster events made the slightest dent in Ben Graham's investment principles, nor did they render unsound the negotiated purchases of fine businesses at sensible prices. Imagine the cost to us then if we had let a fear of unknowns cause us to defer or alter the deployment of capital. Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the fattest, but the friend of the fundamentalist.
15:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
15:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): different set of major shocks is sure to occur in the next thirty years. We will neither try to predict these nor to profit. from them. If we can identify businesses similar to those we have purchased in the past, external surprises will have little effect on our long term results. What we promise you, along with more modest gains,
15:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
15:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that during your ownership of Berkshire, you will fare just as Charlie and I do. You, If you suffer, we will suffer. If we prosper, so will you, and we will not break the this bond by introducing compensation arrangements that give us a greater participation in the upside than the downside.
15:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
15:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): further promise you that our personal fortunes will remain overwhelmingly concentrated in Berkshire shares. We will not ask you to invest with us and then put our own money elsewhere. In addition, Berkshire dominates both the investment portfolios of most members of our families and of a great many members. friends who belong to partnerships that Charlie and I ran in the 1960s. We could not be more motivated to do our best. Luckily, we have a good base from which to work. Ten years ago, in nineteen eighty four, Berkshire's insurance companies held securities having a value of one $1.7 point seven billion dollars or about one $1,500 thousand five hundred dollars per Berkshire share. Leaving aside all income and capital gains from those securities, Berkshire's pre-tax earnings that year were only about $6 million. We had earnings, yes, from our various manufacturing, retailing, and service businesses, but they were almost entirely offset by the combination of underwriting losses in our insurance business, corporate overhead, and interest expense.
16:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
16:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we hold security. securities worth $18 billion or over $15,000 per Berkshire share,
16:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
16:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you again exclude all income from these securities. Our pre-tax earnings in 1994 were about $384 million. During the decade, employment has grown from $5,000 to $22,000, including 11 people at World Headquarters.
17:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
17:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb core of operators. operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as getting paid for home runs, other fellows hit. That's my formula at Berkshire, also.
17:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
17:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses in which we have partial interests are equally important to Berkshire's success. A few statistics will illustrate their significance. In 1994, nineteen ninety four, Coca-Cola sold about two hundred eighty billion eight ounce servings and earned a little less than a penny on each. But pennies add up, through Berkshire's seven point eight percent ownership of Coke, we have an economic interest in twenty one billion of its servings, which produce soft drink earnings for us of nearly two hundred million dollars. Similarly, by way of its Gillette stock, Berkshire has a seven percent share of the world's razor and blade market, measured by revenues, not by units.
18:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
18:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): proportion according us about
18:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): two
18:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hundred fifty million dollars of sales in nineteen ninety-four, and at Wells Fargo, a fifty-three fifty three billion dollar bank, our thirteen percent ownership translates into a seven billion dollar Berkshire. bank that earned about one hundred million dollars during nineteen ninety four. It's far better to own a significant portion of the Hope Diamond than one hundred percent of a rhinestone,
18:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
18:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the companies just mentioned easily qualify as rare gems. Best of all, we aren't limited to simply a few of this breed, but instead possess a growing collection. Stock prices will continue to fluctuate. sometimes sharply, and the economy will have its ups and downs. Over time, however, we believe it highly probable that the sort of businesses we own will continue to increase in value at a satisfactory rate. Book value and intrinsic value. We regularly report our per share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly, we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate. For example, in nineteen sixty four, we could state with certitude that Berkshire's per share book value was nineteen dollars forty six cents. Sense. However, that figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since all the of company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In nineteen sixty four, then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance sheet might well have deserved the
19:55answer once offered up by a Hollywood mogul Woodmogul of dubious reputation. Don't worry, the liabilities are solid.
20:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Today,
20:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire's situation is reversed. Many of the businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying value. Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette, are carried at current market values. We continue to give you book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough, albeit significantly It's understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the two measures moved in concert, book value gained thirteen point nine percent, and that was the approximate gain in intrinsic value also.
20:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
20:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised. and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments in businesses. To see how historical input, book value, and future output, intrinsic value, can diverge, let's look at another form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its book value. If it is to be accurate, the cost should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job. For this exercise, we will ignore the important non economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime.
21:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Bet
21:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): BetMGM, MGM, an official sports betting partner of the National Hockey League, is ready for puck drop. Now hockey fans in Alberta can get in on the action from the opening face-off with goal in first 10, a betting market where you can call whether a goal will be scored by any team in the first 10 minutes of a game. From pregame to live bets, same game parlays, player props, and more, BetMGM has over 500 NHL betting markets to choose from. And the BetMGM app has instant deposit and fast withdrawal options, including Interact e-transfer, Visa, MasterCard, and Apple Pay, and more. Download the BetMGM app and don't miss a second of the opening minutes. BetMGM, an official sports betting partner of the National Hockey League, your home for hockey bets all season long. See BetMGM.com for terms. 18 plus only, bet responsibly. Alberta only, subject to eligibility requirements.
22:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): If gambling is affecting your mental health or well-being, well being, 211 Alberta is here to help. Call or text 211 or visit ab.211.ca. Standard message and data rates may apply. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with the Alberta Eye Gaming Corporation.
22:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
22:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted at an appropriate interest rate. back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education. Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education
23:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): will
23:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
23:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
23:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's get less academic and look at Scott Fetzer, an example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic value can change, but also will provide an accounting lesson that I know you have been breathlessly awaiting. Naturally, I've chosen here to talk about. an acquisition that has turned out to be a huge winner. Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at the beginning of 1986. At the time, the company was a collection of twenty two businesses, and today we have exactly the same lineup, no additions and no disposals. Scott Fetzer's main operations are World Book, Kirby, and Campbell Housefeld, but many other units are important contributors to earnings as well. We paid three hundred fifteen point two million dollars for Scott Fetzer, which at the time had one hundred seventy two point six million dollars of book value, the one hundred forty two point six million dollar premium we handed over indicated our belief that the company's intrinsic value was close to double its book value.
24:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
24:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report traces the book value of Scott Fetzer as well as its earnings and dividends since our purchase. The
24:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): shape of
24:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the book. it is this. Scott Fetzer began under our ownership with $173 million of book value, and it ends 1994 with ninety-four million. Yet earnings rose almost without pause across those nine years, from forty million dollars in nineteen eighty-six to seventy-nine million. Last year, the reason book value shrank while earnings grew is that the company sent us nearly everything it made, and then some six hundred. $634 million of dividends against $555 million
24:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
24:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): earnings. Because it had excess cash when our deal was made, Scott Fetzer was able to pay Berkshare dividends of $125 million in 1986,
25:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): though
25:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it earned only $40.3 million. I should mention that we have not introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's balance sheet. In fact, the company has gone from very modest debt when we purchased it to virtually no debt at all, except for debt used by its finance subsidiary. Similarly, we have not sold plants and leased them back, nor sold receivables nor the like. Throughout our years of ownership, Scott Fetzer has operated as a conservatively financed and liquid enterprise.
25:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
25:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings have increased steadily since we bought it, but book value has not grown. commensurately. Consequently, return on equity, which was exceptional at the time of our purchase, has now become truly extraordinary. Just how extraordinary is illustrated by comparing Scott Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune five hundred,
25:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
25:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): group it would qualify for if it were a standalone company. Had Scott Fetzer been on the nineteen 1993, ninety-three Fortune five 500 hundred list?
26:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
26:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): latest available for inspection,
26:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
26:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): company's return on equity would have ranked fourth.
26:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
26:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that is far from the whole story. The top three companies in return on equity were in Silco, LTV, and Gaylord Container, each of which emerged from bankruptcy in 1993,
26:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
26:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): none of which achieved meaningful earnings that year, except for those they realized when they were accorded debt, forgiveness, and bankruptcy. proceedings. Leaving aside such non-operating windfalls, Scott Fetzer's return on equity would have ranked it first on the Fortune 500, well ahead of number two. Indeed, Scott Fetzer's return on equity was double that of the company ranking tenth.
26:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
26:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): might expect that Scott Fetzer's success could only be explained by a cyclical peak in earnings, a monopolistic position, or leverage, but no such circumstances apply. Rather, the company's success comes from the managerial expertise of CEO Ralph Shea, of whom I'll tell you more later. First, however, the promised accounting lesson. When we paid a one hundred forty two point six million dollar premium over book value for Scott Fetzer, that figure had to be recorded on Berkshire's balance sheet. I'll spare you the details of how this worked.
27:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): These
27:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were laid out in an appendix to our 1986 annual report.
27:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
27:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get to the bottom line, after a premium is initially recorded, it must in almost all cases be written off over time through annual charges that are shown as costs in the acquiring company's earnings statement.
27:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
27:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report also shows first the annual charges Berkshire has made to gradually extinguish the Scott Fetzer acquisition premium, and second, the premium that remains on our books. These charges have no effect on cash or the taxes we pay, and are not, in our view, an economic cost, though many accountants would disagree with us. They are merely a way for us to reduce the carrying value of Scott Fetzer on our books so that the figure will eventually match the net worth that Scott Fetzer actually employs in its business. In outline, the premium began at $142.6 one hundred forty two point million. six dollars and has been whittled down by annual charges of roughly seven million dollars, with one larger charge of twenty eight million in nineteen ninety three. Note that by the end of nineteen ninety four, the premium was reduced to fifty four point two million dollars.
28:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
28:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this figure is added to Scott Fetzer's year end book value of ninety ninety-four four million dollars, the total is one hundred forty eight point two million dollars.
28:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
28:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer on Berkshire's books. That amount is less than half of our carrying value for the company when it was acquired.
28:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yet
28:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Scott Fetzer is now earning about twice what it then did. Clearly, the intrinsic value of the business has consistently grown, even though we have just as consistently marked down its carrying value through purchase premium charges that reduced Berkshire's earnings. and net worth.
28:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
28:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): difference between Scott Fetzer's intrinsic value and its carrying value on Berkshire's books is now huge, as I mentioned earlier, but am delighted to mention, again, credit for this agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Shea, a focused, smart, and high grade manager.
29:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
29:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben Graham taught me forty. five years ago that in investing, it is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this statement holds true in business management as well. What a manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted. That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side, Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and is self confident without being self important. He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age.
29:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
29:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do know that, like many of our managers, he is over sixty five. At Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie and I, at seventy one and sixty four, respectively, now keep George. Foreman's picture on our desks.
30:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
30:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can make book that our scorn for a mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year. Intrinsic value and capital allocation. Understanding intrinsic value is as important for managers as it is for investors. When managers are making capital allocation decisions, including decisions to repurchase shares, it's vital that they act in ways that increase. per share intrinsic value and avoid moves that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious, but we constantly see it violated,
30:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
30:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt. For example, in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share, or at financial institutions, to per share book value. An emphasis of this sort carries great dangers. Going back to our college education example, imagine that a 25-year-old, first-year MBA student is considering merging his future economic interests with those of a 25-year-old day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, would find that a share-for-share merger of his equity interest in himself with that of the day laborer would enhance his near-term earnings
31:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
31:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a big way.
31:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
31:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what could be sillier for the student than a deal of this kind?
31:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
31:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): corporate transactions, it's equally silly for the would-be purchaser to focus on current earnings when the prospective acquiree has either different prospects, different amounts of non-operating non operating assets, or a different capital structure. At Berkshire, we have rejected many mergers. merger and purchase opportunities that would have boosted current and near term earnings, but that would have reduced per share intrinsic value. Our approach rather has been to follow Wayne Gretzky's advice
31:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): go
31:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to where the puck is going to be, not to where it is.
31:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
31:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a result, our shareholders are now many billions of dollars richer than they would have been if we had used the standard catechism.
32:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
32:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sad fact is that most major acquisitions are display an egregious imbalance. They are a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiry, they increase the income and status of the acquirer's management, and they are a honeypot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides. But alas, they usually reduce the wealth of the acquirer's shareholders, often to a substantial extent. That happens because the acquirer typically gives up more intrinsic value than. it receives. Almost by definition, a really good business generates far more money, at least after its early years, than it can use internally. The company could, of course, distribute the money to shareholders by way of dividends or share repurchases, but often the CEO asks a strategic planning staff, consultants, or investment bankers, whether an
33:02acquisition or two might make sense. That's like asking your interior decorator whether you need a fifty thousand dollar rug. The acquisition problem is often compounded by a biological bias. Many CEOs attain their positions in part because they possess an abundance of animal spirits and ego. If an executive is heavily endowed with these qualities, which, it should be acknowledged, sometimes have their advantages,
33:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
33:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): won't disappear when he reaches the top. When such a CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make deals, he responds much as would a teenage boy who is encouraged by his family. father to have a normal sex life.
33:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
33:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not a push he needs. Some years back, a CEO friend of mine,
33:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
33:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): jest it must be said, unintentionally described the pathology of many big deals.
33:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
33:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): friend who ran a property casualty insurer was was explaining to his directors why he wanted to acquire a certain life insurance company after droning rather unpersuasively. through the economics and strategic rationale for the acquisition, he abruptly abandoned the script.
34:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): With
34:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an impish look, he simply said, Aw, fellas, all the other kids have one.
34:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
34:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, our managers will continue to earn extraordinary returns from what appear to be ordinary businesses. As a first step, these managers will look for ways to deploy their earnings advantageously in the their businesses. What's left they will send to Charlie and me. We then will try to use those funds in ways that build per share intrinsic value. Our goal will be to acquire either part or all of businesses that we believe we understand that have good sustainable underlying economics and that are run by managers whom we like, admire, and trust. Compensation
34:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
34:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, we try to be as logical about compensation as about capital allocation. For example, we compensate Ralph Shay, based upon the results of Scott Fetzer rather than those of Berkshire. What could make more sense, since he's responsible for one operation but not the other? A cash bonus or a stock option tied to the fortunes of Berkshire would provide totally capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, for example, be hitting home runs at Scott Fetzer, while Charlie and I rang up mistakes at Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts many times over. Conversely, why should option profits or bonuses be heaped upon Ralph if good things are occurring in other parts of Berkshire, but Scott Fetzer is lagging?
35:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
35:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): setting compensation, we like to hold out the promise of large carrots, carats, but make sure their delivery is largely. tied directly to results in the area that a manager controls. When capital invested in an operation is significant, we also both charge managers a high rate for incremental capital they employ and credit them at an equally high rate for capital they release. The product of this money's not free approach is definitely visible at Scott Fetzer. If Ralph can employ incremental funds at good returns, it pays him to do so. His bonus increases when earnings on additional capital exceed a meaningful hurdle charge.
36:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
36:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our bonus calculation is symmetrical. If incremental investment yields substandard returns, the shortfall is costly to Ralph as well as to Berkshire. The consequence of this two-way arrangement is that it pays Ralph
36:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
36:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pays him well
36:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
36:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): send to Omaha any cash he can't advantageously use in. his business. It has become fashionable at public companies to describe almost every compensation plan as aligning the interests of management with those of shareholders. In our book, alignment means being a partner in both directions, not just on the upside. Many alignment plans flunk this basic test being artful forms of heads I win, tails you lose.
36:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
36:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): common form of misalignment occurs. in the typical stock option arrangement, which does not periodically increase the option price to compensate for the fact that retained earnings are building up the wealth of the company. Indeed, the combination of a 10 year option, a low dividend payout, and compound interest can provide lush gains to a manager who has done no more than tread water in his job. A cynic might even note that when payments to owners are held down, the profit to the option holding manager increases.
37:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
37:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have yet to see this vital point spelled out in a proxy statement asking shareholders to approve an option plan.
37:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
37:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't resist mentioning that our compensation arrangement with Ralph Shea was worked out in about five minutes immediately upon our purchase of Scott Fetzer and without the help of lawyers or compensation consultants.
37:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
37:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): arrangement embodies a few very simple ideas.
37:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
37:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the kind of terms favored by consultants who cannot easily send a large bill unless they have established that you have a large problem, and one of course that requires an annual review.
37:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
37:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): agreement with Ralph has never been changed. It made sense to him and to me in 1986, and it makes sense now. Our compensation arrangements with the managers of all our other units are similarly simple, though the terms of each agreement vary. to fit the economic characteristics of the business at issue, the existence in some cases of partial ownership of the unit by managers, and so on. In all instances we pursue rationality, arrangements that pay off in capricious ways, unrelated to a manager's personal accomplishments, may well be welcomed by certain managers. Who, after all, refuses a free lottery ticket? But such arrangements are wasteful. to the company and cause the manager to lose focus on what should be his real areas of concern. Additionally, irrational behavior at the parent may well encourage imitative behavior at subsidiaries.
38:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
38:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, only Charlie and I have the managerial responsibility for the entire business, therefore we are the only parties who should logically be compensated on the basis of what the enterprise does as a whole. Even
38:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so,
38:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that is not a compensation arrangement we desire. We have carefully designed both the company and our jobs so that we do things we enjoy with people we like. Equally important, we are forced to do very few boring or unpleasant tasks. We are the beneficiaries as well of the abundant array of material and psychic perks that flow to the heads of corporations. Under such idyllic conditions, we don't expect shareholders to anti ante up loads of compensation for which we have no idea. possible need. Indeed, if we were not paid at all, Charlie and I would be delighted with the cushy jobs we hold. At bottom, we subscribe to Ronald Reagan's Creed. It's probably true that hard work never killed anyone, but I figure, why take the chance? Sources of reported earnings.
39:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
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40:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
40:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): gambling is affecting your mental health or well-being, 211 Alberta is here to help. Call or text 211 or visit ab.211.ca. Standard message and data rates may apply. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with the Alberta Eye Gaming Corporation.
41:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
41:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase premium charges of the type we discussed in our earlier analysis of Scott Fetzer are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. This form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAOP, which we requires purchase premiums to be charged off business by business. The total earnings we show in the table are of course identical to the GAP total in our audited financial statements. In summary, operating earnings before tax rose to uh eight hundred thirty nine million dollars from six hundred forty three million, and Berkshire's share after taxes and minority interest to six hundred six million from four hundred seventy. eight million. Insurance underwriting led the way, more than quadrupling to one hundred thirty million dollars pre tax, with investment income up to four hundred nineteen million. The Shoe Group nearly doubled to eighty six million, the first full year with Dexter.
42:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
42:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Buffalo News, Cs, Kirby, World Book, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group all gained ground. Only Nebraska Furniture Mart, slipped. Below the operating line, however, two items pulled the total down. Gains from sales of securities fell to ninety one million dollars from five hundred forty six million, and we took a two hundred sixty nine million dollar write down on our US Air preferred. So total earnings for all entities came to six hundred sixty two million dollars pretax and four hundred ninety five million net against one point one. nine billion and six hundred eighty eight million in nineteen ninety three.
42:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
42:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): large amount of information about these businesses is given later in the report, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAA app basis. In addition, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non GA app basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
43:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Look
43:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through earnings. In past reports, we've discussed look through earnings,
43:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
43:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does our gap result. As we calculate them, look through earnings consist of first the operating earnings reported in the previous section, the plus second, the retained operating earnings of major investies that under GAUT GAYAP accounting are not reflected in our profits, less third, an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us, the operating earnings of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special accounting items, and major restructuring charges.
43:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
44:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our intrinsic value is to grow at our target rate of fifteen percent, 15%, our look through earnings over time must also increase at about that pace. When I first explained this concept a few years back, I told you that meeting this 15% goal would require us to generate look through earnings of about $1.8 billion by the year 2000. Because we've since issued about 3% more shares, that figure has grown to $1.85 one point eight five billion. dollars.
44:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
44:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are now modestly ahead of
44:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the year.
44:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): schedule in meeting our goal, but to a significant degree, that is because our SuperCat insurance business has recently delivered earnings far above trend line expectancy, an outcome I will discuss in the next section. Giving due weight to that abnormality, we still expect to hit our target, but that, of course, is is no sure thing.
44:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
44:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows how we calculate look through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized earlier, mostly under insurance group, net investment income. In outline, our share of the undistributed operating earnings of our major investees came to $492 million. Against $422 million in 1993, Coca-Cola led with $116 million, then capital. Cities ABC at 85 million, Wells Fargo at 73 million, GICO at 63 million, Gillette at 51 million, and Freddie Mac at 47 million, American Express,
45:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
45:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): holding we enlarged this year, contributed $25 million, The Washington Post $18 million, PNC Bank 10 ten million, and Gannett 4 four million. From that $492 four hundred ninety two million, we deduct a hypothetical tax of sixty eight million, figured at fourteen percent, the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives,
45:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
45:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): add our reported operating earnings of six hundred six million to arrive at total look through earnings of one point zero three billion dollars, up from eight hundred forty one million. As before, the GICO figure excludes realized capital gains, which at that company have been both recurring and significant. Insurance operations.
46:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
46:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we've explained in past reports, what counts in our insurance business is first the amount of float we develop and second its cost to us. Float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because most policies require that premiums be prepaid and, more importantly, because it usually takes time for an insurer to hear about and resolve of loss claims. Typically, the premiums that an insurer takes in do not cover the losses and expenses it must pay. That leaves it running an underwriting loss,
46:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
46:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that loss is the cost of float.
46:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
46:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insurance business is profitable over time if its cost of float is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business has a negative value if the cost
46:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of the cost.
46:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): its float is higher than market rates for money.
46:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
46:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the numbers in the report show, Berkshire's insurance business has been an enormous winner. For the table, we have compiled our float, which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume. By adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes, and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance, our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last two, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
47:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
47:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shape of that record, year by year since 1967, nineteen sixty-seven, is this. Our float has grown from about seventeen million dollars to three point zero six billion dollars. In fourteen of those twenty-eight years we underwrote at a profit, which means our cost of funds was less than zero. The expensive stretch came in the mid 1980s. 1984 cost us almost 19%, against a government bond yield of about eleven and a half percent. Then the cost came steadily down, six point three one percent in nineteen eighty. ninety one, four point seven six percent in nineteen ninety two, and for the last two years below zero again, against a year end government bond yield of seven point eight eight percent. Charlie and I are delighted that our float grew in nineteen ninety four, and are even more pleased that it proved to be cost cost-free. free. But our message this year echoes the one we delivered in nineteen 1993. ninety three. Though we have a fine insurance business, it is not as good as it currently looks.
48:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
48:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reason we must repeat this caution is that our SuperCat business, which sells policies that insurance and reinsurance companies buy to protect themselves from the effects of mega catastrophes,
48:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
48:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): again highly profitable. Since truly major catastrophes occur infrequently, our supercat business can be expected to show large profits in most years, but occasionally to record a huge loss.
48:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
48:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other words, the attractiveness of our supercat business will take many years to measure. Certainly 1994 should be regarded as close to a best case. Our only significant losses arose from the California earthquake in January. I will add that we do not expect to suffer a major. loss from the early 1995 Kobe earthquake. SuperCAP policies are small in number, large in size, and non-standardized. Therefore, the underwriting of this business requires far more judgment than, say, the underwriting of auto policies, for which a massive data is available. Here, Berkshire has a major advantage. Ajit Jane, our supercap SuperCat manager, who's whose underwriting skills are the finest. His value to us is simply enormous.
49:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
49:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition, Berkshire has a special advantage in the SuperCat business because of our towering financial strength, which helps us in two ways. First, a prudent insurer will want its protection against true mega catastrophes, such as a fifty billion dollar windstorm loss on Long Island or an earthquake of similar cost in California.
50:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To be
50:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): absolutely certain. But that same insurer knows that the disaster making it dependent on a large supercat recovery is also the disaster that could cause many reinsurers to default. There's not much sense in paying premiums for coverage that will evaporate precisely when it is needed. So the certainty that Berkshire will be both solvent and liquid after a catastrophe of unthinkable. proportions is a major competitive advantage for us.
50:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
50:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second benefit of our capital strength is that we can write policies for amounts that no one else can even consider. For example, during nineteen ninety-four, a primary insurer wished to buy a short-term policy for four hundred million dollars of California earthquake coverage, and we wrote the policy immediately. We know of no one else in the world who would. take a four hundred million dollar risk or anything close to it for their own account. Generally, brokers attempt to place coverage for large amounts by spreading the burden over a number of small policies, but at best, coverage of that sort takes considerable time to arrange. In the meantime, the company desiring reinsurance is left holding a risk it doesn't want and that may seriously threaten its well being. At Berkeley Berkshire, on the other hand, we will quote prices for coverage as great as five hundred million dollars on the same day that we are asked to bid. No one else in the industry will do the same.
51:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
51:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): writing coverages in large lumps, we obviously expose Berkshire to lumpy financial results. That's bid totally acceptable to us. Too often, insurers, as well as other businesses, follow suboptimum strategies in order to smooth their reported earnings. By accepting the prospect of volatility, we expect to earn higher long-term returns than we would by pursuing predictability. Given the risks we accept, Ajeet and I constantly focus on our worst case, knowing, of course, that it is difficult to judge what this is, since you could conceivably have a Long Island hurricane, a California earthquake, and SuperCat 10 all in the same year. Additionally, insurance laws. losses could be accompanied by non insurance troubles. For example, were we to have Supercat losses from a large Southern California earthquake, they might well be accompanied by a major drop in the value of our holdings in C's, Wells Fargo, and Freddie Mac. All things considered, we believe our worst case insurance loss from a Supercat is now about six hundred million dollars after tax, an amount that would slightly exceed Berkshire's. annual earnings from other sources.
52:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
52:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you are not comfortable with this level of exposure, the time to sell your Berkshire stock is now, not after the inevitable mega catastrophe. Our Supercat volume will probably be down in 1995. Prices for garden variety policies have fallen somewhat, and the torrent of capital that was committed to the reinsurance business a few years ago
52:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): will
52:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be inclined to
52:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): chase
52:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): premiums.
52:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
52:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): irrespective of their adequacy. Nevertheless, we have strong relations with an important group of clients who will provide us with a substantial amount of business in nineteen ninety-five. Berkshire's other insurance operations had excellent results in nineteen ninety-four. Our home state operation, led by Rod Eldred, our workers' compensation business, headed by Brad Kinsler, our credit card operation. managed by the Kaiser family, National Indemnities Traditional Auto and General Liability Business, led by Don Worster.
53:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
53:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of these generated significant underwriting profits accompanied by substantial float.
53:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
53:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can conclude this section as we did last year. All in all, we have a first class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds. its book value by a large amount, larger, in fact, than is the case at any other Berkshire business. Common stock investments.
53:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
53:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year end, our common stockholdings having a value of over $300 million were these. American Express Company, Capital City's Cities ABC Incorporated, the Coca-Cola Company, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and Freddie Mac, Gannett Company, Geico Corporation, the Gillette Company, PNC Bank Corporation, the Washington Post Company, and Wells Fargo and Company. Together these ten positions cost us about four point five six billion dollars and had a market value at year end of about thirteen point nine seven billion dollars.
54:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): standouts remain Coca-Cola Coca Cola bought for one point three. billion dollars and worth five point one five billion,
54:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
54:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): GICO bought for forty six million dollars and worth one point six eight billion. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than one hundred percent. Our investments continue to be few in number and simple in concept.
54:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): truly big investment idea can usually be explained in a short paragraph. We like a business with enduring competitive advantages that is run by able and owner-oriented people. When these attributes exist, and when we can make purchases at sensible prices, it is hard to go wrong, a challenge we periodically manage to overcome. Investors should remember that their scorecard is not computed using Olympic diving methods, degree of difficulty doesn't matter. count if you are right about a business whose value is largely dependent on a single key factor that is both easy to understand and enduring.
55:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
55:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): payoff is the same as if you had correctly analyzed an investment alternative characterized by many constantly shifting and complex variables.
55:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
55:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): try to price, rather than time, purchases. In our view, it is folly to force. forego buying shares in an outstanding business whose long term future is predictable because of short term worries about an economy or a stock market that we know to be unpredictable. Why scrap an informed decision because of an uninformed guess? We purchased national indemnity in nineteen sixty seven, Cs in nineteen 1972, seventy two, Buffalo News in nineteen 1977, seventy seven, Nebraska Furniture Mart in nineteen eighty 1983, three. and Scott Fetzer in 1986 because those are the years they became available and because we thought the prices they carried were acceptable. In each case, we pondered what the business was likely to do, not what the Dow, the Fed, or the economy might do. If we see this approach as making sense in the purchase of businesses in their entirety, why should we change tack when we are purchasing small pieces of wonderful businesses in the stock market? Before looking at new investments, we consider adding to old ones. If a business is attractive enough to buy once, it may well pay to repeat the process. We would love to increase our economic interest in Cs or Scott Fetzer, but we haven't found a way to add to a 100% holding.
56:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
56:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the stock market, however, an investor frequently gets the chance to increase his economic interest in business. businesses he knows and likes. Last year we went that direction by enlarging our holdings in Coca-Cola and American Express. Our history with American Express goes way back and in fact fits the pattern of my pulling current investment decisions out of past associations.
57:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
57:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1951, for example, Geico GICO shares comprised 70% of my personal portfolio, and GEICO GICO was also. the first stock I sold.
57:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
57:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was then twenty,
57:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
57:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a security salesman. The sale was one hundred shares to my aunt Alice, who, bless her, would have bought anything I suggested. Twenty five years later, Berkshire purchased a major stake in GICO at the time it was threatened with insolvency. In another instance, that of the Washington Post,
57:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about
57:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): half of my initial investment funds came from delivering the paper in the nineteen ninety. forties. Three decades later, Berkshire purchased a large position in the company two years after it went public. As for Coca-Cola, my first business venture, this was in the nineteen thirties,
57:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
57:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buying a six pack of Coke for twenty five cents and selling each bottle for five cents.
57:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
57:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): took only fifty years before I finally got it. The real money was in the syrup.
58:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
58:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): American Express history includes a couple of episodes. In the mid-1960s, just after the stock was battered by the company's infamous salad oil scandal, we put about 40% of Buffett Partnership Limited's capital into the stock.
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59:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
59:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should add that this commitment gave us over five percent ownership in Amex at a cost of thirteen million dollars. As I write this, we own just under ten percent, which has cost us one. point three six billion dollars. Amex earned twelve point five million dollars in nineteen sixty four and one point four billion dollars in nineteen ninety four.
59:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
59:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): history with Amex's IDS unit, which today contributes about a third of the earnings of the company, goes back even further. I first purchased stock in IDS in nineteen 1953, fifty three when it was growing rapidly and selling at a price earnings ratio of only three.
1:00:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
1:00:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was a lot of low hanging fruit in those days.
1:00:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:00:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even produced a long report.
1:00:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Do
1:00:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I ever write a short one? On the company that I sold for one dollar through an ad in the Wall Street Journal. Obviously, American Express and IDS, recently renamed American Express Financial Advisors, are far different operations today from what they were then. Nevertheless, I find that a long term familiarity with a company and its products is often helpful in evaluating
1:00:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
1:00:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mistake du jour. Mistakes occur at the time of decision. We can only make our Mistake du jour award, however, when the foolishness of the decision becomes obvious. By this measure, nineteen ninety four was a vintage year
1:00:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
1:00:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): keen competition for the gold medal. Here, I would like to tell you that the mistakes I will describe originated with Charlie.
1:00:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:00:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whenever I try to explain things that way, my nose begins to grow.
1:00:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:00:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the nominees are late in nineteen ninety-three, I sold ten million shares of Cap Cities at sixty-three dollars. At year in nineteen ninety-four the price was eighty-five eighty five dollars and twenty-five twenty five cents. The difference is two hundred twenty-two twenty two point five million dollars. for those of you who wish to avoid the pain of calculating the damage yourself. When we purchased the stock at seventeen dollars and twenty five cents in nineteen eighty six, I told you that I had previously sold
1:01:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
1:01:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cap Cities holdings at four dollars and thirty cents per share during nineteen 1978 seventy eight to nineteen 1980, eighty, and added that I was at a loss to explain my earlier behavior.
1:01:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
1:01:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've become a repeat offender. Maybe it's time to get a guardian appointed.