Investing Legends

Berkshire Hathaway 1993 Letter: Float Economics, Coca-Cola Long-Termism, and Supercat Risks

1h 13m Listen to the original Episode page
Insurance FloatCoca-ColaBerkshire HathawayAccounting StandardsReinsuranceLong-term InvestingDexter ShoeMarket Volatility

Summary

Speaker 0 analyzes Berkshire Hathaway's 1993 shareholder letter, emphasizing the intrinsic value of insurance float and the long-term compounding power of durable competitive advantages like those held by Coca-Cola and Gillette. The speaker rejects academic beta-based risk models in favor of permanent capital loss as the true measure of risk, citing historical examples where market volatility diverged from fundamental value. Key financial metrics are reviewed, including a 14.3% book value increase in 1993 and the impact of GAAP accounting changes on reported net worth. The discussion also covers the acquisition of Dexter Shoe, the economics of 'supercat' reinsurance, and the critical importance of underwriting discipline in a low-interest-rate environment.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Berkshire's book value per share grew from $19 to $8,854 over 29 years, representing a 23.3% compounded annual growth rate.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 39:11

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 0:44

    Insurance Operations and Float

    Speaker 0 details the strong underwriting profits and substantial float generated by Berkshire's insurance units, including Homestate, workers' compensation, credit cards, and National Indemnity. The speaker asserts that this operation has intrinsic value exceeding its book value by a large margin compared to other Berkshire businesses.

  2. 0:44 – 2:59

    Common Stock Portfolio and Concentration Philosophy

    The speaker lists nine major common stock holdings valued at $11.27 billion, highlighting Coca-Cola and GEICO as standout performers. He argues against frequent trading, stating it is foolish to part with an interest in an understandable and durably wonderful business, comparing stock ownership to owning a subsidiary.

  3. 2:59 – 6:23

    Coca-Cola Long-Term Performance and Saturation Myths

    The speaker cites a 1938 Fortune article that incorrectly predicted Coca-Cola's decline due to saturation and competition. He contrasts this with the reality of a 50-fold increase in volume and massive stock appreciation from 1919 to 1993, illustrating that established brands can grow significantly over long periods.

  4. 6:23 – 11:08

    Critique of Academic Risk Theory (Beta)

    The speaker rejects the academic definition of risk as stock volatility (beta), arguing instead that risk is the possibility of permanent loss of capital. He contends that beta theory produces absurdities, such as labeling a stock riskier after it has dropped sharply, and ignores the fundamental business characteristics that protect long-term value.

  5. 11:08 – 33:36

    Competitive Advantages of Coke and Gillette

    The speaker highlights Coca-Cola's 44% global soft drink share and Gillette's 60%+ blade market share as evidence of durable competitive advantages or economic moats that protect long-term value.

  6. 33:36 – 35:13

    Neighborly Origins and Coca-Cola Investment

    The speaker recounts meeting Don Keough, a former coffee salesman who lived across the street, which influenced Berkshire's $1 billion investment in Coca-Cola. Keough and CEO Roberto Goizueta transformed Coke's market value from $4.4 billion to $58 billion in under 13 years.

  7. 35:13 – 35:55

    Frank Rooney and Dexter Shoe Acquisition

    Frank Rooney, who led H.H. Brown to record profits, facilitated Berkshire's merger with Dexter Shoe. Rooney's track record at Melville Corporation and his relationship with Dexter's founders were key factors in the deal.

  8. 35:55 – 39:10

    Annual Meeting Logistics and Personal Updates

    Details are provided for the 1994 annual meeting at the Orpheum Theater, including hotel recommendations and transportation. The speaker mentions buying 25% of the Kansas City Royals and will throw the first pitch.

  9. 39:10 – 42:30

    1993 Financial Performance and Accounting Changes

    Berkshire's book value rose 14.3% in 1993, achieving a 23.3% compounded annual growth rate over 29 years. The speaker explains four non-operating items affecting net worth, including GAAP changes regarding taxes on unrealized gains and market value accounting.

  10. 42:30 – 44:13

    Intrinsic Value vs. Book Value and Market Volatility

    The speaker distinguishes between book value and intrinsic value, noting that while they diverge in the short run, they converge over time. He cites Coca-Cola and Gillette as examples where market prices moved independently of earnings in the short term.

  11. 44:13 – 47:28

    Historical Perspective on Coca-Cola Stock

    A historical example is given of Coca-Cola stock falling over 50% after its 1920 IPO, yet a $1 investment with reinvested dividends growing to over $2.1 million by 1993. The speaker quotes Ben Graham on the market being a voting machine in the short run and a weighing machine in the long run.

  12. 47:28 – 55:03

    Dexter Shoe and H.H. Brown Operations

    Berkshire acquired Dexter Shoe, building on its 1991 purchase of H.H. Brown. The speaker highlights the success of these shoe businesses, which produce over 7.5 million pairs annually, competing effectively against imports despite industry skepticism.

  13. 55:03 – 1:06:03

    Look-Through Earnings and Tax Efficiency

    The speaker defines look-through earnings, which include operating earnings plus retained earnings of investees minus hypothetical taxes. He uses a Lil Abner parable to illustrate how deferring taxes on a single compounding investment yields significantly higher after-tax returns than frequent trading.

  14. 1:06:03 – 1:12:59

    Float Economics and Cost of Funds

    The speaker explains that the value of insurance float has declined with falling interest rates, making past industry data less useful for profitability comparisons. True economic evaluation must combine underwriting results with the risk-free rate obtainable from float. Berkshire calculates float by adding reserves and subtracting acquisition costs, determining cost of float via underwriting profit or loss.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
COCA COLA COKOequityneutralTwo years ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Berkshire Hathaway's book value per share increased 14.3% during 1993.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:10

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Financial Statements section; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-94-000016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Over 29 years, book value grew from $19 to $8,854, a 23.3% compounded annual rate.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:10

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-94-000016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Coca-Cola's market value grew from $4.4 billion to $58 billion in less than 13 years under Goizueta and Keough.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·34:51

How to verify: Coca-Cola Company historical market capitalization data via Yahoo Finance or SEC filings; Berkshire 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

A GAAP change regarding taxes on unrealized appreciation reduced net worth by $70 million.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:31

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Notes to Financial Statements; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-94-000016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

A tax rate increase to 35% penalized net worth by $75 million.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·40:53

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Notes to Financial Statements; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-94-000016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

GAAP change to mark-to-market accounting produced a $172 million gain.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:33

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Notes to Financial Statements; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-94-000016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Coca-Cola and Gillette increased operating EPS by 38% and 37% from 1991 to 1993, while market prices rose 11% and 6%.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·43:37

How to verify: Coca-Cola and Gillette historical stock price and earnings data via Yahoo Finance or SEC filings; Berkshire 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

A $1 investment in Coca-Cola at its 1919 IPO, with dividends reinvested, was worth over $2.1 million by 1993.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:34

How to verify: Coca-Cola historical stock price and dividend data via Yahoo Finance or S&P Capital IQ; Berkshire 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Berkshire's shoe operations were expected to have more than $550 million in sales in 1994.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·49:40

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shoe Operations section; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-94-000016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Berkshire paid $390 million in federal income taxes in 1993.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·59:22

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Income Tax section; SEC EDGAR filing 0000950103-94-000016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and still break even from its insurance writings because of the earnings derived from investing this float.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:06:03

How to verify: Verify historical industry combined ratios and investment income data from 1980s-1990s via NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) annual reports or S&P Global Market Intelligence historical insurance data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's float grew from about seventeen million dollars to about two point six two billion dollars over twenty-seven years.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:07:56

How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the Insurance Operations section, for historical float figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In thirteen of those twenty seven years, Berkshire underwrote at a profit, which means their cost of funds was less than zero.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:07:56

How to verify: Review Berkshire Hathaway annual reports from 2026 to 2026 to count years with underwriting profits. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The cost of float was six point three one percent in nineteen ninety one and four point seven six percent in nineteen ninety two.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:08:21

How to verify: Verify against Berkshire Hathaway 2026 and 2026 Annual Reports, which detail the cost of float calculation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 1993, Berkshire had the use of two point six billion dollars at no cost and was paid thirty one million dollars, their underwriting profit, to hold these funds.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:08:41

How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for the 2026 underwriting profit and float figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The truly catastrophic Midwestern floods of nineteen ninety three did not trigger supercat losses because very few flood policies are purchased from private insurers.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:09:17

How to verify: Review 2026 insurance industry loss reports from the Insurance Information Institute or NAIC regarding the 2026 Midwest floods and private sector flood insurance penetration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Hurricane Andrew blew in nineteen ninety two, and Berkshire paid out about one hundred twenty five million dollars.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:10:34

How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for Hurricane Andrew loss disclosures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

A similar storm today could cost Berkshire six hundred million dollars.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:10:44

How to verify: This is a forward-looking estimate; verify by checking subsequent Berkshire annual reports (e.g., 2026-2026) for actual supercat losses to see if they align with this magnitude, or review reinsurance market capacity data from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that of its main competitors in the supercat business.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:11:23

How to verify: Compare Berkshire Hathaway's 2026 net worth from its annual report with the net worths of major reinsurance competitors (e.g., Swiss Re, Munich Re, Lloyd's syndicates) from their 2026 financial statements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:11:47

How to verify: Verify by checking Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for a list of major reinsurance clients or reviewing the annual reports of the world's largest reinsurers for Berkshire as a client. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Berkshire Hathaway's 1993 Annual Report for exact book value per share figures and compounded annual growth rates.
  • Check GAAP accounting standards in effect in 1993 regarding taxes on unrealized gains and market value accounting for common stocks.
  • Review historical Coca-Cola stock price and dividend data from 1919 to 1993 to validate the $2.1 million total return claim.
  • Analyze the composition of Berkshire's insurance float, including loss reserves and unearned premiums, as defined in the letter.
  • Assess the risk profile of 'supercat' reinsurance by comparing Berkshire's net worth to competitors' capital bases.
  • Verify the 1993 underwriting profit/loss figures for Berkshire's insurance units to confirm the negative cost of float claim.
  • Research the acquisition details of Dexter Shoe and H.H. Brown to validate sales and earnings projections.
  • Compare academic beta-based risk models with fundamental analysis using historical price volatility vs. earnings stability for Coke and Gillette.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In other areas of our insurance business, our homestate operation, led by Rod Eldred, our workers compensation business, headed by Brad Kinsler, our credit card operation, managed by the Kaiser family, and National Indemnities traditional auto and general liability business, led by Don Worcester, all achieved excellent
0:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): results. In combination, these of four units produced a significant underwriting profit and substantial float. All in all, we have a first class insurance business. Though its results will be highly volatile, this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount, larger, in fact, than is the case at any
0:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other Berkshire business. Common stock investments.
0:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
0:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year end, And our common stockholdings having a value of over $250 two hundred fifty million dollars were these
0:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): capital.
0:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cities ABC Incorporated,
0:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
0:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Coca-Cola Company, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac, Gico Corporation, General Dynamics Corporation, the Gillette Company, Guinness PLC, the Washington Post Company, and Wells Fargo and Company. Together, these nine positions cost us about three point one eight
1:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): billion dollars and had a market value at year end of about eleven point two seven billion dollars.
1:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): standouts remain Coca-Cola bought for about one billion dollars and worth four point one seven billion, and Geico bought for forty six million dollars and worth one point seven six billion.
1:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
1:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than one 100%. hundred percent. Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last,
1:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): may decide your management is hopelessly comatose. But we continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an interest in a business that is both understandable and durably wonderful. Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to replace. Interestingly, corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate.
2:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A parent company that owns a subsidiary with superb long-term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price. Why, the CEO would ask, should I part with my crown jewel?
2:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yet
2:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that same CEO, when it comes to running his personal investment portfolio, will off-handedly, and even impetuously, move from business to business when presented with no more than super. superficial arguments by his broker for doing so.
2:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
2:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): worst of these is perhaps
2:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
2:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't go broke taking a profit. Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary? In our view, what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks. An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity. that an owner would
2:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exhibit if he owned all of that business. Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been achieved by investing forty dollars
2:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
2:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Coca-Cola Company in nineteen nineteen.
3:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
3:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen thirty eight, more than fifty years after the introduction of Coke, and long after the drink was firmly established as an American icon, Fortune did an excellent story on the company.
3:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the
3:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second paragraph, the writer reported: Several times every year, a weighty and serious investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca-Cola's record, but comes regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking too late.
3:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
3:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): specters of saturation and competition rise before
3:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): him.
3:30
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4:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes, competition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well. But it's worth noting that in 1938, the Coca-Cola company The sold 207 two hundred seven million cases of soft drinks.
4:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
4:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's gallon gallonage then is converted into the one hundred ninety two ounce cases used for measurement today,
4:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
4:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in nineteen ninety three it sold about ten point seven billion cases, a fifty fold increase in physical volume from a company that in nineteen thirty eight was already dominant in its very major industry, nor was the party over in nineteen thirty eight for an investor, though the forty dollars invested in nineteen nineteen in one share of the
5:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had, with dividends reinvested, turned into three thousand two hundred seventy seven dollars by the end of nineteen thirty eight, a fresh forty dollars then invested in Coca-Cola stock would have grown to twenty-five thousand dollars a year end nineteen ninety-three.
5:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
5:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't resist one more quote from that nineteen 1938 thirty-eight fortune story. It would be hard to name any company comparable in size to Coca-Cola. and selling, as Coca-Cola does, an unchanged product that can point to a ten year record anything like Coca-Cola's.
5:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
5:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the fifty-five years that have since passed, Coke's product line has broadened somewhat, but it's remarkable how well that description still fits. Charlie and I decided long ago that in an investment lifetime, it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment became ever more. compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments
6:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that could significantly affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being smart and not too smart at that. Only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good idea a year. Charlie says it's my turn.
6:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
6:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification. dogma. Many pundits would therefore say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with which an investor
6:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thinks about a business and the comfort level he must feel with its economic characteristics before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk using dictionary terms as the possibility of loss or injury. Academics, however, however, like to define investment risk differently, averring that it is the relative volatility of a stock
7:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or portfolio of stocks. That is, their volatility as compared to that of a large universe of stocks. Employing databases and statistical skills, these academics compute with pretty precision the beta of a stock, its relative volatility in the past,
7:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
7:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then build arcane investment and capital allocation theories around this calculation.
7:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
7:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their hunger for a single statistic to measure risk, however, they forget a fundamental principle. It is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong. For owners of a business,
7:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
7:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's the way we think of shareholders, the academic's definition of risk is far off the mark, so much so that it produces absurdities. For example, under beta base theory, a stock that has dropped very sharply compared to the market, as had Washington Post when we bought it in nineteen seventy three, as becomes riskier at the lower price than it was at the
7:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher price. Would that description have then made any sense to someone who was offered the entire company? at a vastly reduced price? In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham explained why in chapter eight of the Intelligent Investor. There he introduced Mr. Market, an obliging fellow who shows up every day to
8:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The more manic depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor. That's true, because oh. a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be attached to solid businesses. It is impossible to see how the availability of such prices can be thought
8:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly. In assessing risk, a beta purist will disdain examining what a company produces, what its competitors are doing, or how much borrowed money the business employs. He may even prefer not to know the company's name. What he
8:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): treasures is the price history of its stock. In contrast, we'll happily forego knowing the price history and instead we'll seek whatever information will further our understanding of the company's business. After we buy a stock, consequently, we would not be disturbed if markets closed for a year or two. We don't need a daily quote on our one hundred percent position. in Caesar H H
9:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Brown to validate our well being. Why then should we need a quote on our seven percent interest in Coke?
9:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
9:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our opinion, the real risk that an investor must assess is whether his aggregate after tax receipts from an investment, including those he receives on sale, will, over his prospective holding period, give him at least as much purchasing power as he had to begin with. plus a modest rate of interest on that initial stake. Though this risk cannot be
9:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): calculated with engineering precision, it can in some cases be judged with a degree of accuracy that is useful. The primary factors bearing upon this evaluation are these. First, the certainty with which the long-term economic characteristics of the business can be evaluated.
10:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Second,
10:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the certainty with which management can be evaluated, both as to its ability to realize the full potential of the business and to wisely employ its cash flows. Third, the certainty with which management can be counted on to channel the rewards from the business to the shareholders rather than to itself. Fourth, the purchase price of the business.
10:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
10:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fifth, the levels of taxation and inflation that will be experienced. and that will determine the degree by which an investor's purchasing power return is reduced from his gross return. These factors will probably strike many analysts as unbearably fuzzy, since they cannot be extracted from a database of any kind. But the difficulty of
10:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): precisely quantifying these matters does not negate their importance, nor is it insuperable, just as Justice Stewart found it impossible to formulate a test for obscenity but nevertheless asserted I know it when I see it, so also can investors in an inexact but useful way. See the risks
11:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inherent in certain investments without reference to complex equations or price histories.
11:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
11:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it really It's so difficult to conclude that Coca Coca-Cola Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than saying? say, any computer company or retailer. Worldwide, Coke sells about forty-four percent of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a sixty percent share in value of the blade market, leaving aside chewing
11:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gum, in which Wrigley is dominant. I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power. Moreover, both Coke and Gillette. have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution
11:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): systems give them an enormous competitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their economic castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodities. commodity-like products should come with a warning label. Competition may prove hazardous to human
12:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wealth. The competitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to even the casual observer of business. Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run-of-the-mill companies who possess little or no competitive advantage. Should we conclude from this similarity that the competitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them? nothing when
12:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business risk is being measured, or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a company, its stock, is somehow divorced from the long term risk inherent in its business operations?
12:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
12:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe neither conclusion makes sense, and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no sense.
12:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
12:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk. inherent in, say, a single product toy company selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy company whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie. But it's quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they
13:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long-term long term competitive. strength or weakness. Obviously, every investor will make mistakes, but by confining himself to a relatively few easy to understand cases, a
13:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reasonably intelligent, informed, and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy.
13:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
13:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): many industries, of course, Charlie and I can't determine whether we are dealing with a pet rock or a Barbie. We couldn't solve this problem, moreover, even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries. Sometimes,
13:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
13:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): own intellectual shortcomings would stand in the way of understanding, and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock. For example, a business that must deal with fast moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long term economics. Did we foresee thirty years ago what would
14:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): transpire in the television manufacturing or computer industries?
14:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
14:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): course not. Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries. Why then should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly evolving businesses? We'll stick instead with the easy cases. Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight?
14:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
14:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): course, some investment strategies, for instance, our efforts in arbitrage over the years require wide diversification. If significant risk exists in a single transaction, overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually investing. independent commitments. Thus you may consciously purchase a risky
14:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investment, one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury.
15:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
15:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you believe that your gain, weighted for probabilities, considerably exceeds your loss comparably weighted, and if you can commit to a number of similar but unrelated opportunities. Most venture capitalists employ this strategy. Should
15:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
15:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): choose to pursue this course, you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel, which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities, but will refuse to accept a single huge bet. Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does
15:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be,
15:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
15:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, a long-term owner of American industry. That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases. By periodically investing in an index fund, for example, the know nothing investor can actually outperform most investment professionals. Paradoxically, when dumb money acknowledges its limitations, it
16:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ceases to be dumb.
16:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On the other
16:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hand, if you are a know something investor, able to understand business economics, and to find five to ten sensibly priced companies that possess important long term competitive advantages, uh conventional diversification makes no sense for you, it is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I cannot
16:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his twentieth favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices.
16:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
16:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential.
16:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
16:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the words of the prophet May West, too much of a good thing can be wonderful. Corporate governance.
16:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At our annual meetings, someone usually asks, What happens to this place if you get hit by a truck?
16:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): glad they are still asking the question in this form.
16:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
16:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): won't be too long before the query becomes, What happens to this place if you don't get hit by a truck? Such questions in any event raise a reason for me to discuss corporate governance, a hot topic during the past year. In general,
17:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
17:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe that directors have stiffened their spines recently,
17:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and that
17:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shareholders are now prepared to
17:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be.
17:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): being treated somewhat more like true owners than was the case not long ago. Commentators on corporate governance, however, seldom make any distinction among three fundamentally different manager owner situations that exist in publicly held companies. Though the legal responsibility of directors is identical throughout, their ability to effect change differs in each of
17:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the cases. Attention usually falls on the first case because it prevails. on the corporate scene. Since Berkshire falls into the second category, however, and will someday fall into the third, we will discuss all three variations.
17:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
17:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): first and by far most common board situation is one in which a corporation has no controlling shareholder. In that case, I believe directors should behave as if there is a single absentee owner. whose long term interest they should try to further in all proper ways. Unfortunately,
18:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long term gives directors a lot of wiggle room. If they lack either integrity or the ability to think independently, directors can do great violence to shareholders while still claiming to be acting in their long term interest. But assume the board is functioning well and must deal with a management that is mediocre or worse. Directors then have
18:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the responsibility for changing that management, just as an intelligent owner would do if he were present.
18:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
18:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if able but greedy managers overreach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders' pockets, directors must slap their hands.
18:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
18:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this plain vanilla case, a director who sees something he doesn't like should attempt to persuade the other directors of his views if he's
18:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not.
18:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he is successful, the board will have the muscle to make the appropriate change. Suppose, though, that the unhappy director can't get other directors to agree with him. He should then feel free to make his views known to the absentee owners. Directors seldom do that, of course.
19:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
19:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): temperament of many directors would in fact be incompatible with critical behavior of that sort, but I see nothing improper in such actions, assuming the issues are serious. Naturally the concepts
19:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
19:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the boards just discussed, I believe the directors ought to be relatively few in number,
19:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say
19:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ten or less,
19:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
19:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ought to come mostly from the outside.
19:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
19:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): outside board members should establish standards for the CEO's performance. and should also periodically meet without his being present to evaluate his performance against those standards.
19:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
19:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): requisites for board membership should be business savvy, interest in the job, and owner orientation. Too often, directors are selected simply because they are prominent or add diversity to the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, mistakes in selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments are so hard to
20:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): undo.
20:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
20:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pleasant but vacuous director need never worry about job security. The second case is that existing at Berkshire, where the controlling owner is also the manager, at some companies this arrangement is facilitated by the existence of two classes of stock endowed with disproportionate voting
20:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): power. In these situations, it's obvious that the board does not act as an agent between owners and management, and that the directors cannot affect change except through persuasion. Therefore, if the owner-manager is mediocre or worse, or is overreaching, there is little a director can do about it except object. If
20:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the directors having no connections to the owner-manager owner manager make a unified argument, it may well have some effect. More likely, it will not. If change does not come, and the matter is sufficiently serious, the outside directors should resign, their resignation will signal their doubts about management and it will emphasize that no outsider is in a position to correct the owner
21:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): manager's shortcomings.
21:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
21:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): third governance case occurs when there is a controlling owner who is not involved in management. This case, examples of which are Hershey Foods and Dow Jones, puts the outside directors in a potentially useful position. If they become unhappy with either the competence or integrity of the manager, they can go directly to the owner, who may also be
21:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the board, and report their dissatisfaction. This situation is ideal for an outside director since he need make his case only to a single, presumably interested owner who who can forthwith effect change if the argument is persuasive. Even so, the dissatisfied director has only that single course of action. If he remains
21:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unsatisfied about a critical matter, he has no choice but to resign. Logically, the third case should be the most effective in ensuring first class management. In the second case, the owner is not going gonna to fire himself.
22:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
22:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the first case, directors often find it necessary. very difficult to deal with mediocrity or mild overreaching. Unless the unhappy directors can win over a majority of the board, an awkward social and logistical task, particularly if management's behavior is merely odious, not egregious, their hands are effectively tied.
22:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
22:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): practice, directors trapped in situations of this kind usually convince themselves that by staying around they can do at least some good. Meanwhile, management proceeds unfettered.
22:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
22:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third case, the owner is neither judging himself nor burdened with the problem of garnering a majority. He can also ensure that outside directors are selected who will bring useful qualities to the board. These directors in turn will know that the good advice they give will reach the right ears, rather than being stifled by a recalcitrant management. If the controlling owner
22:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is intelligent, and self-confident, he will make decisions in respect to management that are meritocratic and pro shareholder. Moreover, and this is critically important, he can readily correct any mistake he makes.
23:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
23:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, we operate in the second mode now, and will, for as long as I remain functional. My health, let me add, is excellent. For better or worse, you are likely to be
23:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): able to get
23:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have me as an owner manager for some time.
23:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Either my wife or the foundation.
23:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire will enter the third governance mode, going forward with a vitally interested but non management owner and with a management that must perform for that owner. In preparation for that time, Susie was elected to the board a few years ago, and in nineteen ninety three, our son Howard joined the board. These family
23:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): members will not be managers of the company in the future, but they will represent the controlling interest should anything happen. to me. Most of our other directors are also significant owners of Berkshire stock and each has a strong owner orientation. All in all, we're prepared for the
24:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): truck.
24:18
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25:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Shareholder designated contributions. About ninety-seven percent of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's nineteen 1993 ninety-three shareholder designated contributions perfectly. program. Contributions made through the program were $9.4 million, and 3,110 charities were recipients.
25:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire's practice in respect to discretionary philanthropy, as contrasted to its policies regarding contributions that are clearly related to the company's business activities, differs significantly.
26:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from that of other publicly held corporations. There, most corporate contributions are made pursuant to the wishes of the CEO, who often will be responding to social pressures, employees through matching gifts, or directors through matching gifts or requests they make of the CEO.
26:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
26:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire,
26:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
26:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe that the company's money is the owner's money, just as it would be in a closely held corporation partnership or sole proprietorship. Therefore, if funds are to be given to causes unrelated to Berkshire's business activities, it is the charities favored by our owners that should receive them. We've yet to find a CEO who
26:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believes he should personally fund the charities favored by his shareholders. Why then should they foot the bill for his pay? picks? Let me add that our program is easy to administer. Last fall, for two months, we borrowed one person from national indemnity to help us implement the instructions that came from our
27:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 7,500 registered shareholders. I'd guess that the average corporate program in which employee gifts are matched incurs far greater administrative costs. Indeed, our entire corporate overhead is less than half the size of our charitable contributions. Charlie, however, insists that I tell you that one point four million dollars of our
27:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): four point nine million dollar overhead is attributable to our corporate jet, the indefensible. Here are the largest categories to which our shareholders steered their contributions. three hundred forty seven churches and synagogues received five hundred sixty nine gifts two hundred eighty three colleges and
27:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): universities received six hundred seventy gifts, two hundred forty four schools from kindergarten through twelfth grade, about two thirds secular, one third religious, received five hundred twenty five gifts. Two hundred eighty eight institutions dedicated to art, culture, or the humanities received four hundred forty seven gifts,
28:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
28:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hundred eighty and religious
28:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): social service organizations, split about equally between Christian and Jewish, received four hundred eleven gifts, four hundred forty five secular social service organizations, about forty percent of them youth related, received seven hundred and fifty nine gifts,
28:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
28:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hundred and fifty three hospitals received two hundred sixty one gifts, and one hundred and eighty six health related organizations such as the American Heart. Association and the American Cancer Society received three hundred twenty gifts. Three things about this list seem particularly interesting to me. First, to some degree it indicates what people choose
28:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to give money to when they are acting of their own accord, free of pressure from solicitors or emotional appeals from charities. Second, the contributions programs of publicly held companies almost never allow gifts to churches and synagogues, yet clearly these institutions are what many shareholders would like to support. Third, the
28:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gifts made by our shareholders display conflicting philosophies. One hundred thirty gifts were directed to organizations that believe in making abortions readily available for women, and thirty gifts were directed to organizations other than churches. That discourage or are opposed to abortion.
29:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Last year, I told you that I was thinking of raising the amount that Berkshire shareholders can give under our designated contributions program and asked for your comments. We received a few well written letters opposing the entire idea on the grounds that it was our job to run the business and not our job to force shareholders into making.
29:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): charitable gifts. Most of the shareholders responding, however, noted the tax efficiency of the plan and urged us to increase the designated amount. Several shareholders who have given stock to their children or grandchildren told me that they consider the program a particularly good way to get youngsters thinking at an early age about the subject
29:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of giving. These people, in other words, perceive the program to be an educational as well as philanthropic tool.
30:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
30:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bottom line is that we did raise the amount in nineteen ninety three from eight dollars per share to ten.
30:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
30:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition to the shareholder designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about two point five million dollars. annually. These contributions support local charities such as the United Way and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
30:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
30:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder designated contributions program that appears later in this report. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker. bank, or depository. Shares not so registered on august thirty first, nineteen ninety-four will be
30:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ineligible for the nineteen ninety-four program.
30:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
30:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few personal items. Mrs. B. Rose Blumkin had her one hundredth birthday on december third, nineteen ninety three.
31:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
31:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): candles cost more than the cake. That was a day on which the store was scheduled to be open in the evening. Mrs. B., who works seven days a week for however many hours the store operates, found the proper decision quite obvious. She simply postponed her party until an evening when the store was closed.
31:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mrs.
31:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): B's story is well known, but worth telling again. She came to the United States 77 years ago, unable to speak English and devoid of formal schooling. In 1937, she founded the Nebraska. Furniture Mart with $500. Last year, the store had sales of $200 million, a larger amount
31:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by far than that recorded by any other home furnishing store in the United States. Our part in all of this began ten years ago when Mrs. B sold control of the business to Berkshire Hathaway, a deal we completed without obtaining audited financial statements,
32:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): checking
32:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): real estate. records, or getting any warranties. In short, her word was good enough for us. Naturally, I was delighted to attend Mrs. B's birthday party. After all, she's promised to attend my hundredth. Catherine Graham retired last year as the chairman of the Washington Post Company,
32:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): having relinquished the CEO title three years ago in 1975. 1973, we purchased our stock, in our company, for about $10 million. Our holding now garners $7 million a year in dividends, and is worth over $400 million. At the time of our purchase, we knew that the economic prospects of the
32:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): company were good, but equally important, Charlie and I concluded that Kay would prove to be an outstanding manager and would treat all shareholders honorably. That latter consideration was particularly important because the Washington Post Company has two classes of stock, a structure that we've seen some managers abuse.
33:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
33:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of our judgments about this investment have been validated by events. Kay's skills as a manager were underscored this past Last year when she was elected by Fortune's board of editors to the Business Hall of Fame.
33:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
33:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): behalf of our shareholders,
33:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Charlie and I had long ago put her in Berkshire's Hall of Fame. Another of last year's retirees was Don Keogh of Coca-Cola, although, as he puts it, his retirement lasted about fourteen hours. Don is one of the most extraordinary human beings I've ever known. A man of enormous business talent, but even more
33:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): important, a man who brings out the absolute best and everyone's. in everyone lucky enough to associate with him. Coca-Cola wants its product to be present at the happy times of a person's life. Don Keo, as an individual, invariably increases the happiness of those around him. It's impossible to think about Don without feeling
33:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): good. I
33:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will edge up to how I met Don by slipping in a plug for my neighborhood in Omaha. Though Charlie has lived in California for forty forty-five five years, his
34:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): home
34:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as a boy was about two hundred feet away from the house where I now live. My wife, Susie, grew up a block and a half away, and we have about one hundred twenty-five Berkshire shareholders in the zip code. As for Don, in 1958 he bought the house directly across the street from mine. He was then a coffee salesman with a big family and a small
34:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): income.
34:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
34:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): impressions I formed in those days about Don were uh were a factor in my decision to have Berkshire make a record one billion dollar investment in Coca-Cola in nineteen eighty eight and nineteen eighty-nine. Roberto Goizueta had become CEO of Coke in nineteen eighty one, with Don alongside as his partner.
34:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
34:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): two of them took hold of a company that had stagnated during the previous decade and moved it from four $4.4 point four billion dollars of
34:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the city.
34:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market value to $58 billion in less than 13 years.
34:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
34:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a difference a pair of managers like this makes, even when their product has been around for 100 years. Frank Rooney did double duty last year, in addition to leading H.H. Brown to record profits, thirty five percent above the nineteen ninety two high. He also was key to our merger with Dexter.
35:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Frank
35:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): has known Harold. Alphon and Peter Lunder for decades, and shortly after our purchase of HH Brown, told me what a wonderful operation they managed. He encouraged us to get together and in due course we made a deal. Frank told Harold and Peter that Berkshire would provide an ideal corporate home for Dexter, and that assurance undoubtedly
35:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contributed to their decision to join with us. I've told you in the past of Frank's extraordinary residence. record in building Melville Corporation during his twenty three year tenure as CEO. Now at seventy-two, he's setting an even faster pace at Berkshire. Frank has a low key, relaxed style, but don't let that fool you. When he swings, the ball disappears
35:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): far over the fence.
35:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
35:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): annual meeting.
35:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
35:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year, the annual meeting will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at nine 9 thirty 30 in the morning. on Monday, april twenty fifth, nineteen ninety-four. A record two thousand two hundred people turned up for the meeting last year, but the theater can handle many more. We will have a display in the lobby featuring many of our consumer products candy, spray guns, shoes,
36:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cutlery, encyclopedias, and the like. Among my favorites, slated to be there, is a C's candy assortment that commemorates Mrs. B's 100th one hundredth birthday, and that features her. picture rather than Mrs. C's on the package.
36:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
36:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend that you promptly get hotel reservations at one of these hotels. First, the Radisson Reddick Tower, a small hotel of eighty eight rooms, but a nice one across the street from the Orpheum. Second, the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five minute walk from the Orpheum. Or third, the Marriott, located in West Omaha, about one hundred 100 yards from
36:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the street. Borsheimes, which is a a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 830 and 845 for the meeting and return after it ends.
37:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
37:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly, and you may have to walk a few blocks.
37:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
37:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. Those of you arriving early can visit the furniture mart any day of the week. It is open from ten in the morning to five thirty in the afternoon on Saturdays and from noon to five thirty on Sundays.
37:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Borshimes normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to six in the evening on Sunday, april twenty fourth.
37:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
37:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): past trips to Borshimes, many of you have met Susan Jacques. Early in nineteen ninety four, Susan was made president and CEO of the company, having risen in eleven years from a four dollar an hour job that she took at the store when she was twenty three. Susan will be joined at Borshimes Borsheem's on Sunday by many of the members of the managers of our other businesses, and Charlie and I will be there as well.
38:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): As you may know, a few years ago, I bought twenty five percent of the Royals,
38:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
38:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): capital allocation decision for which I will not. become famous.
38:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
38:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this year the league has cooperatively scheduled a homestand at annual meeting time.
38:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
38:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will throw the first pitch on the twenty third, and it's a certainty that I will improve on last year's humiliating performance. On that occasion, the catcher inexplicably called for my sinker, and I dutifully delivered a pitch that barely missed my foot. This year, I will go with my high hard one regardless of the
38:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): first.
38:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what catcher signals, so bring your speed timing devices. The proxy statement will include information about obtaining tickets to the game.
38:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
38:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): regret to report that you won't have to buy them from scalpers. Warney Buffett, Chairman of the Board, March first, nineteen ninety four. To the shareholders of Berkshire, Hathaway Incorporated,
39:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
39:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): per share book value increased fourteen point three percent during nineteen ninety. three. Over the last twenty nine years, that is, since present management took over, book value has grown from nineteen dollars to eight thousand eight hundred fifty four dollars, or at a rate of twenty three point three percent compounded annually. During the year,
39:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire's net worth increased by one $1.5 point five billion dollars, a figure affected by two negative and two positive non operating items. For the sake of completeness, I'll explain them here. If you aren't thrilled by accounting, however, feel free to fast forward through this discussion. First,
39:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
39:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): first negative was produced by a change in generally accepted accounting principles, or GAA, having to do with the taxes we accrue against unrealized Realized appreciation in the securities we carry at market value.
40:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
40:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): old rule said that the tax rate used should be the one in effect when the appreciation took place. Therefore, at the end of 1992, we were using a rate of 34% on the six point four billion dollars of gains generated after 1986 and 28% on the $1.2 billion of gains generated before that.
40:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
40:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): new rule stipulates that the current tax rate should be applied to all gains. The rate in the first quarter of 1993, when this rule went into effect, was 34%.
40:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Applying that rate to our pre-1987 gains reduced net worth by $70 million.
40:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Second.
40:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
40:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second negative, related to the first, came about because the corporate tax rate was raised in the third quarter of 1993 to 35%.
40:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This change required us to make an additional charge of 1% a year. against all of our unrealized gains,
40:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
40:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that charge penalized net worth by $75 million. Oddly, GA app required both this charge and the one described above to be deducted from the earnings we report, even though the unrealized appreciation that gave rise to the charges was never included in earnings but rather was credited directly to net worth. Third, another 1993 nineteen ninety three change
41:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in GAAP GAP affects the value at which we carry the securities that we own. In recent years, both the common stocks and certain common equivalent securities held by our insurance companies have been valued at market, whereas equities held by our non insurance subsidiaries or by the parent company were carried at their aggregate cost or market, whichever was lower.
41:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now GAP says that all common stocks should be carried at market, a rule we began following in the fourth quarter of nineteen ninety. three. This change produced a gain in Berkshire's reported net worth of about one hundred seventy two million dollars. And fourth, finally, we issued some stock last year. In a transaction described in last year's annual report,
41:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we issued three thousand nine hundred forty four shares in early January nineteen 1993, ninety three upon the conversion of forty six million dollars of convertible shares. debentures that we had called for redemption. Additionally, we issued $25,203 shares when we acquired Dexter Shoe,
42:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
42:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchase discussed later in this report. The overall result was that our shares outstanding increased by $29,147 and our net worth by about $478 $178 million. Per share book value also grew because the shares issued in these transactions could be. carried a price above their book value.
42:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
42:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): course, it's per share intrinsic value, not book value, that counts. Book value is an accounting term that measures the capital, including retained earnings that has been put into a business. Intrinsic value is a present value estimate of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. At most companies, the two values are unrelated.
42:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshare Berkshire, however, is an exception. Our book value, though significantly below our intrinsic value, serves as a useful device for tracking that key figure.
43:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
43:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1993, each measure grew by roughly 14%, advances that I would call satisfactory but unexciting. These gains, however, were outstripped by a much larger gain. 39% thirty nine percent in Berkshire's market price. Over time, of course, market price and intrinsic value will arrive at about the same
43:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): destination. But in the short run, the two often diverge in a major way, a phenomenon I've discussed in the past. Two years ago, Coca-Cola and Gillette, both large holdings of ours, enjoyed market price increases that dramatically outpaced their earnings gains.
43:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
43:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the nineteen 1991 ninety one annual report, I said that the stocks of these companies could not continuously overperform their businesses. From 1991 to 1993, Koch and Gillette increased their annual operating earnings per share by 38% and 37%, respectively, but their market prices moved up only 11% and 6%.
43:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In other words, the companies overperformed their stocks, a result that no doubt partly reflects Wall Street's new apprehension. about brand names. Whatever the reason, what will count over time is the earnings performance of these companies. If they prosper, Berkshire will also prosper, though not in a lockstep manner.
44:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Let
44:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): me add a lesson from history. Coke went public in nineteen nineteen at forty dollars per share. By the end of nineteen twenty, the market, coldly reevaluating Coke's Koch's future prospects, had battered the stock down by more than fifty 50% percent, to $19.50. At year in 1993, that single share, with dividends reinvested,
44:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was worth more than $2.1 million.
44:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
44:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ben Graham said,
44:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
44:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the short run, the market is a voting machine. Reflecting a voter registration test that requires only money, not the other
44:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not intelligence or emotional stability.
44:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
44:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the long run, the market is a voting. weighing machine.
44:56
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46:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,
46:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how should Berkshire's overperformance in the market last year be viewed? Clearly, Berkshire was selling at a higher percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the case at the beginning of the year. On the other hand, in a world of six or seven percent long term interest rates, Berkshire's market price was not inappropriate
46:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if
46:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
46:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you should understand. that this is a huge if
46:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman, and I can attain our longstanding goal of increasing Berkshire's per share intrinsic value at an average annual rate of fifteen percent. We have not retreated from this goal.
46:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
46:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we again emphasize, as we have for many years, that the growth in our capital base makes fifteen percent an ever more difficult target to hit.
46:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What we have
46:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): going
46:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to be
46:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for us is a growing collection of good size operating businesses that possess economic characteristics ranging from good to terrific, run by managers whose performance ranges from terrific to terrific. You need have no worries about this group. The capital allocation work that Charlie and I do at the parent company, using the funds that our
47:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): managers deliver to us, has a less certain outcome. It is not easy. to find new businesses and managers comparable to those we have. Despite that difficulty, Charlie and I relish the search, and we are happy to report an important success in nineteen ninety-three. Dexter Shoe.
47:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What we did last year was build on our nineteen ninety-one purchase of H.H. Brown, a superbly run manufacturer of work shoes, boots, and other footwear. Brown has been a real winner. Though we had high hopes to begin with, these expectations have been considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney, Jim Eisler, and the talented
47:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): managers who work with them. Because of our confidence in Frank's team, we next acquired Lowell Shoe. At the end of 1992, Lowell was a long-established Established manufacturer of women's and nurses' shoes, but its business needed some fixing.
48:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Again,
48:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): results have survived. surpassed our expectations, so we promptly jumped at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter, Maine, which manufactures popular priced men's and women's shoes. Dexter, I can assure you, needs no fixing. It is one of the best managed companies Charlie and I have seen in our business lifetimes.
48:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Harold Alfond, Alphond, who started working in a shoe factory at twenty five cents an hour when he was twenty, founded Dexter in nineteen fifty six with ten thousand dollars of capital. He was joined in nineteen fifty eight by Peter Lunder, his nephew. The two of them have since built a business that now produces over seven and a half million pairs of shoes annually,
48:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most of them made in Maine and the balance in Puerto Rico. As you probably know, the domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to compete with imports. from low wage countries.
48:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
48:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): someone forgot to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H.H. Brown and to their skilled labor forces, which together make the United States plants of both companies highly competitive against all comers. Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets located primarily in the Northeast. The company is also a major manufacturer of
49:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): golf shoes. producing about fifteen percent of United States output. Its bread and butter, though, is the manufacturer of traditional shoes for traditional retailers, a job at which it excels. Last year, both Nordstrom and JC Penney bestowed special awards upon Dexter for its performance as a supplier during
49:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1992. Our nineteen 1993 ninety three results include Dexter only from our date of merger, November. 7th.
49:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
49:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1994, we expect Berkshire's shoe operations to have more than $550 million in sales,
49:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
49:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we would not be surprised if the combined pre-tax earnings of these businesses topped $85 million. Five years ago, we had no thought of getting into shoes. Now we have 7,200 employees in that industry, and I sing there's no business. business
50:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
50:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shoe business as I drive to work. So much for strategic plans. At Berkshire, we have no view of the future that dictates what businesses or industries we will enter. Indeed, we think it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision. We prefer
50:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): instead to focus on the economic characteristics of the businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics of managers with whom we wish to associate.
50:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
50:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then to hope we get lucky in finding the two in combination. At Dexter, we did.
50:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
50:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now we pause for a short commercial. Though they owned a business jewel, we believe that Harold and Peter, who were not interested in cash, made a sound decision in exchanging. their Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire. What they did, in effect, was trade a 100% interest in a single terrific business for a smaller interest in a large group of terrific
51:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses. They incurred no tax on this exchange, and now own a security that can be easily used for charitable or personal gifts, or that can be converted to cash and amounts. And at times,
51:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of their own choosing. Should members of their families desire to,
51:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they can pursue varying financial paths without running into the complications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a private business.
51:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is difficult to diversify outside their industries. Berkshire in contrast can diversify with ease. So in shifting their ownership to Berkshire, Dexter's shareholders solved a reinvestment problem. Moreover, though Harold and Peter now have non-controlling shares in Berkshire rather than controlling shares in Dexter, they know they will be treated as partners and that
51:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we will follow owner-oriented practices. If they elect to retain their Berkshire shares, their investment result from the merger date forward will exactly parallel my own result. Since I have a huge percentage of my net worth committed for life to Berkshire shares,
52:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
52:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): since the company will issue me neither restricted shares nor stock options, my gain loss equation will always match that of all other owners. Additionally, Harold and Peter know that at Berkshire we can keep our promises. There will be no changes of control or culture at Berkshire for many decades to come. Finally, and of
52:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): paramount importance, Harold and Peter can be sure that they will get to run their business, an activity they dearly love, exactly as they did before the merger.
52:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
52:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, we do not tell four hundred hitters how to swing.
52:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
52:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made sense for Harold and Peter probably makes sense for a few other owners of large private businesses.
52:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
52:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you have a business that might fit, let me hear from you.
52:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our acquisition criteria are set forth in the appendix to this report. Sources of reported earnings.
52:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
52:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): table in the annual report shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of goodwill and other major purchase price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated. and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our
53:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GAP, which requires purchase price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we
53:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAPE total in our audited financial statements. In summary, Berkshire's share of operating earnings after taxes and minority interests rose to about $478 million in 1993 from about $348 three hundred forty
53:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): eight million dollars in 1992. nineteen ninety two.
54:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): biggest change was in insurance, where underwriting swung from a one hundred nine million dollar pre-tax loss to a thirty one million dollar pre-tax profit, while investment income rose again. The shoe businesses, the Buffalo News, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group all advanced, and
54:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interest expense fell sharply. C slipped a little and World WorldBook Book fell considerably. including large gains from sales of securities in the $146 million charge caused by the new accounting rules. Total earnings came to about $688 million
54:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): against about $407 million the year before.
54:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
54:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): large amount of information about these businesses is given later in the report, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GayApp. gay app basis. In addition, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-gay app basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information
55:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed. Look through earnings. We've previously discussed look through earnings, which we believe more accurately portray the earnings of Berkshire than does our GA app result. As we calculate them, look through earnings consist of first the operating earnings reported in
55:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the previous section, plus second, the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less third, an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. The operating earnings of which we speak here exclude capital gains, special
55:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accounting items, and major restructuring charges. Over time, our look through earnings need to increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic value is to grow at that rate. Last year I explained that we had to increase these earnings to about $1.8 one point eight billion dollars in the year 2000 two thousand were we to meet the 15% fifteen percent goal.
56:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because we issued additional shares in nineteen ninety three, the amount needed has risen to about one point eight five billion dollars. That is a tough goal, but one that we expect you to hold us to. In the past, we've criticized the managerial practice of shooting the arrow of performance and then painting the target, centering it on whatever point the arrow happened to hit.
56:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We will instead risk embarrassment by painting first and shooting later.
56:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
56:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are to hit the bullseye, we will need markets that allow the purchase of businesses and securities on sensible terms. Right now, markets are difficult, but they can and will change in unexpected ways and at unexpected times. In the meantime, we'll try to resist the temptation to do something marginal simply because we are long on
56:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cash. There's no use running if you're on the wrong road.
56:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
56:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows how we calculate look through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. The dividends paid to us by these investies have been included in the operating earnings itemized earlier, mostly under Insurance Group, Net Investment Income. In outline, our share of the undistributed operating earnings of our
57:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): major investees came to $439 four hundred thirty nine million. dollars against two hundred ninety eight million dollars in nineteen ninety two. Coca-Cola led with ninety four million, then Capital Cities ABC at eighty three million, GICO at seventy six million, Wells Fargo at fifty three million,
57:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Gillette at forty four million, and Freddie Mac at forty one million. General Dynamics contributed twenty five million, the Washington Post fifteen million. 15 and Guinness eight million. From that four hundred thirty nine million, we deduct a hypothetical tax of sixty one million, it figured at fourteen percent the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives,
57:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and add our reported operating earnings of four hundred seventy-eight million
57:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
57:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): arrive at total look through earnings of eight hundred $156 fifty-six million dollars, up from six $604 hundred four million in nineteen 1992. ninety-two. As before, the guidelines. GEICO figure excludes realized capital gains, which at that company have been both recurring and significant.
58:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
58:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have told you that we expect the undistributed, hypothetically taxed earnings of our investees to produce at least equivalent gains in Berkshire's intrinsic value. To date, we have far exceeded that expectation. For example, in 1986, we bought three 3 million shares of Capital City's Cities A B. ABC for
58:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): $172.50 per share, and late last year sold one third of that holding for $630 per share. After paying 35% capital gains taxes, we realized a $297 million profit from the sale. In contrast, during the eight years we held these shares, the retained earnings of Capital Cities
58:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attributable to them, hypothetically taxed at a lower. fourteen percent in accordance with our look through method,
58:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were only one hundred fifty-two million dollars. In other words, we paid a much larger tax bill than our look through presentations to you have assumed and nonetheless realized a gain that far exceeded the undistributed earnings allocable to these shares.
59:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
59:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expect such pleasant outcomes to recur often in the future,
59:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
59:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): therefore believe our look through earnings. to be a conservative representation of Berkshire's true economic earnings taxes.
59:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
59:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our capital city's sale emphasizes, Berkshire is a substantial payer of federal income taxes. In aggregate, we will pay nineteen ninety three federal income taxes of three hundred ninety million dollars, about two hundred million of that, attributable to operating earnings in one. and hundred ninety million to realized capital gains. Furthermore,
59:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our share of the nineteen ninety-three federal and foreign income taxes paid by our investies is well over four hundred million dollars.
59:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A figure
59:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
59:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't see on our financial statements,
59:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
59:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that is nonetheless real. Directly and indirectly, Berkshire's nineteen 1993 ninety-three federal income tax payments will be about one half.
1:00:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of one percent of the total paid last year by all American corporations. Speaking for our own shares, Charlie and I have absolutely no complaint about these taxes. We know we work in a market-based economy that rewards our efforts far more bountifully than it does the efforts of others whose
1:00:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): output is of equal or greater benefit to society. Taxation should and does partially redress this inequity, but we still remain extraordinarily well treated. Berkshire and its shareholders, in combination, would pay a much smaller tax if Berkshire operated as a partnership or S corporation, two
1:00:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): structures often used for business activities. For a variety of reasons, that's not feasible for Berkshire to do. However, the penalty our corporate form imposes is mitigated. Though far from eliminated by our strategy of investing for the long term, Charlie and I would follow a buy and hold policy even if we ran a
1:01:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tax-exempt institution. We think it the soundest way to invest, and it also goes down the grain of our personalities. A third reason to favor this policy, however, is the fact that taxes are due only when gains are realized. Through my favorite comic strip, Lil Abner, I got a chance during my youth to see the benefits of delayed taxes,
1:01:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): though I missed the lesson at the time, making his readers feel superior, Lil Abner bungled happily but moronically through life and dog patch. At one point he became infatuated with a New York Temptress, a Apassionata passionata Van Climax, but despaired of marrying her because he had only a single silver dollar and she was interested solely in millionaires. Dejected,
1:01:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Abner took his problem to old man Moe, the font of all knowledge and dog patch. Said the sage, Double your money twenty times, and Afassinata will be yours. One, two, four, eight, and so on, all the way to one million forty eight thousand five hundred seventy six. My last memory of the strip is Abner entering a
1:02:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): roadhouse, dropping his dollar into a slot machine, and hitting a jackpot that spilled money all over the floor. Meticulously following Moses' advice, Abner picked up two dollars and went off to find his next double. Whereupon I dumped Abner and began reading Ben Graham. Moose clearly was overrated as a guru. Besides failing to anticipate Abner's slavish obedience to
1:02:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): instructions, he also forgot about taxes. Had Abner been subject, say to the 35% thirty-five fee. percent federal tax rate that Berkshire pays, and had he managed one double annually, he would, after twenty years, only have accumulated twenty two thousand three hundred seventy dollars. Indeed, had he kept on both, getting his
1:02:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): annual doubles and paying a thirty five percent tax on each, he would have needed seven and a half years more to reach the one million dollars required to win a Appassonata. passionata.
1:02:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:02:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what if Abner had instead put his dollar in a single investment and held it until it doubled the same twenty seven and a half times? In that case, he would have realized about two hundred million dollars pre-tax, or after paying a seventy million dollar tax in the final year, about one hundred and thirty million dollars after tax. For that, appassionata would have crawled to dog
1:03:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): patch. Of course, with twenty seven and a half years having passed,
1:03:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
1:03:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): appassionata would have looked to a fellow sitting on one hundred thirty million dollars is another question. What this little tale tells us is that taxpaying investors will realize a far, far greater sum from a single investment that compounds internally at a given rate than from a succession of investments compounding at the same rate.
1:03:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:03:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I suspect many Berkshire shareholders figured that out long ago. Insurance operations
1:03:41
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1:04:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
1:04:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this point in the report, we've customarily provided you with a table showing the annual combined ratio of the insurance industry for the preceding decade. This ratio compares total insurance costs, losses incurred plus expenses,
1:05:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
1:05:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): revenue from premiums. For many years, the ratio has been above 100, a level indicating an underwriting loss. That is,
1:05:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
1:05:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industry has taken in less money. each year from its policyholders than it has had to pay for operating expenses and for loss events that occurred during the year. Offsetting this grim equation is a happier fact. Insurers get to hold on to their policyholders' money for a time before paying it out. This happens because most policies require that premiums be
1:05:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): prepaid, and more importantly, because it often takes time to resolve loss claims. Indeed.
1:05:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the case of certain lines of insurance, such as product liability or professional malpractice, many years may elapse between the loss event and payment. To oversimplify the matter somewhat, the total of the funds prepaid by policyholders and the funds earmarked for
1:05:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): incurred but not yet paid claims is called the float.
1:06:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:06:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the past, the industry was able to suffer a combined ratio of 107 to 111 and still break even from its insurance writings because of the earnings derived from investing this float. As interest rates have fallen, however, the value of float has substantially declined. Therefore, the data that
1:06:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we have provided in the past are
1:06:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): no
1:06:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): longer useful for year-to-year comparisons of industry profitability. A company writing at the same combined ratio now as in the 1980s today has a far less attractive business than it did then. Only by making an analysis that incorporates both underwriting results and the current risk-free earnings obtainable from Float can
1:06:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one evaluate the true economics of the business that a property casualty insurer writes. Of course, the average actual investment results that an insurer achieves from the use of both float and stockholders' funds is also of major importance and should be carefully examined when an investor is assessing managerial performance. But that should be a separate analysis from the one we are discussing here. The value
1:07:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of float funds, in effect, their transfer price as they move from the insurance operation to the investment operation, should be determined simply by the risk free long term rate of interest.
1:07:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:07:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows the numbers that count in an evaluation of Berkshire's insurance business. We calculate our float, which we generate in exceptional amounts relative to our premium volume, by adding loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, and deferred charges
1:07:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): applicable. to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit.
1:07:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:07:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those years when we have had an underwriting profit, which includes nineteen ninety-three, our cost of float has been negative, and we have determined our insurance earnings by adding underwriting profit to float income.
1:07:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:07:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shape of that record, year by year since nineteen sixty seven, is this. Our float has grown. from about seventeen million dollars to about two point six two billion dollars. In thirteen of those twenty seven years, we underwrote at a profit, which means our cost of funds was less than zero.
1:08:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Government bond yield of about eleven and a half percent, then the cost came steadily down, six point three one percent in nineteen ninety one, four point seven six percent in nineteen ninety two, and last year below zero again against a year end government bond yield of six point three five percent. As you can see, in our insurance operation last year, we
1:08:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had the use of two point six billion dollars at no cost. In fact, we were paid thirty one million dollars, our underwriting profit to hold these funds. This sounds good, is good, but is far from as good as it sounds.
1:08:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
1:08:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): temper our enthusiasm because we write a large volume of supercat policies, which other insurance and reinsurance companies buy to recover part of the losses they suffer from mega catastrophes, and because last year we had no losses of consequence from this activity. as that suggests the truly
1:09:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): catastrophic Midwestern floods of nineteen ninety three did not trigger supercat losses, the reason being that very few flood policies are purchased from private insurers.
1:09:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
1:09:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would be fallacious, however, to conclude from this single year result that the supercat business is a wonderful one,
1:09:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
1:09:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even a satisfactory one.
1:09:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A simple example will illustrate the fallacy.
1:09:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Indeed, you may go a straight six, seven, or more years without loss. You also will eventually go broke.
1:09:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
1:10:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, we naturally believe we are. obtaining adequate premiums and giving more like three and a half for one odds, but there is no way for us or anyone else
1:10:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
1:10:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): calculate the true odds on super cat coverages.
1:10:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:10:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact, it will take decades for us to find out whether our underwriting judgment has been sound. What we do know is that when a loss comes, it's likely to be a Lulu.
1:10:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
1:10:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): may well be years when Berkshire will suffer losses from the Supercat business equal to three or four times what we earned from it in nineteen ninety three.
1:10:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
1:10:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hurricane Andrew blew in nineteen ninety two, we paid out about one hundred twenty five million dollars because we've since expanded our supercat business.
1:10:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
1:10:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): similar storm today could cost us six hundred million dollars. So far, we have been lucky in nineteen ninety three. four. As I write this letter, we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake will be nominal. But if the quake had been a 7.5 instead of a six point eight, it would have been a different
1:11:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): story. Berkshire is ideally positioned to write supercat policies. In Ajit Jane, we have by far the best manager in this business. Additionally, companies writing these policies needed. need enormous capital, and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that of our main competitors. In most lines of insurance, huge resources aren't
1:11:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that important. An insurer can diversify the risks it writes, and if necessary, can lay off risks to reduce concentration in its portfolio. That isn't possible in the superCAT super cat business, so these competitors are forced into offering far smaller limits than those we can provide.
1:11:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Were
1:11:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they bolder, they would run the risk that a mega catastrophe
1:11:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
1:11:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a confluence of smaller catastrophes
1:11:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would wipe them out. One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that each of the four largest reinsurance companies in the world buys very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire, better than anyone else, these giants understand that the
1:12:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ourselves to much reduced volume, keeping ourselves available though for the large, sophisticated buyer who requires a SuperCAD insurer with large capacity and a sure ability to pay losses.
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