Investing Legends

Berkshire discusses 1992 results, Salomon interim role, and accounting critiques

1h 13m Listen to the original Episode page
Berkshire HathawayInsuranceAccountingSalomon BrothersInvestment Philosophy

Summary

The speaker outlines Berkshire Hathaway's 1992 performance, highlighting a 20.3% increase in per-share book value and a strategic shift toward buying good businesses at fair prices. He details the interim chairmanship at Salomon Brothers, noting the firm's recovery and record earnings, while emphasizing the importance of low corporate overhead and experienced management. The episode covers insurance industry trends, including the impact of Hurricane Andrew on super-catastrophe reinsurance, and critiques accounting practices regarding stock options and post-retirement health liabilities. Finally, the speaker addresses investment philosophy, advocating for a margin of safety and acknowledging past mistakes in the airline industry.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 9:16

    Post-retirement health liabilities and accounting issues

    The speaker discusses avoiding companies with significant post-retirement health liabilities, citing a near-miss in 1982 where a transaction fell through and the target company went bankrupt. He criticizes the use of cash-basis accounting for these liabilities and the lack of expense recognition for stock options, arguing that both practices misstate true economic costs.

  2. 9:16 – 15:08

    Retirement, management, and corporate overhead

    The speaker announces the retirement of long-time assistants Gladys Kaiser and Vern McKinsey, while praising Mrs. B. (Rose Blumkin) for working at age 99. He highlights Scott Fetzer's record earnings and low corporate overhead, contrasting Berkshire's efficient structure with bureaucratic competitors like Walmart and GEICO.

  3. 15:08 – 22:36

    Shareholder policies, stock splits, and convertible debentures

    The speaker addresses the high stock price causing gift-tax issues for shareholders, suggesting workarounds like bargain sales or partnerships. He reiterates the no-stock-split policy to maintain a long-term owner base and discusses calling zero-coupon convertible debentures to eliminate conversion options that are no longer attractive.

  4. 22:36 – 30:32

    Performance, accounting volatility, and market forecasts

    The speaker reports a 20.3% increase in per-share book value for 1992, noting that market volatility and corporate taxes create a structural disadvantage against the S&P 500 index. He predicts lower returns for stocks in the next decade and acknowledges that Berkshire's growing capital base will likely reduce its historical outperformance relative to the index.

  5. 30:32 – 33:05

    Salomon Brothers Interim Chairmanship and Post-Interim Review

    The speaker discusses stepping down as interim chairman of Salomon Brothers after ten months, noting that Berkshire's performance did not suffer during his absence. He highlights Salomon's improved reputation and record earnings, crediting key executives and legal counsel for the firm's recovery from regulatory issues.

  6. 33:05 – 34:45

    Acquisition Philosophy and the 'Frog-Kissing Princess'

    The speaker describes the excitement of acquiring businesses with excellent economics and trusted management, advising against haste. He uses the metaphor of managers paying dearly for 'corporate toads' expecting transformation, admitting his own past mistakes before shifting strategy to buying good businesses at fair prices.

  7. 34:45 – 37:25

    Recent Acquisitions: Central States Indemnity and H.H. Brown

    Details are provided on the acquisition of 82% of Central States Indemnity, an insurer for disabled or unemployed credit card holders, managed by Bill Kaiser. The speaker compares this to the earlier purchase of National Indemnity and mentions H.H. Brown's acquisition of Lowell Shoe Company as a successful add-on.

  8. 37:25 – 42:41

    Financial Performance and Look-Through Earnings

    Operating earnings rose to $348 million in 1992 from $316 million in 1991. The speaker explains 'look-through earnings,' which include retained earnings of major investees, totaling $604 million in 1992. He sets a long-term goal for these earnings to grow at 15% annually, targeting over $1.8 billion by 2000.

  9. 42:41 – 44:52

    Insurance Industry Trends and Hurricane Andrew

    The combined ratio for the property-casualty industry climbed to 114.8% in 1992, partly due to Hurricane Andrew, which caused the largest insured loss in history. The speaker notes that Andrew exposed inadequate reinsurance protections for many large insurers.

  10. 44:52 – 50:25

    Berkshire's Super-Cat Business and Risk Management

    Berkshire, a major writer of super-catastrophe reinsurance, suffered $125 million in losses from Andrew, roughly equal to its premium income for the year. The speaker emphasizes the difficulty of pricing such risks due to factors like global warming and coastal development, and notes that they reject over 98% of reinsurance proposals.

  11. 50:25 – 54:25

    Cost of Float and Insurance Operations

    The cost of float for 1992 was 4.76%, below the 7.39% yield on long-term government bonds. The speaker highlights that National Indemnity and the home state operation generated float at a negative cost (underwriting profit), while Ajit Jain's large transactions drive the bulk of float growth.

  12. 54:25 – 1:02:09

    Equity Portfolio and Investment Philosophy

    Berkshire's nine largest common stock holdings had a market value of $11.44 billion. The speaker discusses the General Dynamics purchase, which evolved from an arbitrage play to a long-term investment after observing CEO Bill Anders' strategy. He argues that value and growth investing are 'joined at the hip' and that the term 'value investing' is redundant.

  13. 1:02:09 – 1:03:02

    Margin of Safety and Circle of Competence

    The speaker explains that Berkshire Hathaway manages uncertainty by sticking to simple, stable businesses they understand and insisting on a margin of safety in purchase price. They emphasize that defining what one does not know is more important than knowing everything.

  14. 1:03:02 – 1:13:13

    Fixed Income Holdings and Performance

    Berkshire's largest fixed income holdings at year-end included ACF Industries Debentures, American Express Perks, Champion International Convertible Preferred, First Empire State Convertible Preferred, Salaman Convertible Preferred, USAIR Convertible Preferred, and Washington Public Power Systems Bonds. The total amortized value was $1.89 billion with a market value of $1.95 billion.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
S&P 500indexneutralaveraging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been invested in the standard and poor's five hundred.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Berkshire has 22,000 employees and inconsequential post-retirement health benefit liabilities.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:06

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Employee Count and Post-Employment Benefits sections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 1982, the speaker committed to buy a company with extraordinary post-retirement health obligations, but the transaction fell through and the business went bankrupt.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:19

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, discussion of 2026 acquisition attempt; historical bankruptcy records of the target company. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Accounting rules allowed cash basis accounting for post-retirement health costs, understating liabilities.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:40

How to verify: Historical FASB accounting standards (e.g., FAS 106) prior to mandatory accrual requirements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's corporate expense fell from $5.6 million in 1991 to $4.2 million in 1992.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·12:42

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Consolidated Statements of Earnings or Operating Expenses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Scott Fetzer earned $110 million pre-tax in 1992 with $116 million in equity capital.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·11:58

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Scott Fetzer Operating Results section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's per-share book value increased 20.3% in 1992.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:36

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Summary of Operations or Per Share Data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's book value grew from $19 to $7,745 over 28 years, at a 23.6% compounded annual rate.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·23:04

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Per Share Data table. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire called its zero-coupon convertible debentures for payment on January 4, 1993.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·17:40

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Debt section or SEC filings (Form 8-K) from late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

97% of eligible shares participated in the 1992 shareholder designated contributions program, totaling $7.6 million.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·18:39

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Designated Contributions section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire has 1,152,547 shares outstanding after converting debentures.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·23:51

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Capital Stock section or SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The speaker stepped down as interim chairman of Salomon Brothers after ten months in the job.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·31:03

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section: The Salomon Interim. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Salomon Brothers reported record pre-tax earnings in 1991, thirty-four percent above the previous high.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:39

How to verify: Salomon Brothers 2026 Annual Report or SEC filings (e.g., Form 10-K) for the year ended Dec 31, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Berkshire acquired 82% of Central States Indemnity in December 1992.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·34:45

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section: Acquisitions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Central States Indemnity had annual premiums of about $90 million and profits of about $10 million at the time of acquisition.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·35:05

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section: Acquisitions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's share of operating earnings rose to about $348 million in 1992 from about $316 million in 1991.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·38:10

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section: Sources of Reported Earnings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Look-through earnings in 1992 were six hundred four million dollars, up from five hundred sixteen million in 1991.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:56

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 1992 Shareholder Letter, Section: Look-Through Earnings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Hurricane Andrew caused the largest insured loss in history at that time.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:18

How to verify: Insurance industry reports from 2026/2026 (e.g., Swiss Re Sigma, ISO reports) or Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire suffered losses from Hurricane Andrew of about $125 million, roughly equal to its 1992 Super-Cat premium income.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·45:12

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section: Insurance Operations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The cost of float in 1992 was 4.76% against a year-end government bond yield of 7.39%.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:50

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section: Insurance Operations; U.S. Treasury yield data for Dec 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The combined ratio for the property-casualty industry was estimated at 114.8% in 1992.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·43:31

How to verify: Insurance industry statistics (e.g., ISO Combined Ratio Statistics) for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire attempts to deal with estimation problems by sticking to businesses they believe they understand, which must be relatively simple and stable.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:02:12

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Section on 'Investing' or 'Philosophy'; verify against text of the letter available on Berkshire Hathaway website or SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Berkshire's largest holdings of fixed income securities at year-end were in ACF Industries Debentures, American Express Perks, Champion International Convertible Preferred, First Empire State Convertible Preferred, Salaman Convertible Preferred, USAIR Convertible Preferred, and Washington Public Power Systems Bonds.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:03:02

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Section on 'Investments'; verify list against the published letter on Berkshire Hathaway website or SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The total cost or amortized value of these fixed income holdings was about $1.89 billion and market value about $1.95 billion.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:03:28

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Section on 'Investments'; verify numbers against the published letter on Berkshire Hathaway website or SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The largest single position was the Salaman Preferred, carried at $700 million and valued at $756 million.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:03:28

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Section on 'Investments'; verify numbers against the published letter on Berkshire Hathaway website or SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The USAIR position was a significant shortfall, carried at $358 million and valued at $268.5 million.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:03:48

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 1992 Annual Letter, Section on 'Investments'; verify numbers against the published letter on Berkshire Hathaway website or SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Do your own research

  • Review Berkshire Hathaway's 1992 Shareholder Letter for detailed financials and management discussion.
  • Verify the 1992 property-casualty industry combined ratio of 114.8% using industry reports from the Insurance Information Institute.
  • Check the impact of Hurricane Andrew on reinsurance companies' financial statements for 1992.
  • Analyze the effect of the 1993 accounting rule change on deferred taxes for companies with significant deferred tax liabilities.
  • Compare Berkshire's look-through earnings calculation methodology with standard GAAP earnings.
  • Assess the performance of secondary market preferreds versus new issues using historical bond market data.
  • Review the corporate governance and overhead costs of competitors like Walmart and GEICO as cited in the letter.
  • Examine the accounting treatment of stock options and post-retirement health benefits in 1992 versus current standards.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In making acquisitions, Charlie and I have tended to avoid companies with significant post-retirement liabilities.
0:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As a
0:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): result, Berkshire's present liability and future costs for post-retirement health benefits, though we now have twenty-two thousand employees, are inconsequential.
0:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
0:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): need to admit, though, that we had a near miss.
0:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
0:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen eighty-two, I made a huge mistake in committing to buy a company burdened by extraordinary post-retirement health obligations. Luckily, though, the transaction fell through for reasons beyond our control.
0:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Even so, I wasn't expecting things to get as bad as they did. Another buyer appeared, the business soon went bankrupt and was shut down, and thousands of workers found those bountiful healthcare promises to be largely worthless.
0:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
0:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recent decades, no CEO would have dreamed of going to his board with the proposition that his company become
1:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
1:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insurer of uncapped post-retirement health benefits that other corporations chose to install. A CEO didn't need to be a medical expert to know that lengthening life expectancies and sort soaring health costs would guarantee and ensure a financial battering from such a business. Nevertheless, many a manager blithely committed his own company to a self-insurance plan embodying precisely the same
1:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): promises,
1:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thereby doomed his shareholders to suffer the inevitable consequences. In healthcare, open-ended promises have created open-ended Ended liabilities that in a few cases loom so large as to threaten the global competitiveness of major. American industries.
1:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe part of the reason for this reckless behavior was that accounting rules did not for so long require the booking of post retirement health costs as they were incurred. Instead, the rules allowed cash basis accounting, which vastly understated the liabilities that were building up.
1:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): effect, the attitude of both managements and their accountants toward these liabilities was out of sight, out of mind. Ironically, some of these same managers would be quick to criticize Congress for employing cash basis thinking in respect to Social Security promises or other programs creating future liabilities of size. Managers thinking about accounting issues should
2:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): never forget one of Abraham Lincoln's favorite riddles. Examples. How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg? The answer? four, because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg.
2:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
2:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): behooves managers to remember that Abe's right, even if an auditor is willing to certify that the tail is a leg.
2:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
2:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most egregious case of let's not face up to reality behavior by executives and accountants has occurred in the world of stock options.
2:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
2:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire's nineteen eighty five annual report, I laid out my opinions about the use and misuse of the stock. options, but even when options are structured properly, they are accounted for in ways that make no sense.
2:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
2:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lack of logic is not accidental. For decades, much of the business world has waged war against accounting rulemakers, trying to keep the costs of stock options from being reflected in the profits of the corporations that issue
3:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
3:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Typically, executives have argued that options are hard to value and that therefore their costs should be ignored.
3:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
3:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other times, managers have said that assigning a cost to options would injure small startup businesses. Sometimes they have even solemnly declared that out of the money options, those with an exercise price equal to or above the current market price have no value when they are issued. Oddly, the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in with a
3:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): variation on that theme,
3:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a pine.
3:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): opining that options should not be viewed as a cost because they aren't dollars out of a company's coffers. I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving their reported profits. For example, they could eliminate the cost of insurance by paying for it with options.
3:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
3:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you're a CEO and subscribe to this no cash-no-cost cash no cost theory of accounting, I'll make you an offer you can't refuse. Give us a call at Berkshire and we will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of long-term options on your company's stock. Shareholders should understand that companies incur costs when they deliver something of value to another party, and not just when cash
4:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): changes hands. Moreover, it is both silly and cynical to say that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply because it can't be quantified with pinpoint precision. Right now, accounting abounds with imprecision. After all, no manager or auditor knows how long a 747 is going to last, which means he also does
4:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not know what the yearly depreciation charge for the plane should be. No one knows with any certainty what a bank's annual loan loss charge ought to be.
4:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
4:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the estimates of losses that property casualty companies make are notoriously inaccurate.
4:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Mortgage payment?
4:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Done.
4:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kids fed?
4:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Uh yeah, technically they have been fed.
4:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Dog
4:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): walked.
4:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): D walked me more so.
4:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Coffee?
4:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh, yes, now we're asking the important questions.
5:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We have a lot going on.
5:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. Isn't it just kind of great though?
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6:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Does
6:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this mean that these important items of cost should be ignored simply because they can't be quantified with absolute accuracy? Of course not. Rather, these costs should be estimated by honest and experienced people and then recorded. When you get right down to it, what other item of major but hard to precisely calculate cost, other, that is, than stock options,
7:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): does the
7:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accountant? accounting profession say should be ignored in the calculation of earnings? Moreover, options are just not that difficult to value. Admittedly, the difficulty is increased by the fact that the options given to executives are restricted in various ways. These restrictions affect value. They do not, however, eliminate it. In fact, since I'm in the
7:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mood for offers, I'll make one to any executive who is granted a restricted option. even though it may be out of the money. On the day of issue, Berkshire will pay him or her a substantial sum for the right to any future gain he or she realizes on the option. So if you find a CEO who says his newly issued options have
7:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): little or no value, tell him to try us out. In truth, we have far more confidence in our ability to determine an appropriate price to pay for an option than we have in our ability to determine the proper depreciation rate for our corporate jet.
8:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
8:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seems to me that the realities of stock options can be summarized quite simply. If options aren't a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?
8:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
8:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accounting profession and the Securities and Exchange Commission should be shamed by the fact that they have long let themselves be muscled by business executives on the option accounting issue. Additionally, the lobbying that executives engage in may have an unfortunate byproduct. In my opinion, the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of
8:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): significance to society, about which it may have much of value to say.
8:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When it
8:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.
8:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Miscellaneous.
8:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
8:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have two pieces of regrettable news this year. First, Gladys Kaiser, my friend and assistant for 25 years, will give up the latter post after the 1993 annual meeting, though she will certainly remain my friend forever. Gladys and I have been a team, and though I knew her retirement was coming, it is still a jolt. Secondly, in
9:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): September, Vern McKinsey relinquished his role as chief financial officer after a thirty year association with me that began when he was the outside auditor of Buffett Partnership Limited. Verne is staying on as a consultant, and though that job description is often a euphemism, in this case it has real meaning. I expect Verne to continue to fill an important role at
9:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, but to do so at his own pace. Mark Hamburg, Verne's understudy for five years, has succeeded him as chief financial officer.
9:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
9:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recall that one woman, upon being asked to describe the perfect spouse, specified an archaeologist.
9:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
9:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): older I get, she said, the more he'll be interested in me.
9:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): She
9:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would have liked my tastes.
9:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
9:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): treasure those extraordinary Berkshire managers who are working well past normal retirement age and who can calmly. concomitantly are achieving results much superior to those of their younger competitors. While I understand and empathize with the decision of Verne and Gladys to retire when the calendar says it's time, theirs is not a step I wish to encourage. It's
10:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hard to teach a new dog old tricks.
10:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
10:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): am a moderate, in my views, about retirement compared to Rose Blumkin, better known as Mrs. Beaum. B.
10:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At ninety-nine, she continues to work seven days a week. And about her, I have some particularly good news. You will remember that after her family sold eighty percent of Nebraska furniture mart to Berkshire in nineteen eighty-three,
10:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mrs.
10:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): B. continued to be chairman and run the carpet operation. In nineteen eighty nine, however, she left because of a managerial disagreement and opened up her own operation next. door, in a large building that she had owned for several years. In her new business she ran the carpet section but leased out other home furnishings departments.
10:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
10:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the end of last year, Mrs. B decided to sell her building and land to the furniture mart. She'll continue, however, to run her carpet business at its current location. No sense slowing down just when you're hitting full stride. The furniture mart will set up shop alongside her in that same building, thereby making a major addition to its furniture business.
11:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
11:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): am delighted that Mrs. B has again linked up with us. Her business story has no parallel, and I have always been a fan of hers, whether she was a partner or a competitor. But believe me, partners better. This time around, misses B. graciously offered to sign a non noncompete compete agreement. And I, having been incautious on this point when I was
11:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): she was eighty-nine, snapped at the deal. Mrs. B. belongs in the Guinness Book of World Records on many counts. Signing a noncompete at ninety-nine merely adds one more. Ralph Shea, CEO of Scott Fetzer, and a manager who I hope is with us at ninety-nine also, hit a grand slam last year when that
11:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): company earned a record one hundred ten million dollars pre-tax and What's even more impressive is that Scott Fetzer achieved such earnings while employing only one hundred sixteen million dollars of equity capital. This extraordinary result is not the product of leverage. The company uses only minor amounts of borrowed money, except for the debt it
12:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): employs, appropriately,
12:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
12:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): its finance subsidiary. Scott Fetzer now operates with a significantly smaller investment in both inventory and fixed assets than it had when we bought it in 1986. This means the company has been able to distribute more than 100% of its earnings to Berkshire during our seven years of ownership while concurrently increasing its earnings stream. Which was
12:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): excellent to begin with.
12:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By a lot. Ralph just keeps on outdoing himself, and Berkshire shareholders owe him a great deal. Those readers with particularly sharp eyes will note that our corporate expense fell from five point six million dollars in nineteen ninety one to four point two million dollars in nineteen ninety two. Perhaps you will think that I have sold our corporate jet, the
13:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): indefensible. Forget it. I find the thought of retiring the plane even more revolting than the thought of retiring the chairman. In this matter, I've demonstrated uncharacteristic flexibility. For years I argued passionately. against corporate jets. But finally, my dogma was run over by my karma.
13:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
13:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reduction in corporate overhead actually came about because those expenses were especially high in 1991
13:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
13:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we incurred a one-time environmental charge relating to alleged pre-1970 actions of our textile operation. Now that things are back to normal, our after tax overhead costs are under 1% of our reported operating. earnings and less than one half of 1% of our look through earnings. We have no legal, personnel, public relations, investor relations, or
13:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strategic planning departments. In turn, this means we don't need support personnel such as guards, drivers, messengers, and the like. Finally, except for Vern, we employ no consultants. Professor Parkinson would like our operation.
14:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Though
14:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Charlie, I must say, still finds it outrageously fat. At some companies, corporate expense runs 10% or more of operating earnings. The tithing that operations thus makes to headquarters not only hurts earnings, but more importantly slashes capital values. If the business that spends 10% on headquarters costs achieves
14:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): earnings at its operating levels identical to those achieved by the by the business that incurs costs of only one percent, shareholders of the first enterprise suffer a nine percent loss
14:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
14:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the value of their holdings simply because of corporate overhead. Charlie and I have observed no correlation between high corporate costs and good corporate performance. In fact, we see the simpler, low cost operation as more likely to operate effectively than its bureaucratic brethren. We're admirers of the Walmart, Newcore, Dover, Geico, and
14:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the U.S.
14:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Golden West Financial and Price Company models. Late last year, Berkshire's stock price crossed $10,000. Several shareholders have mentioned to me that the high price causes them problems. They like to give shares away each year, and find themselves impeded by the tax rule that draws a distinction between annual gifts of
15:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): $10,000 ten thousand dollars or under to a single individual and those above. ten thousand dollars. That is, those gifts no greater than ten thousand dollars are completely tax free. Those above ten thousand dollars require the donor to use up a portion of his or her lifetime exemption from gift and estate taxes,
15:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or if that exemption has been exhausted, to pay gift taxes.
15:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
15:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can suggest three ways to address this problem. The first would be useful to a married shareholder who can give up to $20,000 annually to a single recipient as long as the donor files a gift tax return containing his or her spouse's written consent to gifts made during the year. Secondly, a shareholder, married or not, can make a bargain sale. Imagine,
15:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for example, that Berkshire is selling for $12,000 and that one wishes to make only a $10,000 gift. In that case, sell the stock. to the gift E for $2,000. A caution: you will be taxed on the amount, if any, by which the sales price to your gift E exceeds your tax basis. Finally, you can establish a partnership with people to whom you are making gifts,
16:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fund it with Berkshire shares, and simply give percentage interests in the partnership away each year. These interests can be for any value that you select. If the value is $10,000 ten thousand dollars or less, the gift will be. tax free.
16:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
16:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): issue the customary warning. Consult with your own tax advisor before taking action on any of the more esoteric methods of gift making.
16:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
16:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hold to the view about stock splits that we set forth in the nineteen eighty three annual report. Overall, we believe our owner related policies, including the no split policy,
16:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
16:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): helped us assemble a body of shareholders that is the best associated with the with any widely held American corporation.
16:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
16:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shareholders think and behave like rational long-term owners and view the business much as Charlie and I do. Consequently, our stock consistently trades in a price range that is sensibly related to intrinsic value. Additionally, we believe that our shares turn over far less actively than do the shares of any other widely held company, the frictional costs of
17:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trading,
17:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and the same.
17:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which act as a major tax on the owners of many companies, are virtually nonexistent at Berkshire. The market making skills of Jim McGuire, our New York stock exchange specialist, definitely help to keep these costs low. Obviously, a split would not change the situation dramatically. Nonetheless, there is no way that our shareholder group would be upgraded by the new
17:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shareholders enticed by a split. Instead, we believe that modest degradation would occur.
17:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
17:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mentioned earlier, on december sixteenth, we called our zero coupon convertible debentures for payment on january fourth, nineteen ninety three. These obligations bore interest at five and a half percent, a low cost for funds when they were issued in nineteen eighty nine, but an unattractive rate for us at the time of call.
17:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
17:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debentures could have been redeemed at the option of the holder in September nineteen ninety nine. 1994, and 5.5% money available for no longer than that is not now of interest to us. Furthermore, Berkshire shareholders are disadvantaged by having a conversion option outstanding. At the time we issued the debentures, this disadvantage was offset by the attractive interest rate
18:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they carried. By late 1992, nineteen ninety two, it was not. In general, we continue to have an aversion to disagree. debt, particularly the short term kind, but we are willing to incur modest amounts of debt when it is both properly structured and of significant benefit to shareholders. About ninety seven percent of
18:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's nineteen ninety two shareholder designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were seven point six million dollars and two thousand eight hundred ten charities were recipients. I'm considering increasing these contributions in the future at a rate greater than the increase
18:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in Berkshire's book value, and I would be glad to hear from you as to your thinking about this idea. We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder O designated contributions program that appears later in this report to participate in future projects. programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in
19:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the nominee name of a broker, bank, or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31st, 1993 will be ineligible for the 1993 program.
19:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
19:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions including merchandise, averaging about two million. dollars annually. These contributions support local charities such as the United Way and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses. However, neither our
19:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them,
20:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): except
20:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
20:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
20:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year, the annual meeting will be held at the Orphium Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at nine 9 thirty 30 in the morning on Monday, april twenty 26, sixth, nineteen 1993. ninety two.
20:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
20:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): record 1700 people turned up for the meeting last year, but that number still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.
20:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
20:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels. First, the Radisson Riddick Tower, a small hotel of 88 rooms but a nice one, across the street from the Orpheum. Second, the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five minute walk from the Orpheum. Or third, the Marriott, located in West Omaha, about one hundred yards
20:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from Borshim's,
20:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
20:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at eight thirty and eight forty five for the meeting and return after it ends. Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get. We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere. that
21:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): features such a consistently high level of intelligent owner-related questions.
21:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
21:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly. and you may have to walk a few
21:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): blocks.
21:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
21:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture, Mart, and Borsheims after the meeting, and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the furniture mart any day of the week. It is open from ten in the
22:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): morning to five in the
22:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): morning.
22:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thirty in the afternoon on Saturdays and from noon to five thirty on Sundays. While there, stop at the C's candy cart and find out for yourself why Charlie and I are a good bit wider than we were back in nineteen seventy two when we bought C's. Borsheimes normally is closed on Sunday, but will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to six in the
22:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): evening on Sunday, April twenty fifth. Charlie and I will be in attendance for
22:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the first time.
22:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sporting our jewelers loops and ready to give advice about gems to anyone foolish enough to listen. Also available will be plenty of cherry cokes, C's candies and other lesser goodies.
22:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
22:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope you will join us. Warren E Buffett, Chairman of the Board, march first, nineteen ninety three, to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated Our per share book value increased twenty 20.3% point three percent during nineteen 1992. ninety two.
22:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Over the last 28 years, that is, since present management took over, book value has grown from $19 to $7,745, or at a rate of $23.6%
23:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compounded annually. During the year, Berkshire's net worth increased by $1.52 billion. More than 98% ninety eight percent of this gain came from earnings and a appreciation of portfolio securities, with the remainder coming from the issuance of new stock. These shares were issued as a result of our calling our convertible debenters for redemption on January
23:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fourth, nineteen ninety three,
23:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
23:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of some holders electing to receive common shares rather than the cash that was their alternative.
23:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Most
23:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): holders of the debenters who converted into common waited until January to do it, but a few made the move in December and therefore remained. received shares in 1992. To sum up what happened to the $476 million of bonds we had outstanding. $25 million were converted into shares before year end, 46 million were converted in January, and
23:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): $405 million were redeemed for cash. The conversions were made at $11,719 nineteen dollars per share, so altogether we issued $6,106 six thousand one hundred six shares. Berkshire now has one million one hundred fifty two thousand five hundred forty seven shares outstanding. That compares you will be interested to know to one million
24:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one hundred thirty seven thousand seven hundred seventy eight shares outstanding on October first, nineteen sixty four, the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership Limited acquired control of the company.
24:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We have
24:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire, doing so only when we receive as much value as we give. Equal value, however, has not been easy to obtain since we have always valued our shares highly. So be it. We wish to increase Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth of its owners. Those two
24:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): objectives do not necessarily go hand in hand. As an amusing but value destroying experience, in our past illustrates. On that occasion, we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell bent on expansion. Aren't they all?
24:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
25:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our bank wooed a smaller bank, its owner demanded a stock swap on a basis that valued the acquiry's net worth and earning power at over twice that of the acquirer's. Our management, visibly in heat, quickly capitulated. The owner of the acquirer. acquiry then insisted on one other condition. You must promise me, he said in
25:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): effect,
25:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
25:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): once our merger is done and I have become a major shareholder, you'll never again make a deal this dumb. You will remember that our goal is to increase our per share intrinsic value, for which our book value is a conservative but useful proxy.
25:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
25:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a 15% annual rate. This objective, however, cannot be attained in a smooth manner. Smoothness is particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply to the common stocks owned by University owned by our insurance companies, whose portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire's net worth. Since 1979, generally
25:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accepted accounting principles or GAAP have required that these securities be valued at their market prices. less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation rather than at the lower of cost or market, run-of-the-mill fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results to gyrate, especially in comparison to those of the typical
26:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industrial company.
26:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
26:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): illustrate just how volatile our progress has been,
26:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
26:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to indicate the impact that market movements have on short-term results,
26:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
26:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows our annual change. in per share net worth year by year and compares it with the annual results, including dividends, of the standard and poor's 500.
26:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
26:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should keep at least three points in mind as you evaluate this data. The first point concerns the many businesses we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in stock market valuations. The impact of these businesses on both our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years. Early on, returns from our textile operation, which then represented a significant portion of our
26:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): net worth, were a major drag on performance, averaging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been invested in the standard and poor's five hundred. In more recent years, as we assembled our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally exceptional managers, the returns from our operating businesses have been high. Usually well in excess of the returns
27:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of
27:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
27:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): achieved by the index.
27:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
27:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second important factor to consider,
27:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
27:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one that significantly hurts our relative performance.
27:24
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27:39
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28:05
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28:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Corporation.
28:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Is that both the income and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability, whereas the index returns are pre tax.
28:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Covered, in that case, the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the index. Under present tax laws, a gain for the index of eighteen percent delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of thirteen percent,
28:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
28:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise.
29:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
29:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with.
29:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
29:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is no antidote for
29:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. The
29:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): third point incorporates two predictions Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman and my partner, and I'm
29:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not sure.
29:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I are virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an investment in the index will be far less than that of the past decade,
29:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
29:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index. Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain. We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters. is to make fortune tellers look good. Even now, Charlie and I continue
29:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to believe that short-term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place, away from children, and also from grown ups who behave in the market like children. However, it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses, as they have so dramatically done for some time,
30:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and that
30:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact makes us quite. confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be significantly smaller than they were in the last. Our second conclusion,
30:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
30:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance, seems incontestable. The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable though slowed pace. We will continue to experience considerable. volatility in our annual results. That's assured by the general volatility of the stock market,
30:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by
30:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the concentration of our equity holdings in just a few companies,
30:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
30:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by certain business decisions we have made, most especially our move to commit large resources to super catastrophe insurance. We not only accept this volatility, but welcome it. A tolerance for short term swings improves our long-term prospects.
30:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
30:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): baseball lingo, our performance yardstick is slugging percentage, not batting average.
30:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
30:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Salaman Interlude. Last June,
31:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
31:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stepped down as interim chairman of Salamon Incorporated after ten months in the job.
31:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
31:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can tell from Berkshire's nineteen ninety one and nineteen ninety two results that the company didn't miss me while I was gone.
31:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But the
31:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reverse isn't true. I missed Berkshire and am delighted to be back full time. There is no job in the world that is more fun than running Berkshire, and I count myself lucky to be where I am.
31:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
31:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Salamon Post, though far from fun, was interesting and worthwhile. In Fortune's annual survey of America's most admired corporations conducted last September, Salamon ranked second among 311 three hundred eleven companies and
31:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the degree to which it improved its reputation. Additionally, Salamon Brothers, the securities subsidiary of Salamon Incorporated, reported record pre-tax earnings last year,
31:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thirty four percent above the previous high. Many people helped in the resolution of Salamon's Salomon's problems and the writing of the firm, but a few clearly deserve special mention. It is no exaggeration to say that without the combined efforts of Salomon executives, Derek Maughn, Bob Denham, Don Howard, and John McFarlane, the firm very
32:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): probably would not have survived. In their work, these men were tireless, effective, supportive, and selfless,
32:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
32:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I will forever be grateful to them. Salomon's lead lawyer, in its government, matters, Ron Olson of Munger. Tollez and Olson, was also key to our success in getting through the this trouble. The firm's problems were not only severe, but complex. At least five authorities,
32:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
32:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the United States Treasury, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
32:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): had
32:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): important concerns about Salamon. If we were to resolve our problems in a coordinated and prompt manner, we needed a lawyer with exceptional legal, business, and human skills. Ron had them all. Acquisitions.
33:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
33:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all our activities at Berkshire, the most exhilarating for Charlie and me is the acquisition of a business with excellent economic characteristics and a management that we like, trust, and admire. Such acquisitions are not easy to make, but we look for them constantly. In the search, we adopt the same attitude one might find appropriate in looking for a spouse. It
33:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pays to be active, interested, and open minded, but it does not pay to be in a hurry.
33:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
33:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the past, I've observed that many acquisition hungry managers were apparently mesmerized by their childhood reading of the story about the frog kissing. princess, remembering her success, they pay dearly for the right to kiss corporate toads, expecting wondrous transfigurations. Initially, disappointing results only deepen their desire to round up new
33:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): toads. Fanaticism, said Santayana, consists of redoubling your effort when you've forgotten your aim. Ultimately, even the most optimistic manager must face reality, standing knee deep in unresponsible. unresponsive toads, he then announces an enormous restructuring charge. In this corporate equivalent of a Head Start program, the CEO
34:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): receives the education, but the stockholders pay the tuition.
34:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've never been much of a sport,
34:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
34:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my results matched those of acquirers who courted higher priced toads.
34:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Said the pro, practice doesn't make perfect, practice makes permanent.
34:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
34:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thereafter I revised my strategy and tried to buy good businesses at fair prices. rather than fair businesses at good prices. Last year, in December, we made an acquisition that is a prototype of what we now look for. The purchase was 82% of Central States indemnity, an insurer that makes monthly payments for credit
35:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): card holders who are unable themselves to pay because they have become disabled or unemployed. Currently, the company's annual premiums are about $90 million and property. profits about $10 million. Central States is based in Omaha and managed by Bill Kaiser, a friend of mine for over 35 years. The Kaiser family, which includes sons
35:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bill, Dick, and John, retains 18% ownership of the business and will continue to run things just as it has in the past. We could not be associated with better people. Coincidentally, this latest acquisition has much in common with our first, made twenty six years ago. At that time, we purchased
35:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): another Omaha insurer, National Indemnity Company, along with a small sister company from Jack Ringwalt, another longtime friend. Jack had built the business from scratch and, as was the case with Bill Kaiser, Kiser, thought of me when he wished to sell. Jack's comment at the time,
36:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
36:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't sell the company, my executor will, and I'd rather pick the home for it. National indemnity was an outstanding business when we bought it and continued to be under Jack's management. Hollywood has had good luck with sequels, I believe we too will. Berkshire's acquisition criteria are described later in this report. Beyond purchases made by the parent company, however,
36:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our subsidiaries sometimes make small add add-on on acquisitions that extend their product lines or distribution capabilities. In this manner we enlarge the domain of managers we already know to be outstanding,
36:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
36:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's a low risk and high return proposition.
36:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
36:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made five acquisitions of this type in nineteen ninety-two, and one was not so small. At year end, H
36:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): H
36:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): H Brown purchased Lowell Shoe Company, a business with ninety million dollars in sales that makes nursemates, a leading line of shoes for nurses, and other kinds of shoes as well. Our operating managers will continue to look for add-on opportunities and we would expect these to contribute modestly to Berkshire's value in the future. Then again, a trend has emerged that may
37:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): make further acquisitions difficult. The parent company made one purchase in nineteen ninety one, buying H Brown, which is run by Frank Rooney, who has eight children. In nineteen ninety one, two, our only deal was with Bill Kaiser, father of nine.
37:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
37:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): won't be easy to keep this string going in nineteen ninety three. Sources of reported earnings
37:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
37:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): table in the annual report shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of goodwill and other major purchase price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply. but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had
37:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing GA Ape, which requires purchase price adjustments to be made on a business by business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are
38:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of course, identical to the GA app total in our audited financial statements.
38:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
38:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): summary, Berkshire's share of operating earnings after taxes and minority interests rose to about $348 million in 1992, from about $316 million in 1991, insurance investment income rose,
38:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
38:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): underwriting loss narrowed slightly, and the Buffalo News was World Book, the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, Nebraska Furniture Mart, and a full year of H. H. Brown all contributed. C's and Kirby were essentially flat. Interest expense rose partly because we paid twenty two and a half million dollars of premiums on the early redemption of debt, but
38:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): including gains from sales of securities, much smaller than nineteen ninety one's,
38:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
38:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): total earnings came to about four. hundred seven million dollars against about four hundred forty million dollars the year before.
38:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
38:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): large amount of additional information about these businesses is given later in the report, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a gayopy basis. Our goal is to give you all of the financial information that Charlie and I consider significant in making our own evaluation of Berkshire. Look through earnings.
39:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We've previously discussed look through earnings, which consist of first the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus second, the retained operating earnings of major investees that under GA GAP accounting are not reflected in our profits. Less third, an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been
39:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): distributed to us, though not. no single figure can be perfect, we believe that the look through number more accurately portrays the earnings of Berkshire than does the GA app number. I've told you that over time look through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Our look through earnings in
39:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1992 were six hundred four million dollars, and they will need to grow to more than one point eight billion dollars per year. by the two thousand.
40:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
40:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are to meet that fifteen percent goal, for us to get there, our operating subsidiaries and investees must deliver excellent performances, and we must exercise some skill and capital allocation as
40:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well. We
40:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cannot promise to achieve the one point eight billion dollar target. Indeed we may not even come close to it, but it does guide our decision making. When we allocate capital today, we are thinking about what will maximize look through earnings in the year 2000.
40:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
40:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do not, however, see this long term focus as eliminating the need for us to achieve decent short-term results as well. After all, we were thinking long range thoughts five or ten years ago, and the moves we made then should now be paying off. If plantings made confidently are repeatedly followed by disappointing harvest, uh something is wrong with the farmer.
40:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or perhaps with the farm, investors should understand that for certain companies and even for some industries, there simply is no good long-term strategy. Just as you should be suspicious of managers who pump up short-term earnings by accounting maneuvers, asset sales, and the like, so also should you be suspicious of those managers who fail failed to deliver
41:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for extended periods and blame it on their long-term focus, even Alice, after listening to the Queen lecture her about jam tomorrow, finally insisted, it must come sometimes to jam today.
41:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
41:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows how we calculate look through earnings, though I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized earlier, mostly under insurance group, net investment income. In outline, our share of
41:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the government.
41:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): undistributed operating earnings of our major investies came to two hundred ninety-eight million dollars, against two hundred thirty million dollars in nineteen ninety-one. Coca-Cola led with eighty-two million, followed by Capital Cities slash ABC at seventy million, Gillette at thirty-eight million, Geico at thirty-four thirty four million, and Freddie Mac Mack at twenty
41:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nine million. Wells Fargo swung from minus seventeen million to plus seven million. sixteen million, and General Dynamics and Guinness joined the list for the first time, at eleven million and seven million. The Washington Post contributed eleven million. From that two hundred ninety-eight million, we deduct a hypothetical tax of forty two million and add our reported operating earnings of three hundred
42:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): forty-eight million to arrive at total look through earnings of six $604 hundred four million dollars, up from five $516 hundred sixteen million in nineteen 1991. ninety one.
42:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
42:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Geico figure, it should be noted, excludes realized capital gains which at that company have been both recurring and significant. Insurance operations. Here is an updated look at the key figures for the property casualty insurance industry.
42:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the
42:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): early 1980s, premiums written grew only about 4 four or 5% five percent a year, while losses grew faster, and the combined ratio after policy. policyholder dividends climbed steadily from one hundred six in nineteen eighty one to one hundred eighteen in nineteen eighty-four. Premiums then surged, growing about
43:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty-two percent in both nineteen eighty-five and nineteen eighty-six, which pulled the combined ratio down to one hundred eight and then to one hundred four point six in nineteen eighty-seven. eighty seven. Since then, premium growth has been feeble.
43:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
43:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the two to five percent range every year,
43:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
43:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the ratio has climbed back accordingly. 105.4 in nineteen eighty eight, one hundred nine point two in nineteen eighty nine,
43:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
43:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hundred nine point six in nineteen ninety, a revised one hundred eight point eight in nineteen ninety one,
43:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
43:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an estimated one hundred fourteen point eight last year on premium growth of just two 2.7%. point seven percent.
43:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
43:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio represents total insurance costs, losses incurred plus expenses, compared to revenue from premiums, a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
43:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
43:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds, the float,
43:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
43:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): taken into account, a combined ratio in the 106 one hundred six to 110 one hundred ten range typically produces an overwriting. overall break even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders. About four points in the industry's nineteen ninety two combined ratio can be attributed to Hurricane Andrew, which caused the largest insured loss in history. Andrew destroyed a few small insurers.
44:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Beyond that, it awakened some larger companies to the fact that their reinsurance protection against catastrophes was far from adequate.
44:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
44:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): only when the tide goes out that the you learn who's been swimming naked. One major insurer escaped insolvency solely because it had a wealthy parent that could promptly supply a massive transfusion of capital. Bad as it was, however, Andrew could easily have been far more damaging if it had hit Florida twenty or thirty miles north of where it actually did, and had hit
44:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Louisiana further east than was the case. All in all, many companies will rethink their reinsurance programs in light of the Andrew experience.
44:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
44:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, we are a large writer. Perhaps the largest in the world of SuperCat coverages, which are the policies that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Consequently, we too took our lumps from Andrew, suffering losses from it, of about one $125 hundred twenty five million dollars,
45:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
45:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): amount roughly equal to our nineteen 1992 ninety two.
45:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): SuperCat premium income. Our other supercat losses, though, were negligible. This line of business therefore produced an overall loss of only two million dollars for the year. In addition, our investee, Geico, suffered a net loss from Andrew after reinsurance recoveries and tax savings of about $50 million, of which our
45:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): share is roughly $25 million. This loss did not affect
45:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the government.
45:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our operating earnings but did reduce our look through earnings.
45:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
45:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): last year's report I told you that I hoped that our SuperCAT business would over time achieve a ten percent profit margin.
45:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
45:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I also warned you that in any given year, the line was likely to be either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable. Instead, both nineteen ninety one and nineteen ninety-two ninety two have come in close to a break-even level. Nonetheless, I see these results. as aberrations and stick with my prediction of huge annual swings in profitability from this
46:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business.
46:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Let
46:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): me remind you of some characteristics of our SuperCAP policies. Generally, they are activated only when two things happen. First, the direct insurer or reinsurer we protect must suffer losses of a given amount. That's the policyholder's retention from a catastrophe. And second, industry wide insured losses from the catastrophe. must exceed some minimum level,
46:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which usually is three billion dollars or more. In most cases, the policies we issue cover only a specific geographical area, such as a portion of the United States, the entire United States, or everywhere other than the United States. Also, many policies are not activated by the first supercat that meets the policy terms, but instead cover only
46:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a second event or even a third. or fourth event. Finally, some policies are triggered only by a catastrophe of a specific type, such as an earthquake. Our exposures are large, we have one policy that calls for us to pay one hundred million dollars to the policy holder if a specified catastrophe occurs.
47:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
47:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know why I suffer eye strain from watching the Weather Channel. Currently, Berkshire is second in the United States. property casualty, industry and net worth, the leader being State Farm, which neither buys nor sells reinsurance. Therefore, we have the capacity to assume risk on a scale that interests virtually no other company. We have the
47:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): appetite as well. As Berkshire's net worth and earnings grow, our willingness to write business increases also.
47:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
47:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let me add that means good business. The saying a fool and his money are not. soon invited everywhere, applies in spades in reinsurance, and we actually reject more than 98% of the business we are offered. Our ability to choose between good and bad proposals reflects a management strength that matches our financial strength. A
47:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Jeet Jin, who runs our reinsurance operation, is simply the best in this business. In combination, these strengths guarantee that we will. stay a major factor in the SuperCat business so long as prices are appropriate. What constitutes an appropriate price, of course, is difficult to determine. Catastrophe insurers can't simply
48:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): extrapolate past experience. If there is truly global warming, for example, the odds would shift since tiny changes in atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather patterns. Furthermore,
48:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
48:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recent years there has been a mushrooming of population and insured values in United States coastal areas that are particularly vulnerable to
48:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hurricanes,
48:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
48:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): number one creator of supercats, a hurricane that caused a given amount of damage twenty years ago could easily cost ten times as much now. Occasionally, also the unthinkable happen. happens.
48:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Who
48:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would have guessed, for example, that a major earthquake could occur in Charleston, South Carolina? It struck in eighteen eighty six, registered an estimated six point six on the Richter scale, and caused sixty deaths,
49:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
49:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who could have imagined that our country's most serious quake would occur at New Madrid, Missouri, which suffered an estimated eight point seven shocker in eighteen twelve, by comparison, the nineteen eighteen. eighty nine San Francisco quake was a seven point one. And remember that each one point Richter increase represents a tenfold increase in strength.
49:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Someday, a United States earthquake occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for insurers.
49:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
49:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): viewing our quarterly figures, you should understand that our accounting for SuperCat premiums differs from our accounting for other insurance premiums. Rather than recording our supercat premiums on a pro rata basis over the life of a given policy, we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs or until the policy expires.
49:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
49:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): take this conservative approach because the likelihood of supercats causing us losses is particularly great toward the end of the year. It is then that weather tends to kick up. Of the ten largest insured losses in United States history, nine. occurred in the last half of the year. In addition, policies that are not triggered by a first event are unlikely, by their very
50:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): terms, to cause us losses until until late in the year.
50:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
50:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bottom line effect of our accounting procedure for supercats is this. Large losses may be reported in any quarter of the year, but significant profits will only be reported in the fourth quarter.
50:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
50:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've told you in each of the last few years,
50:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what counts in our insurance business is the cost of funds developed from insurance, or in the vernacular that is the cost of float, float, which we generate in exceptional amounts, is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves, and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid Paid acquisition costs, and deferred charges applicable
50:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to assumed reinsurance. The cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.
50:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
50:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows our cost of float in each year since we entered the business in 1967, set beside the year-in yield on long-term government bonds. The shape of that record is this: our float has grown from about $17 million in 1967 to about $2.29 billion in 1992. In twelve of those 26
51:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years, we underwrote at a profit, which is
51:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Of about $109 million against average float of $2.29 billion.
51:41
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52:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
52:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cost of funds was 4.76% against a year-end government bond yield of 7.39%.
52:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Last year, our insurance operation again generated funds at a cost below that incurred by the United States government on its newly issued long-term bonds. This means that in 21 years out of the 26 twenty six years we have been in the insurance business, we have beaten the government's rate,
53:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
53:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): often we have done so. by a wide margin. If on average we didn't beat the government's rate, there would be no economic reason for us to be in the business.
53:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
53:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen ninety two, as in previous years, national indemnities, commercial auto, and general liability business, led by Don Worcester, and our home state operation, led by Rod Eldred, made excellent contributions to our low cost of float. Indeed, both of these operations recorded an underwriting profit last year, thereby
53:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): generating float at a less than zero cost.
53:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
53:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bulk of our float, meanwhile, comes from large transactions developed by Ajit. His efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during nineteen ninety three. Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business, which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to come. The industry is huge. In certain sectors we can compete
54:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): worldwide, and Berkshire possesses an important competitive advantage. We will look for ways to expand our participation in the business, either indirectly as we have done through GEICO, or directly as we did by acquiring central states indemnity. Common stock investments.
54:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
54:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year end, our common stock investment. holdings with a value of over one hundred million dollars were these Capital Cities slash ABC Incorporated, the Coca-Cola Company, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac, GICO Corporation, General Dynamics Corporation, the Gillette Company, Guinness
54:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): PLC, L C, the Washington Post Company, and Wells Fargo and Company, together these nine positions could be. cost us about three point six four billion dollars and had a market value at year end of about eleven point four four billion dollars. The two largest gains remain Coca-Cola, bought for about one billion dollars and worth three point nine one billion,
55:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and GICO, bought for forty six million dollars and worth two point two three billion. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than one 100%. hundred percent.
55:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Leaving aside splits, the number of shares we held in these companies changed during 1992 in only four cases. We added moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo, we more than doubled our position in Freddie Mac, and we established a new holding in General Dynamics. We like to buy. Selling, however, is a different story.
55:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There. Our pace of activity resembles that forced. upon a traveler who found himself stuck in tiny Podunk's only hotel. With no TV in his room, he faced an evening of boredom, but his spirits soared when he spied a book on the night table entitled Things to Do in Podunk. Opening it he found just a single sentence. You're doing it.
55:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
55:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were lucky in our general dynamics purchase.
55:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
55:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had paid little attention to the company until last summer, when it had been announced it would repurchase about thirty percent of its shares by way of a Dutch tender. Seeing an arbitrage opportunity, I began buying the stock for Berkshire, expecting to tender our holdings for a small profit. We've made the same sort of commitment perhaps a half dozen times in the last few years, reaping decent rates of return for the short
56:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): periods our money has been tied up.
56:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
56:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then I began studying the company and the accomplishments of Bill Anders in the brief time he'd been CEO.
56:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
56:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what I saw made my eyes pop. Bill had a clearly articulated and rational strategy.
56:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
56:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had been focused and imbued with a sense of urgency in carrying it out, and the results were truly remarkable.
56:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
56:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): short order, I dumped my arbitrage thoughts and decided that Berkshire should become a long term investor with Bill. Well, We were helped in gaining a large position by the fact that a tender greatly swells the volume of trading in a stock. In a one-month period, we were able to purchase 14% of the general dynamics shares that remained outstanding after the tender was completed. Our
56:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): equity investing strategy remains little changed from what it was 15 years ago when we said in the 1977 annual report, we select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one first that we can understand. second, with favorable long-term prospects, third, operated by
57:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): honest and competent people, and fourth, available at a very attractive price.
57:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
57:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have seen cause to make only one change in this creed. Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute an attractive price for a very attractive price. But how, you will ask, does one decide what's attractive?
57:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
57:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition, value and growth. Indeed, many investment professionals see any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-dressing.
57:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
57:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): view that as fuzzy thinking, in which, it must be confessed, I myself engaged some years ago.
57:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
57:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our opinion, the two approaches are joined at the hip. Growth is the always a component in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose importance can range from negligible to enormous, and whose impact can be negative as well as positive.
58:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
58:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition, we think the very term value investing is redundant. What is investing if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value?
58:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the
58:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope that it can soon be sold for a still higher price, should be labeled speculation, which is neither illegal, immoral, nor, in our view, financially fattening. Whether appropriate or not, the term value investing is widely used. Typically it connotes the purchase of stocks having attributes such as a low ratio of price to book
58:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): value, a low price earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly, opposite
59:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): characteristics.
59:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
59:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): high ratio of price to book value, a high price earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield
59:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are in the
59:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no way inconsistent with a value purchase. Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value, sometimes one of spectacular proportions, but such an effect is far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured money into the domestic airline business to
59:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): finance profitless or worse growth.
59:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For these
59:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investors, it would have been far better if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk. The more the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners. Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can invest at incremental returns that are enticing. In other words, only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a
59:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dollar of long-term market value.
1:00:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the
1:00:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): case of a low return business requiring incremental financial. funds, growth hurts the investor.
1:00:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:00:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the theory of investment value, written over fifty years ago, John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we condense here.
1:00:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:00:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): value of any stock, bond, or business today is determined by the cash inflows and outflows, discounted at an appropriate interest rate, that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important and difficult to deal with difference between the two. A bond has a coupon
1:00:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and maturity date that define future cash flows,
1:00:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
1:00:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the future coupons. Furthermore, the quality of management affects the bond coupon only rarely. Chiefly when management is so inept or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast, the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity coupons.
1:00:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:00:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investment shown by the discounted flows of cash calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should purchase. Irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn't, displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown equities to
1:01:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable. When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment, they should be bought. Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst business to own is one that must, or will,
1:01:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do the opposite, and that is consistently employ ever greater amounts of capital at very low rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very hard to find. Most high return businesses need relatively little capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if it pays out most of its earnings and dividends or makes
1:01:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): significant stock repurchases. Though, the mathematical calculations required to evaluate equities are not difficult, an analyst, uh, even one who is experienced and intelligent,
1:02:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
1:02:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): easily go wrong in estimating future coupons.
1:02:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
1:02:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject,
1:02:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know.
1:02:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
1:02:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes. Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in buying. We believe this margin of
1:03:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): safety principle, so strongly emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success fixed income securities. Our largest holdings of fixed income securities at year end were in ACF Industries Deventures, American Express Perks, Champion International Convertible Preferred, First
1:03:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Empire State Convertible Preferred, Salaman Convertible Preferred, USAIR Convertible Preferred,
1:03:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:03:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Washington Public Power Systems Bonds. In total, these carried a cost or amortized value of about one $1.89 point eight nine billion dollars and a market value of about one $1.95 point nine five billion. billion. The largest single position is the Salaman Preferred, carried at $700 million and valued at $756 million. The one significant shortfall of
1:03:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): USAIR, carried at $358 million and valued at $268.5 million. During 1992, we added to our holdings of ACF debentures, had some of our WPPSS WPPS bonds called, and so
1:04:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that we have to be able to do that
1:04:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sold our RJR Nabisco position. Over the years we've done well with fixed income investments, having realized from them both large capital gains, including eighty million dollars in nineteen ninety two, and exceptional current income. Chrysler Financial, Texaco, Time Warner,
1:04:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): WPPS W P P S S and R J R Nabisco were particularly good investors. investments for us. Meanwhile, our fixed income losses have been negligible. We've had thrills, but so far no spills. Despite the success we experienced with our Gillette Preferred, which converted to common stock in nineteen ninety one, and despite our
1:04:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reasonable results with other negotiated purchases of preferreds, our overall performance with such purchases has been inferior to that we have achieved. with purchases made in the secondary market. This is actually the result we expected. It corresponds with our belief that an intelligent investor in common stocks will do better in the secondary market
1:05:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): than he will do buying new issues.
1:05:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:05:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reason has to do with the way prices are set in each instance. The secondary market, which is periodically ruled by mass folly, is constantly setting a clearing price. No matter
1:05:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
1:05:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how foolish that price may be, it's what counts for the holder of a stock or bond who needs or wishes to sell, of whom there are always going to be a few at any moment. In many instances, shares worth a given amount in business value have sold in the market for half that or less.
1:05:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:05:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): new issue market, on the other hand, is ruled by controlling stockholders and corporations, who can usually select the timing of offerings, or, if the market looks unfavorable,
1:05:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can avoid an offering altogether. Understandably, these sellers are not going to offer any bargains, either by way of a public offering or in a negotiated transaction. It's rare you'll find a dollar of value for fifty cents here. Indeed, in the case of common stock offerings, selling shareholders are often motivated to unload only when they feel
1:05:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the market is overpaying. These sellers, of course, would state that. proposition somewhat differently, averring instead that they simply resist selling when the market is underpaying for their goods. To date, our negotiated purchases as a group have fulfilled but not exceeded the expectation we set forth in our 1989 annual report.
1:06:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our preferred stock investments should produce returns modestly above those achieved by most fixed income portfolios.
1:06:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:06:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): truth, we would have done better if we could have put the money that went into our negotiated transactions into open market purchases of the type we like, but both our size and the general strength of the markets made that difficult to
1:06:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do. There
1:06:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was one other memorable line in the nineteen eighty nine annual report. We have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business, the airline industry, or the pay. paper industry.
1:06:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
1:06:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the time some of you may have doubted this confession of ignorance. Now, however, even my mother acknowledges its truth. In the case of our commitment to US Air, industry economics had soured before the ink dried on our check. As I've previously mentioned, it was I who happily jumped
1:07:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): into the pool. No one pushed me. Yes, I knew the industry would be ruggedly competitive,
1:07:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
1:07:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I did not expect its leaders to engage in prolonged kamikaze behavior. In the last two years, airline companies have acted as if they are members of a competitive tauntine, which they wish to bring to its conclusion as rapidly as possible. Amidst this turmoil, Seth Schofield, CEO of US Air, has done a truly extraordinary job in repositioning the
1:07:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): airline. He was particularly courageous in accepting a strike last fall that, had it been lengthy, might well have bankrupted the company. Capitulating to the striking union, however, would have been equally disastrous. The company was burdened with wage costs and work rules that were considerably more onerous than those encumbering its major competitors, and it was clear that over
1:07:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): time, any high cost producer faced extinction. Happily for everyone, the strike was settled in a few days.
1:08:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
1:08:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): competitively beset business such as US Air requires far more managerial skill than does a business with fine economics. Unfortunately, though, the near-term reward for skill in the airline business is simply survival, not prosperity.
1:08:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:08:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): early 1993, US Air took a major step toward assuring survival
1:08:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:08:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): eventual prosperity.
1:08:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by
1:08:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accepting British Airways' offer to make a substantial but minority investment in the company. In connection with this transaction, Charlie and I were asked to join the US Air Board. We agreed, though this makes five outside board memberships for me, which is more than I believe advisable for an active CEO. Even so, if an investee's management and
1:08:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): directors believe it particularly important that Charlie and I join its board, we are glad to do so. We expect the managers of our investees to work hard to increase the value of the businesses they run, and there are times when large owners should do their bit as well. Two new accounting rules and a plea for one more.
1:09:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Holidays calling, holidays calling, holidays calling
1:09:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Hello, holidays. Hey
1:09:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Dan, guess who's who?
1:09:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a year
1:09:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): already?
1:09:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Listen, the bracelet looks great, but what she really wants is the all-new Kia Celtos X-Line Limited.
1:09:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, did she put you up to this?
1:09:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um, no. She really wants all-wheel drive for added safety
1:09:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the road. Plus, the heated steering wheel means she can show off her new bracelet.
1:09:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The Celtos might be a bit harder of a gift to hide.
1:09:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:09:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe in you.
1:09:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Test drive the all-new Kia Celtos during the holiday savings event. See Kia.ca for details. Kia. Movement that inspires. Mortgage payment?
1:09:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Done. Kids
1:09:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): spend.
1:09:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fed?
1:09:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Uh, yeah, technically, they have been fed. Dog walked. He walked me more so.
1:09:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Coffee?
1:09:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh, yes, now we're asking the important questions.
1:09:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We have a lot going on.
1:09:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. Isn't it just kind of great though?
1:09:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bemo Insurance. Designed for real life.
1:09:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Legendary has arrived in Alberta with BetMGM Cassino. Casino. Sign up to unlock access to over 4,000 casino games, including exclusive slots you can't spin anywhere else. Survivors ready? The iconic TV show is now an online casino game where you can tap into island fun. BetMGM has also brought the
1:10:19
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1:10:39
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1:10:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): If gambling is affecting your mental health or well being, two one one Alberta is here to help. Call or text two one one or visit AB.211.ca. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with the Alberta IGaming Corporation. Standard message and data rates may apply.
1:11:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
1:11:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): new accounting rule having to do with deferred taxes becomes effective in nineteen ninety-three. It undoes a dichotomy. in our books that I have described in previous annual reports, and that relates to the accrued taxes carried against the unrealized appreciation in our investment portfolio. At year in 1992, that
1:11:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): appreciation amounted to $7.6 billion. Against $6.4 four billion dollars of that, we carried taxes at the current 34% thirty four percent rate. against the remainder of one point two billion dollars. We carried an accrual of twenty eight percent the tax rate in effect when that portion of the
1:11:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): appreciation occurred, the new accounting rule says we must henceforth accrue all deferred tax at the current rate, which to us seems sensible.
1:11:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:11:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): new marching orders mean that in the first quarter of nineteen ninety three, we will apply a thirty four percent rate to the all of our unrealized appreciation, thereby increasing the tax liability
1:12:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:12:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reducing net worth by seventy million dollars. The new rule also will cause us to make other minor changes in our calculation of deferred taxes. Future changes in tax rates will be reflected immediately in the liability for deferred taxes and correspondingly in net worth.
1:12:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:12:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): impact could well be substantial. Nevertheless, what is important in the end is the tax rate at the time we sell securities,
1:12:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
1:12:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unrealized appreciation becomes realized. Another major accounting change, whose implementation is required by january first, nineteen ninety three, mandates that businesses recognize their present value liability for post post-retirement retirement health benefits. Though Gabe has previously required recognition of pensions to be paid for in the future, it has
1:12:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): illogically ignored the costs that companies will then have to bear for health benefits. The new rule will force many companies to record a huge balance sheet liability and a consequent reduction in net worth, and also henceforth to recognize substantially higher costs when they are calculating annual profits.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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