Investing Legends

Berkshire Hathaway 1991 Letter: Growth Constraints, Insurance Float Economics, and Portfolio Updates

1h 4m Listen to the original Episode page
Berkshire HathawayInsuranceValue InvestingCapital AllocationCorporate Governance

Summary

The speaker details Berkshire Hathaway's 1991 performance, noting a 39.6% increase in net worth driven by market re-rating of holdings like Coca-Cola and Gillette, while acknowledging that future growth will likely slow to a 15% annual target due to the company's size. He discusses the erosion of media industry franchises and the importance of capital allocation, highlighting the acquisition of H.H. Brown and the operational strengths of See's Candies. The episode covers the property-casualty insurance industry's financial health, defining 'cost of float' and comparing Berkshire's underwriting results to government bond yields. Finally, he reviews investment mistakes, such as early sales of Fannie Mae, and outlines the company's charitable contribution program and annual meeting logistics.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 2:37

    Berkshire Hathaway 1991 Performance and Growth Constraints

    Berkshire reported a 39.6% increase in net worth for 1991, driven by a $2.1 billion gain. The speaker notes that maintaining past growth rates is impossible due to the company's size, citing a goal of 15% annual intrinsic value growth. A significant portion of the gain came from market re-rating of Coca-Cola and Gillette, which cannot be repeated annually.

  2. 2:37 – 4:53

    Interim Role at Salomon Brothers and Management Confidence

    The speaker took an interim chairman role at Salomon Brothers in 1990, stating this was possible because Berkshire's operating managers are exceptional and require no help. He emphasizes that Berkshire remains his primary focus and that his operating managers are masters of their operations.

  3. 4:53 – 13:09

    Accounting Presentation and Look-Through Earnings

    Berkshire presents earnings excluding amortization of goodwill to show operational performance more clearly. Look-through earnings, which include retained earnings of major investees minus hypothetical taxes, declined 14% in 1991 to $516 million, down from $602 million in 1990, due to media declines and Gillette preferred stock conversion.

  4. 13:09 – 20:45

    Media Industry Franchise Erosion and Valuation Math

    The speaker argues that media properties have shifted from franchises to businesses due to increased competition and fragmented audiences. He illustrates that if earnings growth assumptions drop from 6% to zero, valuation multiples fall from 25x to 10x after-tax earnings, significantly reducing intrinsic value despite unchanged current earnings.

  5. 20:45 – 32:51

    See's Candies 20-Year Review and H.H. Brown Acquisition

    Reflecting on the 1972 See's Candies purchase, the speaker highlights the franchise's ability to generate profits with minimal capital reinvestment. He also details the 1991 acquisition of H.H. Brown, praising its management and unique compensation structure that aligns managers with owners by charging for capital employed.

  6. 32:51 – 37:36

    Acquisition Criteria and Insurance Industry Overview

    Berkshire outlines its preference for acquiring businesses from owner-managers seeking liquidity while retaining control, citing examples like Nebraska Furniture Mart. The speaker then details the property-casualty insurance industry's financial health, noting that while the combined ratio improved slightly in 1991, underlying incurred losses are growing faster than premiums, suggesting potential under-reserving by insurers.

  7. 37:36 – 43:53

    Berkshire's Cost of Float and Reinsurance Operations

    Berkshire defines its 'cost of float' as the underwriting loss divided by average float, comparing it to government bond yields. The speaker highlights that Berkshire has beaten government bond yields in 20 of the last 25 years. The segment also covers 'Supercat' reinsurance, noting its volatility and the competitive advantage of Berkshire's financial strength during catastrophic events.

  8. 43:53 – 48:29

    Investment Portfolio and Philosophy

    The speaker lists Berkshire's major common stock holdings, emphasizing the massive gain in Coca-Cola. He reiterates a 'Rip Van Winkle' investment philosophy, advocating for holding great businesses for long periods rather than active trading. He quotes John Maynard Keynes on the risks of diversification into unknown enterprises and stresses the importance of understanding the business and management.

  9. 48:29 – 57:18

    Investment Mistakes and Fixed Income Updates

    The speaker admits to a significant omission mistake involving Fannie Mae, estimating the foregone gain at $1.4 billion due to selling early and stopping purchases as the price rose. He then updates on fixed income holdings, noting the conversion of Gillette preferred to common, the poor performance of US Air due to industry bankruptcy, and the stability of Salomon preferred.

  10. 57:18 – 59:14

    Charitable Contributions and Corporate Governance

    Berkshire reports on its Shareholder Designated Contributions Program, where 97.7% of eligible shares participated, directing $6.8 million to 2,630 charities. The speaker clarifies that operating managers do not use Berkshire funds for personal charitable causes. He also announces the succession of Malcolm G. Chase Jr. by his son, Kim Chase, to the Board of Directors.

  11. 59:14 – 1:03:47

    Annual Meeting Logistics and Closing Remarks

    The speaker provides details for the 1992 Annual Meeting at the Orpheum Theater in Omaha, including hotel recommendations and transportation. He mentions tours of Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheimes, and a special Patek Philippe watch exhibition. He concludes with a humorous anecdote about a shareholder, Nicholas Kenner, correcting his age calculation, highlighting the interactive nature of the meeting.

Claims worth verifying

Berkshire Hathaway's net worth increased by $2.1 billion, or 39.6%, in 1991.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:03

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 1; verify against audited financial statements for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's per share book value grew from $19 to $6,437 at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually since present management took over.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:03

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 1; verify against historical book value data in the annual report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Nearly $1.6 billion of the $2.1 billion net worth growth in 1991 came from the market re-rating of Coca-Cola and Gillette.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:40

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 3; verify against investment performance tables in the annual report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's goal is to attain a 15% average annual increase in intrinsic value.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:08

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 2; verify against stated goals in the letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Look-through earnings declined by 14% in 1991 to approximately $516 million, down from $602 million in 1990.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·10:02

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 10; verify against the look-through earnings calculation table in the report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The conventional wisdom held that media properties would increase earnings at 6% annually without additional capital, justifying a 25x after-tax earnings multiple.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·16:14

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 12; verify against the valuation math example provided in the text. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

See's Candies profits grew from $4.2 million in 1972 to $42.4 million in 1991, requiring only $18 million of reinvested earnings.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·21:48

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 16; verify against See's Candies financial history if available or internal Berkshire records cited in the report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

H.H. Brown earned about $25 million annually before taxes by 1990.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·28:10

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 18; verify against H.H. Brown financial data or acquisition details in the report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

H.H. Brown managers are paid an annual salary of $7,800 plus a designated percentage of profits after a charge for capital employed.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·30:43

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 19; verify against the compensation description in the letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire does not sell businesses classified as permanent holdings simply because they see better uses for the money elsewhere.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·19:02

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Shareholder Letter, Page 13; verify against the stated business principles in the letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire prefers to buy for cash but will consider issuing stock when intrinsic business value is received.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:51

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Section on Acquisitions; verify against Berkshire's historical acquisition methods and public statements on capital allocation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The combined ratio for the property-casualty insurance industry climbed from 106 in 1981 to 118 in 1984.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·34:29

How to verify: Insurance Information Institute (III) historical data or NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) combined ratio reports for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Premiums in the insurance industry grew about 22% in both 1985 and 1986.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·34:49

How to verify: NAIC or III historical premium growth statistics for 1985 and 1986. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 1991, Berkshire's cost of float was 6.31%, calculated from a $120 million underwriting loss against $1.93 billion average float.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:42

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Insurance Operations section; verify calculation: 120/2026 = 6.21% (speaker says 6.31%, check exact float figures in report). For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire beat the government's cost of funds in 20 of the 25 years it has been in the insurance business.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:51

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Insurance Operations section; compare Berkshire's cost of float vs. US Treasury yields for each year since 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The biggest catastrophe in 1991 was a September typhoon in Japan causing $4-5 billion in insured losses.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·40:51

How to verify: Insurance industry loss reports for 2026, such as those from Swiss Re or Munich Re, or news archives for the September 2026 Japan typhoon (Typhoon Orchid). For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's gain on Coca-Cola was the largest single gain, bought for $1.02 billion and worth $3.75 billion at year-end.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:33

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Investment Portfolio section; verify purchase price and year-end market value of Coca-Cola shares. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire estimates the foregone gain on Fannie Mae due to selling early and stopping purchases at $1.4 billion.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·51:09

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Mistakes section; verify the estimated opportunity cost calculation provided by Buffett. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

US Air preferred stock carried at $358 million was valued at $233 million at year-end.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:24

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Fixed Income section; verify cost and market value of US Air preferred holdings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Salomon preferred stock carried at $700 million was valued at $714 million at year-end.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:10

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Letter, Fixed Income section; verify cost and market value of Salomon preferred holdings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Berkshire Hathaway 1991 Annual Report for the exact 39.6% net worth increase and $2.1 billion gain figures.
  • Check the 1991 10-K filing for the specific look-through earnings calculation of $516 million and the 14% decline.
  • Review historical combined ratios for the property-casualty insurance industry to validate the 104.6 figure for 1987 and the 118 figure for 1984.
  • Confirm the 1991 cost of float calculation: $120 million underwriting loss divided by $1.93 billion average float.
  • Compare the 1991 long-term government bond yield of 7.40% against historical Treasury yield data.
  • Investigate the Fannie Mae investment history to understand the timeline of the $1.4 billion foregone gain claim.
  • Research the 1991 typhoon in Japan and Hurricane Hugo to verify the $4-5 billion insured loss estimate.
  • Read the 1991 Annual Report section on the Shareholder Designated Contributions Program to verify the $6.8 million donation to 2,630 charities.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated,
0:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
0:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gain in net worth during nineteen ninety one was two point one billion dollars, or thirty nine point six percent over the last twenty-seven years, that is, since present management took over, our per share book value has grown from nineteen dollars to six thousand four hundred thirty-seven dollars, or at a rate of twenty-three twenty three point seven
0:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): percent compounded annually.
0:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
0:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): size of our equity capital. capital, which now totals seven point four billion dollars, makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate of gain or, for that matter, come close to doing so. As Berkshire grows, the universe of opportunities that can significantly influence the company's performance constantly shrinks.
0:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
0:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we were working with capital of twenty million dollars,
0:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
0:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): idea or business producing one million dollars of profit added five percentage points to our return for the year. Now we need a three hundred seventy million dollar idea, that is, one contributing over five hundred fifty million dollars of pretax profit
1:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
1:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): achieve the same result.
1:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there are many more ways to make one million dollars than to make three hundred seventy million. Charlie Munger. Berkshire's vice chairman, and I have set a goal of attaining a fifteen percent average annual increase in Berkshire's intrinsic value.
1:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
1:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our growth in book value is to keep up with a fifteen percent pace, we must earn twenty two billion dollars during the next decade. Wish us luck. We'll need
1:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. Our
1:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): outsize gain in book value in nineteen 1991 ninety one resulted from a phenomenon not absolutely. apt to be repeated,
1:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
1:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dramatic rise in the price earnings ratios of Coca-Cola and Gillette. These two stocks accounted for nearly one point six billion dollars of our two point one billion dollar growth in net worth last year.
1:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
1:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we loaded up on Coke three years ago, Berkshire's net worth was three point four billion dollars.
1:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
1:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our Coke stock alone is worth more than that. Coca-Cola and Gillette are two of the best companies in the world, and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates in the years ahead. Over time, also, the value of our holdings in these stocks should grow in rough proportion. Last year, however, the valuations of these two companies
2:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rose far faster than their earnings.
2:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
2:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): effect, we got a double dip benefit delivered partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so by the market's reappraisal of these stocks. We believe this reappraisal was warranted, but it can't recur annually.
2:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We'll
2:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have to settle for a single dip in the future.
2:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
2:37
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4:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
4:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen eighty-nine, when I
4:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
4:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): happy consumer of five cans of cherry coke daily announced our purchase of one billion dollars worth of Coca-Cola stock, I described the move as a rather extreme example of putting our money where my mouth was. On August 18th of last year, when I was elected interim chairman of Salaman Incorporated, it was a different story.
5:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You've all read of the events that led to my appointment. My decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but important message. Berkshire's operating managers are so outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time I was spending at the company and yet remain confident that its economic progress would not skip a beat.
5:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
5:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsy, Ralph Shea, and Frank Rooney, CEO of H.H. Brown, our latest acquisition, which I will describe later, are all masters of their operations and need no help from me.
5:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
5:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): job is merely to treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate. Neither function is impeded by my work at Salamon.
6:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
6:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): role that Charlie and I play in the success of our operating units can be illustrated by a story about George Mira, the one time quarterback of the University of Miami, and his coach, Andy Gustafson. Playing Florida and near its goal line, Mira dropped back to pass. He spotted an open receiver, but found his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a
6:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Florida linebacker.
6:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
6:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right handed Mira thereupon switched the ball to his other hand and threw the only left handed pass of his life for a touchdown.
6:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Slip away from time to time. You should note, however, the interim in my Salamon title, Berkshire is my first love and one that will never fade.
6:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
6:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Harvard Business School last year, a student asked me when I plan to retire, and I replied, About five to ten years after I die. Sources of reported earnings. The table in the annual report shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of governments
7:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are not a very important thing.
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): goodwill and other major purchase price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to
7:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing.
7:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): generally accepted accounting principles or GAAP, which require purchase price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GA app total in our audited financial statements.
7:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
7:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): large amount of additional information about these businesses is given later. in the report, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a gap basis. However, we will not in this letter discuss each of our non insurance operations, as we have in the past. Our businesses have grown in number and will continue to grow, so it now
8:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): makes sense to rotate coverage, Average, discussing one or two in detail each year.
8:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
8:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): summary, Berkshire's share of the operating earnings after taxes and minority interests fell to about three hundred sixteen million dollars in nineteen ninety-one from about three hundred seventy one million dollars in nineteen ninety. The main cause was a far larger underwriting loss. About one hundred twenty million dollars
8:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): against twenty $27 seven million the year before. Kirby C's and the newly acquired H.H. Brand. Brown all advanced, while the Buffalo News, World Book Nebraska Furniture Mart, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group declined, and interest expense rose again, including gains from sales of securities, much larger than
9:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen nineties, and total earnings came to about four hundred forty million dollars, against about three hundred ninety-four ninety four million dollars the year before. Look through earnings. We've previously discussed look through earnings, which consist of first the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus second
9:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the retained operating earnings of major investees that under GA app accounting are not reflected in our profits. Less third, an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us.
9:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've told you that over time look through earnings must increase at about fifteen percent annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management took over in nineteen sixty five, our look through earnings have grown at almost the identical twenty-three percent rate of gain recorded for book value. Last
9:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year, however, our look through earnings did not grow as
10:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well.
10:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at all, but rather declined by 14%. To an extent the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's report and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look through earnings. First, I told you that our media earnings, both direct and look through,
10:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were sure to decline, and they in fact did,
10:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
10:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second force came into play on april first when the call of our Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into common.
10:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Of look through earnings on the common. Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt look through earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result from our interest in Wells Fargo. Dividends we received from the company were offset by negative retained earnings. Last year I said that such a result at Wells was a low level possibility,
11:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not a likelihood. Second, we recorded significantly lower, though still excellent, insurance profits.
11:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
11:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows how we calculate the look through earnings, although I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough.
11:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
11:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): outline, our share of the undistributed operating earnings of our major investies,
11:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Capital Cities slash ABC, Coca-Cola, Freddie Mac, Gillette. Geico, The Washington Post, and Wells Fargo came to $230 million against $266 million in 1990. The largest contributors were Coca-Cola and Geico at sixty-nine million dollars, and Capital
11:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cities at sixty-one million. Wells Fargo subtracted seventeen million. From that two $230 hundred thirty million, we deduct a hypothetical tax of thirty $30 million. and add our reported operating earnings of $316 million to arrive at total look through earnings of about $516 million,
12:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): down from $602 million in 1990. We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing on their own look through earnings.
12:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
12:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): calculate these, they should determine the underlying earnings attributable. to the shares they hold in their portfolio and total these.
12:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
12:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): goal of each investor should be to create a portfolio, in effect, a company,
12:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
12:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will deliver him or her the highest possible look through earnings a decade or so from now.
12:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
12:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): approach of this kind will force the investor to think about long long-term term business prospects rather than short term stock market prospects.
12:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
12:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): perspective likely to
12:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be a good.
12:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): improve results. It's true of course that in the long run, the scoreboard for investment decisions is market price, but prices will be determined by future earnings. In investing, just as in baseball, to put runs on the scoreboard, one must watch the playing field, not the scoreboard.
13:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
13:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): change in media economics and some valuation math.
13:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
13:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): last year's report, I stated
13:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the government.
13:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that case. The economic strength of once mighty media enterprises continues to erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and entertainment choices proliferate. In the business world,
13:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unfortunately, the rearview mirror is always clearer than the windshield. A few years back, no one linked to the media business. Neither lenders, owners, nor financial analysts
13:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): saw the economic deterioration that was in store for the industry,
13:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
13:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): give me a few years and I'll probably convince myself that I did.
13:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
13:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact is that newspaper television and magazine properties have begun to resemble business more than franchises in the their economic behavior. Let's take a quick look at the characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise. Keeping in mind, however, that many operations fall in some middle ground and can
14:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): best be described as weak franchises or strong businesses. An economic franchise arises from a product or service that first is needed or desired, second is thought. by its customers to have no close substitute, and third, is not subject to price regulation.
14:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
14:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively, and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mismanagement. Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability, but they cannot inflict more effective. mortal damage. In
14:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contrast, a business earns exceptional profits only if it is the low cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low cost operator for a much longer time, but even then, unceasingly face the possibility
15:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of competitive attack.
15:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And a business
15:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unlike a franchise,
15:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
15:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be killed by poor management. Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information and entertainment, their primary interest being the latter, enjoy greatly broadened choices as
15:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to where to find them. Unfortunately, demand can't expand in response to this new supply. Five hundred million American eyeballs and a twenty four hour day are all that's available. The result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some, though far from all,
15:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of its franchise strength.
16:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
16:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industry's weakened franchise hasn't been. has an impact on its value that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings. For an understanding of this phenomenon, let's look at some much oversimplified but relevant math.
16:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
16:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few years ago, the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper, television, or magazine property would forever increase its earnings at six percent or so annually and would do so without the employment of
16:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the process.
16:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges would roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings before amortization of intangibles were also freely distributable earnings, which meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin to owning a perpetual annuity, set
16:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to grow at six percent a year. Say next that a discount rate of ten percent was used to determine the present value of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that it was appropriate to pay
16:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
16:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whopping twenty-five million dollars for a property with current after tax earnings of one million dollars. This after tax multiplier of twenty-five translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about sixteen. 16. Now change the assumption and posit that the one $1 million million dollars represents represents no equation. normal earning power and that earnings will bob around this
17:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): figure cyclically. A bob around pattern is indeed the lot of most businesses, whose income stream grows only if their owners are willing to commit more capital, usually in the form of retained earnings. Under our revised assumption, one $1 million dollars of earnings, discounted by the same ten 10%, percent,
17:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): translates. translates to a $10 million valuation. Thus, a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property's valuation to ten times after tax earnings
17:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
17:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about six and a half times pre-tax earnings. Dollars are dollars, whether they are derived from the operation of media properties or of steel mills, what in the past caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media farms. far higher than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property were expected to constantly grow
18:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): without the business requiring much additional capital, whereas steel earnings clearly fell in the bob around category. Now, however, expectations for media have moved toward the bob around model. And, as our simplified example illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations are revised.
18:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We have a significant investment in media, both through our direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in the Washington Post Company and Capital Cities slash ABC,
18:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and
18:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
18:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intrinsic value of this investment has declined materially because of the secular transformation that the industry is experiencing. Cyclical factors have also hurt our current look through earnings, but these factors do not reduce intrinsic value. However, as our business principles note, one of the rules by which we run
19:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses or investi holdings that we have classified as permanent simply because we see ways to use the money more advantageously. elsewhere. We did sell certain other media holdings some time back,
19:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
19:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these were relatively small.
19:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
19:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been moderated because
19:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
19:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Buffalo News,
19:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): under
19:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Stanlipsy's leadership, has done far better than most newspapers, and because both both Capital Capit's Cities and and Washington Washington Post Post are are exceptionally. exceptionally well managed, in particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during the late 1980s period, in which
19:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchasers of media properties regularly paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Capital Cities and Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold. As a result, the shrinkage in the value
20:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of the
20:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their assets has not been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly owned media companies, our two investees are about the only ones essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies, through a combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to five or more times their current net
20:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): income.
20:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
20:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strong balance sheets and strong managements of capital. cities and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these investments than we would be with holdings in any other media companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to have far better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average American business.
20:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
20:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gone are the days of bulletproof franchises and cornucopian economics.
20:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Twenty
20:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years in a candy store. We've just passed a milestone.
20:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Twenty
20:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years ago, on January 3rd, 1972, Blue Chip Stamps, then an affiliate of Berkshire and later merged into it, bought control of C's Candy Shops, a West Coast manufacturer and retailer of box chocolates. The nominal price that the sellers were asking, calculated on the 100%
21:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ownership we ultimately attained was forty million dollars, but the company had
21:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a lot of the same.
21:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ten million dollars of excess cash, and therefore the true offering price was thirty million dollars. Charlie and I, not yet fully appreciative of the value of an economic franchise, looked at the company's mere seven million dollars of tangible net worth and said twenty five million dollars was as high as we would
21:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): go.
21:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And we meant it. Fortunately, the sellers accepted our offer.
21:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
21:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sales of trading standards. stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined from one hundred two point five million dollars in nineteen seventy two to one point two million dollars in nineteen ninety one.
21:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
21:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): C's candy sales in the same period increased from twenty nine million dollars to one hundred ninety six million. Moreover, profits at C's grew even faster than sales, from four $4.2 point two million dollars pretax in nineteen 1972 seventy two to four point. $42.4 million last year.
22:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
22:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it must be compared with the incremental capital investment required to produce it. On this score, CS has been astounding. The company now operates comfortably with only $25 twenty five million dollars of net worth, which means that our beginning base.
22:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of seven million dollars has had to be supplemented by only eighteen million dollars of reinvested earnings. Meanwhile, C's remaining pre-tax profits of four hundred ten million dollars were distributed to Blue Chip and Berkshire during the twenty years for these companies to deploy after payment of tax in whatever way made most sense.
22:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
22:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our C's purchase, Charlie and I had one important insight. We saw that the business had untapped pricing power. Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction was
22:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
22:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): derailed by our dumb insistence on a twenty five million dollar price. Second, we found Chuck Huggins, then C's executive vice president, whom we instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal experiences with Chuck Huggins. have been outstanding. One example
23:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
23:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the purchase was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation arrangement, conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a written contract.
23:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
23:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen ninety one, C's sales volume, measured in dollars, matched that of nineteen ninety. In pounds, however, volume was down four percent, and
23:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
23:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of that slippage took place in the last two months of the year, a period that normally produces more than eighty percent of annual profits. Despite the weakness in CIS, profits last year grew seven percent, and our pretax profit margin was a record twenty one point six percent. Almost eighty percent of C sales come from
23:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): California,
23:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
23:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the state with particular force late in the year. Another negative, however, however, was the mid year initiation in California of a sales tax of seven to eight and a half percent, depending on the county involved, on snack food that was deemed applicable to our candy. Shareholders
24:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who are students of epistemological shadings will enjoy California's classifications of snack and non snack foods.
24:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And a Milky Way candy bar is taxable, while a Milky Way ice cream bar is not. What
24:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
24:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are sure to ask, is the tax status of a melted Milky Way ice cream bar.
24:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
24:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that androgynous form, does it more resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the sun? It's no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California's State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food bill, but must now administer it, has said,
25:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
25:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): came to this job as a specialist in tax. law. Now I find my constituents should have elected Julia Child.
25:23
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26:28
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27:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our association with Chuck and C's. The obvious ones are that we've earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process. Equally important, ownership of C's. has taught us much about the evaluation of franchises. We've made significant money in certain common stocks because
27:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the lessons we learned at C's. Um
27:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we made a sizable acquisition in 1991. The H.H. Brown Company. And behind this business is an interesting. history. In 1927, a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, for $10,000
27:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and began a 62-year career of running it. He also found time for other pursuits. At age 90, he was still joining new golf clubs. By Mr. Heffernan's retirement in early 1990, H. H. Brown
28:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had three plants in the United States and one in Canada, employed close to 2,000 people,
28:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
28:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): earned about $25 million annually before taxes.
28:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Along the way, Francis Heffernan, one of Ray's daughters, married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. mister Heffernan before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas. he might have about working for his father-in-law?
28:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
28:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was one of mister Heffernan's few mistakes. Frank went on to become CEO of Melville Shoe, now Melville Corporation. During his twenty-three years as boss, from nineteen sixty-four through nineteen eighty-six, Melville's earnings averaged more than twenty percent on equity in and its stock, adjusted for splits, rose from sixteen $16 dollars to
28:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nine $960. hundred sixty. And a few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen ill, asked him to run Brown. After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided to sell the company.
29:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
29:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here we got lucky. I had known Frank for a few years, but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to a major investment. banker, which failed also to think of us. But last spring, Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis, a
29:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): longtime friend of mine, as well as a Berkshire shareholder, who was always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing about the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company should be right up Berkshire's alley, and Frank promptly gave me a call. I thought right away that we would make a deal. and before long it was done.
29:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Much
29:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank's willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers, he has no financial need to work, but does so because he loves the game and likes to excel. Managers of this stripe cannot be hired in the normal sense of the word. What we must do is provide a concert hall in
30:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which business artists of this class were will wish to perform. Brown, which by the way has no connection to Brown, shoe of St. Louis, is the leading North American manufacturer of work shoes and boots, and it has a history of earning unusually fine margins on sales and assets. Shoes are a tough business.
30:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
30:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the billion pairs purchased in the United States each year, about 85% are imported,
30:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
30:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most manufacturers in the industry. do poorly. The wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes inventories to be heavy. Substantial capital is also tied up in receivables. In this kind of environment, only outstanding managers like Frank and the group, developed by Mr. Heffernan, can prosper.
30:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
30:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): distinguishing characteristic of H.H. Brown is one of the most unusual compensation systems I've encountered. But one that warms my heart. A number of key managers are paid an annual salary of $7,800, to which is added a designated percentage of the profits of the company after these are reduced by a charge
31:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for capital employed. These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes of owners. In contrast, most managers talk the talk but don't walk the walk, choosing instead to employ compensation systems that are long on carrots but short on sticks,
31:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
31:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that almost invariably treat equity capital as if it were cost free.
31:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
31:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): arrangement at Brown in any case has served both the company and its managers exceptionally well, which should be no surprise. Managers eager to bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to bet on. It's discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment
31:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us
32:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
32:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): therefore represent. repeat here what we're looking for. First, large purchases of at least ten million dollars of after tax earnings. Second, demonstrated consistent earning power. Future projections are of little interest to us nor are turnaround situations. Third, businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt.
32:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fourth, management in place.
32:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
32:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't supply it. Fifth, simple businesses and if there's lots of technology we won't understand it. And sixth, an offering price.
32:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
32:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown. We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer, customarily within five minutes,
32:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as to
32:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whether we're
32:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): going to be able to do that.
32:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interested. With Brown, we didn't even need to take five out. We prefer to buy for cash, but we'll consider issuing stock when we receive as much an intrinsic business value as we give. Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fitchheimers, and Borsheimes. In
33:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cases like these, the company's owner managers wish to generate significant amounts of. cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for
33:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): owners with such objectives, and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests. We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A
33:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction like sales.
33:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
33:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the phone If don't ring, you'll know it's
33:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
33:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above.
34:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large but not controlling blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in capital cities Salamon, Gillette, US Air, Champion, and American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market. Insurance
34:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operations.
34:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Here
34:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is an updated look at the key figures for the proper property casualty insurance industry.
34:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
34:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the early 1980s, premiums written grew only about four or five percent a year, while incurred losses grew faster. The combined ratio after policyholder dividends therefore climbed steadily, from one hundred six in nineteen eighty one to one hundred eighteen in nineteen 1984, eighty four, when incurred losses jumped almost seventeen 17%. percent.
34:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Premiums then surged, growing about 22% in both 1985 and 1986, which pulled the combined ratio down to 108 and then to 104.6 in 1987. Since then, premium growth has been feeble: 4.4% in 1988, 3.2% in 1989, a revised
35:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 4.4% in 1990, and an estimated 3.1% last year. The combined ratio claimed. climbed back accordingly to 109.2 in 1989 and 109.6 in 1990. But in 1991 it slightly improved to an estimated 109.1 because
35:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): incurred losses grew only 2.9%. General inflation, measured by the GDP deflator, ran at about 3.7%.
35:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
35:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio represented. represents total insurance costs, losses incurred plus expenses. Compared to revenue from premiums, a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year.
35:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
35:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds, the float,
35:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
35:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 to 111. range typically produces an overall breakeven result exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
36:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
36:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. Over the last 25 twenty five years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate. eleven percent, if premium growth meanwhile
36:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): materially lags that ten percent rate, underwriting losses will mount. However, the industry's tendency to under reserve when business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time,
36:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
36:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that could well describe the situation last year, though premiums did not come close to growing ten 10%. percent.
36:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
36:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio failed to deteriorate as I had expected. but instead slightly improved. Loss reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason to be skeptical of that outcome,
36:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
36:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it may turn out that 1991's ratio should have been worse than was reported. In the long run, of course, trouble awaits managements that paper over operating problems with accounting maneuvers. Eventually, managements of this kind achieve the same result as the seriously ill paid. patient who tells his doctor,
37:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
37:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't afford the operation, but would you accept a small payment to touch up the X-rays? Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make combined ratios our own or the industries largely irrelevant to our performance. What counts with us is the cost of funds developed from insurance, or in the vernacular, the cost of
37:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): float. Float which we generate in exceptional amounts, is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves, and unearned premium reserves, minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our
37:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): underwriting loss.
37:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
37:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report shows our cost of float in each year since we entered the business in 1967, set beside
38:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the number of the first.
38:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year-end yield on long-term government bonds.
38:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
38:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shape of that record is this. Our float has grown from about $17 million in 1967 to about $1.9 billion in 1991. In 12 of those 25 years we underwrote at a profit, which means our cost of funds was less than zero.
38:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
38:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expensive stretch came in the mid-1980s. mid nineteen eighties. 1984 cost us almost. 19% against a government bond yield of about eleven and a half percent, then came several very cheap years, under one percent in nineteen eighty-eight and about one and a half percent in each of nineteen eighty-nine and nineteen ninety. Last year with an underwriting loss of about one
38:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hundred twenty million dollars against average float of one point nine three billion, our cost of funds was six point three one percent.
38:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
38:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can see, our cost of funds in
38:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
38:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen ninety one was well below the United States government's cost on newly issued long term bonds, which yielded seven point four zero percent at year end. We have in fact beat the government's rate in twenty of the twenty five years we have been in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold, which counts as
39:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory.
39:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire continues to be a very large rider, perhaps the largest in the world,
39:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
39:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Supercat insurance, which is coverage that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against
39:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
39:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): major catastrophic losses. Profits in this business are enormously volatile.
39:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
39:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mentioned last year, one hundred million dollars in supercat premiums, which is roughly our annual expectation,
39:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): could
39:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deliver us anything from a one hundred million dollar profit
39:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
39:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a year with no big catastrophe to a two hundred million dollar loss in a year in which a couple of major hurricanes or earthquakes come along. We price this business, expecting to pay out, over the long term, about 90% of the premiums we receive. In any given year, however, we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or
40:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enormously unprofitable. That is true in part because GAPE accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophe free years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other years. In effect, a one-year accounting cycle is ill-suited ill suited to the nature of this business. And
40:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
40:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a reality. you should be aware of when you assess our annual results. Last year, there appears to have been, by our definition, one super cat, but it will trigger payments from only about twenty five percent of our policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the nineteen ninety one underwriting profit from our catastrophe business to have been about eleven
40:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): million dollars.
40:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
40:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): may be surprised to learn the identity of the biggest catastrophe in nineteen ninety one.
40:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
40:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was neither the Oakland fire nor Hurricane Bob, but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused the industry an insured loss now estimated at about four to five billion dollars. At the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass that from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record holder. Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance
41:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): protection for marine and aviation disasters as well. as for natural catastrophes.
41:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
41:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the nineteen eighties, much of this reinsurance was supplied by innocence, that is, by insurers that did not understand the risks of the business, but they have now been financially burned beyond recognition. Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often when I was personally running the insurance operation. Insurers, though, like investors, eventually
41:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): repeat their mistakes. At
41:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): some point,
41:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): probably after a few catastrophe scarce years, innocence will reappear and prices for supercat policies will plunge to silly levels.
41:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
41:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long as apparently adequate rates prevail, however, we will be a major participant in SuperCat coverages. In marketing this product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because of our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know that. when the big one comes, many reinsurers who found it easy to write policies will find it difficult to write
42:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): checks. Some reinsurers can say what Jackie Mason does. I'm fixed for life, as long as I don't buy anything. Berkshire's ability to fulfill all its commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is unquestioned. Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest opportunities. Mike Geit Goldberg has accomplished wonders
42:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with this operation since he took charge, and it has become a very valuable asset, albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision. Marketable.
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43:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
43:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year end, our common stock holdings with a value of over $100 million dollars were these. Capital Cities slash ABC Incorporated. the Coca-Cola Company, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, GICO Corporation, the Gillette Company, Guinness PLC, the Washington Post
44:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Company, and Wells Fargo and Company. Together, these eight positions cost us about two point eight three billion dollars and had a market value at year end of about nine point zero two billion dollars. By far the largest single gain was in Coca-Cola, bought for about one point zero two billion dollars and worth three point seven five
44:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): billion at year end.
44:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
44:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than one hundred percent.
44:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
44:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): usual, the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to investing. Guinness is a new position, but we held the other seven stocks a year ago, making a allowance for the conversion of our Gillette position from preferred to common, and in six of those we hold an unchanged number of shares.
44:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
44:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exception is Federal Home Loan Mortgage, Freddie Mac, in which our shareholdings increase slightly. Our stay put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient. With tongue only partly in check, I suggest that recent events indicate that the much maligned idle rich have received a bad rap. They
45:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have maintained or increased their wealth while many of the energetic rich, aggressive real estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, and the like have seen their fortunes disappear.
45:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Significant investment in a company domiciled outside the United States. Guinness, however, earns its money and in much the same fashion as Coca-Cola and Gillette, United States based companies that garner most of their profits from international operations. Indeed,
45:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
45:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the sense of where they earn their profits, continent by continent, Coca Cola and Guinness display strong similarities.
45:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
45:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you'll never get their drinks confused,
45:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
45:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your chairman remains unmovably in the chair. Cherry Coke camp. We continually search for large businesses with understandable, enduring and mouthwatering economics that are run by able and shareholder oriented managements. This focus doesn't guarantee results. We both have to buy at a sensible price and get business
46:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): performance from our companies that validates our assessment. But this investment approach, searching for the superstars.
46:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): offers us our only chance for real success. Charlie and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large sums we work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and selling portions of far from great businesses, nor do we think many others can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from flower to flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name
46:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investors to institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one night stands a romantic. If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say to private companies in Omaha, I would first try to assess the long-term economic characteristics of each business. Second, assess
47:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the quality of the people in charge of running it. And third, try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price. I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town. Why then should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public companies?
47:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
47:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult,
47:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): why
47:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should we discard proven products?
47:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
47:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was tempted to say the real thing. Our motto is: if at first you do succeed, quit trying.
47:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): John
47:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, FC Scott on august fifteenth, nineteen thirty four, that says it all As time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one
47:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence. One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited, and there
48:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence. Mistake du jour.
48:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
48:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the nineteen eighty nine annual report I wrote about mistakes of the first twenty five years and promised you an update in twenty fifteen. My experiences in the first few years of this second semester indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in these
48:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pages in the hope that public confusion
48:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is.
48:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): confession may deter further bumblings. Postmortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams. Why not for businesses and investors? Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission rather than the commission category. That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment since you don't see these errors,
49:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but their invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this Mia culpable Culpa, I am not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an esoteric invention, such as Xerox, high technology, such as Apple, or even brilliant merchandising such as Walmart. We will never develop the competence to spot such businesses
49:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): early. Instead, I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand, and that seem clearly attractive.
49:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
49:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in which way we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying. Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic. In early 1988, we decided to buy thirty million shares, adjusted for a subsequent split, of Federal National Mortgage
49:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Association, Fannie Mae, which would have been a three hundred fifty to four hundred million dollar. investment. We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the company's business. Furthermore,
50:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
50:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae's CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the company as a financial powerhouse. With the best yet to come, I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a look at
50:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
50:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): large position. After we bought about seven million shares, the price began to climb. In frustration, I stopped buying.
50:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
50:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mistake that, thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program.
50:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
50:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an even sillier move, I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the seven million shares we owned.
50:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I wish
50:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I could give you a half. halfway rational explanation for my amateurish behavior with respect to Fannie Mae, but there isn't one. What I can give you is an estimate as of year in 1991 of the approximate gain that Berkshire didn't make because of your chairman's mistake about $1.4 one point
51:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): four billion dollars. fixed income securities.
51:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
51:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made several significant changes in our fixed income portfolio during nineteen ninety one.
51:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
51:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common stock. We eliminated our hold holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call. And we purchased fixed income securities of American Express and First Empire State Corporation, a Buffalo Buffalo-based
51:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bank holding company. We also added to a small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late 1990.
51:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
51:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): largest holdings at year end were in ACF Industries, American Express, Champion International, First Empire State, RJR Nabisco, are
51:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Salaman, Salamon, US Air, and Washington Public Power Systems. In total, these carried a cost or amortized value of about $2.17 billion and a market value of roughly the same amount.
52:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
52:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): two extremes are worth noting. Our Salamon preferred carried at $700 million was valued at $714 million. Our US Air preferred carried at $358 million was valued at $233 two hundred thirty three million.
52:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
52:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): forty million dollars of First Empire State preferred carries a nine percent coupon, is non callable until nineteen ninety six and is convertible at seventy eight dollars ninety one cents per share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers, CEO of First Empire, and like being his partner on
52:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): any scale. Our American Express Preferred is not a normal fixed income security, rather it is a perk. PERC which carries a fixed dividend of eight point eight five percent on our three hundred million dollar cost. Absent one exception mentioned later, our preferred must be converted three years after issuance into a maximum of twelve million two hundred forty
53:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): four thousand eight hundred ninety eight shares. If necessary, a downward adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order to limit to four hundred fourteen million dollars the total value of the common we receive. Though there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock that we will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms of the preferred, however, include a
53:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): provision allowing us to extend the conversion date by one year if the common stock is below twenty four dollars and fifty cents on the third anniversary of our purchase. Purchase. Overall, our fixed income investments have treated us well, both over the long term and recently. We have realized large capital gains from these holdings, including about one hundred
53:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fifty two million dollars in nineteen ninety one. Additionally, our after tax yields have considerably exceeded those earned by most fixed income portfolios. Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater than the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the salamon. situation.
54:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
54:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I write this letter, I am also writing a letter for inclusion in Salamon's annual report, and I refer you to that report for an update on the company. You can write for it to the corporate secretary, Salamon Incorporated, Seven World Trade Center, New York. Despite the company's travails, Bales, Charlie and I believe our Salamon Salaman preferred
54:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stock increased slightly in value during New York. nineteen ninety one. Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salamon's Common produced this result. Last year, I told you that our US Air investment should work out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few years. Unfortunately, nineteen ninety one was a decimating
54:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): period for the industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered bankruptcy, stretched stretch the period to fourteen 14 months, and you can add Continental and TWA.
54:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): low valuation that we have given USAIR in our table reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from negligible.
55:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
55:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating. These carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry's cost because the bankrupts don't incur the capital costs faced by their solvent brethren, and because they can fund their losses,
55:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
55:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thereby stave off shutdown, by selling off assets.
55:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
55:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): burn the furniture to provide firewood approach to fair setting by bankrupt carriers contributes to the toppling of previously marginal carriers, creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed to bring the industry to its knees. Seth Schofield, who became CEO of US Air in 1991, is making major adjustments in the
55:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): airline's operations in order to improve its chances of being one of the few industry survivors. There is no tougher job in corporate America than running an airline. Despite the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected into it, the industry in aggregate has posted a net loss since its birth after Kitty Hawk. Airline managers need brains, guts, and
56:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): experience.
56:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
56:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Seth possesses all three of these attributes.
56:13
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57:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
57:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gambling is affecting your mental health or well-being, 211 Alberta is here to help. Call or text 211 or visit ab.211.ca.
57:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Standard message and data rates may apply. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with the Alberta Eye Gaming Corporation.
57:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1991 Shareholder Designated Contributions Program. Contributions made through the program were $6.8 million, and 2,630 charities were recipients.
57:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
57:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated shareholder designated contribution. contributions program that appears later in this report. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank, or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31,
57:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1992 will be ineligible for the 1992 two program.
57:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
57:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition to the shareholder-designated shareholder designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about one point five million dollars annually,
58:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these
58:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contributions support local charities such as the United Way and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses. However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the
58:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
58:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
58:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): faithful will notice that, for the first time in some years, Charlie's annual letter to West Coast. Wesco shareholders is not reprinted in this report. Since his letter is relatively bare bones this year, Charlie said he saw no point in including it in these pages. My own recommendation, however, is that you get a copy of the Wesco Report. Simply write to the
59:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, three 315, hundred fifteen, East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California.
59:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Malcolm
59:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): G Chase, Jr., now 88, has decided not to stand for election as a director this year, but the association of the Chase family with Berkshire will not end. Malcolm III, known as Kim, Malcolm's son, will be nominated to replace him.
59:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
59:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1931, Malcolm went to work for Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, which merged with Hathaway Manufacturing Company in 1955 nineteen fifty five to form our present company.
59:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Two years later, Malcolm became Berkshire Hathaway's chairman, a position he held as well in early nineteen sixty five, when he made it possible for Buffett Partnership Limited to buy a key block of Berkshire stock owned by some of his relatives. This purchase gave our partnership effective control of the company. Malcolm's immediate family meanwhile kept its Berkshire
59:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stock and for the last twenty twenty-seven seven years has had the second large largest holding in the company, trailing only the Buffett family. Malcolm has been a joy to work with, and we are delighted that the long running relationship between the Chase family and Berkshire is continuing to a new generation.
1:00:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:00:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9 30 thirty in the morning on Monday, April 27, twenty seventh, nineteen 1992. ninety two, Attendance last year grew to a record fifteen hundred fifty, but that still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.
1:00:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
1:00:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels. First the Radison Redick Tower, a small hotel of eighty eight rooms but a nice one, across the street from the Orpheum. Second, the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five minute walk from the Orpheum. Or third, the Marriott located in West Omaha, about one hundred yards
1:00:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from Borsheim's and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 830 and 845 for the meeting and return after it ends. Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting and we hope you can make it.
1:01:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The questions we get. We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent owner-related questions.
1:01:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
1:01:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.
1:01:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
1:01:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska for
1:01:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the year.
1:01:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Furniture Mart and Borsheimes after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the furniture mart any day of the week. It is open from ten in the morning to five
1:01:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thirty in the afternoon on Saturdays and from noon to five thirty on Sundays. While there, stop at the C's candy cart and find out for yourself why Americans ate twenty six million pounds of C's products last year. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to six in the evening
1:02:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on Sunday, April 26th. Twenty sixth. Borsheim's Borsheimes will also have a special party the previous evening at which shareholders are welcome to be. You must, however, write Mrs. Gladys Kaiser at our office for an invitation. On display that evening will be a one hundred fifty year retrospective of the most exceptional time pieces made by Patek Philippe,
1:02:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): including watches once owned by Queen Victoria, Pope Pius IX, Rudyard Kipling, Madame Curie, and Albert Einstein. The centerpiece of the exhibition will be a five million dollar watch whose design and manufacture required nine years of labor by Patek Philippe Craftsman. Along with the rest of the collection, this watch will be on display
1:02:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at the store on Sunday, unless Charlie has by then impulsively bought it. Nicholas Kenner nailed me. Again. At last year's meeting pointing out that I had said, in the nineteen ninety annual report that he was eleven in May nineteen ninety, when actually he was nine. So asked Nicholas
1:03:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rather caustically,
1:03:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
1:03:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can't get that straight, how do I know the numbers in the back? The financials, are correct?
1:03:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
1:03:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): still searching for a snappy response. Nicholas will be at this year's meeting.
1:03:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
1:03:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spurned my offer of a trip to Disney World on that day. So join us to watch a continuation of this lopsided battle of wits.
1:03:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, February 28, 1992.
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