Investing Legends

Berkshire Hathaway 1990 Letter: Capital Allocation, Insurance Float, and Media Headwinds

1h 41m Listen to the original Episode page
Capital AllocationInsurance FloatJunk BondsWells FargoMedia IndustrySuper Cat ReinsuranceBerkshire HathawayIntrinsic Value

Summary

The speakers analyze Berkshire Hathaway's 1990 shareholder letter, highlighting the disciplined capital allocation by non-insurance managers who returned over 80% of earnings to leadership. They discuss the deteriorating property casualty insurance industry, noting a combined ratio of 109.8, and introduce Berkshire's new super cat reinsurance business characterized by high volatility. The episode covers investment psychology, praising the purchase of Wells Fargo stock during a price collapse and critiquing the junk bond era's leverage risks. Finally, they address the diminishing pricing power in media businesses and the specific outlook for the Buffalo News.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    About ninety seven point three percent of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's nineteen ninety Shareholder Designated Contributions Program. Contributions made through the program were five point eight million dollars and two thousand six hundred charities were recipients.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 47:14

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 3:19

    Scott Fetzer Operating Performance

    Details on Scott Fetzer's 1990 performance, including Fetchheimer's improved integration, World Book's leadership, and Kirby's volume growth despite startup costs.

  2. 3:19 – 5:36

    Non-Insurance Operations and Capital Allocation

    Discussion of how non-insurance managers returned over 80% of earnings to Berkshire leadership rather than reinvesting in their franchises.

  3. 5:36 – 9:27

    Property Casualty Insurance Industry Outlook

    Analysis of the industry's combined ratio reaching 109.8 in 1990 and the gap between premium growth and loss growth.

  4. 9:27 – 13:28

    Super Cat Reinsurance Business

    Introduction of Berkshire's new super cat reinsurance line, characterized by high volatility and concentrated risk.

  5. 13:28 – 22:24

    Float and Cost of Funds Framework

    Explanation of insurance float, with Berkshire's 1990 cost of funds at 1.6% against $1.6 billion in float.

  6. 22:24 – 28:17

    Wells Fargo Investment and Banking Philosophy

    Berkshire's acquisition of a near-10% stake in Wells Fargo at less than five times earnings, praising management despite general aversion to bank leverage.

  7. 28:17 – 30:24

    Investment Psychology and Market Fluctuations

    The speaker welcomes the 50% stock price collapse in Wells Fargo, using the analogy of rational buyers welcoming falling prices.

  8. 30:24 – 32:13

    Junk Bond Investments and Market Conditions

    Discussion of Berkshire's $440 million in RJR Nabisco bonds and the rise of 'manufactured junk' bonds in the early 1990s.

  9. 32:13 – 34:19

    Junk Bond Era and Margin of Safety

    Critique of high debt leverage ('dagger on the steering wheel') and emphasis on Ben Graham's 'margin of safety'.

  10. 34:19 – 37:11

    Junk Bond Mechanics and RJR Nabisco

    Statistical flaws in comparing junk bonds to fallen angels and the view that RJR Nabisco's credit is better than perceived.

  11. 37:11 – 38:07

    Convertible Preferred Stocks Performance

    Assessment of convertible preferreds in Salomon, Gillette, US Air, and Champion International.

  12. 38:07 – 39:24

    US Air Investment and Industry Economics

    Admission of an 'unforced error' in buying US Air during industry problems and warnings about commodity business competition.

  13. 39:24 – 42:27

    Convertible Preferred Valuation Logic

    Correction of press miscalculations, asserting that value comes from fixed income characteristics, not just conversion parity.

  14. 42:27 – 1:41:07

    Acquisition Criteria and Philosophy

    Berkshire's criteria for acquisitions: $10M+ earnings, high ROE, simplicity, and cash purchases at intrinsic value.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INCBRK-Bequitybullishyou should decide to sell, I think Berkshire Hathaway offers some advantages that most other buyers. do not.
COCA COLA COKOequityneutralLast year I told you that though these companies capital cities slash ABC, Coca-Cola, Geico, and Washington. Post had fine businesses and superb

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

In 1990, the proportion of news hole at the Buffalo News rose to 52.3% against 50.1% in 1989, resulting from a decline in advertising pages.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 1990 Annual Report, specifically the section discussing the Buffalo News operations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Scott Fetzer's finance operation earned a record $12.2 million pre-tax in 1990.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:33

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section discussing Scott Fetzer operating results. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Non-insurance operations saw net worth increase by only $47 million in 1990, although earnings were $133 million.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·3:19

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on non-insurance operations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The property casualty insurance industry's combined ratio climbed to an estimated 109.8 in 1990.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:23

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on insurance operations and industry statistics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire held about $1.6 billion of float in 1990, with an underwriting loss of $27 million, resulting in a cost of funds of about 1.6%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·18:33

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on measuring insurance performance and float. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire owned 48% of GEICO at the time of the report.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·20:13

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on insurance operations and GEICO. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's common stockholdings with a value over $100 million included Capital Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, GEICO, Washington Post, and Wells Fargo.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:24

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on marketable securities. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Berkshire purchased a 10% interest in Wells Fargo for $290 million, which was less than five times after-tax earnings.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·25:35

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on marketable securities and Wells Fargo. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Wells Fargo had $56 billion in assets and was earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·25:55

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on marketable securities and Wells Fargo. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire held $440 million in RJR Nabisco bonds at year-end 1990, which had appreciated by more than $150 million.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·30:40

How to verify: Verify via Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, specifically the section on marketable securities and RJR Nabisco bonds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's net worth rose 7.3% in 1990, while four permanent holdings went nowhere.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:13

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Page 1; verify against 2026 and 2026 annual reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire purchased a 10% stake in Wells Fargo for $290 million at less than five times after-tax earnings.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:13

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter; SEC Form 13F filings for Q4 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Berkshire holds $700 million of Salomon Brothers, $600 million of Gillette, $358 million of US Air, and $300 million of Champion International convertible preferreds.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:11

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, 'Investments' section; SEC Form 13F. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Gillette convertible preferreds will convert into twelve million shares of common stock on April 1st.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:31

How to verify: Gillette Company proxy statements or press releases from 2026/2026; Berkshire 2026 Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

US Air's troubles were brought on by industry conditions and post-merger difficulties integrating Piedmont.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:07

How to verify: US Air Group historical news archives; Berkshire 2026 Shareholder Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

97.3% of eligible shares participated in the 1990 Shareholder Designated Contributions Program, contributing $5.8 million to 2,600 charities.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·47:14

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, 'Shareholder Designated Contributions' section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's non-insurance businesses earned 51% on equity with no leverage.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:13

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, 'Operating Results' section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Ben Graham rejected the 'dagger on the steering wheel' thesis in the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·33:07

How to verify: Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor, Final Chapter; verify against 2026 or 2026 edition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Salomon Brothers preferred convertible into common at $38; if common sold at $22.80, preferred would be worth 60% of face value according to press logic.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:31

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, 'Convertible Preferred Stocks' section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Berkshire's corporate jet sale would increase earnings by $1 million annually.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·47:14

How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, 'Succession' section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Review Berkshire Hathaway's 1990 Annual Report for detailed financials on Scott Fetzer and non-insurance operations.
  • Verify the 1990 property casualty insurance industry combined ratio using data from the Insurance Information Institute or NAIC filings.
  • Check Wells Fargo's stock price and earnings per share in 1990 to confirm the 'less than five times after-tax earnings' valuation claim.
  • Analyze the performance of RJR Nabisco bonds post-1990 to assess the validity of the 'considerably better than perceived' credit view.
  • Examine the Buffalo News' 1991 earnings report to validate the predicted substantial fall in earnings.
  • Research the definition and mechanics of 'super cat' reinsurance to understand the risk concentration described.
  • Compare Berkshire's 1990 float cost of 1.6% against US Treasury yields of the same period to evaluate the value of insurance float.
  • Review the 1990 shareholder designated contributions program data to verify the $5.8 million contribution figure.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Profits may be off, but our pride in the product remains. We continue to have a larger news hole, the portion of the paper devoted to news, than any comparable paper. In 1990, the proportion rose to 52.3% against 50.1% in 1989. Alas, the
0:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): increase resulted from a decline in advertising pages rather than from a gain in news pages. Regardless of earnings pressure. pressures, we will maintain at least a fifty percent news hole. Cutting product quality is not a proper response to adversity.
1:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fetchheimer's operating performance improved considerably in nineteen ninety,
1:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
1:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): many of the problems we encountered in integrating the large acquisition we made in nineteen 1988 eighty eight were moderated or solved. However, several unusual items caused the earnings reported in the sources table to be flat.
1:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the retail operation, we continue to add stores and now have 42 in 22 states. Overall, prospects appear excellent for Fetchheimer.
1:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
1:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Scott Fetzer, Ralph Shea runs 19 businesses with a mastery few bring to running one.
1:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition to overseeing three entities, World Book, Kirby, and Scott Fetzer Manufacturer. Manufacturing, Ralph directs a finance operation that earned a record $12.2 million pre-tax in 1990.
1:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Were
1:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Scott Fetzer an independent company, it would rank close to the top of the Fortune 500 in terms of return on equity, although it is not in businesses that one would expect to be economic champs. The superior results are directly attributable to Ralph.
2:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
2:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): WorldBook, World Book, earnings earnings and improved on a small decrease in unit volume. The costs of our decentralization move were considerably less in nineteen ninety than nineteen eighty-nine, and the benefits of decentralization are being realized. WorldBook remains far and away the leader in United
2:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): States encyclopedia sales, and we are growing internationally,
2:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): though
2:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): freely. from a small base. Kirby unit volume grew substantially in 1990 with the help of our new vacuum cleaner, the Generation 3, which was an unqualified success. Earnings did not grow as fast as sales because of both startup expenditures and learning curve problems we encountered in manufacturing the new product.
2:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): International business, whose dramatic growth I described last year, had a further twenty. 20% sales gain in 1990. With the aid of a recent price increase, we expect excellent earnings at Kirby in 1991. Within the Scott Fetzer manufacturing group, Campbell Housefeld, its largest unit, had a particularly fine year.
3:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This company, the country's leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, achieved record sales of $109 million. more than 30% of which came from products introduced during the last five years.
3:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
3:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): looking at the figures for our non-insurance operations, you will see that net worth increased by only $47 million in 1990. Although earnings were $133 million, this does not mean that our managers are in any way skimping on investments that strengthen their business franchises or that promote. growth.
3:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Indeed, they diligently pursue both goals. But they also never deploy capital without good reason. The result, in the past five years, they have funneled well over 80% of their earnings to Charlie and me for use in new business and investment opportunities. Insurance operations.
4:00
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5:01
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5:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Here is an updated look at the key figures for the proper. property casualty insurance industry.
5:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
5:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the early 1980s, premiums written grew only about 4%
5:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a year, while incurred losses grew faster. The combined ratio after policyholder dividends therefore climbed steadily, from 106 in 1981 to 118 in 1984, when incurred losses jumped almost 17%.
6:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Premiums then surged. growing about 22% in both 1985 and 1986, which pulled the combined ratio down to 108 and then to 104.6 in 1987. Since then premium growth has stayed stuck in the low single digits, and 4.4% in 1988,
6:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
6:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): revised 3.2% three point two percent in 1989, nineteen eighty nine
6:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
6:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an estimated 4.5% four point five percent in 1990. nineteen ninety. Far below what the industry needs.
6:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
6:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio has duly climbed back one hundred five point four, then one hundred nine point two, and an estimated one hundred nine point eight last year. General inflation, measured by the GNP deflator, meanwhile ran at about four percent.
6:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
6:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio represents total insurance costs, losses incurred plus expenses, compared to revenue from premiums
6:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
6:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds, the float is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 to 111 one hundred eleven range typically produces an
7:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
7:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
7:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at an average of ten percent annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. Over the last twenty five years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, eleven percent. If premium growth, meanwhile,
7:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): materially lags that ten percent. rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to under reserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. Last year, premium growth fell far short of the required ten percent and underwriting results therefore worsened. In those figures, however, the severity
7:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the deterioration in nineteen 1990 ninety is massed, because the industry's nineteen 1989 eighty nine losses from Hurricane Hugo caused the ratio for that year to be somewhat above trend line. The combined ratio will again increase in nineteen ninety-one, probably by about two points. Results will improve only when most
8:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insurance managements become so fearful that they run from business, even though it can be done at much higher prices than now exist. At some point these managements will indeed get the message that The most important thing to do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging. But so far that point hasn't gotten across. Insurance managers continue to dig
8:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sullenly but vigorously.
8:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
8:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): picture would change quickly if a major physical or financial catastrophe were to occur. Absent such a shock, one to two years will likely pass before underwriting losses become large enough to raise management. fear to a level that would spur major price increases. When that moment arrives, Berkshire will be ready, both financially and psychologically,
8:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to write huge amounts of business.
9:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
9:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the meantime, our insurance volume continues to be small but satisfactory. In the next section of this report, we will give you a framework for evaluating insurance results. From that discussion, you will gain an understanding of why I am so enthusiastic about the performance of our insurance manager, Mike Goldberg, and his cadre of stars,
9:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Rod Eldred, Dinos Yordanau, Ajit Jane, and Don Worster.
9:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
9:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): assessing our insurance results over the next few years, you should be aware of one type of business we are pursuing that could cause them to be unusually volatile. If this line of business expands, as it may, our underwriting. experience will deviate from the trend line you might expect. In most years we will somewhat exceed expectations, and in an occasional year we will fall far
9:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): below them.
9:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
9:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): volatility I predict reflects the fact that we have become a large seller of insurance against truly major catastrophes, or super cats, which could, for example, be hurricanes, windstorms, or earthquakes.
10:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
10:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buyers of these policies are reinsurance companies that themselves are in the business of writing catastrophe coverage for primary insurers
10:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
10:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that wish to lay off or rid themselves of part of their exposure to catastrophes of special severity, because the need for these buyers to collect on such a policy will only arise at times of extreme stress, perhaps even chaos.
10:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
10:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the insurance business, they seek financially strong sellers.
10:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
10:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here we have a major competitive advantage.
10:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
10:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the industry, our strength is unmatched.
10:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
10:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): typical superCAT contract is complicated.
10:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
10:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in a plain vanilla instance, we might write a one-year $10 million policy providing that the buyer, a reinsurer, would be paid that sum only if a catastrophe caused two results. First, specific losses for the reinsurer above a threshold amount, and second, aggregate losses. for the insurance industry of say more than five billion dollars. Under virtually all circumstances,
10:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loss levels that satisfy the second condition will also have caused the first to be met.
11:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
11:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this $10 million policy we might receive a premium of say three million dollars. Say also that we take in annual premiums of $100 million from SuperCAT policies of all kinds. In that case we are very likely in any given year to report either a profit of close to $100 million or a loss of well over $200 million.
11:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Note that we are not spreading risk as insurers typically do. We are concentrating it. Therefore, our yearly combined ratio on this business will almost never fall in the industry range of 100 to 120, but will instead be close to either 0 zero or 300%. three hundred percent.
11:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Most
11:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insurers are financially unable to tolerate such swings, and if they have the ability to do so, they often lack the desire. They may back away, for example, because
11:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
11:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): write gobs of primary property insurance that would deliver them dismal results at the very time they would be experiencing major losses on SuperCat reinsurance. In addition,
12:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): most
12:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): corporate managements believe that their shareholders dislike. volatility and results.
12:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
12:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can take a different tack. Our business in primary property insurance is small, and we believe that Berkshire shareholders, if properly informed, can handle unusual volatility and profits so long as the swings carry with them the prospect of superior long-term results. Charlie and I always have preferred a lumpy 15% return to a smooth twelve 12%. percent.
12:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We want
12:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to emphasize three. points. First, while we expect our superCAT business to produce satisfactory results over, say a decade, we're sure it will produce absolutely terrible results in at least an occasional year. Second, our expectations can be based on little more than subjective judgment.
12:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For this kind of insurance, historical loss data are of very limited value to us as we decide what rates to charge today. And third, though we expect to write significant quantities of SuperCat business, we will do so only at prices we believe to be commensurate with risk. If competitors become optimistic, our volume will
13:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fall. This insurance has in fact tended in recent years to be woefully underpriced. Most sellers have left the field on stretchers.
13:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
13:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the moment we believe Berkshire to be the largest United States rider of supercat business.
13:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
13:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when a major quake occurs in an urban area or a winter storm rages across Europe, light a candle for us. Measuring insurance performance.
13:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
13:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the previous section, I mentioned float, the funds of others that insurers in the conduct of their business temporarily hold, because these funds are available to be invested, they the typical property casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by seven percent to eleven percent and still be able to break even on its
13:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business. Again, this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth, that is, on the funds provided by shareholders. However, many exceptions to this seven 7 to eleven 11% percent range exist. For example,
14:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all. Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat, and if a farmer sustains a loss, he will be paid almost immediately. Thus, a combined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the
14:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insurer.
14:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
14:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the other extreme, malpractice insurance. covering the potential liabilities of doctors, lawyers, and accountants produces a very high amount of float compared to annual premium volume. The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy
14:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): litigation.
14:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
14:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance long tail business. in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers,
14:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
14:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to the insurer's lawyers as
14:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well. In
15:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long tail situations, a combined ratio of 115 or even more can prove profitable since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15% by which claims and expenses overrun premiums. The catch though is that long. tail means exactly that. Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to
15:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have produced a combined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200, 300, or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled.
15:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
15:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pitfalls of this business mandate and operating principle that too often is ignored. Though certain long tail lines may prove profitable.
15:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at combined ratios of 110 or 115, insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets. Instead, prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry.
16:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses, aiming for one hundred ten to one hundred fifteen is business suicide.
16:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
16:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of that said,
16:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
16:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should the measure of an insurer's profitability be? Analysts and managers customarily look to the combined ratio, and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a company ranks in profitability.
16:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
16:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe a better measure, however, to be a comparison of underwriting loss to float, developed.
16:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This loss to float ratio, like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results, is meaningless over short time periods. Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good. But when the ratio takes in a period of years, it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations.
16:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A low cost of funds signifies a good business. a high cost translates into a poor business.
16:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
16:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the report, we show the underwriting loss, if any, of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business, and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year. From this data, we have computed a cost of funds developed from insurance and set it beside the year-in year end yield on long-term government bonds. The shape of that record is this
17:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
17:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): float has grown from
17:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the year.
17:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about seventeen million dollars in nineteen sixty-seven to about one point six four billion dollars in nineteen ninety. In twelve of those twenty-four years, we underwrote at a profit, which means our cost of funds was less than zero. The expensive stretch came in the mid nineteen eighties. 1984 Nineteen eighty four cost us almost
17:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 19% nineteen percent, against a government bond yield of about eleven and a half percent.
17:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and nineteen eighty three cost us nearly fifteen percent. Recently the cost has been very low indeed, under one percent in nineteen eighty eight, and about one and a half percent in each of nineteen eighty nine and nineteen ninety. All told, in nineteen years out of the twenty four we have been in insurance, we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the
17:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): government.
18:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
18:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): float figures are derived from the total of loan. loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves, and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance.
18:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
18:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some insurers, other items should enter into the calculation, but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored. During 1990, we held about $1.6 billion of afloat, float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others. The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was $27 million, and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a
18:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cost of about 1.6%.
18:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There are two important qualifications to this calculation. First, the fat lady has yet to gargle, let alone sing, and we won't know our true nineteen sixty-seven to nineteen 1990 ninety cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now. Second, the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must
18:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment income these funds earn. Direct investments would be more tax efficient.
19:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
19:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is in fact substantial. Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise, I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance company would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost afloat. I also think that approximates the correct figure for
19:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire. Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders. If this cost, including the tax penalty, is higher than that, applying to alternative sources of funds, the value is negative. If the cost is lower,
19:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the value is positive.
19:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
19:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if the cost is significantly lower, the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset.
19:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
19:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly lower camp. Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO, in which our ownership interest is now forty eight percent. and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit. GEICO's growth has generated an ever larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero. Essentially,
20:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): GEICO's policyholders, in aggregate, pay the company interest on the float rather than the other way around. But handsome is as handsome does. GICO's GEICO's unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and and its careful classification of risks, a package that in turn allows rock bottom prices for
20:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): policyholders. Many well known insurance companies, on the other hand, incur an underwriting loss and float costs that, combined with the tax penalty, produces negative results for owners. In addition, these companies, like all others in the industry, are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection. and take their cost of
20:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): float right off the chart, unless these companies can materially improve their underwriting performance.
20:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And history indicates that is an almost impossible task.
21:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Their
21:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans.
21:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
21:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in all, the insurance business has treated us very well. We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable, and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low cost funds. Our shareholders, true, have incurred extra taxes,
21:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
21:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they have been more than compensated for this cost so far by the benefits produced by the float.
21:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
21:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): particularly encouraging point about our record is that it will be. was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your chairman prior to Mike Goldberg's arrival. Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error, and when opportunity knocked, too often I answered. Many years later the bills keep arriving for these mistakes. In the insurance business there is no statute of limitations
21:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on stupidity.
21:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
21:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of, say, our candy or newspaper companies. By any measure, however, the business is worth far more than its carrying value. Furthermore, despite the problems this operation periodically hands us, it is the one among all the fine
22:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses we own that has the greatest potential. Marketable securities.
22:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
22:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year end, our common stockholdings with a value of over $100 million were these Capital Cities slash ABC Incorporated, the Coca-Cola Company, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, GICO Corporation, the Washington Post Company,
22:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
22:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wells Fargo and Company. Together, these six positions cost us about $1.96 one point nine six billion dollars and had a market value at year end of about $5.41 five point four billion. one dollars.
22:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
22:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than one hundred percent. Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style. This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings.
23:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
23:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exception was Wells Fargo, a superbly managed high return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under ten percent.
23:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board. About one sixth of our position was bought in nineteen eighty nine, the rest in nineteen ninety.
23:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
23:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banking business is no favorite of ours, when assets are twenty times equity,
23:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
23:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): common ratio in this industry. Mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity. And mistakes have been the rule rather than the approval. exception, at many major banks. Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the institutional imperative, the tendency of executives to
23:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers, no matter how foolish it may be to do so. In their lending, many bankers played follow the leader with lemming-like lemming like zeal, now they are experiencing a lemming-like fate.
24:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
24:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): leverage of twenty to one magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly managed bank at a cheap price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices.
24:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): With
24:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wells Fargo, we think we have obtained the best managers in the business, Carl Reichart Reichhart and Paul Hazen.
24:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
24:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): many ways, the combination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another. Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities slash ABC. First, each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands, trusts, and admires the other. Second, both managerial teams pay able people well, but abhor
24:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): having a bigger headcount than is needed. Third, both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure. Finally, both stick with what they understand and let their abilities, not their egos, determine what they attempt. Thomas J. Watson, senior of IBM, followed the same rule. I'm no genius, he
25:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): said. I'm smart in spots. But I stay around those spots.
25:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
25:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchases of Wells Fargo in nineteen ninety were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks. The disarray was appropriate.
25:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well regarded banks were put on public display, as one huge loss after another was unveiled. Often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well, a investor's understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted. Aided by their flight from bank stocks, we purchased our ten 10% percent
25:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interest in Wells Fargo for two $290 hundred ninety million dollars. less than five times after tax earnings, and less than three times pre tax earnings. Wells Fargo is big, it has $56 billion in assets, and has been earning more than 20% on equity and 1.25% on assets.
25:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our purchase of one tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100% of a $5 billion. bank with identical financial characteristics. But were we to make such a purchase, we would have to pay about twice the $290 million we paid for Wells Fargo. Moreover, that $5 billion bank commanding
26:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a premium price would present us with another problem. We would not be able to find a Carl Reichart to run it. In recent years, Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business. No one, however, has been able to hire the dean. Of course, ownership of a bank, or
26:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about any other business, is far from riskless. California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake, which might wreak enough havoc on borrowers to in turn destroy the bank's lending to them.
26:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
26:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second risk is systemic. The possibility of a business contraction or financial panic so severe that it would endanger almost every highly leveraged institution, no matter how intelligently.
27:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Finally, the market's major fear of the moment is that West Coast real estate values will tumble because of overbuilding and deliver huge losses to banks that have financed the expansion. Because it is a leading real estate lender, Wells Fargo is thought to be
27:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a very important thing.
27:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): particularly vulnerable. None of these eventualities can be ruled out. The probability of the first two occurring, however, is low, and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well-managed institutions. Consider some mathematics. Wells Fargo currently earns well over one $1 billion dollars
27:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pre-tax annually after expensing more than three $300 hundred million dollars. for loan losses. If 10% of all $48 billion of the bank's loans,
27:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
27:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just its real estate loans, were hit by problems in 1991,
27:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
27:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these produced losses, including foregone interest, averaging 30% a principal, the company would roughly break even.
27:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
27:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year like that, in which we consider only a low-level low level possibility, not a likelihood, would not distress us. In fact, at Berkshire, we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produce no return for a year, but that could then be expected to earn twenty percent on growing equity. Nevertheless, fears of a California real
28:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost fifty 50% percent within a few months during nineteen ninety,
28:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even though
28:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall, we welcomed the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new panic prices. Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations. Instead, many
28:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): illogically become euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall. They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices. Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food, they welcome falling prices and deplore price increases. It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining prices. Similarly, at the Buffalo News, we would cheer
29:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lower prices for newsprint, even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand.
29:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
29:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product. Identical reasoning guides are thinking about Berkshire's investments. We will be buying businesses, or small parts of businesses called stocks, year in, year out as long as I live, and longer if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled. Given these
29:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intentions, declining prices for businesses benefit us, and rising prices hurt us.
29:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
29:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most common cause of low prices is pessimism, sometimes pervasive, sometimes specific to a company or industry. We want to do business in such an environment not because we like pessimism, but because we like the prices it produces. It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer.
29:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): None
29:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of this means, however, that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase. simply because it is unpopular.
30:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
30:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow the crowd strategy. What's required is thinking rather than polling. Unfortunately, Bertrand Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world. Most men would rather die than think. Many do.
30:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
30:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other major portfolio change last year was. large additions to our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds, securities that we first bought in late 1989. At year in 1990, we had $440 million invested in these securities,
30:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
30:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): amount that approximated market value. As I write this, however, duo.
30:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Their market value has risen by more than $150 one hundred fifty million. dollars. Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us, so is the purchases of below investment grade bonds. But opportunities that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile impact on Berkshire's results are rare. Therefore we will look at any category of investment so long
31:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as we understand the business we're buying into To and believe that price and value may differ significantly. Woody Allen, in another context, would be pointed out the advantage of open mindedness. I can't understand why more people aren't bisexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.
31:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
31:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the past, we have bought a few below investment grade bonds with success, though these were all old fashioned fallen angels. Bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times.
31:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
31:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 1984 nineteen eighty four annual report, we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel, the Washington Public Power Supply System.
31:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Junk bonds that were far below investment grade when issued. As the decade progressed, new offerings of manufactured junk became ever junkier, and ultimately the predictable outcome occurred. Junk bonds lived up
32:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to the city.
32:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their name. In 1990, even before the recession dealt its blows, the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations.
32:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
32:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't happen. Huge debt, we were told, would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before, much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care. We'll acknowledge that such an attention getter would produce a very alert driver, but
32:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): another, certain consequence would be a deadly and unnecessary accident if the car hit even the tiniest pothole or sliver of ice.
32:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
32:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): roads of business are riddled with potholes. A plan that requires dodging them all is a plan for disaster.
32:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the
32:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): final chapter of the Intelligent Investor, Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis. Confronted with the challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto margin of safety. Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words.
33:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
33:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began.
33:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At the
33:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): height of the debt maniac, mania, capital structures were concocted that guaranteed failure. In some cases, so much debt was issued that even highly favorable business results could not produce the funds to service it. One particularly egregious kill him at birth case a few years back involved the purchase of a mature television station in Tampa, bought with so much debt that
33:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the interest on it exceeded the station's gross revenues. Even if you assume that all labor
33:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): programs, and services were donated rather than purchased, this capital structure required revenues to explode, or else the station was doomed to go broke. Many of the bonds that financed the purchase were sold to now failed savings and loan associations. As a taxpayer, you are picking up the tab for this folly. All of this seems impossible now.
33:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When these misdeeds were done, however, dagger selling investment banks. bankers pointed to the scholarly research of academics, which reported that, over the years, the higher interest rates received from low grade bonds had more than compensated for their higher rate of default. Thus, said the friendly salesman, a diversified portfolio of junk bonds would produce
34:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): greater net returns than would a portfolio of high grade bonds. Beware of past performance proofs in finance.
34:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
34:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): history books were the key to riches, the Forbes four hundred would consist of librarians. There was a flaw in the salesman's logic. One that a first year student in statistics is taught to recognize. An assumption was being made that the universe of newly minted junk bonds was identical to the universe of low grade
34:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fallen angels, and that, therefore, the default experience of the latter group.
35:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The universes were, of course, dissimilar in several vital respects. For openers, the manager of a fallen angel almost invariably yearned to regain investment grade status and
35:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the case.
35:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): worked toward that goal.
35:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
35:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): junk bond operator was usually an entirely different breed. Behaving much as a heroin user might, he devoted his energies not to finding a cure for his debt-ridden condition, but rather to finding another fix. Additionally, the fiduciary sensitivities of the executives managing the typical fallen angel were often, though not always, more
35:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): finely developed than were those of the junk bond issues. issuing financiopath. Wall Street cared little for such distinctions. As usual, the street's enthusiasm for an idea was proportional not to its merit, but rather to the revenue it would produce. Mountains of junk bonds were sold by those who didn't care to those who didn't think,
35:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
35:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there was no shortage of either. Junk bonds remain a minefield, even at prices that today are. often a small fraction of issue price. As we said last year, we have never bought a new issue of a junk bond. The only time to buy these is on a day with no why in it. We are, however, willing to look at the field
36:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now that it is in disarray.
36:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
36:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the case of RJR J. R. Nabisco, we feel the company's credit is considerably better than was generally perceived for a while. and that the yield we receive, as well as the potential for capital gain, more than compensates for the risk we incur, though that is far from Neil. RJR has
36:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made asset sales at favorable prices, has added major amounts of equity, and in general is being run well. However, as we survey the field, most low grade bonds still look unattractive.
36:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
36:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): handiwork of the Wall Street of the nineteen eighties is even worse than we had thought. Many important businesses have been mortally wounded. We will, though, keep looking for opportunities as the junk market continues to unravel. Convertible Preferred Stocks. We continue to hold the convertible preferred stocks described in earlier
37:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reports, seven $700 hundred million dollars of Salamen Salaman Incorporated, $600 million of the Gillette Company, $358 million of US Air Group, and $300 million of Champion International Corporation. Our Gillette holdings will be converted into twelve million shares of common stock on April first, weighing
37:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interest rates, credit quality, and prices of the related common stocks. We can assess our holdings in Salamon Salaman and Champion at year. end nineteen ninety as worth about what we paid, Gillette as worth somewhat more, and US Air as worth substantially less.
37:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
37:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): making the US Air purchase, your chairman displayed exquisite timing. I plunged into the business at almost the exact moment that it ran into severe problems. No one pushed me. In tennis parlance, I committed an unforced error. The company's trusted. troubles were brought on both by industry conditions and by the post merger difficulties it encountered
38:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in integrating Piedmont, an affliction I should have expected since almost all airline mergers have been followed by operational turmoil. In short order, Ed Kalodney and Seth Schofield resolved the second problem. The airline now gets excellent marks for service. Industry Industry-wide wide problems have proved to be far more serious. Since our purchase, the
38:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): economics of the airline industry have deteriorated at an alarming pace, accelerated by the kamikaze pricing tactics of certain carriers. The trouble this pricing has produced for all carriers illustrates an important truth. In a business selling a commodity type product, it's impossible to be a lot smarter than your dumbest competitor.
38:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): However, unless the industry is decimated during the next few years, our USAIR investment should work out alright. Ed and Seth have decisively addressed the current turbulence by making major changes in operations. Even so, our investment is now less secure than at the time I made
39:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
39:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our convertible preferred stocks are relatively simple securities, yet I should warn you that if the past is any guide, you may from time to time read inaccurate or misleading statements about them. Last year, for example, several members of the press calculated the value of all our preferred as equal to that of the common stock into which they are
39:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): convertible. By their logic, that is, our salamon preferred, convertible into common at thirty eight dollars,
39:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): would
39:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be worth sixty percent of face value if Salamon common were selling at twenty $22.80. two dollars eighty cents. But there is a small problem with the salary. this line of reasoning. Using it, one must conclude that all of the value of a convertible preferred resides in the conversion privilege and that the value of a non convertible preferred of Salamon would be zero, no matter what its coupon or
39:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): terms for redemption. The point you should keep in mind is that most of the value of our
39:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Bet
39:59
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Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
40:46
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41:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Convertible preferred is derived from their fixed income characteristics. That means the securities cannot be worth less than the value they would possess as non convertible. preferred and may be worth more because of their conversion options.
41:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
41:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deeply regret having to end this section of the report with a note about my friend Coleman Mockler Jr. CEO of Gillette, who died in January. No description better fitted Coleman than gentleman, a word signifying integrity, courage, and modesty. Couple these things qualities with the humor and
41:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exceptional business ability that Coleman possessed, and you can understand why I thought it an undiluted pleasure to work with him, and why I, and all others who knew him, will miss Coleman so much.
41:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
41:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few days before Coleman died, Gillette was richly praised in a Forbes cover story. Its theme was simple The Company's success in shaving products has come not from marketing. savvy, though it exhibits that talent repeatedly, but has instead resulted from its devotion to s to quality. This mindset has caused
42:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it to consistently focus its energies on coming up with something better, even though its existing products already ranked as the class of the field. In so depicting Gillette, Forbes in fact painted a portrait of Coleman. Help, help,
42:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Regular readers know that I shamelessly utilize the annual letter in an attempt to acquire businesses for Berkshire, and as we constantly preach at the Buffalo News, advertising does work. Several businesses have knocked on our door because someone has read in these pages of our interest in making acquisitions. Any good ad salesman will tell you that trying to sell
42:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): something without advertising is like winking at a girl in the dark and
42:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
42:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an appendix to this report, I've reproduced the essence of a letter I wrote a few years back to the owner manager of a desirable business. If you have no personal connection with a business that might be of interest to us but have a friend who does, perhaps you can pass this report along to him. Here's the sort of business we are looking for. First, large
43:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchases of at least ten million dollars of after tax earnings. Second, demonstrated consistent earning power. Future projections are of little interest to us, nor are turnaround situations. Third, businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt. Fourth, management in place. We can't supply
43:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it. Fifth, simple businesses.
43:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
43:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's lots of technology we won't understand it. And sixth, an offering price.
43:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
43:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown. We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer, customarily within five minutes, as to whether we're interested.
43:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
43:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing. stock when we receive as much and intrinsic business value as we give. Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin Friedman Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but
44:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue. to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in
44:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the past. Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests. We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell. you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales.
44:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
44:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the phone don't ring, you'll know it's me. Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large but not controlling blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in capital cities, Salamon, Gillette, U.S. USAIR, and Champion. We are not interested, however,
45:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market. Miscellaneous. Ken Chase has decided not to stand for reelection as a director at our upcoming annual meeting. We have no mandatory retirement age for directors at Berkshire, and won't, but Ken, at seventy five and living in Maine, simply decided to
45:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): come. cut back his activities. Ken was my immediate choice to run the textile operation after Buffett Partnership Limited assumed control of Berkshire early in nineteen sixty five. Although I made an economic mistake in sticking with the textile business, I made no mistake in choosing Ken. He ran the operation well, he was always one hundred percent straight with
45:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): me about its problems, and he generated the funds that allowed us to diversify and to ensure.
46:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Nor its subsidiary businesses and important investments should be sold simply because some very high bid is received for one or all.
46:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
46:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): feel strongly that the fate of our businesses and their managers should not depend on my health, which, it should be added, is excellent,
46:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
46:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I have planned accordingly. Neither my estate plan nor that of my wife is designed to preserve the family fortune. Instead, both are aimed at preserving the character of Berkshire and returning the fortune to society.
46:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Were I to die tomorrow, you could be sure of three things. First, none of my stock would have to be sold. Second, both a controlling shareholder and a manager with philosophies similar to mine would follow me. And third, Berkshire's earnings would increase by one million dollars annually, since Charlie would immediately sell our corporate jet, the indefensible,
47:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ignoring my wish that it be buried with
47:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
47:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): About ninety seven point three percent of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's nineteen ninety Shareholder Designated Contributions Program. Contributions made through the program were five point eight million dollars and two thousand six hundred charities were recipients.
47:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
47:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder designated contributions program that appears later in this. report. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank, or depository. Shares not so registered on august thirty first, nineteen
47:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ninety-one will be ineligible for the nineteen ninety-one program.
47:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
47:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition to the shareholder designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions. including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities such as the United Way and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our
48:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses. However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of
48:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the company.
48:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
48:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
48:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha. at 9 30 in the morning on Monday, April 29th, 1991. Attendance last year grew to a record 1300, about a hundredfold increase from ten years ago.
49:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
49:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend getting your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels. First, the Radisson Reddick Tower, a small hotel of 88 rooms but a nice one across the street from the Orpheum. Second, the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about
49:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the street.
49:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a five minute walk from the Orpheum, or third, the Marriott, located in West Omaha, about one hundred yards from Borsheimes, and a twenty minute drive from downtown.
49:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
49:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at eight thirty and eight forty five for the meeting and return after it ends. Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions. we get. We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently
49:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): high level of intelligent owner-related questions.
49:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
49:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them. As usual, we will
50:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture, Mart and Borsheams after the meeting, and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the furniture mart any day of the week.
50:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is open from 10 in the morning to 5:30 in the afternoon on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 on Sundays. While there, stop at the C's Candy Cart and see for yourself the dawn of synergism at Berkshire. Borsheimes normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to six
50:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the evening on Sunday, April 28th.
50:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
50:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our Sunday opening last year, you made Ike very happy. After totaling the day's volume, he suggested to me that we start holding annual meetings quarterly. Join us at Borsheim's even if you just come to watch.
51:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Last year, the first question at the annual meeting was asked by eleven year old Nicholas Kenner, a third generation shareholder from New York City. Nicholas plays rough. How come the stock is down? he fired at me.
51:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
51:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): answer was not memorable.
51:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
51:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope that other business engagements won't keep Nicholas away from this year's meeting. If he attends, he will be offered the chance to again ask the first question. Charlie and I want to tackle him while we're fresh. This year, however, it's Charlie's turn to answer. Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board. March
51:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): eighteen.
51:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): first, nineteen ninety one. Appendix A United States Steel Announced Sweeping Modernization Scheme.
51:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
51:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): follows is an unpublished satire by Ben Graham, written in nineteen thirty six and given by the author to Warren Buffett in nineteen fifty four. Myron C. Taylor, chairman of United States Steel Corporation, today announced the long long-awaited awaited plan for completely modernizing. the world's largest industrial enterprise. Contrary to
52:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expectations, no changes will be made in the company's manufacturing or selling policies. Instead, the bookkeeping system is to be entirely revamped. By adopting and further improving a number of modern accounting and financial devices, the corporation's earning power will be amazingly transformed. Even under the subnormal.
52:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): conditions of nineteen thirty five, it is estimated that the new bookkeeping methods would have yielded a reported profit of close to fifty dollars per share on the common stock. The scheme of improvement is the result of a comprehensive survey made by the firm of Price, Bacon, Guthrie, and Colpitts.
52:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
52:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): includes the following six points. One, writing down of plan account to minus one billion dollars.
52:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Two
52:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): par
52:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): value of common stock to be reduced to one cent. Three payment of all wages and salaries and option warrants. Four inventories to be carried at one dollar. Five preferred stock to be replaced by non-interest bearing bonds redeemable at fifty percent discount. And six a one billion dollar contingency reserve to
53:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be established. Uh, the official statement of this extraordinary modernization plan follows in full.
53:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
53:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Board of Directors of United States Steel Corporation is pleased to announce that after intensive study of the problems arising from change conditions in the industry, it has approved a comprehensive plan for remodeling the corporation's accounting methods. A survey by a special committee, aided and abetted by the firm of Price, Bacon, Guthrie, and Colpitz,
53:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): revealed that our company has lagged somewhat behind other American business enterprises in utilizing certain advanced bookkeeping methods,
53:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by
53:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): means of which the earning power may be phenomenally enhanced without requiring any cash outlay or any changes in operating or sales conditions. It has been decided not only to adopt these newer methods, but to develop them to a still higher stage of perfection. The changes adopted by the board may be summarized under six heads as follows.
54:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): First, fixed assets to be written down to minus one billion dollars. Many representative companies have relieved their income accounts of all charges for depreciation by writing down their plan account to one dollar.
54:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): special committee points out that if their plants are worth only one dollar, the fixed assets of United States. Steel Corporation are worth a good deal less than that sum. It is now a well recognized fact that many plants are in reality a liability rather than an asset, entailing not only depreciation charges but taxes, maintenance, and other
54:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expenditures. Accordingly, the board has decided to extend the write down policy initiated in the 1935 nineteen thirty five report and to mark down the fixed assets from one billion.
54:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three hundred thirty eight million five hundred twenty two thousand eight hundred fifty eight dollars and ninety six cents to around minus one billion dollars.
54:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
55:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): advantages of this move should be evident. As the plant wears out, the liability becomes correspondingly reduced. Hence, instead of the present depreciation charge of some forty forty-seven seven million dollars yearly, there will be an annual appreciation credit of five percent or fifty million dollars. This will increase earnings by no less than ninety-seven million
55:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dollars per annum. Second and third, reduction of par value of common stock to one cent and payment of salaries and wages and option warrants. Many corporations have been able to reduce their overhead expenses substantially by paying a large part of their executive salaries
55:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the
55:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): form of the options to buy stock, which carry no charge against earnings. The full possibilities of this modern device have apparently not been adequately realized.
55:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
55:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Board of Directors has adopted the following advanced form of this idea. The entire personnel of the corporation are to receive their compensation in the form of rights to buy common stock at fifty dollars. per share
56:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
56:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the rate of one purchase right for each fifty dollars of salary or wages in their present amounts. The par value of the common stock is to be reduced to one cent.
56:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
56:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): almost incredible advantages of this new plan are evident from the following. A the payroll of the corporation will be entirely eliminated, a saving of two hundred fifty million dollars per annum based. on nineteen thirty five operations.
56:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): B.
56:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At the same time, the effective compensation of all our employees will be increased several fold. Because of the large earnings per share to be shown on our common stock under the new methods, it is certain that the shares will command a price in the market far above the option level of fifty $50 dollars per share, making the readily realizable
56:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): value of the
56:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): same.
56:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these option warrants greatly in excess of the present cash wages that they will replace. C.
56:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
56:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): corporation will realize an additional large annual profit through the exercise of these warrants. Since the par value of the common stock will be fixed at one cent, there will be a gain of forty nine dollars and ninety-nine cents on each share subscribed for.
57:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
57:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the interest of conservative, accounting, however, this profit will not be included in the income account, but will be shown separately as a credit to capital surplus.
57:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): D the
57:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): corporation's cash position will be enormously strengthened. In place of the present annual cash outgo of $250 two hundred fifty million dollars for wages on a $1935 nineteen thirty five basis,
57:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there will
57:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be annual cash inflow of two hundred fifty million dollars through exercise of the subscription warrants for five million shares of common stock. The company's large earnings and strong cash position will permit the payment of a liberal dividend, which in turn will result in the exercise of these option warrants immediately after issuance, which
57:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in turn will further improve the cash position.
58:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Which
58:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in turn will permit a higher dividend rate, and so on indefinitely. Fourth, inventories to be carried at one dollar. Serious losses have been taken during the depression due to the necessity of adjusting inventory value to market. Various enterprises, notably in the metal and cotton
58:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): textile fields, have successfully dealt with this problem by carrying all or part of their inventory. inventories at extremely low unit prices. The United States Steel Corporation has decided to adopt a still more progressive policy and to carry its entire inventory at one dollar. This will be affected by an appropriate write down at the end of each year,
58:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the amount of said write down to be charged to the contingency reserve here and after referred to.
58:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
58:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): benefits to be derived from this new method are very important. great. Not only will it obviate all possibility of inventory depreciation, but it will substantially enhance the annual earnings of the corporation. The inventory on hand at the beginning of the year, valued at one dollar, will be sold during the year at an excellent profit. It is estimated that our income will be increased
59:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by means of this method to the extent of at least one hundred fifty million dollars per annum, which, by a coincidence,
59:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will about equal the amount of the write down to be made each year against contingency reserve.
59:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
59:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): minority report of the special committee recommends that accounts receivable and cash also be written down to one dollar in the interest of consistency and to gain additional advantages similar to those just discussed. This proposal has been rejected for the time being because our auditors still require that any
59:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recoveries of receivables and cash so charged off be credited to surplus instead of to the year's income. It is expected, however, that this auditing rule,
59:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
59:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is rather reminiscent of the horse and buggy days,
59:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will soon be changed in line with modern tendencies. Should this occur, the minority report will be given further and further. favorable consideration. Fifth, replacement of preferred stock by non interest bearing bonds. Redeemable at fifty percent discount. During the recent depression, many
1:00:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): companies have been able to offset their operating losses
1:00:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by
1:00:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): including in income profits arising are rising from repurchases of their own bonds at a substantial discount from PAR, unfortunately. the credit of United States Steel Corporation has always stood so high that this lucrative source of revenue has not hitherto been available to it. The modernization scheme will remedy this condition. It is proposed that
1:00:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): each share of preferred stock be exchanged for three hundred dollars face value of non-interest bearing sinking fund notes, redeemable by lot at fifty 50% percent of face value in ten equal annual installments. This will require the issuance of one billion eighty million dollars of new notes,
1:00:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
1:00:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which one hundred eight million dollars will be retired each year at a cost to the corporation of only fifty-four million dollars, thus creating an annual profit of the same amount. Like the wage and salary plan described under the third point above, this arrangement will benefit both the corporation and its preferred stockholders.
1:01:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The latter are assured payment for their present shares at one hundred fifty percent of par value over an average period of five years. Since short-term securities yield practically no return and at present, the non interest bearing feature is of no real importance. The corporation will convert its present annual charge of twenty five million dollars for preferred dividends into an
1:01:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): annual bond retirement profit of fifty four million dollars.
1:01:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
1:01:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): aggregate yearly gain of seventy nine million dollars. Sixth, establishment of a contingency reserve of one billion dollars.
1:01:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:01:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): directors are confident that the improvements herein before described will assure the corporation of a satisfactory earning power under all conditions in the future. Under modern accounting methods, however, however, it is unnecessary to incur the slightest risk of loss through advertisement. adverse business developments of any sort, since all these may be provided for in advance by means of a
1:02:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contingency
1:02:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reserve.
1:02:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:02:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): special committee has recommended that the corporation create such a contingency reserve in the fairly substantial amount of one billion dollars. As previously set forth, the annual write down of inventory to one $1 dollar will be absorbed by this reserve. To prevent eventual exhaustion of the contingency reserve, it has been further decided that it be replenished
1:02:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): each year by transfer of an appropriate sum from capital surplus. Since the latter is expected to increase each year by not less than two hundred fifty million dollars through the exercise of the stock option warrants, it will readily make good any drains on the contingency reserve.
1:02:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:02:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): setting up this arrangement, the board of directors must confess regretfully.
1:02:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
1:02:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they have been unable to improve upon the devices already employed by important corporations
1:02:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
1:02:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): transferring large sums between capital, capital surplus, contingency reserves, and other balance sheet accounts. In fact, it must be admitted that our entries will be somewhat too simple and will lack that element of extreme mystification that characterizes the most advanced procedure. in this field. The board of
1:03:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): directors, however, have insisted upon clarity and simplicity in framing their modernization plan, even at the sacrifice of possible advantage to the corporation's earning power.
1:03:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:03:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): order to show the combined effect of the new proposals upon the corporation's earning power, a condensed income account for nineteen thirty five is submitted on two bases. On both gross receipts for the from all sources are the same seven hundred sixty five million dollars. As actually reported, salaries and wages took two hundred
1:03:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fifty one million dollars, other operating expenses, and taxes four hundred sixty one million, depreciation forty seven million, interest five million, and preferred dividends twenty $25 five million, leaving a loss for the common of twenty $24 four million dollars per hundred. or $2.76 per share. Under the changes
1:04:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): proposed herewith, salaries and wages disappear altogether, other operating expenses and taxes fall to $311 million.
1:04:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Depreciation becomes a credit of $50 million. A credit of $54 million appears for discount on bonds retired, and preferred dividends vanish.
1:04:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:04:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): balance for the common is thus transferred. transformed into a profit of five hundred fifty-three million dollars, or forty-nine dollars and eighty cents per share.
1:04:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:04:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accordance with a somewhat antiquated custom, there is appended herewith a condensed pro forma balance sheet of the United States Steel Corporation as of december thirty first, nineteen thirty-five, after giving effect to proposed changes in asset and liability accounts.
1:04:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
1:04:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the asset side, fixed assets net stand at minus one billion dollars, cash assets at $142 million, receivables at $56 million, inventory at $1, and miscellaneous assets at $27 million, for a total of minus $774,999,999.
1:05:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): On the liability side, common stock carries a stated value of minus three and a half billion dollars. Subsidiaries, bonds, and stocks one hundred thirteen million, the new sinking fund notes one billion eighty million, current liabilities sixty nine million, the contingency reserve one billion, other reserves seventy four million, and initial
1:05:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): surplus three hundred eighty nine million and one dollars
1:05:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
1:05:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the same total of minus seven $774,999,999, hundred seventy four million nine hundred ninety.
1:05:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the common stock is given a stated value differing from par value in accordance with the laws of the state of Virginia, where the company will be reincorporated.
1:05:53
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1:07:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
1:07:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is perhaps unnecessary to point out to our stockholders that modern accounting methods give rise to balance sheets differing somewhat in appearance from those of a less advanced period. In view of the very large earning power. that will result from these changes in the corporation's balance sheet, it is not expected that undue attention will be paid to the details of assets and
1:07:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): liabilities. In conclusion, the board desires to point out that the combined procedure whereby plant will be carried at a minus figure, our wage bill will be eliminated, and An inventory will stand on our books at virtually nothing, will give United States Steel Corporation an enormous competitive advantage in the industry, we shall be able
1:07:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to sell our products at exceedingly low prices and still show a handsome margin of profit. It is the considered view of the Board of Directors that under the modernization scheme, we shall be able to undersell all competitors to such a point that the antitrust laws will constitute the only barrier to one hundred percent domination of the industry.
1:08:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:08:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): making this statement, the board is not unmindful of the possibility that some of our competitors may seek to offset our new advantages by adopting similar accounting improvements.
1:08:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
1:08:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are confident, however, that United States Steel will be able to retain the loyalty of its customers, old and new, through the unique prestige that will accrue to it as the originator and pioneer in these new fields of service to the user of steel should necessarily necessity arise, moreover, we believe we shall be able to maintain our deserved
1:08:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): superiority by introducing still more advanced bookkeeping methods, which are even now under development in our experimental accounting laboratory. Appendix B Some thoughts on selling your business. What follows is an edited version of a letter Warren Buffett sent some years ago to a man who had indicated that he might want to sell his family business.
1:08:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is presented here because it is a message he would like to convey to other prospective sellers. Here are a few thoughts pursuant to our conversation of the other day. Most business owners spend the better part of their lifetimes building their businesses. By experience built upon endless repetition, they sharpen their skills in merchandising,
1:09:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchasing, personnel selection, and so on. It's a learning process. and mistakes made in one year often contribute to competence and success in succeeding years. In contrast, owner managers sell their business only once, frequently in an emotionally charged atmosphere with a multitude of pressures coming from different directions. Often, much of the pressure comes
1:09:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from brokers whose compensation is contingent upon consummation of a sale, regardless of its consequences for both buyer and seller. The fact that the decision is so important both financially and personally to the owner can make the process more, rather than less, prone to error. And, mistakes made in the once in a lifetime sale of a business are
1:09:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not reversible. Price is very important, but often is not the most critical aspect of the sale. You and your family have an extraordinary business.
1:10:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One of a kind in your field.
1:10:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:10:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): any buyer is going to recognize that. It's also a business that is going to get more valuable as the years go by,
1:10:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
1:10:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you decide not to sell now, you are very likely to realize more money later on. With that knowledge, you can deal from strength and take the time required to select the buyer you
1:10:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): want. If
1:10:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you should decide to sell, I think Berkshire Hathaway offers some advantages that most other buyers. do not. Practically all of these buyers will fall into one of two categories. The first is a company located elsewhere but operating in your business or in a business somewhat akin to yours. Such a buyer, no matter what promises are made,
1:10:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will usually have managers who feel they know how to run your business operations, and sooner or later will want to apply some hands hands-on on help.
1:10:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
1:10:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the acquiring company is much larger, it often will have squads of managers recruited over the years in part by promises that they will get to run future acquisitions. They will have their own way of doing things, and even though your business record undoubtedly will be far better than theirs, human nature will at some point cause them to believe that their methods of operating
1:11:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are superior. You and your family probably have friends. who have sold their businesses to larger companies, and I suspect that their experiences will confirm the tendency of parent companies to take over the running of their subsidiaries, particularly when the parent knows the industry or thinks it does.
1:11:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:11:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second is a financial maneuverer, invariably operating with large amounts of borrowed money who plans to resell either to the public or to another corporation as soon as the time. is favorable. Frequently, this buyer's major contribution will be to change accounting methods so that earnings can be presented in the most favorable light just prior to his bailing out. I'm enclosing a recent article
1:11:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that describes this sort of transaction, which is becoming much more frequent because of a rising stock market and the great supply of funds available for such transactions.
1:12:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
1:12:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the sole motive of the present owners is to cash their chips and put the business behind them,
1:12:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:12:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): plenty of sellers fall in this category, either type of buyer that I've just described is satisfactory, but if the seller's business represents the creative work of a lifetime and forms an integral part of their personality and sense of being, buyers of either type have serious flaws. Berkshire is another kind of buyer,
1:12:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
1:12:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rather unusual one. We buy to keep, but we don't have to and don't expect to have operating people in our parent organization. All of the businesses we own are run autonomously to an extraordinary degree. In most cases, the managers of important businesses we have owned for many years have not been to Omaha or even met each other. When we buy a business, the
1:12:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sellers go on running it just as they did before the sale. We adapt to their methods rather than vice versa. We have no one. Family, recently recruited MBAs, and so on,
1:12:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
1:12:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whom we have promised a chance to run businesses we have bought from owner managers. And we won't have.
1:13:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
1:13:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know of some of our past purchases. I'm enclosing a list of everyone from whom we have ever bought a business, and I invite you to check with them as to our performance versus our promises. You should be particularly interested in checking with the few whose business. businesses did not do well in order to ascertain how we behaved under difficult conditions. Any buyer will tell you that he needs you
1:13:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): personally,
1:13:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:13:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if he has any brains, he most certainly does need you, but a great many buyers, for the reasons mentioned above, don't match their subsequent actions to their earlier words. We will behave exactly as promised, both because we have so promised and because we need to in order to achieve the best business results.
1:13:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
1:13:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): need explains why we would want the operating members of your family to retain a twenty percent interest in the business. We need eighty percent to consolidate earnings for tax purposes, which is a step important to us. It is equally important to us that the family members who run the business remain as owners. Very simply, we would not want to it to buy unless we felt key members of presentation.
1:14:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): present management would stay on as our partners. Contracts cannot guarantee your continued interest. We would simply rely on your word.
1:14:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:14:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): areas I get involved in are capital allocation and selection and compensation of the top man. Other personnel decisions, operating strategies and the like are his bailiwick. Some Berkshire managers talk over some of their decisions with me, some don't. It depends upon their personality personalities and to an extent upon their own personal relationship with
1:14:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me. If
1:14:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you should decide to do business with Berkshire, we would pay in cash, your business would not be used as collateral for any loan by Berkshire, there would be no brokers involved. Furthermore, there would be no chance that a deal would be announced and that the buyer would then back off or start suggesting adjustments.
1:14:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): With apologies, of course, and with an explanation that banks, lawyers, boards of directors, and the rest were to be blamed. And finally, you would know exactly with whom you are dealing. You would not have one executive negotiate the deal only to have someone else in charge a few years later, or have the president regretfully tell you that his board of
1:15:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): directors required this change or that, or possibly required. sale of your business to finance some new interest of the parents? It's only fair to tell you that you would be no richer after the sale than now.
1:15:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:15:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ownership of your business already makes you wealthy and soundly invested. A sale would change the form of your wealth, but it wouldn't change its amount. If you sell, you will have exchanged a hundred percent owned valuable asset that you understand for another valuable asset. Cash.
1:15:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That will
1:15:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): probably be. invested in small pieces, stocks, of other businesses that you understand less well. There is often a sound reason to sell, but if the transaction is a fair one, the reason is not so that the seller can become wealthier.
1:15:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:15:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will not pester you. If you have any possible interest in selling, I would appreciate your call. I would be extraordinarily proud to have Berkshire, along with the key members of your family, own your company. I believe we would do very well financially, and I believe you would have just as much fun running the business over the next twenty years as you have had during the past
1:16:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty. Sincerely, Warney Buffett. To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated Last year we made a prediction. A reduction in Berkshire's net worth is almost certain in at least one of the next three years. During much of nineteen ninety's second period. half, we were on the road to quickly proving that forecast accurate, but some
1:16:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strengthening in stock prices late in the year enabled us to close nineteen ninety with net worth up by three hundred sixty two million dollars, or seven point three percent. Over the last twenty six years, that is, since present management took However, over, our per share book value has grown from nineteen dollars forty six cents to four thousand six hundred dollars.
1:16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hundred twelve dollars and six cents, or at a rate of twenty three point two percent compounded annually.
1:16:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
1:16:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): growth rate was lackluster in nineteen ninety because our four major common stock holdings in aggregate showed little change in market value. Last year I told you that though these companies capital cities slash ABC, Coca-Cola, Geico, and Washington. Post had fine businesses and superb
1:17:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): managements, widespread recognition of these attributes had pushed the stock prices of the four to lofty levels. The market prices of the two media companies have since fallen significantly, for good reasons relating to evolutionary industry developments that I will discuss We'll later.
1:17:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:17:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the price of Coca-Cola stock has increased significantly for what I also have. believe are good reasons. Overall, year in nineteen ninety prices of our permanent four, though far from enticing, were a bit more appealing than they were a year earlier. Berkshire's twenty six year record is meaningless in
1:17:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): forecasting future results, so also we hope, is the one year record. We continue to aim for a 15% average annual gain in an intrinsic value. But as we never tire of telling you, this goal becomes ever more difficult to reach as our equity base, now $5.3 billion, increases.
1:18:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
1:18:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we do attain that 15% average,
1:18:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
1:18:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shareholders should fare well. However, Berkshire's corporate gains will produce an identical gain for a specific shareholder
1:18:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): only
1:18:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if he eventually sells his shares. at the same relationship to intrinsic value that existed when he bought them. For example, if you buy at a 10% premium to intrinsic value, if intrinsic value subsequently grows at 15% a year, and if you then sell at a 10% premium, your own return will correspondingly be 15%
1:18:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compounded. The calculation assumes that no dividends are paid. If, however, you buy at a premium. and sell at a smaller premium, your results will be somewhat inferior to those achieved by the company. Ideally, the results of every Berkshire shareholder would closely mirror those of the company during his period of ownership.
1:19:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
1:19:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is why Charlie Munger, Berkshire's vice chairman, and my partner, and I hope for Berkshire to sell consistently at about intrinsic value,
1:19:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
1:19:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): prefer such beneficial. steadiness to the value ignoring volatility of the past two years. In nineteen eighty nine, intrinsic value grew less than did book value, which was up forty four percent, while the market price rose eighty five percent. In nineteen ninety, book value and intrinsic value increased by a small amount
1:19:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): while the market price fell twenty three percent. Berkshire's intrinsic value was continues to exceed book value by a substantial margin. We can't tell you the exact differential because intrinsic value is necessarily an estimate. Charlie and I might in fact differ by ten percent in our appraisals.
1:19:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We do know, however, that we own some exceptional businesses that are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. Much of the extra value that exists in our businesses has been created by the managers now running them. Charlie and I feel free to brag about this group because we had nothing to do with developing the skills they
1:20:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): possess. These superstars just came that way. Our job is merely to identify talented managers and provide an environment in which they can do their stuff. Having done it, they send their cash to headquarters and we face our only other tasks. task, the intelligent deployment of these funds.
1:20:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
1:20:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): own role in operations may best be illustrated by a small tale concerning my granddaughter, Emily, and her fourth birthday party last fall. Attending were other children, adoring relatives, and Beamer the Clown, a local entertainer who includes magic tricks in his act. Beginning these, Beamer asked Emily to help him by waving a magic.
1:20:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wand over the box of wonders.
1:20:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Loose handkerchiefs went in, and upon a magisterial wave by Emily, Emerge nodded.
1:21:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Professor, Emily was unable to contain herself. Her face aglow, she exulted. Gee, I'm really good at this.
1:21:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:21:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that sums up my contribution to the performance of Berkshire's business magicians,
1:21:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
1:21:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsy, and Ralph Sche. They deserve your applause. Sources of reported earnings.
1:21:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:21:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): table in the annual report shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of goodwill and other major purchase price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings
1:21:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles or GA app, which require purchase price adjustments to be made on a business by business basis.
1:22:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:22:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the
1:22:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): JAP
1:22:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): J
1:22:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): app total in our audited financial statements.
1:22:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Much additional information about these businesses is given later in the report, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GP basis. For information on West Coast businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger's letter. His letter also contains the clearest and most insightful discussion of
1:22:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the banking industry that I have seen.
1:22:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:22:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): summary, Berkshire's share of operating earnings after taxes and minority interests rose to about three hundred seventy one million dollars in nineteen ninety from about three hundred million dollars in nineteen eighty nine. The main driver was a sharp rise in insurance investment income, with C's, World Book and Kirby also advancing strongly. Working against
1:23:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those gains were a slightly larger underwriting loss, lower earnings at the Buffalo News,
1:23:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and the U.S.
1:23:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, and a steep rise in interest expense, including gains from sales of securities. Far smaller than 1989's, total earnings came to about $394 million against about $447 million the year before. four. We refer
1:23:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you also to the pages where we have rearranged Breakfast. Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you more in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value than consolidated figures would do. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings
1:23:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): statements for
1:23:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): first
1:23:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our insurance operations with their major investment positions itemized. Second our are manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses leaving aside certain non operating assets and purchase price accounting adjustments. Third are subsidiaries engaged in finance type operations, which are mutual savings in Scott Fetzer financial. And fourth, an all other category that includes the non
1:24:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operating assets, primarily marketable securities held by the companies in the second segment, all purchase price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire Parent Company. companies.
1:24:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
1:24:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you combine the earnings and net worths
1:24:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
1:24:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four category presentation does not fall within the purview purview of our auditors who in no way bless
1:24:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
1:24:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Look through earnings.
1:24:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:24:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): term earnings has a precise ring to it, and when an earnings figure is accompanied by an unqualified auditor's certificate, a naive reader might think it comparable in certitude to pie, calculated to dozens of decimal places. In reality, however, earnings can be as pliable as putty when a charlatan heads the company reporting them. Eventually, truth
1:25:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will surface, but in the meantime, a lot of money can change hands. Indeed, some important of American fortunes have been created by the monetization of accounting mirages. Funny business in accounting is not new. For connoisseurs of chicanery, I have attached as an appendix a previously unpublished satire on accounting practices written by Ben Graham in
1:25:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen thirty six. Alas, excesses similar to those he then lampooned have many times since found their way into the financial statements of major American corporations. and been duly certified by big name auditors. Clearly investors must always keep their guard up and use accounting numbers as a beginning, not an end, in their attempts to calculate true economic
1:25:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): earnings accruing to them. Berkshire's own reported earnings are misleading in a different but important way. We have huge investments in companies, our investies, whose earnings far exceed their dividends and in which we record our share of earnings only to the extent of the dividends we receive. The extreme case is Capital
1:26:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cities slash ABC Incorporated,
1:26:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
1:26:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seventeen percent share of the company's earnings mounted to more than eighty three million dollars last year, yet only about five hundred thirty thousand dollars, six $600,000 hundred thousand dollars of dividends it paid us, less some seventy $70,000 thousand dollars of capital. tax is counted in Berkshire's GAP earnings.
1:26:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:26:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): residual $82 million and more stayed with Capital Cities as retained earnings, which work for our benefit but go unrecorded on our books. Our perspective on such forgotten but not gone earnings is simple. The way they are accounted for is of no importance, but their ownership and subsequent utilization is all important. We care not whether the
1:26:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): auditors hear a tree fall in the forest. We do care who owns the tree and what's next done with
1:26:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
1:26:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When Coca-Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares, the company increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to be the most valuable franchise in the world. Coke also, of course, uses retained earnings in many other value-enhancing value enhancing ways. Instead of repurchasing, stock, Coca-Cola could pay those funds to
1:27:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): us in dividends, which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares. That would be a less efficient scenario, because of taxes we would pay on dividend income, we would not be able to increase our proportionate ownership to the degree that Coke can, acting for us. If this less efficient procedure were followed, however, Berkshire would report far
1:27:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): greater earnings.
1:27:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:27:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe the best way to think about our earnings is in terms of look through results, calculated as follows Take two hundred fifty million dollars, which is roughly our share of the nineteen ninety operating earnings retained by our investies, subtract thirty million dollars for the incremental taxes we would have owed had that two hundred fifty million been paid to us in dividends,
1:27:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and add the remainder two hundred twenty million dollars to our reported fundamental. operating earnings of three hundred seventy one million dollars. Thus our nineteen ninety look through earnings were about five hundred ninety million dollars.
1:28:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
1:28:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mentioned last year, we hope to have look through earnings grow about fifteen percent annually. In nineteen ninety we substantially exceeded that rate, but nineteen ninety ninety-one one we will fall far short of it.
1:28:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
1:28:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Gillette profession preferred has been called and we will convert it into common stock on April first. This will reduce reported earnings by about thirty-five million dollars annually and look through earnings by a much smaller but still significant amount. Additionally, our media earnings, both direct and look through, appear sure to decline. Whatever the
1:28:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): results, we will post you annually on how we are doing on a look look-through through basis. Non-insurance operations.
1:28:54
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1:29:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Take another look at the figures that aggregate the earnings and balance sheets of our non-insurance operations. After tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51%, a result that would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500. Two factors make this return even more remarkable. First,
1:30:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): leverage did not produce it. Almost all our major facilities are owned, not least, and such small debt as these operations have is basically. offset by cash they hold, in fact, if the measurement was return on assets.
1:30:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
1:30:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): calculation that eliminates the effect of debt upon returns,
1:30:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
1:30:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): group would rank in Fortune's top ten. Equally important, our return was not earned from industries such as cigarettes or network television stations possessing spectacular economics for all participating in them. Instead, it came from a group of businesses who had operating in such prosaic fields as furniture retailing, candy, vacuum cleaners, and
1:30:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even steel warehousing.
1:30:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:30:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): explanation is clear, our extraordinary returns flow from outstanding operating managers, not fortuitous industry economics. Let's look at the larger operations.
1:31:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
1:31:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was a poor year for retailing, particularly for big ticket items.
1:31:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:31:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): someone forgot to tell Ike Friedman at Borshimes, sales were up eighteen percent. That's both the same stores and all stores percentage, since Borshimes operates but one establishment. But oh what an establishment. We can't be sure about the fact because most fine jewelry retailers are privately owned, but
1:31:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we believe that this we jewelry store does more volume. than any other in the United States. Except for Tiffany's New York store. Borsheim's could not do nearly that well if our customers came only from the Omaha metropolitan area, whose population is about six hundred thousand. We have long had a huge percentage
1:31:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of Greater Omaha's jewelry business, so growth in that market is necessarily limited, but every year, business from non-Midwest non Midwest customers. grows dramatically. Many visit the store in person, a large number of others, however, buy through the mail in a manner you will find interesting. These customers request a jewelry selection of a
1:32:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): certain type and value, say emeralds in the ten thousand to twenty thousand dollar range,
1:32:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:32:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we then send them five to ten items, meeting their specifications and from which they can pick. Last year, we had mailed about fifteen hundred assortments of all kinds, carrying values ranging from under $1,000 to hundreds of thousands of dollars.
1:32:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:32:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): selections are sent all over the country, some to people no one at Borsheim's has ever met. They must always have been well recommended, however. While the number of mailings in nineteen 1990, ninety was a record, Ike has been sending merchandise far and wide for decades. Misanthrope Misanthropes is
1:32:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a very good.
1:32:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will be crushed to learn how well our honor system works.
1:32:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
1:32:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have yet to experience a loss from customer dishonesty.
1:32:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
1:32:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attract business nationwide because we have several advantages that competitors can't match. The most important item in the equation is our operating costs, which run about 18% of sales compared to forty percent or so at the typical competitor, included in the 18%. are occupancy and buying costs, which some public companies include in
1:33:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cost of goods sold, just as Walmart, with its fifteen percent operating costs, sells at prices that high cost competitors can't touch and thereby constantly increases its market share, so does Borsheim's. What works with diapers works with diamonds.
1:33:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
1:33:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): low prices create huge volume that in turn allows us to carry an extraordinarily broad inventory. of goods, running ten or more times the size of that at the typical fine jewelry store. Couple our breadth of selection and low prices with superb service, and you can understand how Ike and his family have built a national jewelry phenomenon from an
1:33:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Omaha location. And family it is. Ike's crew always includes son Alan and sons-in-law Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale. And when things are busy,
1:34:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's often,
1:34:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
1:34:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are joined by Ike's wife Roz and his daughters Janice and Susie.
1:34:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:34:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition, Fran Blumkin, wife of Louie, chairman of Nebraska Furniture Mart, and Ike's cousin, regularly pitches in. Finally, you'll find Ike's eighty-nine-year-old mother, Rebecca, in the store most afternoons, Wall Street Journal in hand. Given a family commitment like this, is it any surprise that Borsheim's runs? rings around competitors whose
1:34:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): managers are thinking about how soon five o'clock will arrive?
1:34:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): While
1:34:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fran Blumkin was helping the Friedman family set records at Borsheim's, her sons, Irv and Ron, along with husband Louis, were setting records at the Nebraska Furniture Mart. Sales at our one and only location were one hundred fifty nine million dollars, up four percent from nineteen eighty eighty-nine. nine. Though again, the fact can't be conclusively proved,
1:34:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we believe the furniture mart does close to double the volume of any other home furnishing store in the country.
1:34:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:34:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): furniture mart formula for success parallels that of Borsheim's. First, operating costs are rock bottom, fifteen percent in nineteen ninety against about forty percent for Levitz, Leavitz, the country's largest furniture retailer, and twenty-five twenty five percent for Circuit City stores, the largest. leading discount retailer of electronics and appliances. Second,
1:35:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the MART's low costs allow the business to price well below all competitors. Indeed, major chains, knowing what they will face, steer clear of Omaha. Third, the huge volume generated by our bargain allows us to carry the broadest selection of merchandise available anywhere. Some idea of the MART's merchandising power can be gleaned from a recent report of consumer behavior and demand.
1:35:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in Des Moines, which showed that the furniture Mart was number three in popularity among twenty furniture retailers serving that city. That may sound like no big deal until you consider that nineteen of those retailers are located in Des Moines, whereas our store is one hundred thirty miles away. This leaves customers driving a distance equal to that between Washington and Philadelphia in
1:35:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): order to shop with us, even though they have a multitude of alternatives next door. In effect, the furniture mart, like Borsheim's, has dramatically expanded the territory it serves. Not by the traditional method of opening new stores, but rather by creating an irresistible magnet that employs price and selection to pull in the crowds.
1:36:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Last year, at the Mart, there occurred an historic event. I experienced a counter counter-revelation. revelation. Regular readers of this report know that I have long scorned the boasts of corporate executives about Synergy, deriding such claims as the last refuge of scoundrels defending foolish acquisitions. But now I know better.
1:36:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:36:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire's first synergistic explosion, the furniture mart put a CS candy cart in the store late last year and sold more candy than that moved by some of the full-fledged stores CZ operates in California. This success contradicts all tenets of retailing.
1:36:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): With the
1:36:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Blumkins though, the impossible is routine.
1:36:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
1:36:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): C's, physical volume set a record in nineteen ninety, but only barely and only because of good sales early in the year. After the invasion of Kuwait, mall traffic in the West fell.
1:37:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Though our dollar sales were up because of a 5% price increase. That increase in better control of expenses, improved profit margins, against the backdrop of a weak retailing environment, Chuck Huggins delivered outstanding results, as he has in each of the 19 years we have owned CES, Chuck's imprint on the business,
1:37:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
1:37:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): virtual fanaticism about quality and service, is visible at all of our 225 two hundred twenty five stores. One happening in 1990 nineteen ninety illustrates the close bond between CES Cs and its customers.
1:37:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): After fifteen years of operation our store in Albuquerque was endangered, the landlord would not renew our lease, wanting us instead to move to an inferior location in the mall, and even so to pay a much higher rent, these changes would have wiped out the store's profit. After extended negotiations got us nowhere, we set a date for closing the store. On
1:37:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): her own, the store's manager, Anne Filkins, the then took action, urging customers to protest the closing. Some two hundred sixty three responded by sending letters and making phone calls to C's headquarters in San Francisco, in some cases threatening to boycott them all. An alert reporter at the Albuquerque paper picked up the story. Supplied
1:38:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with this evidence of a consumer uprising, our landlord offered us a satisfactory deal.
1:38:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
1:38:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): too proved susceptible to a counter. revelation. Chuck subsequently wrote personal letters of thanks to every loyalist and sent each a gift certificate.
1:38:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
1:38:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): repeated his thanks in a newspaper ad that listed the names of all two hundred sixty three,
1:38:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
1:38:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sequel, Christmas sales in Albuquerque were up substantially. Charlie and I were surprised at developments this past year in the media industry, including newspapers such as our Buffalo News.
1:38:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the business showed far more vulnerability to the early stages of a recession than has been the case in the past. The question is whether this erosion is just part of an aberrational cycle,
1:39:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
1:39:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be fully made up in the next upturn,
1:39:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
1:39:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whether the business has slipped in a way that permanently reduces intrinsic business values. Since I didn't predict what has happened, you may question the value of
1:39:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the business.
1:39:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my prediction about what will happen. Nevertheless, I'll proffer a judgment. While many media businesses will remain economic marvels in comparison with American industry generally, they will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry or lenders, thought would be the case only a few years ago. The reason media businesses have
1:39:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): been so outstanding in the past was not physical growth, but rather the unusual pricing power that most participants wielded. Now, however, advertising dollars are growing slowly. In addition, retailers that do little or no media advertising, though they sometimes use the postal service, have gradually taken market share in certain
1:39:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): merchandise categories. Most important of all, the number of both print and electronic advertising channels has substantially increased. As a consequence, advertising dollars are more widely dispersed and the pricing power of ad vendors has diminished. These circumstances materially reduce the intrinsic value of
1:40:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our major media investments and also the value of our operating unit, Buffalo News, though all remain Main fine businesses. Notwithstanding the problems, Stanlipsy's Stan Lipsey's management of the news continues to be. superb. During nineteen ninety, our earnings held up much better than those of most metropolitan papers, falling only five percent. In the last
1:40:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few months of the year, however, the rate of decrease was far greater.
1:40:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:40:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can safely make two promises about the news in nineteen ninety one.
1:40:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): First,
1:40:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Stan will again rank at the top among newspaper publishers, and second, earnings will fall substantially. Despite a slowdown, in the demand for newsprint, the price per ton will average significantly more in 1991, and the paper's labor costs will also be considerably higher. Since revenues may meanwhile be down, we face a real
1:41:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): squeeze.
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