Jason Cohen on startup probability, customer interviews, and AI's impact on work and society
Summary
Jason Cohen, founder of WP Engine and Smart Bear, discusses the low probability of startup success using a Drake Equation framework, emphasizing the need to identify and mitigate high-risk variables early. He details his structured approach to customer interviews, arguing that listening to user behavior rather than stated intent is critical for product pivots and pricing strategies. Cohen also challenges traditional views on distribution moats and customer churn, asserting that cancellations stem from unmet expectations rather than price. Finally, he shares insights on angel investing, the importance of funnel top-quality, and expresses concerns about AI's energy drain and societal impact on human connection.
Key takeaways
- 1 I think of a startup like a Drake equation, where a ton of stuff has to go right, or at least right enough, or else it dies. And that explains why startups usually don't work. Because it's not enough to say, like, I have a good product. Yes, but also you have to get attention for it. And there has to be enough people who want it. And you have to be able to get to them. And that has to be not too expensive so that it's just unprofitable to get to them. And they have to have a budget. And they have to want to buy today. They if they're locked into a three-year contract, it still doesn't matter. And they have to want to buy from you and not a competitor, so you need some way to be differentiated. And you have to be able to build the thing in the first place. And it's just go down the line of like all these things have to be true. We're at least true enough, or not fatal.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:00
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 0:57
Startup Probability and the Drake Equation
Speaker 0 compares startup success to the Drake Equation, arguing that numerous independent variables must align for a company to survive. These variables include product-market fit, acquisition cost, customer budget, and differentiation, with the cumulative probability of success being very low.
- 0:57 – 2:59
Jason Cohen's Background and WP Engine Origins
Speaker 1 introduces Jason Cohen, founder of Smart Bear and WP Engine. Speaker 0 explains that WP Engine was born from his personal blog crashing due to traffic, leading to 50 customer interviews that validated a need for high-performance, secure WordPress hosting at a premium price point.
- 2:59 – 5:53
Smart Bear and Product Pivoting
Speaker 0 recounts founding Smart Bear in 2002 with a flawed idea for code analytics. He pivoted the company to a code review tool after observing customers 'abusing' the original product for that purpose, illustrating the importance of listening to actual user behavior versus stated intent.
- 5:53 – 14:05
WP Engine Pricing and Packaging Evolution
Speaker 1 highlights that four pricing changes drove WP Engine from $1M to $5M in revenue. Speaker 0 details how customer interviews revealed that agencies wanted to bundle small sites under a single higher-tier plan, leading to a packaging change that increased revenue without lowering the base price.
- 14:05 – 21:04
Structured Customer Interviews and Hypothesis Testing
Speaker 0 outlines a structured interview process involving defining goals, writing down hypotheses, and asking open-ended questions to avoid leading the witness. He uses the example of Discord adopting customer language ('server' vs 'chat room') and his own failed hypothesis about security concerns driving WP Engine sales.
- 21:04 – 25:01
De-risking via the Drake Equation Framework
Speaker 0 revisits the Drake Equation analogy, suggesting founders should identify their weakest links (highest risk variables) and tackle them first. He argues that engineers often avoid high-risk areas like marketing to focus on comfortable tasks like feature building, which delays learning whether the business model works.
- 25:01 – 26:13
Strategy and Product-Led Growth
Jason Cohen discusses how founders should select a go-to-market strategy that leverages their existing strengths rather than trying to fix weaknesses. He argues that if a founder dislikes sales, they should adopt a product-led growth model, whereas a sales-focused co-founder suggests a different approach.
- 26:13 – 27:08
Customer Interviews and Feedback Frequency
Cohen advises that founders should speak with customers multiple times a week to understand market dynamics and refine their roadmap. He views customer interviews as a primary tool for validating goals and identifying competitive gaps.
- 27:08 – 30:41
The Value of Honesty and Negative Reviews
Cohen cites data from Bizarre Voice showing that displaying negative reviews alongside positive ones increases sales and decreases returns. He attributes this to transparency: customers are more likely to buy when they understand a product's trade-offs and know what to expect.
- 30:41 – 36:43
Distribution as a Competitive Moat
Cohen challenges the notion that distribution is a new moat, arguing it has always been harder to acquire customers than to build features. He distinguishes between platform-dependent channels like SEO, which carry platform risk, and brand or personal channels, which are more durable.
- 36:43 – 44:04
The Elephant Curve and Growth Ceilings
Cohen introduces the 'elephant curve' to describe how marketing growth typically follows a parabola rather than an exponential curve. He argues that while marketing growth plateaus, customer cancellations compound exponentially, creating a 'growth ceiling' that limits expansion.
- 44:04 – 45:58
Reasons for Customer Cancellation
Cohen asserts that price is rarely the actual reason customers cancel after they have already purchased. He argues that cancellations stem from unmet expectations or broken promises, meaning that lowering prices will not retain these customers.
- 45:58 – 48:05
Angel Investing and Deal Flow
Cohen states that deal flow is the most critical factor in angel investing success. He shares that he has invested in over 60 startups and achieved a 4x return, which he considers successful given his lack of focus on maximizing returns compared to the S&P 500's performance.
- 48:05 – 56:01
Investment Strategy and Funnel Top-Importance
Speaker_0 explains preferring to invest in funds like Tiny Seed to avoid paperwork and focus on mentoring. He argues that the top of any funnel (hiring, marketing) is the most critical lever, as poor input quality renders downstream optimization ineffective.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| AlphabetGOOGL | equity | neutral | And and my answer is some is and some isn't. Uh five years ago people would tell you that SEO is a moat because once you're locked in on Google, you can stay ahead and forever and ever you'll get that. And Google has now proven it's not a moat. |
| AppleAAPL | equity | neutral | But brand is it is more moaty. Apple's Apple. They come up with a new i i i iPad mini. It's way too expensive and they're gonna sell out. |
| Meta PlatformsMETA | equity | neutral | And if you look at their actual growth of things like users or revenue, it's never exponential. Now, the reason I said Facebook and Slack is because in 2022, Facebook was the fastest growing consumer tech |
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | But if you think about 4X over say 12 or 15 years and the S P 500 is up 8X over that same period, I could have just bought an ETF. |
| AmazonAMZN | equity | neutral | But hey, in company companies you're picking companies, right? If we're gonna we're gonna do like with like if if you had invested in Google and Amazon and stuff, you're definitely doing better. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
WP Engine grew from $1 million to $5 million in revenue in a single year due to four changes in pricing and packaging.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·5:53
How to verify: Verify via WP Engine's historical press releases, blog posts by Jason Cohen, or financial reports if publicly disclosed; cross-reference with the book 'Hidden Multipliers'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
WP Engine has 200,000 customers, employs 1,200 people, and generates hundreds of millions in revenue.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:46
How to verify: Check WP Engine's official 'About' page, recent press releases, or third-party business databases like Crunchbase or PitchBook. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Jason Cohen founded Smart Bear in 2002 and WP Engine 16 years ago (relative to the 2026 transcript date).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:26
How to verify: Verify via Smart Bear's historical records or Jason Cohen's LinkedIn/profile; WP Engine's founding date is publicly documented as 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Discord changed its messaging from 'chat room' to 'server' based on customer language.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·15:25
How to verify: Verify via Discord's early marketing materials, blog posts, or interviews with Discord founders discussing their growth strategy. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
80% of WP Engine's early customers did not prioritize security as a primary buying factor.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·18:03
How to verify: Verify via Jason Cohen's blog posts detailing customer interview findings or the book 'Hidden Multipliers'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Smart Bear was founded in 2002.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:06
How to verify: Verify via Smart Bear's historical records or Jason Cohen's professional biography. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
WP Engine's initial pricing strategy was to be the most expensive and best option.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:23
How to verify: Verify via Jason Cohen's blog posts or early WP Engine marketing materials. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Erica Douglas, an entrepreneur who sold a hosting company, advised Jason Cohen that his prices were too low.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:43
How to verify: Verify via Jason Cohen's blog posts or the book 'Hidden Multipliers'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Smart Bear's original product idea was a tool for code analytics/reporting.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:19
How to verify: Verify via Jason Cohen's blog posts or the book 'Hidden Multipliers'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
WP Engine conducted 50 customer interviews before launching.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:06
How to verify: Verify via Jason Cohen's blog posts or the book 'Hidden Multipliers'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0 invests in funds like Tiny Seed rather than making direct investments to avoid paperwork and taxes.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·48:05
How to verify: Check Tiny Seed's website or SEC filings for their fund structure and investor relations page; verify Speaker_0's investment via public announcements or fund LP lists. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceGarbage traffic breaks A/B testing systems because tests measure retention of bad users rather than conversion of good users.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·49:48
How to verify: Review standard digital marketing literature on A/B testing validity and traffic quality; consult Google Analytics documentation on segment quality. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
AI can enable individuals to complete a month's worth of work in a single day.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·51:11
How to verify: Analyze case studies or productivity reports from AI tool providers (e.g., GitHub Copilot, Jasper) or user testimonials regarding output velocity. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Historical aristocracy in Europe, when freed from work, did not primarily produce art but engaged in drinking, drugs, and patronizing starving artists.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·53:02
How to verify: Consult historical records or academic papers on European aristocracy leisure activities and patronage systems (e.g., JSTOR, Britannica). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Nomadic hunter-gatherers work only two or three hours a day, spending the rest on grooming, hanging out, and art.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·53:42
How to verify: Review anthropological studies on hunter-gatherer societies (e.g., Marshall Sahlins' 'Stone Age Economics' or National Geographic reports). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_0's website is asmartbear.com.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·55:02
How to verify: Visit asmartbear.com and verify ownership/content associated with Jason Cohen. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Smart Bear Live is a podcast on YouTube featuring unscripted working sessions.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·55:33
How to verify: Search YouTube for 'Smart Bear Live' and verify the format and host. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Jason Cohen's role as founder of WP Engine and Smart Bear via company press releases or SEC filings if public.
- Check the 'elephant curve' concept in Cohen's writings on asmartbear.com for the specific data on marketing growth vs. cancellation rates.
- Review Bizarre Voice's data on negative reviews to verify the claim that transparency increases sales and decreases returns.
- Research the performance of Tiny Seed fund versus direct angel investments to assess Cohen's claim of 4x returns.
- Analyze historical anthropological studies on leisure time to verify the claim that freed populations do not primarily produce art.
- Examine AI energy consumption reports to evaluate the claim that AI tools are energy-draining and cause fatigue.
- Look for counter-arguments to the 'distribution is not a new moat' claim by reviewing recent SaaS growth case studies.
- Check Cohen's podcast 'Smart Bear Live' on YouTube for unscripted working sessions to verify his mentoring approach.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think of a startup like a Drake equation, where a ton of stuff has to go right, or at least right enough, or else it dies. And that explains why startups usually don't work. Because it's not enough to say, like, I have a good product. Yes, but also you have to get attention for it. And there has to be enough people who want it. And you have to be able to get to them. And that has to be not too expensive so that it's just unprofitable to get to them. And they have to have a budget. And they have to want to buy today. They if they're locked into a three-year contract, it still doesn't matter. And they have to want to buy from you and not a competitor, so you need some way to be differentiated. And you have to be able to build the thing in the first place. And it's just go down the line of like all these things have to be true. We're at least true enough, or not fatal.
0:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hey everyone, welcome back to the Ignite podcast. Today we are delighted to have Jason Cohen on the mic. He has founded four companies over twenty-five years, including two unicorns, smart bear and WP Engine, and has invested in sixty 60 more startups. He's written about building companies at a smart bear for near nearly two decades and is his new book, Hidden Multipliers, shows founders how small, repeatable changes can grow a company with the budget and team it already has. Jason, uh, thanks for coming on.
1:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks for having me.
1:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
1:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'd love to start with your origin story. What's your background?
1:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've always written code like a lot of people have that same story. I mean, I've I'm old, so I've done lots of things. You don't want to hear the whole story, it's not interesting. I guess with WP Engine, which is my latest company, which is now sixteen 16 years old. See, I'm old. What happened is I had this popular blog about startups, as you mentioned. And uh every time I get on hacker news, it would crash. So I'd call up other bloggers and say, hey, how how do you keep WordPress running? Because WordPress is is uh the most popular software for making websites in general and blogs in particular. And people would say, I don't know, but if you find that tell me because I need it. Of course just that is not a validation of a business but it is a spark that you might want to fan and see if there's something there. So I did 50 customer interviews, 5-0, and uh that took months. But I was able to determine that if I did a few things, I could charge $50 a month for hosting, where currently they would spend, let's say, two to five dollars at a shared hosting company. And those things were things like making the site fast, making it scale under traffic. So stay fast even if you get a lot of traffic. Security, still an issue today, of course, across the entire internet, especially with AI. And uh service, actually having human beings that know what they're doing and take the time to answer your calls. And uh of course, all that does cost money, so it makes sense that it would be expensive. So for people that care about those things, it would be worthwhile to pay for it. And that was the idea of WP Engine. It's still the fundamental reason why people sign up today, although we do a ton of other stuff now, because again, 16 years later, of course we've
2:46done other things. Also, there's twelve 1,200 hundred people there, many hundreds of millions in revenue, two hundred 200,000 customers. We have we run some of the most popular development tools for the developers that make websites. So now it's a lot. But uh at the beginning it was just that.
2:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so you initially walk me through how a kid from Austin uh ends up writing a book on code reviews and and you know, what is that? Yeah,
3:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so now we're rewinding some more. So I wrote that book in 2005. I started that company, Smart Bear, in 2002, and that's how I have my online name of Smart Bear Smart Bear is because of that. company. And I stumbled into peer code review because
3:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
3:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I originally did at Smart Bear was made a my idea was a tool. My idea was that version control systems are write many, read never. Meaning there's all this information about how we're coding and who did what and all this and when. And we don't really use that for anything. There's no reporting. So I had ideas like hey, so if there's code that's been changed over and over again today. and you make another change, that's just code that's under development. But if you haven't touched this code in five years and you're making a change, and especially if other things are connected to it, isn't that scary? Don't you want to know that? So that was the original idea. It wasn't a very good idea, by the way. It sounds okay. No one cares. So yeah, some people bought it, but not a lot. It wasn't doing that much. But then what started happening is that people would abuse the product to do code reviews. meaning engineers reviewing each other's work just like authors and editors do, and for the same reasons to find issues, to help new people get on on board with the platform, or help junior developers get better, all the usual reasons why you one might review code. And they were abusing my tool. They were like making reports out of my tool and emailing
4:19it, and people would write on it and send it back. So I'd get these feature requests like, Can I write on the HTML that you make? I'm thinking, what what are you talking about? Right. Again, this is also 2002. So this is uh, you know, we don't have like fancy websites or software like that. It's old school stuff, right? This was in software you installed. This was not SaaS. This is pre-SAS, right? So they were abusing it to do code review, and that's another interesting insight in general. When customers are abusing your product to do something, one of two things might be happening. One is those are not your right customers, those are not your ideal customers. Who knows why they bought your product, but they're they're doing something weird with it. And if that's a different direction than your strategy, then you need to ignore them and they'll get mad and cancel. But that's because it was never right for them. And you have to have the fortitude to realize, well, it's not right for you. But that means you have to know what your strategy is and who you're selling to so that you would realize this is a distraction. But the alternative is you have found a new vein. And in my case, the original product was okay, but not really that interesting. And all the excitement was coming from many people, not one, who were trying to effectively do code review. So I thought, okay, maybe I should make a code review product using the same code base. So I did. And that was correct. That was something people wanted. So then the company did well. And uh of course nowadays everyone uses GitHub to do code review. Like again, but we're talking about twenty, twenty five years later. So to be fair, it was a good idea then. It's okay if twenty five years later it's not as relevant. Yeah,
5:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's incredible to think that. just twenty twenty five years ago SaaS was like this new shiny object.
5:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No
5:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): SaaS, no iPhone, no social media um how
5:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fast. I
5:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean I wonder what will happen in twenty years. It's hard to imagine, but magazine has. I
5:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean,
5:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, I did.
5:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let's talk about the multiplier idea. So the book opens with the story that four changes to pricing and pack packaging took WP engine from one to five million in a single year. Well Wow, I walk us through that.
6:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
6:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's a whole chapter talking about that, but I'm trying to think. I've written so many articles online that you can get some of the stuff for free. Cause I don't I'm I don't want this to turn into, oh, there's this great thing, but you have to buy the book. I don't want it to turn into that. So like I said, people would spend ten times as much. Okay. So my thought was our pricing strategy is we're the most expensive and the best. So if your website's very important to you, then that's a good trade. And that's what we did. And to be fair, we're still probably that now. But about two years in, I got a visit from Erica Douglas, who herself is an entrepreneur and had built a hosting company and sold it. And she was moving to Austin, where I am. And she said, Your prices are too low, and you should hire me to figure out what your pricing should be. And I thought, I don't know if they're too low, but that Now literally, I don't know. And Erica's, she seems like she knows what she's doing. And so we did. And we did think things like we interviewed a customers about many things, pricing among them, but just what what they're dealing with. And with the result of those interviews, we learned some things, which we then use to change a few in retrospects, it looks simple because many times it it takes a lot of work to find a few simple things to do that are right. That's that's what good strategy and good decisions often look like. So just because the answer was simple, that's actually a good thing. That means you distilled all kinds of complexity into something executive. executable. So that's that's a that's a positive thing. And we figured out there were these things. And so, okay, in the in the book, I go through like here's exactly how we decided how to
7:22interview customers. Like, how do you know what to ask? And then what do we do with that information? So I go into detail, but the information about how did I interview? That is a blog post. So you can go look that up. It's called iterative development. And look, you can just have that. And then uh for the items, we found things like this. People would say things like Listen, I don't mind spending $99 a month for my main site. That's fine. But I have this one site that for my mom, and I have this other one for my brother's wedding, and it gets like two hits, you know. And are you really making me get an account somewhere else? Or can you just let me run those little nothing things in my $99 account? At the time, we and all our competitors, it had that our pricing was you buy a site for a certain amount of money. You have two sites, you buy two C seats at whatever price. But what I learned is people who buy a higher plan, they have little pissant sites they want to bring on. And can they just have it? And so we created stuff like okay, the the middle plan for $100, you could actually have up to 10 sites, and it's agg will have aggregate usage like page views or whatever, it doesn't matter. And that's what the pricing will be limited to. So that eventually effectively we could say yes to that. Now, again, you have to be careful when people ask. for stuff. Are they dragging you away from your strategy, your vision, your this, or that? The way we knew that those customers were in fact perfect, great customers for us, and therefore we should listen to them is think about what this is. It's a person who says, I have a medium or large site. So already that's kind of interesting. And I build other
8:42sites for other people too. So that sounds like someone who's really invested, really engaged, wanting to like put a lot of stuff on you. That sounds better and better. That sounds like a really solid forever customer. Furthermore, they were often freelancers or agencies where they built actually lots of sites for lots of clients. Okay, wait a minute. So if I if they love us for whatever reason that they love us, maybe it's our personality, or if they love us, not only could we get all their clients, but every client they add. And so this is an account that could grow and grow on this one relationship. So it's not about this one site for not. $99 or this mother's website. If we just make this a great relationship, could we be in business together for 10 years while you just put more and more of your clients on us and you just grow? Well, that is a fantastic, awesome customer. So once you put that together, you realize, yes, of course, that's what we should do. So that's the decision process that went to, oh yeah. Because of course, we had lots of requests for other things that were distracting us. I'll give you an example. A lot of times enterprises and we do sell. to large enterprises. At the time, only a little bit. Later, we put together a whole motion for tens of millions of dollars. We invested in all of it. So we didn't lose our focus. We invested in an adjacent expansion. It's not the same thing. And uh but at the beginning, it was like they would sign up sometimes and we'd say, okay, that's great. But they would ask for weird stuff like, can we have our own custom infrastructure? Because we need to do this and we need to bora bore a or bore a VPN hole into this other thing because reasons.
10:02And we thought about it at first because they could give us a lot of money. A lot of money is good. That's a good reason to do it. But it was so hard to manage it, maintain it, also with things like security. If we're supposed to, if we're promising to have good security, but you can literally do anything you want on the infrastructure and and and break the VPN, can we really promise security? Like can we, in fact, deliver on the product? And does it and can it scale even with a lot of money, even if it's a high a high dollar thing? And so we ended up saying no, we actually that would be against our ability to scale who we are, what the the the um the things we're promising to do. It would be too hard to fulfill our own promises if we did that. And so we we would say no to those things. Now you could argue whether we're right or wrong, but the point is it was a good decision process to say this is why, because then it's not us and it's not our our our prom prompt our product promise. We can't fulfill it as opposed to this other thing where, oh man, this is a growing customer for a long time. And just having some more sites on the same plane doesn't violate any product ideas that we have or any kind of strategy or vision about the product. That's a pricing and packaging thing only. Okay, that is
11:02good. So that's how we sifted these kind of things that we heard into so but should we do it? Now this all presumes you have a strategy and you know who your target customer is. Of course, I have other chapters in the book and the things that are just online. that you don't have to look at the book to do that. Oh, I should also add I'm since Sam just on its monologue here. There's also AI skills that go with the book. So that's at skills.hiddenmultipliers.com. Those are also not only free and open, you don't even have to put in an email address or anything. They're just there. Okay. And there's a GitHub there too. Like you just have it. And it includes things like the skills for how do I develop these customer interview questions? How do I find my perfect customer? Of course, I write about in the book. Obviously, that's the idea, but they're all there. So you could just do it and see if you like it. Like hit it.
11:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
11:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): love that. Yeah. Yeah.
11:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
11:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's a good idea for a book. Just to stand up a GPT thing. Well,
11:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what's so great is I'm not,
11:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't have to make any money on the book. I'm not a consultant. I don't sell courses. I don't, there's no products coming. I'm this is for the love of the game. So I don't mind giving away all the stuff. I just want people to have the information and a and a dead and dead trees cost money. So that's the only reason why the book costs money, right? So
12:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it sounds like there were two what you call hidden multipliers there in that that story. One was the pricing, right? Your price was too low. Too
12:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): high. Because in
12:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): order to have these five sites that are all little, they'd have to pay like thirty or fifty bucks per site. Right. And they're
12:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like,
12:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No, no, no, I'm already giving you a hundred bucks and I'm happy. Let me just fold it under there. No, our pricing was too high. But in specific ways, the answer. wasn't just reduce all the price on the website, right? That that's not what they were saying. It was how is it that we can achieve we can keep our higher price for a lot of service, but in what other ways can we work with people? Right.
12:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So so you uncovered a hidden multiplier that what you might call price segmentation bundling seg segmentation, right? So you were able to
12:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind of say,
12:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): oh, these agencies that run 10 sites and they shouldn't pay $300 a month. That's too much. But $100 a month allows us to get a lot more revenue than we would have otherwise had. And you only found that out by just talking to your customers.
12:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): With a structured interview. That's the key. If you just talk, who knows? It may be
13:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
13:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): random you'll find some stuff, but that's not very good use of your time. Yeah or
13:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): your
13:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): customers' time for that matter. So you it needs to be a structured, thoughtful way that you're going gonna to get the information that you need without, let's say, leading the witness into saying what you hope they say. So that's that is what this this uh this particular process I use and I've used many times. That's that's the idea behind it. I wouldn't just say it's it's lower price though. It's also the price structure. So in other words, remember what they said? The $99 site, I'm fine with that. So just saying you should pay less isn't isn't what they were even asking for and not what we should do. It was a structure around, but in what configuration do they want to pay more or not? So, like when they think about their big sites, they're fine paying more for every site. They weren't even asking for a deal. It was another kind of thing that they wanted to structure in there to so in this case it's a pricing structure. When is it that I want to spend more with you? And I'm fine with that. I think it's fair. And when do I think it's not? Or and not necessarily it's not fair, but like this would be great if that's a structural question, not just like what is the price. on the on the on the on the website.
14:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So what are some of those interview process processes and techniques that you use or that you describe in the book?
14:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And again, here there's an article that you can read and the skills, so you don't have to get the book for this. So briefly it goes I'll just here's the brief outline. You start with what are the goals of the interview? So if it's a brand new company, for example, you might have goals like what are the titles, like the job titles of the people that would buy this? How do their budgets work? What makes them say, you know what? I need to move my WordPress site because I'm not happy. Because that's not usually what people say. Usually they don't think about it at all. So like what caused them to do that? So I call that an inciting event. What made them say, today's the day I'm gonna buy something? Because you need to find people in that location. So you need to understand that because that's where your like ads are gonna going to target and you know, right? Like you're gonna need to know that. Another one I really like is what language do my customers use to talk about the concepts? So, in other words, a a great example. Uh I actually don't give this example in the book, but a great example is uh Discord, which of course is chat uh chat rooms, right? When they were starting, they were trying to sell to people who used gaming chat rooms, like they would be playing a game and it was a chat room for that. And so they would say things like, but uh hey, get Discord, you can have a free gaming chat room. or whatever language they used, because that's what it is. And and people weren't getting it, not even for free. What they figured out when they talked to the customers is the way the customers thought is we need a Minecraft server.
15:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
15:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they were thinking we got to host Minecraft and then chat there. So their language is I need a Minecraft server. And so when so Discord changed their text to be get a server. Now you and I know it's a chat room. What do you mean server? It's not even really a server. It's not literally, it's not a server. it's a chat room. And there isn't a physical, right? But when they change it to get a server, people got it all the time, right? So that's what I mean by what language do my customers use? Not what I would call it. What do they say? Because again, that's the language I need in my ads, my homepage, my pricing, that may be keywords, not what I think it is, but my customers think it is. I don't even care if they're right or wrong technically. That's that's irrelevant, right? But what is that? Okay. So there's more, but you get the idea. These goals, what am I trying to learn? So there's some interesting things, right? Next, what you do is you say, what are my hypotheses about the answer? I think they'll call that a chat room. Well, that would have been wrong, but that's that's a good hypothesis, right? Or in my case, uh an example I do give is uh I think people are worried about security online, like that they would so then they might want to pay to uh to have a more secure website. Not everyone, but like I think a lot of people who would would care. That's the hypothesis. Okay. So you write all these hypotheses down, which is weird because the whole point of the interview is to find out the answer. So what are you doing guessing? Who cares what you think? Who cares what your guesses are? And the answer is there's all these studies that show that only if you write down your predictions first will you learn and update your knowledge. Otherwise,
16:45you just retcon yourself. Oh, I thought that all along. No, you did it, and now you're not learning, right? So there's a lot of science behind that, but the point is you write it down and then you find out. Now you have to ask questions. You can now line up questions with hypotheses. It could be one-to-one, it usually is, but it doesn't have to be. Come on, it's not that formal. You do what you want, but okay. Now the key here is not to lead the witness. So like I think security is important. So here would be a bad question for that hypothesis. Hey, the internet's a scary place, right? Did you see like every day there's another news story about AI hacking, something important? Like it's bad out there, right? Do you wanna like have a secure site? Okay. So of course everyone would say yes to that, and you haven't learned a damn thing because that's not what's in their mind necessarily when they come to your homepage, right? So a a better question that would not lead the witness is something like, How do you think about website security, if at all? Or what do you do today about website security, if anything? How did you come to think that? Like what was your thought process? of what you needed to do or not need to do, or did you not think about it? See, I'm not suggesting the answer. I'm just trying to find out how they think about it.
17:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right?
17:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I did that, and guess what? I was wrong about the security. They don't think that. Here's what the here's what everybody said. I say everybody. Here's what 80% said. I'm just a little website. No one's gonna hack me. And they're totally wrong. Right now, what they are correct about is a nation state won't try to hack your website because it's you're your right, they don't care about you. But that's not what
18:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you're doing.
18:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): almost all hacking is. It's just people running scripts against every domain that in existence, just trying to find a machine they can take a hold of so that they can do whatever they really want it to do. Bounce through there to hide their IP address or send spam email or send fraudulent clicks on a website. There's other things they want to do. They just want to control your site. They just want to serve it to that they can hack. They don't know who you are, but nobody knows but almost no one knows that. You have to be a technical insider person to know. that. So I was totally wrong. My hypothesis was wrong. I am right about how the world works, but I'm totally wrong if that's what customers think. Because I asked open-ended questions, I was able to discover that, right? So what you generally find, well, I don't want to put really numbers on it, but let's just say even a third of your hypotheses might be right. But even so you'll get more detail that like makes them even more precise. So great. And then a third of them will be wrong just like me and you'll find out what is right. And of course, with open ended questions like that, hey, how do you think about security? Right? It's not a yes or no question. So with open ended questions, they'll generate more stuff for you. And the shit you didn't even think about that now, wait, that makes me think of a new hypothesis or a new
19:03idea. I wonder if other people think that. Okay. So you're now you're learning, exploring new ideas, which may or may not turn out to be true. Could be a one off thing. Who knows? Right. But now you're getting that. So that's what happens. And so I did so many of these interviews. And so my hyper. hypotheses changed. Again, you you don't have one interview and change your mind about everything. That's not quite right. But you morph over time as you hear stuff. And so your your hypotheses and maybe even the questions can change too as you as you interview because you're trying to learn. Now it if things aren't going well, what happens is you never converge on any truth. It's just everyone you talk to says something different. You're like, I'm just not seeing the patterns here. It's just there's nothing I can hold on to. That doesn't mean there's it's impossible. to make a company here. It's just unclear what it is. But sometimes, like WP Engine, they'll converge on, like, oh my God, 80% of the time they say this, or man, I've discovered there's two segments. There's little small businesses, and there's people that work at big companies. And the small businesses will answer these questions this way, and the big company this way. And so we're gonna tackle this one, and you know, and it just gets to be boring almost to do the interviews because you just know what they're gonna say, and that's when. you stop interviewing because if you're not if you're bored you're not learning. If you're not learning this this is a waste of your time. So I always say you should do at least five of these. If you do five you'll realize you're not done yet and probably do 10. You'd uh who knows? I know people have done over a hundred. I think that's probably delaying. I think that's probably procrastination of getting stuff done. But I think not talking to your
20:22customers not doing this is dumb because of course you'll build the wrong thing. So that's a waste of time. Right. On the other hand, doing this too much, of course, that's also waste time. So all right, you have to you have to like do it. This technique can help you learn some things. And so that's what you should do. Right. Anyway, so that's what I did before WPN even started. That's what I did again to test pricing and over and over again with different products we would build and different other things. I I used the same thing.
20:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There's lots of founders, you know, probably in the camp A that we were just describing, like, should I build a business around this? Right. Which I think you just described pretty well, like how to, you know, go do that customer discovery and try to figure out if there's a business there. Well,
20:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's one way. Yeah,
20:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's one way. Let's talk about some of the other pieces. Yeah, because lots
21:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
21:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): entrepreneurs listen to
21:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
21:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): podcast.
21:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So uh so to me, a there's a lot of ways to think about this, and they're all probably about right. One way to think of it is I think of it like a Drake equation, you
21:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
21:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Drake equation with aliens. So for people that don't know, it's anything an for even people who do know the idea is you say, What's the chance that there's aliens? And you're like, Well, let's let's let's let's uh make a big equation with variables. And so you're like, oh well, there's this many galaxies, and every galaxy has this many stars, and every star has on average this many planets, and on average this many are in habitables in habitable zones, as if we know what that is for other kinds of life, and so on, and so and what's the chance that life develops, and what's the chance that okay, you know, do all this stuff, right? And so you have all these. variables and uh and you say, Well, that's the chance of of life. And of course, part of the problem is we don't even know from a power of ten what those are supposed to be. So it's you know. But his point of making it was to say, actually to try to explain why don't we see any? Because when you do that, you kind of you often compute that we sh that there should be billions of of civilizations, and so why aren't we seeing any? And maybe which of these variables are right or wrong in our equation. And I'm not saying that's even the right equation, but that's what I
22:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
22:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by the Drake equation. So I think of a startup like a Drake equation, where a ton of stuff has to go right, or at least right enough, or else it dies. And that explains why startups usually don't work. Because it's not enough to say, like, I have a good product. Yes, but also you have to get attention for it. And there has to be enough people who want it. And you have to be able to get to them. And that c has to be not too expensive so that it's just unprofitable to get to them. And they have to have a budget and they have to want to buy today. They if they're locked into a three year contract, it still doesn't matter. And they have to want to buy from you and not a competitor. So you need some way to be differentiated. And you have to be able to build the thing in the first place. And it just go down the line of like all these things have to be true or at least true enough or not fatal, let's say. And when you multiply a lot of probabilities like that, the the total probability goes down, down, down, down,
22:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): down, because for all
22:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the and it's a bunch of ands, right? It's very hard for all that to succeed. So if you like that mental model of how why why startup is low probability, it suggests answers to well, how would I increase the chance of success? So for example, you'd say, well, just from my natural strengths and assets, meaning I have these capabilities, you know, I know how to do marketing or I know how to do engineering. So just from my strengths and a some of these are actually a higher percentage chance of working because I'm good at it. So that's not going to be the reason I fail. So if I'm an engineering, an engineer, it's very unlikely that the reason my company fails is because I'm unable to build it. So what what what does that mean though? But let's let's just say marketing, because it's often the case, is my weakest suit. I've never done it. I hate it. I don't know what to do. SEO's broken now, so I can't hide behind my screen and just make uh articles with AI. That's not gonna work. Oh my gosh, I'm gonna have to actually learn marketing, maybe. I don't know how. So that's a very high risk. That's one of the reasons why you're gonna die. Now, as an engineer, if you know that there's a project and some aspects of the project are high risk and some are not,
23:46which do you tackle first? We all know the answer. The high risk ones. We have to tackle the unknowns first, because if we do the stuff we know how to do, of course we'll just be a few months we'll be a few months down the road. We'll have accomplished exactly what we knew we always could, so we haven't learned a thing. And all those unknowns are still ahead of us. And if we're not able to solve them, we'll have wasted this entire time. We could have found out in the beginning that this was impossible or we couldn't surmount the things we didn't know and saved all that engineering time that we already knew we could do. That we know this from engineering projects. So if you're looking at your Drake equation, you say, What are my lowest categories that are probably going to kill me? And I should do those first. But that's not what we do. We say, But that's uncomfortable. I'm going gonna to do the the comfortable fun thing, which is to make features. And you're like, all right. And then you're gonna, it's not gonna work, right? So that's one thing you can do with this equation is realize what is this math telling you to do? Right. Also, you can ask things like, Do I need a co-founder or someone else to help me with some of these things so that it's overall more likely? Because a lot of times what happens is if you have a co-founder, it's like two
24:46engineers. Well, that didn't help, right? Part of what you can do with more than one person is cover. more of this equation, right? And of course, I'm being, you know, I don't take it too literally, but you know, this is a help, this is a helpful way to think about how do I de-risk this business. Another thing you could think is
25:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): could
25:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I pick, since I'm bad at one of these things or I'm scared of one of these things, could I pick a different strategy? Meaning, who am I selling to, at what price? Why are they picking me? What are the attributes of my product? What does it do or not do? What are
25:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): those
25:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trade-offs? That's what I
25:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
25:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by the strategy. these major decisions about what is it? What am I doing? Could I pick a strategy that sidesteps some of those weaknesses? So I hate sales. Okay, well, then I need a product-led growth strategy. Now that may or may not end up working, but the sales one definitely wouldn't because it's running right into a huge market.
25:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You might need a sales
25:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): co-founder.
25:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
25:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or a sales co-founder, and then it
25:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): should
25:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be, then I shouldn't use product product-led led growth because then that doesn't exploit that person's strength. And that's what we need to do. Every good strategy exploits strengths that you have, of course. So you could think that what is there a different strategy that's still logical, cohesive, coherent with itself, that would avoid some of those things I don't have so that I don't have to fix it. Or at least they're not, they're not as likely to kill a whole company because they're not that important anymore. Because I've picked a path that doesn't require me to do that. So that's another thing you could do with that. So I think, well, of course, it's just a mental model. it's quite actionable. I just told you three different things that it could that you could do with it, just with that idea. Right. Um, so I do think that's useful. And so that's why should you interview customers? Yes, because you're you're you're figuring out some of this stuff. But there's all these other pieces too. So interviewing customers doesn't maybe doesn't tell you some things like how many of them are there. It might tell you something about your com competition, maybe that's a little harder to tell. But I I I do think there's a lot of that you can learn by interviews. And and actually mapping that out might help you know what are my goals. Well, my goals are to figure out the answers to a lot of these things, you know. So that might be helpful.
26:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One one thing you mentioned is you throughout shipping new features and new you know, product lines, you kept talking to customers. How do you know how much and how often to keep doing that as you kind of scale?
26:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Keep doing a new feature?
26:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, or that like I'm expanding the product or yeah, I'm gonna. I'm trying to prioritize my roadmap or how do how do founders and founding teams know when to go talk to customers and how often
26:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how much.
26:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you're not talking to them a few times a week, I don't know what you're doing.
27:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So all the time. Got it. One one thing in the notes is you share data that showing negative reviews can lift sales and lower returns. Walk us through that. What is that?
27:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. So this is I one of my uh soapboxes for a couple of decades is that honesty works in business. especially with so many businesses not being honest. It's refreshing. And uh I have lots and lots of examples all over the place of in of in what ways does it work. And this is a one of the really fun ways what you're touching on. So the date there's data about this from a company in Austin called Bizarre Voice. Bizarre Voice uh 20 years ago powered all the user-generated reviews on websites like Walmart and uh and eBay and and Best Buy and all these companies. At that time there were no the again the internet's brand new, so we don't have stuff like that. And nobody knew how to implement anything. So they they implemented like a a a module so all these companies could have user generated reviews on all the products. And the retailers liked it, but so did the uh the manufacturers. Like RubberMade wants to know what people think about the RubberMade products so they can improve it and all this kind of stuff. Right. So really interesting useful data. And now a lot of there's lots of ways to get it. Back then that was new. So they learn things about what do you show in review? So here's what you would think, or I would think most people would think I think is you want to show the five-star reviews for the thing. People saying, oh, this is great because reasons, and that will help people buy the thing. But that's not actually what increased sales. When they tested just the five-star reviews against five-star five star reviews in column in the left column and all the bad reviews in the right column. at the same time though. So the person was
28:28shown both. Sales went up and returns went down. And why did sales go up? Now you can make up your own reason if you want, but right away the but the bottom line is if you're honest, you make more sales. And by returns going down, you might say, and your customers are happier with the product. You might
28:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): also know
28:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): why people returned it were unsatisfied, Satisfied, right? Well,
28:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but so here's
28:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here's
28:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
28:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think why this happened. I could be wrong about the why, but the conclusion's the same. When you know what the trade-offs are, which is what you're seeing, it's good at this, but it's bad at that. That's called a trade-off. I know the product has trade-offs. I know it's not a perfect product, but I don't know what they are, so it makes it hard for me to buy it. Once you tell me what they are, I can decide if I care or if this is a trade-off I like. Many times the good stuff is like, ooh, that's it. See, that's exact that was my number one thing. Is that thing that it's good at this thing it's bad at, I don't even care. Yeah, that would be nice, but like. I care less that it's got that problem than I like that it has the my number one thing. So I'll buy it. It's a trade-off that I want, that I'm I accept. And so if another product has a different trade-off, I want this one. And if I don't know what the trade-off is of this other product, I'm I'm concerned about buying and I'd rather buy something I understand that is a reasonable fit to what I want. No matter how analytical or not analytical I'm I'm consciously being, that's the case. That's why I think sales go up. Now what about the returns? This one I think is more obvious. If I already know what the problem is and I get the product and it has that problem, I don't return it. I expected that. It's not a surprise. It's a it's when it's a surprise and you're like, oh my God, and you return it. And
29:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you might
29:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be right, because you might have gotten a bad trade off or whatever, right? Now, for manufacturers, returns are horrifically expensive because manufacturers may only have a margin of five or 10%. So a return, especially if it's gets lost in the mail, it's damaged, or it might take them 10 or 20 sales worth of profits to replace the one loss from that one thing. Insanely, insanely expensive. It's even expensive for software companies because you still spent money on things like getting the person in, maybe tech support. So, like it still costs money, it costs them a lot of money. Anyway, the bottom line is reducing returns is actually an enormous financial. benefit. If
30:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
30:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): change it by even five, it's enormous for a Walmart. That's that's the story of why being honest and showing the negative reviews is is actually quite quite valuable. And I do think you can extrapolate the more general lesson of being honest works to many other aspects of the business.
30:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So distribution is the new moat, very popular right now. What's your take on that?
30:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I have a more nuanced take on that. First of all, what do you mean new? If 10 years ago I had a unassailable way to get sales for customers that stay forever, is that not a moat? So I first of all disagree that it's a new idea. Now I do agree that with AI we can make stuff faster than we could before. But so can can you're so can your competitors. So if we're both making stuff faster, both making stuff slower, it's still a tie. It was always easier to make a new feature than it was to get people to buy the damn thing. Always. So again, is that new? And I would say yes and no. It's always been harder to get distribution than to make the product. And it's always been true that if you're really good at distribution, you you you can win even with a mediocre product. People have been writing about that for twenty, thirty, forty years. So that's not new. I do agree that it's so fast to develop features that makes that you could say that makes the balance even greater, but the general concept is not new. I have articles myself going back fifteen 15 years that say that. So it's not new, even if it is more exaggerated. And I agree that it's so much more exaggerated that that's different. And I agree with that, but let's not get carried away. The other thing is, is it a moat? So a moat has a definition. You know, Warren Buffett coined the term, it has a definition. It's a competitive advantage that even a well-funded, intelligent competitor cannot take away from you. Like no matter what they do, you still have this advantage. That's what a moat is. And you might say, long term. Some people say permanent, and then
32:05you could say nothing's permanent. Okay. Let let's say in the software world at least 10 years, call it that, right? So is distribution a moat? And and my answer is some is and some isn't. Uh five years ago people would tell you that SEO is a moat because once you're locked in on Google, you can stay ahead and forever and ever you'll get that. And Google has now proven it's not a moat. It's gone. You like that? You like that moat? So is that a moat? And I would say who cares? I don't care to I don't care to label it a moat or not. I would just take each marketing channel by itself and ask, what are its attributes? What are its risks? Like the risk with that is platform risk that they change it on you. Are you okay with that? Early on, you have to be okay with platform risk because you know you can't you can only do so much. So you just pick something that you're good at, that your customers are also there, and whatever's in that intersection in the Venn diagram of what you can execute well. and where your customers actually are, you just do it. That's what you do. Now later on, if you're WP Engine and you have 200,000 customers and you and your monthly paid marketing budget is as many millions of dollars a month, of course then you can say we should be on we should diversify. We should have many channels because you never know what's going to change. And we could have different teams or people who specialize in them to mine each one as much as we can and and we have a portfolio and that becomes correct when you can afford it, but not at first. Right. So those are the ways you deal with that, I think. So I do think you could say some of those are more permanent or
33:25more moody than others. Again, I just don't care for the to to use the term because I think it's distracting from what's really going on. I just don't think it's that useful to argue about Google the moat part. So for example, I could I would I do say if I'm just buying ads, of course it's not a moat. Someone else can run the same ad and I don't know, like it's also a class
33:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one.
33:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I don't know, twice as good as your competition and not sustainable.
33:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's not
33:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a moat. They can do it
33:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): too.
33:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They can literally copy what you say. So it's not a
33:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): moat,
33:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right? But brand is it is more moaty. Apple's Apple. They come up with a new i i i iPad mini. It's way too expensive and they're gonna sell out. Why? That's whatever that answer is is a moat because it's not like no other companies aren't. spending billions of dollars a year trying to compete against that, right? That's a mote.
34:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
34:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. So that's a moat. So brand can be a moat still, right? So okay. I also think that having a personal marketing campaign. So when you're a YouTube personality, of course, there could be infinite other YouTube personalities, but they're not taking away from the fact that people like to watch you, right? Just because there's
34:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): someone
34:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): else there doesn't mean now I don't want to watch this person. What? You know, that's not true, right? Yeah. It's not, I mean, you're sort of competing, competing for attention, but like they can't, they can't take it away from you. We're the only ones with this feature. Well, now 10 people have that feature. They can just eliminate the idea that you're the only one with the feature. But a ch a YouTube channel that has a million views, of course, I know that's a lot, but someone else can't just remove that from you. Now there's
34:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): platform
34:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): risk, I suppose, from Google, but if you have a lot of, if you have a million subscribers, which I again that's that's a lot, but if you did, yes, but come on, that's pretty good in this in this day and age. Wouldn't you call that moat-ish? You know, right? It's close enough without arguing about it, the terminology too much. That's pretty good. Better than ads, right? So that's how I would do it is I would I would stop saying moat. I would say, like, which of these is it hard for other people to do anything about? Which of these Things do I think I can take for the long term? But there's downsides. Like if it is a personality YouTube thing, it's tied to you. That means you can never sell the company. Or you can, but like this doesn't come with it. So there's
35:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
35:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): downside.
35:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I shouldn't
35:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): call my VC firm Bell Capital. I called it Team Ignite. Exactly
35:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): why.
35:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So it's so that but that's a trade-off. So does it is it a moat? Well, moat, you could if a true moat, I could sell the whole company, it would still be there, right?
35:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right.
35:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I think. I mean again, you could argue with me. And again, and the answer is I don't care. Like that's just how I think of it. I I I don't get to decide, you know. But that's what I would do is ask these kinds of questions. What kinds of risks are they? Am I okay with that? When do I want to diversify? And what does that mean?
35:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yep.
35:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh, you know, if I do have so for example, if I have what's not diversification is saying I'll do SEO on Google and then SEO on Bing. That's not diversified. But SEO on Google and then paid ads and then affiliates, okay, those are all very different things. One of those could explode and it wouldn't change the other ones at all. Might even help them. Like if search traffic goes down, affiliates with big newsletter subscribers might actually increase in their power because you no longer can get it from Google. Maybe the newsletters are more likely where you get it from. I just made that up. I don't know if that's true. I'm just saying when it's diversified, just like markets, sometimes when one goes down, another one might go up. Anyway, you're doing that for yourself. So you could ask what's uncorrelated or different because if my goal, if my goal is to diversify marketing to make myself more sustainable and predictable, well, then I can be intentional about that, right? Again, we're talking roughly, but nevertheless, that's that's smart. So which of those is a moat? I don't know. A lot
36:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of your thoughts
36:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there
36:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
36:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): motes. So you've written about the myth of exponential hypergrowth and
36:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the elephant curve. I've never heard the term elephant curve. Maybe it's
36:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because I made it
36:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the audience understand that. Oh,
36:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I made up the word, that's why you haven't heard it. I've made up many things and I've never named it after my myself. So yeah. So this also is an article, so people can just click and see it. Yeah. So this was an article that took me over a decade to write because I had this notion forever ago, and I didn't know if I was right or not. And I always wanted to like research whether it was right. But I was building companies. I don't have time to, you know, research stuff. And so every time I came across another example of my theory of I was like, see, there it is again. And I would capture it and throw it in a note. So it was 2022, and I I had a one-month sabbatical from WP Engine. And with that little break, my mind sort of went back into writing and thinking, right? And I I came by my note. I'm like, I think I'm in the headspace where I could do this. And I did. So I have this full theory and all this data. And so the resulting, the result of all this is it's a magnum of. opus of data of mine, I suppose you could say, on this concept, which is people say companies grow exponentially in some cases, like the Facebooks of the world, the Slacks of the World, the
37:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): tropic. Yeah,
37:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they say exponential. And maybe with AI it actually could be true. But even with Facebook and Slack and these type of things, it's not true. And if you look at their actual growth of things like users or revenue, it's never exponential. Now, the reason I said Facebook and Slack is because in 2022, Facebook was the fastest growing consumer tech company ever. And Slack at the time was the fastest growing uh B2B company ever. If they're not exponential and they're the fastest ever, ain't nobody exponential. Or at least not in a way that's like important to or like, right? Why not? And why do we say that? And so that's what the whole thing breaks down. And I break it down into pieces and and I guess the I guess the the bros would say uh uh first principles I don't, because I think unless you're talking about whether the integral of the wave function from negative infinity to positive infinity of of the wave function times its complement is one, you're not talking about first principles. You're talking about you're just making that up to sound smart, right? Yeah. If we're talking about the axiom of choice, then we're at first principles. Otherwise, yeah, I don't think so, you know. So so so but I did come I did try to break down my again, it's a theory. So if
38:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
38:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like this kind of stuff, then you're gonna love this because it's a fun theory to you could like it or not, argue with or not, but it's a but at least it's a well thought out data backed idea. So okay, good, you know. But even if you disagree, it's still fun to to disagree with a good argument, right? So I I go and show like here's how marketing campaigns typically work, here's the shape of those, and even if I do many of them, you still get this. totality shape, which is the same as the shape of one of them. And this is the elephant curve that marketing campaigns, when you unlock one, you get this little surge of of growth because you've unlocked whatever. And then maybe in a period of optimization as you get a little bit more out of it. And then often with these campaigns, they they they tap out or even start to go down because the channel's diminishing, or people have just seen your ad a bunch of times, or there's various reasons, which I talk about in there. And so it tapers off. So this shape of like high up in the taper, that's like an elephant. Is it? I don't know. I put a picture of an elephant in there and I wanted a key
39:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): name.
39:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Like whatever you'd
39:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like.
39:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's
39:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like an S
39:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shape. Yeah.
39:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's with that that sags. You can call it this saggy.
39:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's a saggy
39:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): S. Yeah.
39:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
39:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know? And then
39:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if you
39:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stack
39:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them in a
39:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): row like you do when you when you stack on marketing that and you add it, you still get another elephant curve. It doesn't change what the curve is mathematically. And then I have actual data from WP Engine where we did this. And in fact, the data is exactly this. And our marketing campaigns did exactly this. And we added it. And it's a whole thing. And of course, then
40:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): marketing.
40:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah. Then I show data from all
40:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kinds of companies: Facebook, Slack, HubSpot. I show it from bootstrap companies, from VC companies, fast-growing, slow growing. I have all this data, and they all show these same kinds of effects. And so this is my argument why it's actually a parabola, not or linear, even. and not um exponential. I, of course, it's all this data back stuff. Even the growth of the internet is a pr is a very clean parabola. It's like really, really tight parabola, not exponential. Not S-curve, even parabola. So I it's however you uh mobile phone usage, like just you look at all kinds of things and it's
40:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
40:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exponential.
40:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, nothing can continue forever exponentially, right? Yes,
40:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): cancellations. do.
40:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cancellations do. This is this is see, this is part of the application of this. knowledge. If you know that marketing is maybe linear, at best quadratic, then you turn around and say, wait a minute, but what about customers leaving if I have a subscription revenue business? What's that like? And the answer is that's exponential. That's why we say two percent per month. The words two percent per month mean exponential. That's what that is, is an exponential curve, right? Well,
41:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I mean, but the flip side of that would wouldn't two 2% percent growth per month. also be exponential.
41:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But that's not what happens. What happens is you have a percent growth and that percentage diminishes over time. Right. And there's even
41:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): data
41:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strategy which
41:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
41:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have in the article showing that on average that percentage goes down 15% every year for public SaaS companies. Right. Well, if the percentage consistently goes down, that's because it's not exponential.
41:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Right.
41:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And when you plot what that is, if you plot literally, I stay sta say start at 100%. a hundred percent year over year growth, but that goes down fifteen percent every year, which is the actual data. If you plot that, it's a parabola again. Right. It's right back to the elephant curved parabola argument again. Because it's not exponential. We use those language, but it's not. But cancellation is two percent of your business leaves every month or whatever. That's true.
41:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Always
41:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fighting entropy in in the universe of business.
41:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): As you grow, cancellations grow with you exponentially, but marketing. doesn't. So cancellations and early on, you don't have any customers, so cancellations are small. So marketing wins and you grow fast. Later on, X the cancellations are more than what marketing can make up for and you stop growing. So I call this the growth ceiling. You can compute what that number is. I have another article about that you could read. And there's lots of things you could do about it. You can try to lower cancels, you can try to have have existing customers grow. There's a million things to do. New product
42:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I devote two entire chapters of the book.
42:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
42:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I I I I devote two entire chapters of the book to this question of how do I either make cancellations better or grow uh other things that combat cancellations that are also exponential. Because this is such a major impact on growth. It's worth all of that conversation about well, what will I do about it? It's worth that much yapping about it because that's how big of a deal it is.
42:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. Really good. Yeah, I gotta go read these. articles. I think you missed your calling as a professor of business. At
42:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um at WP Engine, my nickname was the professor.
42:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
42:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): awesome. Yeah.
42:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Again, that's why
42:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's why this stuff is uh is just a a labor of love. I just love doing this. I love talking
43:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about
43:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it. And these ideas, some of them, this this traditional one, I've been thinking about it for so long. So these are not things I've just dashed off of my top of my head. Yeah. Uh all the articles, a lot of them are like
43:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there was this idea, we tried them at WP Engine.
43:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We, you know, it worked or didn't work. And we and then I have hundreds of things in drafts I never published because it just wasn't good enough. I couldn't really understand what I thought about it, or it in retrospect doesn't seem quite right. And so I never published it. So these are only things that again, they're still just opinions. Half the stuff you won't like or you won't agree with, or it won't apply to you. I know most of
43:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
43:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): okay.
43:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): formed opinion or theory based on the data,
43:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right?
43:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, and contextual.
43:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah.
43:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. And very rarely. do you hear advice or a framework with the context attached that says, and here's when this applies, including my own. I'm guilty of that too. I know. I'm I'm admitting it. Right. So I'm just saying, since since even I don't even I'm bad at saying that, you you you the the reader has to decide for herself like what is what if this is applicable to me. What do I like? And yeah, you're on your own. But all I can do is say look, at least this is at least these are like decent ideas. That's what all I can say.
44:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Speaking of cancellation, you've said that it's uh too expensive, is almost never the real reason customers cancel. What do you think is going on instead?
44:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the the background of that is when you ask people why did you cancel, which is a good idea, a lot of times it's a drop-down list or something, right?
44:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah.
44:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
44:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh,
44:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like whatever. Yeah.
44:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Almost always.
44:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
44:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I would say always in the top three, right? And often number one. And so what I see people do, including even at WP Engine, what but teams would want to do, let's make it cheaper. And my argument is that is never actually the answer. Ever. And here's my argument. How did this person sign up in the first place? They came to the website, they read what you promised, they got to the pricing page, they saw the price, and they said, Okay, it wasn't too expensive then. The people that think it's too expensive, they might exist, but they're not your customer. customers. They're the people that didn't buy. Now, is that possible that you are too expensive? Yes, but the way you'd find out is by talking to people who never bought, which is very, very hard. But hey, if you can do it, or maybe you see it in reviews, right? Like there's ways. Okay, so that could be. But when someone
45:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who's
45:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): someone who's been a customer for a year cancels and says it's too expensive, that cannot be the reason. So what is going on? Well, there were some was promise. you made or some expectation they had, whether you promise it or not, that's not being met and therefore it's not worth the money. And that promise is the reason, or that expectation is the reason. And so you promise three things, but that third thing, it's not do not working for them. That's why they canceled. So if you were to make the price lower, they would still have signed up because they already did at this price. So of course they would sign up at the blower, but button, it's not like they'd still be here because you still promise promised something. and that still didn't work for them. Or again, maybe they're confused. They thought the product would do X. You never said it did, but they thought so. Okay. You could say that's not your fault. Maybe you could be clear, or maybe it's just random. That's okay. But still, lowering the price is not the answer. So again, lowering the price is never the answer because that wasn't the cause. At least not if that's where you heard that from. Right.
45:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So through all this, you've actually invested in over 60 startups. What have you learned after so many? investments?
46:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, what I know about investing is deal flow is the most important aspect. And the way to see this is if you see great deals all the time, it doesn't really matter how good your selection process is. If you just invest in a bunch of actually good things, you'll you'll be great. Yeah. And simultaneously, if you don't get to see the good deals, if the best companies out there don't cross your desk, then no matter how good you are at picking them, you will lose money because you won't have those big winners that of course you need when you're investing. So to me, if you don't have good deal flow, you won't be a good investor, period, the end. You have to invest in that. Whether it's an angel or an institutional investor, that's the deal. So I know I don't have great deal flow and I don't work on it. And I'm not that interested in working on it. That means I shouldn't try to be an investor. So I don't. And instead, what happens is my attitude. is am I having fun? And I'll just use money and I don't care if I make money. That way it's okay if I don't get in the big deals. I don't care.
46:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because that's not I
46:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wasn't going to get the big deals. I would like to lot not lose money, but I'm not trying to maximize returns. And therefore I don't need to be in the big deals. So as a result, I have actually really good results for an angel because the median investor loses money. And I'm up about 4X, and that's much better than losing money. But if you think about 4X over say 12 or 15 years and the S P 500 is up 8X over that same period, I could have just bought an ETF. Well
47:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's not up 8x in that same period.
47:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes it is
47:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): false. SP
47:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 500?
47:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes.
47:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I don't
47:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I don't think so. Yes,
47:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the bull run was 7x. That's right.
47:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): From from 2009? two thousand nine, Like from in
47:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the bottom. Yeah, sure. If you pick
47:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you have to pick it, which is of course you
47:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can't
47:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pick it. But hey, in company companies you're picking companies, right? If we're gonna we're gonna do like with like if if you had invested in Google and Amazon and stuff, you're definitely doing better. So it's better to have put money in Google and Amazon
47:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if you're if you're
47:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not three Xing three or four X in gross
47:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on your angel portfolio, you're probably better off just putting it in the Nasdaq
47:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or something
47:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over what period of time?
47:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah.
47:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Over what period of time?
47:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Over any like random ten 10
47:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 10
48:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): year period of time.
48:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ten 10 years, yeah. Ten years is is it's bad because of the risk. Because you probably won't for X.
48:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
48:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Like that that that's a really, really good result. That no, you you have to expect it might be much worse. Yeah. Right. So so the bottom line is like so so instead what I do is I invest in in things like Tiny Seed, where someone else who I trust has great deal flow and I think good selection. And in anyway, any way I love working with them. That way I can just give them my money, they get they give it to good companies. Then I can just do what I like, which is this. I can just do mentor calls whenever they want. I don't care. I don't I don't need to get paid. I don't I don't yeah,
48:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
48:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't need to get involved. I've already invested in you indirectly, right? We can just I can just help whenever you want. That end of story. So I can just kind of do the fun part. I don't have to do the the paperwork or the taxes or the reporting and or pick them or tell people no all the time, which I hate.
48:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's It's hard.
48:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right? And
48:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so,
48:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like
48:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): okay, I don't have to
48:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do that. So I get to not do all the stuff I don't like. and I can just have fun. So that to me is like a perfect thing for me. So that's my that's that's like part of the things I've learned. By the way, this is this general idea of like the top of you might say the funnel is more important than the rest of the funnel, which is kind of what I said. That's true of every funnel. It's true of the hiring funnel, it's true of the marketing funnel. And for the same reason, if you only see great candidates, it doesn't matter how good your interview process is, if you only see bad candidates, it doesn't matter how good your interview process is. And the same thing with marketing. If I just dump shit traffic in your website, I don't care the design and the conversion and that it doesn't matter. They weren't, they're it's not good. So once you've learned that, you realize everything that is funnel like, the top of the funnel is far more important, far than everything else in the funnel. And you should be spending an inordinate amount of your time and energy improving the top of the funnel. Whereas we don't we tend to go, how do we have better interviews for hiring? How do I uh A B test my homepage better? It doesn't matter. In fact, the more garbage traffic that comes to your website, what are you A B testing in your homepage? What percentage don't bounce? But if most of it's garbage, what you're actually testing is how do I get the garbage to stay? But that's the opposite. You're trying to filter out the garbage. So if you
50:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): put garbage in,
50:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're A your B testing. test will be worse. You can't use A B tests. You've broken the A B test system if you put garbage on the top. So it it I cannot stress enough how bad it is to put garbage in the top of any funnel-like thing. It's way another hidden multiple multiplier from the book, right? It's be even if you shift the quality a little bit at the top of the funnel, it's drastically impactful compared to anywhere else in the funnel. That doesn't mean the rest of the funnel is irrelevant. I'm not of course, I'm not saying it that far. Yeah. But one of these is much more a much bigger lever than the rest. Again, hidden multiplier. Hidden if you didn't know that. Multiplier regardless. Yes.
50:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Really good insights. Well, we've seen a lot of changes, obviously. Uh you have in your career. What are you excited about over the next you know three to five years?
50:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not having to have a job where I have to worry about AI. It's is pretty exciting. Getting to have missed that. So I can just do stuff. like this, which is fun, and not worry about how to have a job as a designer. That's fun. What am I excited about? It you know, it's very it's the reason that uh it's hard is is um I actually feel like even people who are supercharged by AI and love that aspect, they say, like, you know, but I'm kind of beat at the end of the day. It's like actually quite energy draining to be context contact switching and doing all this stuff.
51:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
51:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so on the one
51:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): hand,
51:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I did a month's worth of work in a day. That's undeniable. But I'm actually beat to death. And then, you know, you have these people, I don't want to overstate it because you know, some of these things go around and then you think everyone's doing it, quote unquote, when it's three people. But there are a lot of people who are like, again, I'm super powered in my as an engineer, as a web designer, as a writer, but I feel hope this helped this, but who cares? We've just lost humanity. And I'm really actually fundamentally sad. Sort of like in COVID, where it wasn't just that we had to stay home and all this. It's like we're losing a part of human our humanity that I think we're still recovering from the shock of that. Right. And uh, or at least many people are, let's say. And AI, I think, even if it's su you're supercharged with it, and I am too I am, and I I love that. I use it every day and it's really fun. But I also have this feeling of just like, who cares? Like, even stuff like, oh, and don't write prompts, write loops and and loops that write their own loops. And see, it's just doing it. itself. And it's like, yes, that's interesting intellectually, and I like playing with it and trying to build it. And then also what's the point of me anymore? And so I can write a book AI cannot write. I can have a podcast, which I do, that AI cannot have. And so that's good. So I guess I'm excited about my little projects, but I'm not excited for humanity about my little projects. So I don't know. No, That's but a bad answer because you say, What are you excited about? I'm like, eh, I'm a negative Nelly. And I and again, I'm not saying we shouldn't do it, we should stop. I'm not saying that. Yeah. I'm just I'm just a moaning. Not all is lost, but
52:31rather that's important. What should we do about that? I'm not saying stop AI, but I am saying, look, but this other stuff is also true. Can we simply say both are true? Can we just admit that? And they're both important. Can we agree? And so should we spend time, not in lieu of AI, but in addition to AI, can we spend time on this question of humanity and this thing of like well, people will just make art. It's just not true. It's never been true. And the times when humanity has been able to do things like that, that's not what they've done. And when people d are out of work, that's not what they do. Yes, I know. I'm talking about ninety percent. The aristocracy in Europe, uh when they didn't have to work. That's not what they did, actually. Right. And so
53:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): through parties and
53:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even then they
53:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they they did their version of drugs and drinking. and and and and maybe paid other artists who were starving. So that's not ever what humanity has done with freedom from work. So again, I'm not saying so everyone should work or but th just saying everyone will do art uh what that is is abdicating you could say responsibility, abdicating even just the even admitting that it's a problem that is not solved by this kind of flippant statement like that.
53:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
53:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I wish we could go back and interview nomadic hunter-gatherers, right? Who lived off the land and just
53:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like that's what and
53:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): people have been studying them for a hundred years. They have
53:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): so
53:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can read that. You can read about that.
53:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, so it's interesting. I think you know they only worked, you know, two or three hours a day, and the rest of the time they were just grooming each other and hanging out and you know, playing games and making love and making art. And so I I think it's gonna be an adjustment because we've been living in this industrialized society where we we are required to go trade our time and labor and capital for money.
54:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We're not.
54:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Um
54:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're not. You you y I can show you millions of people in America that do not trade their time for money. But what they're not doing is making art as uh in general.
54:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right. Mm-hmm.
54:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
54:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what do you what do you think we do in this transition when AI is eating labor, obviously, robots are right behind that, right? And that's you know, the twenty thirties is gonna look really different, you know, and that's four years away, three years away. Yeah,
54:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that again, this is a challenge that we shouldn't stop AI to tackle it, but on the other hand, we should tackle it and we should expend a lot of energy and time and money to tackle it. I'm not even saying it has to be identical money to AI. I'm trying to make this false equivalence, equivalents, but surely we're not spending enough time and money on it. And of course I don't have the answer off. offhand. Obviously.
54:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right. No, that's why
54:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
54:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): call it the singularity. It's hard to imagine what life is like after that, right? Really enjoy the conversation. Uh the with the professor Jason Cohen. Uh where can folks find you online?
55:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The Nexus is asmartbear.com because I'm a smart bear on Twitter and et cetera. So that's where all these articles are, and then links to these AI skills and links to where you can buy the book. Uh and uh and I have a podcast where a founder goes in the hot seat and opens up their business and with with their biggest challenge. And then me and another founder of a related company or who has a related problem, we all just work on that problem together. So it's there's no script, it's not an interview, we don't try to make anybody look good to their dismay sometimes.
55:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
55:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like a working session, that's
55:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. It's a working
55:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): session.
55:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): set.
55:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's just like a working session, you're a fly on the wall as we as we as
55:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
55:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): try to tackle something for two hours. And that's
55:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
55:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): podcast. So there's a link to that. It's called Smart Bear Live, and that's on YouTube and also all the podcasting thingies. So yes, there's many things, and all of them are AI proof in the sense that, like, if you want any of that, then you wouldn't want an AI writing that. So there you go. Well,
55:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
55:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): really enjoyed it. Thanks so much for coming on.
55:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks for having me.