Bruce Flatt discusses Brookfield's value investing principles, crisis opportunism, and operational strategy
Summary
Bruce Flatt, CEO of Brookfield Corporation, outlines the firm's value investing philosophy, emphasizing the importance of buying assets at a discount to replacement cost and maintaining liquidity during market distress. He recounts Brookfield's history, including its 2009 acquisition of General Growth Properties debt and its strategy of using non-recourse debt to isolate risk. Flatt highlights the firm's 'operating investor' approach, which involves active management and deep operational knowledge to enhance asset value, citing high returns on hydroelectric and power assets. He also explains the corporate restructuring into two entities and the succession planning that led to Connor Teskey becoming CEO in 2026.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 1:03
Introduction and 2008 Crisis Context
The program introduces Bruce Flatt, CEO of Brookfield Corporation, highlighting his value investing approach and Brookfield's 2009 acquisition of General Growth Properties debt. It notes the company's history, leadership transitions, and its strategy of using long-term non-recourse debt to finance assets.
- 1:03 – 6:37
2008-2009 Letters and Financial Resilience
Flatt's letters from late 2008 and early 2009 detail Brookfield's strong balance sheet, high cash flow, and ability to weather the crisis without selling core assets. The company bought back shares at a discount and maintained operations while competitors struggled.
- 6:37 – 15:54
Company History and Evolution
Brookfield traces its roots to 1899, starting in Brazil with infrastructure. It evolved from a property and resource company to a global real asset manager, renaming from Brascan to Brookfield Asset Management in 2005 and to Brookfield Corporation in 2022.
- 15:54 – 21:03
Investment Principles and Value Investing
Flatt outlines Brookfield's core principles: buying at a discount to replacement cost, focusing on cash-generating assets, and using asset-specific non-recourse debt. He emphasizes patience, avoiding the crowd, and the importance of intrinsic value over market price.
- 21:03 – 25:57
Price vs. Value and Ownership Mindset
The discussion distinguishes between market price and intrinsic value, noting that markets are inefficient. Flatt advocates for an owner's mindset, arguing that private ownership allows for better long-term decision-making compared to public market distractions.
- 25:57 – 30:44
Cash Management and Financing Discipline
Flatt asserts that cash is most valuable during crises. Brookfield maintains ample liquidity and uses asset-by-asset financing to prevent any single loan from threatening the broader franchise, ensuring survival through downturns.
- 30:44 – 34:03
General Growth Properties Recapitalization
Brookfield capitalized on the 2009 distress by buying defaulted debt of General Growth Properties and sponsoring its recapitalization. This trade exemplifies their strategy of acquiring assets at deep discounts during periods of market panic.
- 34:03 – 37:33
Recapitalization and Distressed Opportunities
The speaker details Brookfield's strategy of acquiring assets during distress, citing a 2013 exit yielding 2.6x capital and a 38% IRR. He explains how capital shortages in 2009 allowed Brookfield to recapitalize Babcock & Brown Infrastructure and buy foreclosed land in California at deep discounts.
- 37:33 – 43:14
Operational Advantage and Asset-Specific Returns
Flatt emphasizes Brookfield's identity as an 'operating investor' that runs businesses, citing a 45% annualized return on NY hydro plants and a 35% compound return on Terraform Power. He notes that deep operational knowledge allows them to solve management and financial issues others cannot.
- 43:14 – 48:23
Relentless Incrementalism and Learning
The speaker outlines Brookfield's 'relentless incrementalism' philosophy, which involves watching, learning, investing, perfecting, and scaling. He cites a German hotel loan that turned into a 13% annual return after a default, illustrating the value of patience and doubling down on good businesses bought at the wrong time.
- 48:23 – 53:02
Liquidity and Crisis Preparedness
Flatt discusses the importance of liquidity during the 2020 pandemic, noting that Brookfield avoided bad deals and remained disciplined. He highlights the strategic acquisition of Oaktree Capital in 2019 as preparation for the downturn, which allowed Brookfield to widen its credit aperture.
- 53:02 – 57:33
Corporate Structure and Split
The speaker explains the rationale for splitting Brookfield into two entities: a capital-heavy investment company and a fee-based asset manager. He describes the December 2022 distribution of Brookfield Asset Management shares to shareholders, aiming to unlock value and provide separate identities for distinct business models.
- 57:33 – 1:01:44
Partnership Culture and Succession
Flatt describes Brookfield as an extreme meritocracy and partnership where senior leaders promote from within. He details the succession planning that led to Connor Teskey becoming CEO of Brookfield Asset Management in February 2026, while Flatt remained Chair.
- 1:01:44 – 1:06:13
Long-Term Compounding and Timberland Strategy
The speaker concludes with three keys to success: enduring businesses, operational excellence, and uninterrupted compounding. He uses a timberland example where holding production during a downturn led to 10% annual compounding, illustrating the power of sticking with investments through cycles.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brookfield CorporationBN | equity | neutral | Rather than adding our views on the world at large to those published by many other more qualified people, this letter will focus on what we believe to be topical items with respect to Brookfield. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Brookfield bought a large position in the defaulted bank debt of General Growth Properties in early 2009 and sponsored its recapitalization.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: SEC EDGAR filings for General Growth Properties (GGP) bankruptcy proceedings and Brookfield's investor presentations from 2009-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBruce Flatt joined Brookfield in 1990 and succeeded Jack Cockwell as CEO in 2002.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:27
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation 2026 Annual Letter or SEC Form DEF 14A for executive tenure dates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceIn November 2013, Flatt reported $2.3 billion invested in General Growth Properties with $6 billion of value realized.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:19
How to verify: Brookfield Asset Management Investor Day presentations from 2013 or 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield bought back 7.5 million shares at an average price of $20 in 2008.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:50
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation 2026 Annual Letter or SEC Form 10-K for share repurchase activity. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBrookfield's share price ended 2008 down 56%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:37
How to verify: Historical stock price data for Brookfield Corporation (BN) on NYSE/TSE. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield bought a metallurgical coal terminal in Northeast Australia for 0.75 times replacement cost.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·20:25
How to verify: Brookfield Infrastructure Partners (BIP) investor presentations or annual letters detailing the Port of Newcastle or similar assets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The predecessor company was set up in 1899 to supply electricity and transportation in Brazil.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:45
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation historical overview in its Annual Letter or corporate website history section. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield monetized its last major position in the cyclical resource industry in 2005.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·15:12
How to verify: Brookfield Asset Management 2026 Annual Letter (dated Feb 10, 2026) or SEC filings for the sale of Naranda. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceConnor Teskey became CEO of Brookfield Asset Management in February 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:27
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation press release or SEC Form 8-K filed in February 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBrookfield's share count has grown at less than 1% over the last 20 years.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:01
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation 2026 Annual Letter (dated Aug 9, 2026) or calculation from SEC filings showing share count changes from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBrookfield initially invested $2.3 billion and realized $6.0 billion of value, resulting in a 2.6x multiple and 38% gross IRR.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:23
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Annual Letter 2026 (filed Feb 2026) or 10-K for fiscal year 2026 on SEC EDGAR. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBrookfield recapitalized Babcock and Brown Infrastructure, which had roughly $8 billion of assets, in 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:11
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated Nov 6, 2026, or press releases from 2026 regarding the Prime Infrastructure transaction. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield bought 3,200 house lots in Riverside County, California, through foreclosure for less than a tenth of peak value.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:10
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated Aug 7, 2026, or 2026 Annual Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield's share price rose 53% in 2010, following a 51% increase in 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:30
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated Feb 18, 2026, or 2026 Annual Letter; verify stock price data from Yahoo Finance or Bloomberg. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield bought hydroelectric stations in upstate New York for $847 million in 2004.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·38:22
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated May 11, 2026, or 2004/2026 Annual Letters. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The NY hydro plant investment compounded at 45% a year and produced 4.5x original capital by May 2011.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·39:01
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated May 11, 2026, or 2026 Annual Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield acquired Terraform Power, resulting in a 35% compound return and over a tripling of value for shareholders.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·40:37
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated Aug 13, 2026, or 2026 Annual Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield bought Westinghouse out of bankruptcy in 2018 for $4 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·40:56
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated Feb 15, 2026, or press releases from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield invested about $1 billion of equity in Westinghouse through a private equity fund.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·41:26
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated Nov 10, 2026, or 2026 Annual Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brookfield received $1.5 billion of cash from an initial $140 million investment in a Park Avenue office tower sold in 2017.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·42:27
How to verify: Brookfield Corporation Letter dated May 11, 2026, or 2026 Annual Letter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-17 through 2026-11-17. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Review Brookfield Corporation's 2022 annual report for details on the corporate split and financial structure.
- Verify the 2009 General Growth Properties recapitalization terms and outcomes through SEC filings or financial news archives.
- Check current performance data for NY hydro plants and Terraform Power to assess the validity of the claimed operational improvements.
- Research the succession timeline and Connor Teskey's appointment as CEO of Brookfield Asset Management in February 2026.
- Analyze Brookfield's debt structure and non-recourse financing practices in recent quarterly filings.
- Investigate the performance of the German hotel loan mentioned to understand the 'relentless incrementalism' case study.
- Compare Brookfield's IRR and multiple claims against industry benchmarks for distressed debt investments.
- Look for counter-arguments regarding the risks of concentrated exposure to real assets and infrastructure.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to a new Latticework Audio program, brought to you by the research team at MOI Global. Early in 2009, as the global credit crisis peaked, Brookfield bought a large position in the defaulted bank debt of General Growth Properties, the American shopping mall owner, and went on to sponsor the company's
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recapitalization. In November 2013, Bruce Flatt gave the arithmetic. $2.3 billion invested.
- 0:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): $6 billion of value realized. He joined Brookfield in 1990 and is chief executive of Brookfield Corporation. You will hear why he says cash only matters when it matters, and how Brookfield bought into a coal terminal in Australia for three-quarters of its replacement cost.
- 0:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bruce Flat. Strength to act when others cannot. Real assets, downside protection, and the miracle of compounding. Better situations are still coming.
- 1:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter is dated November 7, 2008. It went to the shareholders of a company that owned hydroelectric stations, office towers, power transmission lines, and forests, and it was written weekly. weeks after the liquidity crisis of September 2008. Its readers, the letter said, already knew the bad news from the coverage.
- 1:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Rather than adding our views on the world at large to those published by many other more qualified people, this letter will focus on what we believe to be topical items with respect to Brookfield. Its author, Bruce Flatt, is Chief Executive Officer of Brookfield Corporation and Chair of Brookfield Asset Management. In
- 1:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2008, the parent company itself was called Brookfield Asset Management. It took the name Brookfield Corporation in December 2022.
- 1:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): businesses were performing well, the letter reported, with a few small exceptions. The power plants had just come through a record nine months on strong water flows. The office towers were leased to creditworthy tenants for long terms, and the transmission lines, most of them regulated, produced steady cash.
- 2:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 2:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thanked the banks and the institutional clients that had stood behind the company through the year, and the clients were still committing money to its funds. For a year and a half, Brookfield had taken in more cash than it spent. Since the summer, it had sold, or agreed to sell, what it could spare. half of an office tower in Toronto, its transmission
- 2:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lines in Brazil, and two insurance businesses outside its core. Then the letter took up the loans that would fall due over the next few years. In any event, we have the financial resources today to repay all of the corporate and subsidiary debt maturing prior to 2011, even in the most draconian scenario where we roll over none of.
- 2:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the debt maturities. Since the end of June, he wrote, Brookfield had kept its investing inside the company, and that had included buying back 7.5 million of its own shares at an average price of 20 US dollars. His reasoning took one sentence. We believe this to be a substantial discount to long long-term term
- 3:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): intrinsic value, and we inherently have greater knowledge of this security than anything. else we can purchase. It had also been adding to its interests in its other assets and investments, and giving some of its subsidiaries the capital to repay debt so that each of them could weather the worst. On new investments outside the company, he wrote, To date, we
- 3:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have chosen to be patient on the belief that better situations are still coming.
- 3:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 3:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): listed what Brookfield had on its side,
- 3:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 3:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): large balance sheet. with investment grade ratings, high quality assets, its own operating teams in each of its businesses, cash it could put to work, and a name for dealing fairly with institutions. Three months later came his letter for 2008, dated February 13, 2009. It began with the year.
- 3:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2008 was unquestionably one of the most challenging years ever to be involved in the investment business. While everyone was affected, we avoided most of the investment mishaps experienced by many others, largely due to the type of long-duration hard assets we own. Cash flow from operations, he reported, had been among the highest in the
- 4:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company's history, and none of its major businesses had suffered lasting damage. Brookfield had been sparing with its capital through the year. Most of what it did invest went into raising its stakes in assets it already owned, and the capital it did not invest sat in cash or had gone to paying down debt. Then he turned to the stock. As
- 4:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): substantial shareholders ourselves, we empathize with you. Our share price ended the year down 56%, which resulted in our worst share price performance in 20 years. Later in the letter, he set out what the company could count on, beginning with about $20 billion of capital. In his words, this capital does
- 4:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not come due, and its trading price in the market has little direct impact on our operations. Near its end, the letter restated the company's purpose. Investing capital for you and our investment partners in high high-quality, quality, simple to understand assets which earn a solid cash cash-on-cash on cash. return on equity, while always
- 5:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): emphasizing downside protection of the capital employed. A version of that sentence stands near the end of nearly every annual letter he has written since 2005.
- 5:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 5:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter of May 5, 2009, on the first three months of the year, opened this way. Our operations performed as expected in the first quarter of 2009. In summary, nothing exceptional. occurred, but more importantly, nothing detrimental happened. It may seem odd to count this as an accomplishment, but we have been living
- 5:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in extraordinary times. The strategy had been built for a downturn of exactly this kind, he wrote, and so far the assets were holding up. Brookfield's shopping malls in Brazil were still selling strongly, and in North America, new office leases were being signed at rents above the ones they replaced.
- 6:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 6:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): weak spot was a handful of smaller businesses tied to American home building, which had weighed on results for three years. He usually stayed out of public debates about commercial real estate, he wrote, but this time he set out his views at length on vacancies, rents, new supply, and financing. His last word on the subject was
- 6:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that, not since the early 1990s have we seen such a wealth of opportunities.
- 6:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): More capital than anybody else.
- 6:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 6:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company that sent those letters traces itself to 1899.
- 6:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 6:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he told shareholders in May 2022, a predecessor was set up that year to supply electricity. and transportation, and it changed its name more than once in the century that followed.
- 6:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 6:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the 1970s, it moved its money into property, financial services, hydroelectric power, and industry. Thus, our roots are in the direct ownership and operation of businesses, sometimes in partnership with others, but mostly for our own account.
- 7:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 7:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter of August 2008 says where it all began. The company was formed to build the transit, gas, telephone, and power systems of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, holdings it sold long ago. That history was one reason Brazil became the first country outside North America where Brookfield set out to grow.
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Another was the local management teams it had worked with there for many years.
- 7:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 7:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business it built in Brazil came. to look much like the one at home.
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a Bloomberg television interview in March 2022, he described how Brookfield had been built. We had our own money, invested in our own businesses, and over time we figured out which ones we liked, and then we raised money around those businesses. Flatt joined Brookfield in 1990. By his own later account,
- 8:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he was a value investor at heart from the start. Asked during a talk to Google employees in August 2018 what had shaped his career, he said, You either get lucky or you make your own luck during your life. His own luck, as he told it, had come from the people he got to know at the company from which Brookfield grew. Then he described
- 8:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what came after. We had a small company, we started the business, and 30 years later, we've been doing exactly what we started 30 years ago.
- 8:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 8:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lesson he drew for the audience was to find work one cares about. For him, that work had been building Brookfield, and it had been a pleasure. He had been chosen as the next chief executive in 1999 and took the role in 2002. Over time, he wrote in August 2024, he also took on the senior partner's role.
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from the generation before him, most of whom were still helping Brookfield in some way. His first annual letter as chief executive is dated February 13, 2002. I feel privileged to be taking over from Jack Cockwell as president and chief executive officer of Braskin at this time. Braskin was the company's name then.
- 9:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 9:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): handover completed a succession plan begun about three years earlier. Cockwell had led the company for the previous ten years, and Flat credited that decade with leaving it stronger than at any time in its history. Cockwell remained part of the partnership that ran it.
- 9:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 9:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter said that everything the company did was aimed at building value for its shareholders, chiefly through steady, growing cash flow. Cash flow per share, he wrote, is the most important measure of wealth creation and the one a good manager can do most about.
- 9:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 9:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company was buying out the public shareholders of its own operating businesses, with the aim of one day owning most of them privately. He also believed that successful companies take sensible risks and learn quickly from their setbacks. Then came a pledge. We may make mistakes, even with the best of intentions. However, we will do all we
- 10:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can to ensure that none of these threaten the viability of your company. He closed by conceding that he could not guarantee the future.
- 10:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 10:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): September 10, 2025, on stage at Brookfield Asset Management's Investor Day, before an audience of investors, a colleague of decades who had also worked under that earlier generation asked him which of its lessons still held. Flatt named Jack Cockwell as the man who had led that generation. and then said, I think he set many
- 10:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of these principles. I think we refined them, tailored them, built them, institutionalized them, and made them better. The first applied to Brookfield's own people and to the companies it buys. That we're incented properly, and that everyone is an owner of the business. The second, we only buy things that we can understand,
- 10:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that we can build. and we can grow, and we can be responsible for, and we can be proud of owning. And the third, foundationally have more capital than anybody else, and build businesses off of that. And never, ever, ever get yourself in a situation where you don't have capital when things are going down.
- 11:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Nobody would take them. Brookfield did little to manage money for outside investors until the late 1990s, as he reminded shareholders in 2022.
- 11:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 11:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 2024, on Brookfield's own podcast, a colleague asked him to think back to those years when he was on his way to becoming chief executive.
- 11:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 11:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): remembered it this way: But we had a very successful investment business. and it was our own investment business. And I guess I was trying to convince Jack and the others and the board. His case was to put clients' money into the same kinds of real assets Brookfield had always bought for itself. Private equity was a young industry
- 11:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then, and property investors had only begun to raise money from institutions. The plan meant selling much of what the company then owned and putting the money into real estate, infrastructure, and renewable power, with the business of managing money for others built out over time. He went on. Starting off, oh, those first funds,
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nobody would take them. So it was 100% our money. But we had enough capital to be able to do that. And I think that was really the difference of why we were successful.
- 12:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 12:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): team's discipline helped as well. he added.
- 12:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 12:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield's Investor Day for its listed affiliates in September 2025, he said the asset management business had begun as a means, not an end. It was a way to do what Brookfield already did, in more countries and on a larger scale, owning a small share of something alongside many partners instead of all of it alone.
- 12:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): On stage at the Asset Manager's Investor Day that month, he looked back on the same years. Then there was no business, and we actually had to make it up, literally made it up as we went along. A quarter century later, he said, the business had become thoroughly institutional, and the team that ran it far more professional than the
- 13:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): founders had been. Early on, he recalled, Brookfield's marketing people had told him and his partners that there was only one way. to sell funds. And we said, well, we're not doing it that way. We invest and we're going to invest. And if people want to come with us, they will invest with us. He counted it among the most basic decisions they made,
- 13:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because it meant Brookfield believed in everything it invested in, with its own money in each investment beside its clients. Over the two decades after those first funds, he wrote in 2021. 2022, Brookfield's experience investing its own money served its clients well, and the asset management business grew fast.
- 13:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 13:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company he took over in 2002, as his first annual letter described it, had three strong operating businesses in real estate, financial services, and power generation. He wrote, but there is still much to do, both in our operating businesses and with our investment. investments in the resource sector. The resource investments included
- 14:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brascans mining holding, Naranda. Through 2002, the company kept building its asset management business for the steadier income that fees bring. Three years later, in his letter of February 14, 2005, he summed up the years since. We have been working in recent years to reposition the company out of cyclical resource
- 14:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): assets. and into lower volatility property, power, and long life infrastructure assets.
- 14:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the
- 14:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bloomberg interview of March 2022, he explained what the mining years had left behind. The mining businesses had been a rough ride everywhere in the world, so Brookfield sold them. But it found two outstanding businesses inside them. The first, many of the things we built for mines were global backbone. infrastructure. We actually
- 14:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kept some of the assets and started an infrastructure business. The second, and our renewables business, started because we had hydro plants in our mining businesses. Wind and solar came later. His letter for 2005, dated February 10, 2006, listed the goals the company had met that year and put this one first.
- 15:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We monetized our last major position. in the cyclical resource industry. It had also made real headway, the letter said, as a manager for institutions and private investors who wanted property, power, and infrastructure, and had launched a number of new funds.
- 15:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 15:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same letter reported that Brascan had recently taken the name Brookfield Asset Management, so that every part of its operating platform in every country would carry a single name. He wrote that changing a name that has over 100 years of history operating around the world is not to be done lightly.
- 15:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Walk away from the cliff.
- 15:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 15:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): talk Flat gave to Google employees in August 2018 had a set brief.
- 16:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
- 16:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): overview of the principles Brookfield follows. when it invests in real assets. After a word of thanks, he said that, over the years, we didn't have any secret sauce, and we had no strategy. Really, when we started, I would say it was based on the value thesis. Brookfield had worked out its approach over the years to
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): suit itself, he went on, and no approach is right in general, only right for a particular investor.
- 16:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 16:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a letter of November 2015, he had described how value investing itself had changed.
- 16:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 16:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was born, he wrote, when an investor's edge lay in knowing what others did not. With information instant and open to everyone, the edge had moved to interpreting it better. One habit, though, had held from the start. We're trying to walk away from the cliff.
- 16:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 16:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had the slide on the screen. and he said Brookfield kept it in many of its offices around the world to remind its people that one should always look for opportunity away from where the crowd is going and not go with the crowd.
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm had written down its investment guidelines 15 or 20 years earlier, he said, and they had barely changed since. Among them, buy on value and look for assets that produce cash or can be made to. even a bare piece of land if it sits in the right place. And he gave another rule. We try to invest, assuming that
- 17:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we're going to own the assets forever. Buying on that assumption, he explained, makes a buyer judge an asset on its long term fundamentals rather than on what it might fetch next month, even if Brookfield sells it in the end. In practice, it tends to hold what it buys for a very long time.
- 17:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Six months before the talk, in his letter of February 15, 2018, he had put the method in writing. Over time, we have found that the five most important principles to successful real asset investing are to stick to what we know, ensure that we are diversified, buy at a discount to replacement cost, focus
- 17:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on quality assets and businesses, and finance with asset-specific non-recourse debt.
- 18:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 18:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a letter of November 5, 2010, he had offered a label for what Brookfield owns. We think of the assets we buy as equity like fixed income investments. They behave like bonds, he explained, because their cash flows run far into the future, and like equities because those cash flows grow over time, through contract terms, the
- 18:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quality of the assets, or inflation. That held, he wrote, for almost every hard asset Brookfield owned, and the approach had proved itself in the downturn of the previous few years.
- 18:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 18:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of May 13, 2016, he explained why the cost of replacement matters to an owner of real assets. Over time, these assets must generate a cash return that justifies replacement value, or supply with. will ultimately contract. At Google, he gave the consequence for a buyer. In real estate and infrastructure,
- 18:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he said, nothing drives value more than buying in a good place for less than it would cost to build. Any competitor that comes later will have paid more, so the owner can either earn more or charge less.
- 19:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 19:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2016 letter also described how Brookfield values what it buys, with cash flow models. that run 10 to 20 years out, so that its judgment rests on something steadier than the news cycle.
- 19:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 19:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): clearest signal that it is time to buy, he told the audience, is a shortage of capital, and Brookfield searches the world for markets that money has deserted and where it has people who can act. His letter of November 11, 2011 had tracked that search over most of a decade. Today, our major value. focus is Europe. In
- 19:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2008, it was the US. In 2006, it was Australia. And in 2003, it was Brazil. Because most of the firm's capital comes with few restrictions, he said, it can take whatever form an opportunity offers: a public company or a private one, debt or equity. Patience, he told one questioner,
- 20:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): has to be built into pay. People in a new region are rewarded on the results of the wider firm, so that no one is pushed into a bad deal by how they are paid. He gave one asset as an example: a metallurgical coal terminal in Northeast Australia that Brookfield bought into in 2009. As he told it, two years before,
- 20:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the company that owned it before we bought it paid one and a half times its replacement cost.
- 20:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 20:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bought it for. 0.75 replacement cost. The fact is, the only thing that changed is that they were too positive at the time they bought it. We were able to buy it because we weren't too negative. News coverage, he had said just before, always pushes the good too far and the bad too far. Near the end of his remarks, his
- 20:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): advice to the audience was to try to be where others are not, and it doesn't feel good off. often, sometimes for long periods of time, but in the end, it's often extremely lucrative.
- 21:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Price versus value.
- 21:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 21:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): summer of 2011 brought another round of market turmoil. Brookfield's letter of August 10th that year reported on the quarter and then opened a section under a heading he would use again in later letters. It began: We are great believers that over the longer term, the price of a security will equal its value. Despite this,
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the short term, for many reasons, price often does not equal value. Price, in his account, is set by whatever money wants into or out of the market, a sector or a single stock at a given moment. and it moves with headlines that may have nothing to do with the business. Then he turned to value. The
- 21:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): difficulty is that there is no absolute value for anything, as there can always be wide views over an asset's growth profile and the appropriate discount rate. Brookfield published its own estimate of value, which it called intrinsic value. Book values, adjusted for assets, the accounting rules. do not carry at what they are worth.
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): He set a band on either side of it, from what the assets would fetch in a liquidation at the low end to what the business would be worth as a going concern at the high end. Six months later, in his letter of February 17, 2012, before he put a value on Brookfield himself, he set down a caution. Most management teams have
- 22:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a high estimate of the value. of the assets they are responsible for managing. This is usually because they are emotionally attached to the business, but also because they exercise control over achieving the plans. Managers also know more than outsiders, he allowed, because they work inside the business every day. His letter of August
- 22:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 12, 2016, opened the subject again with a definition. Value investing is, in essence, the arbitrage between price and value. Unlike classic arbitrage, he went on, this kind can lose money, pays out on no fixed schedule, and takes years of practice before an investor has the temperament for
- 23:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it.
- 23:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 23:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same forces, he noted, put a price on private assets too, even though no one quotes it daily.
- 23:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 23:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of November 8, 2018, after granting that price can stray for any number of reasons, he wrote, Our job, however, is to know value. Knowing value was not enough by itself. Brookfield controls most of what it owns and can choose when to sell, so it can realize value on its own timetable.
- 23:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): An investor who holds only the stock has to wait for the market to agree and cannot know when that will happen. He applies the same logic to Brookfield's own stock. Of buying back shares, he wrote in his letter of August 8, 2024, it is not, as some think, a method to boost the share price. In fact, one should
- 23:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hope to make these purchases at a lower price. Asked on the Knowledge Project, in an interview published in April 2025, whether he believed markets were efficient, he said. No, the answer is no. The markets are never efficient. In fact, very seldom do they ever trade at the actual value of securities. A
- 24:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): private owner, he said in the same conversation, has no quoted price to watch, only a business to run sensibly, deciding whether to pay out its cash or put it back to work. A daily price, by contrast, distracts people into rash decisions. In his view, sparing institutions that distraction is a large part of why private
- 24:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): assets have drawn so much of their money. Earlier in the conversation, he had described what the growth of index investing does to companies that fit no index. They can be left without natural buyers. Brookfield took one of them private when it was cheap, a large container shipping company that sat in no index and had a single. analyst covering it.
- 24:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 24:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Affiliates Investor Day in September 2025, asked what nearly a quarter century as chief executive had taught him, he said, in part, if you're outside of a company looking in, you see a stock. If you're inside of a company looking out, you own the business, and you don't really care what the stock does. In his letter of February
- 25:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 13, 2025, under a heading that asks whether one is an owner or a renter, he began with an everyday example. Consider the car you own and the care you take not to go too fast over speed bumps, for example. Conversely, rental cars are driven with much less care, and their depreciation is dramatically higher than owned
- 25:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cars. Apartments show the same pattern more sharply, he wrote. Rented ones wear out far faster than those they're occupied. their occupants own. Then he turned to investors.
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is our observation that people sometimes act like owners with their house, but act like renters with their investments. This is one of the great errors in investing.
- 25:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Cash only matters when it matters.
- 26:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 26:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): November 2016, nearly eight years into a rising market and with bond prices near their highs, cash and the assets closest to it earned next to nothing.
- 26:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 26:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a world like that, he wrote in his letter of November 11th that year, cash might seem to have no use at all. He argued that it was worth far more than its yield. Brookfield had been selling assets, paying down its bank lines, and letting cash build up. at some cost to growth in the short run. It had not stopped investing,
- 26:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he added, it was simply growing more conservative at the margin.
- 26:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 26:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explained the choice with a look back. During periods of illiquidity in the past, we did two things. We protected our franchise, and we acquired many of our greatest initial stakes in assets. Among them, he named the New York Office Building. buildings of Olympia and York and the Canary Wharf Portfolio in London, along with more
- 26:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): recent investments in emerging markets, assets that would never otherwise have come up for sale at sensible prices. Brookfield's growth, he wrote, owed a great deal to patience and staying power.
- 27:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 27:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): closed the passage this way. Bottom line: cash only matters when it matters. And when it matters, it really, really matters. At Google in 2018, he turned from opportunities to errors. The greatest mistakes in real asset investing, in particular in real estate and
- 27:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): infrastructure, have been made by those that misfinance their assets. Assets like these can carry heavy borrowing, he explained, which is what makes leverage so powerful. in his business, but only on long term loans that can survive a downturn. And many owners had lost fine assets for want of them. His own rule,
- 27:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as he put it in the 2025 podcast interview, is a sensible amount of debt on each asset, sized to get through bad markets and fixed in rate where possible, with money held back in case an asset needs support.
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And he
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): described how Brookfield borrows. All of our financing is asset by asset by asset by asset, or business by business by business by business. Brookfield does not borrow this way in order to hand assets back to its lenders, he added. Its reputation with them rests on standing behind its businesses.
- 28:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): His letter of February 13, 2020 had drawn the consequence. No single loan can ever create a forced liquidity event for the broader franchise or even parts of the franchise. Each loan is still structured to last through bad times, that letter added, and the approach had come through 2008 and 2009 in good
- 28:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): order.
- 28:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 28:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same letter explained why the consolidated debt looked larger than Brookfield's own. Accounting rules required it to consolidate many of the investments. it managed, borrowings included, though its economic share of most of them was well under half. Debt was half of the design, shares were the other half.
- 29:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 29:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of August 9, 2018, he pointed shareholders to one line in a table of Brookfield's long-run figures. You will note that all the other statistics compounded at about 15% to 20% over the last 20 years. but our share count has grown at less than 1%. Not having had to sell new shares, he wrote,
- 29:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was one of the main reasons for the company's record. Asked in the 2025 interview to describe the meetings at which Brookfield decides on a large investment, he said, What's really important is what are the risks, what can go wrong, how bad could it get, and how do we deal with it if that happens. And so we spend virtually all of our time on
- 29:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): downside protection at our investment committees.
- 29:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 29:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the same interview, he set out the terms Brookfield offers. What we promise our investors and our clients is that we will take moderate amounts of risk, not no risk, but moderate amounts of risk and earn good returns over long periods of time. We won't shoot the lights out.
- 30:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 30:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of November 9, 2020, 2023, he listed the principles Brookfield had settled on over many decades for financing itself. The first was to keep ample liquidity from more than one source at the parent company, and he gave the reason. Opportunities come to those with capital. Periods of stress, he wrote in the same letter, under the
- 30:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): heading Cash is King, are reminders to hold plenty of liquidity and to match how long capital. is committed with how long the investment needs it. Then he wrote: The most damaging position to be in is to be forced to sell assets or raise equity capital at the low point in a cycle.
- 30:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A year of opportunity. Fifteen years earlier, Brookfield had been on the other side of that trade. In his letter of November 7, 2008, under the advantage he called cash, he had written that most of the deals ahead would need less cash than usual and would take on more of the existing debt. Then came the line that
- 31:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): described much of what Brookfield would do over the next two years. The key will be a solid sponsor for a recapitalization plan.
- 31:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 31:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kept a short list of operating priorities. and reordered it as conditions changed. By his letter of November 6, 2009, one item had moved to the top. To be the sponsor others turned to for acquisitions, on the strength of Brookfield's operating ability, its standing with institutional investors, and its capacity to commit
- 31:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): capital. He explained. Only when we had our own house in order and the capital markets were back to some semblance. of normalcy did we start working on new asset acquisitions. In his letter for 2009, dated February 19, 2010, he gave the year a heading of its own and began 2009 was a year
- 31:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of outstanding opportunity for us as the global credit crisis peaked at the start of the year with a wholesale liquidation of risky investments by many investors. Rookfield did much of its buying through the debt of overextended owners, purchasing loans it intended to convert into ownership, and it stood behind a number of rights offerings. Next
- 32:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came the principle behind the buying. Simply stated, we believe that acquiring assets through distress situations offers one of the few ways to acquire assets at meaningful discounts to their intrinsic value.
- 32:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 32:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a distressed period, he went on. the owner is almost always carrying too much debt. The cash the assets throw off has shrunk, the mood is gloomy, and financing is hard to find, so few rivals can bid.
- 32:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One
- 32:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of those debts belonged to General Growth Properties, owner of a large portfolio of high quality American shopping malls. As Flatt Flat told it in his letter of May 6, 2010, Brookfield had approached the company about two years later. earlier, before it filed for bankruptcy, with a plan to recapitalize it on terms agreed in advance with its creditors.
- 32:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Events moved faster, and the bankruptcy came first.
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield had already studied the malls and the people who ran them. Early in 2009, it bought a large position in General Growth's defaulted bank debt for less than its face value, while making the case for the company to several of its institutional clients.
- 33:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 33:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the first quarter of 2010, that work led to an agreement under which Brookfield, with partners from one of its funds, would sponsor the company's recapitalization. He gave his reading of the case. General Growth is a great company. Other than a few events conspiring to cause the company a number of issues, too much short short-term term debt, the total
- 33:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shutdown of the capital markets, and a consumer consumer-led U.S. recession, this opportunity would never have been available.
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company emerged from bankruptcy in November 2010, with Brookfield's consortium holding a large stake. Early in 2011, Brookfield issued new shares of its own to buy more of general growth. His letter of May 11, 2011, set that decision against the record. Apart from a single corporate transaction, the company had issued
- 34:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): no meaningful number of shares since 1995, and it had later bought most of those back. But a platform of that size and quality was seldom on offer. He wrote: We have not changed our strategy. This was merely an exception to our rule. The outcome came in November 2013, when Brookfield arranged for its
- 34:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): consortium partners to cash out. That month, he gave the arithmetic. We initially invested $2.3 billion, and during the last three years, we realized $6.0 billion of value. That came to 2.6 times the capital invested, he added, and a gross internal rate of return of
- 34:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 38%.
- 34:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Another large recapitalization Capitalization had begun in the fall of 2009, while general growth was still in bankruptcy. In
- 34:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): his
- 34:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter of November 6, 2009, Flatt gave the background. About four years ago, when many new investors were attracted to the infrastructure sector, it became much more difficult, if not virtually impossible, for us to acquire assets at valuations that we were comfortable with. Brookfield's own rules on borrowing and valuation had kept it on
- 35:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the sidelines. The letter went on. Everyone knows what happened next. Too much capital, lots of over leveraged deals, and some lower quality assets sold at extreme valuations. For an investor with cash, that left an opening. Lenders needed someone to recapitalize good assets whose owners could no
- 35:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): longer carry them. His case in point was Babcock and Brown Infrastructure, listed in Australia, whose roughly $8 billion of assets Brookfield had just agreed to recapitalise as sponsor. The company would carry on under a new name, Prime Infrastructure, and some of its assets would pass to Brookfield directly. That deal
- 35:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is how Brookfield came to own its share of the coal terminal in Northeast Australia. Three months earlier, in his letter of August 7, 2009, he had reported a far smaller purchase. About 3,200 house lots in Riverside County, California, within an hour of Los Angeles, but in one of the weakest housing
- 36:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): markets in the country. Brookfield had picked them up through foreclosure for less than a tenth of the value put on the land and its improvements at the peak. His letter for 2010, dated February 18, 2011, reported that Brookfield's share price had risen 53% that year. He added, This came on top of the 51%
- 36:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): increase in 2009, although, despite these gains, we now know all too well how many increases it takes to recover from a year like 2008.
- 36:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 36:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): year later, in his letter for 2011, dated February 17, 2012, he raised the dividend and then explained why Brookfield still paid out only part of what it earned.
- 36:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 36:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): share it did distribute, he wrote, was right for a long-term business where growth relies on having capital available to capitalize on opportunities as they arise, and especially when others do not have the same access to funding. The next sentence named the evidence. Our acquisitions in 2009 to 2010 of General
- 37:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Growth Properties and Babcock and Brown infrastructure. and recent purchases of defaulted loan portfolios and other assets from European corporations illustrate why having strength to act when others cannot generally leads to exceptional returns.
- 37:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Ran these businesses. Those purchases took more than capital.
- 37:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 37:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bloomberg Television, in March 2022, Flatt was asked what Brookfield had done over 20 or 30 years that nobody else quite had. His answer? Look, I think because we started off as an industrial conglomerate, we're a little bit different. We're operating investors. We ran these businesses.
- 37:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And today, we act like and we do run these businesses.
- 38:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In his
- 38:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): opening remarks, at Brookfield's Investor Day on September 12, 2022, he returned to the point and added a second advantage. But also, when we go and talk to management teams, we understand what their issues are, and that does differentiate the franchise. The renewable power business that grew out of the hydro plants of the mining
- 38:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): days offered an early case. In 2004, while the American power industry was still absorbing the shock of Enron's collapse, Brookfield bought a large group of hydroelectric stations in upstate New York for $847 million. New York was then moving from fixed price electricity contracts to an open
- 38:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wholesale market, and Brookfield's power teams already knew how to sell into competitive markets from their work in Ontario and New England. They changed how the plants sold. their output so that it fetched peak prices, made the stations more reliable, and found new revenue without putting in more capital. By his letter of May 11, 2011, the
- 39:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investment had compounded at 45% a year and produced four and a half times its original capital.
- 39:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 39:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Terraform companies came to Brookfield by a longer road. For years, Brookfield had followed Sun Edison and its affiliates, competing with them in the same markets and often for the same assets. In 2015, Sun Edison ran into serious financial trouble. Brookfield considered taking part in its reorganization, as it had with many
- 39:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): companies, by buying the debt and later converting it into ownership. Measured against what it knew of the assets and the price of the debt, the numbers did not work.
- 39:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then,
- 39:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sun Edison went bankrupt, and the shares of its two listed offshoots, Terraform Power and Terraform Global, fell to prices Brookfield at last found attractive. Their trouble was twofold. With their parent gone, they had no management, and because they could not file their financial statements, few investors believed their
- 39:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): figures. His letter of November 9, 2017 set out what Brookfield brought. We believed we could solve the first issue with our people, and on the second, our advantage was that we had deep knowledge of the assets and countries in which they were invested. Brookfield was chosen to sponsor a recapitalization and ended with control of
- 40:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Terraform Power in a purchase that took close to two years to complete. It put in a new operating plan and got the company growing again. And in 2020, Terraform Power was merged into Brookfield's renewable power business in an all-stock deal. His letter of August 13, 2020, gave the result. This has given
- 40:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all Terraform shareholders, including us, a 35% compound return and over a tripling of value since our involvement with the business began. Westinghouse was distress of another kind. In 2018, Brookfield bought it out of bankruptcy for $4 billion. A deal that large for a company in that
- 40:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): condition drew few other potential buyers, he noted.
- 41:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 41:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of February 15, 2018, as the purchase was agreed, Flatt described the company's trouble. It ran into significant difficulties when it strayed from its core services business.
- 41:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 41:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company had tried, he later explained, to build nuclear plants on fixed-price contracts.
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business Brookfield wanted had nothing to do with the trouble. Servicing, maintaining, and fueling the nuclear plants already running around the world.
- 41:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 41:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went back over the purchase in his letter of November 10, 2022. Brookfield had made it through its private equity fund, because Westinghouse needed a turnaround and had put in about $1 billion of equity. borrowing the rest. He reported the outcome. The turnaround was extremely successful, and to date, the company has distributed
- 41:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cash greater than the original equity investment. Its debt is lower. Some cases take 20 years to tell, and Flatt seldom had the chance to tell one whole.
- 41:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 41:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of May 11, 2017, he did.
- 42:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 42:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1996, Brookfield had bought a New York real estate company out of bankruptcy, and with it, an office tower on Park Avenue. Over the years that followed, it renovated the building, released it at higher rents to stronger tenants, and twice borrowed more against the rising value, taking cash out each time.
- 42:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 42:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2017, it sold the tower. He tallied what the building had returned. In total, we received
- 42:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a building.
- 42:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $1.5 billion of cash from our initial $140 million investment, or more than 10 times our initial equity investment. He had his reasons for selling, he wrote, but we still believe that great real estate always outperforms what any arithmetic model can show. On September 10, 2025,
- 42:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the colleague interviewing him on stage asked where real estate stood. in its cycle. Before answering, Flatt said he had been listening to the day's presentations and added a point of his own. We started as real estate investors. What's being built out for artificial intelligence is the backbone of the global economy. And really, it's just a giant
- 43:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): real estate business.
- 43:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Relentless Incrementalism. In August 2018, having walked Google employees through case after case, Flatt turned to the question that usually follows a run of success stories. What goes wrong? Nobody can invest without making mistakes, he told them. Then he named some of Brookfield's own.
- 43:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sometimes we've got seduced to buy a bad business cheaply. That's a mistake. in what we do. Sometimes we started too large in a new business or a market. Sometimes we got the compensation incentive plans wrong. Later, when the questions came, the moderator asked him to pick the one mistake he would go back and fix.
- 43:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): He said there was more than one, and then chose I think 25 30 years ago, we probably should have paid more attention to what was going. on in technology. Brookfield had the means to build in that direction, he added, and had not used them. His annual letter of February 15, 2018, had carried a
- 44:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): section on lessons learned. Brookfield builds them into how it works, he explained, so as not to repeat its mistakes as it grows. One lesson concerned recovery.
- 44:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 44:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have also found that the single group greatest way to dig ourselves out of mistakes is to be patient with investments, and, in most cases, double down. That takes conviction, he added, and capital to spare, and it works best on a good business bought at the wrong time.
- 44:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 44:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had told such a case in his letter of August 12, 2016. In 2007, Brookfield had bought a mezzanine loan backed by a group of hotels. in Germany. Then came 2009. Our borrower defaulted on the loans and chose to walk from the investment. We made the decision to stay with it. Brookfield put
- 45:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in fresh cash, turned its loan into a stake in the hotels, and reworked several of the properties, which held up well through the crisis, as the original underwriting had assumed. In 2016, the portfolio was sold. All told, he reported, the original loan had earned 2.1 times its cost, a compound return of
- 45:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 13% a year. Earlier that year, in his letter of May 13, 2016, he had given the discipline behind all of this a name. We have found that the only way to ensure the avoidance of life-threatening mistakes in growing a business is to start slowly and grow methodically. We term this relentless incrementalism.
- 45:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Each business sets long-term plans for growth, he explained, but grows only when the numbers justify it, which usually means when others are under pressure and not growing at all. The approach needs a company spread across many businesses in many places, he argued, since human nature rarely lets a business stand still. With that spread, each
- 46:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one can afford to wait. It also lets Brookfield average its way in, with its capital and its knowledge alike.
- 46:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 46:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new country or a new kind of business usually comes through a small exposure picked up in an acquisition, and Brookfield learns it at little risk. Then, one of two things happens. It finds good people and builds, or it concludes the business does not suit it and leaves. One example from the same letter was a business supplying heating and
- 46:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cooling to office buildings in downtown Toronto. Once Brookfield had learned it, it added systems in Chicago, Seattle, New Orleans, Houston, Las Vegas, and Windsor. His other example was India, where Brookfield had chosen, more than a decade earlier, to build a presence. When we first went there, capital was flowing in with reckless
- 46:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): abandon. None of the valuations. made sense to us given the risks. In 2008, the markets cracked and India became a value market. Even then, Brookfield moved a step at a time, investing across most of its businesses there only years later and building each one up gradually. A decade later, in his letter of May
- 47:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 14, 2026, he set the method down as a sequence. We have codified how to do this over time, and essentially, in simple terms, it is watch, learn, invest, perfect, scale. Brookfield watches an industry, often for years, before committing serious capital. Learns
- 47:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how it really makes its money, invests in measured amounts, refines Finds the model, and only then builds it out. Every platform Brookfield had built successfully, he wrote. had followed that order. In the Bloomberg television interview of March 2022, asked how he reacts when an investment loses money, he described
- 47:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield's culture. Try to make as many small mistakes as you possibly can, but don't make any really large mistakes.
- 47:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 47:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is the promise of his first letter as chief executive: to do all he could to keep any mistake from threatening the company. turned into a working rule. He carried the rule a step further on the Knowledge Project in 2025. We want to make mistakes with our own money first, not with others. Our reputation with our clients is the only
- 48:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thing we have.
- 48:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Liquidity, liquidity, and liquidity. On March 23, 2020, nearly six weeks after his annual letter, Flatt wrote to shareholders again. Markets had fallen hard within weeks. Brookfield had been expecting a recession and a sharp sell off for some time, he wrote, though nobody could have
- 48:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): known that a virus would set it off.
- 48:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 48:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went through the company's resources one by one, from bank lines it had barely touched to new. funds only partly invested. He did not pretend the slowdown would pass Brookfield by. Its shopping malls would run well below normal for a while, and fewer ships would call at its ports. But its businesses were diverse, its borrowing had held up
- 49:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): through hard times before, and it would keep capital in reserve against the worst outcomes. Nor was it stuck with purchases it had agreed to and not yet closed. Far from it, he wrote. Every contested deal we tried to do over the past five months, we lost. We remained disciplined, which meant that we did not buy a number of businesses
- 49:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as their price rose. In hindsight, this was good. His first concern, he wrote, was to stay calm and keep Brookfield's people safe. Then he gave shareholders a sense of proportion. For us, compared to the direct hit we took on 9-11, this uncertainty and volatility feels manageable. It never feels very
- 49:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): good to have this degree of chaos, but this will pass.
- 49:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 49:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the same update, he pointed to a decision made the year before.
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2019, Brookfield had agreed to buy a majority stake in Oak Tree, the credit manager built by Howard Marks and Bruce Karsh, and best known for distressed debt. Flatt's letter of May 9, 2019, had given one reason. We have been bolstering our financial resources in preparation for the inevitable downturn in markets and credit that
- 50:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): will come at some point in time. Of that downturn, the March update said, now it's taking place. Looking back on the deal at the affiliates Investor Day in September 2025, he said it had widened our aperture. in credit in a very significant way. He closed the update by speaking to shareholders directly. It is
- 50:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very easy to invest in the markets when times are good, but it is in times of market decline that following the tenants of value investing matters most. Please know that we are watching out for your capital. Seven weeks later, in his letter of May 14, 2020, he could report that Brookfield had come through the quarter in reasonably sound condition,
- 50:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with most of its businesses barely touched by the pandemic. Tens of thousands of its people had spent those weeks keeping the water and power on, the offices running and essential services working, and he thanked them. Then he named what the business needed above all. In his words, it is liquidity, liquidity, and liquidity,
- 51:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in that order. Not the quarter's results, he went on, nor the investments made during the crisis, nor the next large fund. Each mattered, but none came first. The real test, as he saw it, was whether a business could get through a period like this, whole and without serious harm. And he added that, it is usually a function
- 51:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of having made preparations before the tide went out. Asked by his colleague on stage in September 2012, 2025 what had accelerated Brookfield's course, he pointed to the hard periods. In good times, he said, everyone does well. In tough ones, a business either goes backward or makes great strides. By his count, several of
- 51:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield's biggest steps of the past five years had been taken during COVID. It. Among them, an insurance business started from nothing. On the Knowledge Project in 2025, he described putting part of Brookfield's capital into insurance about five years earlier and why the timing had worked. We bought some excellent insurance companies at a point in time
- 52:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where they weren't doing very well because interest rates were extremely low. His letter of May 9, 2024, had been plain about what Brookfield brought to the business. Our expertise is in investing, it is not in making money from insurance.
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So, Brookfield sought out long-dated, low-risk obligations, much like the long-term debt it uses on its real assets, and put its investing skill to work on the capital behind them. As for 2020 itself, his annual letter of February 11, 2021, reported that the year had ended with the strongest quarter in Brookfield's history,
- 52:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): setting the year against 30 years of returns to shareholders. he wrote, Some years have been fantastic. Some were like 2020.
- 53:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Asset light or asset heavy? By the start of 2022, Brookfield's parent held about $50 billion of its own investment capital, net of debt, built up over decades by keeping. profits and watching asset values rise. Most asset managers, he pointed out, were younger or had paid their
- 53:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): profits out to their owners every year.
- 53:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 53:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter for 2021, dated February 10, 2022, Flatt took up what that difference meant for the company's future. He opened with the question itself
- 53:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 53:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are often asked if we would prefer to be asset light or stay asset heavy. Handing most of that capital back to shareholders would settle it quickly, he observed. Longstanding shareholders understood what the capital did for the business and were comfortable letting Brookfield invest it. For decades, the company's only aim had been to
- 53:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): compound its shareholders' capital, and its asset management business, started only about 25 years earlier, had not been mature enough. to stand on its own. He added, In fact, our business has grown faster and become more profitable because of the capital we have to support it. By 2022, though, the asset manager had become a
- 54:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): large business in its own right, with long-lasting fee income, and it could stand alone.
- 54:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 54:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): separate listing might open new ways to grow, he wrote, since Brookfield disliked issuing its own share. shares for less than they were worth.
- 54:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 54:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): listed doing nothing among the options and asked shareholders for their views.
- 54:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Ten
- 54:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): years earlier, in his letter of February 17, 2012, he had looked five to ten years ahead, to a time when the asset management business would be fully grown. At that point, he wrote, if its intrinsic value is not reflected in the share price, we will be able to separate this. business from our real assets to ensure the values are
- 54:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): surfaced.
- 54:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 54:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of May 12, 2022, he announced that Brookfield would split in two.
- 55:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 55:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two halves, he wrote, needed different things. One company would invest Brookfield's own capital for its own account, need a great deal of capital, and keep most of what it earned. The other would manage money for clients, need little capital. and so could pay out most of its earnings. Over close to 15 years, he noted,
- 55:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield had already turned its renewables, infrastructure, real estate, and private equity platforms into separately managed businesses, and he credited much of their success to teams devoted to each.
- 55:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 55:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): described the result. We think this is the best of both worlds. Separate identities for our two distinct businesses, but preservation of their ability to benefit each other, and thus all shareholders.
- 55:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 55:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): added a lighter note. Of course, any shareholder who likes things exactly the way they've been will be able to hold both shares side by side and have just that.
- 55:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 55:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the investor day that September, he told shareholders and analysts that the distribution would be simple to carry out, because Brooke Brookfield was handing the shares to its own shareholders, as it had done with other businesses before. Then the mechanics. We're distributing 25%. It'll be a one for four. Every four shares you own,
- 56:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you get one share. He ended his remarks on the manager this way Welcome to the new Brookfield Asset Management. For a brief period of time, you may be confused with the old. Brookfield Asset Management. His letter of November 10, 2022, spelled out what the parent was for. Its whole job would be deciding
- 56:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where its capital went, among its operating businesses and into new ventures, free of any restriction on how that capital could be used.
- 56:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 56:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shares of the manager went out the next month, in December 2022, and from then on, shareholders owned part. of it directly, not only through the parent. The old name went with the manager. Then came the year itself. In his letter for 2022, dated February 9, 2023, he wrote Our
- 57:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): underlying business performance was excellent in 2022, but, like everything else, Brookfield Corporation's stock performance was far from good.
- 57:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 57:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): addition to the general market, malaise, the distribution of shares of our asset manager caused some short-term pressure on Brookfield Corporation's shares. This has started to clear, and the underlying value of the business continues to compound away.
- 57:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 57:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): partnership of individuals.
- 57:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 57:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the March 2022 Bloomberg interview, Flatt was asked whether he ever stood back and took the credit for what Brookfield had become. He answered, Look, I would say I didn't build this. My partners and I built it. And the other 2,000 people built it, and it's not about me.
- 57:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 57:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the podcast conversation of April 2025, he was asked how Brookfield decides to hand large responsibilities to people early in their careers. He began with its rules: We're an extreme meritocracy. This is a partnership. It's a partnership of individuals. Nobody's family will ever be part of this
- 58:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): partnership. It's a meritocracy. For more than 50 years, as he wrote in his letter of August 11, 2022, Brookfield's Rookfield's senior leaders had run it together as a team on principles of value investing. teamwork, and fairness set down at the start. The organization keeps breaking itself into smaller entrepreneurial
- 58:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): groups with clear mandates, which widens what its executives learn. He explained how its leadership renews itself. To ensure the continuity and success of the partnership, we actively promote from within and move executives into new roles so they will be prepared to take on still greater responsibilities. responsibilities. Senior people are encouraged to
- 58:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stay on after handing over their frontline duties, he added, so that younger colleagues can learn from them and rise faster. With the split of the asset manager coming, it was time again to promote the next generation of leaders. Two years later, in his letter of August 8, 2024, he wrote that long long-term term planning for people is one of the things that
- 59:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): separate good companies. from great ones. At Brookfield, the chief executive may be the most senior of the partners, but a group of long-standing partners stand roughly level with him. And senior partners are expected to push younger ones into roles that stretch them. One rule concerned his own job. The CEO has the
- 59:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): final say in the partnership, but leads through respect and not the power of the position. Late in 2023, on Norgus Bank Investment Management's podcast, In Good Company, he was asked what Brookfield looks for in a recruit. He said, We hire people that are passionate about business. Mostly have an
- 59:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): EQ that allows them to deal with people and to grow a team.
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everything, he said, working as a team probably counts most.
- 1:00:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Later in
- 1:00:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the conversation,
- 1:00:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he added that people want to be part of something that wins, and that Brookfield builds its teams to win, for themselves and for its clients.
- 1:00:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:00:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also described how his own time divided. Roughly a third with clients, working out what Brookfield could do for each of them, a third on people and the business inside the firm, and a third on the investment committees, all of which he sat on.
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:00:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): call he enjoyed most came from one of the deal teams, asking him to come along and meet a company's chief executive.
- 1:00:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:00:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had once done that every day. By then, it was an occasional pleasure. The succession had been years in the making. In 2019, he wrote, in August 2024, the senior partners and the board began a review that looked 20 years ahead, and in 2024, 2023, it identified Connor Teske as the next
- 1:00:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chief executive of the asset manager. Flatt would hand over the role when the time was right for clients, investors, and Brookfield's own people, and would stay on to help with clients.
- 1:01:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:01:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): change took effect in February 2026.
- 1:01:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 1:01:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): annual letter of February 12, 2026, recorded it, and his own place.
- 1:01:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:01:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): will continue. as chair of that board in addition to my role as CEO of Overall Brookfield.
- 1:01:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:01:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had described the goal in late 2023 in the Norgus conversation. A new generation was being prepared, he said, to run the business one day. And the day that nobody knows my name and doesn't want to talk to me and wants to talk to them, I will have done my job.
- 1:01:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Grow on the stump.
- 1:01:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:01:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): February 12, 2026, Flatt signed his 25th annual letter to shareholders. One section took up what long-term success in business requires. He counted three things, which together make the difference between good returns and great ones. The first is a business built to endure and to change with
- 1:02:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the economy. Half of what Brookfield invested in, he noted, had not been something institutions commonly owned 15 years before, from telecom towers and data centers to solar plants and battery systems. The second is running the business well and leaving the returns to build on themselves. Over a horizon of decades,
- 1:02:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he wrote, compounding stops being. one factor among several and becomes the one that decides the outcome, so that a slightly higher return each year ends in a vastly different result.
- 1:02:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:02:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ranked the third above the others. One must never be disrupted in the compounding process. For us, it means that we must always keep excess capital available to ensure that we can ride through any market cycle.
- 1:02:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:02:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went on. Holding excess fortress capital does mean that one never maximizes short term returns, but it should be considered insurance. You only buy insurance for the possibility of a problem, and you hope you never have to make a claim. Earlier in the same letter, he had set down the record. For reference, $1 million
- 1:03:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): invested 30 plus years ago in Brookfield Corporation is worth $285. million today, representing an annualized return of 19%.
- 1:03:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Over the long run, he added, the share price had kept pace with his own estimate of the business's value per share. Nearly 17 years earlier, his letter of May 5, 2009 had reported on Brookfield's operations one at a time: the hydroplants, hydro plants, then the office towers, then the forests. Of the forests, he
- 1:03:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrote, we have curtailed harvest levels in response to lower log prices, to protect the value of our investment and let the trees grow on the stump. Private buyers, he noted, were still valuing timberland for the long term, and prices had held up through the slump. A year later, his letter of May 6, 2010 reported that
- 1:04:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): timber orders were picking up across North America. and that, for the first time, demand from China counted for something in the business. Then he added, We have been storing our trees over the past few years, so as prices increase, we will begin to sell our surplus inventory. In his letter of August 9, 2013, he told
- 1:04:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shareholders what the waiting had earned. He offered the case as an example of how the whole strategy works. Brookfield buys real. assets for less than they are worth, improves them, and in time turns them back into cash. Brookfield had bought Longview with its timberlands in the Pacific Northwest in 2007, just as the American housing
- 1:04:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): market was turning down, and had gone ahead because it had owned and run timberlands for a long time. It split the timber from the mill business, found new buyers for the wood in Asia, and managed the forests for their. margins over many years, rather than for cash in the near term. That meant cutting well below the usual harvest while builders bought little.
- 1:04:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Through the worst of the downturn, 2009 and 2010, it held production to 55% of what the land could sustainably yield. The trees left uncut But went on adding wood. In 2013, they were sold with the land, at a price among the highest. ever paid for American timberland. Through a hard stretch for anyone
- 1:05:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): who owned forests, he wrote, the timber business had compounded at 10% a year. In August 2018, toward the end of his conversation with Google employees, he was asked what advice he would give a young person starting out. Most people, he said, put money in, watch the price drop, and get out, and so end up selling at exactly.
- 1:05:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the wrong moments. He put it this way: So the miracle of compounding is just sticking with it. It's almost like anything in life. It's like business, it's like your individual relationships, it's like anything. You just have to stick with
- 1:05:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 1:05:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That concludes our audio program on learning from Bruce. Flatt. If you would like to be invited to a future Latticework Summit, subscribe to our Substack at Latticework.com.
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