Bill Ackman discusses Pershing Square's investment principles, activist campaigns, and lessons from major wins and losses.
Summary
Bill Ackman outlines Pershing Square's core philosophy of investing in simple, predictable, free cash flow generative businesses, symbolized by a granite tablet in the office. He recounts key activist campaigns, including successful turns at Canadian Pacific and Chipotle, and contrasts them with failures at JCPenney and Valiant Pharmaceuticals. Ackman details the firm's hedging strategy during the 2020 market crash, which generated billions in proceeds, and explains the structural shift to permanent capital via Pershing Square Holdings and the recent IPO of Pershing Square Inc. He emphasizes the importance of aligned shareholder bases, avoiding short selling, and focusing on businesses with high barriers to entry and low debt.
Key takeaways
- 1 you look at our most successful investments, they've usually been cases where we've done something that someone hasn't done before. Buying credit default swaps before a pandemic, for example, or investing in the stock of a bankrupt company, or shorting the credit of a AAA triple A company before the financial crisis. Those are among our best investments. AI would not have told you to do any of those things.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 4:27
- 2 The speaker notes that influence at Canadian Pacific was secured because other large institutional shareholders backed the campaign and were not seeking quick profits, highlighting the importance of aligned shareholder bases in activist campaigns.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 31:30
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 4:36
Introduction and Pershing Square Principles
The podcast introduces Bill Ackman and Pershing Square's history, highlighting the General Growth and Canadian Pacific investments. It details the firm's core principles, symbolized by a granite tablet, emphasizing simple, predictable, free cash flow generative businesses.
- 4:36 – 9:32
Early Life and Education
Ackman recounts his upbringing in Chappaqua, NY, his entrepreneurial childhood, and his time at Harvard. Key anecdotes include a bet on his SAT score, a lesson in safety from changing a flat tire, and learning persistence from his mother.
- 9:32 – 16:20
Career Beginnings and Gotham Partners
After working for his father and attending Harvard Business School, Ackman co-founded Gotham Partners in 1992. The segment covers the firm's early activist investments, such as Rockefeller Center properties, and its eventual closure in 2003.
- 16:20 – 19:26
Founding Pershing Square and Early Activism
Ackman explains the structural differences between Pershing Square and Gotham, focusing on liquid large-cap investments. He describes the firm's first major campaign at Wendy's regarding the Tim Hortons spin-off, termed 'transactional activism'.
- 19:26 – 24:28
MBIA Short and Bond Insurance Crisis
Ackman discusses his long-term short position in bond insurers MBIA and AMBAC, which began at Gotham. He details the 2008 congressional hearing where he presented his thesis on the insurers' over-leverage and the eventual payoff during the financial crisis.
- 24:28 – 29:27
General Growth Capital Restructuring
The transcript covers Pershing Square's contrarian investment in General Growth Properties during the 2008 crisis. Ackman describes buying equity in a bankrupt company, leading a Chapter 11 restructuring, and spinning off non-core assets to create Howard Hughes.
- 29:27 – 31:30
Canadian Pacific Activism
Ackman outlines the firm's investment in Canadian Pacific, citing its simple, predictable business model. He details the activist campaign to replace the board and install CEO Hunter Harrison, aiming to double operating margins through management changes.
- 31:30 – 34:32
Canadian Pacific and JCPenney Outcomes
The speaker describes the successful activist campaign at Canadian Pacific, noting its operating margin reached 39% in 2015 and Pershing Square sold its shares in August 2016. He contrasts this with JCPenney, where a new CEO's strategy of eliminating markdowns failed due to poor execution and lack of board alignment, leading to a turnaround filing 15 months after the CEO's hire.
- 34:32 – 36:55
Pershing Square Holdings and Valuation Errors
Pershing Square Holdings listed in Amsterdam in October 2014 to create permanent capital, inspired by Warren Buffett's move to Berkshire Hathaway. The speaker admits to a major valuation error in 2015, overvaluing 'platform value' which proved fleeting compared to tangible assets or operating businesses.
- 36:55 – 39:33
Valiant Pharmaceuticals and Capital Structure Changes
The speaker identifies Valiant Pharmaceuticals as a huge mistake, attributing it to distraction from raising capital and over-reliance on a General Growth analogy. To address outflows from large institutions, he and partners bought enough Pershing Square Holdings to prevent a wind-up, shifting focus from raising money to managing permanent capital.
- 39:33 – 48:25
Operational Reset and Investment Criteria
In January 2018, the firm stopped investor meetings to focus on investing, a move that initially caused withdrawals but later improved performance. The firm adopted a checklist favoring businesses with high barriers to entry, low debt, and strong management, explicitly avoiding short selling and 'platform value' assumptions.
- 48:25 – 51:48
2020 Market Crash and Hedging Strategy
Anticipating a market decline in early 2020, the firm bought credit default swaps on investment grade and high yield indices. The hedges generated $2.6 billion in proceeds against $27 million in costs, offsetting portfolio losses and providing capital to buy stocks at discounts, including a re-entry into Starbucks.
- 51:48 – 53:03
Netflix Sale and Investment Discipline
The firm sold its Netflix position by April 2022 after the company shifted its business model toward advertising, which widened the dispersion of outcomes. The speaker emphasizes that when new information breaks the thesis, the firm exits rather than trying to make back losses in the same way.
- 53:03 – 1:04:40
Activist Approach and Chipotle Turnaround
The firm cultivated 'reputational equity' to gain invited access to boards, exemplified by its friendly engagement with Chipotle. After a food safety crisis, Pershing Square helped recruit Brian Nickel as CEO, leading to a tenfold stock increase by March 2024.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | and later moved it to Pershing Square Holdings had earned 16.2% a year on. net asset value, compounded, over 22 years against 10.7% for the SP 500. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
General Growth stock fell from $63 to 34 cents in the fall of 2008, and Pershing Square's exit shares reached about $35.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check SEC filings (e.g., Schedule 13D/G) for Pershing Square's stake in General Growth Properties (GGP) and historical stock price data for GGP from 2008-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePershing Square Inc. listed in New York at the end of April 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check NYSE or NASDAQ listing records for Pershing Square Capital Management or related entities for April 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePershing Square was founded in 2003, and its first fund opened on January 1, 2004.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check Pershing Square's official website, SEC Form ADV, or press releases from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBill Ackman attended Harvard College and Harvard Business School.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check Harvard University alumni records or Ackman's official biography. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Gotham Partners opened in early 1993 with a little over $3 million and closed in 2003.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check SEC filings for Gotham Partners or historical news articles from 2026 and 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceAckman's father was a mortgage broker in a family firm started around the 1920s.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:36
How to verify: Check Ackman's interviews or biographies for details on his father's career and family business history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ackman put away about $2,000 by the time he sat for the SATs.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·5:26
How to verify: This is a personal anecdote; verify via Ackman's published interviews or speeches where he recounts this story. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Gotham Partners was co-founded with David Berkowitz in 1992.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check SEC filings for Gotham Partners or historical records of the firm's formation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePershing Square's first major activist investment was at Wendy's regarding the Tim Hortons spin-off.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·17:31
How to verify: Check SEC filings (Schedule 13D) for Pershing Square's stake in Wendy's and press releases regarding the Tim Hortons spin-off. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCanadian Pacific's operating margin reached 39% in 2015, better than projected.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:50
How to verify: Check Canadian Pacific Railway Corp. 2015 Annual Report or Q4 2015 earnings release for operating margin figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Pershing Square sold the last of its Canadian Pacific shares on August 4, 2016.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:50
How to verify: Check Pershing Square Capital Management Q3 2016 investor letter or SEC Form 13F filings for Q3 2016. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePershing Square Holdings listed on the Stock Exchange in Amsterdam in October 2014.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·34:32
How to verify: Check Amsterdam Euronext listing records or Pershing Square Holdings prospectus for October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Pershing Square Holdings listed in London in 2017.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·34:32
How to verify: Check London Stock Exchange listing records or Pershing Square Holdings investor materials for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Valiant Pharmaceuticals was sold because any further gain would not repay the attention it consumed.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:06
How to verify: Check Pershing Square Capital Management March 2026 investor letter for discussion on Valiant Pharmaceuticals. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Pershing Square Holdings was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in July 2020 as a $4 billion SPAC.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·57:26
How to verify: Check NYSE listing records or Pershing Square Tontine Holdings (PSTH) prospectus for July 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
PSTH returned $4 billion to shareholders on July 26, 2022.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·58:42
How to verify: Check PSTH press releases or SEC filings regarding the liquidation and distribution of SPAC assets in July 2022. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePershing Square Inc. listed its shares in New York under ticker PS in April 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:05
How to verify: Check NYSE listing records or Pershing Square Inc. IPO prospectus for April 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceInvestors in Pershing Square's first fund (Jan 1, 2004) earned 16.2% annualized net asset value over 22 years, vs 10.7% for S&P 500.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:45
How to verify: Check Pershing Square Capital Management February 2026 investor letter for performance data and S&P 500 total return index data for the same period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ryan Israel has been the Chief Investment Officer since 2022.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:01:51
How to verify: Check Pershing Square Capital Management press releases or investor letters from 2026 regarding management appointments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Review Pershing Square Inc. (PS) SEC filings (S-1, 10-K) for financial performance, fee structures, and risk factors following the April 2026 IPO.
- Examine Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) annual reports and press releases to verify the 39% operating margin in 2015 and the timeline of Pershing Square's exit in August 2016.
- Analyze Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG) stock performance data from March 2024 to validate the claim of a tenfold increase under CEO Brian Nickel.
- Check Netflix (NFLX) earnings reports and investor presentations from 2022 to understand the shift toward advertising and the resulting dispersion of outcomes.
- Research MBIA and AMBAC bond insurance financial statements from the 2008 financial crisis period to verify the over-leverage thesis presented by Ackman.
- Review General Growth Properties (GGP) Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings and the subsequent formation of Howard Hughes Corporation to assess the restructuring details.
- Verify the $2.6 billion proceeds from credit default swaps against the $27 million cost during the early 2020 market crash using Pershing Square's public disclosures or reputable financial news archives.
- Look for counter-arguments to Ackman's view that AI cannot replicate unique investment insights by reviewing academic or industry literature on AI in quantitative finance and alternative data analysis.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to a new Latticework Audio program, brought to you by the research team at MOI Global. In the fall of 2008, the stock of General Growth, a mall company facing bankruptcy, had fallen from $63 to 34 cents, and everyone expected its shareholders to lose everything.
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Bill
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ackman looked at the malls instead, and Pershing Square bought the stock. Counting its spin-offs, the shares reached about $35 by the firm's exit. The best result, his letter said, the firm had ever had from a company it owned. You will hear how a proxy contest brought new leadership to Canadian
- 0:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Pacific, and why he says business quality is the one thing the firm does not compromise on.
- 0:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bill Ackman. Sleep at night, make money. Engaged ownership, cheap protection, permanent capital. A piece of granite.
- 1:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): each desk at Pershing Square sits a small tablet, made to look like stone. Bill Ackman, who founded the firm and runs it as its chief executive, wrote about it in his letter to shareholders of March 2022.
- 1:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): called it the physical form of the fourth pillar of the firm's turnaround, a renewed commitment to the principles behind most of its returns, and a reminder of the kind of company those principles allow it to own. The firm, he added, had been greatly rewarded for keeping to them. The tablet and the principles on it belong Belonged to the same moment.
- 1:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 1:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a meeting with the firm's investors in London in January 2018, a slide listing Pershing Square's core investment principles appeared for the first time, in a presentation that told them the firm had learned from its mistakes. By February 2024, the slide carried a picture of the object itself a gray slab with the texture of stone,
- 1:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the principles printed on its face in four groups, and the firm's name on a plate at its foot.
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 2:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wording on the slide has been revised a little in the years since. Its first line has not moved. Under the heading for the key characteristics the firm looks for in a business, the line reads, as it did in London simple, predictable, free cash flow generative business.
- 2:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 2:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tablet has a story, and Ackman has told it on more than one stage. In Omaha in 2024, he told it at a UBS fireside conversation. before an audience of investors, with his chief investment officer beside him.
- 2:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 2:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): moderator asked how the tablet had come about. Well, it came about by when we veered. So we had a great initial first dozen years at Pershing Square, and then we made the biggest investment mistake, certainly of my career. He left the investment unnamed. Then he came to the decision itself, and to what he did about
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it. Had we stuck to our core principles, we'd never made the investment in the first place. And we'd always talked about these principles, but we hadn't sort of engraved them in stone. So I told a member of the team come back with a piece of granite and a chisel, and we're going to put this up on the wall. And he came back with a deal toy. Copies went onto
- 3:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the desks, and with them went a standing order from the man who. had asked for the granite. And the kind of the advice to the team was: if I ever veer, just hit me over the head with this thing. And it worked. Most of the principles on the slab had appeared in one wording or another in his letters to investors for years before they went on to it. On
- 3:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The Knowledge Project, a podcast released in September 2026, he spent more than an hour in a conversation that ranged over how he invests, how the firm is run, and what the firm's mistakes have taught him. Near the middle of it, after he had walked through the way Pershing Square researches a company before it buys, he was asked how the firm
- 3:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uses artificial intelligence in that work. He said that the team used it mostly as a research tool, a way to learn about a subject, and that it had not crept deeply into the firm's process or into the building of its models. Then he widened the answer.
- 4:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 4:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you look at our most successful investments, they've usually been cases where we've done something that someone hasn't done before. Buying credit default swaps before a pandemic, for example, or investing in the stock of a bankrupt company, or shorting the credit of a AAA triple A company before the financial crisis. Those are among our best investments.
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): AI would not have told you to do any of those things.
- 4:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 4:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): flat tire. Ackman grew up in Chappaqua, New York, a suburb in Westchester County whose commuter trains ran to the city. His father was a mortgage broker in the family firm, which an earlier generation had started around the 1920s to arrange financing for real estate developers.
- 4:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 4:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was a comfortable childhood, with a good school system and a nice house. But there was no allowance. His parents did not believe in one, and if he wanted money, he had to earn it.
- 5:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 5:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oxford in October 2013, speaking to business students, he described the enterprises that followed.
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was an entrepreneur as a kid. and I had my car waxing business, and I had my ditch-digging business, and you learn about the relative measures of different businesses. There's only so many ditches you can dig yourself.
- 5:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 5:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the time he sat for the SATs, he had put away about $2,000.
- 5:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 5:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told his father what he expected to score, his father asked how much he wanted to bet on it, and Ackman named the whole $2,000.
- 5:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Ackman told the cadets at the Citadel how it ended when he spoke there in April 2025.
- 5:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 5:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Friday before the SATs, my dad got a bit nervous and he withdrew the bet.
- 5:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 5:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Columbia Business School's podcast Value Investing with Legends in October 2025, asked about the early experiences that had shaped his temperament, he went back to the family driveway.
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One of
- 6:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the tires on his father's car was flat, and his father saw a chance to teach him how to change one. Ackman took the owner's manual out of the glove box and read what it said. Put the car on a level surface, jack it up, change the tire.
- 6:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 6:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): driveway had a grade to it, and he told his father he needed to move the car. His father said the driveway was pretty flat. Ackman pointed out that the manual called for a level surface.
- 6:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 6:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): father said it was fine. So he jacked up the car and took the bolts off. And with his legs under the car, he pulled at a tire that was stuck. The car began to tip off the jack. He got his legs out from under it before it came down. And it was this very significant moment for me, because my father is someone I have enormous respect for, and my
- 6:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): parents always told me to listen to them. But my takeaway from the whole experience was: I'm always going to listen, but I'm going to make my own decisions, because it's my life that I have on the line. At Oxford, where his father was in the audience, he was asked about his family, and he began with his father. So, my dad told me that I should never
- 7:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): work for anyone else because they'll never pay me what I'm worth. And then he tried to convince me to work for him. Then he turned to his mother. I describe myself as the most persistent person in America, but actually, that belongs to my mother. When he was a boy, the trains that ran from their town to New York were old diesel locomotives,
- 7:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): late and rusting, and the commute was so slow that his father rarely got home in time for dinner.
- 7:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 7:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mother joined a grassroots group that was trying, without much success, to improve. the service, and she turned it into something. She ran a petition drive, and in the end, the line was rebuilt as a modern electric railroad. He had watched it happen. As he put it, so you learn competitiveness from mom, entrepreneurship
- 7:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from dad. At Harvard College, he went out for crew at a time when a student could still row onto the team without being recruited, and for four years he stroked the varsity third boat.
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Columbia podcast, he counted it among the most meaningful parts of his Harvard years, one of two that happened outside the classroom. In his words, rowing really teaches you that the limits of your physical, mental limits are much greater than you believe. The other was a job with Harvard student agencies, selling advertising in its
- 8:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): student travel guides to hotels. rental car companies, and credit card companies around the world.
- 8:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): taught him to sell, and he would draw on that when he came to raise money of his own. He also wrote a book. At college, he collected the application essays of students who had been admitted to Harvard, interviewed admissions officers, and assembled a guide to the college essay. He knew nothing about publishing, so he asked a family friend, an author, for advice.
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The friend said the subject was too specific for a book, and the manuscript was rejected.
- 8:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 8:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): year later, two men from Yale published their own book on how to write a college application essay, and it became a bestseller. He told the story to a podcast interviewer in September 2023. He had known the idea was right, he said, and he had let the grown grown-ups ups talk him out of it.
- 9:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He made
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): himself a promise about the next good idea. I'm just going to do it anyway. And that became my iconoclastic willingness to go against kind of the system, or to go against our elders or conventional wisdom.
- 9:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 9:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lot of Moxie. After college, he went to work for his father.
- 9:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For a
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): little under two years, he arranged loans for developers, in a job where a new man was handed a telephone and a directory and told to go find his own clients.
- 9:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 9:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was a sales job, but it taught him real estate, debt, and equity, and something more lasting, as he said on the Columbia podcast. It was my first mental model for thinking about the value of something.
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explained what he meant.
- 10:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Real
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): estate people. don't care about accounting. They care about cash flow. So I had this cash flow-focused view of how to think about value. The people who seemed to be having the most fun in that world, he decided, were not the ones providing the service, but the ones making the investments.
- 10:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 10:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): asked his father who in his circle was a good investor, and his father sent him to a friend of his, Leonard Marks. Marks recommended that he read Benjamin Graham's The Intelligent Investor.
- 10:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 10:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next thing he read was one of Warren Buffett's annual letters to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, and then the others. Speaking in Omaha in 2024, he was plain about where that reading led. The vast majority of what I know about investing, I learned from Warren. And sometimes you have to relearn things that you learned from Warren.
- 10:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 10:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went to Harvard Business School to learn how to be an investor, and he did not go back to the family firm.
- 10:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 10:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had not read the course catalog before he enrolled. When he arrived, he found that the school did not offer a single class on how to pick stocks. So, he taught himself. About a month in, he opened his first brokerage account at Fidelity with the $40,000 he had made at his job after tax. taxes. This was going to be
- 11:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): my tuition in the investment business. I said, look, if I lose it all, it's equivalent to another year of school. And the first stock I bought went up. And that was the beginning. And it was October of 1990. In a written interview conducted in November 2014 14 for Graham and Doddsville, Columbia Business School's
- 11:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): student investing newsletter, he had added a coda. I think if it had gone down, I would have become a real estate developer or something. Reading annual reports alone in a dormitory room was lonely work, and before long, he brought in a classmate from his section, David Berkowitz, who lived a floor above him.
- 11:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 11:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two of them read filings together, formed an investment club of two, and used the Bloomberg Terminal in Baker Library. By
- 12:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): their
- 12:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): second year, they were imagining what it would be like if people paid them to do it. There was a precedent close at hand. Seth Clarman had graduated from the same school ten years earlier and had been backed to start his own firm straight out of it. If he could do it, Ackman reasoned, so could they. And the worst case was that he would have to
- 12:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): get a job. His father did not see it that way, as Ackman recalled at Oxford. in October 2013. He told me it was a really dumb idea to start an investment fund right out of business school, and he recommended that I go work for Michael Steinhart or George Soros or one of the other famous investors at the time.
- 12:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 12:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I figured that I knew enough. This is the perils of youth. Gotham Partners, which he started in 1992 with Berkowitz, needed money, and the partners had no record to show anyone. In March 2023, on the podcast 20 VC, he described the search. It was a bit like blind dating. A
- 13:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lot of blind dates. Not much success. They pitched well over a hundred prospective investors, and six said yes. What worked was the telephone.
- 13:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 13:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went down the Forbes list of the 400 richest Americans. and made cold calls. And four of the six who said yes came from that list. The partners told them they were Warren Buffett devotees who would buy public companies after detailed research, and that they were passing up jobs at firms like McKinsey and Goldman Sachs to do it.
- 13:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We sold them on track record of life success. No experience, a lot of Moxie. Berkowitz, who had taken a job at a bank after graduation, would not go forward unless they raised $3 million. By February, they were stuck short of it, and without a March launch, they were finished. For their meetings, they had written up
- 13:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): four investment ideas, and one prospect, the heir of a well known New York real estate family, had turned them down and then invested in all four ideas himself.
- 14:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then
- 14:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he called back. I invested in your ideas, and I felt it was morally wrong for me not to invest with you guys. And he gave us a half million bucks.
- 14:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 14:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a CAZ investments podcast released in September 2026, he recalled what happened once the others had committed. And my dad sort of last minute Minutes said, Okay, well, maybe I'll put some money. Gotham opened for business in early 1990s. 1993, with a little over $3 million.
- 14:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Activist Tendencies. Looking back in October 2025, he summed up Gotham's first years.
- 14:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 14:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I first started, it was a small capital base. We were buying cheap things with a catalyst. That was Gotham.
- 14:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 14:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): described the next stage to Graham and Doddsville in November 2014. Gotham was not set up to be an activist hedge fund. It just sort of happened. I don't remember the moment we decided to intervene in a company. In practice, as he explained at the Citadel, it meant finding companies that were undervalued Valued because they were making poor
- 15:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): decisions, buying a stake, and helping them make better ones.
- 15:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The first
- 15:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big activist investment Gotham made, as he has described it, was in Rockefeller Center properties. It was a public company that owned a $1.3 billion mortgage on Rockefeller Center, at a time when Japanese owners were walking away from American real estate.
- 15:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 15:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mortgage was headed for default, and a stake in the company offered a claim on one of the most famous properties in New York for pennies on the dollar. Gotham bought one.
- 15:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 15:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Forbes Iconoclast Summit in June 2025, he described what he did next. I literally called every billionaire on the list to see if we could find a partner to buy control of this mortgage.
- 15:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 15:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): met a guy named Joe Steinberg, and it ended up becoming very important to me. At the same event, he recalled a verdict passed on him in those years.
- 16:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 16:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): remember meeting a CEO. actually in the 1990s in my first fund, and he said, Bill, I think you have activist tendencies. And he didn't mean it in a very positive way. Gotham closed in 2003 and returned its partners' money. Berkowitz went in a different direction, and Ackman started again on his own.
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 16:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Columbia podcast, he listed what he did differently the second time, beginning with who would make the decision. decisions. You kind of need one person that's ultimately accountable. The second change concerned what the new firm would own. The early years of Gotham, we invested in only liquid securities. About six, seven years in, we went
- 16:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): back to the partners. We got permission to do illiquids and privates and set up side pockets. I said, you know what? Too complicated. Pershing Square would stick to liquid. large companies. He also invested more than he had at Gotham in the systems and infrastructure behind the investing.
- 16:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 16:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): last item on his list concerned his own judgment. I set up an advisory board, a group of people that were investors, gray hairs, who I could go to. He founded Pershing Square in 2003, and its first fund opened on January 1, 2004.
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Among
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its backers at the launch was Lucadia, the company Joe Steinberg had built. Asked in March 2023 whom he admired, Ackman named Buffett, his own parents, and the man he had met over the Rockefeller Center mortgage, singling out what Steinberg had meant to the course of his career.
- 17:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 17:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new firm's first campaigns were fought from outside the boardroom. One of the earliest was at Wendy's, the restaurant company. Pershing Square's idea was that Wendy's should spin off its subsidiary Tim Horton's, and the firm was still small enough that, to take a meaningful position, it raised a separate co investment fund to sit beside its own.
- 17:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In 2023, he described the firm's first approach. We knocked on the door, and literally we couldn't get a return phone call from management. So, in what he presented as an unusual step for its time, the firm hired Blackstone, which then had an investment bank, to write a fairness opinion on what Wendy's would be worth if it spun off Tim
- 18:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hortons. Blackstone came back with a valuation close to Pershing Square's own. The firm mailed it to the company and made it public with the filing that disclosed its stake. And the case now carried Blackstone's name. He said, and magically, the company. did a spin-off. I call that transactional kind of activism. As the firm
- 18:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): became better known, it no longer needed to borrow a bank's name. A public letter or a presentation at an investment conference could carry the argument instead. The proposals stayed transactional, the kind of advice a company might have bought from its own bankers. At one consumer company that owned golf, spirits, and hardware businesses, the firm. argued that the
- 18:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): three would be worth far more apart. He came to call that first era Pershing Square 1.0. Looking back, in his letter of March 2015, he wrote that the firm had then sought changes to how a company was put together, a sale or a spin-off, rather than to how it was run. The first example he gave was Wendy's.
- 19:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In the September 2023 interview, he weighed the model. You can make pretty good money doing it, but you have to start all over again every time.
- 19:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The cost of carry.
- 19:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 19:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): February 14, 2008, Ackman appeared before a subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee at a hearing on the state of the bond insurance industry.
- 19:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He was
- 19:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there. as the managing member of Pershing Square. After a few words about his firm and a word to say that he had not come to discuss its long investments, he said why he had come.
- 19:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 19:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): am here to talk about a short position we have in the holding companies for the two largest bond insurers, MBIA and AMBAC. Back.
- 19:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 19:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): took up the question of his own motives early and briefly by turning to the executives. who ran the companies he was betting against and who owned their stock and their options. They are long, we are short. We both have, you could argue, a bias. His own interest, he went on, lay with the policyholders whom the insurers had promised
- 20:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to pay.
- 20:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 20:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wanted the insurance subsidiaries to hold on to as much capital as they could so that they would have a better chance of making good on those promises. The bet he was describing was six years old, and it had begun at Gotham. In 2002, after an earlier bet against a lender's credit, made with credit default swaps, he went back to one of the
- 20:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): counterparties who had sold Gotham those swaps, a trader he believed was at Lehman at the time.
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 2025, he recalled the question he had put to the trader. What other triple A rated company do you think doesn't deserve a AAA rating? And he said, there's this company, MBIA, that guarantees a ton of stuff. I don't get how the magic works. You should take a look at it.
- 21:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 21:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): read the annual report, and more than two decades later, he said he still had his copy somewhere, full of his own notes. MBIA FBIA had begun as the Municipal Bond Insurance Association, guaranteeing the debt of towns and cities, where the job was mostly to review the paperwork and stand behind obligations that almost never failed. He
- 21:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): described what the guarantee did. They put this good housekeeping seal of approval on the debt. Now, with that AAA rating, you attract a lot of flies. There was only so much money to be made in that business, and over the years, as he saw it, the company moved further and further out on the risk. curve. By the time he was studying it in
- 21:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2002, it had, by his count, a trillion dollars of obligations on about $5 billion of equity. In his words, so it wasn't an investment predicated on a view that the real estate markets would be blowing up. It was predicated on the view that all you had to have was a tiny little bit of thing go wrong, and this thing is
- 22:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): toast. The swaps. were what made the bet possible. He has explained them in plain terms to audiences of students. There was an instrument invented a year or two earlier called a credit default swap, which is basically like an insurance policy you can buy on a company. Because the company had a triple A rating, the insurance on the company defaulting was
- 22:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): almost nothing. The contracts generally ran for five years, longer than he expected to need. and they could be extended. Nobody else knew what he knew, so he asked the firm's lawyers how to get the word out. They told him to write it all down, with a footnote for every fact, and to publish it. Joe Steinberg invested alongside, through a
- 22:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): separate partnership set up to buy more of the protection. The document had an unambiguous title. It was a 66-page white paper entitled, Is MBI. MBIA Triple A? At Oxford in October 2013, he recalled what followed. And I came public with this, and I was largely ignored. And I kept at it because
- 23:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm a persistent guy. He made presentation after presentation. The price of the protection, meanwhile, kept falling. The bet outlived Gotham. When that firm closed, its funds unwound the position, but a separate vehicle held the same bet, and at Pershing Square, he placed it again. It was that position he was
- 23:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): describing to the subcommittee in 2008. His statement that day was not only a case against the holding companies, he also brought a proposal meant to protect municipal bonds and those who held them from the insurers' downgrades. The rating agencies, he argued, had long graded municipal debt more harshly than. corporate debt of the same risk.
- 23:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Put both on the corporate scale, and most municipalities would rate highly enough on their own to remain eligible for the money market funds and pension funds that may hold only highly rated bonds, even if their insurers were downgraded. Later in the hearing, he answered one of the insurers' own executives. The solution to the problem
- 24:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is simply transparency. The financial crisis reached the bond insurers early. Seventeen years later, on the Columbia podcast, he gave the ending. By the time the financial crisis came around, we eventually got a big payoff. And since the cost of carry was so low, we could have paid premium for 30 years, and it was
- 24:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): still been a decent investment.
- 24:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 24:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Most Contrarian Investment.
- 24:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 24:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the fall of 2008, with the financial crisis at its worst, Pershing Square found a company that seemed to be beyond anyone's help.
- 24:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 24:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Citadel, he walked the cadets through the case.
- 24:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 24:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shopping mall company called General Growth, second largest shopping mall company in the country. The stock went from $63. a share to $0.34 in like six months. They had $27 billion of debt, about $15 billion coming due in the next 18 months. General Growth had borrowed in the market
- 25:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for commercial mortgage securities, and in the crisis, that market shut. It could not refinance, Finance, and everyone expected it to go bankrupt. Ackman looked at the malls instead. Occupancy had risen from one year to the next, rents were up, and so was the income the properties produced. They were among the best malls in the country,
- 25:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and the business under the debt was sound. He said: everyone who had invested in a company that had gone bankrupt, the shareholders had lost all their money. But I didn't understand why that had to be the case.
- 25:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 25:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): read up on bankruptcy and called the firm's lawyers. He told them he thought the assets were worth more than the liabilities, and asked why the shareholders should not be able to make a meaningful recovery.
- 25:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 25:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lawyer's answer was short: It can happen, but it never does. When a company went bankrupt, they explained, its shareholders sold, and investors in distressed debt bought the debt at a discount. So I said, well, we're going to do something different. At General Growth, the distressed investors he knew were buying the debt.
- 26:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pershing Square bought the stock.
- 26:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 26:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): began buying in November 2008 and kept buying through the months that followed, disclosing its growing position every few days.
- 26:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 26:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 2025, he described what that required. You have to have a lot of confidence that you're right when the whole world is making fun of you.
- 26:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 26:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter to shareholders of March 2015 would later mark general growth as the beginning of a second era for the firm, which he called Pershing Square 2.0, and he noted the milestone that opened it. In GGP, I joined my first board since the inception of Pershing Square, more than five years after we launched the firm.
- 26:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): On the Knowledge Project, he told what the firm did from there. We were pushing the board. to file for Chapter 11, but our view is we could run a restructuring where the shareholders could keep their investment in the company, maybe with some dilution. General Growth filed in April 2009. Pershing Square led the restructuring from inside the boardroom,
- 27:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and it worked. Along the way, the firm helped recapitalize the company and had a hand in choosing its new management. The next step was the firm's own invention. Besides its malls, General Growth owned a great deal of land, including master planned communities it had acquired with an older company, Rouse, and the stock market
- 27:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): did not like those businesses. So, Pershing Square took everything that was not a first-class mall, put it in a new company, and spun that company off to General Growth's shareholders in November 2010. The development assets the new company was left holding, his letter recalled later, were widely doubted at the time. On the Knowledge
- 27:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Project, he described the usual arithmetic. Normally, when you spin off a company from another company, the spinning company's stock price drops by the value of the thing you spin off, because it's kind of like a dividend. This time, General Growth's stock went up. The new company needed. a name. Rouse had once bought the real estate interests
- 28:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in Las Vegas of the industrialist Howard Hughes, and Ackman on the CAZ Investments podcast remembered choosing. I thought Howard Hughes, kind of a cool name. But the fortune was made on the mall company. This was just a way to make the mall company more attractive. Because the firm had created Howard Hughes from idea to launch, it had to
- 28:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): help build the new company's board. And in the same letter of March 2015, Ackman explained how he came to lead it. I became chairman because there was no one else logical to serve in this role. He held the chair until 2024 and returned in May 2025 as executive chairman. His letter of August 2025
- 28:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gave the record. Counting the companies spun off from it, general growth had gone from 34 cents a share at the firm's first purchases to about $35 at its exit, and the Pershing Square funds had made $2.8 billion. It was, the letter said, the best result the firm had ever had from a company
- 29:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it owned. Few investors will buy the shares of a company headed into Chapter 11, he told the cadets, because everyone says it has to go to zero.
- 29:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you do a little bit of work, a lot of work, and have an insight, those are the best examples.
- 29:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): With a mandate.
- 29:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Two of those engagements ran through the same years, and on October 29, 2013, he told the story of both to students at Oxford's Saeed Business School.
- 29:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 29:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): began with what the firm looks for: a business that is simple, predictable, generates cash, and we can be confident we'll be here 50 years from now. His example was a railroad. A rival cannot Not simply lay new track beside an existing line, and, short of some dramatic change in technology, goods
- 30:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would move by rail for a very long time. Pershing Square began buying Canadian Pacific in the fall of 2011.
- 30:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 30:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): described the railroad as the firm had found it. It had the lowest profit margins, it was trading at the lowest valuation relative to earnings, and had a very unhappy Happy shareholder base. Its operating margin was 19%, about half that of its closest competitor.
- 30:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 30:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm concluded after months of study that nothing in the railroad's network or assets held it back. The opportunity lay in its leadership. With the right person running it, the railroad could be worth a great deal more.
- 30:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 30:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): man they had in mind was Hunter Harrison, who had twice before taken a railroad that trailed its industry and doubled its margins, and who had most recently run Canadian National.
- 30:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 30:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oxford, Ackman described him and how the firm began working with him. Widely considered the best railroad executive of all time, certainly in North America, we hired him as a consultant. He helped us study the railroad, and he had plenty of fire in his belly.
- 31:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 31:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): railroad's board, among the most distinguished in Canada, turned the firm down. and Pershing Square took the question to the shareholders in a proxy contest, nominating seven directors. In May 2012, all seven were elected, and the new board soon chose Harrison as chief executive. When Ackman spoke at Oxford, the results were
- 31:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): already visible. He said, and it's almost the most profitable railroad in North America after 16 months. That's how quick this guy goes to work. Later in the talk, he came back to Canadian Pacific and to why the campaign had succeeded. The only reason why we were able to get and have the influence we had is because the other shareholders
- 31:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): backed us. They were large institutions, he said, and they were not in it for a quick profit. The railroad's operating margin reached 39% in 2015, better than the firm had projected. On August 4, 2016, Pershing Square sold the last of its shares. The letter reporting the sale summed it up. This sale marked
- 32:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the end of our five-year investment in CP, which was a noteworthy success. The second story at Oxford went the other way. Pershing Square had invested in JCPenney in the same years, and he told the students it had known on the way in that the risk was higher than at Canadian Pacific. The reason retailer was more than a century old and well past its
- 32:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prime. It had come to depend on constant markdowns and coupons to move undifferentiated merchandise. But its brand, he believed, was faded rather than lost, and it owned, or held on long, cheap leases, some of the best real estate in America's shopping malls. He was invited to join the board, and he did. The board was planning
- 32:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for the succession. of its chief executive, and a candidate from outside kept surfacing as the best executive in retail. Ackman helped persuade him to take the job. The new chief executive gave up a great deal to come, and then bought long dated options in the company with his own money. Ackman said, I thought this is the absolute perfect
- 33:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thing. We've got a great platform at a really cheap price, we have the perfect alignment of incentives. and I thought, it's done. But it didn't work. Many of the early changes went well. Costs came down, and assets the company did not need were sold. But the new strategy replaced the markdowns and coupons with everyday prices, and it
- 33:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was introduced across the whole country at once, rather than tried first in a few stores or a region. It failed. Fifteen months after the new chief executive was hired, the company found itself in a turnaround. Speaking in October 2013, he gave the students the lessons. This was what I call an extreme makeover of a company.
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And when you do an extreme makeover, it requires perfect board alignment and backing for the CEO. And we didn't have that. I don't think I'll ever go on a board and be one of 11 anymore. I like going on with a mandate. like in Canadian Pacific. Retail, he added, is a business in which a new idea can be tested in a
- 34:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): single store or a region before it is tried everywhere, and a retailer has to listen to what its customers want. Then he said what he still thought of the plan. I still love the vision for JCPenney. I think it was right. I think the execution was difficult.
- 34:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The humility side.
- 34:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 34:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 2014, Pershing Square listed a closed end fund, Pershing Square Holdings, on the Stock Exchange in Amsterdam. A London listing followed in 2017.
- 34:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 34:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): called the listing perhaps the most significant thing the firm accomplished that year.
- 34:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 34:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): month later, Graham and Dodd. Doddsville asked him what the new vehicle was for.
- 34:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 34:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): answered with a story about Buffett. Having bought control of Berkshire Hathaway, Buffett gave the partners in his investment partnership a choice take their money in cash or take Berkshire stock.
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the bargain, he walked away from a partnership's share of the profits and its freedom from corporate tax to run a small public textile company for a salary. Why would anyone make that trade? Ackman answered that if you are a control oriented investor, you recognize that the stability of your capital base has a huge impact
- 35:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on your returns over time. Then he tied the story to his own firm. That's basically what inspired us to create a public entity. He said he thought of the new fund less as a fund than as an investment holding company. one that stayed with a handful of businesses for years and often sat on their boards. His letter of January
- 35:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2016 began: 2015 is a year we will not forget. There had been no broad financial crisis, he went on, and most of the firm's companies had made progress in their businesses. Yet the funds had just had their worst year and their steepest fall from a peak. He began with his own mistakes. The first was
- 36:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a missed chance to trim holdings as they neared his estimate of what they were worth. Then came this. Our biggest valuation error was assigning too much value to the so-called platform value in certain of our holdings. Platform value was real, he wrote, but it was a more fleeting kind of value than a drug, an operating business,
- 36:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or a building, because it depended on cheap capital, on unusually gifted managers, and on the market for deals. He ended that letter on the balance an investor has to strike. The confidence to commit money without perfect information while others doubt weighed against the readiness to recognize a mistake. No one at the firm had enjoyed
- 36:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its worst year, he wrote, but it certainly does a good job reinforcing the humility side of the equation that is necessary for long-term investment performance.
- 36:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 36:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter of March 2017 turned to Valiant Pharmaceuticals, a drug company Pershing Square had bought into in 2015. Clearly, our investment in Valiant was a huge mistake.
- 37:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 37:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm had sold the last of it, he explained, because any further gain would not repay the people and the attention it would go on consuming. One of
- 37:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 37:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reminders he set down concerned what a steep fall in a stock price can do on its own. It can destroy value through what it does to morale, to recruiting, and to a company's reputation. He named the analogy that had misled him. General growth, bought after an almost total collapse, had given him the confidence that the firm could help
- 37:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Valiant recover from its own. Later, in the same letter, he wrote, My approach to mistakes is that I personally assume 100% of the responsibility on behalf of the firm while sharing the credit for our successes. It is much more painful to lose our shareholders' money. And for this, I deeply and profoundly apologize.
- 37:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 37:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Columbia podcast in October 2025, he maimed the cause. Valiant pharmaceuticals did not meet our simple, predictable model. Didn't meet our checklist. The deal toy on every desk grew out of that failure. In 2026, he traced it one step further back. I attribute our biggest investment mistake to
- 38:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): my being distracted by having to be on the road to some extent, raising capital. In the hedge fund business, he explained, money leaves a manager who does very well because large institutions find him too big a part of their portfolio. portfolios, and it leaves again when he has a bad stretch. Part of the repair was his own money. With a couple of his partners, he
- 38:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bought enough of Pershing Square Holdings that its other shareholders could no longer vote to wind it up. On the Columbia podcast, he described the thinking behind it. I looked up, I was 50 years old at the time, and I said, okay, how much capital was Buffett managing when he was? 50? So I said, okay, not
- 38:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): inflation adjusted, but we got almost 10 times as much capital as Buffett. Let's get out of the business of raising money, running a hedge fund, particularly a big one.
- 39:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 39:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter of March 2021, he counted that larger investment by the firm's own people among the causes of its recovery.
- 39:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 39:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Citadel, he summed up the sequence. My ambition was always to get to a place where the capital was permanent, where it would never leave. And the path by which I got there? It was that failure that created the opportunity to create permanent capital.
- 39:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Returning to our roots.
- 39:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 39:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the end of 2017, the firm made a change that involved. no stock at all. In January 2018, it told its investors that, with one exception, the members of its investment team would no longer meet with them. Letters, conference calls, presentations, and the annual investor meeting would keep them informed, and the
- 39:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investor relations team would handle the rest.
- 39:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 39:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): knew that some institutions might leave over it, and he accepted a stretch of heavy withdrawal. withdrawals as the price of a change he believed would serve the investors who stayed. In March 2022, he looked back at the years before the change.
- 40:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 40:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he started Gotham, he wrote, his ambition had never been to build a large asset management firm. It had been to produce one of the best long term investment records, and the goal had been the same when he launched Pershing Square. Success had brought capital, and capital had brought a second job, keeping investors and finding new ones,
- 40:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): until I had inadvertently become the chief marketing officer of Pershing Square. Investors who had committed large sums wanted to see the chief executive and his team at least once a year. Even a five-minute check-in in the middle of the workday can materially disrupt the flow essential to the research and investment. process.
- 40:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): His view of the change, four years on, was plain. It was a good decision. Freed of the meetings, the team could give effectively all of its working time to its investments, and he credited much of the firm's success in the years that followed to that focus.
- 41:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 41:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter of March 2019 had already described the restructured firm as returning to our roots as an investment-centric. operation. In it, he judged the portfolio one of the highest quality groups of businesses the firm had owned since it began, the product of a renewed discipline about what it would buy. Near its end, the letter said:
- 41:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As I have often said, experience is making mistakes and learning from them. And learn Return, we have done. The reset, as he laid it out three years later, had rested on four pillars. getting out of the investments that had gone wrong, shrinking to an organization built around investing, steadying the firm's capital, and
- 41:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): holding hard to its core principles. He put the lesson of the Herbalife short in one sentence of his March 2018 letter. While we believe that deteriorating business fundamentals and a high valuation are a good recipe for an attractive short sale, technical factors. are a critically important additional consideration. A year later, he
- 42:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrote that the firm had no current intention of shorting stocks. By March 2022, writing about activist short selling as a whole, he added, Fortunately for all of us, and as importantly for our reputation as a supportive, constructive owner, we have permanently retired from this line of work. The new shape of the firm was
- 42:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tested within the year. In December 2018, the market broke. Index funds, exchange traded funds, and computer driven trading, he observed, had led to occasional shocks like that one, in which falling prices frighten investors, investors pull money from funds, and the funds must sell into the decline.
- 42:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pershing Square used the fall to buy Hilton, the hotel company, who whose strength, he wrote, was a large and growing network of brands and hotels that served guests and hotel owners alike, each side reinforcing the other. His letter of March 2019 said of that purchase: we would likely have been sellers rather than opportunistic
- 43:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): buyers had PSH been subject to the risk of investor redemptions.
- 43:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What the tablet says.
- 43:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 43:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tablet on each desk carries a short list. As set out in January 2018, after the opening line, the list asked for businesses with formidable barriers to entry, limited exposure to forces the firm cannot control, generally low debt and little need for the capital markets.
- 43:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 43:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): favored liquid mid and low. large cap companies.
- 43:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 43:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): asked for a fair price and for a valuation that did not lean on future acquisitions or on platform value. It asked for management of high integrity, with a record of success and the right incentives. Another heading allowed for the occasional bet with a lopsided payoff, kept small and inside the firm's circle of competence.
- 44:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 44:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): September 2023, in a podcast, interview, he gave the spoken version. Basic commandments are: we want to buy the best businesses in the world. Simple, predictable, free cash flow generative, dominant companies, as Warren Buffett would say, with a moat around them. The firm also wanted strong balance sheets and good
- 44:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): governance, he went on. And a fair price seldom buys all of that. Something is usually missing. And then, the one thing we don't compromise on is business quality.
- 44:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 44:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): businesses had to be the best there were, and after that, the job was to buy them at attractive prices and use our influence to make sure that they're managed and governed correctly. That's it. Pretty simple. The test of quality is an old one for him.
- 44:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 44:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a lecture for the floating university, published in 2012, he gave the last item on his own list. You want to invest in a business that you could theoretically own forever. If the stock market were to close for 10 years, you wouldn't be unhappy. Compounding over a working lifetime, he told his listeners, rewards owning a business rather
- 45:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): than hopping from one to the next, and very few businesses qualify. His example was Coca-Cola, Coca Cola, which sells its syrup in almost every country. and has made a little more money nearly every year through world wars and every other upheaval of its long life. In 2026, he said an investor has to see with real confidence what
- 45:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a business will look like 10, 20, and 30 years out, and that the firm judges even its easily traded holdings that way. He put the old test again a stock market shut for 10 years, and added It's good discipline. On one point, he and Buffett part company. Buffett, as Ackman tells it, has long held
- 45:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that the best businesses earn high returns on capital and keep finding room to reinvest more of it at those returns.
- 45:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 45:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 2025, Ackman answered, I think that's a very good business, but I disagree with him. The best business, in his view, earns enormously. enormous returns on the capital it already has. In order to continue to grow at a high rate, they don't need to reinvest. You can actually literally take that capital out of the business.
- 46:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 46:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business that needs little capital, he added, can usually grow faster. Hilton was one of his examples. It owns the brands, and other people put up the capital for the hotels. Judging how long a business will stay that good has become harder. Even Buffett, whom he has called the greatest investor of all time, did not foresee, he
- 46:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): said, what the Internet would do to a business like WorldBook. Then he turned to the newer threat. All of us are guaranteed to look foolish with one business or another that we didn't anticipate the risk of disruption because of AI. The firm owns few companies, and it means to. At
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Citadel, he explained why. Most investors make the mistake of owning too many things. And the reason for that is diversification protects you from ignorance, right? If you don't know what you're doing, just do a lot of things, right? The wealthiest people in the country made their money generally in one company. They had a portfolio of one.
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What makes the concentration bearable is the kind of thing owned. A simple, predictable, durable business bought at a fair price, he told the Columbia Newsletter in November 2014, is hard to lose much money on. His letter of March 2015 set out how the firm protects itself. A few very sturdy baskets,
- 47:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kept where no margin call could force their sale at the wrong moment, and watched with great care.
- 47:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 47:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrote We call this approach the sleep at night. approach to risk management. How much goes into each of those few is set by weighing the gain the firm hopes for against the permanent loss it could suffer.
- 47:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 47:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): short list of great businesses means long waits.
- 47:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 47:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Knowledge Project, he described what the firm keeps in reserve a library of companies that we've followed for a long period of time. So we do the work and then put it aside on valuation concerns. His letter of August 2026 put that library at hundreds of businesses, tracked and updated so the firm can move
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quickly when the price is right. Then it waits for a market scare to bring one of them to its price.
- 48:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Overinsure.
- 48:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 48:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): annual letter for 2019.
- 48:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): written while the crash of 2020 was still unfolding, told the story. In January, the firm had sold its stake in Starbucks, whose price had neared its estimate of the company's worth. Then, the virus came. Early in 2020, he wrote: We considered, for the first time ever, liquidating the portfolio in its
- 48:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): entirety because we believed it was likely that markets would decline. materially. After reviewing the portfolio, we concluded that a hedging strategy was more consistent with our long term ownership philosophy. Selling everything, he judged, would likely lead to a worse long term result than keeping the companies and protecting them.
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): late February, the firm bought credit default swaps on indices of American investment grade and high yield corporate debt. and on a European investment grade index, the same instrument he had once turned against the bond insurers.
- 49:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 49:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): March 3, it disclosed that it held large hedges. Markets fell hard.
- 49:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 49:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the hedges rose in value, the risk of staying short credit grew less attractive against what was left to gain, and the money they held could now buy stocks at deep discounts. Between March 12 and March 23, the firm closed them out, and they generated total proceeds of $2.6 billion for the Pershing Square funds,
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): compared with premiums paid and commissions totaling $27 million.
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gains roughly offset what the stock portfolio had lost on paper over the same weeks.
- 49:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 49:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): money went straight back to work, into companies the firm already owned, at deeply discounted prices, and into Starbucks, sold only two months before.
- 50:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 50:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): did not claim to know where the bottom was. He chose to be a large buyer while markets fell. Most of the firm's companies, he noted, were considered essential businesses that would stay open through a shutdown as far as they could, and the strategy behind them should serve the firm well under the strain. Losing a year or two of a durable company's cash,
- 50:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he argued in the same letter, takes away only a small part of what the company is worth. His letter of March 2021 opened, 2020 was the best year in the 17 year history of Pershing Square. Net asset value had risen 70.2%. In March 2022, he wrote down how the firm thinks about protection
- 50:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of this kind. It does not hedge to smooth. out ordinary swings in its results. When macro considerations warrant the purchase of protection and the price of the insurance is favorable, we overinsure. When the storm hits, we cash in the policies and buy more of what we already own andor new companies that are available at a big discount. The
- 51:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cost, he conceded, is the occasional policy that never pays, because no one forecasts perfectly. He had done it. again with interest rates. From December 2020, the firm bought protection against rising rates, expecting inflation to push short-term rates sharply higher. Like the credit swaps, the protection was built so that the most it could lose was
- 51:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): small, and the most it could make was many times that. It was sold at a large profit. In March 2023, he returned to that trade. We were completely ahead of the curve. and the mistake was not making that a bigger bet, because we were a little timid. In January 2022, the firm sold some of those rate hedges and put most of
- 51:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the proceeds into Netflix, a business it had long admired and studied but had never owned. The opening had come when Netflix's subscriber guidance disappointed and the stock fell hard. The firm met the company's management and shared its detailed analysis of the business. Weeks later came the first quarter results, and with them a required shift in the
- 52:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business model toward advertising. The firm had sold its last share by April 20, 2022. In August, his letter to shareholders explained the sale. While we have confidence in Netflix's superb management team and their long term record, we believed the dispersion of outcomes had widened such that it no longer met our requirements for a core holding.
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Looking back on the Knowledge Project, he put the rule in general terms. You make an investment in a company and then you learn new information that's inconsistent with the original thesis. You either have to buy a lot more because the stock's gotten cheap and you believe that the new information is not material, or you have to exit because the thesis is broken. The money went into
- 52:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a business the firm could forecast with more confidence. and he explained why that was enough. For us, we don't need to make it back the same way we lost the money.
- 53:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Invited in. In March 2022, he wrote that for five years, every one of the firm's dealings with the companies it owned had been friendly and productive.
- 53:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 53:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): world of large public companies is small, he observed, and word of how the firm behaved had spread among the people who run and oversee them. Most of the firm's engagements had always been quiet and constructive, he added, and for that reason, little known.
- 53:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 53:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cordial meeting makes no headlines, and a proxy fight does. He meant to keep things that way, because it made the job easier and more enjoyable. Then he gave the approach a number. So, if it is helpful to call this quieter approach Pershing Square 3.0, let it hereby be so anointed.
- 53:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 53:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Knowledge Project, he was asked why the change had come. When we went into the business, we didn't have credibility or reputation. We hadn't been in the boardroom. You can buy 5% of a company and you have to win on the power of the idea to get the big institutions to support you. And so today, we buy a stake in the company. We
- 54:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): literally get letters from the CEO.
- 54:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 54:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letters, he said, thanked the firm for investing.
- 54:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 54:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Citadel, he had put it more briefly. You build what I call reputational equity over time. We haven't had to barge our way into the boardroom. Today, we get invited in. Influence of that kind usually has. to be bought, with a premium for control, because the power to change a company's management, governance, and strategy is
- 54:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): valuable.
- 54:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 54:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm tends to buy when investors have lost patience with a company and its stock is cheap.
- 54:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 54:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 2025, he described what it gets instead. We get the control premium at a discount, or the control benefit at a discount, which is a huge advantage. In return, as he wrote in March 2019, the firm shares what its work creates with the other shareholders, whose support gives it that influence in the first place.
- 55:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A large patient shareholder, he argued in the same letter, can shield a chief executive from Wall Street and give a public company something of a private owner's time horizon. The letter also described the firm's part once a strong chief executive is in place.
- 55:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Most of the time, our CEOs rarely hear from us. More often, they seek us out. We view our job as oversight, not day-to-day management. The model case began in 2016. Pershing Square bought a stake in Chipotle, the fast casual restaurant chain, after a run of food safety problems had hurt its sales and
- 55:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its name. His letter of March 2017 gave the reason. reasoning. We have always believed that a good time to buy a great business is when it is in temporary trouble. He expected the business not only to recover, but to come out stronger.
- 55:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 55:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Forbes summit in June 2025, he said of purchases like that one: a stock can be expensive at 10 times earnings, and it can be cheap at 50 times earnings. What matters is not next year's earnings. What matters is the present value of the cash over the life of the business.
- 56:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 56:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the firm bought, many investors thought the company might not survive, and by the usual yardsticks, it did not look cheap. It was cheap only to a buyer who expected to help put the company right. That meant finding the right person to run it.
- 56:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 56:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): November 2017, Chipotle began a search for a new chief executive, with its founder. moving to executive chairman. Asked on the Knowledge Project how the firm recruits a chief executive, he said that finding someone who's done it before is the lowest risk, highest return potential.
- 56:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
- 56:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Chipotle, one name kept coming up, and the firm used expert networks to talk with people who had worked for him and people who had competed against him, then met the man himself.
- 56:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 56:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was the logic that had brought Hunter. Harrison to Canadian Pacific. A Pershing Square partner sat on the three person committee that helped find him. And on February 13, 2018, Chipotle announced that Brian Nickel, who had led the turnaround of Taco Bell, would become its chief executive. Six years later, his letter of March
- 57:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2024 needed two sentences. Chipotle's stock is up more than tenfold since Brian became CEO. in March 2018. What more can we say?
- 57:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Capital that can't leave.
- 57:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 57:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): July 2020, the firm took Pershing Square Tontine Holdings public on the New York Stock Exchange, a $4 billion blank check company. Its sponsor, Pershing Square, took no fees, no advisory payments, and none of the founder shares that sponsors of such vehicles usually keep for themselves. Together with
- 57:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the fund's own commitment, it was the largest such vehicle in the world, and demand ran so far ahead of the offering that he could choose the shareholders. His letter of August 2020 set out the aim. We designed PSTH to be the most investor and merger. friendly SPAC in the world. The idea was to offer a
- 58:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): good private company a public listing with a minority owner, rather than a buyer who demanded control. In June 2021, Tontine agreed to buy a stake in Universal Music Group from Vivendi after seven months of diligence and negotiation.
- 58:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 58:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): agreement passed to the Pershing Square funds, which completed the purchase on time and on the original terms. The seller, he wrote the following March, had wanted an owner able to hold for the long term, with its own money at stake and a record as a steward for other shareholders. The firm, he added, needed no exit strategy.
- 58:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Tanteen itself returned its $4 billion to its shareholders on July 26, 2022. Pershing Square Holdings stayed as it was. In March 2023, he wrote that the firm was still weighing ways for it to become part of a company listed in the United States. By February 2024, the firm had
- 59:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): concluded that it would remain a listed closed end fund over the long term.
- 59:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 59:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): February 2024, the firm announced Pershing Square USA, a closed closed-end end fund to be listed in the United States that would largely mirror Pershing Square holdings. It spent two months presenting the fund to investors and launched the offering. That July, in his words, we withdrew the offering. The firm then turned
- 59:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to its own ownership. In June 2024, it sold a minority stake in itself to a group of outside investors, among them institutions and the founders of other investment firms, and set up an independent. board, with Ackman as its chairman. The firm had sold new shares to fund its growth, he explained, not to let its owners
- 59:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cash out, because continued growth is part of what keeps any organization sound over the long run. With outside owners and a new board, he wrote in March 2025, we have taken important additional steps toward our goal of making Pershing Square a perpetual life enterprise. At the end of April 2026, the
- 1:00:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pieces came together. Pershing Square Inc. listed its shares in New York, under the ticker PS, alongside a $5 billion initial public offering of Pershing Square USA. Investors who bought into the fund's offering also received shares of the manager. Pershing Square Inc. is the manager, the company that earns
- 1:00:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fees for running the money. Pershing Square Holdings and Pershing Square USA are listed funds that it manages, and they own much the same portfolio. In his letter of February 2026, he had set down the long record. Investors who had put money into Pershing Square's first fund on January 1, 2004,
- 1:00:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and later moved it to Pershing Square Holdings had earned 16.2% a year on. net asset value, compounded, over 22 years against 10.7% for the SP 500.
- 1:00:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:00:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the CAZ podcast, he explained the design behind all of it.
- 1:01:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 1:01:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're a long-term investor and your investors can pull your money in three months, you're not going to succeed. And so we set up our kind of business model in a way where the liabilities match the assets.
- 1:01:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A life-changing investment.
- 1:01:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 1:01:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he started Pershing Square, he recalled on the Knowledge Project, he did nearly everything himself.
- 1:01:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:01:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came up with the ideas and hired an analyst to help him carry them out.
- 1:01:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:01:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2026, the firm ran on a team. In an industry where people moved from firm to firm for enormous bonuses and turnover is the rule. Pershing Square had almost none. Its investment team had been the same group, with a couple of additions, for about nine years.
- 1:01:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 1:01:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): recruited mainly from private equity, and no one on it was paid on a single stock. Every member's pay rode on the whole portfolio. Since 2022, his chief investment officer has been Ryan Israel, who joined the firm in 2009. Announcing the appointment, Ackman assured investors that he was not stepping back
- 1:02:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and that he loved the work. A partner ran the business side, which left him free for strategy and the occasional idea. The work itself, he said, is basically simple, and the firm to some degree runs itself through delegation, incentives, and alignment. A team that keeps changing, he said, never learns whether its members
- 1:02:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are telling one another the whole truth about the risks and rewards of a position. Years of working side by side had built a culture of candor, and I don't for a second ever question anything that's being told to me by a member of the investment team. The final say remained his. But, he said, I am no longer the guy that
- 1:02:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): generates the bulk of the ideas. I'm someone that generates a minority of the ideas in the portfolio. Few firms in his industry, he had observed in March 2024, last a decade, let alone 20 years. He had long studied a company built to last. He began following Berkshire Hathaway Pathway in 1988 and had
- 1:03:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): attended most of its annual meetings since the early 1990s. and Buffett, he wrote in August 2019, had clearly designed it to succeed for decades after he stopped running it.
- 1:03:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:03:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Knowledge Project, he was asked what had made it work. Ackman answered with a list. He had permanent capital. He didn't pay dividends. He retained all the capital the business generated. He had a talent for investing in common stocks, and he was able to recruit. talented people to run the various businesses of Berkshire Hathaway.
- 1:03:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): He added one more. Buffett had not diluted his shareholders by handing out options or paying for acquisitions in stock. Earlier in that conversation, he had come back to the list on the desks. Having a checklist is actually not a bad way to make sure you avoid mistakes. Then he was asked what success means. The returns could be measured.
- 1:04:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he allowed, but he answered in other terms: for the people whose money the firm manages. They should make a life-changing investment with us so that by the time they retire, they can do the things they want to do. They can pay for education for their kids, they can buy the house they want to retire
- 1:04:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in.
- 1:04:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That concludes our audio program on learning from Bill Ackman. If you would like to be invited to a future Latticework Summit, subscribe to our Substack at Latticework.com.