Great Investors

Chris Hohn discusses TCI's shift to constructive activism, barriers to entry, and capital allocation discipline.

1h 3m Listen to the original Episode page
ActivismCapital AllocationMoatsCorporate GovernanceClimate DisclosureInvestment Philosophy

Summary

Chris Hohn outlines TCI's investment philosophy, emphasizing intrinsic value compounding and durable moats over short-term price movements. He details the firm's evolution from hostile campaigns to constructive engagement, driven by the rise of passive indexation and the difficulty of mobilizing votes. Hohn highlights specific activist successes, including campaigns against Safran, Airbus, Altaba, and Alphabet, focusing on capital allocation and margin discipline. He also describes TCI's 'Say on Climate' initiative and the firm's internal culture of intellectual humility and teamwork.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    was not trying to change a business it doubted, it was defending Ending a business it rated highly against a use of capital it judged poor.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 40:41

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 7:47

    Introduction and CSX Activism

    The program introduces Chris Hohn and his philosophy that intrinsic value compounding matters more than stock price. It details TCI's 2007 letter to CSX, where the fund held 4.1% of the company and argued for operational improvements and better capital allocation based on replacement value rather than historical cost.

  2. 7:47 – 16:53

    TCI's Investment Philosophy and Background

    Hohn discusses his education at Harvard and early career at Apax and Perry Capital. He explains his preference for public markets over private equity due to the latter's tendency to acquire weaker businesses and the difficulty of exiting large public companies.

  3. 16:53 – 27:38

    Barriers to Entry and Moats

    Hohn defines risk as not knowing what you are doing and emphasizes identifying businesses with durable moats. He categorizes protections into physical assets, intellectual property, network effects, and switching costs, noting that competition and substitution are the primary threats to profits.

  4. 27:38 – 35:21

    Long-Termism and Concentration

    Hohn argues that holding great companies for decades is a key strategy, focusing on businesses with durable competitive advantages.

  5. 35:21 – 37:41

    Activism Spectrum and Methodology

    Hohn describes activism as a spectrum from hostile campaigns to constructive engagement, noting that by 2025 most TCI dealings were constructive due to the difficulty of mobilizing passive index holders. He emphasizes that persuasion and long-term relationships are preferred over fighting, a shift driven by the patience afforded by a larger capital base.

  6. 37:41 – 39:41

    Aerospace Barriers to Entry

    Hohn highlights aerospace, specifically aircraft engines, as a sector with high barriers to entry including intellectual property, contracts, and an installed base. He notes that only two makers compete in each jet class, with no new entrants for over 50 years, and that the primary profit center is spare parts rather than new engine sales.

  7. 39:41 – 43:13

    TCI vs. Safran and Airbus

    TCI opposed Safran's acquisition of Zodiac Aerospace due to price and currency concerns, leading to a personal lawsuit against Hohn. Later, TCI urged Airbus to abandon its talks to buy a stake in Avidian, arguing it was inefficient use of capital; Airbus subsequently ended the negotiations.

  8. 43:13 – 46:28

    Altaba Liquidation Campaign

    Hohn details TCI's successful campaign to liquidate Altaba, which held Alibaba and Yahoo Japan shares. TCI argued that the company's discount to net asset value was too wide and that a gradual sale was inefficient, proposing an in-kind distribution of Alibaba shares to avoid withholding taxes.

  9. 46:28 – 49:03

    Alphabet Cost Management Letter

    In a November 2022 letter, TCI criticized Alphabet for bloated costs and low margins in its Google Services segment. Hohn demanded a public EBIT margin target of at least 40%, a 50% reduction in 'Other Bets' losses, and increased share buybacks, citing Alphabet's large cash balance.

  10. 49:03 – 56:02

    Say on Climate Initiative

    Hohn explains TCI's 'Say on Climate' strategy, which involves sending letters to portfolio companies demanding TCFD-aligned emissions disclosure. He argues that low-emission companies benefit from lower capital costs and higher valuations, and that shareholder votes on climate plans are objective and effective.

  11. 56:02 – 1:00:10

    TCI Culture and Hiring

    Hohn describes TCI's small, collegiate investment team built on 'intangible trust.' He emphasizes hiring for openness to being wrong and teamwork, rejecting dogmatic candidates. The firm avoids short selling, viewing it as too unpredictable, and prioritizes businesses that do not depend on specific management.

  12. 1:00:10 – 1:02:51

    Guardians of Capital Philosophy

    Hohn reiterates TCI's role as 'guardians of others' capital,' citing a 2007 letter to CSX that framed activism as acting in the long-term interests of all stakeholders. He concludes that good investing requires humility, focusing on a few key factors, and avoiding arrogance.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
NVIDIANVDAequityneutralThe letter pointed out that Airbus already worked well with thousands. of suppliers in which it owned no shares and could keep working with Nvidia in the same way.
AlibabaBABAequityneutralWhat remained was chiefly a pair of large holdings in Alibaba and in Yahoo, Japan.
AlphabetGOOGLequityneutralGoogle's search business has high operating leverage and is not labor-intensive. Yet, over the previous five years, despite strong growth in revenue, little of that leverage Average had reached the margins.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

By 2025, most of TCI's dealings with companies were at the constructive end of the activism spectrum.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:41

How to verify: Check TCI Fund Management investor letters or public statements from 2025-2026 for descriptions of engagement methods. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Getting passive holders to vote for anything is very difficult due to the rise of indexation.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:41

How to verify: Review industry reports on passive vs. active asset ownership trends from 2026 to 2025 (e.g., from S&P Dow Jones Indices or Morningstar). For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The last new entrant in the aircraft engine market was GE, over 50 years ago.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·38:22

How to verify: Check historical records of aircraft engine manufacturers and entry dates for GE and competitors like Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

TCI sued personally over its campaign against Safran's acquisition of Zodiac Aerospace.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·40:01

How to verify: Search French court records or legal news archives for lawsuits involving Chris Hohn or TCI related to Safran/Zodiac around 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

On February 20, 2023, Hohn wrote to Airbus urging it to end negotiations to buy a 29.9% stake in Avidian.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·41:01

How to verify: Locate the public letter from TCI to Airbus dated February 20, 2026, via TCI's website or financial news archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Airbus announced on March 29, 2023, that it would no longer pursue the Avidian stake.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·42:39

How to verify: Check Airbus press releases or SEC filings (if applicable) or major news wires for the announcement date of March 29, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Altaba registered as an investment company on June 16, 2017, after selling Yahoo to Verizon.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·43:13

How to verify: Verify Yahoo's corporate history and Altaba's registration documents via SEC EDGAR or company press releases from June 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

TCI owned close to 10% of Altaba as of March 15, 2018.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·43:38

How to verify: Check Altaba's proxy statements or SEC filings (Schedule 13D/G) from early 2026 for TCI's stake. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Altaba's shares traded 26% below the value of its net assets.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·44:17

How to verify: Calculate the discount to NAV using Altaba's stock price and quarterly net asset value reports from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Altaba's board approved a plan of liquidation on April 2, 2019, and shareholders approved it on June 27, 2019.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·46:20

How to verify: Review Altaba's proxy statements or press releases from April and June 2019 confirming the board and shareholder votes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-10 through 2026-11-10. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify TCI's actual ownership stakes in CSX, Safran, Airbus, Altaba, and Alphabet via SEC Form 13F filings.
  • Review the specific TCI letters to CSX (2007), Alphabet (Nov 2022), and Safran/Airbus for detailed financial arguments and outcomes.
  • Check the current net asset value (NAV) discount of Altaba (or its successor entities) and the tax implications of in-kind distributions in relevant jurisdictions.
  • Analyze Alphabet's Google Services EBIT margins and 'Other Bets' losses in recent 10-K filings to assess if the 40% margin target is feasible.
  • Research the TCFD framework requirements and compare portfolio company disclosures against these standards.
  • Investigate the voting power distribution of major passive index funds (e.g., BlackRock, Vanguard) to understand the constraints on activist campaigns.
  • Review TCI's public statements on climate initiatives and their correlation with portfolio company stock performance.
  • Assess the competitive landscape in aerospace engines to verify the claim of only two makers per jet class and the lack of new entrants for 50 years.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to a new Latticework Audio program, brought to you by the research team at MOI Global. During the financial crisis, Chris Hahn bought shares of Moody's at 10 times earnings, doubled his money, and thought he was clever. The earnings kept compounding, and he bought the shares back at a higher price. He tells
0:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the story against himself and draws the lesson that intrinsic value compounding matters more than the stock price. He is the founder and portfolio manager of TCI Fund Management. You will hear why he calls long-termism in a great company a free lunch, and why he wrote to the board of Airbus that it was a great
0:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business that demands management's full attention.
0:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Chris Hahn, Guardians of Others Capital, Long Holding Periods, Concentrated Quality, and the Shareholder's Voice. Decades, not years.
0:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
0:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 16, 2007, TCI Fund Management wrote to the board of directors of CSX, the railroad company based in Jacksonville, Florida. TCI's fund held 17.8 million CSX shares, 4.1%. of the company, and the letter noted in its opening lines that this made the fund one of the
1:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): railroad's largest shareholders.
1:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter was long and built on evidence a table ranking the major railroads, a page of arithmetic on operating costs, an estimate of the network's replacement value, and notes on its figures.
1:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
1:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was addressed to the directors as a body. By TCI's later account, the firm had spent two years and more than $1 million studying CSX and the railroad industry. One of the two signatures was that of Chris Hahn. He is the founder and portfolio manager of TCI fund management. The other signature was a
1:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): partners.
1:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter's opening paragraph described the firm that was writing. TCI is an engaged, long-term long term investor with a track record. of helping companies reach their potential with management's cooperation or without it. A sentence later, it said how far ahead the firm was looking. Our outlook is decades, not years or
2:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): months or weeks. Next, the letter explained why it was a letter at all. By TCI's account, the firm had spent the past year trying to discuss its concerns with the board and senior. management in private, and it was now setting them down in writing. It urged the board to act at once, and of its own accord. It
2:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was not written against the railroad. It called CSX an essential part of the country's infrastructure and commerce, a route on which thousands of businesses relied, and said that a CSX running below its full potential let every one of them down. TCI the letter added, also owned shares in other American railroads.
2:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Its body ran under six headings corporate governance, operational improvement, returns on capital, capital spending, the response to regulatory pressure, and relations with the railroad's workers, shippers, and shareholders. Much of the argument turned on how the railroad ran. TCI had built a
3:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): table from public data for the 12 months to June 30, 2007. It compared the five major North American railroads on train speed, the time cars spent standing in terminals, labor costs against revenue, the accident rate, and the growth of costs. By that table, CSX stood last or near last on most
3:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of the measures.
3:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
3:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter also took up how the company paid its senior. executives. Their long term pay now rested mainly on the operating ratio. That measure, TCI argued, could be flattered by moving costs into the capital budget, or bought with new spending. And since the board had moved pay away from free cash flow, the letter noted, the
3:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): annual capital budget had grown by more than half. By TCI's arithmetic, the company's target for its operating ratio could be met through price increases alone, with no growth in volume and no gain in efficiency, which is why the letter asked for targets on the operations themselves. Behind both points sat a principle the letter had
4:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stated near its start. Achieving operational excellence and maximizing shareholder value are inextricably linked, not mutually exclusive.
4:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
4:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): second argument concerned was. what the railroad's capital was really worth. CSX measured its returns on about $16 billion of invested capital, the figure carried on its books. But land bought in the 19th century, locomotives bought 30 years earlier, and rail laid 20 years before could not be replaced at the
4:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prices once paid for them. TCI estimated that the network would cost close to $100 billion.
4:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to replace, and on that base, the railroad earned about 1%. Even at half that value, the letter added, the return could be no more than 3%.
5:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Replacement value, it observed, was a widely accepted standard in accounting and in regulation around the world, and the rail regulator, Later, citing its predecessor, had called it preferable to the original cost of the assets.
5:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
5:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter made the point with a comparison. Using historic cost is the same flawed logic as a landlord charging rent on a 100-year-old home based on what it cost to buy the land and build that home 100 years ago, as opposed to a rent based on the value of that home today.
5:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
5:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): made the same point with an old saying: it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.
5:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
5:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spending, the letter laid down a rule. Capital should be allocated to where it is able to achieve its highest long-term risk-adjusted return. It was not an argument against spending as such. Value, the letter said, is created by sustainable investment in safety, maintenance, infrastructure, and training. And
5:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because the railroads then face faced the risk of renewed regulation of their rates, TCI. asked that spending on growth be frozen until that risk had passed. The demands came as a list. Separate the roles of chairman and chief executive. Bring onto the board new independent directors with railroad or other relevant business
6:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): expertise. Let shareholders holding 10% of the stock call a special meeting, a change the shareholders had already backed at the last annual meeting by nearly. 2.3 votes to one. Tie executive pay to returns on capital. Publish an operating plan with specific long-term targets for operations and costs.
6:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Explain to regulators and policymakers the true economics of the industry, and give the rail regulator a practical way to estimate replacement value. And present the capital plan in detail with the pricing and volume assumptions. and the expected return of each major project. The paragraph making that last demand closed with a
6:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): short sentence. It is, after all, our capital. In December 2007, TCI joined with another investor in CSX, 3G Capital. In 2008, the two put forward five candidates for the company's 12 12-member member board, Han Hahn among them. On July 3, 31, 2008, the
7:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Inspector of Elections certified the results of the annual meeting. Four of the group's nominees had been elected, Hahn one of the four. On September 22, 2008, he agreed to join the board. In 2025, in a podcast interview with Norgus Bank Investment Management, the host asked Hahn how he felt about confrontation.
7:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): He answered, I don't really enjoy. fighting people anymore. I never really did.
7:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Before TCI. Asked on a podcast in 2021 about his beginnings, Hahn started with his education. In his words, he went to undergraduate in the UK, where I did accounting and business economics. And, as luck would have it, I was taught by a visiting professor from Harvard Business School who taught
8:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): entrepreneurship, and he took me under his wing. The professor pointed him toward his own school, and in time, Hone was admitted. By TCI's own account in 2007, he took first class honors in his undergraduate degree and an MBA with high distinction from the school. He took one lesson away from it.
8:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There was no reason to assume people were smarter than you.
8:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
8:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spent a brief period afterward at APAX, the private equity firm. The work, as he described it, meant searching for a deal at the right price and sometimes waiting years for one. It rewarded procedure, and his aptitude ran to analysis. He put it plainly: Given my psychological makeup, which is impatient, I didn't. have
8:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the patience for it. He saw two further drawbacks. Companies tend to keep their best businesses and sell the others, so a private equity buyer is offered, almost by definition, the weaker ones, with little choice in the matter. The better businesses were to be found in the public markets. And, a man who wanted a fund of his own would find it far easier
9:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to start one there.
9:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
9:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): still held the view in the 2025. podcast interview and added a point about size. The largest companies with the most money to spend on research and on competing are usually the ones that beat smaller rivals, and they are too big for any private equity fund to buy. From there, he moved into the public markets. In his words, the
9:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): only firm that would take me was Perry Capital. And so I stayed there for seven years, learning about investing. focused on Europe. Perry sent him to London to build its European investing, and by TCI's account, he went on to run Perry Capital's European Fund. Asked in 2025 what makes a good investor, he described a habit he had
9:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kept from the start. He was always willing to study a company's fundamentals and never tried to guess where the stock market or the economy was heading. Conviction, he said in the same interview, has to be present at every moment of a holding, and it is easy to claim. Talk, as the saying goes, is cheap. Nor is conviction the
10:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same as certainty.
10:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
10:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went back to his early years to make the point. One of my first investments when I worked in New York for a hedge fund before starting TCI was in an Italian media company. It was the country's telephone directory business, and he had bought into it before the internet changed that trade. He drew the lesson in a breath. People thought yellow pages were a monopoly,
10:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and they were. And so the point is, you can be wrong. Speaking at an investor conference in Oslo in April 2025, he traced his caution further back. I was born into a poor family, and so I always wanted to get my capital back. I thought that was a good starting point. Don't lose your capital. And so I
10:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sort of believed in physical asset backing. Asked in 2021 about the people who had shaped him early, he named first John Armitage, who runs Egerton Capital, who was a dear friend when I was starting to learn. The two had met as shareholders in the Energy Group, a company spun off from Hansen when Armitage had just set up at
11:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Egerton. They found themselves holding the same positions more than once, helped each other over the years, and stayed friends. Then he added a second name. Seth Clarman was, I wouldn't say a mentor, but an inspiration with his value mindset. Beyond those two, he said, he had learned most from experience and from the people he worked
11:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): beside, absorbing the trade as much as being taught it. Of the decision to go out on his own, he said. in 2025, I just had this intuition that I was in the wrong place and not doing what I was meant to do. And it wasn't about money. Intuition, he said, is part of how TCI works, and not only in choosing stocks, which people
11:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): find strange in an investor, it comes after the analysis, not in place of it. TCI fund management was established in June 2003. The initials stood for the fund's full name, and the name raised a question from the start. As he recalled it in 2025, when we named it the Children's Investment Fund, we thought,
12:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how are we going to compete with Tiger and Viking and more aggressive named funds?
12:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Good is better.
12:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One of
12:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the earliest fights. came over a stock exchange. Early in the firm's life, as TCI later told it, Goche Borsa, the German exchange group, proposed to buy the London Stock Exchange, and TCI, a shareholder in the German company, asked that its shareholders be given a vote on the purchase.
12:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
12:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a podcast in 2021, he set the holding in the firm's history. I'd been invested in exchanges for a long time, right from the start of TCI, Deutsche Borsa, Euronext, so we knew they were good business. In the 2025 podcast interview, he explained what had made the German company so strong. They had a
13:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): derivative business called Eurex, which was a natural monopoly. It was a network effect. This was the barrier to entry. The contract that mattered most was the European bond. future. Traders go where the prices are best. The prices are best where the trading is deepest. And once one market holds that depth, he said, it
13:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is very hard to draw anyone away from it. A rival can never offer the better price. The first market to gain that depth keeps nearly all of it, as the Chicago futures market had done in American futures. And the same holds, he added, wherever an exchange reaches a market first. Then the economics. There was a lot of growth
13:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): without capital. As capital markets expanded and people traded more, the exchange's business rose with them. On January 27, 2009, a parliamentary committee in London taking evidence on the banking crisis Cases called several witnesses from the fund industry, Hohn among them. The members' questions ran from leverage to short
14:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): selling. When the questioning turned to Deutsche Borsa, he answered that a problem running through the system was boards that failed to oversee management, as at the banks. Of the German company, he said, In the case of Deutsche Borsa, we were exerting ownership rights as owners of the shares, and naturally, boards are resistant to that. A second case came
14:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up in the same hearing. On February 20, 2007, TCI had written to ABN Amro, the Dutch bank. In the bank's own account, published later that year, its boards had already decided to look beyond standing alone and to step up talks with possible merger partners. That search was accelerated once
14:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): TCI's letter arrived and other shareholders voiced support for a review of its strategy. Hohn gave the committee his own account of the bank's. annual meeting. We put a motion on their AGM requesting the potential sale of the company, and, in a democratic process, not driven by hedge funds, over 70% of the shareholders in that giant
15:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company voted for that. In December 2007, TCI told CSX shareholders that it aimed to bring a long-term owner's philosophy to the public markets, and it described its method in one way. line. TCI employs a deep value, fundamentally driven approach to identify attractive investments. It sought,
15:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it said, an open dialogue with the managements and boards of the companies it owned, and took an active role only where it felt they were not acting for their shareholders. Cheapness alone was another matter. In the 2025 podcast interview, he allowed that ordinary assets, bought far below what they would cost to replace, can work, and that he had done
15:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it himself. But he could never be confident of such investments, because the earning power of an ordinary business is unpredictable. Looking back in the same conversation, he concluded that, in the end, the fundamentals of a business count for more than anything else, and drew a general lesson about activism. A lot of activists end up being
16:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): activists in bad businesses. Then, after a question from his host, he added, It's pointless being an activist in a B business. In the 2021 podcast, he asked whether his process had changed in the time he had run TCI, he described the universe as it first looked to him. When I started investing, we'd look at anything:
16:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a bank, a miner, and a steel company. Then, he said,
16:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Over the years, I realized there's good companies and bad companies. Realized good is better. The strongest businesses, he observed, also tend to be well managed. So the firm's habits changed. We do less activism and more let the quality of the companies do the Work. work.
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Barriers to Entry.
16:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
16:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oslo, on April 29, 2025, Hahn had a session of his own at the Investor Conference. Asked to share his approach, he gave it in four parts Find the Great Companies, Focused or Concentrated Portfolio, Long Termism, and Engagement. The first part, he had said at the start of the session,
17:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was the one he had come to reflect. refine and understand better over time. On stage at an allocators summit later in 2025, asked what had made the difference in his career, he began with the first part's foundation. Investing is all about risk and return. The vast majority of investors focus on return. But I
17:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): focused actually in my career on risk firstly. Return does matter, but to me, risk. was always the first thing that mattered. In Oslo, he took the definition from Warren Buffett. He defined risk as not knowing what you're doing.
17:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
17:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): recalled a warning from the same source. Most moats, Buffett had said, are worth very little because a company believes it has one and then watches it erode. In Hahn's words, the real thing is sustainability of motes. moats. Knowing what one is doing. in his account, starts with knowing what can go wrong for a business. A moat,
18:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as he put it, is whatever makes a business hard to compete with and hard to replace.
18:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
18:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the 2025 podcast interview, he named the first danger in three words competition kills profits. The second is substitution. A rival takes the profit, but a new product can make the business itself unnecessary.
18:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
18:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Allocators Summit, he was more direct still. So, I hate competition. Too much of it, he said there, leaves the future too uncertain either to predict or to value. TCI spends nearly all its time on two questions what protects a business and what could disrupt it.
18:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
18:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the podcast, he singled out one lesson from his whole career. Investors underestimate the forces of competition and disruption. Because they just look today.
18:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
18:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): newcomer may hold the lead for a while, he went on. Then the competitors arrive. He expects those forces to grow stronger. Artificial intelligence, he said in 2025, will disrupt businesses in ways no one can yet predict, and is already wearing down some protections that only looked secure.
19:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
19:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it will also lower every company's costs, so that a business with real protection becomes worth more. Protection against those forces, he said in the podcast, comes in several kinds. And the first is the physical asset backing he had wanted since he started out. Structures that cannot be duplicated. Most investors,
19:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he said, overlook them. We're in a world where people just look at earnings. They don't look at asset value or physical assets. In Oslo, he named the category himself. It's a bit boring, owning toll roads and airports and transmission lines, cell phone towers. Nobody, he pointed out in the podcast, gets permission
19:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for a second airport beside a city's first, and nobody builds a second road where there is neither the land nor the traffic to pay for it. The first becomes a natural monopoly. Physical assets were only the first kind he listed. The others, as he went through them, were intellectual property so advanced that it is very hard to copy,
20:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an installed base of equipment already in service, and scale, which he called no guarantee of protection. Then came brands, though only some of them. Network effects, in which each new user makes a service more valuable to the rest, and the cost to a customer of switching away from software it cannot do without.
20:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The list, he said at the summit, has grown as TCI learned. It began with hard assets and later found protection of other kinds, such as a payments network linking customers and banks around the world, which becomes harder to copy the larger it grows.
20:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
20:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): showed the last. kind on his list at work. When Zoom brought out its video calling product, Microsoft answered with Teams and put it inside the bundle of Office software its customers already used.
21:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
21:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explained the result. Microsoft won that battle because they had the installed base, the incumbency, and high switching costs. It didn't have to be the best if it's free. What he wants, he said in Oslo, is protection from competitors joined to a product that adds enough value for customers to pay for it. Only then
21:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): does growth have value. The ideal, he said in the podcast, is not the absence of competition, but competition that is weak, or rivals that choose to compete on something other than price. Most companies, he went on, can raise their prices only in line with inflation, if they are lucky, which is why investors who
21:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): forecast growth tend to assume nothing more than volume plus inflation. Then he described the exception. There is a special group of super companies that can price above inflation, and that's, as Buffett taught, the test of whether you have the moat. He gave the arithmetic. If you can price 1% above inflation
22:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and you have a 20% profit, margin, your profits will grow 5% faster than revenue. Growth that comes from price can matter more than growth in volume because it adds no cost. Few companies have that power, which is why few investors study it, and many of TCI's investments have it.
22:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
22:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the summit, he added that most companies would rather not talk about their pricing power, and that some managements do not fully understand their own. Then the podcast turned to regulated businesses, and he answered: If you have barriers too low, competition or substitution eliminates your business and your investment. Barriers too high, regulators
22:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): may come knocking on your door.
22:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Most industries are bad.
22:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
22:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2025 podcast. interview opened by asking what makes a good investment. Han answered, I think this is something a lot of people get wrong. They think it's about growth often, or something new. Neither, to TCI, counts for much on its own. Later in the conversation, he gave the reason. You can have profitless
23:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): growth. His example was a whole industry. Airline travel has grown at 5% a year. But airlines as a business, cumulatively and collectively, have made almost minimal profits despite growth because of the very low barriers to entry. Must a business grow then? Not necessarily, he said, or not
23:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quickly. That depends on the price paid for it. Nor do heavy capital needs rule a business out. They are one part of the calculation, and what decides it is the protection. Asked what TCI does look for, he said, most important for us is something slightly different, which is essential product or service. We don't like things
23:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which are discretionary. His example was the rating agencies, a business TCI had owned for a long time. An issuer can put off a bond deal for a year, but sooner or later the debt comes due, and new debt needs a rating. Most of TCI's companies, he said, do earn revenue that recurs and can be forecast. The larger point
24:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that what they sell is essential. At the Allocators Summit, he made the same point from the other side. I've never been an investor in the handbag business. Lots of people have, and they've made lots of money in it, but I've never understood what makes one handbag better than another. Nor, he added, could he see why. one would be a necessity. He
24:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): did not need to understand everything, he said. It was enough, as Buffett had advised, to stay within one's sphere of competence. Asked in the podcast which businesses TCI will not own, he said, We have a long list of companies we don't invest in. I have invested in some of these in the past, but I've learned. Banks head the list.
24:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Their earnings are of low quality. he said, and they carry far more leverage than the usual ratios suggest. Measured against total assets rather than risk-weighted assets, many had run at a hundred times their equity. They are opaque, impossible to see into, and leverage and opacity combine with incentives that do not line up with
25:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the shareholders. After banks came car makers, retailers, insurers, commodity producers. and most of manufacturing. And later, he added: traditional asset managers, fossil fuel utilities, airlines, wireless telecommunications, media, and advertising agencies. His summary: most
25:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): industries are bad industries. We say maybe there's 200 companies that we consider to be high quality and investable. At the allocators Allocator summit, he drew the line. Technologies that change quickly aren't good for us. Can't predict them. Asked there how he finds the weakness that can break a thesis, he said, You really want something
25:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's obvious. When it's not obvious, you probably just leave it alone because it's probably not sustainable. Obviousness, as he described it there, can be almost physical. No one knows what kind of cars people will drive, or whose, but they will. plainly need the roads. An investor once told him of needing to be able to sleep at night.
26:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): For Han, that meant a thesis obvious enough to trust. No one can forecast the future with much precision, he said in the podcast, so he leans on simpler tests. Will the business still exist? Will people still want to fly a generation from now? Valuation, in his view, is only ever approximate, and only a small set of
26:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): businesses, the most powerful ones, can be predicted at all. Asked near the end of the summit session where his enthusiasm lay, he said, things that I feel confident will be around, in a dominant position, excite me because it's just predictable. I value predictability. Asked in the podcast what tool he uses to value a
26:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business, he said, We don't even look at that until we get comfortable. that the barriers are so strong it will be around. When price does come into it, it must still be at or below his estimate of what the business is worth. His example in Oslo was Aena, the company that owns the airports of Spain, which were, as he described them, large,
27:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): close to new, and with room to grow. He told how the stake began. The Spanish government approached us about taking an anchor position in an IPO. They sold it at a 15% free cash flow yield. You could never replace these assets. Valuation matters. And he gave the rule behind it. I learned at school
27:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that a great company is not necessarily a great investment.
27:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A free lunch.
27:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
27:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Oslo panel, asked whether investing for the long term resonated with him, Hohn answered with two numbers.
27:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
27:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): average life of a holding of our current portfolio is eight years. Now, the average holding of a US stock is less than one year. Most investors, he said in the podcast, trade actively, watch data points, and ask what the catalyst will be, without really knowing what the company does.
28:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Plenty of people, he acknowledged at the Allocators Summit, make money trading at high speed. TCI counts the longer horizon as its advantage. In his own session in Oslo, he gave the reasons so few do otherwise. Even intelligent investors are unable or unwilling to have a long term horizon. A great
28:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company held for a short time, he said there, leaves its owner expected. exposed to the moods of the market.
28:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
28:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told how Buffett, asked whether Coca-Cola had been a risky investment when he first bought it, answered that it depended on the horizon. Over a month or a year, it was very risky, since a stock's price over any short period need not reflect the business at all. He insists that the case for patience patients be justified rather than assumed.
28:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
28:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the panel, he put it in terms. any finance student would recognize. They say there's no free lunch in finance, but actually, I do think long-termism in a great company is a free lunch. The reason lies in everyone else's horizon. A typical analyst's model looks two or three years ahead, because that is how long the typical buyer of
29:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the stock intends to hold it. And then he asked, what if it can keep being good for 30 years? Then you're completely undervaluing that company. At the Allocators Summit, he attached a condition. It only works if you're right on the first point about the quality of the company and the barriers to entry. Then he went on. Good companies stay
29:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): good, and bad companies stay bad. There aren't that many great companies. And if you find them, you should hold on to them. Concentration and engagement. he said in the same answer, comes second to those two. He describes the frame of mind as borrowed from private equity, in the proper sense of the term. A private equity fund expects to
29:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hold a company for the 10-year life of the fund, often longer. TCI buys as though it might have to keep a company indefinitely, since on the day it wanted to sell, the stock market might be offering a very poor price. He thinks that. approach necessary, not merely useful. The public market offers something in return. No premium to
30:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pay for control, as a private buyer must, a price every day, to take or to leave, and a way out for an investor who turns out to be wrong. He values a company by discounting its cash flows far into the future. And the further out one can see the cash flows of a great company, he said, the more it is. worth. He told a story against
30:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): himself to show it. Moody's, the rating agency, has been in business for about a hundred years. In the podcast, he set his host a question how fast the company's revenue had grown over that century, and supplied the answer himself. About 10% a year, a rate he called very unusual over so long a span. He went on.
30:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Investors have always under underestimated its value, including myself. He described his own trade. I bought the stock during the financial crisis at 10 times earnings. I doubled my money. I thought I was clever, but the earnings kept compounding. Having sold, he bought the shares back at a higher price. His
31:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): conclusion? Actually, the intrinsic value compounding matters more than the stock price. He added a correlation. corollary. Here's the thing about the multiples they matter less than the growth when you look at it over a longer period. The rest, he said, is arithmetic, a matter of growth rates and terminal multiples. A company adding to its intrinsic value
31:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at a good rate will look overpriced to someone judging it over a short horizon, and it is worth more to an owner prepared to wait for that growth than to anyone else. The fund's structure matters. mattered too. TCI told CSX shareholders in December 2007 TCI only raises capital that investors commit for multi year periods.
31:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Most of those investors, it said, were American institutions, among them a number of university endowments, and its portfolio was a set of large, concentrated investments built on its own research. In the podcast, going through what had worked for TCI, fundamental analysis, and long termism among them, he came to
32:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): concentration. We've owned a few things 10 stocks, 15 stocks. We don't own 100 things. In Oslo, he did not dress it up. That's a double edged sword. If you're right, it's fantastic. If you're wrong, it's very painful. It sounds risky, he acknowledged. and it is.
32:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): He sells, he said in the podcast, when a holdings value no longer compares well with the alternatives, or when his conviction in it fades. On the Oslo panel, he gave an example from American Cable Television, an investment that had served TCI well for years. The industry started to deteriorate. It became saturated and more
32:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): competitive. I sold because it changed.
32:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The power of the argument. Years before those conversations in Oslo, in a conference interview in 2013, the first question put to Hahn was whether the chance to beat the market had gone. His answer was brief.
33:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
33:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't believe so. There's really no shortage of opportunities and alpha generation. in our view.
33:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
33:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then set out where TCI found its edge. Some of it came from studying business models that hold their shape over a long horizon, some from deep knowledge of a few sectors, infrastructure and consumer goods among them. Some from putting the fund's capital into a handful of Full ideas so that each one could matter.
33:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
33:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): last source he named was of a different kind. Being prepared to be activist, which is an inefficient space where few people are willing to do that. Taken together with the Longview, he said, these let TCI profit from the gap between its own horizon and the markets.
33:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
33:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): interviewer asked him to explain the inefficiency.
33:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
33:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): began with how most portfolios behave. Where there's a corporate governance concern, investors just tend to stay away. completely. They don't try to say, well, what discount should I apply? Then he gave it an image. Think of it like the damaged goods section of a department store where you can get 80%, 90% off,
34:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because most people won't buy anything that's damaged. The other half of the inefficiency was this hardly any investors will be activists because it's a reputational issue for them, and they think that no company will ever talk to them again. Those who were willing, he said, had few competitors. Four years earlier, he had made the
34:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): case in a more formal setting, before the Parliamentary Committee in London in January 2009.
34:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
34:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a question put a contrary view to him, he answered with a statement of principle. It is important that shareholders of companies are allowed to exercise their own. ownership rights. I think it is a very bad thing if there is no oversight of boards by shareholders as owners. He held to it. Sixteen years later, he said TCI
35:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): regards the appointment of directors as a legal right that comes with its shares. The principle depends on owners who use it. On a podcast in 2021, he said what he had seen of them. Most investors are just passive. Bad things will happen and they don't say anything, don't do anything. I've seen it all my career.
35:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Describing activism in the podcast, he began with a definition: it's a spectrum. At one end, he placed the full campaign, removing boards and chief executives, demanding the sale of a company. At the other, a working relationship at a professional level, in which the investor comes to understand how management thinks about its
35:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business. By 2025, he said, most of TCI's dealings with companies sat at that end. He could also point to a structural reason the hard end had lost its force. Getting passive holders to vote for anything, he said, is very difficult. He explained why. When I started, there was very little indexation, and so there was a
36:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): more engaged active shareholder base. And now, indexation has limited the power of shareholders. On the Oslo panel, he gave the other side of it. Large holders that would never campaign themselves, he said, will still back an activist who makes a good case. Shareholders are not stupid. Whatever stake the activist has, 1%, 2%,
36:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it doesn't matter. His own conclusion in the podcast was about method. I've learned that actually.
36:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): activism, hardcore activism, is not a great thing. The label has stayed with TCI anyway. People who read about the firm, he said, call it an activist. And at the allocators summit, asked about his meetings with management, he addressed that first. TCI had done that work, he said, and then, it's sort of a tool, but we
36:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prefer always to have constructive long-term long term relationships with management. Later in the same answer, he described what the firm wants from those meetings. TCI researches each company deeply and follows its industry, and engagement is how it keeps learning. A conversation in which one side only speaks teaches that side nothing. The firm, he
37:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): allowed, had not always worked this way. The change came, by his account, with age, with the patience that a larger pool of capital allowed. allows, and with the realization that a person can achieve more by being constructive than by fighting people. In the same 2021 conversation, he described how TCI had come to go about it. I'm trying to work
37:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): through persuasion as much as I can. No one doubts that we're willing to file a resolution or have a fight if that's what's needed. It's the power of the argument.
37:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Engines and airframes. On stage at the Allocators Summit in 2025, Han turned to one industry in particular. Aerospace is a sector that we've come to learn about and understand, and where the barriers to entry are multiple. Often you would like not just one barrier to entry, but maybe five.
38:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
38:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): aircraft. engines, he went on to count several at once: intellectual property, contracts, an installed base, and customers who cannot easily switch. The engine is the clearest instance. In the podcast, he described a machine of thousands of complex parts, running at heat that would melt ordinary metal, and
38:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a market in which only two makers compete in each of the two classes of jet engine. the narrowbody and the wide body. Then he gave the history. There'd be no new entrants for more than 50 years. The last new entrant was GE. In Oslo, he offered a test of his own. The absence of newcomers is itself a
38:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sign of how high the barriers stand. The money, he explained there, is made in spare parts. New engines are a small part of the business. and an aircraft maker wants only one or two engines to choose from, so there is no room for many competitors. Rivals also find it very hard to break into the trade in replacement parts.
39:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Nor did he expect the engine itself to be displaced soon. The science, he said at the summit, does not really permit an electric one, and the existing fleet would cost too much to replace, which gives perhaps 25. years of visibility. When TCI was first studying the engine makers, he said in the podcast, it took the thesis
39:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to a former chief executive of one of the competing companies, who confirmed it and added that the margins ought, in time, to be much higher. A business like that seldom needs its owner's help. On the Oslo panel, comparing public markets with private ones, he made a point about the people who own. a public company's shares. The public market
39:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investor doesn't have any influence. Provided, he said, that the owner is willing to use it. In the podcast, he told a story from his own portfolio about what using it can involve. Some years before that conversation, Safran, the French maker of aircraft engines, had set out to buy Zodiac Aerospace, another French
40:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): aerospace company. TCI was already among Saffron's owners, and he called it a great company. TCI's quarrel was with the price, which it judged far too high, and with the currency Saffron proposed to use. They wanted to pay in shares, and we believe the shares were half price. In TCI's view,
40:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that would have made the purchase dearer still for Saffron's owners. TCI campaigned hard. against the deal and asked that shareholders be given a vote on it. He was sued personally over the campaign. His own summary was short. It's not for the faint-hearted to do this. The case has a shape that recurs in TCI's campaigns. The firm
40:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was not trying to change a business it doubted, it was defending Ending a business it rated highly against a use of capital it judged poor. In 2023, the same conviction produced a letter to another company he admired. On February 20, 2023, he wrote to the chief executive and board of Airbus on behalf of TCI, a
41:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): long term shareholder with over 3% of the company. Airbus was in talks, begun that month, to buy a 29.9% 9% stake in Avidian, a unit of Atos. The letter opened by urging the board to end. those negotiations at once. Its second part carried a heading that framed the whole argument. Airbus is a
41:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great business that demands management's full attention. Under it, the letter called Airbus one of the highest quality businesses in the world, the leading maker of commercial aircraft in a fast growing industry. Its core aviation business had a very bright outlook, with large room to grow its profits and capital. cash flow once its production programs were fully
41:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ramped up. Then came a sentence on the industry's structure. The barriers to entry are huge, and shareholders rightly value Airbus's dominant market position. The letter's objection to the stake, in its own words, it would be stranded capital and an extremely inefficient use of shareholder funds. The letter pointed out that Airbus
42:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): already worked well with thousands. of suppliers in which it owned no shares and could keep working with Nvidia in the same way. Closer collaboration did not require Airbus to become an anchor shareholder. Airbus's cash flow was large and rising, the letter observed, and the better use of it was to return it to shareholders through a higher
42:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dividend or the repurchase of shares TCI considered undervalued. TCI had also found
42:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
42:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): filed a motion, attached to the letter and dated February 17, 2023, asking that the proposed purchase be put on the agenda of Airbus's annual meeting in April for disclosure and discussion.
42:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
42:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter closed with an offer to discuss the matter with management at the earliest opportunity. Later, on March 29, 2023, Airbus announced that a minority stake in Avidian did not meet the company's. objectives in the current context and under the current structure, and that it would no longer pursue those discussions. Airbus and Atos,
42:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it said, would continue to discuss other options and to work on a long-term strategic and technological partnership between Airbus and AVIDIN.
43:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Returning the Cash.
43:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Altaba was an unusual company to receive a letter from TCI. Yahoo had sold its operating business to Verizon in June 2017, and on June 16, 2017, it took the name Altaba and registered as an investment company. What remained was chiefly a pair of large holdings in
43:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Alibaba and in Yahoo, Japan.
43:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
43:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): March 15, 2018, Han wrote to Altaba's chief executive. TCI, the letter said, was Altaba's largest shareholder, owning close to 10%.
43:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
43:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): began with thanks for management's efforts to create value for shareholders, and then with common ground. We fully agree with your explicit goal of narrowing the wide discount to net asset value, at which Altaba continued. continues to trade. The disagreement was about method.
44:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
44:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter judged that Altaba's current course was unlikely to narrow the discount by much, and the presentation that came with the letter, addressed to the board and shareholders alike, set it out.
44:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
44:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): began by acknowledging what Altaba was already doing. It had announced a share repurchase plan, it was weighing options for its Adibaba holding, and it was. in TCI's view, rightly focused on the discount. Altaba's shares traded 26% below the value of what it owned, a gap far wider than the tax a
44:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidation would cost. Most of its shareholders were outside the United States and paid withholding tax on dividends, which made the shares an inefficient way to own Alibaba. Adibaba. The company sat outside the indices, closed to fund. funds that track them, and so had no natural shareholder base. A gradual sale of the holdings would only
44:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): delay the return to owners. And corporate tax rates, the presentation argued, might rise in the future, so selling sooner would lock in the rate than in force.
45:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
45:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter's conclusion fit in one line. A clear plan of liquidation is now necessary.
45:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
45:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): presentation described. how. Altaba would distribute about 80% of its Alibaba shares to its own shareholders in kind and sell the rest to pay the tax and hold a reserve.
45:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
45:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yahoo Japan stake, which Altaba had already said it intended to sell, would be sold or handed to shareholders. Shares distributed in kind would not attract dividend withholding tax, and the presentation estimated that the plan. would lower the effective rate of tax as well. Each alternative it considered, from an exchange offer to a
45:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bid by Alibaba itself, would have to beat liquidation once the value of time was counted. The whole process, it estimated, would take 9 to 12 months and need a special meeting at which holders of a majority of the outstanding shares would have to approve the plan.
46:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
46:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter said TCI strongly. believed that the great majority of Altaba's shareholders would support the plan. TCI now meant, it added, to engage actively with management, the board, and all shareholders, and looked forward to doing so constructively. On April 2, 2019, Altaba's board unanimously
46:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): approved a plan of liquidation and dissolution, and on June 27, 2019, its stockholders approved. it.
46:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
46:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): second letter went to a business that could hardly have been more different. On November 15, 2022, Hahn wrote to the chief executive of Alphabet with a copy to the board. TCI had been a significant shareholder since 2017 and owned shares worth more than $6 billion, which the letter called a reflection of its strong
46:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): conviction in the company's future.
46:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Its
46:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): purpose was to argue that the company's costs had grown too high and that management should act. Its argument started from the core of that conviction. Google's search business has high operating leverage and is not labor-intensive. Yet, over the previous five years, despite strong growth in revenue, little of that leverage Average had reached the
47:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): margins. The rest of the letter was an argument from the company's own numbers. In
47:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the third
47:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quarter of 2022, it noted, total expenses had grown 18% from a year earlier, while revenue grew 6%, and the EBIT margin of the Google Services segment had fallen from 39% in 2021 to 32%. Headcount had more than doubled since 2017.
47:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
47:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chief executive had himself said publicly that Google should become more efficient, the letter recalled, and it agreed. Otherbets, the group's portfolio of newer ventures, had produced about $3 billion of revenue over five years against about $20 billion of operating losses. Alphabet was already buying back its
47:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shares on a large scale, and the letter welcomed it, but the company still held more than $116 billion of cash, and the letter wanted it put to work. Over time, it proposed, Alphabet should hold no net cash at all, as Apple had set out to do.
48:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
48:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter's own summary came at its close. In a new era of slower revenue growth, aggressive cost management is essential. It asked for a clear plan of action, announced without delay. Its demands were specific, and the first was plain. Alphabet should establish and publicly disclose an EE bit
48:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): margin target for the Google Services segment. The target it proposed was at least 40%. Search, a very strong business, produced most of the revenue, so the letter judged the figure well within reach through operating leverage and cost control, and it asked that management's pay be linked to it. Losses in other bets should be cut
48:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): by at least. half. And while the stock was cheap, Alphabet should step up its buybacks.
49:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Say on Climate.
49:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
49:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): November 30, 2019, TCI sent 17 letters in the same terms to companies it held, most of them addressed to the chief executive,
49:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): each
49:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): signed by Hahn and two. colleagues, and each closing with a short appraisal of the company it addressed. At their center was one sentence. We require companies in which we invest to make appropriate and timely public disclosure of carbon and other GHG emissions.
49:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
49:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letters set out an investor's reasoning. Risks tied to a company's greenhouse gas emissions, from regulation and competitive disadvantage. to damage to its brand, its financing, and its physical assets, would in time weigh on what it earned and on what its owners earned from it. TCI wanted those risks
49:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reported through the framework of the Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures, by way of annual disclosure to CDP.
49:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
49:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letters said what TCI would do if a company did not comply. We will typically vote against all directors of companies which do not publicly disclose their emissions and do not have a credible plan for their reduction. TCI would also oppose the reappointment of auditors where the annual accounts left material climate risks unreported,
50:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and it would weigh selling its shares where a company refused both disclosure and a plan. The appraisals could be warm. The copy sent to Alphabet congratulated it on earning the highest overall grade that CDP awards.
50:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
50:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a podcast in 2021, he set out the reasoning behind the effort. 35% of global emissions come from companies. Most companies don't have any plan to address their emissions. They don't even disclose their emissions, and there's no accountability mechanism for their owners, the shareholders.
50:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
50:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): device he described. next came to carry the name Say on Climate. He put it this way: It's an AGM resolution that mandates a company disclose their emissions, consistent with TCFD. There's an advisory annual AGM on the plan and their performance against plan. So, very simple concept.
51:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Shareholders, he said, would then use the vote to make management justify what it was doing. That only works if the owners take the vote seriously, and he said so. It would be up to them to scrutinize the plans rather than approve them by habit, and to vote against the ones that fell short. The test would be whether emissions actually
51:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came down. That test, he added later in the conversation, has an advantage a vote on executive pay lacks. It is objective.
51:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
51:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): plan under which a company company's emissions rise relative to its output fails it. He also put the case in the language of finance. Emissions, he said in the same conversation, can affect long-term returns. You lower your cost of capital, the greener you are, for debt and equity.
51:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
51:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company's standing with its customers and employees improved as well, in his account, and acting was no longer really optional.
52:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
52:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a 2021 keynote to a climate finance conference, he gave the case its sharpest form. Some TCI investors have been asking me, are you trying to make money or save the world? They tell me if you're only trying to save the world, then they will have to sack us. But they've not understood that companies with low emissions benefit
52:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): competitively and command higher valuations.
52:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
52:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): INA in 2020,
52:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shareholders holding 3.86% of the capital, TCI among them, asked for two items to be added to the agenda of the company's annual meeting. What followed, in his account the next year, was the board's verdict on the proposal. The board said, his points are reasonable. Fix the plan. Make it better. And they did.
52:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
52:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 9, 2020, Hahn Han wrote to AINA. Iena's chief executive with a copy to the board.
52:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
52:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter congratulated management and the directors on the work they had done and said TCI would vote for the plan. It also said this Iena's ESG plan should be a blueprint for other companies.
53:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
53:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 29, 2020, INA's shareholders approved both items. The first instructed the board to put a climate action plan to a separate advisory vote at the 2021 meeting and to put a progress report to an advisory vote at each meeting after. It carried 98.15% of the capital present.
53:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The second, a new article of the bylaws, made the plan and its annual update a standing part of the company's governance, with more than 96% in favor. The board's own proposal on principles for climate action passed at the same meeting. TCI went on to file such proposals at a number of the companies it held. Filing one
53:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): costs little, he pointed out in 2021.
53:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
53:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the United States, shares worth $25,000, held for a year, were enough to put a resolution to a company in the S P P500, 500, and in Canada, the threshold was a small fraction of that.
54:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
54:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Union Pacific,
54:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the result was different. TCI's proposal of November 11, 2020 asked the railroad to disclose its emissions and its plan to reduce them at each annual meeting, and to give shareholders an advisory vote on the plan. The company recommended that shareholders vote against it.
54:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
54:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): March 25, 2021, Hahn answered the board's statement in a letter to its chairman and board. The company had a goal for 2030, the letter noted, and had said that it had not yet published a report on how it would reach it. Then this line We also remind you that a goal without a plan is meaningless.
54:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter also answered the objection that the proposal would intrude on the board's role. On that point, it was exact. The proposal specifically does not direct the board how to act.
54:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
54:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): vote it asked for was advisory, and what it requested was information. TCI's letter added that Union Pacific's railroad peers, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific, had recently committed to give their own shareholders a say on climate. It closed by asking the board to reconsider its recommendation. At Union
55:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pacific's annual meeting on May 13, 2021, the proposal was defeated, with about 158 million votes for and 342 million against. Asked in the 2021 podcast how TCI would measure its own effort, he named the number of large companies adopting the vote, above all, the banks
55:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and the heaviest emitters, the fall in emissions at the companies where it was filed, and the money managed by the investors who backed it. A moment earlier, just after telling the AINA story, he had offered his reading of the idea's progress. Saion Climate is winning, not because of me or power I could wield over a company, but because
55:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the idea resonates with people because of its simplicity and intrinsic logic.
56:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
56:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Intangible Trust.
56:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
56:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Queen's birthday honors of June 14, 2014, Hahn was made a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. On stage at the Allocators Summit in 2025, he described an event TCI runs for its own clients. We hold an Investor Day in New York every year for our investors, and
56:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this year we had the CEO of GE Aerospace, the CEO of Airbus, came to speak to our investors on the stage at the same time.
56:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
56:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): team behind the work is small. In the 2025 podcast interview, he described it.
56:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
56:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the investment team, it's seven, eight people. We've known each other a long time, and there's something that we've built, which is an intangible trust.
56:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It is
56:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): small. and collegiate, with a large back office behind it. His best people, he said, would never stay in a firm with a hundred fund managers. It would be too impersonal, and work has a human side. The best of them come for the environment rather than the money, which makes how everyone treats everyone else matter a great deal. On
57:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hiring, he was specific. I'll never hire someone without the blessing of my senior team, because we could destroy the culture. The size matters only in that it is small enough. Good investing, he said in the same interview, can be trained, though there is an element of judgment in it. A candidate is asked for a case study or two,
57:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and it becomes obvious quickly whether the candidate knows the work and shares the approach. Then, the second test. It's not enough just to be a good investor.
57:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You have to want to work in a team. Not everyone wants that, and getting on with the others asks something particular of a candidate. You have to be open minded to being wrong. You can't be too dogmatic. Personality matters a great deal. Inside the team, an idea has to survive its colleagues. TCI tests
57:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a thesis by talking to competitors and to people who know. the company. And in his experience, what such checks turn up is usually bad news. The team wants competing views. Some of its members are bearish by temperament, and he values them for pressing the case against an investment. He set that against portfolio managers who
58:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have become managers of other managers, and who assess an idea by its profit and loss and a stop loss because they cannot answer. analyze the company themselves.
58:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
58:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rule at TCI is plain: we never take anything from anybody at face value. A story, as he put it, is only a story.
58:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
58:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same caution shapes what TCI does not do. Asked on stage at the same summit about short selling, he answered from his own record: I've never really been a significant short seller. I don't think I've cumulated. cumulatively made absolute money in it. He said he largely agreed with what Buffett had told him one night at dinner when he asked why Buffett did
58:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not short. He and Charlie Munger concluded it was just too hard, too unpredictable. You can eventually be right, but can you hold your position? Earlier in that conversation, he had weighed management against the business. Management matters somewhat, he said, but. it is not the key thing. And an investor who tries to size
59:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up executives across a table may miss the point. In Oslo that spring, he had put it more simply The business to own is one that does not depend on whoever runs it, because the assets are, in the end, more reliable than the manager. At the summit, he went on An investor has to listen and stay humble. Then he
59:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): named the danger. If you become arrogant, that's a killer in the investing business. Investing itself, he had said in 2021, is not that hard. The hard part, as Buffett said, is temperament.
59:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
59:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the podcast, he repeated a saying of a teacher and made it a rule for his trade. Very few things matter, and most things don't matter at all. You need to get out of the noise and just focus on the handful of things that matter.
1:00:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Back to the railroad.
1:00:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
1:00:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his own session in Oslo in April 2025, Hohn had run through the four parts of his method. Engagement, he said, was one more component of the approach, and it belonged on the list. Then he gave the whole of it. a planar form. Act as an owner in simple terms. Eighteen years earlier,
1:00:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the same stance had been set down on paper in the letter to the CSX board of October 16, 2007. Past its tables and its demands, near its end, the letter widened the view. Railroads, it observed, are unlike the rest of American industry. They have the largest self-managed workforce in the
1:00:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): country, touch nearly every sector and every community, and reinvest more capital for each dollar of revenue than any other major industry. Good relations with workers, customers, and owners therefore seemed essential for a railroad. The interests of all three, the letter argued, should for the most part run
1:01:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): together, and each would give more. to a management that dealt with them openly. Its closing paragraphs then set the arguments aside and spoke about the writers themselves.
1:01:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
1:01:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hoped the directors would read the letter as the work of a well informed owner trying to help, and they named its one aim a better and stronger CSX.
1:01:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
1:01:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): said they meant no disrespect to the directors or to management. Their views on CSX.
1:01:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as on every company they owned, rested on evidence, not on any settled idea of what a company ought to do.
1:01:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:01:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they described how those views had come out in the past. We have supported management in many of the companies in which we invest, and opposed it in others.
1:01:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:01:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same was true of acquisitions and of new investment, backed at some companies and resisted at others. Each time, they said, after weighing the facts afresh. Then they gave the role a name. To us, this is being a good shareholder, and that is what we strive to be.
1:02:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:02:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter Hone signed with a partner went on to explain why its writers felt bound to raise these matters on behalf of everyone with a stake in the railroad. As we are guardians of others' capital and have a duty to act. in their best long-term interests, as you do to act in ours, the shareholders.
1:02:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That concludes our audio program on learning from Chris Hahn. If you would like to be invited to a future LatticeWork Summit, subscribe to our Substack at Latticework.com.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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