Logan Wright argues China's economy is in decay, not crisis, posing a deindustrialization threat to the West via deflationary exports.
Summary
Logan Wright, author of 'Broken China,' joins Tom Wheelwright to discuss China's economic trajectory, arguing that growth was driven by credit expansion rather than planning. He characterizes the current state as 'decay' with deflationary pressures rather than a sudden collapse. Wright contends that China is no longer a threat to overtake the US economy but poses a risk of Western deindustrialization through cheap exports. He expresses skepticism about China winning the AI race due to significant financing gaps and chip shortages. The discussion highlights the structural differences between China's state-directed banking system and US markets.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 2:01
Introduction and Guest Background
Tom Wheelwright introduces Logan Wright, author of 'Broken China,' to discuss China's economic shift. Wright outlines his background living in Beijing and Hong Kong and his focus on the intersection of Chinese political culture and international markets, specifically exchange rates and the financial system.
- 2:01 – 4:59
China's Credit Boom and Bust
Wright argues that China's growth was driven by an unprecedented credit expansion rather than long-term planning. He notes that credit grew 18% annually from 2003-2016 but slowed to 9% post-deleveraging, leading to the current economic constraints.
- 4:59 – 9:57
State-Directed Financial System vs. US Markets
Wright contrasts the US market-based system with China's investment-led, state-directed banking system. He explains how local governments compete for growth, creating incentives for over-investment and reliance on shadow banking to maintain credit flows.
- 9:57 – 12:39
Shadow Banking and Deleveraging
The speaker details how Chinese banks used off-balance-sheet instruments like wealth management products to bypass regulatory limits. This created a risky, unstable funding base that fueled bubbles in property and commodities before the 2016 deleveraging campaign.
- 12:39 – 16:38
Economic Decay vs. Crisis
Wright describes China's current state as 'decay' rather than sudden collapse, characterized by slower growth and deflation. He argues that fixing the model requires painful reforms like writing down capital, which political incentives currently prevent.
- 16:38 – 18:08
China's Economic Threat to the US
Wright asserts that China is no longer a realistic threat to overtake the US economy. Instead, the primary threat is deindustrialization in the West due to China's deflationary export pressure and concentration of supply chain choke points.
- 18:08 – 22:47
Limits to EV Exports
The discussion covers the limits of China's electric vehicle exports, citing security restrictions in Western markets, macroeconomic limits in emerging economies, and political pushback in countries with existing auto industries like Europe and Thailand.
- 22:47 – 34:27
AI Race and Financing Gaps
Wright expresses skepticism about China winning the AI race due to a massive financing gap. He cites Rhodium Group data showing $11 billion in revenue against $135-190 billion in planned CapEx, constrained by chip shortages and weak equity markets.
- 34:27 – 34:47
China's Export Expansion and Global Trade Impact
Logan Wright argues that China's continued expansion of global export market share will weaken global trade flows. This trend is expected to trigger a natural pushback from other regions like Europe and the US.
- 34:47 – 35:28
Supply Chain Efficiency and Diversification
The speaker notes that while moving manufacturing away from China is costlier in the near term, current supply chains are inefficient due to risks like rare earth material cutoffs. A diversified manufacturing base is suggested as a more robust solution.
- 35:28 – 37:01
Podcast Conclusion and Sponsor Read
The host wraps up the segment by introducing Logan Wright's book 'Broken China'. The segment ends with a sponsor read for the WealthAbility Accelerator, which is excluded from analysis.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | At one point in April 2016, a single Chinese rebar futures contract was trading at roughly four times the volume of the S P 500. |
| TeslaTSLA | equity | neutral | compared to tesla and and the other electric car companies um where do you think that's going do you think they will continue will do you think they will come to dominate like like japan did |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
China added about a third of global GDP to new credit in just eight years after the global financial crisis.
Logan Wright ·2:42
How to verify: World Bank Global Financial Development Report or IMF Global Credit Database data for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCredit grew about 18% per year from 2003 to 2016 in China.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·3:58
How to verify: PBOC credit data or IMF International Financial Statistics for China's total credit growth. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Credit grew at only 9% per year from 2017 to 2024 after the deleveraging campaign.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·3:58
How to verify: PBOC credit data or IMF International Financial Statistics for China's total credit growth. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Core CPI in China has been around 1.5% since the deleveraging campaign.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:34
How to verify: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) CPI data for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
88% of local fiscal spending is spent at the local government level.
Logan Wright ·6:17
How to verify: Chinese Ministry of Finance budget reports or academic analysis of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In April 2016, a single Chinese rebar futures contract traded at roughly four times the volume of the S&P 500 daily.
Logan Wright ·9:19
How to verify: Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) trading volume data for rebar futures vs. CBOE S&P 500 volume data for April 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Chinese AI models generated about $11 billion in annualized revenues against $135-140 billion in CapEx planned for the current year and $180-190 billion for next year.
Logan Wright ·24:06
How to verify: Rhodium Group report 'Broken China' or subsequent publications by Rhodium Group on China's AI investment. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
China's banking system has an ROA of only about 0.6% across the entire market.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:14
How to verify: PBOC financial stability reports or IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) for China. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
China's fiscal deficit is about 9.5% of GDP, or about $2 trillion a year.
Logan Wright ·29:35
How to verify: Chinese Ministry of Finance budget documents or IMF Article IV Consultation for China. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Migrant workers' pension imbalance is roughly a 30% of GDP problem.
Logan Wright ·27:47
How to verify: Rhodium Group report 'Broken China' or academic papers on China's social security gap for migrant workers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify China's credit-to-GDP growth rates using National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) data or IMF reports for the 2003-2016 period.
- Check current Chinese CPI and core CPI figures from NBS to confirm the ~1.5% level cited.
- Review Rhodium Group reports on China's AI sector CapEx versus revenue to validate the $135-190 billion financing gap claim.
- Examine US and EU tariff schedules and trade defense actions against Chinese EVs and solar to assess export limits.
- Analyze China's local government financing vehicle (LGFV) debt levels via Moody's or S&P ratings reports.
- Compare Chinese rebar futures trading volumes from the Shanghai Futures Exchange against S&P 500 volume data for April 2016.
- Assess Western manufacturing supply chain diversification strategies through corporate earnings calls of major multinationals.
- Review Chinese semiconductor export restrictions and domestic chip production capabilities via Ministry of Commerce announcements.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): big news in the world is focused heavily on the Middle East and Russia and the Ukraine, Europe. What about China? China has long been considered our primary economic
0:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): partner
0:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and foe at the same time. What's going on with their economy? How are we going to deal with the the AI race with them? All of these questions we want to discover really what. what's going on with China right now because it's going to if it affects what we do in the US so much. And fortunately, on the Wealth Building Show today, we have an expert in this, Dr. Logan Wright. Logan wrote the book Broken China. So we we got an idea, Logan, of your your take on this. Um, But if you would give us um thank you so much for being on the wealth building. Show and give us a little bit of your background because it's pretty significant when it comes to China.
0:55Logan Wright: Sure. Thanks, Tom. Really happy to be here. Um, yeah, broken China as the the title, you know, how the economic miracle shattered and what it means for the world. Um, this is an explanation. It's not a prediction, which is one of the important things to understand about how uh we got to to this point. My own background. So um I lived in Beijing from two thousand 2001 one to two thousand. 2015 and then in uh Hong Kong from 2015 to 2022. Um, so I've seen a lot of uh China's uh recent transformation sort of from the ground and spent most of that time um following the Chinese financial system uh professionally and um talking with uh member Chinese officials and um monetary technocrats and officials in the central bank. And so that's sort of how I got into this. I wanted to find something that r reflected the intersection of China's political culture and the international marketplace. And so the exchange rate became a very early sort of focus of mine. It's what I ended up writing a dissertation about, because it reflects this sort of direct balance between state and market adjustment in China. And so,
2:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
2:02Logan Wright: basically. I think what's underappreciated about the Chinese growth story is how much it depended upon the financial system. The financial system was the enabler of Chinese growth when credit was expanding, and it now constrains Chinese growth. And the story of the book is a relatively simple one. It's about how we normally look at China through a sort of a political lens, and we say this is a country that has a one party, uh it's a one party state. with a technocratic elite that can make long term plans. So what are those long term plans and how are they doing relative to these long term plans? And instead, you know, I think it's a in a very different story. It's a story of an unprecedented credit boom and bust. And um as as a result, uh, you know, everyone looks a lot pretty smart as credit is expanding and a lot more reactive and passive when credit is contracting. And we we've never seen anything quite like the expansion in China's financial system uh after the global financial crisis, where they added about a third of global GDP to new credit in just eight years.
3:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wow. So I remember being in, I was in Shanghai 2018. And what I remember is the very large, beautiful department stores with nobody in them.
3:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
3:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that was that was 2018. So that's eight years ago. What's been happening? You know, we uh you know, we've heard about the real estate bust
3:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
3:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in China. What what is it about their system that uh can create such a what I would consider a huge balloon,
3:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
3:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a huge bubble? And uh and has it has it popped or will it pop soon?
3:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
3:45Logan Wright: I think the the bubble, quote unquote, has popped. I mean, I think we're at the end of this credit expansion at this point. So big picture, credit grew about 18% per year from 2003 to 2016.
3:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
3:58Logan Wright: grew at only 9% per year from 2017 to 2024 after the so-called deleveraging campaign, which I can talk through about that attempts to control the shadow banking system. So you were seeing Shanghai right toward the inflection point in consumer credit in particular. I mean, ever since the deleveraging campaign, which sort of cracked down on these shadow financing channels, you haven't seen consumer inflation over 1% one percent um you know sustainably in China. You've seen you know bounces because of food. prices but core cpi has been one one and a half percent because consumer cred consumer borrowing um has been limited
4:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
4:35Logan Wright: during that time and and and during the property bubble you've seen um these sorts you've seen uh deleveraging um actually take place but the the
4:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): story
4:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if if we
4:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can't
4:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can can we just back up a little bit yeah sure um how does china's economy and the way their financial system works, how does it differ from the US and the Western economy?
4:59Logan Wright: Sure. Beijing largely controls, I mean, we set Mac in the US, we sort of set interest rates um at levels that we think will um permit sort of the Fed's dual mandate of employment and uh managing inflation. Um we set fiscal policy based on you know political priorities, and then we sort of let markets uh see where um
5:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
5:22Logan Wright: see where overall growth takes us, and we adjust policy settings accordingly to sort of influence macro aggregates. China does things very differently. It is an economy that is based on investment-led led growth. The funding for that investment largely comes through the state-directed banking system. It comes through credit from state-owned banks and it largely flows through state-owned enterprises to local government companies at the same time. So the tools that China uses are largely the distribution of credit through this state-led financial system in for that are not necessarily market-oriented decisions. And the allocation of local fiscal spending, which 88% of that is spent at the local government level by companies that are largely state directed, but can often proceed based on local government priorities rather than Beijing's own priorities. So a lot of how Beijing tries to guide local governments to spend and a lot of their long-term plans are really sort of more suggestions to how local governments can invest. because local authorities are very much at the commanding heights of the economy. And that problem became much, I mean, for a while, China used this
6:37competition among provincial authorities and provincial leaders to encourage growth. And that was extremely helpful Um, in terms of driving investment and employment because every single local official wanted to sort of compete with. one another, um, you know, to generate more economic growth, to generate more jobs, to, you know, develop new, new high technology industries. Um, but after the global financial crisis, Beijing sort of had to let this competition go. And that created uh these incentives for local officials to basically, you know, hold Beijing for ransom. They could basically say, look, we've started all these projects. Um, you have to basically keep funding them. You have to keep credit flowing through our banks, or else we're going to have half-finished tunnels, bridges, um, you know, industrial parks. And therefore, there'll be this huge cost. And so, by the way, when you actually do fund those projects that we've been asking for, um, we're going to start more at the same time. So once we started more, then you're in the same sort of cycle. And as that credit continues to flow.
7:39um, Beijing starts using blunter and blunter measures to try to control aggregate credit. And when they do that, it creates these unregulated, shadow sort of forms of financing because there's a lot more political incentives at the local level involved in keeping growth going rather than shutting it down. Growth is really strong after the global financial crisis. And so the net result is, you know, if credit depends, if uh if we're seeing 9% GDP growth after the global financial crisis and that depends upon new credit, you know, who's gonna who's gonna really stand up and say, I want new credit to to contract? Um and so it creates this sort of path-dependent model in which the financial system serves as the shock absorber for the political system. You don't have to. see unemployment. You don't have to see bad investments. You don't have to see bankruptcies. You can just keep more credit rolling out the door, pouring, you know, throwing
8:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): new money after
8:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an ever-expanding money supply.
8:40Logan Wright: Exactly. So you have a huge expansion of the money supply first through regulated channels. And then from 2012 to 2016, you have had this largely through shadow channels. And this created these very significant risks that were building up of bubbles in the Chinese financial system in 2014, 2015, 2016 in property, in the massive equity boom and bust, and then in commodities uh trading as well. At one point in April 2016, a single Chinese rebar futures contract was trading at roughly four times the volume of the S P 500. Uh on a daily basis. So it was just, you know, rampant speculation. This is why the deleveraging campaign was designed to control this sort of shadow financing. But the problem is that if you actually cut off all of these shadow banks, you cut off half the credit in China, it has a huge impact on the economy overall. So the the lack of consumption that you were seeing in the malls then, um, you know, true at various points in you know in different parts of the country, um, was indicative of suddenly households that used to rely upon the deepening of financial services um couldn't couldn't uh rely upon that anymore.
9:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So if you could um quickly explain what you mean by this, but by the shadow banking community.
9:57Logan Wright: Sure. So basically, if um if you're Beijing and you uh want to control this aggregate credit. to local governments that's flowing out the door by 2012, what do you do? Well, you put different uh regulatory limits in place. You say, and this was always true, there's a 75% loan to deposit ratio. Okay. So how would you get around that? Um, or there's certain capital risk weightings associated with lending um that banks have to hold in reserve in their own capital. So how would you get around that? Well, you would restructure uh loans not as formal loans funded by deposits, but you would say these are funded by different instruments, um asset uh wealth management products that are not deposits, but are basically deposits in name only.
10:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Basically derivatives.
10:40Logan Wright: Exactly. And or, you know, SIVs or SPVs in terms of where they are. And so then they would make off-balance off balance sheet loans uh to third party institutions and the bank could stand in the middle and claim a premium therein. And so this was obviously fairly risky because you weren't really sure where credit was going to be to be going. Similarly, with capital risk weightings, you don't, you're no longer making loans. You're making uh directional asset management plans, investment receivables, trust beneficiary rights, interbank entrusted payments. Name, go on and on and on. I I used to joke like Wall Street has nothing. on, you know, hube local financial officials when it comes to financial innovation, um, when it comes to this sort of regulatory arbitrage. So this got very, very risky in a very short period of time where you went from having a stable financial system that was funded by deposits that made loans in an inefficient manner, but you know, you had this very stable funding base to a system in which you had an unstable funding base. and you were making loans outside of regulatory purviews, and it was funding all of these bubbles
11:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because of the pressure to continue to grow.
11:46Logan Wright: Because the pressure to continue to grow, because the political system created these incentives. And so the big picture of this boom and bust is that this followed no plan. There was no long term design of this. The most important decisions in China's economy followed no long long-term term design. of Beijing or long-term or the planning agencies. It was in no one's intention to have the largest single country credit expansion in over a century. It was in no one's intention to basically crash the property market on the way down from this credit expansion. And it certainly wasn't in anyone's intention to be grappling with deflation uh to this extent.
12:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So so you you mentioned at the very beginning that your your book is an explanation, not a prediction. So so you're saying this is this is over, this this boom is a bust?
12:39Logan Wright: Well, so what I'm s what I'm describing,
12:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
12:42Logan Wright: reason I say the model is broken is because the normal tools that Beijing would use to respond to this slowdown. are the fiscal and financial systems. But those tools are impaired, which means the overall model is broken. They can fix those tools. They can recapitalize banks. They can restructure the fiscal system in terms of how it collects tax, how it distributes tax. But all of those fixes involve writing down the capital stock in some way or involve uh telling some. part of Chinese society that they're that they um that they're no longer part of the plan. It involves
13:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): deciding who loses.
13:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What would be the downside to them doing that?
13:25Logan Wright: Slower grow slower growth in the short term. So and political costs. So you'd have to basically go to Liaoning province and say,
13:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
13:32Logan Wright: state-owned enterprises that have followed this plan, you know, you're no longer going to receive funding, you're no longer going to receive fiscal resources. Most of you are out of jobs, even though you've done everything we've told you to do. It's obvious why they don't want to pursue this. So the conclusion of the book is that the argument of the book is that decay, we're not seeing crisis or collapse. We're seeing decay. We're seeing slower growth. We're seeing deflationary pressure because there are greater incentives to maintain production, but no way to actually maintain domestic decision. demand. And so you can, you know, continue to, you'll you're more likely to see this decay continue because it's easier than reform. Reform is possible, but it involves slower growth, hence, the era of rapid growth is over. And hence, you know, the model is broken. Now, all that being said, the book is far from deterministic. It is actually a story about how. policy has changed. Most of us who were in Beijing in the 2000s saw a system that was reforming. It was moving two steps forward, one step back. It was certainly not perfect. It was, you know, there were many setbacks along the way, but there was a sort of path or destination toward convergence with With international standards and international economic economic economic norms. No one thought that democracy was
14:52going to flare up overnight. No one thought that this was sort of going to break down the Communist Party, but they thought that there was a sort of liberalization or pluralization in the economic system that would create market opportunities that would be worthwhile. And that, you know, the system would become gradually more, you know, liberal and and and open o over time as well, even if not fully democratic. And frankly, we all saw that on the ground. This was all very real. It reversed and the big debate among China scholars is sort of when it reversed um and when it started. You know, there's obviously a lot to be said for the political instability of 2012 and what Xi Jinping himself did, but many of the things she did in in many ways were a reaction to that previous period of political instability, the Middle Eastern Revolutions in 2011, which really sort of scared um the Chinese leadership as well. And so there's this reversal of reforms that takes place basically in the mid to late 2010s. And the story of the book is about how, you know, this is probably the current trajectory is not a sustainable one. It will probably change. The question is how quickly it changes and what that means for the future. And I think, frankly, the reason I make recent the reason I make this argument is because strategic competition with the West was not inevitable. This was a result of specific choices that China made in the
16:12last decade, basically to move away from reform and to narrow this range of economic engagement with what's possible. That does not mean that this will last indefinitely in the future. And I think there's many outcomes that include moderate Beijing being forced to moderate strategic. competition with the West that are far more plausible than where we where we currently um what people currently consider.
16:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So what does that mean for people in the US and the West?
16:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
16:38Logan Wright: basically what it means is we don't face the same challenge from China as we did just four to five years ago. There is no longer any realistic threat that China is going to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy. And the problems we have with China are the same problems, whether they are 60% of our GDP, roughly 65 right now, 70% of our GDP, 90% of our GDP, that doesn't matter. What matters is they're not going to be 150 or 200% of our GDP, which means that the threats from China, the military and security threats, the industrial and technological competitiveness threats. are deterrable. They are not inexorable. They will not continue to rise in salience indefinitely. China will face trade-offs. They are already facing trade-offs in how they manage this. It also means that we have a different threat right now, which is underappreciated, which is the threat of deindustrialization and the threat of sacrificing to China more supply chain choke points. and an increasing concentration of global export market share over increasing
17:46number of raw materials and different industries. And that is the threat that we are we are seeing accumulate right now. And it's happening because of the weakness in China's economy, because of deflationary pressure, because of a weaker real exchange rate.
18:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So so let's take a couple of um specific items. Let's let's start with with something that's real, which is the automobile industry, where they're pretty much overtaken the rest of the world. It appears that they've overtaken the rest of the world when it comes to uh electric cars. And uh what they're what they're producing seem to be um better more desirable they'll actually look great um
18:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
18:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compared to tesla and and the other electric car companies um where do you think that's going do you think they will continue will do you think they will come to dominate like like japan did
18:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
18:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 30 years ago
18:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
18:48Logan Wright: so there's a few things there i mean that you're you're asking the question sort of implicitly, where do we think the limits to China's export growth are? You know, i i is there any reason that they can't continue expanding their trade surplus further? And I mean, there's all sorts of problems with this in China itself, because essentially China is saying we want to become less reliant upon the rest of the world for our industrial development, but virtually entirely reliant on the rest of the world for economic growth. because the marginal demand for everything we're producing is outside of China rather than inside of China, if they can't produce domestic demand. So take cars, you know, as a good example, you know, what are the limits to China's exports of cars? Well, there's certain markets where electric vehicles, you know, they collect data and are necessary to sort of process their external environments. So there's reasons for security reasons that uh they're probably not
19:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): going to gonna gain
19:38Logan Wright: gain full access to the US market, even if you know some of the components are um you know basically built elsewhere and there's gonna be restrictions on connected vehicles. This will probably be true in several countries as long as you think there's a security threat from the aggregation of that data, and not all those markets will be open. So there'll be sectoral limits to just how much these auto exports can expand regardless of price. and competitiveness, even if price and competitiveness on Chinese batteries and on some of the subcomponents on some of the technologies really is um you know improving. And then you'll have macro macroeconomic limits. Just if China's trade surplus is expanding um basically in um emerging economies at this point. So they're expanding in if you look at uh the trade surplus to the US, EU, and ASEAN collectively, it's basically flat for the last four years. Where it's expanding is is outside of those economies. And when you're expanding in emerging economies, you're largely competing on price and you need to provide more and more incentives uh for those countries
20:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of the economy. I mean, but it
20:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but it does seem to go hand in hand with their belt and road initiatives.
20:47Logan Wright: Sure, but that's also a and and that's part of it. You're essentially sort of providing vendor financing to a certain extent for some of these purchases. But there's a limit to how large the trade deficit with emerging economies can become, um, just based on what they
21:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
21:03Logan Wright: actually sustain. So there's sectoral limits, there's macroeconomic limits to this, and there's political limits. So in countries where you have an auto industry, um, you're going to see increasing resistance to this continuous. continued flood of Chinese exports, which is exactly what you see in Europe right now with the restrictions and the deal that were made on plug in hybrids. It will be less apparent when you have an industry that's sort of emerging or not as not as entrenched. But you know, look at just uh in Thailand recently, you're starting to see, you know, Chinese uh companies investing uh to build electric vehicles there, but an increasing volume. of political pushback against that uh involvement. So this is a real limit if China's not generating domestic demand. If they're not generating domestic demand and the economy remains um led by investment, what it means is you can only grow relative to the rest of the world based on um essentially displacing others' investments.
22:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
22:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.
22:02Logan Wright: And that's the problem because it just becomes this inherently sort of confrontational um economic model. So even if China wins in some of these sectors, they end up losing because you'll face political pushback over time. It's not like countries will just suddenly give up and just allow uh Chinese imports to continue coming in. It's a lot easier to defend industries you already have than try to reconstitute them from the ground up, which is exactly where you're starting to see some of the pushback in Europe take hold.
22:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. All right. Now let's switch to the other side, which is the big one, which is AI. Where do you think China is relating in in relationship to the US in this what you know we are calling the AI race?
22:47Logan Wright: Yeah, I I'm very skeptical of sort of the race metaphor. because I'm not sure how anybody wins, um, so to speak. I mean, for for example, I mean, if there was a you know huge new advanced US model or Chinese model uh released tomorrow, and everyone agreed that it was um superior and um you know met all these standards of of you know of uh of general intelligence and you know was really going to to to set the new standard, does do we think that that means that development would stop on the other side? Probably not. Like they would just be sort of this continued scramble. So what you're really talking about is sort of uh the financing for this and competition over a market and how we embed AI within uh different technologies, both consumer and and manufacturing. And China's always thought about it more as you know a a productivity tool, um, you know, AI plus to sort of embed within certain technologies rather than strict sort of competition along um the models themselves. That being said, um, the build-out in China in data centers is constrained by chips, which is obvious, um, but you know, because of US export controls, but also because of their own domestic constraints. Um, but it's also constrained by financing. Um Chinese models don't generate a lot of revenue. Um, in aggregate, based on the math we did at Rhodium Group, we only saw about $11 billion in
24:06annualized revenues in Chinese models against a planned $135, $140 billion in CapEx this year and about $180, $190 billion planned next year. So that's a huge gap. It's currently being made up by the equity market with some government support. But the idea that government guidance funds or Beijing's directed funding is going to scale this sort of $150 billion gap between revenues and capex every year, it's not realistic. And the equity market's current trouble in China, it's really plummeted quite a bit in the last six weeks. Um Likely portends, you know, weaker capex um for AI. uh build-outs in the years ahead beyond uh 2027, uh precisely because it'll be harder and harder to get this uh to close this financing gap overall. So there's a huge financing gap with the US and a huge uh compute gap that is likely to persist in that regard.
25:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So why do you think you've mentioned this several times, um it being investment driven, not consumer-driven. consumer driven Why is it that uh China is not their economy is not rolling faster domestically why why why this need to export all the time
25:23Logan Wright: well so the basic story is that you know why do you think household consumption is low in China? There's basically four answers out there that are that are are commonly cited. One is the low household income share of GDP, which is true, just this is the structure of an export-oriented economy that wages have to necessarily remain low and in order to maintain this sort of um you know manufacturing uh manufacturing led uh model. Second is the inequality of household income. So even if you improved household income, it would only accrue to the to the wealthy. So you're not seeing the same um level of uh level of consumption in lower. income quintiles. The third is the level of household debt. And the fourth is sort of the traditional argument about precautionary savings, that the social safety net is impaired and therefore people are save more money and don't spend as much. You know, frankly, I think we're a lot more persuaded by the first two explanations that just the level of household income is low and it is unequally distributed. So you can address that, but it needs to be addressed with tax policy. It needs to be addressed with fiscal remedies and transfers after the initial sort of tax take. And so that can be done, but it involves basically cutting off existing. This is it gets back to the same structural
26:43reform point. It involves cutting off certain, you know, uh entities that are currently receiving fiscal revenue. It involves writing down. parts of the capital stock and factoring out uh some parts of China's economic model. And so that's what's um you know different and um and surprising here. It's there's no, you know, there's no um there's no magic bullet here uh in terms of how to fix China's household consumption. You basically need to raise household income levels, and that depends upon employment.
27:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
27:14Logan Wright: China's current strategy is very industry and technology heavy. And what that means, you know, basically, is that it's capital intensive and not labor intensive. It doesn't generate a lot of jobs. And so it's hard to see how this resolves without a pretty wholesale change in China's strategy overall. Precautionary savings is also a problem, but it's primarily a problem for migrant workers. And you can remedy migrant workers' savings imbalances if you improve their pensions and you give them access to urban pensions rather than the lower rural level. And that's a big problem for China's 250, 300 million migrant workers. It's roughly a 30% of GDP problem by our calculation. But they're not really making progress along resolving that either. So household consumption is largely constrained by income growth more than anything else. And to see an acceleration in household consumption growth and a rebalancing, you'd need to see a big surge in employment and you'd need to be a see a change almost certainly from the fiscal system in how uh tax revenues are allocated and how they are distributed.
28:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the the US uh has uh grown a lot because of the consumerism of getting cheaper imports than exports. Will China ever see that? In other words, will they start importing or will they continue to protect their economy the way they have?
28:43Logan Wright: Well, yeah, the trade balance is basically the balance between savings and investment. And so um the key question you're asking is. how do you get the savings rate down? Because investment is slowing. Investment will continue to slow precisely because the financial system can no longer sustain it. It has already run this massive credit expansion. It is already about 60% of global GDP in bank assets, generating Earning very low levels of profitability, only about 0.6% ROA across the entire
29:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): market.
29:15Logan Wright: banking system. So it seems very plausible to us that investment will continue declining. So how do you adjust the savings rate? Well, there's either fiscal spending, you know, very aggressively to do that, but China's already running a very large fiscal deficit. It's about 9.5% of GDP, about $2 trillion a year. Um, So you have to think about, you know, basically how to transfer fiscal revenues from one sector to another in order to reduce savings and increase consumption overall. And so that's why I say the choices that are facing China are extremely stark. They are not easy, you know, incremental sort of of changes, because if those could have been done, they would have been done already. Um, you know, they are certainly, you know, there's certainly no shortage of options about how to to start thinking. about rebalancing the economy. But this is where we are. And so I think the idea for years, I mean, one way to do this would be to have China's exchange rate appreciate and in line with market forces. The problem is that China also has the world's largest money supply. And so there are greater incentives under a wall of capital controls to move money out
30:25of China rather than move it in. Chinese interest rates are below US interest rates. So there's a natural tendency to try to diversify into diversify into foreign assets if you're a Chinese household or business. How do you encourage these inflows becomes the the key challenge for Beijing. And so it's not that there's an easy sort of policy solution to any. of these imbalances. Most likely it will come through overseas pushback against Chinese exports. And the pressure in this system materializes largely through deflation and it largely through the erosion of wherewithal and private profitability and uh in private sector profitability. And that's kind of the the the pressure that you're seeing on the Chinese economy. today, uh notwithstanding some of the commodity price shocks we've seen recently.
31:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So um to let's let's kind of wrap this up with this question. How do you see this uh China's situation affecting uh business owners and investors in the US?
31:32Logan Wright: Yeah, I think that the the threat right now uh from China is is just different than it was recently. It is about cost pressures. It is about disinvestment pressures in the West and uh in the G7 um and in other emerging economies. The spillovers from China's growth are investment um uh investment disincentives incentives everywhere because even in emerging economies, right, you're seeing um you see some reduction of Chinese imports, but the net reduction in final prices of multiple different industries reduces incentives for new investments. So we get this question all the time from our private equity clients, uh, from others about what industries is China currently expanding manufacturing capacity, where we're worried that these deflationary pressures will will spill over elsewhere. And so I think it's a world in which the answer to these disinvestment pressures collectively is to invest. The problem is this is actually a role for business and government together to sort of counter these pressures because you need a certain degree of protection, of uh trade protection, uh to prevent the this sort of
32:47flood of continued imports coming in. At the same time, it can't be just a a safeguards um, you know, club because, you know, not everyone wants more expensive steel. Um, you know, when that happens, that's gonna not everyone wants more expensive copper. It's gonna impact uh manufacturing competitiveness. So this is a very complicated um workout that's uh that's taking place. But the the net result is is that China's current growth model is likely to continue to put these pressures on global investments. And you need um
33:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
33:21Logan Wright: know basically different strategies toward um de-risking and diversifying demand bases um you know toward the rest of the world in order to make uh some of these investments uh make sense and to counter some of these pressures that we're seeing. But nonetheless, there's there's a time-limited nature um of this uh as well.
33:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So do you think that uh US businesses can need to continue looking elsewhere for their manufacturing?
33:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
33:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as we've seen more in Vietnam and uh Thailand and uh uh Indonesia. Um
34:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
34:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you think that's just going to continue because because of China's problems?
34:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
34:07Logan Wright: mean, I think that there's going to be if if you want to set a broad direction from where we are, um, the pattern of de-risking from China, even at higher uh near term cost, will continue. And that includes reshoring, friendshoring, expanding sort of manufacturing bases in Southeast Asia. yes. In Europe, yes. In the United States, yes. All of the above in certain, you know, in certain ways, depending upon uh the investments that are there. Um, the point is that the trend that we're seeing from China itself is a trend of if you just continue global export market share expansion uh from what we've seen over the last five years from from China's growth, it's going to weaken global trade flows. everywhere. And so there is a natural um pushback to that. Uh, I think that broadening that um, you know, manufacturing base away from China, no one everyone says it's costlier in the near term, but there is a um there is a you know inefficient supply chains. Supply chains are not efficient if certain, you know, materials can suddenly be cut off. Like rare earths where they are. So there's a different conception of efficiency and cost um and where those trade-offs are. It's certainly not straightforward and it probably involves a more diversified, you know, base as a result.
35:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So we've been listening to uh Dr. Logan Wright uh on China's faltering economy. He he wrote the book Broken China, how the economic miracle shattered. What It Means for the World. A view it uh of China and the macro world economics uh may seem like it's uh beyond what we can control, but nevertheless, we are part of it. And once we understand it, it's gonna going to make it easier, easier on us as business owners and investors. to make more money and pay way less tax. We'll see you next time on the Wealthability Show. Thanks for listening to the Wealth Ability Show. If today's episode gave you a new perspective, remember this: the tax law is not your enemy. It's a roadmap. And when you know how to follow it, you can build real lasting wealth. If you're a business owner or investor who's tired of overpaying taxes, the wealthability accelerator is your next step. You'll have the opportunity to work directly with me for 80% less than my standard rate. And I'll personally guide you through how to change your facts so that you can change your tax. Go to wealthability.com/slash bonus and apply today. Remember, it's not just what you make, it's
36:48what you keep.
36:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
36:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): podcast is a presentation of Rich Dad Media Network.