Baylor Endowment on VC Skepticism, Concentration, and Compounding
Summary
Renee Hanna and guest discuss Baylor University's endowment strategy, emphasizing a concentrated portfolio of approximately 20 GP relationships to manage operational load and deepen partnerships. They reject early-stage venture due to inflated seed valuations, preferring expansion capital and later-stage investments that offer clearer liquidity paths and 3x-5x returns over 3-5 years. The team enforces a 15% net IRR hurdle for private investments and actively manages liquidity by selling underperforming assets early. They also highlight the role of behavioral biases and geographic location in maintaining disciplined, contrarian investment decisions.
Key takeaways
- 1 A 3x return every 5 years compounds to 27x over 15 years, which Hanna views as superior to chasing a single 15x return over a 15-year period, emphasizing IRR and compounding over raw multiples.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 8:29
- 2 Baylor sets a 15% net IRR hurdle for private investments, calculated as 6% public equity return + 3.5% premium + 5% liquidity opportunity cost.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 28:27
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 4:20
Portfolio Construction and Early-Stage Venture Skepticism
Renee Hanna explains Baylor's strategy of avoiding top-tier early-stage firms due to high seed valuations, focusing instead on expansion capital and later-stage investments to capture growth with clearer liquidity paths.
- 4:20 – 12:14
Expansion Capital Allocation and Compounding Logic
Hanna outlines Baylor's allocation split (10% early-stage, 10% later-stage, balance to expansion/buyouts) and argues that a repeatable 3x return every five years compounds to 27x over 15 years, superior to chasing single large multiples.
- 12:14 – 24:03
Concentration and GP Relationships
Hanna advocates for a concentrated portfolio of ~20 key GP relationships to reduce operational workload and deepen due diligence, noting that 80% of portfolio companies are concentrated in the top 300.
- 24:03 – 26:43
LP Collaboration and Competitive Dynamics
The discussion covers the 'coopetition' model among endowments, where peers share insights while competing for deals, driven by the desire to outperform benchmarks like the Kubo report.
- 26:43 – 28:15
Portfolio Construction and Liquidity Hurdles
Speaker_0 explains the 55/45 split between marketable alternatives and private investments, emphasizing a strict 15% net IRR hurdle to justify illiquidity and support a 5.5% spending rate.
- 28:15 – 31:16
Private Credit Exclusion and Market Bifurcation
Baylor excludes private credit as it fails to meet the 15% return threshold. Speakers attribute the growth of private credit to companies staying private longer to maintain control and avoid public market pressures.
- 31:16 – 36:46
Venture Capital Concentration and Capital Moats
Speaker_1 notes that 76% of Q1 2026 VC capital went to five companies. Both speakers agree that capital acts as a moat, cementing winners like Anthropic and OpenAI who prefer staying private.
- 36:46 – 44:00
AI Impact on Software and Human Capital
Speaker_0 observes legacy software evolving into AI-enabled tools, while Speaker_1 advises students to focus on critical thinking and relationship-building skills that AI cannot replicate.
- 44:00 – 46:54
Active Portfolio Management and Secondary Sales
Baylor actively manages its book by selling underperforming assets early. Speaker_0 describes selling a legacy manager's book with zero growth to a secondary buyer to expedite liquidity.
- 46:54 – 49:44
Follow-on Strategy and Prorata Fallacies
Speaker_1 argues that preserving ownership via prorata is a logical fallacy; capital should be deployed to the highest and best use. Speaker_0 agrees, noting reserves are flexible.
- 49:44 – 52:29
Late-Stage Venture Attractiveness
Baylor increased allocation to later-stage venture, seeking 3x-5x returns in 3-5 years. Speaker_1 highlights that historical data shows early movers are rarely the ultimate winners, making late-stage investments attractive.
- 52:29 – 53:13
SpaceX Investment History and Compliance
Speaker_1 discloses Baylor's investment in SpaceX in the late 2010s. The discussion illustrates how late-stage investors benefited from de-risked milestones like Starlink, achieving high IRRs.
- 53:13 – 56:01
Re-underwriting companies and behavioral biases
Speaker_1 discusses re-underwriting companies from first principles, while Speaker_0 highlights the bias of becoming 'anti-fans' to justify missed investments.
- 56:01 – 1:03:29
Contrarian investing and geographic advantages
Speaker_0 explains how Baylor's location in Waco, Texas, reduces peer pressure and FOMO, allowing for more contrarian, data-driven decisions.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenAI | private company | mixed | you're not able to invest in the next cursor, the next OpenAI, |
| SpaceX | private company | neutral | So using June 30, 2020. 26 as an example where there's gonna be a lot of groups that have SpaceX in their portfolio, a lot of other endowments. |
| Anthropic | private company | neutral | Anthropic, reportedly 2 trillion. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Baylor University has a $2.7 billion endowment.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:37
How to verify: Baylor University Annual Financial Report or IRS Form 990-PF for the relevant fiscal year. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor rebuilt its portfolio from scratch beginning in 2014.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Baylor University Endowment Investment Policy Statement or historical allocation reports from 2014-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor has a lean team of three people on the private team, three on the marketable team, and three on the ops team.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:25
How to verify: Baylor University organizational charts or staff listings on their investment office website. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Venture is roughly a three and a half trillion dollar asset class.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:55
How to verify: Preqin or PitchBook global venture capital market reports for the relevant year. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor allocates approximately 10% of its overall portfolio to early-stage venture and another 10% to later-stage opportunities.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:44
How to verify: Baylor University Endowment allocation disclosures or Kubo Report rankings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Expansion capital comprises roughly 2% of the Burgess benchmark allocation.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:44
How to verify: Burgess Associates Benchmark Study for Endowments and Foundations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor's allocation to expansion capital is closer to 30% of its private portfolio.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:49
How to verify: Baylor University Endowment allocation disclosures or Kubo Report rankings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor has a finite budget of $160 million to deploy in a given calendar year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·17:50
How to verify: Baylor University annual capital deployment reports or budget disclosures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor's top 20 private names now hold closer to $250 million in commitments, up from $100 million five years prior.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·16:44
How to verify: Baylor University investment committee minutes or annual reports detailing top holdings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
80% of the 1,300 line items in Baylor's portfolio are in the top 300 companies.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·16:44
How to verify: Baylor University portfolio analytics or Kubo Report detailed holdings data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor manages a $2.7 billion endowment.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·26:43
How to verify: Baylor University Annual Report or IRS Form 990-PF for the relevant fiscal year. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor allocates 55% of its portfolio to marketable alternatives and 45% to private investments.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·28:15
How to verify: Baylor University Investment Policy Statement or Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor requires a 15% net IRR to justify illiquidity in private investments.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·28:27
How to verify: Baylor University Investment Policy Statement or interview with CFO/CIO. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePublic equity is assumed to generate a 6% return.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·28:55
How to verify: Long-term historical data from S&P 500 or CRSP indices. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In Q1 2026, 76% of all venture capital money went into five names.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:52
How to verify: PitchBook, Preqin, or CB Insights Venture Capital Market Reports for Q1 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
SpaceX valuation was reported at $1.75 trillion.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·50:26
How to verify: Reuters, Bloomberg, or Forbes articles reporting on SpaceX's 2026 valuation rounds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Anthropic valuation was reported at $2 trillion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·50:32
How to verify: Reuters, Bloomberg, or Forbes articles reporting on Anthropic's 2026 valuation rounds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
OpenAI valuation was reported at $1.25 trillion.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·50:42
How to verify: Reuters, Bloomberg, or Forbes articles reporting on OpenAI's 2026 valuation rounds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor invested in SpaceX in the late 2010s.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:36
How to verify: Baylor University Endowment annual reports or SEC filings if publicly disclosed, or press releases from the time period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpaceX early investors (2002) had exponential outcomes, while 2017 investors achieved ~75x returns.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·51:55
How to verify: Historical SpaceX cap table data from PitchBook or Crunchbase, and IPO prospectus if applicable. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
SpaceX became a 'highly rational' trade for institutional investors after the success of Starlink, shifting from a niche bet to an access play.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·53:48
How to verify: Check SpaceX funding rounds and investor lists from 2026-2026 (pre-Starlink) versus post-2026 to identify the influx of institutional capital and valuation changes reported in press releases or filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceFounders Fund re-underwrites companies from first principles at every round, sometimes passing on Series A or B before investing in Series C.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·54:08
How to verify: Review Founders Fund's public portfolio announcements and press releases to track their investment timing relative to company funding rounds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Baylor University is located in Waco, Texas, which provides a geographic advantage for contrarian investing by reducing peer pressure.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·56:23
How to verify: Verify Baylor University's location via its official website or public records; assess the claim's validity by comparing the density of VC firms in Waco vs. New York City. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
GPs who maintain modest fund sizes and curate LPs attract 'stickier' capital that remains during downturns.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·58:42
How to verify: Analyze historical LP commitment data for VC firms that capped funds versus those that expanded, using Preqin or eVestment datasets to correlate fund size growth with LP retention rates during market corrections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Naval Ravikant takes a day to think.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:02:12
How to verify: Search for Naval Ravikant's published writings, tweets, or interviews where he discusses his thinking habits and time management practices. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Baylor University's endowment allocation percentages and spending rate via their public financial reports or NACUBO-TIAA benchmark data.
- Check the Kubo Report for peer group performance benchmarks and average returns for private equity and venture capital strategies.
- Review the 15% net IRR hurdle calculation methodology against standard liquidity premium assumptions in private markets.
- Analyze Q1 2026 VC concentration data from PitchBook or Preqin to validate the claim that 76% of capital went to five companies.
- Assess the performance of secondary market transactions for legacy PE books, comparing discount rates to cost of capital in rising rate environments.
- Evaluate the impact of AI on legacy software companies by reviewing earnings reports and product roadmaps of major software firms.
- Research the investment history and valuation rounds of SpaceX, specifically comparing early-stage vs. 2017 late-stage investor returns.
- Consider the operational capacity of a three-person team managing a concentrated portfolio versus larger endowment structures.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): As we were rebuilding the portfolio effectively from scratch beginning in 2014, we didn't have the benefit of having legacy exposure to early stage names. We didn't have Sequoia, we didn't have benchmark. Because we didn't have that luxury, we had to go down a different path of trying to create upside and capture growth exposure in the portfolio in a different way.
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): People
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): often talk about this saying that the fund fun size is a strategy for a GP, but it's it also seems to be the strategy for the LP as
- 0:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well.
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. We're trying to construct a portfolio. And so if I can get into a great name and it's only a five million dollar check size on a $2.7 billion endowment, I'm not sure that I care, right? It doesn't move the needle. And we are also operating with a lean team. We've got three people on the private team, three people on the marketable team, three people on the ops team. Every time you add a new line item, you're effectively like increasing
- 0:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the workload for everybody else. And so you want it to count.
- 0:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You have this front row seat, endowments are arguably the sexiest and the most attractive LPs, so you get to meet with a lot of the managers.
- 0:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're talking to a lot of the startups as well. Today, Venture is roughly three and a half trillion dollar asset. Five years from now, is that number higher?
- 1:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The platforms will continue to grow and get bigger and scale. I think that companies staying private longer is not gonna go away. I think you'll continue to have kind of a bifurcation in the market where you've got these early stage specialists that are playing. coupled with um these very large platforms.
- 1:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Being in Laco, Texas and chatting with you multiple times, you have several very contrarian views. What's another thing that you disagree with, your other health views?
- 1:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a lot of
- 1:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Renee, you're managing director of private equity at Baylor University, which has 2.7 billion $7 dollars under management. And last time we chatted, you said something really interesting, which is
- 1:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 1:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): used to operate under this framework that venture managers should get into companies as early as possible. Today you're not so sure. Why not? Aaron
- 1:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 1:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For us the biggest hurdle is just the entry valuations have changed so much at the pre seed and seed stage rounds. And so when you look at the entry price, um and we still think it absolutely m matters what you pay for these assets, uh, when you're paying an average price of closer to seven $700 hundred million dollars. That's And
- 2:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the
- 2:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): seed, right?
- 2:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): round.
- 2:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The seed round. We're skeptical about how large the TAM needs to be for us to get the outcomes that we need to make the venture math work given the duration of the holding period.
- 2:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 2:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in other words, it might make sense to wait a little bit and maybe get in at one and a half billion dollars, but it's massively more de-risked than 3X.
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, absolutely.
- 2:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 2:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we were talking about before we started recording, like how does a pre-seed pre-season and seed manager even play an environment like today, given their fund size and their portfolio constructions? What do you see the top GPs doing today?
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a variety of ways to play it. I can tell you the GPs that we're attracted to are the ones that have a specialization, a certain right to win. And so we've leaned into groups that have a fintech Tech specialization. We have a manager that's focused on digital health, and that's all they do, but they're an ex-operator. ex operator, and we feel like they really have a right to win in that space. We've
- 2:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): refined the strike zone for the GP that we think would give them more access. Aaron
- 2:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 2:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It sounds like the specialization is more important for you for getting into the top deals versus knowing which deals to go into. Is that just
- 3:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 3:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): matter of the environment today?
- 3:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
- 3:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For us, knowing which deals to get into at a very, very early stage is really hard, right? Which is why we're happy to
- 3:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be able to do that.
- 3:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): go into later stage rounds when you have product market fit. We're leveraging Intel from an existing GP. There could be a path to IPO over the next three to five years, and you're definitely capping your return, uh, but feel more comfortable about the certainty of that return versus uh quite a bit of zeros when you're going early stages.
- 3:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is your direct investing platform. So we last chatted, I think, 360 episodes ago. How has that evolved over the last couple of years given the current environment?
- 3:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We've had the benefit of really great access with our existing GP network where they've got some pro router rights that they've shared with Baylor, and we're able to double down on those opportunities. We've also changed our view a bit on later stage investing, whereas before it was just something that we shied away a from and clearly we've missed.
- 4:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some of those opportunities. But today we're more willing to leverage the network that we have. We have some great GPs in our portfolios and we feel very comfortable with their selection process and the returns that we'll be able to recoup with these guys and able to layer in that exposure that we just weren't doing a ton of before.
- 4:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Talk to me about your process on when you decide to directly invest into a startup.
- 4:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'll back it up to how we think about investing and where venture sits in our portfolio because candidly it's a bit more muted relative to what we do across the portfolio. Early stage venture for us is roughly 10% of the overall portfolio. Another 10% is going to be in later stage opportunities. And the balance is going to be in
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expansion capital and buyouts across the lower middle market. So to date, when we've leaned into a co-information. co-investment opportunity, a more direct investment, it's been through the lens of leveraging our pre-existing GP network and feeling very comfortable with their research, the path and the line of sight to liquidity for
- 5:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): us from here. I think liquidity is one of the big things that we focus on when we're going into a co-investment. You won't see Baylor lock up capital for a 12 to 15 year run in a co co-investment investment opportunity. It's just too long of a life for us in a single name. Um we understand the duration risk you're taking when you go into early stage venture in a fund. We're just not willing to do
- 5:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it on one isolated name. It's just it's not what we're good
- 5:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at.
- 5:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And how do you underwrite the duration on direct investments?
- 5:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Typically it's going gonna to be something that has more of a path of a three to five X and three to five years.
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in terms of liquidity, you're just looking for something with a certain amount of revenue.
- 5:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
- 5:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): liquidity, we want um a clear path to liquidity and a line of sight to either an IPO or an MA outcome.
- 5:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to take a step back. You're a managing director of private equity. So you're really focused on private equity as a whole. Seems like you've really gone into two different directions. One is venture capital and one is lower middle market. Talk to me about that strategy.
- 6:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, reminder, we're Baylor University. We're sitting in Waco, Texas. And so part of the reason why we've leaned so heavily into lower middle market, as we were rebuilding the portfolio effectively from scratch, beginning in 2014, we didn't have the benefit of having legacy exposure to Two early stage names. We didn't have Sequoia, we didn't have Benchmark. A
- 6:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lot of those positions have grown organically. to be very large allocations within certain university endowments. Because we didn't have that luxury, we necessarily had to go down a different path of trying to create upside and capture growth exposure in the portfolio in a different way. And one of the areas that we sought to exploit was
- 6:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): effectively this line of expansion capital. And if you look at the Burgess benchmark, it could comprises roughly 2% of the underlying allocation versus the market value of venture, which is closer to 14, and buyouts, which is closer to like 45%.
- 7:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think the reason why it's only 2% is because there's a lot of miscategorization that happens across these lines. It's kind of a gray area, which to us was the reason a why we wanted to lean in. And so effectively it's orphaned venture assets.
- 7:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): something a venture manager would probably not touch because it's either in the middle of the country or it has uh a smaller tan. And so we've been able to pick up these assets where you're coming in at an enterprise value less than 100 million with multiple paths to exit either through MA activity or selling to larger private equity sponsors.
- 7:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): This episode is presented by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private markets.
- 7:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I've
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had over 450 episodes. I think this is the first time an institutional investor has gone after this part of the market. Tell me more about the market and how do you even size it?
- 7:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our allocation of expansion capital is closer to 30% relative to the 2% that's in the Burgess benchmark. But even within our venture portfolio, we have groups that have venture at the end of their name, but you look through to the underlying portfolio. and it's comprised of eight to ten companies. They're getting access to these companies where there's five million in ARR,
- 8:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): scaling at north of 50% per annum, getting ownership stakes of closer to 30%. It doesn't look and feel like an early stage venture manager. The loss ratios are definitely lower than an early stage manager, but they're very consistently having a repeatable process of getting that three to five X in three to five years. which to us we're very comfortable with because of the
- 8:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compounding nature of those investments. If I sign up for an early stage venture manager and I am fortunate enough to get a 15x multiple over the course of a 15-year period, I'm actually better off if I can sign up with a repeatable expansion capital manager that gives me a 3x three X consistently every five years. Cause at the end of the day, I'm sitting on a
- 8:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 27x multiple because we were building out the portfolio, we found that we had uh a lot better access to those names and that seemed like an opportunity that we could continue to exploit.
- 8:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): As I like to remind people, a three X over 20 years is not a good return.
- 9:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): People are
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so focused
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
- 9:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): multiple, they just forget about IRR. And especially for a non-taxable investor like Baylor,
- 9:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
- 9:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the compounding is massive.
- 9:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, absolutely. A three X is not interesting over a 20-year twenty year period.
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm fascinated by going after these these companies. In many ways, it's a counterthesis. So Mark Andreessen famously says we're in a consensus market. There's no more diamonds in the rough, only diamonds. What that invariably says is that there's a large part of the market, the majority, probably ninety 90 per percent plus of startups, especially those
- 9:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): funded before twenty 2023, twenty three, are just not impressive enough, are not growing 2x every quarter that that gets the interest of the venture capital markets day, the large funds. So invariably there's hundreds, if not thousands, of these companies.
- 9:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 9:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think one of the most underappreciated aspects of that is there's a huge opportunity cost of the board members' time. If you're a board member at Excel or in Andreessen Horowitz and you invested into some kind of SaaS company that
- 10:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 10:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): triple, triple doubling, which was really the criteria a couple of years ago.
- 10:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 10:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): now because of that board seat, you're not able to invest in the next cursor, the next OpenAI,
- 10:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you would give up a lot just to get out of that position.
- 10:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I'd love that. Like I hope that that's what's going on because I'd love for our expansion capital managers to swoop in and be the ones who participate in that triple, triple, double that's not interesting to a venture.
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): almost
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like a secondary in that you're solving somebody's problems.
- 10:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Correct. Yes. Yeah. Absolutely.
- 10:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Structural
- 10:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): alpha.
- 10:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. And oftentimes we see once they get access to these companies, they find that the GP is a really good partner and the founder enjoys working with them. So there's lots of opportunities to preempt the round where the founder can continue to focus on their day job, the GP can step in and provide a financing round, and they can go about their business.
- 10:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And it's also one of the value add that they bring is the connectivity to other GPs, larger GPs. And there's a lot of private equity capital out there. I think over the last five years, private capital commitments have stabilized at roughly one and a half trillion. There's a ton of dry powder to go in that needs a place to invest. Um and effectively we are creating product
- 11:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for large buyout to invest in.
- 11:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sitting where you're sitting today, three weeks ago I had Matt Harris from Bain Capital Ventures. And I I think for ten funds now they've been top quartile almost all their funds. But they haven't had these massive fund returners, these
- 11:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 11:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hundred X or a thousand X. And he said some of his LPs were upset about that. And I saw that as a huge advantage.
- 11:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 11:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): made me really think about maybe venture LPs are almost manic or bipolar
- 11:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in some way
- 11:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and that they're looking for the power laws. Is that
- 11:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's like
- 11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the benefit to getting the 3X net? Or do you do you think that's the case? Or do you think the 3X net is just a result of something that's just higher vol and more risky?
- 11:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For us, we love consistency. So maybe that makes us boring, but I'd be happy to invest in a Bane fund that's consistently generating a 3X type return and something that we can count on over an appropriate duration, right? Like to the extent that you can give us a repeatable process, we'll take that all day long.
- 12:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 12:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): being in Waco, Texas and chatting with you multiple times, you have several very contrarian views. What's another thing that you disagree with with your other LP peers?
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a lot of really smart investors out there at different institutions, and there's more than one way to build a portfolio. And you know, really the outcome of this for Baylor is simply like we didn't have access to these great venture firms in the past. And so we had to build a book differently. Fast forward to today, and you think about the risk profile of the portfolio that we're building
- 12:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at Baylor, we very much want to defend zero. And we recognize that in doing so, you necessarily might cap your upside. And so one of the things that we have really worked on is
- 12:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
- 12:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can you construct a portfolio where you can keep up uh to the upside? So using June 30, 2020. 26 as an example where there's gonna be a lot of groups that have SpaceX in their portfolio, a lot of other endowments. Uh, returns are rolling in. And so at Baylor, we're sitting there kind of holding our breath because we don't have SpaceX exposure. And you're seeing numbers come in at, you know, north of twenty percent. We came in at nineteen percent.
- 13:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And that that feels pretty good given how we're constructing the portfolio and giving ourselves some ways to participate in an upside uh without being subject to power law. or the volatility that comes with it. Aaron
- 13:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 13:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You mentioned earlier on you were almost forced into this contrarian or differentiated way to look at venture capital. Today,
- 13:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 13:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): large multi-stage firms are just getting so much bigger. Is it still difficult to access those names?
- 13:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's still difficult to get into the early stage products with the size that we want. So at Baylor, one of our alpha drivers.
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that we see is concentration. We're really trying to construct a portfolio with fewer line items. Historically, I think we've been overly diversified and it was really just a race to the middle. So to the extent that we can get access to some of these larger platform platforms, I think we would have a better shot at it today, but I do not think we'd be able to
- 13:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): size it in a way that would give us the exposure that we need.
- 14:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): People often talk about this saying that the fund size is a strategy for GP, but it's also seems to be the strategy for the LP as
- 14:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well.
- 14:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. I mean, we're trying to construct a portfolio. If I can get into a great name and it's only a $5 million check size on a $2.7 billion endowment, I'm not sure that I care, right? It doesn't move the needle. And we are also operating with a lean team. We've got three people on the private team, three people on the marketable team. three people on the ops team. Every time you add a new
- 14:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): line item, you're effectively like increasing the workload for everybody else. And so you want it to count.
- 14:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What are some other, I guess, second order effects of just having too many names?
- 14:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you get spread too thin in terms of travel, we work really hard to be on the L Pac. Um and not because we need that board seat. It's more about the relationship. Uh we've seen that when you're on the LPAC, you have a tighter relationship. with the GP. It tends to be more collaborative. We want to have that give and take. And with that, you necessarily need to spend time with the GP. You need
- 14:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to show up to the annual meeting. You need to be there in person. And that's not scalable. There's only so much of you to go around in a 365-day calendar and still give yourself time to actually think about portfolio construction and what your next step should be. The return on time is probably the most critical piece that we think about as we bring in a new line item.
- 15:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's upstream of these relationships are going back to earlier conversations, these direct investments, these co investments that are so critical to your returns. I oftentimes talk about Dunbar's Law, which is you can only really manage a hundred fifty close relationships. And people will argue until they're blue in the face. But
- 15:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 15:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): podcast actually one of the only hacks that I've seen in terms of uh increasing Dunbar's law where you could build this relationship and and keep up these relationships. But it's so hard to have too many close relationships. And even though people hate this idea, they hate being boxed into this 150 relationships in practice, it's it's pretty consistent with what I've seen.
- 15:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm impressed if somebody can manage 150. We have 20 names in our book that matter.
- 15:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And what other strategic benefits out of these 20 names in terms of
- 15:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
- 15:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): top on top of direct investments, what other strategic value do you get from your managers?
- 16:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We are purposefully keeping our book tight and refined in terms of the number of GPs that we can commit to. And one of them is because of scale. We really want to lean into our top relationships. And so we're seeing commitments go from 20 million in fund two to 40 million in the subsequent fund. As we gain conviction in a GP, we really want to put
- 16:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our money behind that and back them. And it also allows us to have a more concentrated portfolio. We've worked really hard to get more capital into our top 20 names. If you rolled it back, say even five years ago, it was closer to $100 million in our top 20 private names. Today it's closer to 250. So approximately 25%
- 16:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the overall portfolio. And when you look at the 1,300 line items of portfolio companies across the book, 80% is in the top 300. It took some work to get there, but it's by design. We don't necessarily have an approach where we have to be in the top GP of that vintage for that strategy. Let's find somebody we can find a
- 17:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): partnership with. Let's find somebody who's really, really good at executing in this space. And then let's back them with the full force of Baylor behind it and continue to back them for several funds. You know, obviously. they need to hold up their end of the bargain and continue to perform well, but we're not going to jump ship just because you were top quartile and not top decile of that particular year because we're going to believe in
- 17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your ability to execute overtime.
- 17:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Roger Vinson, who is formerly at Cornell Endowment, he talked about he believed the systematic error most LPs are making is they're overly diversified. They have a portfolio of companies within the manager, then they have 20 twenty managers or 40 forty managers. and they have sometimes they even have diversification on that, vintage diversification. And at some point, you're essentially just getting the market.
- 17:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right.
- 17:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you're you're basically defeating the entire purpose of being an active investor.
- 17:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mm-hmm. Couldn't agree more. So we make really tough decisions. We have a finite budget of $160 million that we're deploying in a given calendar year.
- 17:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 17:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and we typically have capacity to add one new GP to the portfolio. And so we're very thoughtful about our portfolio framework. Where are we underallocated? Today we're underweight healthcare. So we're spending a lot of time market mapping. And what does our next move look like? Is it gonna be an early stage commitment versus lower middle market buyout? Where's the best place to put capital to
- 18:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): work? And then we take meetings that fit in that lane. We don't take meetings across the board in categories that aren't a high priority for. us. Again, going back to our return on time, we're very thoughtful about how we spend our time when we're in the office and the pipeline that we're building based on the capital budget that we're trying to fill.
- 18:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I love that because the mere fact that you even know where the holes in the portfolio are is upstream of being able to have these strategic calls, which is upstream of that is having a concentrated portfolio.
- 18:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 18:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a lot of people, it's hard for them. to envision, well,
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would I do with extra time? Well, you don't envision it because you don't even have the time to think about things. Right. So it kind of having concentrated portfolio could also open you up to having uh time to focus strategically.
- 19:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A lot of people will be like, we have an open door policy, we take meetings and there's lots of learnings that come from that. And I think early on in your career when you're an analyst and you're trying to flex that muscle and get pattern recognition, I can understand how that would make sense. But over time for us, we felt like we just aren't having enough time to think. And candidly, as a GP, that's a waste of your time as well, right? If I
- 19:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know that I'm taking a meeting in private credit and we do not invest in private credit, like why do you want to sit down with me? There's much better places to spend your time. And I'm happy to make introductions to the groups who I know really like that flavor of investing. Um, but it's a waste of everyone's time for us to. take that meeting.
- 19:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think this obsession with optionality, whether it's venture capitalist, keeping startups kind of pitching and never saying no to them because there's this one in one thousand chance that they might turn around and invest. And same with the LPs and GPs, I think it's one of the big uh logical fallacies for a couple of reasons. One is, first of all, like there's opportunity cost to talking to that one
- 20:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in 10,000 chance company. You could be talking to some somebody that might be a one in ten chance. And secondly, and perhaps most more importantly, is your reputation. It's a it's a recurring game. So if you have this reputation that you're always stringing people along, it's not gonna take long before founders talk to each other and they're gonna not not include you in the hottest companies.
- 20:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. We're not perfect. We try to be really transparent Um and let people know what we're thinking. And I hope that that translates that when Baylor says we're leaning in. we would really love for you to secure an allocation of $20 million. We're taking it to our board for a full recommendation that they know we're going to come through. And we do. I want Baylor to be the place where people come. It's like
- 20:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they do what they say they're going to do.
- 20:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How you get the first call?
- 20:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes, absolutely.
- 20:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One
- 20:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thing I've learned from talking to hundreds of investors is that great investment firms aren't built on investment returns alone. The firms that endure are great at the things that
- 20:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're going to do.
- 20:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): most people don't see: their operations, their relationship with LPs, and the quality of information they use to make decisions. And here's what AI has changed. Every firm now has access to the very same models, so the intelligence isn't the edge anymore. The edge is what you could feed it. A firm with its fund operations and data in one connected record can actually put
- 21:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): AI to work. A firm running on disconnected systems simply can't. That's why thousands of GPs run their funds on
- 21:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Juniper Square. Juniper Square puts your fund operations, data, and administration together in one connected record. That means less time managing disconnected systems and more time investing, working with LPs, and building your firm. This episode is brought to you by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private market GPs. Learn more at
- 21:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Junipersquare.com. slash how I invest. That's junipersquare.com/slash how I invest.
- 21:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Going from concentration in your portfolio to the concentration of some of these largest companies in the portfolio of venture capital managers. It's also downstream of this consensus market, is these funds piling in massive amounts of capital into the winners. What do you think about that? And what's your mental framework?
- 22:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for thinking about concentration within specific managers?
- 22:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I actually love concentration in GPs. I want a GP to invest in their best ideas. And effectively, it's what we're doing within the private investment portfolio and across the Baylor University portfolio at large, even on the marketable side. That angst of when you're putting a ton of capital to work behind a single name, you're probably going to be really thoughtful about each incremental dollar. And I
- 22:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope that it keeps you up at night because if it blows up, it's a problem, right? And I love that because I think that means you're probably going to pay attention to the details. You're probably going to be on the phone and have a really tight relationship with the founder. You're not going to sit it and forget it. You're going to be paying attention to what happens with that name.
- 22:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 22:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you're willing to put 20% of your capital, 30% percent of your capital plus into a given name because you believe in it, I suspect you're investing with significant conviction behind it. And I can get on board with that. I think that's how you add alpha.
- 22:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's a strong signal. The concentration itself is the signal.
- 22:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely.
- 22:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Scott Wilson, famous CIO of University of Wash Washington, St. Louis, he would actually go to the managers that are at their concentration limit and he would say, could we get more money into those opportunities? Because he realized that A, those were their highest convicted bet. And B, there's only so much career risk that a GP could take. because everything's probabilistic. Let's say that you're in SpaceX, you
- 23:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): love Elon Musk, you this is 10 years ago, you you believe totally in his mission. There's still some 10, 20, 30 percent chance that the entire business fails.
- 23:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
- 23:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even Elon Musk will be the first one to admit this. So you can't put in 50% of your fund, although some people have done that and it's worked out really well for them. But you shouldn't really do that. You still want to manage your portfolio, have some kind of portfolio. construction, some kind of diversification. But if you put 20% of your fund in, that's a very s interesting signal for the LP to come in and say, well, we actually want more of that. Mm-hmm.
- 23:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which
- 23:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is a bit counterintuitive.
- 23:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a great point. I we have a lot of respect for Scott Wilson and what he's built at Washington University. They've killer portfolio, really great returns and very thoughtful investors.
- 23:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Speaking of of your peers, LPs are often these mythical creatures.
- 24:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I obviously bring in a lot to share their views, but a lot of people don't know what goes on kind of behind the curtain in terms of LP to LP relationships. Are you meeting with other allocators as well? And what do you guys talk about?
- 24:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The LP network is really friendly and really collaborative. And I think at the end of the day, um, if endowments and foundations have good returns, it ultimately translates to more students going to school. more people in higher education. And it feels like a really collaborative network of peers and feel very fortunate with the network that I've built over my career at Baylor. Um and
- 24:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then at the same time, I also feel like we're pretty scrappy and love to win, right? Like when the new Kubo report comes out, we're absolutely looking at it, as I'm sure all of my peers are, to see where we rank um compared to those schools that we
- 24:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 24:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have an affinity for or close. closely aligned to in AUM, you know, respect. We mentioned Scott Wilson, but we're definitely paying attention to how other schools are doing and how we compare on a relative basis.
- 24:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There's a form of co opetition.
- 25:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Friendly cop friendly competition. Absolutely.
- 25:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It always befuddled me that people can't come and be competitive with someone else or collaborative. When I am competitive or collaborative, I say, hey, here are the 20% of the places where we're competitive, let me call it out, let me put this on a piece of paper. Let's talk about the other 80%. There's no, this is zero sum right here. We're competing for the same opportunities, same businesses. That's totally fine.
- 25:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How do we collaborate on the other 80%? And I think just bringing in kind of that this transparency and this like, I mean, just naming what it is. It is coopetition could be very powerful.
- 25:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 100%. And I played softball growing up. Uh I played a little bit at uh uh in college, and my favorite people to play and ultimately beat were like your biggest rivals, right? You had the most respect for them. A lot of them ended up being your friends because you've been playing them for years. And I think that competition is healthy. Like you really show up when you're playing those games. Um and so I think the element of
- 25:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): competition is uh a powerful driver. And we're all pretty competitive in the office, especially Dave and I.
- 25:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One of the things that I've been thinking about since uh for the last three 360 hundred and sixty episodes since we last chatted
- 26:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is your reputation of being concentrated, your reputation of being a true alpha investor. You would think most endowments would want to do that. But at the same time, you see a lot of endowments being conservative.
- 26:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 26:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm wondering, what is it that gets your team to be more aggressive and more risk-taking risk taking versus some of your peers?
- 26:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We're thoughtful about the risks that we take. I wouldn't just describe us as being like super high risk takers. In fact, I think we're the opposite. I think we're actually a pretty risk averse bunch. And so we have to push ourselves to take more risk on the margins. Um, but I think there's risks that we're willing to take, right? And concentration is one of them. To your point about leaning in with conviction, we've gotten very
- 26:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comfortable um leaning into the best ideas of GPs that we trust. And it's worked out well for us. At the same time, um, when you look at the risk return metrics of our portfolio, we've done a really good job protecting the portfolio to the downside, and that's paid off well. So I think both things can be true where you're thoughtful about the risk that you're taking
- 27:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and where you add alpha and still uh preserve the value of the portfolio so that you don't have wild swings in returns, because that's very difficult for the university to manage, right? They're counting on our five. 5% spending rate that gets distributed back to the university. They're depending on it for the operating budget. There's students that are depending on it for scholarships. So to have wild
- 27:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): swings in the returns of the portfolio is really not something that we're trying to do. And so we're trying to defend zero, also giving ourselves the ability to participate in the upside. We're very aware of the 5% spend that we have every day and trying to preserve the corpus and compound it over time.
- 27:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Sounds
- 27:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like an oxymoron defending against zero when it comes to venture capital. How do you do that? Or is that just on an overall portfolio?
- 27:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't put venture capital in that bucket. I mean, in venture, I don't uh expect to defend zero. So when we go into an early stage name, we understand what we're signing up for and the loss ratio that we're gonna absolutely have in that particular strategy uh and understand the power law that's associated with it. And it's just um
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): less
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of what we do. It's gonna stay at around 10% of our overall portfolio.
- 28:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And just to zoom out a little bit more, you have 10% venture, you also have private equity. How does that fit into the overall portfolio for Baylor? Aaron
- 28:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 28:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 55% of the portfolio is marketable alternatives, 45% is in private investments. We've been there for the last couple of years and it feels pretty good. Anything coming into the private investment portfolio has a line in the sand of generating a 15
- 28:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): net IRR to justify the lack of liquidity, particularly in a rising rate environment. There's absolutely an opportunity cost of being illiquid and we peg it at 15%.
- 28:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And we got there through really just looking at the long-term returns of public equity. If public equity is going to generate a 6% percent return, we need 350 basis points on top of that to justify being in the portfolio. And then we have to layer in an additional five percent for that opportunity cost that I was just referencing.
- 28:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Essentially you're forcing a liquidity premium on your portfolio.
- 28:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. If we're going to tie up our capital for 10 years, we need a return to justify that. So that was another genesis for looking at the overall line items and how diversified we were. Why does private investments exist in the portfolio? It's doesn't exist for diversification. At the end of the
- 29:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): day
- 29:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's equity. So why are we bringing it into the book? It's to deliver outsized returns relative to public equity. So what is that number? And so that necessarily cuts categories. I mentioned we don't invest in private credit. It's because of the return profile. It's effectively not enough to get into the portfolio. And if it is higher than 15%, it's probably because it's lower in credit and quality and my
- 29:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): upside is necessarily going to be capped. And so it just hasn't been a category that we've been attracted to. Um I understand, you know, the attraction of that category, but in terms of Baylor and the reason why private investments exist in our book, it just hasn't made sense.
- 29:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 29:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lot of people discovered this in twenty twenty two. They had sixty to forty portfolios and then they had forty percent bonds. And because bonds weren't returning enough, they went lower and lower in the quality up to basically junk bonds. Mm-hmm. And then lo and behold,
- 30:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now
- 30:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're almost one to one correlated with equities. So what you basically had is correlation to equities but a lower return versus historically bonds were supposed to be kind of negatively correlated to equities. So you you want to be careful that there's these obvious traps that people get into when they misuse the Use asset for what it's intended to do.
- 30:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, You know, and I think the genesis of private credit and private financing and how large that that market has grown ties into private companies staying longer because they necessarily have uh greater optionality for access to capital that they didn't have. So you don't have to tap into the public markets. You can maintain control of your business for longer, you can have more autonomy. And it makes
- 30:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sense that companies are choosing to stay private longer than they were in the past because of the availability of capital that didn't used to exist, at least not in the same fashion as today.
- 30:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Speaking of the private markets, you have this front row seat endowments are arguably the sexiest and the most attractive LPs. So you get to meet with a lot of the managers.
- 31:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're talking to a lot of the startups as well. Today, Ventures roughly $3.5 trillion asset. Five years from now, is that number higher? Is that number lower? What do you make of sense as a whole? of the venture asset class?
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that the platforms will continue to grow and get bigger and scale. I think that companies staying private longer is not going to go away. I think you'll continue to have kind of a bifurcation in the market where you've got these early stage specialists that are playing coupled with these very large platforms.
- 31:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 31:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came to the S same conclusion when I had Matt Woodheiler Woodhaler from Wellington. And he told me that the public markets have the equivalent of 127 trillion. So three and a half trillion, a hundred twenty-seven trillion. So that's at a high level. And then you double click and you look at what's going on in the private markets and the venture capital markets specifically. Q one twenty twenty six, seventy-six percent of all
- 31:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): venture capital money went into five names,
- 31:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 31:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): goes back to this kind of concentration uh question, which is how how concentrated how diversified are you if you're in venture capital? as a whole? But another side effect of that is that there was no more money to be had for these five companies. So if you're Anthropic, OpenAI, SpaceX,
- 32:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there's
- 32:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an argument that there's just not enough private capital in the world to fund another round. So another way, if you did another round some of these companies, you would be deploying now 100% of all private capital. And my sense, dealing with a lot of founders, is the most ambitious founders would, all things being equal, would love to stay private
- 32:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): longer. I think even SpaceX, I believe they were 24 years into being private, Elon would have stayed public for even longer if he c uh would have stayed private for even longer if he had chance. I I think they just exhausted the private markets. So if you look at ground truth, you know, venture capital is this access class. where the founders choose the GPs and the top GPs choose the
- 32:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): LPs. Um and if you look at the ground truth, which are the top founders, all things being equal, if there are seven trillion in the market, yes, it might still go to the same five companies. But I think anthropics, OpenAI, SpaceX, a lot of these companies would perpetually be private because they just love the idea of being able to think long term, not being
- 33:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): subject to the quarterly financials, not so being subject to all the other negative externalities that come to being a public company.
- 33:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I suspect the minute you turn into a
- 33:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): public founder, the game completely changes. I also think there's some king making going on in terms of the amount of capital and where the dollars are going, but I also think it's real and I'd love to hear your thoughts. But capital as a moat definitely seems to be kind of cemented. cementing the winners as they evolve.
- 33:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 33:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think there's a lot of different perspectives on that. One is I think you have to distinct between businesses that are
- 33:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): data driven and token driven versus other businesses.
- 33:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So at some point in the near future, it might be sooner than most people realize, human beings are going to be surpassed their intelligence by AI, which means that it's going to be a matter downstream of token usage, how well a company is run, how how good of a strategy it has versus the talent, which is a little bit scary to think about.
- 34:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 34:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is.
- 34:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But that that's one side of it. And then the exact opposite is also true, which is if you don't have a capital intensive business and you could vibe code your website over the weekend, what is your moat?
- 34:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And now you look at data, you look at training data, and you look at customers and different aspects that could be moats, but a lot of the moats end up being capital in nature. So then the question becomes: well, would the is this company successful because it raised a lot of capital, or did it raise a lot of capital because it's successful? And I think it's a
- 34:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): combination of that. It showed early signals that it I was going to be the winner and then a bunch of capital. came in and essentially made itself self-fulfilling.
- 34:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I agree. It's interesting to see how the market plays out. I mean, we see in our portfolio. Um
- 34:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 34:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we invested in a co-investment recently. Um, it was a later stage round. It's not something that we normally do, but it was sourced from one of our top GPs in the portfolio um and got very comfortable with the opportunity set and the trajectory from here. And we ultimately had three of our top GPs that were coalescing around this name, which gave us even additional comfort.
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but there was a very consistent thesis, a lot of capital chasing it. And um it was just interesting to see three of our top GPs going after the same play.
- 35:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If I'm honest, that's a signal that I really pay attention to.
- 35:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mm-hmm.
- 35:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's almost like the rule uh of marketing, the it's almost like the rule of seven in marketing, which the first three times you ignore something. And then by the time it's the fifth time you go to the website and then the seventh time like, what the hell is this company?
- 35:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Why
- 35:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): does everybody okay, the first two people it was interesting that they mentioned it. By the fifth time it's like this is clearly consensus. So now I have to it basically forces me as a VC to make a decision. Is the entire market is the consensus market wrong or are they right and and I shouldn't should mess invest in it. So this kind of cole co- this the uh just hearing through
- 36:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the zeitgeist and hearing through a relationship about about a name is is such an underrated aspect of investing.
- 36:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 36:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and that's definitely how we felt. It was this isn't something we normally do. Uh it was a very short fuse, but it felt like we should pay attention to this. And ultimately we got to the finish line on it, and I feel really good about it. We're all very excited to bring that exposure into the portfolio. And to the extent it works, it's gonna going to be a meaningful position to the endowment.
- 36:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 36:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to go to AI, which basically every podcast talks about, but very specifically in the context of managers and the managers that you are backing in a post-AI or a post-Chat GPT moment versus the previous ones. What are the main distinctions between what you're looking for from managers? Trevor
- 36:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.:
- 36:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a lot of different flavors. Of late, there's been a lot of discussion about AI native. versus legacy software. And really, as you think about the AI companies that are moving forward, is software dead? And I think at the beginning of this year, you saw like a very definite um view that AI was going to be a winner and software was no longer going to have a reason to exist. Over time
- 37:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): throughout this year, you've seen that like that's not necessarily the case. Is there going to be some legacy software businesses that don't make the cut and can't transition into this new AI world? Absolutely. Uh, but to your point about data, we've also seen some some really strong SaaS businesses, some software applications where they do own their own data. And the customer is very
- 37:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comfortable with them pushing out and testing AI products through their software provider. When you look
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 37:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Main Street versus perhaps what's happening in Silicon Valley, I think there's a lot of companies that don't have the wherewithal right now to really vet and bring in different AI opportunities. Recently with the cybersecurity, there's a lot of news out there about the different attacks and things that have happened. I just think a lot of people aren't ready to just fully pivot and pull the trigger and move into an AI world.
- 37:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They're very happy to move forward with a software provider that's AI enabled and testing products. And so we've actually Actually, seen that in our own portfolio where some of our legacy software GPs are. putting capital to work in their top performers who have been able to make that pivot, have been very aggressive. I think there's a world going forward where you
- 38:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can have
- 38:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): AI wins in AI native businesses, whether you're picking it up through venture or other means, and your software portfolio also continues to do well. So we've actually been a little bit contrariant in our view. We added to software at the beginning of this year. Dave made a really nice trade that paid off. And we've continued to believe in our software portfolio on the private investment
- 38:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): side as well. I think that they both can exist.
- 38:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 38:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had David Breach, who runs Vistaquity now. And of course I had to ask him about the Sask apocalypse and the future of software. And one of the trends that he sees across his entire portfolio is that software is going from something that you plug in and almost use it as a user to actually done for you, so a services component.
- 38:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So
- 38:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): instead of now going into your CRM and you're saying, well, let me put in the notes. And here I met with Renee, here's kind of what we talked about. It already is gathering information from our Zoom call and it's already making strategic decisions. Oh, I should follow up in three months. And it's be almost becoming and replacing the knowledge worker versus just being a software. And I think
- 39:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's where a lot of the top software companies are evolving to.
- 39:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mm-hmm.
- 39:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So more of an agentic approach where
- 39:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you have
- 39:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an agent with
- 39:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the computer. Because that's very valuable.
- 39:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
- 39:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
- 39:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you could actually take away spend from your human capital and expand that human capital and make every every employee three to five times more productive, how much is that worth versus an application that you may or may not use that you log in? every couple of months? So just having an agentic part of your team that's helping you
- 39:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): execute, I think is probably a highly underrated aspect of the software market today.
- 39:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um, I think it's too soon to tell. I don't think that you're seeing massive layoffs as the result of AI. I think you're seeing stabilization. of employment. And so maybe you can do more with less and you don't need to add that new person that you were gonna add this calendar year. Maybe you add them next calendar year and you can hire every couple of years instead of every year. Perhaps it's you're adding people at a slower rate. If I was graduating right now
- 40:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from college, it'd be a difficult time to decide like where is the best place for me to go, right? I think things are shifting and I think we'll probably have more clarity over the next five to ten years. But I think right now it's a bit marky.
- 40:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I just had my first child, so I'm not yet worried about
- 40:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): college.
- 40:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You have time to
- 40:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): give me a university.
- 40:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thank you. Uh but you you obviously you're on university, you're actually on campus, you're dealing with students. I think you have student interns as well. What's advice that you're giving them?
- 40:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'll tell you where I think about my value add and in a world where AI is coming, I think it goes back to that relationship component. And so one of the things we're really spending a lot of time talking through with students and even in our office is just the relationship aspect. AI is going to be able to possibly replace a lot of things going forward, but I think it will be very difficult to replace the
- 41:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): relationship aspect of what we've built. And so if you're a student that you're coming out of Baylor or any undergrad, really thinking about how you refine your relationship. relationships and your network in an authentic way. And I think a lot of people talk about curating a network and going to conferences and how you do that. But I actually think it's much harder in practice to do the
- 41:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hard things, to follow up, to write a handwritten thank you note, to be intentional, to have it come across as authentic versus transactional. I think these are really hard things to get right over time. We spend a lot of time talking to students about the softer side of that.
- 41:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What about hard skills?
- 41:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
- 41:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): survives? Aaron
- 41:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 41:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How you would write a memo, how you would sell a memo, understanding the Black Shoals model if you're working through derivatives and all these things that like I very much valued when I was getting my CFA and really curated my ability to write a good thoughtful memo.
- 41:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 41:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but today I think it would be more like
- 42:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 42:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ability to think, right? You might have an AI tool that can create an LBO model for you. But like, can you really sit down and analyze the results and then have the wherewithal to be like, oh, you know, here's the sum of that analysis. We should add more capital. Or wait a minute, let's pull back. Let's let's sell this. Like it doesn't make sense. So I think that ability to think. Um,
- 42:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I think it's going gonna to be hard to think and analyze if you don't know how to do, right? Like if you're just, letting an AI model, an AI tool build a model for you and you can't understand the results, like that's a problem, right? But I think that
- 42:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 42:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): least for myself, I'm better because I know how to build the model myself, right? So I I don't know, like there's a little tug and a pull on efficiency
- 42:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 42:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): versus effectiveness.
- 42:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think it's the most overused term. taste, especially among venture capitalists.
- 42:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But I
- 42:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think there's something to it.
- 42:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 42:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think being able to have taste or judgment because now you could just accomplish things so quickly. Right.
- 43:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Even
- 43:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just down to our programming, to our thumbnails. There's certain people that know what kind of feels good and what the guests would like, what the audience would like, and other people wouldn't. And it's almost like this saying common sense is uncommon. It's very uncommon to have somebody both have taste, judgment, agency as well, being able to solve problems. There's a
- 43:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): saying, uh, do you create problems or do you solve problems? And that is the fastest way to rise in an organization is to solve problems and go to your boss and
- 43:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say,
- 43:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What else could I do? And it's just a small part of the market and a small part of the people are able to be high agency enough. A lot of people learn. look at their jobs as they have a punch card, whether they're literally using it or not. They punch in, they punch out and hope that nobody notices them. And I think it's going to be a very difficult
- 43:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): time for for people like that in the future.
- 43:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 43:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as we think about portfolio construction, like the art of building a portfolio, private equity, it is very much like a sit it and forget it asset class, right? It's a 10 10-year year term. Um, but you can be tactical. You can look at your book and be more thoughtful about what you own. We recently got off a phone call with a legacy manager. Effectively, over the next five years, it was going through the
- 44:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): liquidity schedule that we had. But when we looked at the growth rate of that book, it was effectively a zero. I think that everything's appropriately marked. Um, if anything, in a rising rate environment, it could be mismarked. Um, but I don't see a ton of upside here. And so after hanging up the phone, we immediately called a number of our secondary. brokers and was like, hey, let's test the market on this and see where
- 44:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these assets would trade. Um we got a very compelling bid uh from a group that was purely focused on this particular strategy. They were able to add leverage. So it was a reason why they could pay more than
- 44:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): everybody else.
- 44:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. They had structural, it made sense for them. It was significantly higher than the other bids that we had seen in the past. And we hit that. bid. And when I look at making that trade, even at a discount relative to my cost of capital, which is 15%, it makes perfect sense. It was a portfolio construction decision. It would expedite liquidity.
- 45:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We're
- 45:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): going to an election year in 2028. Rates are rising. Like feels like a good time to get some cash back in the door. And I think those types of decisions require thinking, right? It's not like there's a model that said you needed to sell. this asset today. It was just we hung up the phone. It was like, huh, why don't we see if there's a way to resolve this in a way that
- 45:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): makes more sense versus just signing up for a very benign five year ride?
- 45:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Goes back to what we were talking before, which, yeah, maybe you left 20% off the table, but if that 20% takes five years,
- 45:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. It's not interesting.
- 45:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're you're getting beat by treasuries.
- 45:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. Exactly.
- 45:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 45:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mentioned this concept of managing your book and being active in your book
- 45:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 45:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a private equity or venture capital manager. How does one do that?
- 45:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean, for us, it's like the example that I just gave of taking advantage
- 45:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of the GP side. What
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about on the GP side?
- 45:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): On the GP side, I think it's um leaning into concentration, uh putting capital behind your best ideas, selling the mighty middle. If you have a number of companies that look like it's gonna be a one to three X. the return on your time, going back to that, I think is super critical. Don't waste your time on things that aren't gonna deliver a great outcome. I really appreciate when GPs are very candid about
- 46:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that, where they're selling assets that are not gonna have the outcome that they underwrote to and they're selling them early. It's like there's a bid for this, even if it's at par, sell it, even if it's less than par. Like I'm gonna recoup, you know, half of my money on this, but it's no longer gonna be a time drag for me. And the amount of time it would take to turn it around, tell you that I'm gonna hit a
- 46:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2X, ultimately sell it three years later at a one to one and a half. Like, don't do that. Just get it off your plate. I at least from Baylor, it comes from a standpoint of like transparency and no judgment. And that's what you're supposed to do. You're supposed to make those calls. You're supposed to trim the fat and focus on your winners. That's
- 46:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what you're paying your managers to
- 46:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do. That's
- 46:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what we pay them to do. And I think that's what can take.
- 46:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a good fund and turn it into a great fund.
- 46:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You said a very subtle but underrated point, which is even if you've deployed all your primary capital, so you're you know you're gonna have 10 positions and you still have money for ProRata, let's say you have 30% of your book to follow on.
- 47:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 47:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're very active, the right strategy is to spend as much time with those 10 companies, figure out who the winners are, who the losers are. So when the time goes to follow on, you could increase your returns. A lot of times people don't think about their exercising their prerata or doing their follow-ons as an active strategy,
- 47:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): almost
- 47:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like a passive thing. But you could be getting information, you could be talking to other managers. You could be talking about competitors who might be coming into this market. You become more educated on your existing book. It's not always adding to your book that that leads to alpha.
- 47:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One of my biggest pet pees, I think it's no surprise that everybody right now wants co-investments and some of it's fee driven. They want, you know, a 0% management fee and they're trying to dollar cost average their fees down. And when we see a really great uh portfolio company that ends up being, you know, 10% of the overall portfolio and they're offering co investments for you know
- 47:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): LPs to participate, which is really just not something that we do a ton of. We want your best ideas to end up in the fund. And you ask, why aren't you leveraging the reserves for this? The answer is typically well, we don't have reserves for this company. We have it earmarked for
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): other
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): companies that aren't necessarily as visibly obvious that they're working, right? But those reserves are squishy. There's no line in the sand that that has to be allocated to that particular company. So move it over to the thing that's working right now because it makes sense, right? Like you don't have to be so rigid.
- 48:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about your reserve allocation. Um, and sometimes it does feel pretty rigid, whereas
- 48:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): your
- 48:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): best win, your best idea, your winner should get the capital.
- 48:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's one of the biggest logical fallacies is this concept in venture capital of preserving your ownership or retaining your ownership in an asset. That's not great. It's just a logical, there's no mathematical sense. I I went down the rabbit hole. I talked
- 48:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 48:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dozens of people, I was trying to see what didn't make sense. But every net new dollar that you ever invest needs to be the highest and best use of your capital. Now,
- 48:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 48:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): counterexample, the the one good argument against it is you if you make a promise to a founder or you're known as somebody that follows on to your companies as some of these multi-stage firms, there's a reputational aspect. But from purely a financial standpoint, there's no such thing as defending your position or defending your prorata. It's a completely nonsensical thing.
- 49:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think even of late, there's so much capital now in later stage rounds that I don't feel like people care as much if the early stage investor continues to
- 49:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): find out. That's the
- 49:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): paradox, is that the founders that always get upset about you lowering your allocation are the hottest companies, and the ones that really need your capital are the ones that get upset with you when when you kind of lower your prerata. parada. So that itself is a, I think, one of the strongest signals.
- 49:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What have you changed your mind on since we last chatted two years ago?
- 49:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Probably
- 49:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 49:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how much of our portfolio should be
- 49:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 49:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): later stage. And I'm not saying we're piling in at these prices, but effectively before it was pretty close to zero. Um and I think now we just got the TAM wrong in some of these outcomes. Um and so thinking about the room to run and the ability to get a uh acceptable return, which is three to five X for us
- 50:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in three to five years in some of these later stage outcomes with visibility and product market fit and growth rates. That's been an area that we've found more attractive of late.
- 50:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think people are still trying to digest the sticker shock of these IPOs. SpaceX
- 50:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): 1.75
- 50:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trillion. Anthropic, reportedly 2 trillion.
- 50:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And they think that these are going to be the largest companies. OpenAI as well is in the running, reportedly raising at 1.25 trillion.
- 50:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 50:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if that's the case, and there's a chance that these are the three best companies of the next 10, 20 years. There's certainly a chance for that. But historically, that's that has not been the case. Google was like the 12th or 13th search engine. Facebook was also in the teens.
- 50:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Even going back to the original dot com, Amazon was, I don't know, hundreds and hundreds of retailers. They were not the first mover. So it's very uncommon in a technological cycle that the best, the biggest winners are early. It's never happened before.
- 51:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 51:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think if you believe that and if you're bullish on that and you believe that there's still other two trillion dollar outcomes, then in many ways, late stage could be a more attractive risk adjusted bet than than the early stage. That's what a lot of LPs and the it's a consensus view at this point. It's not even a contrarian view, which is quite shocking just from
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): five years ago. Aaron
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Ross
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Powell
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We've talked a lot about uh SpaceX today, but what when we really broke down kind of the math on it and we were looking at the different tranches and the early stage investors who came in in 2002 clearly had a home run, like exponential outcome, right? They did phenomenal. Uh but when you look at the people who came in fifteen years later in twenty seventeen
- 51:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um and had the benefit of Starlink and just really significant credibility that the company had experienced post that time period. they got a return like 75 X. Um and the IRR math on that, because of the shorter duration and the time it took to IPO was very similar to what you were getting as an early stage investor. And we'll take that all day long. Like
- 52:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're very happy to jump in at a point where you have product market fit, it's been de-risked Um, and that's a very acceptable outcome to us. We don't have to shoot for the fences and be a first mover. It's
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just
- 52:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not a game that we're playing.
- 52:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 52:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have to point out compliance always reminds me, disclose, disclose. We we're investors in SpaceX in roughly that time period in the
- 52:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): late
- 52:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two 2010s.
- 52:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Okay.
- 52:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And but I've known the company for a while. I I've driven in Elon's Tesla and I've known that community. And
- 52:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
- 52:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of the things that's really interesting about SpaceX is it's gone through the entire evolution of smart and dumb money.
- 52:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 52:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the very beginning, before I knew about SpaceX or before I knew about Elon, it was the sharpest capital, Founders Fund, people like that. I remember meeting Luke Nosak when he was at Founders Fund and he told me, I'm starting a fund to invest in SpaceX. So I'm like, tell me more. And he's like, No, that's that's it. That's
- 53:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. That's my fund. fun. My
- 53:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fun. I haven't seen the numbers, but I imagine it's probably the
- 53:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one of the best
- 53:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): funds that has ever. And I thought it was crazy even at the time. I'm like, this is like founder level like conviction. I mean, it's basically an NF1. Um, so there's people like that. And then for probably a decade, probably longer, it was a family office This trade,
- 53:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 53:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at least at the time was a very nice way of saying not the smartest people, people that wanted to say, I invested in SpaceX, I invested in rockets. A lot of institutional investors did not invest for a while. And then again, it became a smart money trade post-Starlink.
- 53:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 53:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, people like uh Justin uh Fishner-Wolfson, who was there from the beginning, but he started saying, you know, there's this free free walk to a trillion dollar evaluation Valuation because of Starlink. And it became this highly rational thing. And then you had to get access again. It became an access. play, just like I I imagine it was at their earliest stages. But it's interesting, these companies go through these entire life
- 54:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cycles. And frankly, it's founders fund that had these really interesting conversations across their entire portfolio, which is sometimes going in the seed is very rational. Sometimes passing on the series A of the same company is very rational, passing on the B, and then going into the C is very rational. So re re-underwriting underwriting the companies from first principles every single round is what the
- 54:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): best investors do. And it's it's an unusual and it's cognitively expensive thing to say, well, we were smart to invest before, but now this is dumb. And now we pass on it twice, and now it's smart again. It takes a lot of humility, a lot of mental energy to really do the do this gymnastics and re-underwrite companies from first principles.
- 54:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It does. It's very hard to uh
- 54:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 54:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): re-underwrite. And I think humility is a great way to put it, to say no and then be like, oh, now is a good time. The persistence of it and having the wherewithal to stay close to the hoop enough to do that underwriting. I don't think a lot of people do that. So I think it's very impressive when somebody has the persistence and the tenacity to continue to grind a deal until it makes sense.
- 55:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I think also speaking from personal experience, once you've missed out on day deal or passed on deal, you almost start rooting down. against it.
- 55:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And just you have to capitalize that loss and say, Well, I lost the l the previous 5x, but I still think there's a 10x from here. And it's just a hard cognitive thing. You almost start like rooting against it.
- 55:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 55:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I don't have ill will towards companies, but it's I just observe that mentally. You just almost start to be an anti-fan of the company because you have to justify that I didn't make a mistake, I made the rational decision at that point.
- 55:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 55:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): always surprises me how real behavioral finance is. I wish I would have spent more time taking those classes in undergrad, but um in real life and in practice, I mean just the human behavior of trading and trading mentality is such a real thing that impacts valuations and trades and how we behave and portfolio management.
- 55:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 55:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, it's a very
- 55:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): good thing. it's also one of
- 55:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the things that's not really price into the market.
- 56:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 56:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not only is it real, yeah.
- 56:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's
- 56:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): oftentimes there's there's alpha there. I'm curious now in your career, what are some behavioral finance things that you've fixed in yourself?
- 56:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Just like that fear of missing out, right? I think with time you get more comfortable being contrarian. And I think I've learned from one of the best. Our CIO Dave is really great at uh looking at the data, coming up with a perspective,
- 56:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 56:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and being willing to be unemotional about it, even you know, you could be wrong for some time before you're right, but like continuing to revisit the thesis, does it still make sense?
- 56:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
- 56:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and investing with conviction whenever you have a view. And I think that that muscle develops with time. It's just not something that's supernatural to just completely go against the grain. And I think we also benefit from being in the middle of the country, in Waco, Texas, right? Like we're not able to just like walk to a cocktail party like you can in New York City. right? Like it's very different for us. And
- 56:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so then you don't hear a lot of that chatter. And it would probably be a little bit harder to be contrarian if you're constantly being reinforced by your peers, like how dumb your idea is, right? And then being proven that your idea is dumb because that year what you invested in underperformed everything else that they did, right? Like it's probably harder to continue to have that conviction. And so I think we have a benefit of where
- 57:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we sit in the country that we didn't used to. believe was a superpower, that now we do. For me, it's been something that I've gotten better at in time as you've seen pattern recognition and just get more comfort in your ability to make investment decisions.
- 57:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): On this FOMO point, an underrated behavioral finance issue that I see over and over, and this is the worst possible outcome for investors, is
- 57:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they're
- 57:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): smart enough. but not disciplined enough to execute on the strategy. What does that mean? That means
- 57:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 57:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): see a hype cycle, they pass on the series A, then they pass on the series B. At some point they lack the discipline.
- 57:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's
- 57:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): been worn down and then they come in at the pre IPO round and then it falls down like a wee work.
- 57:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 57:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And then they were smart enough to know that it was probably a hype cycle or that it was a bad company, but they weren't disciplined enough to hold the line and to continue saying no. And I think it's one of the these common things they see smart people do, one of these mistakes that smart people do is that they they don't have enough conviction to follow through the entire life cycle of a company.
- 58:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I see it too on the uh GP side. Obviously, we're very sensitive to fund sizes, and I think the smaller your fund,
- 58:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): generally uh speaking, it ends up being a better multiple for. LPs, which is the goal for us, right? To have an ultimately better fund outcome. And the exclusivity a GP can garner and build to create that FOMO from LPs, to be like, here's my hard cap. It's 250. Like
- 58:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you're
- 58:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in or you're out, and you might not make the cut. And the amount of like access constrain that that brings versus being like, hey, I'm gonna raise my hard cap cat from 250 to 350. Okay, well, now it's gonna be 400 because this other group wants in. Can I have an extension so that they can continue to vet this opportunity versus being like, no, I'm gonna take care of the existing LPs that got me here. Uh to the extent that we grow,
- 59:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's gonna be modest and I'm gonna have room for one or two LPs and I'm going to curate the landscape of those those LPs that are going to be more aligned with me and I will invite you in if we have capacity for you. LPs love that. If I'm a GP, that's my strategy. as I'm fundraising. But we see so many groups that fall subject to the LP demand.
- 59:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 59:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it tends to be short-sighted because the minute your returns are lackluster, those LPs are not going to be there. Versus the ones who believe in your strategy, they actually might give you another chance. If it's like what lessons did you learn from these missteps? steps, What are you going to do to fix it going forward? Uh, that capital will probably be stickier.
- 59:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It goes back to who's willing to play the long term games.
- 59:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. Yes.
- 59:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Long-term games compound, but going back to this previous issue, you need to have the conviction. You need to have the patience. And that is in many ways a lot of the things that separates the top 50% versus the top 10% venture capitalists. I've never met a venture capitalist that was not smart by by the average population standard. They're
- 1:00:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): oftentimes top 10% top 5%. But what oftentimes separates them is work ethic, but also just conviction, long-termism. And these
- 1:00:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
- 1:00:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these are things that it's very difficult to teach. I think it goes back to kind of when kindergartners have the marshmallow test. I think it really goes back to that. And some people have it, some people don't. Last time we chatted, I asked you
- 1:00:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you could go back to when you had first started at Baylor and you could give yourself one timeless piece of advice. What would that be?
- 1:00:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It would be to
- 1:00:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have more face-to-face meetings that aren't with GPs. So I didn't really start doing that until later in my career. And actually on this trip,
- 1:00:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
- 1:00:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I am attending a couple AGMs, um, but I've also sprinkled in several meetings. where I'm just catching up with a friend in the industry that I haven't seen in a while, or meeting with the CIO at another university and created space to do that versus before
- 1:01:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:01:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would say I need to jam my calendar with 10 different meetings. I'm gonna go see 10 different GPs and not thinking about the value that that creates when you're just like going back to the network effects and your relationship. Um, I wish I would have started curating.
- 1:01:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that earlier on and just understanding the benefits of creating space when you travel to just like let these meetings percolate. And when you're back to back to back, then you have to like cut the conversation off because you didn't allow space for type A people. You can be very high charging, which is like I would put myself in that category where you're like, I need to do do do do do. To
- 1:01:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): get the dopamine
- 1:01:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): reinforcement.
- 1:01:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Instead of just it's okay to just like sit here. think, have a nice conversation, ask where they're going for vacation, um, because the dividends that pays back when you pick up the phone and you're like, hey, I just met with this GP and I think they might be in your bubble. Like, what do you really think about them, right? Like that pays off if you can get um one nugget of information that you wouldn't
- 1:01:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): normally get, right? It could really make or break the underwriting that you do or lead you down a different path to start asking different questions. and help you make better decisions.
- 1:02:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To be honest, this is a systematic error I made when I was younger. I would hear those really smart people like Naval Ravakant say,
- 1:02:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 1:02:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I take a day to think. And I'm like, that is the lamest thing.
- 1:02:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Why
- 1:02:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): does he need a day to think? Why not take an hour? And now I take structured times, typically on the weekends. I'll even go to sensory deprivation tank so that my sensory senses are restored. And then I just go out and I just sin nature or at some park in New York City. There's not not that much nature. And just see what
- 1:02:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): surfaces.
- 1:02:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And really kind of nonlinear benefits from that. I think about, well, maybe I should have this guest on. Maybe I think about this investment. Maybe I think about, well, maybe me and Curtis should take an off off-site site guy. old meta. You know, maybe we should go and spend time uh together versus just just by myself. And it's very interesting
- 1:02:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to see the subconscious as a powerful thing. And oftentimes it's so overtaxed to your point. You're still uh focused on this uh, you know, uh first order thinking instead of second order thinking. You're not thinking as strategically, as holistically, and sometimes that could be
- 1:03:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the things that really take you
- 1:03:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:03:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next ten acts in your career versus just always getting that incremental gain. Well, Renee, this has been an absolute master class. Thanks so much for jumping and joining me again.
- 1:03:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thanks,
- 1:03:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): David. I enjoyed it.
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