How I Invest with David Weisburd

Hunter Walk explains why Homebrew switched to self-capital to avoid fund-size incentives and how AI crowds the market.

1h 17m Listen to the original Episode page
Venture CapitalFund ManagementStartup InvestingEmerging ManagersCapital Allocation

Summary

Hunter Walk describes Homebrew's shift from institutional LPs to self-capital in 2022 to maintain alignment and avoid the deployment pressures of large funds. He argues that as venture funds grow, GPs are incentivized to chase hot names and deploy capital volume over ownership quality, forcing founders to raise excessive capital. Walk contrasts 'pre-consensus' investing with consensus-driven punditry, noting that AI-driven crowding requires identifying opportunities before market maps form. He also discusses Screendoor, a vehicle backing emerging managers, and warns against 'dub tape' decay in multi-generational venture firms.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    So in 2022, we switched from a traditional model, we had raised funds from endowments, foundations, great outside investors, to investing our own capital. So Homebrew 4, which I call homebrew forever since it's an evergreen vehicle, see the marketing guy. Um is uh 100% of investments begin with our own capital from my partner, Satya Patel and I. I joke that uh if I want to seem humble, I call it a bootstrapped VC firm. If I want to pat myself on the back a little bit, I call it a dual family office, you know, some fancier structure. But yes, we're investing our own capital.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 2:32

  2. 2
    Walk contrasts 'non-consensus' investing with 'pre-consensus' investing, noting that AI-driven crowding now requires identifying opportunities before market consensus forms to generate alpha.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 1:48

  3. 3
    The average CIO stays at a pension fund 6.1 years, which is 60% the deployment of what a venture capital fund is supposed to do.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 15:40

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 1:48

    Fund Size Incentives and Capital Deployment

    Speaker 0 argues that as venture funds grow from $500M to $5B, the incentive shifts from seeking high multiples to deploying large capital amounts, forcing a focus on check size over ownership percentage.

  2. 1:48 – 2:31

    Consensus vs. Pre-Consensus Investing

    Walk contrasts 'non-consensus' investing with 'pre-consensus' investing, noting that AI-driven crowding now requires identifying opportunities before market consensus forms to generate alpha.

  3. 2:31 – 3:12

    Homebrew's Shift to Self-Capital

    Hunter Walk explains that Homebrew switched from institutional LPs to investing its own capital in 2022, describing the firm as a 'dual family office' or 'bootstrapped VC firm' to maintain alignment and control.

  4. 3:12 – 9:15

    Incentive Misalignment in Large Funds

    The speaker claims large fund managers are incentivized to chase hot names to build brand relevance and raise the next fund, often at the expense of long-term patience and optimal company selection.

  5. 9:15 – 10:24

    Impact of Fund Size on Startup Strategy

    Walk asserts that large fund sizes dictate startup business models, as VCs demand larger checks and higher ownership targets, forcing founders to raise more capital than necessary to satisfy investor deployment needs.

  6. 10:24 – 15:40

    Patience and Deployment Velocity

    Larger funds have less patience because they must deploy capital within a 2-3 year initial investment period, leading to rushed rounds and potential neglect of companies that are not 'off to the races' immediately.

  7. 15:40 – 19:35

    LP Incentives and Career Risk

    Speaker 1 highlights that pension fund CIOs have short tenures (6.1 years) compared to VC fund cycles, creating incentives to invest in branded, large firms rather than emerging managers, perpetuating mediocrity.

  8. 19:35 – 25:48

    Homebrew's Decision to Return Capital to LPs

    Walk details the 'offense and defense' reasons for returning LP capital: offense was the desire to invest own money while successful; defense was the need to avoid the operational changes required to manage a $250M+ fund while maintaining 'joy'.

  9. 25:48 – 27:28

    Fund Size and Team Dynamics

    Speaker 0 explains that raising larger funds forces GPs to expand their teams and coverage areas, leading to 'team creep' and chasing hype cycles like AI or crypto to meet return targets. This dilutes the partnership's focus and original skill set.

  10. 27:28 – 29:12

    Prioritization and Partnership Model

    The speaker outlines a priority list of partnership, portfolio, and pipeline, emphasizing that personal partnership and founder support take precedence over fundraising or media. They reject using automated agents for founder communication, preferring direct, high-touch relationships.

  11. 29:12 – 30:43

    Transition to Personal Capital and Branding

    The speaker discusses switching to investing personal capital ('Homebrew Forever') to maintain control and authenticity. He mentions a tattoo symbolizing this commitment and contrasts this with traditional GPs who may not be present long-term, citing Neil Shaw of Green Oaks as an example of long-term brand commitment.

  12. 30:43 – 33:23

    Investment Strategy and Check Size Flexibility

    The strategy remains 90% pre-seed and seed, with 75% in DevTools, tools, applied AI, and fintech. The speaker notes they ripped up rigid spreadsheet models for ownership percentages, allowing flexible check sizes between $100k and $500k based on founder needs rather than forcing specific terms.

  13. 33:23 – 36:14

    Seed Round Definition and Screendoor Backing

    The speaker argues 'seed' is no longer a distinct round but a phase of funding events. He discusses Screendoor, a vehicle backing emerging managers, noting that early-stage funds look for the first round where they can buy meaningful ownership (5-15%), typically involving raises of a few million to $10 million.

  14. 36:14 – 1:16:58

    Thesis Checks and Post-Seed Investing

    The speaker explains that 'thesis checks' in institutional funds were used for companies they didn't have enough conviction to lead or missed early. For their personal fund, they might invest post-seed (e.g., Series B) if the multiple upside on new capital is comparable to a new seed investment, citing Anthropic as an example.

Claims worth verifying

As fund sizes grow from $500M to $5B, the focus shifts from multiple returns to capital deployment volume, prioritizing $500M checks at 4X over $20M checks at 10X.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00

How to verify: Analyze Homebrew's public portfolio disclosures and check sizes from 2026 vs 2026; compare with industry reports on average seed check sizes from sources like PitchBook or CB Insights. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Homebrew switched from institutional LPs to investing its own capital in 2022.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:31

How to verify: Check Homebrew's official website or press releases from 2026 regarding their fund structure change; verify via SEC Form D filings if they filed for a new self-funded vehicle. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

In 2012, Homebrew could acquire 10-15% ownership for $750k-$1.5M; by 2022, this required $3M-$6M.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:39

How to verify: Review historical term sheets or press releases from Homebrew's early portfolio companies (e.g., Chime, Plaid) for seed round sizes and valuations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Homebrew 4 is an evergreen vehicle funded 100% by partners Hunter Walk and Satya Patel.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:52

How to verify: Check Homebrew's website for fund details; verify partner names via LinkedIn or company press releases. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Chime was invested in before the 'Neobank' and 'FinTech' terms became popular industry consensus.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:09

How to verify: Compare the date of Homebrew's first investment in Chime with the publication dates of major industry reports or media articles defining 'Neobanks'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Shield AI is one of the top three most highly valued defense tech companies.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:09

How to verify: Check valuation rankings from Forbes, Business Insider, or PitchBook for defense tech startups as of the interview date (2026-11-13) or recent prior years. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The average CIO of a pension fund stays in the role for 6.1 years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·15:40

How to verify: Identify the 'famous pension fund study' cited; search for academic or industry reports (e.g., from NACUBO, TIAA, or academic journals) citing average CIO tenure in public pension funds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Homebrew's third fund was $90-$95M; the fourth fund was $250-$300M.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:46

How to verify: Search for SEC Form D filings for Homebrew's Fund III and Fund IV to verify the amounts raised. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Juniper Square is an operations partner for private markets that connects fund operations and data.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·24:43

How to verify: Review Juniper Square's marketing materials or website; verify via their press releases or case studies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Hunter Walk and Satya Pattnaik have known each other since 2003 and worked together at Google for several years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·27:39

How to verify: Hunter Walk's LinkedIn profile and Google employment records; Homebrew founding history. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Homebrew has made approximately 70 investments over four years, averaging 15 per year.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:03

How to verify: Homebrew's public portfolio page or press releases detailing investment count and timeline. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Hunter Walk has a tattoo of the Homebrew logo on his shoulder.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:19

How to verify: Public images or videos of Hunter Walk showing his shoulder; self-disclosure in interviews. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Neil Shaw of Green Oaks uses only his firm email address and does not have a personal email.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:57

How to verify: Neil Shaw's public contact information or professional profiles; Green Oaks website. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Screendoor was founded in 2021 and refounded in 2023 with Lisa Collie as managing director.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:47

How to verify: Screendoor's official website, press releases, or LinkedIn profiles of founders and Lisa Collie. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Kirsten Green is from Forerunner and Charles Hunter is from Precursor; both are co-founders of Screendoor.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:18

How to verify: Screendoor's team page; LinkedIn profiles of Kirsten Green and Charles Hunter. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Homebrew's median check size is between $100k and $250k starting per company.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·37:05

How to verify: Homebrew's public data on check sizes; industry reports on early-stage fund distributions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Hunter Walk invested in Plaid during Homebrew's first institutional fund.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·36:33

How to verify: Plaid's funding history; Homebrew's portfolio announcements or press releases. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Speaker 1 invested in Anthropic Series C.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·38:14

How to verify: Anthropic's funding announcements; Speaker 1's public portfolio disclosures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Screendoor has backed 20-25 emerging managers.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·46:37

How to verify: Screendoor's portfolio page or press releases detailing fund investments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Homebrew's participation rarely makes the difference between success and failure for a startup, but aims to increase velocity and probability of success.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·50:27

How to verify: Primary source: Podcast transcript. This is a subjective claim about impact, not easily verifiable externally, but stated as fact by the speaker. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Most multi-generational venture firms suffer from 'dub tape' decay, losing their original strategy and talent over time.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·55:46

How to verify: Primary source: Podcast transcript. This is a theoretical claim about firm lifecycle. Verification would require historical performance analysis of firms across generations, which is not publicly available in a standardized dataset. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Sequoia and Benchmark are rare exceptions among venture firms that are good at generational transfer.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·55:46

How to verify: Primary source: Podcast transcript. This is a subjective assertion. Verification would require comparing the performance and leadership continuity of Sequoia and Benchmark against other multi-generational firms using private market data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Most venture firms die slowly, like in the movie 'The Sixth Sense,' being 'dead for years' before a final announcement.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·57:51

How to verify: Primary source: Podcast transcript. This is a metaphorical claim. Verification would require tracking the timeline of fund-raising failures and partnership dissolutions for defunct firms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

90th percentile spin-outs from top firms often underperform because LPs cannot verify true deal attribution.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:01:27

How to verify: Primary source: Podcast transcript. This is a claim about market inefficiency. Verification would require comparing the performance of spin-out funds against their parent firms' historical performance, controlling for deal attribution. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Lu Jiang's Sunflower is a '99th percentile' spin-out that will outperform.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:01:27

How to verify: Primary source: Podcast transcript. This is a forward-looking prediction. Verification will occur when Sunflower's fund performance is publicly reported or disclosed to LPs. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 2020 pandemic closed period broke Speaker_0's investment model because he could not meet people in person to assess them.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:15:39

How to verify: Review Hunter Walk's public writings or interviews from 2020-2026 discussing the impact of remote work on his due diligence process at Homebrew. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Homebrew's fund size and LP composition changes post-2022 via their website or public filings.
  • Check the average tenure of pension fund CIOs against VC fund cycle lengths using industry reports from Preqin or Cambridge Associates.
  • Assess whether 'pre-consensus' investing is feasible in AI by analyzing the speed of market consensus formation in recent AI startups.
  • Review Screendoor's portfolio and LP base to understand their due diligence process for emerging managers.
  • Compare the performance of 'spin-out' venture firms against their parent firms to validate claims about 'dub tape' decay.
  • Examine the impact of remote due diligence on startup investment outcomes during the 2020 pandemic period.
  • Look for data on the average check size and ownership percentage targets of large vs. small venture funds.
  • Investigate the operational infrastructure investments made by Homebrew and Screendoor to identify potential gaps in their deal flow tracking.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The incentive model of the large firms has created a huge white spot for new investors. As you go from a $500 million fund to a $5 billion fund, you just don't care only about the multiple. You care about how much capital you get into these companies. Because would you rather put $20 million into a startup and get a 10X or $500 million into a startup and get a 4X? The
0:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reality is your job is to do the latter. You're the first bench of capitalist across $450 episodes that I've interviewed that. decided to give back money to institutional LPs and invest his money along with your part-time. Why do that? It was really a combination of offense and defense. When we started in 2012 for 750,000, a million and a half, we could get that 10 to
0:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 15% ownership. By 2022, you're talking three, four, five, six million dollars to get that type of ownership.
0:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Do
0:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the math on the spreadsheet. All of a sudden we're going from being a 90, 95 million dollar third. fund to a $250 million, $300 million fourth fund.
0:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
0:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): raising it's not a problem. R LPs, you've earned the right to do that if you wanted.
1:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Investors in the world, you were early to Chime, Cruz, Plaid, Gusto, Shield AI, a lot of these companies before. the entire industry was was coined. That's what I always joke. I'm like, the job of a seed investor is to invest in the company before the market map comes out. So we did Chime before Neobanks and FinTech became popular, obviously now a double digit billion dollar uh
1:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): public company. And we did Shield AI, one of the top three most highly valued defense tech companies, before American dynamism and defense tech and so on came forth. If you're doing it after the market maps come out, then you're just a pundit. If you're doing it before, you're a seed investor. So almost the difference between beta and alpha? Yes. What do you think about the funding environment
1:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): today? Wow. So I used to think that my job as an early stage investor was to truly be non-consensus and then bet that those companies could convince the next round of investors that this matters. I almost think now uh the job is to be pre-consensus, not non-consensus, because there is so
2:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): much crowding into the trends, mostly driven by AI. Some of that might be quite logical, bigger outcomes, lots of capital needs. But I think a lot of it is actually based upon the incentive model of the investors. And I'm not sure that that's actually good for startups.
2:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I want
2:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to double double-click click on that because unlike probably ninety 99 nine
2:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): plus
2:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): percentage of VCs, you invest now your own money
2:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
2:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): homebrew.
2:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So in 2022, we switched from a traditional model, we had raised funds from endowments, foundations, great outside investors, to investing our own capital. So Homebrew 4, which I call homebrew forever since it's an evergreen vehicle, see the marketing guy. Um is uh 100% of investments begin with our own capital from my partner, Satya Patel and I. I joke that uh if I want
2:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to seem humble, I call it a bootstrapped VC firm. If I want to pat myself on the back a little bit, I call it a dual family office, you know, some fancier structure. But yes, we're investing our own capital.
3:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So going back to what you said before, which is this consensus is is largely driven by incentives. What are those incentives?
3:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you are a venture firm, it's crazy to think that you're not influenced by the incentives as an individual GP and as a firm.
3:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
3:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so of course you want to pick the best companies with great outcomes and so on and so forth. But when you think about the near-term incentives, they're not always aligned with that same type of patience to bet on a company when others don't believe and to be able to wait a long time for that to come true. You might tell folks, folks might say that, well, I'm I
3:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not going to be able to do
3:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gotta be in the hot names. Even if maybe there's some outcome risk down the road, because if I'm not in the hot names, I don't build the brand. If I don't build the brand, I don't get to see the next good company, so on and so forth. So I truly think if you gave lie detector tests to some of the investors right now,
3:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
3:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you said, you can be, choose one. You can pick either a hot name that's gonna inflate a lot over the next few years, that you get credit for being a associated with, but there's greater risk in the actual outcome, or something that kind of is under the radar for the next two, three, four, five years, but ultimately produces returns.
4:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
4:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think a lot of people would pick the first because as a GP you have an incentive to become a star within your firm.
4:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
4:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a GP, you are trying to build a marketplace brand and being associated with hot deals, the hot founders makes you relevant. And you're also trying to raise that next fund, which keeps you alive, pays your salary, so on and so forth. And so losing, I guess, some of that, you know, be damned, I don't care, I believe in this company, and I'm gonna bet on it, um, I
4:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know. I'm seeing that disappear a little bit from the market. It's not to say that everybody behaves in the same way, but as you know, people have once said, your fund size is your strategy. So when you have this coalescing around multiple multi-billion dollar fund sizes, it would be crazy to think that their strategies and incentives aren't also coalescing.
4:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So there's two aspects to
4:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
4:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to first handle the economic aspects, the dollars and cents. Let's say you have a $500 million fund,
5:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
5:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): invest in one cohort of companies, maybe you have a chance to get a 3X. So now you have $200 million in carry, or you go the safe. route and you get a $2x and now you have $100 million in carry. Well, obviously there's a $100 million difference. But that $100 million may not come there for 10,
5:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 15 years if you're an early stage investor. On the other hand,
5:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
5:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you could raise another $500 million fund, And that's that's $100 a hundred million million dollars in management fees guaranteed. So even if you are contrarian and right. which is no easy feat, you still at best end up in the same exact situation. At worst, if you're contrarian and right over long term and you don't raise
5:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): another fund, that could be a career under even though the
5:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fund
5:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): may end up doing it.
5:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I guess it's the question. When we started out homebrew, we sort of said we want to sit at the intersection of excellence and joy.
6:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Excellent would be the economic performance, especially for ourselves, the opportunity cost of our time. And also taking money from endowments foundations, people had great exposure to great managers. We wanted to do justice by their trust in
6:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us.
6:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): However, we knew that if we were just excellent but not enjoying it, that we wouldn't actually continue it. Right. So if we somehow managed to get returns but weren't proud of the work we were doing, like life is too short. And so our decisions were always trying to focus well, how do we sit at that intersection? And frankly, I think if all you're doing is creating a net
6:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): present value based upon the certainty of how much money you can raise and what fee structure that's going to create, then you are so misaligned with the nature of the founders taking the risks that you should probably just be a structured growth investor and create all your value and de-risk on the term sheet rather than in company picking. And that's what's sad. I think
6:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): founders should have a bunch of different tools in their toolboxes to pick from when they're putting together a cap table. Essentially what you're increasingly having is a box of hammers trying to content market why their color handle is better than the others. We're all in on AI. We have the government captured in our lobbyists, like all these things that have turned us like big tech, big tech in a way that big oil, big tobacco
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, big steel used to be. And I don't know why I do early stage. It's still because I like when more people disbelieve than believe. I like when the founders aren't quite sure it's going to work. For a while, that was rewarded with lower valuations. Now not as clear. It's a tough market, but we actually think that the
7:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
7:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know, the incentive model of the large firms has created a huge white spot. for new investors, homebrew 10, 15 years ago, and a whole generation of new firms that are much closer to the metal than now the titans of industry on the venture side have become.
7:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): This episode is presented by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private markets.
7:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
7:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was smiling because me and my business partner Curtis just went through an exercise of going through the top 20 venture capital firms. websites. And essentially all of them said a variation of we back great founders
8:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): going
8:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): after exceptional opportunities. It was
8:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): almost the exact same message. I love this because this
8:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is what I always say. Venture capitalists don't take the advice that they give to startups, right? They would, if they you told the startup, well, what's your brand? And you said we're here to change the world, you'd be
8:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like,
8:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that doesn't mean anything, right? But if you ask venture firms why they exist besides having capital,
8:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one of
8:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): two things. would happen. They'd give you exactly what you said, which is sort of the most bland thing. Even worse, I bet if you separated the three, five, ten, twelve partners from one another and asked them to answer that, I'm not even sure you'd get the same answer from all of that.
8:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In many ways, it's the most optimal thing to say because it's attractive to the most amount of people without
8:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): being
8:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): contrarian to anything. Trevor
8:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.:
8:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Trying to be everything to everyone is
8:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
8:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it doesn't sound like it's contrarian.
8:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We always used to say,
8:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you
8:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
8:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Steve Jobs, the pirates, right? Like the the the technologists or the pirates. Like venture capital started out believing they were, you know, accessories to the pirates and somehow they became the Navy, right? You were talking about a little bit earlier the question about incentives and you know returns versus uh near-term uh momentum. What we failed to mention, and I think this makes it even harder,
9:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is these fund sizes are growing.
9:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
9:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so as you go from a $500 million fund to a $5 billion fund, you just don't care only about the multiple. You care about how much capital you get into these companies. Because would you rather put $20 million into a startup and get a 10X or $500 million into a startup and get a 4X? The reality is your job is to do the latter. And so all of a sudden,
9:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your business model is not just impacting, it's changing. the startup's business model because they say, Well, I need to raise 25, and you say, How about 45? Well, what are you going to do with the capital? Like, I can't do anything with that. Well, I need to get I need to get my ownership target. I need to write we only write $25 million checks. And so all of a sudden, the business model of the
9:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): VCs is not just meeting the founders where they are, it's dictating the terms, you know, to the take more, take more, take
10:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): care of the market.
10:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more.
10:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
10:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's on the startup side. Yeah. That obviously has some unintended consequences. If you raise a certain amount of capital, it takes away opportunity to exit outside of IPO.
10:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think it
10:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): has unintended consequences for some of the investors too. Yeah,
10:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to double-click on that. So what are those unintended consequences of having a five billion dollar fund? Is it just going later and is that just
10:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
10:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few things. One, um you become less patient. because you have all this money put to work and you want to see it start to get marked up faster, faster, faster in order to legitimize having put it to work who's going to do the next round. I think that um
10:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
10:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): become
10:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): double
10:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): click on that. Why does a five billion dollar fund have less patience than a five hundred million dollar fund?
10:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, because uh they the velocity of getting that money into the company matters too. You have a fund cycle and so you want to put it
10:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the market.
10:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to work within two, three years. So if there's th used to be what, twenty-four months, thirty-six months between funding rounds, if you're trying to get enough capital into that company, you can't wait. Okay, I'll do the A in twenty twenty-six, and then we'll do the B in twenty twenty nine, and we'll do the C in twenty 2032, thirty-two, not
11:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): out of the same vehicle. You don't have a six-year initial investment period. So you're trying to figure out who can I load up on. Now it's different if you have a regular fund, a growth fund, so on and so forth. But a lot of these folks are investing out of large singles.
11:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Just
11:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): feel that pressure of deploying so much more.
11:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And if
11:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and if the company is not off to the races, then all of a sudden, you know, it's forgotten, even if some of the best companies were overnight successes, but it took a thousand overnights. Overnight.
11:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And obviously, on a return basis, if you invest $25 twenty five million dollars and take twenty percent of a company versus forty five million, take twenty percent net net, you're gonna get a worse return investing forty-five million if it's the fundamentally the same company.
11:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Yeah. I mean you but that you're you know, one of the things that you know is unintuitive to people who didn't spend a world in finance is as the fund sizes go up, the underwriting target goes down, right? Like if you can consistently deliver three 3x X on billions of dollars, you know. you'll never go out of business. If 3X is your best return on a $25 million
12:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fund, you know,
12:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you might
12:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be 75th percentile, not 99th percentile. And so actually, uh, I used to think that
12:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
12:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): venture investors at the seed, A, B, C stage, you know, maybe were different people, maybe had different ways of viewing the world, but essentially we're all playing the same game. And it was really the growth investors, the people who would do the one round before the other. IPO that maybe had a ratchet or things like that. Those
12:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who are the
12:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bad guys.
12:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now I think everybody after, you know, it's less about stage and more about fund size. That like everybody who's under a hundred million dollar fund is playing a different game than everybody who's now, you know, 500 billion, two $2 billion, three $3 billion, four $4 billion. And I think as an early stage fund, that is what not just changed the nature of how you think about entering, but changing the nature of how you think
12:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about exiting. Secondaries, figuring out how to not do the later rounds out of your core fund, but instead using SPV vehicles, so on and so forth, because you don't want to be the one at the table with the smallest chip stack and the largest underwriting target against people who are playing a very different game and at the end of the day don't really care about you. Trevor
13:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus
13:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's interesting that you mentioned
13:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
13:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I had Eric's first time from Angelist, and they have the benefit of having a 25,000 plus company data set. So they could really and and they're they're it's on their platform, so so they're direct to it. There's no one intermediary.
13:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
13:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): isn't the Cambridge Associates data that has like a bunch of stuff, but unfortunately
13:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is missing like the
13:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): top one percent.
13:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
13:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they have access to all the information. And one of the things that they figured out is they were basically like banging their head on the wall. They realized that you can't actually make generalizations about venture as one asset class. They had to turn it into early stage and late stage. And then they could actually compute some useful insights. But until you look at venture from these kind of two different lenses and two
13:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just mathematically different lenses, you don't really get a good side of
13:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the same thing. I think you have
13:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to turn that that duality into maybe four quadrants, because I think it's early and late and then it's fun. size. Because there's plenty of billion-dollar funds doing early stage investing.
14:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For them it's a toehold sometimes, for them it's you know trying to uh get information. Um, but it doesn't mean they're not investing in in that stage. And so I really do think it's kind of like early stage small fund, you know, early stage big fund, you know, multi-stage multi stage big fund, and then maybe just later stage big funds, that matter. But I sometimes I think what's the the story? It's
14:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the you know, I think every like I don't remember which culture produced this tail, but everyone has a version of it, which is like there's a bunch of blind men and an elephant, and depending on which part of the elephant the man is touching, they think it's a different animal. If you're touching the tail, you think it's a rat. If you're touching, you know, the the leg, you think it might be a hippopotamus. I mean, venture Ventures has become so big the financialization of it,
14:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, whether you're direct on the cap table or you're through a different vehicle, whether you're uh uh an evergreen fund or a fund that's raising every few years, whether as an LP you're running your own book, you're you know, a fund of fund, so and so forth, we're all touching different parts of the elephant. And I'm sure you have all different people come in and talk about their part of the elephant. You know, I'm most excited about my
15:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): parts of the elephant, which tend to be, you know, early stage, bet on the company, bet on the founder, being willing to take the risk of being alongside them as both homebrew, and then, you know, through Screendoor, the fund of funds we created, um, being able to bet on the next generation of emerging managers who I think are filling a very needed white space uh that has been
15:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): left behind by the growth of these mega vehicles.
15:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I want to get into your incentives, I want to get into Screandoor, screen door, but first just to add more complexity. There's not enough complexity in this conversation.
15:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To add some more complexity, the LP side of the equation. LPs also have some interesting incentives to say the least. The average, there's a famous pension fund study. The average CIO stays at a pension fund 6.1 years, which is 60% the deployment of what a venture capital fund is supposed to do. Oftentimes they they go over that. And oftentimes when you
16:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): look at the incentives, what are those incentives? You want to get into the most branded venture capital firms. What are the most branded venture capital firms? Almost by definition, the bigger your brand, the bigger your fund. Largest funds and funds that have historically performed well, not necessarily moving forward. So you have this incentive. So it could be a situation where pick your multi-stage
16:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm, you're the CIO IO of a endowment or pension fund, and you actually get positively rewarded for investing into this brand name fund that may end up returning to
16:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): app.
16:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I came in raising Homebrew 2012-2013 with no venture experience, a lot of tech experience, product management, angel experience, but the LP world, I knew
16:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
16:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they were. I mean, I understood the concept of endowment foundation, so on and so forth, but you know, I hadn't had any direct experience. And through, you know, raising our funds, through seeing other people raise funds, uh,
16:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
16:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's the expression is the scales. fell from my eyes, right? So uh I realize that there are a bunch of reasons why I say Darwin runs at half speed in venture and LP incentives, the long time cycles, like so basically the competitive dynamics are not fast enough to flush mediocrity out as fast as it should be. Why time cycles are very long? Why
17:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): By relationships, if you're an LP and I'm a GP and my firm has made you money, you'll give me the benefit of the power. in past, you'll give me the benefit of the doubt as we go through a turnover, so
17:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
17:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and so forth. But one of the reasons is exactly like you said, it's sort of who's in the seat at the LP and their incentives. I was very surprised. We've had wonderful LPs, always a very small group, but the person who's sitting at across from us has changed more than we are. We haven't changed. There's two of us. But that role changes. And like you said, they inherit a book of business, and so they first have to make a decision about well,
17:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): am I gonna rock going to the boat right away? You know, or am I just going to roll with these names for a while and then put my stamp on it? You have the question about, you know, they're often managing privates in general. And so the sun doesn't just uh rise and set on the venture aspect of that. And so if they have, you know, a book of managers who, you know, some of whom may be a little bit long in the tooth, but as a basket,
17:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's meeting their goals alongside other things, that might not even be their first place to turn to say I got to do
18:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
18:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gotta do work here. You
18:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
18:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they may be looking at their PE you know allocations, other stuff. And so I was like, Well, it's infuriating. Why don't you want to get into the best new managers as quickly as possible? So and so forth. It's like, well, I get uh punished more for taking a zero on a firm than I do for taking a get rewarded for taking for getting a forex.
18:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
18:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): All these issues, right? And so and uh good people, good smart people, but it's just the question. about like what about that system leads us to, you know, let mediocrity in venture persist longer than it should. I often say I have love in my heart, chip on my shoulder, right? So part of, and I know we'll get to it, part of the fund of funds for me was love in my
18:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): heart was I just really love working with new VC firms. I learn a lot from them in addition to being able to pass on uh knowledge that that we've learned. The chip on my shoulder. is I watched enough National Geographic specials as a kid to know what happens when you want to speed up Darwin. You release some new natural predators into the ecosystem and you let them
19:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): chase down and kill the weakest of the herd. So like I'm funding not scouts, not minor leagues, I'm funding competitors to myself, to the, you know, large firms out there, and I hope they take down a few of us.
19:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Perfect segue into your incentives.
19:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes.
19:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So again, just to show you how unusual this is, I don't I think you're the first venture capitalist across 450 episodes that I've interviewed that decided to give back money to LPs, to institutional LPs, invest his money along with your partner. Why do
19:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that?
19:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I would say we definitely inhabit a unique chess based. space on the board. There are people who have, you know, um left their venture firms to, you know, angel invest or to take a break. And you know, either those people are usually wealth effect retired. They were good at what they did, and so they're really just kind of throwing some money around, having some good time, enjoying their life, or um they were asked to step away, they didn't have a good track
19:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): record, and they are, or, you know, trying to rebuild a reputation, get a little bit of heat to then go raise more money or get hired. So we are kind of obviously neither of those. And to be honest, it was something we always planned to do. We told our endowments, foundations from the first fund that
20:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
20:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not going anywhere, but we think sometime in the future we're going to switch to our own capital model. And everyone just kind of nodded. I think that they thought, well, great, thank you for telling us, but like really one of two things is going to happen. Either you're not going to be good enough to do this for very long and in which case doesn't matter to us what you think about you're going to do in 20 years, or you're going to be good at it and nobody stops once they're
20:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): good at it. Because it's fun, it's addictive, the and the amount of capital you can make and you know just keep raising, like you do it longer than you expect.
20:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And there's essentially a lifestyle creep. We were talking about this before we were recording is once you have this home, now you're it's keeping up with the Joneses, now you're you
20:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can't do it.
20:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in
20:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): general other other people. Even if you say
20:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm not a ceiling guy, I'm a floor guy, the floor keeps rising, right? Like you get used to certain things. And I think there's a lot of reasons besides just economic incentive that people do it. They if they hire a team, they want to keep that team employed, right? They want to keep their firm together. If they um enjoy being able to go five hundred million dollars deep into nuclear fusion before the technology is proven, it's harder to do that out of your
21:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wallet than it is out of a venture fund. So there's lots of reasons to continue institutional. We did it a little bit earlier than we expected. So I sort of said five funds 20 years. If you do the math, that means we were going to do this change in 2030, sometime in the future from when we're talking right now. Instead, we did it, you know, eight years earlier, 2022. And I think it was really a combination of offense and defense, to
21:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be honest. Um the offense was what are we waiting for? Man, if this is what we want to do, why don't we do it now? We uh we're successful. enough over the course of our first decade to sort of earn the right to sort of call our shot in the sense that uh you know we're willing to put more of our money at risk. Maybe we're not as entrepreneurial as the founders we back, but we're certainly more
21:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): entrepreneurial than the average venture firm.
21:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
21:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and so we looked at each other and said, great, let's do it. The defense or the sort of reaction, I think, was the market was changing around us. And in order to continue our strength. strategy, which at the time for homebrew was concentrated early stage venture, 10, 12, 15 investments a year, where we're leading, co-leading a seed round, owning 10 to 15%, the check size it took to do that was growing
22:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): faster than inflation, right? So maybe when we started in 2012 for 750,000, a million, a million and a half, we could get that 10 to 15% ownership. By 2022, you're talking three, four, five, six million dollars. to get that type of ownership.
22:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Do
22:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the math on the spreadsheet. All of a sudden we're going from being a $90, $95 million third fund to a $250 million, $300 million fourth fund. Now, raising it's not a problem. RLPs, uh, we had earned the right, I think, to do that if we wanted. But returning it, I think, it would have changed how we operated
22:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in a way that
22:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
22:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): order to make sure we were excellent, would have reduced the joy. It would have forced us to do a bunch of things in order to run homebrew successfully
22:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
22:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think either one of us were excited to do. They didn't add value. They were about the business model of venture, not the helping startups, not the working together on whiteboards with founders. So we said, why Why do that? Just for money? Not worth it.
23:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Unpack those. What are the
23:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): those
23:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): things that you did not want to do? So
23:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the first thing is I think you get into this insidious mindset about
23:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
23:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): types of exits then that you need to return the fund, right? Like all of a sudden, if you're gonna own ten ten to fifteen percent of a startup and as an early stage investor, let's just assume by exit you'll be diluted down to half of that, whatever. So all of a sudden, as opposed to a billion dollar outcome being an outlier Liar for you, do the math.
23:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh wow, now I need a five $5 billion dollar outcome. Now I need four of them. Just
23:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to get the same exact number. Just
23:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
23:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get the same exact number. Now, it doesn't mean that we're not shooting for those same types of returns. Doesn't mean that previously we were looking for singles, doubles, triples, and letting others hit home runs. We were fortunate enough to invest
23:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
23:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): several multi-billion dollar outcomes, not just valuations. Um, But I do think your mindset changes from
24:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the first day
24:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
24:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pick a company, but also your question about what is that company becoming and how fast. And I think the m the heavier the weight on your shoulder, the heavier the burden is to imagine that the only way this company matters to me professionally is if it's a five billion dollar company. You get impatient, you start giving bad advice to founders, you start encouraging them to do things
24:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): faster and unnaturally, unnatural. you start to try to preserve the valuation at all costs in order to, you know, not uh not uh take the write down. And like these companies, the first few years of a company, it's about figuring out who they are and what they are. And the venture business model should not be a factor.
24:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One
24:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): thing I've learned from talking to hundreds of investors is that great investment firms aren't built on investment returns alone. The firms that endure are are great at the things most people don't see: their operations, their relationship with LPs, and the quality of
24:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): information
24:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they use to make decisions. And here's what AI has changed. Every firm now has access to the very same models, so the intelligence isn't the edge anymore. The edge is what you could feed it. A firm with its fund operations and data in one connected record can actually put AI to work. A firm running on disconnected systems, simply can't.
25:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's why thousands of GPs run their funds on Juniper Square. Juniper Square puts your fund operations, data, and administration together in one connected record. That means less time managing disconnected systems and more time investing, working with LPs, and building your firm. This episode is brought to you by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private market
25:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): GPs. Learn more at junipersquare.com. slash how I invest. That's junipersquare.com slash how I invest.
25:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): People talk about product market fit as if it's a singular event, but really you're constantly rediscovering.
25:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely, absolutely. So I think that that first thing is sort of would it leave us in a mindset to be the best partners to the founders we are backing? And we were worried it would cause us to implicitly and explicitly stray. The second thing is I think you have to put together a larger team, right? You have to all of a sudden start thinking about well, if I'm going to write these bigger checks into companies and I'm even more on the hook, I'm gonna have to write
26:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more, I have to make better decisions about paradas, so
26:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
26:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and so forth. All of a sudden I need more coverage. If I need to
26:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): need
26:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): more finance people.
26:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more and more $5 billion outcomes, well then I can't afford to say no to that emerging area of, let's say, AI bio that Satya and I might not have any experience in, but is going to, if that's going to produce a disproportionate amount, if science AI is going to produce a disproportionate amount of the next $5 billion, $10 billion, $50 billion, we better have coverage. Because if we don't have coverage, well then I have to
26:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hit an even higher percentage of what I know how to do. So you start bringing people into the firm, you start expanding the partnership, maybe without the type of relationship, the type of diligence, how many people have we seen come into these firms and cycle in and cycle out of the team page, that type of stuff? Or, oh, crypto's hot, we're gonna be crypto. Oh, wait, hold on, no, scrub that, deep depublish the blog post. Now we're AI. You
27:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, like people end up chasing these hype cycles because they're chasing returns. Now, if they had a modestly or appropriately sized fund that matched Match their skill set and understanding, you know, and were confident enough to say, I'm gonna keep winning at that scale. So we were worried about kind of uh team creep and culture creep as
27:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a nature of having to you know expand to encompass even even more. Um, also, frankly, Satch and I, here's what we'd always
27:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say: uh
27:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here's what here was our priority list: partnership, portfolio, pipeline. Everything else is below the line. What does that mean?
27:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We've known that.
27:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): each other since 2003. We sat this far from one another at Google for a bunch of years. We've been friends in addition to professional colleagues. But if anything ever feels out of sort from the partnership, if we've even just haven't spent that much time together, nothing else matters as much as getting back on the same page. Fortunately, that hasn't been an issue. Of the investments we've made and the next hot deal, what matters more? The
27:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investments we've made. We will always pass on a startup opportunity if it's moving. too quickly. If there's something urgent going on in the portfolio where that founder depends on us to help them get through a tough spot, make a decision, so on so forth. I think that's why we have a you know stellar founder NPS, so to speak. I think once you start getting and everything else below the line: operations, team,
28:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fundraising, media, content marketing, personal brand, right? I think the more and more you start playing everybody else's game, everybody's playbook. Oh, now
28:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're gonna be able to do
28:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one of $15 $300 million early stage funds, which might be exactly the right size or might be no man's land. All of a sudden, how do I preserve that prioritization? Don't I have to start getting the hot deals? Don't I have to start doing the brand marketing? You know, where's my portfolio? Oh, they haven't heard from me, but they've heard from my analyst or my my Claude agent.
28:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's
28:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bullshit. Like I want to be there with people. I want to bet on people. I want to earn trends. trust and context so that they turn to me and say, I'm trying to figure this out. Would you help me? As they start taking the $50 million checks from the larger funds, you know what they don't like doing? Calling the GP who gave them the $50 million check and asking them what might be a dumb question about hiring. They can always turn to us for that, whether we're
29:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): writing a check out of our pocket, which is what we do now, or before when we were writing, you know, seven-figure seven figure uh checks out of a fund.
29:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
29:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fast forward to today. you and Satya are now investing your own money.
29:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yep.
29:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What's the strategy there?
29:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well I
29:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have the homebrew tattoo on my shoulder. I got it when we started, not when we succeeded. Because I said I wanted to capture the moment. Now there won't be any rebrand, and I've only had to use it a few times to win a deal sitting across from a founder.
29:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh yeah. Well, of course, because when they say, Well, I'm trying to decide between you and this other firm, and I'm able to say the partner you're talking to the other firm won't even be there. in a year. And then I roll down my sleeve and I show them the tattoo. I said, I live my firm just like you live yours.
29:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
29:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reminds me
29:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a little
29:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bit.
29:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I might as
29:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well slide the term sheet right then. I mean it's why see anything.
29:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's actually why we put our name behind our brand because twice for Pierce. We can never say it's not us. We can
29:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): never say
29:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some asshole GP promised you that. It's always our name. I got
29:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
29:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from from Ryan Sirhan. Also reminds me of uh Neil Shaw.
30:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So he
30:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): doesn't have a personal email. He only has a his Green Oaks email because he says that
30:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
30:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): will always be at this email. I will always be at this firm.
30:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
30:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this kind of real signal that's
30:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not an outfit I take on
30:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or all
30:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that. Yeah,
30:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah. I'm not trying to go anywhere else, that type of stuff. So yeah, so we switched over and it's been great. I think the
30:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So
30:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's still called homebrew.
30:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Still called homebrew, homebrew four.
30:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
30:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the tattoo. That too. It's gonna yeah, homebrew home brew forever, like I
30:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): said.
30:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What hasn't changed? Our appetite for risk. We're investing the same type of stuff. Uh what hasn't changed? The hours per week we work. Like this isn't, you know, retirement. Uh what hasn't changed? Trying to be the most useful investor on that cap table, no matter whether we're first, which sometimes we still are, but more likely we're second, fifth, twentieth.
30:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
30:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want to be useful. The two things that did change, and I said we invest in the same type of companies, it's still 90% pre-seed and seed. When we're we only leading round, rounds, there's certain type of companies where you just felt like, why am I the best investor to lead a AI chip company, right? So there's certain types of things we've done in deep tech, cybersecurity that before we know how to be a great supporting
31:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investor. But to be honest, I don't think we would have been a great lead investor. So I'd say 75% is the type of stuff we always do: dev DevTools, tools, applied AI, fintech, so on and so forth. 25% are of some of those areas where we're an excellent supporting investor.
31:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The other thing that's changed is I ripped up the spreadsheet. At the end of a call, let's say you were a founder and we were just jamming for 28 of 30 minutes. You telling me about your company,
31:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
31:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sounds awesome. I want to work with you. I don't have to end that call by saying, fantastic, let's work together. I need 12.75% of your company because that's exactly what the spreadsheet says. I don't care if that means you can't bring in another. great co-lead. I don't care if that means you have to kick out, you know, some operators who would add a lot of value. If you want to work with me, that's what I need.
31:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now, of course, we're always in a partnership. You have to understand my needs of ultimately, you know, I'm a shareholder and things like that. But what we're able to say is, hey, fantastic. Where are you in this round?
31:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Did
31:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you just finish it up? Oh, great. Can we figure out how to get a small check in? Are you just starting? We'll commit to you before there's a lead and we'll help you find one.
32:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, here's between a we'd like to do between 100k and 500k. You tell us. So you're basically pretty flexible because all we want to do is work with the greatest companies and greatest founders. We've done about 70 investments over the four years, so we're still doing about 15 a year. And I like to think, well, certainly uh we haven't seen every company in the world. I don't think we have a hundred 100% percent coverage. No one does. It's not our
32:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): goal. Um also nobody is perfect in their selection. I'm sure we have false positives. I'm also aware we have, you know, false negatives. I do like to think that because our puzzle piece is so flexible and so valuable, you know, we do have a hundred percent win rate, right? So uh the portfolio is probably like the best expression of
32:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our tastes and interests over the last four years because we didn't have to meet that company at just the right moment where they had just the right slot available in just the right. round. And it's been great. There's nothing else I would have wanted to do for the first 10 years. I think the market needed us to be leading, co-leading rounds at that point. And we needed that experience. We needed that success. But I would never want to go
33:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): back to that for our second 10 years, both given where we are as well as where the market is.
33:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One of the things that Silicon Valley and venture capital is trying to figure out is whether there's such a thing as a pre pre-seat seed. and round anymore. Obviously the nomenclature is there, people still use it from a marketing standpoint. But is there this small round to to to prove something out?
33:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I joke only in hindsight.
33:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't blog as much as I used to, but I, you know, I'm a twenty-year-plus year blogger, you know, from back in the days I've always enjoyed writing. And so I had friends who sometimes joke, like whenever somebody asks a question like that, I always respond with a URL. Like, hey, I once wrote a post, you know, blah, blah, blah. But in this case, it's true. I wrote a post a while back called Seed is No Longer Around. It's a phase.
33:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
33:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I still think it's true. It's something that gets, you know, um aggregated into a you know a series of funding events in hindsight. In hindsight, once you say, I'm sure of the small team I have, the product I'm working on, and I have product market fit for it, and now I'm ready to raise an A round. For some people, it might be a small one $1
34:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): million, and that's actually all they need. They're off to the races. They raise $25 million next, and you can call that a seed, whatever. For others, it might be $2 million, $2 million, $1 million, $2 million. There's any combination. Now,
34:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
34:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that, is there a point at which in total dollars raised that it crosses from pre-seed Seed, seed to something else?
34:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
34:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): somebody announces $100 a hundred million dollar seed round,
34:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do I kind of
34:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): roll my eyes? Of course. I think for purposes of
34:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my strategy, but even more so for a lot of the fund managers we back via Screandoor, who are mostly early stage managers investing out of initial maybe sub hundred million dollar vehicles, they are really looking at the first round where enough ownership can be bought for a check that's meaningful to
34:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
34:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So for some of those people, it's similar. to homebrew, 10 to 15% ownership targets. For sometimes it's 5%, 7.5%.
34:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
34:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it usually means those rounds are capital-wise, you know,
34:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
35:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few million dollars raised to maybe 10 at the most. Things above that, you just sort of get into the imputed math, right? Like the valuations are high, so on and so forth. I think those start to move into um big game hunting, large fund territory. And or if you're a more modest fund, you're looking at that as sort of the twenty percent of your
35:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): eighty twenty. These are momentum checks, everyone calls them differently, supporting checks, momentum checks, thesis checks, explorer checks. You expect them to be accretive to your portfolio. If you hit a true outlier, if you would put that into an early round of pick any of the recently filed S S1s, ones, right? it would probably still be the
35:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): best returning, not just uh multiple but aggregate dollar investment in your in your fund. Um but you know, you didn't have them in your initial portfolio model. You're not modeling them out yet, you know, as individual companies. You're holding them as a basket. And I think that's totally legitimate for an early stage fund to do. Uh it's not just
35:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): logo collecting. It's hey, I earned the right to put a smaller check into a larger round.
36:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
36:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): believe in this company for reasons that are greater than its competitors, and I want exposure to it.
36:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Do you still make these thesis checks?
36:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Across our three institutional funds, um
36:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
36:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all were sort of twenty 25 five to thirty-five 35 company vehicles. We would take maybe the amount of capital that we, you know, would use for like one core check and break that into pieces and do those, sometimes quite successfully.
36:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And these are just companies at a higher valuation? Aaron
36:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
36:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Higher valuation or that we um didn't have enough conviction to try to go lead or co-lead the round. Maybe we let them met them too late, things like that. We had done that previously. And I mean um our investment in plaid was an example of that uh in our first fund. We met them just as we were getting started and they had already almost closed the road round. There was a small amount of money left, but it turns out that when you put a small amount of money into a
36:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): multi-billion dollar company, it can still be quite meaningful to a what at the time was a $35 million net asset sort of size fund. Now, as Homebrew Forever, it's like they're all the same because we're just committing checks. I think our median check size is, you
37:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
37:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): somewhere between 100K, 250K starting per company and that type of stuff. Um and so it's not the same for us. I think we look at every company the same way. Maybe the version of that for us now. would be when it's post post seed. I said 90% of what we do is still pre seed and seed. If we missed it or we were wrong and we come back to it later, maybe that would be our equivalent now. Because
37:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're not trying to play catch up just to get the logo on our website. Nobody cares. Um what we are believing is saying we were wrong or we didn't see this, and we think that there is still the same upside
37:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from
37:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a net new earlier investment. So for example, you know,
37:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
37:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hindsight, let's use anthropic, like you're just saying, like, turns out that the multiple upside from anthropic at the series B was still higher than the average multiple at a successful seed investment, right? So when we invest post-seed, it's not because we think the company has be d been de-risked. It's not because we want to be associated with the brand. We think it we think it's
38:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because it still offers us the same uh upside on a new dollar in as if we had picked a new new company, a new venture. And so we do that selectively.
38:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
38:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): invested in Anthropic Series C. And one of the reasons was I've always thought ownership percentage was a vanity metric and
38:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): really
38:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it was about multiple on capital.
38:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
38:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that you're investing your own money and you don't have to spin any narratives for LPs, where do you stand between ownership versus
38:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I guess
38:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the way
38:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think
38:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about it is that every fund manager needs to understand the math of their portfolio and what assumptions you want to base your portfolio management on.
38:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
38:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're somebody who believes, look,
38:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
38:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in a different era. The outcomes are orders of magnitude. bigger, not just in aggregate, but you know, before they go public, right? So like these outcomes are bigger and they're being captured by the private markets, not the public markets. So I'm going to be comfortable owning less of these names, no matter the price, no matter the stage of entry. My answer would be
39:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we'll see, right? Like certainly if you believe and if you know they've displayed a skill of picking and accessing those names.
39:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then they might be
39:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right.
39:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I still think
39:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if you
39:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gave me today, you said, Hunter, I know you just talked about not wanting or needing an institutional fund, but I'm going to force you
39:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
39:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): take $500 million from your previous LPs, go invest it. I think I would still mostly run a concentrated book because that's just still the way I understand how to. create value. Does it mean that I might have broader targets of ownership? Maybe I don't need to own 10 to 15%. Maybe I'd be happy, you know, 8
39:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to 10%, you
39:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
39:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so
39:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
39:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so I'd be flexible. But I wouldn't go multi-stage across the board, inception stage to growth stage. And I don't think I would be evenly distributed across all ownership ranges. Largely because I don't know how to concentrate my time and effort and expertise when I do that. I do think that
40:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you're looking at seed and series A all day, that almost every Series B company you look at is going to be by definition look better. They're further along. You know, the uh selection bias has meant that they survived. So they have a more mature team. They have more like, and so I think if you're the type of person as an individual
40:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who
40:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is looking across all stages, playing all different roles in companies, so on and so forth, and is consider yourself a generalist,
40:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
40:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): better have some other rubric to make decisions other than vibes. Now, a firm can be a collection of those individuals where the firm as a total might have somebody who I do initial checks, that person decides on follow-ons. I do early stage, that person does late stage. The mechanics of uh, you know, velocity of a dev rel tool startup is very different than
40:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know a consumer app. So they're the consumer person, I'm this, and together hold is greater than some of the parts. I think you can get great market coverage, you know, put together different strategies that way. I'm just skeptical that people can be repeatedly talented um looking at companies across, you know,
41:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all markets, all technologies, all stages, all participation model.
41:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you think about every human has their own LM, just like a model, and you've been trained on the pre-seed and seed LM, some of the benefits of that model are gonna be different than a growth model. What does that mean? For pre-seed and seed investor, for example, you're not focused on loss ratio primarily. You're focused on the upside. If you could have a portfolio with a 50% loss
41:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rate ratio that's in the best companies versus a 30% that's even in the second best companies, the first portfolio is going to do much better. So the intuition to be more optimistic or more focused on the winners versus not being in the losers, versus if you're in a later stage fund and you have a fifty percent growth rate
41:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and what community
41:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we always talk about with Screandoor, one of the things we look for is um are the managers we're backing native.
42:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to the founder communities that you wanted to invest in? So are they somebody who grew up around the founders that they're thinking of backing, grew up in the technology spaces, grew up um whether it be literally growing up or sort of academically, vocationally, uh demographically, have they spent time in the markets that they um believe that they um
42:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have figured out and want to invest in? Because it turns out that uh we thought
42:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's the thing.
42:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think that when you're sort of looking at the nature of the venture market today and you have these very, very large asset managers, most of those folks have removed themselves from the scrum. They have teams, they have data tools, so and so forth. They can be very valuable in certain ways, certainly as companies grow, being able to be capital
42:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): providers, being able to open doors, so on and so forth. But you know, those first three to five years, that's why you don't often hear my largest investor was also my most helpful one. You hear a lot of things of like my largest investor was, you know,
43:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
43:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): angel who or the founder who had done this right before, or it was this fund who m the check that they wrote was meaningful because it wasn't an option value check. It wasn't, it was a belief check. And so yeah, I think if you're a little bit more uh qualitative supported by quantitative rather than the other way around, which I think is sort of the early stage model that you know we practice,
43:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
43:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I just I I'm always aware of trying to be all things to all people. Back to your what you're saying about venture brands, it's like if you can't if you can't say uh if if why you exist doesn't give a founder at least some sense of whether you're right for them or they're right for you or not, well then you haven't told them anything. Trevor
43:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.:
43:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So another way, conviction, if it's not polarizing anyone, it's not actually conviction. It's just
43:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sometimes we think about polarizing as like if you're not being controverted.
43:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Does it have to personally
43:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): offend them? It just has to not be so.
43:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I say all
43:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the time there are categories that we do not invest in as homebrew um because I I am not interested in them. We are not interested in them.
44:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
44:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have fantastic entrepreneurs that have created
44:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
44:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): very interesting companies. Um, but I think founders deserve, especially early on, deserve investors who aren't waiting for them to pivot, aren't waiting for them to uh be validated, but who believe in them. And so we haven't done things, for example, in gaming or fitness or wellness by and large, because I don't think those are the categories we get up
44:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): every morning and think
44:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about.
44:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Certainly there's some wonderful companies in those spaces. but it's fine. You know, we've been able to find wonderful companies in spaces that we do get up every morning and think
44:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about.
44:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
44:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mentioned Screen Door.
44:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
44:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): founded Screendoor, which is quickly becoming one of the top LPs to back emerging managers and the managers backing the pre-seed and seed. Your competitors, as you
44:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, mentioned.
44:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I that's what you
44:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know. Tell Talk me
44:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about the story about that.
44:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So um Screendoor is uh, like you said, sort of a vehicle that's meant to back the next generation of funds, sometimes called you know emerging managers, but you can just think of them as founders who start venture firms as opposed to founders starting uh startups. Um Sacha myself uh sort of started spinning on the idea in 2021 and founded it,
45:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): brought in some of our friends and colleagues, uh Kirsten Green from Forerunner, Charles Hunter from Precursor, a bunch of people who have had also started their own firms, maybe around the same time.
45:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And our goal, again, loving your heart, chip on your shoulder, our goal was one, to be able to make meaningful bets, meaningful put in business great emerging managers who we thought um
45:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could benefit not just from advice, but benefit from an anchor check. So how can we
45:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): signaling? Yeah.
45:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How can we help
45:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): write
45:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bigger checks than we were currently doing at the time if we were writing personal checks off in into these into these funds? But how could we go and be 10% of their fund instead of half a percent of their fund?
45:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
45:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and thus, as you said, sort of be a signal that helped them get to a first close, or if they're past a first close, help them get to a second close, get them off the fundraising trail and start to just building their firm. We also found that it was really interesting to work with these managers. That um the way I always think about it is um I'm a I'm NBA pilled, so I'll use a basketball
46:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): analogy. On the court, Victor Wemagnana is gonna dunk on LeBron James without hesitation. But off the court,
46:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): he
46:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): might saddle up to LeBron and say,
46:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): tell
46:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): me what you learned about likeness rights so I can make good choices about how I manage my image. and get the most money for my sponsorship deal, so on and so forth. Fierce competitors on the court,
46:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
46:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, can learn a little bit off the court. So not to call myself LeBron, but we're
46:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which one are you?
46:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, you know, the beard.
46:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The beard
46:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): suggests on LeBron, if not the physique. Um the you know, so what we've been able to do, I think, is put together an amazing portfolio so far, about twenty 20 to twenty 25 five managers who are the Victor Wemon Yanamas, are the rookies of the year. They're folks who are getting into these interesting deals, interesting areas, you know, ahead of or
47:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): alongside some of the best firms in the world. They're pre-consensus, you know, not post-consensus. And we learn from them, and you know, hopefully they learn from us. Not about investment picking, that's what they know how to do, but in firm building or in general questions or that type of
47:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thing.
47:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what happens when type of stuff. Now, we did that originally with a group of us raised a vehicle from institutional LPs, started writing these anchor checks.
47:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
47:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I sort of call that a fund zero, not a fund one, because we knew that if we were going to build something of real credibility, it couldn't just be in our hands. We had day jobs. And frankly we enjoyed our day jobs too much to, you know, sort of quit them to become professional LPs.
47:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So we were fortunate in 2023, just two years after we founded, to sort of um have kind of I'd call it like our refounding. Um, we're able to hire as a managing director uh a woman named Lisa Collie. She also hired a team, all of whom had been first check sort of into EMs from various points on the LP spectrum. So they um were practicing a muscle
47:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): memory that they had been at the forefront already. We didn't have to they didn't
48:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have to be.
48:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unlearn how to some of the incentives to the LP model. But now they were doing it out of their own vehicle. And so Sacha, myself, some of the folks I named earlier, along with some new additions, have stayed on as what I'd call kind of GP advisors, helping Lisa and team on aspects of sourcing, diligence, underwriting,
48:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so on and so forth when they ask it of us. But most importantly, making ourselves available, building relationships, working with the underlying portfolio managers as they move from their fund ones and twos to threes and fours and so and so forth and grow as their own firms. Um Satcha and I are also LPs in it, so we have real skin of the game. We don't draw salaries from it. So it was this wasn't a case of oh
48:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deinstitutionalize homebrew, institutionalized screen door, one pocket pays the other, so and so forth. Um like everything, you know, we sort of like I said, we've put in our own money and we're believing the outcomes, you know, not just the inputs.
48:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
48:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
48:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for me, it's been incredibly valuable. I mean the I'm in the group chats that I wouldn't otherwise be in, right? So these early managers, many of whom are in their 20s, early 30s, just have a different way of looking at the world. They have different ways of doing things, many of which you know make me a better investor these days. We don't, as homebrew, we don't get their documents, right? So this isn't a data play. You'll see lots of venture
49:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): firms either as firms or as GPs writing checks into emerging managers. Most of it is um I don't want to say predatory, but it's with uh the belief that they are going to the firm will benefit from
49:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the yeah.
49:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. They don't see it's they're investing in the scouts, the minor leagues. They're not investing in competitors. We invest in competitors. I hope that Screen Door never underwrites a manager.
49:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who doesn't a little bit give me a shiver. Because
49:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
49:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want them out on the field beating the established VCs. But you also build these relationships and you get to collaborate with them. So we've co-invested with a number of them in companies, and it's really fun to see them do their work there too.
49:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
49:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a play on Ashton Kutcher's angel investing rule, which is if he even for a second feels like he should quit whatever he's working and work for the startup, he invests. So as soon as you find somebody that good that you're like, wow, what they're doing might be better than what I'm doing, then you kind of invest as one.
50:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, and
50:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): obviously, you
50:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
50:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): people have different playbooks on so forth, so it's not always an apples to apples comparison. But I would never want to feel like I'm investing in somebody and then coaching them up. This is quite the opposite. Um we're investing in somebody who doesn't need our help, but our help and our mindset are attractive to them. We are a differentiated LP, uh, not just in our um ability and velocity.
50:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to commit, underwrite a fund one, to be in a first close, that type of thing, but bringing a community and a mindset to their own building that I'd like to say, just like Sacha and I at Homebrew, our participation rarely is the difference between success or failure. Yeah. Rarely is the difference in success uh to a startup. But what we
50:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope to do is slightly increase the velocity and probability of their success. I would say the same thing about Screandoor. We're backing great managers and just trying to increase the probability that they're great firm builders.
51:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You mentioned that these managers, some of them are in their 20s. Oftentimes they have a different mindset. You mentioned earlier you're NBA pilled.
51:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes.
51:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you had to explain the pills that these managers are, what are they pilled in? It
51:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): depends on the world and the specific sites of the world they grew up in. Um the ones who are, you know, early in robotics and have been around that maker space are just um I think see the future a little more crisply. So uh whether you call if I was going to try to bring it back to to
51:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): basketball, it's yeah, the they're making no look passes while I have to Within
51:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): their dad. domain.
51:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Within their domain where I have to actually see where I'm passing the ball. They have an intuitive sense for how this technology is developing.
51:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oftentimes some of the people
51:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they don't
51:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know the world before.
51:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
51:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): oftentimes some of these investors are even down on the research level,
51:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
51:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the science level.
51:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. They come out of companies, campuses, or you know, Discord groups that are dealing with the raw material,
52:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
52:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with the investment memo. So what they sometimes need to think about is the, you know, um,
52:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
52:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): many of these do I want in the portfolio? What is the type of risk I'm taking investing in this company? But they don't need any help on predicting the future or understanding the talents and competencies and spikiness of the founders because they're hanging out with them. Um but it's not just a social aspect, it's um they also know
52:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how to help those companies build bridges to the partners, investors, talent that they need. They understand the mindset.
52:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Sometimes
52:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're translators. They
52:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): understand because the first 20 people to join a startup are more similar to the founders than not, right? Why would you join an early stage startup Up if you didn't passionately and unnaturally believe in its ability to succeed? The idea of taking a first 20 person role and not having founder equity is almost crazy, right? You have taking almost all the risk besides maybe some
52:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): capital raise for a fraction of the equity. You're only going to do that if you love startups, love early stage, and believe in this one. And so they also tend to be really great on helping founders assemble their early stage teams. It's different than the talent group at a
53:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): multi
53:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): multi-billion billion dollar fund who's going to call their executives for the series B, series C, series D. These are folks who are who's on the ground.
53:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): These
53:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are more through networks versus through processes.
53:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.
53:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. And often passive candidates, it's not job seekers, all that type of stuff. So it's that's why I see them being so incredibly valuable. They're also peers, so they have the trust built
53:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in.
53:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They know that they're all they're going through it. They're building their firm just like somebody's building their company. It's more similar than different. When we were raising homebrew, in the earliest years, even though a venture firm was very different than a startup, the questions we were asking ourselves felt much more similar to the questions that a plaid, a chime, or whatever asking themselves than what I think Sequoia was
53:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): asking themselves in 2013.
53:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
53:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and so what
53:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do you mean by that?
53:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, all the questions about um
53:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
54:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sort of things do we focus on now?
54:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that pay off right away versus do we plant seeds that won't pay off for a while? What sort of team and structure do we build? How do we we we have too much to do, not enough time, how do we actually sequence it?
54:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's funny, we're
54:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): both old enough
54:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and then
54:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for product
54:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market fit.
54:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We b we're both old enough and been around enough to realize that up until about five years ago, venture capital was not seen as this ongoing cause. It was basically two people like you and Satya that came together and decided you wanted to deploy money and then maybe do another fund, another fund. And now it's gone from basically no intrinsic value, no GP
54:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): staking of venture capital firms to now of venture capital firms going public reportedly within five years.
54:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now you're like,
54:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what institutional value are we or creating? It's like, I don't know, I go home each night. But that's why I thought it was so important when we um when Lisa asked. et al. you know sort of started Screendoor Proper, we gave them the it's their management company. So like the things you can do when you sort of take a mindset of um what's the right structure for something to succeed, and you say,
55:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's just all succeed together are so different. How many venture firms break up because of economics or break up because of poor generational transition so forth? I'm not saying that like we did a generational transition or anything like that. But I'm saying if you don't look and you don't examine the core questions about incentives, what needs to who's fully committed versus
55:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who's helping that type of stuff. It's like we didn't look at it and say, hey, we started this thing, come work for us. I hope you succeed. We said great, we work for you now, not org chart wise, but you
55:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
55:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're not we're not tied to the organization. But it's like this is yours.
55:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The best answer
55:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to your question of how many firms are good at generational transfer is essentially none except the ones that you know.
55:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So the
55:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ones that are still around are the ones that are good at generational transfer. It's Sequoia, it's benchmark.
55:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Maybe there's a bunch around that. Maybe a couple
55:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): TBD. I
55:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): call it like
55:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're you
55:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
55:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you still have to.
55:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
55:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everybody else, everybody
55:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that you can't
55:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): name, everyone that people have forgot about in the last twenty years, some of these some of the top funds. I don't want to speak of the dead, but
56:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Or the dying.
56:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And still TBD,
56:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some of them have taken one or two swings and have just now found the right potential right combination. I often so uh I'll show my age again. Um you know, you used to ha have used to say, Oh, I got a bootleg, right? It's a tape. And then is this a first generation bootleg, a second generation, so is it a tape? of a tape of a tape? Like, did you get this off the soundboard at the Grateful Dead show, or did somebody else record it? You recorded it. So
56:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think unless they really think about this intentionally, who are the people we have? Does our strategy still match these talents? Are we too big for our strategy or we're too small? Basically, multi-generational venture firms are more likely to be dub tapes of dub tapes of dub tapes of dub tapes,
56:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): who are
56:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
56:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): where music sucks. It's
56:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of the name
56:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): by the fourth generation.
56:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's still it says on the label soundboard recording, Grateful Dead, Fillmore, 1963, but it's the fourth generation of that recording, and you can barely make out the music, and it's not a good jam.
57:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The only firm that I've ever seen do a full reboot has been Kleiner Perkins.
57:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Do
57:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know
57:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): any
57:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): others?
57:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Only when and the that was that was only when. it became so painful and existential, right? They tried to do the change the jet engine in air.
57:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In many ways, that was a brand new firm.
57:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. They had to uh Do
57:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know any other? I always wondered
57:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if they I mean, uh maybe this was a step before and we you know we're never privy to what goes on inside. I always wondered if you know Mamoon at all ever had any discussions about in order to finish this we need to rename
57:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
57:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm sure those discussions happen.
57:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
57:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, and credit to them, you know, they've kept the heritage while creating something
57:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): new.
57:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): When these venture capital firms die, my sense of it is that it happens very slowly
57:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because these are 10-year funds, because talent slowly creeps out. Is is that how it happens? Aaron
57:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell I
57:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think unless it's really ugly, right? Unless the ones that happen fast are usually uh partnership dynamics. or behavior issues, right? When you think about sort of the last decade of those that sort of had to break up and give money
58:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): back.
58:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Or there's ones that actually couldn't raise and sort of make announcements that are everything but we couldn't raise, right? The ones that are slow, air coming out of balloon, I call I think it's the sixth sense actually. I think they're Bruce Willis in the Sixth Sense. They've been dead for years and they haven't realized it. And eventually.
58:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
58:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): movie ends and it's the twist.
58:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Spoiler alert.
58:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
58:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
58:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think you have to say spoiler alert for a 20 year old movie, but I appreciate your consideration for your audience.
58:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So going back to because you didn't answer my question, so these managers, I guess you and you answered it partially, which is one archetype of these emerging managers that they you like to back are these technology. technologists. Oh sure.
58:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So another one I'd say so the way I always say it is they have to be
58:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): similar but better, or different and excellent. So the one of the archetypes we just talked about, I think the roboticist that type of stuff, I think is sort of different but excellent. They're There people are who don't necessarily have track records. They might have portfolio model constructions or ideas on how they work. run the want to run their enter firms that aren't informed by the
59:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): top five firms and the way they run themselves. And
59:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that's positive.
59:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
59:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): positive when it succeeds. There's good versions and bad versions of all these things. Just saying you're that is not sufficient, right? The um similar but better, I think those more often look like spin-outs, very often. To be concrete, uh this incredible one, woman Lu Jiang, um left Sequoia to start a firm called Sunflower, and we were she's now investing out of a larger second vehicle, which we're a part of, but we were
59:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): also fortunate enough to be in her first vehicle. And the types of stuff that she was doing at Sequoia and the types of stuff she's doing now, I mean, she might be able to compare it more specifically based upon her mandate at Sequoia or what, you know, she was able to get through the partnership or how much unioncy she had for what she could write versus what she had to get consensus on. But I get the sense
1:00:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that like we weren't underwriting um, oh, I invested in X and now I want to invest in Y. Sequoia doesn't do Y and that's why I'm leaving. We invest in somebody who had all the grit and determination of an entrepreneur to want to be able to go in even earlier with even higher conviction and um run her own shop. And so if you look and you say, well you're
1:00:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): she
1:00:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): does a lot, she's a very technical investor does a lot of interesting stuff in the sciences and dev tools so and so forth. If you do some areas that um other people have their eyes on, my question is, well, well great, why are you going to be better in them? Like how do you beat those folks? How do you
1:00:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): outsoquoia?
1:00:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
1:00:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how
1:00:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
1:00:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you outsoquoise sequoia? And that ends up being, I think, a combination of some of the questions of playbook. Like what are you specifically good at as a founder? And why are you going to be even better at that outside of the platform?
1:00:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): As a founding
1:00:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): GP.
1:00:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): As a founding GP. And some of it, I think, is the counterbalance to
1:01:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
1:01:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these are the types of things I believe in and I think I can do out of a initially first fund, you know, sub hundred million, second fund 150. Um, do out of a vehicle that's not a multi-billion multi billion dollar shop where I don't have to take some of the consideration, some of the thought process, some of the deliberateness, some of the restrictions that come with that and that
1:01:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): brand to run my own. And that combination, I think in general, spin outs are overrated.
1:01:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But um so I feel like the 80th percentile, 90th percentile spin Spin-out out is going to underperform, and the 99th percentile spin out is going to overperform. And I think she's a 99th percentile spin-out. spin out.
1:01:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Back up there. So spin-outs are one of the most popular strategies for LPs. In fact, a lot of LPs think about we're going to put a lot of money into the multistage firms and we're going to do a couple spin-outs. Why is the 90th percentile spin-out just not a good bit? Aaron
1:01:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
1:01:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, uh for the average LP. Because a few things. One, I think um most LPs
1:02:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh a l a lot of LPs can't get to ground truth on the story of why that person is leaving. Everybody does a very good job of telling the story of why they're leaving, giving that person the track record they need to go raise their next fund, my old fund is supporting me, so on and so forth. But if you really were got to ground truth, if you knew who did the
1:02:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deals, if you knew how much of their attribution was theirs versus the principal, the associate, so on so forth, if you knew who provided the value add to the founders afterwards, you would find that maybe that person's bio doesn't match
1:02:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all
1:02:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those sub bulk.
1:02:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Do you think there's more adverse selection for partners leaving the top funds today or less given that they're bigger?
1:02:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In other words, is there more top talent looking to leave the top multi-stage firms today, or was there more five years ago?
1:02:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I think there's a bunch of people leaving out of frustration with what becoming a multi-billion dollar fund has turned into.
1:03:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because the counter
1:03:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): counteracting measure on that is just more management fees, more salary, more carry dollars, even if smaller percentage.
1:03:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think some of those people um
1:03:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even some
1:03:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the people who are good investors have stayed too long to really understand how to be new fund builders.
1:03:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
1:03:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): harder than they expected once they're
1:03:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So even
1:03:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): outside of investment.
1:03:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So the ninetieth percentile. The nineth
1:03:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): percentile isn't just a saying that the 90th percentile I don't think is going to be that impressive isn't necessarily even a statement about the individual, although as we were just relating, sometimes it is. And that's one of the things that
1:03:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm gonna do.
1:03:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think about so great about Screendoor, because we have those 10 to 15, myself included, GP advisors to help with the underwriting, like we get to ground truth very, very quickly on spin-outs. And sometimes we were co-investors with them in company. I mean, we know. And people come to us ahead of spin outs to say, hey, what do you think? I see you guys started your own because we are the truth
1:03:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tellers and what it's like to build your own firm.
1:04:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Said another way, that's almost the minimum viable team. size to ascertain whether there's a great spin-out fifteen super connected, super active people. And
1:04:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and if you
1:04:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have one person,
1:04:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's different even than
1:04:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): LP
1:04:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is thinking they have a great diligence network. Because you know what happens. It's
1:04:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): misalignment.
1:04:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's misalignment. We're all gonna be in business together. I why why I I'm not gonna go on record saying anything nasty about you. Why? Why? If the the risk of that getting back to you is too high. We're all gonna be in business together, We're all gonna make money together. That's why nobody nobody calls anybody out unless, you know, it's a Twitter beef or whatever, and I got off that site years ago. So I think there's a bunch of things
1:04:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that you can say. The people spinning out by and large often aren't as good as they say they are. They might be perfectly wonderful smart people, but we're talking about a power law business, right? They may have stayed too long and they actually don't know how to be competitive in a new firm mentality. Or they're spitting out past their peak. They're taking the shot that they wish they would have taken seven years
1:04:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ago, but they're no longer networked the same way. They maybe they don't work as hard. They're zooming in from the second or third house on the weekends as opposed to hanging out at the hacker house, that type of stuff. And there's nothing wrong with that. Like I work a different style now than I worked when I was twenty-two also. But I'm not starting a
1:05:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): venture firm at fifty-three. And so I think that the spin outs seem like a safe place to put money. And it's very possible that they're not gonna be again, they're not gonna be zeros. So maybe you're uh very many of them probably won't be zeros. So you're settling for, oh, this seemed like a reasonable bet. If it comes in slightly below the
1:05:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): benchmark threshold, it'll all get evened out and nobody's gonna blame me for having picked the ex-benchmark partner.
1:05:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I could say I did a
1:05:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fund one,
1:05:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I got access, all of a sudden
1:05:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I got access. So it's like faux risk, you know. Um, where I think the real fund one returns
1:05:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are going to accrue to LPs like Screendoor, who are pickers of both diamonds and diamonds in the rough, right? So the diamonds in the rough are the too small, no track record, we'll wait for fund two, three, four, five that cause major LPs to not be pos well positioned
1:06:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to invest in those. And then the diamonds are which is the cubic zirconium versus which is the flawless cut. Rex, Woodbury, Daybreak, you know, coming out of Index, Lu Jang, Saying Sunflower coming out of Sequoia, those are the diamonds. There's plenty of other cubic zirconium that we didn't back.
1:06:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
1:06:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and this idea of consensus, uh Mark Andreessen says there's no more diamonds in the rough, only diamonds. I tend to believe that that's generally true, but it's not meant to be literal, meaning if you keep on going back to the through the history of the startup, at some point they incorporate it. At some point it was just two founders.
1:06:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It also
1:06:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): has to do with your nimbleness, right? So um if uh Screen Screendor Door was a 10 billion. ten dollar vehicle that in order to allocate needed to be able to write minimum fifty b $50 million checks into every firm and we couldn't be more than twenty percent of their you know AUM,
1:07:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
1:07:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then maybe we would have by our strategy screened out all the diamonds in the rough.
1:07:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
1:07:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the diamonds in the rough are a thirty-five $35 million dollar fund one that's gonna going deliver to 10X.
1:07:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
1:07:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think by staying a fight worthy but comfortable nine digit size, by being able to cross the Rubicon in terms of understanding what it means to take underwriting risk in a manager like that versus underwriting risk in a hundred million dollar spin out, everything we pass upstream will be diamonds. But when we got them, maybe they weren't yet as polished.
1:07:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you mentioned you're able to access through Screen Door, you're oftentimes able to go below certain thresholds where where there's still diamonds. They're also coming to you for advice. What are otherwise very talented managers? Where are their blind spots and where do they really need help? Aaron
1:07:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
1:07:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What I was always surprised by, we had a charmed fundraise, I think, in 2013 for Homebrew One. Part of that was we were coming to it later in our careers, we were both in our middle. mid to late 30s. So we had networks, we had both professional, and in Satch's case who had done venture twice before, we had track records. We were also investing at a very good uh raising at a very good time. 2013, 2012 was sort of the beginning of
1:08:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the post-first round, post-floodgate, post soft technique.
1:08:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A little bit later, but it was sort of the it was the second wave. Every LP who had invested in a seed fund early stage manager pure play before was doing pretty well and wanted more. It was
1:08:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a Steve Steve Anderson. Steve Anderson, Baseline,
1:08:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ron Conway, Chris Saka. And those who had
1:08:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): been
1:08:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like, I don't think that's a segment or they can't possibly move the needle were like, I was wrong. And so we were institutional from day and we ran a good process. We were institutional from day one, very concentrated, small LPs, pieces, blah, blah, blah. Once I started helping others do the same, I was very surprised how long their fundraising was taken. People who I thought were excellent managers. And what I realized was that
1:08:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even if they'd been at great large firms, they were never involved
1:08:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
1:09:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the LP side of the business. The IR person did the fundraising and the managing partners, some of them had never met LPs, whereas we had to live amongst them. So even just helping them think about two things.
1:09:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are
1:09:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you pitching the right product?
1:09:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
1:09:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are you running the right process?
1:09:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
1:09:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): immeasurably speeds up, I think, the fundraising, let alone when Screandoor does commit, so and so forth. One of the things I'm most proud of that Lisa and others have shared with me is that managers that they've passed on still come back and thank them for the advice, the help, like you know, you know, go and close their funds, so and so forth, do great. Um, that they became better
1:09:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): funds. fundraisers because of the advice that they got from Screandoor, not just the yes or no. Not ask people how many LP conversations, give them feedback, advice, support, and introduction.
1:09:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Or how many
1:09:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even say no?
1:09:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Or how many, how many even respond? That's what I always said, you know, oh, this is great. We should build a relationship. My answer was always like the best way to build a relationship is to invest in our fund one. Um, if that's not right for you, that's fine. We'll try to, I'm, you know, we will. we'll keep each other up to date. Um, we don't intend to grow our fund size that dramatically, and we have LPs who I believe will have an appetite to grow
1:10:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with us. And so, you know, I'm not sure that there'll be an opportunity to work together again. And please factor that into deciding whether you want to prioritize it now. Not because I was trying to
1:10:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): give
1:10:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): them FOMO or play a game, but it's true. We were four LPs in our fund one. We expanded that slightly, mostly based on recommendations from our current LPs of other endowments and foundations they appreciated to eight major LPs in fund two, and then we added one in fund three that we all took a little bit of cutback of our percentage on because they were such an interesting LP that we wanted to have them involved. If you were an LP who said no to homebrew
1:10:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fund one because you wanted to wait, you know, you missed a double-digit fund. Sorry. Trevor
1:10:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.:
1:10:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You referenced it today's a much more difficult fundraising market for emerging managers.
1:10:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's never been more people investing in ventures. venture. There's so many folks putting money in globally than when I started. But there's also so many more vehicles to put them into, including direct into private so on and so forth, mixtures, these shared vehicles, and the underlying funds that existed over the last year. Everyone every fund is double, tripled,
1:11:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): quadrupled. So maybe it was a good time 15 years ago to run a strategy of oh, we're we are looking
1:11:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at the
1:11:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): similar to X or we co-index with S co-invest with X a lot. And if you're an LP who can't get access to X, well then great, invest in Y.
1:11:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When X has gone from 500 million to 5 billion, you can usually get some direct exposure, right? So being a first round knockoff, a benchmark knockoff, so on and so forth, like, well, now you can get to first round. Now you can get a benchmark. All right. And so I really think that the people who are running there's always going to be some
1:11:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market for lookalikes, right? But I I mean I think it's more fun to talk about what do the smartest people decide rather than what do the second and third tier of LPs and the second and third tier of ECs decide to do. And so I I get most excited when I see people running their own playbooks that are undeniable. And regardless of whether they're coming with a track record or not, you just believe that like
1:12:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this fund is going to be created, and we are probably underwriting a great fund. And what we're hoping to find out is whether it's going to be a great firm. Right. So when Screen Door makes a fund one decision or whatever the fund is, that sort of is the now it's an institutional fund. I think we are pretty confident we're underwriting a high-quality initial investment with somebody who wants to grow and learn and become
1:12:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not just an investor, but a managing partner. And that's what we will find out. over the successive years, whether they even want to invest multiple raise multiple funds. We've had some great managers who are having amazing fun ones. And I'd say they don't necessarily know if they want to raise a fund too. Um we have had others that want to stay the same size. We have others that, you know, like Lewis
1:12:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sunflower and something who've, you know, been able to grow successively as, you know, their own abilities and team has grown.
1:12:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
1:12:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I had one of the most successful careers in venture going back to 2013 when you saw your homebrew, you mentioned it. Double digit returns. I used to read your blog. Uh I didn't realize you were off of X, which which explains why.
1:13:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I've
1:13:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): disappeared. I'm in I'm I'm in my, you
1:13:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
1:13:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): old man in the river face, but you can still find my blog. It's on WordPress. Yeah.
1:13:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We'll link it in the show notes. But if you could give yourself younger hunter in 2013. 13 years ago, one timest piece of advice
1:13:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
1:13:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would you take the next 13 years of your career. What would that
1:13:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be?
1:13:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'll I'll do a bonus. I'll give two. The one that I always say and I pay yeah I pay forward when people ask me, well, what would you have done differently for one? I said, look, we were very smart about a lot of things. I think what we did was we we though we underinvested in systems and teams because we weren't trying to be the next multiple multibillion dollar firm. And because twenty thirteen, frankly,
1:13:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investing in IT and stuff meant something very different than vibe coding or spinning update. There's
1:13:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so many
1:13:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and there's so many more platinums that are uh platforms that are also built for the private markets, let alone building your own. I think that we made do with, you know, Google Docs and Notion Sheets for too long. And as the velocity of the markets, the founders, our talent networks, it wasn't that we um fell behind, it's that we didn't take advantage of one of our
1:14:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strengths. So for example, now it's so much easier to manage, find, and track in a you know, non-stalky way, like the first engineer hires at the companies you've backed.
1:14:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
1:14:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those folks go and start their companies, they should be coming to me or I should be finding them. That's dark deal flow before it becomes public deal flow, right? And that's not just, you know, doing listening stuff on LinkedIn for who changes the thing. I think it's having the data to then help you to know where to invest the actual personal time. And I feel like we ended up doing that in non-scalable ways.
1:14:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think frankly, that probably hurts some of our returns towards the end of the institutional funds, where there were some folks that I would have thought would be like captured deal flow for us that I ended up not getting to in time to get my. 15%. Right. So the double sort of penalty of you didn't know it early enough. And when you get to them, they don't have your ownership slot available.
1:14:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Very frustrating. So I tell them, I was like, even though you're not, you know, you're spinning out a big firm, I don't expect you and don't and don't expect to recreate every database or hey, you're just spinning up, Um, you know, don't spend all your time and all your management fees on software. You need to figure out, you know, how to pay you know, for this, for this, for this. But like think about the
1:15:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expansiveness of the information that you really want to have at your fingertips. Pick like one or two things, whether it be, you know, networks for introductions, talent for hiring, you know, LPs for follow-on, for direct, for whatever, or like start building out the infrastructure of that. That's what I would have told 2013 editor. Hunter. That like build it out a little bit.
1:15:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ahead of what you need it. The second thing I would have said is um don't invest uh through COVID. I feel like COVID that period, the closed down period of 2020, like broke some of our model. I was so used to meeting people in person and being able to get a real sense of who they were. All of a sudden with ZERP and so on and
1:15:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so forth, you're doing a Zoom and then pressured three days later to make a decision. Things that felt like PMF, product market fit, virtual offices. We're all going to need 3D renderings of our virtual offices. We're dead by 2021. We're pivoting to something else. And uh so maybe I'll file it away. If there's another pandemic, it's a good time to buy an apartment in New York and a bad
1:16:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): time to invest in of the moment startups.
1:16:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
1:16:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this has been an absolute master class. I barely got through any of my questions. but appreciate you jumping on.
1:16:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This has been great. I'm, you know, please. Uh I'm always interested in what people have to say too. So I'm always happy to hear from folks directly. Uh my information is on my blog. And um, like I said, you know, I get the best job in the world. I back, you know, founders who start companies via homebrew, and that's our own capital, skin in the game. And have the good fortune to be able to back entrepreneurs who happen to be building build
1:16:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): venture firms who then are hopefully backing great startups via Screen Door. And so couldn't be happier uh to you know be in be in that stage of my career. Awesome.
1:16:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
1:16:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you, Hunter.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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