How I Invest with David Weisburd

True Anomaly's Even Rogers discusses space warfare, China's military advantage, and defense tech innovation

1h 1m Listen to the original Episode page
Space WarfareDefense TechChina MilitaryTrue AnomalyGovernment PolicySupply ChainHiring StrategyInvestment

Summary

Even Rogers, founder of True Anomaly, explains his company's for-profit model and $2 billion valuation, contrasting it with traditional defense contractors. He highlights China's two-decade head start in space-to-ground kinetic weapons and the US's current efforts to catch up. Rogers details True Anomaly's shift to vertical integration and firm-fixed price contracts to drive innovation and profitability. The discussion covers the importance of the OODA loop, hiring strategies, and the need for strong government affairs advocacy in the defense sector.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Vertical integration in hardware is driven by the need for organizational velocity and rapid learning cycles, as suppliers often cannot match the speed required for innovative prototype development.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 48:37

  2. 2
    But what John Boyd's writings really point to is actually like a heavy emphasis on orientation. So this is orientation is like what you do with the data that you have available to you.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 52:57

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 5:11

    Space Warfare Capabilities and China's Lead

    Speaker 0 describes China's 2024 test of a space-to-ground kinetic weapon, colloquially called 'rods from God,' which uses impact velocity rather than nuclear warheads to destroy targets. Speaker 1 compares this to the 'Death Star' from Star Wars. Speaker 0 notes that while the US has recently announced fielding orbital weapons, their effectiveness at scale is uncertain compared to China's two-decade head start in R&D since 2004.

  2. 5:11 – 6:30

    True Anomaly's Business Model and Valuation

    Even Rogers explains that True Anomaly is a for-profit company with a $2 billion valuation that sells defense products to the US government and allies. Revenue is primarily generated through per-unit sales of 'Jackal' spacecraft, software licenses for 'Mosaic,' and services like training, rather than traditional cost-plus contracts.

  3. 6:30 – 19:18

    Space as the Ultimate High Ground and Combat Domain

    Speaker 0 argues that space is the 'ultimate high ground' because surveillance systems in orbit can also serve as weapon platforms, a concept studied since the 1960s. He compares the current state of space defense to the interwar period of aviation, where commercial dual-use platforms are insufficient for contested combat environments requiring different performance envelopes.

  4. 19:18 – 32:48

    Defense Procurement and Profitability

    Rogers details a successful acquisition strategy involving firm-fixed price contracts with open competition and significant capital, which incentivized over $600 million in R&D. He contrasts this with traditional cost-plus contracts that incentivize bloating costs, arguing that the Department of War must embrace profit to drive innovation and that political instability hinders long-term defense planning.

  5. 32:48 – 34:05

    Congressional Awareness and Political Dynamics

    Speaker_0 states that Congress is now acutely aware of space threats, making advocacy easier. However, some political reactions, such as to the Golden Dome Bradley, stem from reflexive partisan disagreement rather than capability concerns.

  6. 34:05 – 36:19

    Defense Tech Collaboration and Advocacy

    Defense tech companies collaborate to take market share from primes, citing demonstrations by Saronic and SHIELD as proof of capability. Speaker_0 emphasizes the need for strong government affairs resources, quoting Trey Stevens on spending time in DC.

  7. 36:19 – 40:52

    True Anomaly's Origin and Military Background

    Even Rogers founded True Anomaly 12 days after leaving the Air Force in 2012. He describes the early space community as a 'redheaded stepchild' focused on support rather than combat, noting a lack of doctrine and investment compared to China's advancements.

  8. 40:52 – 47:55

    Hiring Strategy and Learning Culture

    Rogers built the team by leveraging co-founder Kyle Zakchesky's network from Ball Aerospace. He outlines a learning culture based on problem-solving from physics and battlefield perspectives, with a strict rubric for failure requiring 100% effort, meaningful data, and no repeated mistakes.

  9. 47:55 – 51:44

    Vertical Integration and Supply Chain Limits

    The speaker argues that vertical integration is necessary for hardware learning velocity, though True Anomaly initially relied on suppliers. They are now moving in-house because the supply chain cannot meet their needs for performance, cost, and schedule.

  10. 51:44 – 56:22

    OODA Loop and Victus Nova Mission

    Rogers explains the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act), emphasizing 'orientation' as the critical factor. He cites the Victus Nova mission against Rocket Lab, claiming their system won 9 out of 10 times by optimizing orientation over kinematic performance.

  11. 56:22 – 1:01:23

    US Industrial Capacity and Talent Advice

    Speaker_0 expresses optimism in American capitalism's ability to ramp industrial capacity, comparing it to WWII. He advises founders to prioritize talent and cultural expectations over immediate financial metrics, noting that military habits can lower talent standards.

Claims worth verifying

Members of Congress are now acutely aware of the growing threat to space infrastructure, making advocacy for defense programs easier than in the past.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:48

How to verify: Review congressional hearing transcripts and public statements from the House Armed Services Committee or Senate Armed Services Committee regarding space defense between 2026 and 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Political reactions to programs like Golden Dome Bradley are driven by reflexive partisan disagreement rather than capability concerns.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·33:36

How to verify: Analyze public statements and voting records of members of Congress regarding the Golden Dome Bradley program to identify partisan patterns. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

True Anomaly was founded 12 days after Even Rogers left the U.S. Air Force.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:28

How to verify: Check True Anomaly's incorporation date via Delaware Division of Corporations records and compare with Rogers' military discharge date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Even Rogers served as a satellite operations officer (13 Sierra) starting in 2012.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·36:24

How to verify: Verify Rogers' military service record via official U.S. Air Force public affairs or LinkedIn profile. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

China conducted foundational weapons tests that exposed shortfalls in U.S. space doctrine and industrial base investment.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:51

How to verify: Review U.S. Department of Defense annual reports on Chinese military power and satellite tracking data for Chinese anti-satellite tests during the 2010s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

True Anomaly's co-founder Kyle Zakchesky recruited talent from Ball Aerospace.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:59

How to verify: Check True Anomaly's press releases or employee announcements from the company's early years (2026-2026) for mentions of Ball Aerospace hires. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

True Anomaly conducted a 1v1 operational demonstration against Rocket Lab during the summer of 2026.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·55:01

How to verify: Review True Anomaly's official press releases or mission reports from July-September 2026 regarding the Victus Nova mission. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

True Anomaly won 9 out of 10 engagements against Rocket Lab in the Victus Nova mission.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·55:32

How to verify: Check True Anomaly's post-mission analysis or press releases for specific engagement statistics from the Victus Nova demonstration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

True Anomaly is a multi-billion dollar defense company.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·59:07

How to verify: Check True Anomaly's latest funding rounds, valuation reports from private market data providers (e.g., Preqin, PitchBook), or SEC filings if any. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Do your own research

  • Verify True Anomaly's $2 billion valuation and recent funding rounds via SEC filings or press releases.
  • Check China's 2024 space-to-ground kinetic weapon test reports from reputable defense news outlets or official military statements.
  • Review True Anomaly's contract portfolio for firm-fixed price vs. cost-plus structures in public defense procurement databases.
  • Assess the effectiveness of True Anomaly's vertical integration strategy by comparing their production timelines and costs to industry benchmarks.
  • Research the 'Golden Dome Bradley' program's status and partisan opposition details in congressional records.
  • Evaluate True Anomaly's 'Jackal' spacecraft and 'Mosaic' software capabilities through technical whitepapers or independent reviews.
  • Investigate the hiring practices and failure rubric implementation at True Anomaly through employee reviews or industry reports.
  • Confirm the OODA loop's application in modern defense tech by reviewing John Boyd's original works or contemporary military strategy analyses.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In 2024, it was reported that China had tested their first space to ground weapon. This is a satellite that is in orbit that deploys a munition. That munition re enters the atmosphere and guides itself to the surface of the Earth. There are some velocities you can achieve in space to ground weapons that will have the yield of a small kind of kiloton class nuclear weapon.
0:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): These are colloquially called rods from God.
0:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let's just call this military weapon the Death Star from Star Wars. So you have the this object in space that can now shoot nuclear weapons in Earth's orbit.
0:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, it doesn't even need to be nuclear. The impact velocities uh will hit the ground with the force of a nuclear weapon, but they don't have to actually have a nuclear warhead.
0:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There seems to be this proliferation of space companies. There's dozens and dozens of these companies. What inning of space deck are we in today?
0:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
0:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think we're in the second inning of space deck.
0:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
0:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think the first inning was largely driven by the space race up until 1992 when the United States largely kind of retired many of the capabilities that were driving the space innovation. We lost the competitive pressure to really advance space capabilities for military purposes or civilian purposes.
1:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that's a really important lesson in history, by the way. Uh, Trey Stevens from Andrew and Founders Fund always says which is like basically it's not founded the company on day two. I was on an airplane, right? I was in DC.
1:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You started True Anomaly four and a half years ago, you built it into this multi-billion dollar defense company. If you could go back four and a half years ago and you could give yourself one timeless piece of advice that you could bring into the founding of the company, what would that be?
1:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): My advice to myself would be.
1:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Years at the Air Force and Space Force thinking about American defense and space. What's the state of American defense and space today?
1:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's not good. Um, China, which is our principal adversary for space warfare, has been at this problem now for about 20 years. The indications that we've received from the public domain are or that China really started research and development on space weapons in 2004. And if you remember at the time, the
2:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): United States was largely focused on the global war on terror, what became the global war on terror a la the Middle East. And there's a different set of systems, space systems, that you use when you fight that war. You f you generally bias towards building really expensive things. And the United States after the fall of the USSR effectively
2:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mothballed the research and development of all of its different defensive and offensive space capabilities. So the last like publicly known system was SDI, and that shuttered in the early 90s and uh i it really in the Clinton administration as part of a bargaining chip with nuclear negotiations for Russia. So we we've come up
2:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kind of largely empty-handed. And The one thing that that has changed just recently in the last month is that the Secretary of the Air Force, Troy Mink, has announced that the United States has fielded orbital weapons. For a long time, the United States has a ground-based electronic warfare capabilities, but but Troy Mink uh recently came out and said that
3:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we have space weapons for the first time. The question is to whether that those are are kind of effective at scale or not, and whether that is really a deterrence tactic vice having true combat capability.
3:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
3:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Troy Menck is the Air Force secretary. And a lot of people are saying that space is the future of warfare. To what extent is that hyperbole? And to what extent is that actually factual? Trevor
3:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
3:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think it is true. I mean, space, the way to think about the space domain is truly the ultimate high ground. It gives you unfettered access to the surface of the earth. In in traditional operations, global mission operations, we use that to keep track of troop movements on the ground, right? We take picture and we take video from space and we understand the
3:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): terrestrial environment through the space domain. And now there are so many intelligence satellites and so many commercial intelligence satellites that we largely have almost real-time coverage of the surface of the earth. And so you can understand change detection. You can understand when troops are amassing at a border, for example.
4:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But from a combat capability standpoint, the high ground has traditionally been an important vantage from which to deploy systems, right? The air domain became the vertical flank. Marine Corps doctrine actually talks about the air domain as the vertical flank, which is, which is, I think, unique to the Marines. And the space domain, Maine, I think, is the ultimate flank. It's the ultimate vertical
4:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): flank from which you can deploy systems, re-enter those. into the atmosphere. You can continue to have global mission operations effects. And so I think you're going to see the United States continue to invest in this space, which means that we need to also defend ourselves, right? It's not enough to just have
4:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): surveillance satellites. You need to be able to defend those surveillance satellites. And then finally, as the United States and I think the global economy becomes pushes further and further into the space domain, into the orbital environment, um, the value of those assets will will necessitate kind of an active defensive posture. It'll become critical infrastructure. And
5:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one of the things that we've that the United States has spent probably over a decade on now is really shoring up critical infrastructure weaknesses. And space, space will go kind of go the same way.
5:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I want to talk later on about the geopolitical ramification. ramifications of space and what happens if China wins. But first, you guys raise a $2 billion valuation. You're a for-profit. Talk to me about your business model in terms of how True Anomaly makes money.
5:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our business model is to build defense products and sell those to the U.S. government and its allies. So we build spacecraft and we build software. The way that we sell that to the U.S. government. is always program dependent, but in general, we invest our own capital in products that can be sold to multiple programs. So we we really make
5:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money off of the per unit sales of Jackal spacecraft, supporting OM uh tails as the spacecraft uh continue to age and we make updates and improve their performance, as well as software licenses against our mosaic product. Uh, we do have a a grown growing services business as well. So one of the areas that the Space Force is investing in really
6:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is uh is in training, for example. Um they need to train combat forces to prepare for for war fighting, and we'll provide some services. But largely the vast majority of our revenue is coming from product sales of units of Jackal and other spacecraft.
6:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This episode is presented by Juniper Square, the Opposite. operations partner for private markets.
6:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
6:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to go get back to what you said before, which you said space is the ultimate high ground. So in traditional warfare, kind of 20th century, if you controlled the airfield, then you could do a lot of things. You could monitor the movements of uh troops on the ground, you could shoot down on those troops, and you kind of control.
6:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): controlled controlled the the area of conflict. Space is is another level to that. It's even higher out. What are the ramifications of that? Is it just in terms of monitoring and getting information, or can you actually attack uh adversaries in space?
7:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's a great question. You know, one of the lessons from the air domain is that surveillance systems um
7:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): generally by virtue of their role enter into a location that is close in proximity to its target. So if you can put the surveillance or the reconnaissance sensor on a target, that means in many, many cases you can also put a weapon on that target. This has been an
7:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): observation that has been made by the US government for a long time. The it's not in just in modern history that the that space as a high ground has been kind of a relevant factor in combat operations. This was studied in the 60s, the 70s, and the 1980s, but it's surged again in terms of
7:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): relevance because of the kind of arms race that the United States finds itself in in space against the People's Republic of China. One of the things that the United States is particularly worried about is actually the deployment of space based weapons in space that are designed to employ munitions against the
8:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): surface of the Earth. So in 2024, that China had tested their first space to ground weapon. And the weapon system they tested was kinetic. So this is a satellite that is in orbit that deploys a munition. That munition re-enters the atmosphere and guides itself to the surface of
8:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the earth. There's so much kinetic energy involved in dropping something from space to the surface of the earth in an uncontrolled way. So the way that the dragon re-enters the atmosphere is really under is is in a free-fall. You're you're dispersing all of that kinetic energy in the form of heat and then shoots. deploy, and that
8:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): controls the closing velocity with the ground. In a space-to-ground kinetic weapon, you're relying on the kinetic energy to create the explosive effect on the target. So there are some velocities you can achieve in space-to-ground weapons that will have the yield of a small kind of kiloton class nuclear weapon. These are
9:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): colloquial, colloquially called rods for from God. So large kind of masses, tungsten rods typically will survive the re-entry velocities and heating that strike the surface of the Earth. This gives you basically unfettered access to any target on the ground. And we think China tested one of these in
9:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2024, which is kind of like it's it that is a monumental um development in space warfare. And it really reflects. like how far ahead China is relative to the United States. These systems are called, if your audience wants to research them, they're called fractional orbital bombardment systems or multi-orbit
9:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bombardment systems. And these are concepts that were explored
9:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
9:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 60s and 70s by Russia. In fact, that's what everybody was worried about when Sputnik launched. Their the the public response to that was. oh God, now now Russia's gonna bomb the United States. They're gonna nuclear bomb the United States from orbit, which is kind of one of the reasons that you had the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
10:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): provisions that happen. You know, that space is the ultimate high ground. You can deploy weapons from space, you can also do surveillance missions. And one of the challenges is that then you don't necessarily always know what's being deployed to the old overall world environment. So, like a really robust or economic. reconnaissance infrastructure is required to understand what our adversaries are doing.
10:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let's just call this military weapon the Death Star.
10:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): From Star Wars. So you have this object in space that can now shoot nuclear weapons on
10:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
10:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Earth in Earth's orbit. Aaron Trevor
10:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell Burrus Well,
10:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it doesn't even need to be nuclear weapons. It can just there's the impact velocities from orbit. You have so much energy in orbit, the impact velocities will hit the ground with the force of a nuclear weapon, but they don't have to actually have a nuclear warhead. Trevor
11:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus
11:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sort of like hitting a uh throwing a nickel from the Empire State Building by the time it chops, it's it's it's like a ton of bricks. So let's say that China did actually test this, and let's say that the capability is there. If that's the case, what could counteract something like that? Does it have to be another s
11:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): object in space, or there is there's some ground to air defense system to this weapon?
11:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
11:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's a great question. The ideal engagement time is before the weapon gets deployed. So
11:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in general, you want to eliminate the platform that hasn't a threat on it. That's the best kind of risk-adjusted opportunity to engage these things. You can do that from space.
11:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh,
11:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you could also do that from the ground, but your instinct is right. Shoot it before it releases its munition, because then the dynamics get a lot harder. You're in kind of a classical missile. defense problem where you're trying to engage a hypersonic glide weapon at these massive, massive velocities. And doing that from a traditional anti ballistic missile system
12:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is very difficult. This is the adage of shooting a bullet with a bullet. Except it's it's way more challenging at orbital velocities than uh what we've seen the United States and Israel be successful in doing in countering uh ballistic missile. missiles launched from Iran.
12:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
12:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, you want to shoot something before it deploys the weapon. That's kind of the best, least risky time to do it. Aaron
12:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
12:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You've compared this moment in time
12:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to the military moment following World War I. In what ways are these times comparable? Aaron
12:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
12:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Where we find ourselves in kind of the arc of space defense development for capabilities and technologies is very similar. to what happened after World War I, before World War II, and and then and then after World War II, of course. But I think the interwar period is really interesting. So in World War I, we saw the really the first demonstrations of
13:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the value of air systems. So this is coming off of the back of first winged flight, right in the early 1900s, and some enterprising pilots and and war fighters at the time
13:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): asked questions like, well, if I'm over the adversary, couldn't I just drop a drop a grenade on them? Or can't I just take pictures of them to try to understand what's going on behind enemy lines? That created the first fighter escort or the first fighter sweep tactics, which were, well, if my adversary has an air platform
13:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that can go do all of these things air to ground, well, then I have to be able to counter that aircraft. And so you had the first dog fights and the first aerial kills, actually, uh, in World War One. The value that was demonstrated by air platforms in World War One really kicked off a development cycle and a period of air
13:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): experimentation in the late 20s and and 1930s, in which the envelope of what was possible from the air domain was was started to be explored. And that actually drove the development of new air technologies as well. So there's this positive feedback loop between air technology development, aircraft development, so
14:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): engines, airframe design, as well as combat operations concepts. And so you the the kind of convergence of events were the the advanced. advancement of flight sciences, the the buildup pre-World War II, and then the advancement of tactics and techniques to uh to extract the most combat
14:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): value out of air platforms. The net result of that was the generation of entirely new air systems that really didn't have necessarily a commercial application or were built for defense purposes first and then repurposed repurpose for commercial values. value. In space, the opposite has been true, which is there's been a need to offset the
14:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): capital risk associated with generating a commercial capability through defense sales. When you're dealing with a spent space domain that isn't a war-fighting environment, you can get away with that, right? This idea of dual use. You can build a system that can provide services and capabilities. to the battlefield as well as to
15:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): commercial partners. And that's a great position to be in. It's a good risk-adjusted position to be in. The problem is commercial platforms built for a commercial operating environment fall short of what's necessary for combat operations when space became a contested environment. So when your adversary is trying to shoot back at you, you have to deal with
15:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a contested environment. or you have to deal with your adversary's own countermeasures. You need a performance envelope that's different than a commercial application and that may, in many ways, actually may not even have a commercial application. And so I call kind of what happened in aviation in the 1930s the Cambrian explosion of spit of air platforms. Like you had the first fighters, the first bombers
15:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that were created. The same thing is happening in space. Space is a war warfighting fighting domain.
16:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
16:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our adversary is ahead. of us. A warfighting domain means you're optimizing for very different things in system design. And when you and and like that generates a different, a different product that may not have a commercial application.
16:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There seems to be this proliferation of space companies. One of our portfolio companies, Varda Space, for example, is is doing biology in space and there's dozens and dozens of these companies. What ending inning of Space Deck are we in today?
16:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think we're in the second inning of Space Deck.
16:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
16:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think the first inning was largely driven by
16:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the space race up until 1992, when the United States largely kind of retired many of the capabilities that were driving uh space innovation. Um
16:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there,
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we just lost sort of the competitive impulse. We lost the competitive pressure to really advance space capabilities for military purposes or civilian purposes.
17:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
17:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh, I think that's a really important lesson in history, by the way. Um, that that interplay between research and development and defense technology and advancing sort of like sciences and and and extending research and development into the commercial domain.
17:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Tell
17:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me about what's that. the lesson to learn there?
17:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The lesson is like
17:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
17:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is one for biology. It's like competitive pressures generate generate innovation, right? You have to trim the branches of the tree that don't make sense from a technology standpoint. And only the things that have the maximum utility for their application end up surviving. And and the that
17:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combat process. performance is, as I said before, like very different than a traditional space environment. Like you're in space, it's really hard. The environmentals of space are really hard. The ride to space is really hard. But when you're dealing with an adversary that's shooting you back, you have to optimize for for different things. Like a Boeing passenger jet or uh or an
17:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A320, for example, like most uh almost everybody that's listening to this podcast is has like flowing flown on on an aircraft. before, for sure.
18:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
18:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't have countermeasures. They don't have the wing strength to to pull nine Gs. They don't have the power plant that's necessary to climb to super high altitudes and maintain uh engine performance at 50,000, 60,000 feet, for example. Um, the that that those applications aren't necessary, those technologies aren't necessary
18:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when you're optimizing for like fuel efficiency and maximum payload capacity. You have sp put 350 people into an aircraft, like you design a fundamentally different thing. The general I think the general lesson is like geopolitical pressure drives research and development and and it creates like entirely new markets.
18:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Another lesson I'm trying to learn and get to ground truth then is I I'm this capitalist. I believe that capital capitalism drives these efficiencies in these markets. And, you know, a small group of very smart, very motivated people can create industries as ha have been done over the last 20, 30 years. But also what I'm coming across in all these
19:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): defense tech companies is this public private partnership. This partnership with the US government, Department of Defense, other wings and other public partnerships. Talk to me about that. How does that relationship look when done right?
19:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a great question. And I think that we we actually are executing against a program that I won't be able to say much about, unfortunately, but I think is one of the best examples of when acquisition strategy drives
19:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): RD by industry. So there's a large program that uh has a couple of key characteristics to it from an acquisition strategy. standpoint. One is it is a really, really difficult problem, a really interesting problem that drives I think industry to want to deliver.
19:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Two, there is significant capital available. Uh three, there is a the the prize,
20:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the acquisition is open. to multiple players. So that's not a first past the post or winner take all market.
20:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And four is like limited requirement specification. So on this program, we've been able to bring over $600 million in RD to date. We're adding another billion dollars of RD to that product. Uh And that is
20:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
20:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unprecedented, I think, in in modern defense tech.
20:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
20:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're not the only company that's doing it. So we're incentivized to deliver products on sort of like a milestone basis, investing around capital would do that. And then we're rewarded when we demonstrate capability, not when we turn in a PowerPoint presentation or show compliance an analytically to a program. This is a great
20:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): example where the opportunity is big enough that we're willing to put up the capital to fund entirely new products
21:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because the, you know, because the production volumes are so substantial that it like will make a meaningful business case to
21:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us. One
21:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thing I've learned from talking to hundreds of investors is that great investment firms aren't built on investment returns alone. The firms that endure are are great at the things most people don't see: their operations, their relationship with LPs, and the quality of information they use to make decisions. And here's what AI has changed. Every firm now has access to the very same models, so the
21:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): intelligence isn't the edge anymore. The edge is what you could feed it. A firm with its fund operations and data in one connected record can actually put AI to work. A firm running on disconnected systems, simply can't. That's why thousands of GPs run their funds on Juniper Square. Juniper Square puts your fund operations, data, and administration together in one
21:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): connected record. That means less time managing disconnected systems and more time investing, working with LPs, and building your firm. This episode is brought to you by Juniper Square, the operations partner for private market GPs. Learn more at junipersquare.com. junipersquare.com/slash how I invest. That's junipersquare.com slash how I invest. A
22:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lot of my friends in defense talk tell me about the transformation of the Department of War under Secretary Hexeth and Under Secretary Emil Michael, and how they're really evolving defense. To what extent is that true and what exactly is being done to evolve the space and to make it more I guess,
22:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): commercially viable for startups?
22:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There's a recognition by the Department of War that there's a a substantial amount of capital and talent available to solve the most acute defense technology problems. But and it's so it's not a question of capacity, it's a question of incentives. Can a business make a case that there is meaning there is
22:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): meaningful revenue to be made? profitably, by the way, uh, which is which is really critical. This is a the this is a word that I think the Department of War is is learning. I think in senior levels, it's well understood. I think in program management, in the in the program managers, it's a like a little bit more of a foreign concept. Um, but the the transformation they're
23:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): driving is really to like capture the engine that is American capitalism
23:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
23:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): drive that. into defense tech problems. So what has to be true in order for America's best talent and most capital to be applied to the defense of the nation and the development of interesting and and combat capable products? There's a few factors, and I named a few of them, but
23:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but I'll repeat
23:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
23:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): One is the opportunity has to be large. There's always going to be a company that is incentivized to solve a a problem, right? So what what motivates True Anomaly is a combination of the battlefield need. What is the problem that needs to be solved on the battlefield? Is it a
23:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): real problem? Is it is it an acute problem that war warfighters fighters need solved? And two, is it an opportunity that's large enough? where we can turn a meaningful investment and then take that capital and invest it in the next generation of products?
24:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
24:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the other element that has to be true is that you have to have open competition. And
24:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
24:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): least initially there need to be multiple awardees on programs, but not too many. So there are programs where there there've have been where where,
24:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
24:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a thousand companies or twenty companies get awarded an initial contract. That can be a very confusing signal to a company and the capital markets. And and I think, you know, as somebody who has who has fundraised in this environment, when there's a large contract with many players on it, you spend most of your time talking about what
24:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): differentiates what what how you're positioned relative to your competitors, which of course is really, really important, but it generates a lot of noise in the system, right? Like we have no problem articulating why our product is differentiated. But there's always a little bit of mistrust on the part of capital allocators in the decision-making process of program
25:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): managers. So when you see a company, a contract that has like a dozen or more competitors on it, there's a question about like market structure. Can are there going to be awards that are diffuse across industry or is it going to be concentrated? And really the only way that like you can turn a meaningful profit in many of these programs that keep the innovation and industrial
25:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): engine driving is like to have some level of concentration that's meaningful. Now you can't overconcentrate Right and get back into the days of of like the previous era of defense and even in many ways, like the current era of defense procurement, which is all of the procurement dollars go to a single company. Like there's one
25:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): awardee on a contract because then the government doesn't have any leverage. You have massive waste. And that means that like you're building, you are, you you kind of have like the the concentration issue of building a a capability for a really long time that ends up being obsolete uh in in a short amount of time. just like given innovation cycles out of PRC. And then finally, like
26:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these need to be acquired largely as firm fixed price contracts.
26:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
26:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think the Department of War like totally gets this. You're seeing a huge amount of firm fixed price contracts under OTAs be used now, even for really, really big projects. There's always going to be a role for like the very, very difficult cutting-edge cutting edge tech, like core low TRL RD. work needs to be cost plus. But technology's advanced so much
26:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that, and it's so prolific that you largely can like solve a lot of the problems on the battlefield with firm fixed price programs as long as the other kind of two criteria are met. So firm fixed price programs incentivize industry, of course, to like reduce their costs, generate profit. When you generate profit, you invest in the next generation of products and you end.
26:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): up like in a virtuous innovation cycle. Um, the one allergy within the Department of War, though, again, as I said, is like the word profit is uh is
27:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
27:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a new word to the department.
27:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): encourage defense contractors to consolidate, then they had this market pricing that was very favorable to the defense industry and it was extremely profitable to be a defense contractor. Why is why is profit so controversial?
27:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It really is like the level of profit that's controversial, right? So like in a cost plus contract, typically your fee is going to be something around like 10 to 12%, or you're going to make 10 to 12%. But really like defense can defense large defense companies are yes, while they're turning to a maybe maybe a 10 to 12% profit on a cost plus contract, they're actually incentivized
27:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to bulk up the cost portion of the cost plus contract, right? So they they will
27:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's no incentive to to share costs. There's no incentive to drive per unit cost down and that you end up with these like very, very bloated programs. But if the Department of War wants innovation out of industry, they want us to co invest. coinvest alongside them. We have to at some point generate capital from sales. We have to generate profit
28:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from sales. Um so they've uh they co equate so sometimes what happens is program managers will equate like
28:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): large contract profits with profits, period. So we'll they'll Like look at the F twenty two program to or the F thirty five program and they'll be like, wait, you want to make more money on that program you you actually want the program to be larger. And so no, we're actually saying is like over the long term, actually over the near term, programs will be less expensive because companies are footing the bill for the research and development
28:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and recouping the cost of that product through unit sales, through services, through licenses over time. But you know, you also have to the department of the war has to give a long view into contracts. So like political instability is another challenge. associated with some of these things. And then contracting philosophy around like how how long a contract and
28:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how enduring a contract will be. If if you give me the opportunity to go to spend a billion dollars, but I only have visibility into one year or two years of sales, and those don't cover my research and development costs, that's not an opportunity we're going to go after. So we have to have long-term certainty in order volume in order to expect. expend the amount of capital that's often
29:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): required for these like large capital intensive defense programs, which is where
29:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like a lot of innovation really, really is required.
29:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's actually where I want to go to. I had uh Bradley Tusk, famous a lobbyist, one of the top lobbyists really in the last 20, 30 years. And We talked about lobbying and how coin operated congressmen or senators are. And essentially said something like 95 to 99% of
29:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): congressmen are basically coin operate, directly operate on incentives, aren't really independent, don't have their own views, and essentially you could shift them one way or another. And that by itself is somewhat alarming. But on
29:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): top of
29:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that, today we have a more polarized uh Congress and Senate. Mostly it's due to gerrymandering. So now you have basically no primary uh basically today, today you don't have much primary competition. So Democrats don't have to really run against
30:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Republicans, and Republicans don't really have to run about Democrats. Democrats are always running against far-left Democrats, and Republicans are are running against far-right Democrat, uh far far-right right Republicans, essentially. So now you have more of a polarizing
30:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Congress
30:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and also coin operating also just functioning on these two-year intervals. On the other side, you have China that probably the strength of their central planning is that they can make these 20, 30-year 30 year plans. You might argue against their democratic values, against their
30:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
30:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ethics of their policies, but this continuity is a huge advantage when it comes to these multi decade programs. How do you plan for this type of political climate today?
31:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To your point, you have a very well resourced government affairs uh function that allows that that enables us to advocate for what is going to make America a better and more secure place. I think when as we've as
31:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we've
31:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as we have m engaged with members of Congress, generally defense is not a uh there isn't a lot of bipartisan disagreement in defense. I think these are issues in other domains. Um
31:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
31:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can't name one off the top of my head ass because most of my time is spent on defense. But like,
31:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): basically everything but defense.
31:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that's probably true. So like so when you get behind closed doors,
31:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the reality kind of sets it, which is the United States is behind in some really critical areas, particularly in space. And the intelligence community is reporting on this information to members of Congress. And members of Congress have like face, they face that reality. They have to choose between believing the
32:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intelligence record or not. And
32:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's
32:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not to say that the intelligence record is infallible, by the way, but like the overwhelming evidence here is that the United States has some significant deficiencies relative to our ability to To deter deter the PRC globally, not just in the South China Sea.
32:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
32:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the challenge for us is like if you had asked me five years ago, does every member of Congress understand space defense? I would have told you like they probably don't understand that space has become a war finite domain and that we have to resource this. Or they would have said something like, oh, Space Force, is that that like Trump thing?
32:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um and And
32:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
32:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so there were like kind of reflexive reactions. in members of Congress. That is not the case anymore. The service and the Pentagon, over the last really two administrations, have done a great job of ensuring that members of Congress are acutely aware of the growing threat to space
33:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): infrastructure, to the United States superiority and dominance in space. And so it is not a challenge for us. Like it's not a difficult conversation for us to have with members of Congress. So we come in and we say, hey, we think these programs are really important. We think that like the United States is short in these areas and we need to invest more in these areas and like move dollars from
33:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): legacy contracts.
33:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
33:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like that box to me is largely checked. What we are seeing is
33:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some political reactions to kind of like Golden Dome Bradley, for example. And I think this is less about the capability and more about the reflexivity in Congress right now about anything that any one party does. Like there's almost a moral obligation to just disagree for disagreement's sake. Um, that can be what is said in public. That
33:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is true for some members of Congress, but that is also like sometimes a member of Congress will say something in public and something completely different in. private. Um so
34:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
34:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think like for our purposes,
34:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these are bipartisan issues and we have a like a lot of success in just just calling, calling it like we see it, like calling our shot without having to do a lot of political maneuvering. But you do, I think as a defense tech company, you have to be extremely well resourced from a GA standpoint. There's a adage that that uh Trey Stevens,
34:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
34:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from Andrew and Founders Fund always says, which is like, basically you founded the company on day two. I'm paraphrasing, day two, I was on an airplane, right? I I was in DC. Time was spent in DC generating advocacy. Thankfully, other defense tech companies, like there's a coalition of defense comp tech companies that have really done a, I think, a great job like
34:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): articulating that this kind of new new set of players. is uh is is capable, that we're capable. It's not just sort of like
34:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
34:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bunch of VCs saying, hey, this is really important. It's actually like we had we were generating combat effects on the battlefield. Look at what Saronic's doing. Look at what SHIELD is doing. Um, the demonstrations that True Anomaly had did this summer, uh, like the the capabilities are now are now real. They've taken time to develop, but they're now. real. I think members of Congress are really seeing the
35:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): impact of
35:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
35:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There seems to be this camaraderie we were talking before we started recording between defense tech companies. You guys are all obviously in some ways competitive, but also in many ways collaborative and and also looking to help each other as well.
35:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's right. I think we all want the same thing at the end of the day. Like we want the United States to have meaningful deterrence capability and um, you know. I think defense tech founders do spend time with each other. We end up all going to kind of the same conferences or have personal friendships with each other. And we're it, you know, we don't want to take each other's lunch. We actually want to just take the lunch of the
35:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): primes. We want to take their market share. We want to grow the opportunity for other defense tech companies. And at the end of the day, Today. like we want to make sure that our troops are equipped with the right set of systems to do their job.
36:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Reasons for this podcast is really to investigate how the most ambitious projects, aka startups, start. True Anomaly is one of the most ambitious startups in the world today.
36:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How
36:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): did you go from zero to one?
36:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So our founding story, I think, is like very different than many defense tech companies.
36:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I started my career in the Air Force in two thousand. 2012. I was a satellite operations officer.
36:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I was
36:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's called a 13 Sierra. So
36:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
36:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just happened to put the uniform on at a moment when the defense, or excuse me, when the space domain was becoming a war-fighting domain. So I, my first assignment was a fourth space operations squadron. So I show up, I go spend six months at Vandenberg, what is now Vandenberg Space Force Base, then Vandenberg Air Force Base. This is like before the
36:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Space Force existed. And the space community was like the redheaded stepchild of the Air Force. It was kind of like, oh, those space nerds, those kind of like all wannabe astronauts. We weren't really a meaningful player in combat operations. And I can tell a couple of like interesting stories around that if you're interested. Um we were there to
37:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): provide a service. And that means like, just keep the GPS satellites flying, keep the satellite communication satellites flying, but you don't have anything to contribute. This is kind of like paraphrasing, I think, how how fighter pilots and bombers would think about space space professionals. Like you don't really have anything to contribute directly to my
37:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ability to get ammunition a munition off of the wing of my aircraft and to its target. And and like for the most part, that that was true because space was an unc it was not a contested domain. So it early on in my career, though, there's the sands really started to shift. And it was driven by by some
37:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): foundational weapons tests by the People's Republic of China. So kind of over the decade of my career, I saw China advance and I saw two big shortfalls. The first was in United States doctrine and tactics. So doctrine is the body of knowledge that
38:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): military services assemble to try to understand conflict and to organize the way that we fight and think through operational and tactical problems. There was no war-fighting doctrine for space, there was no philosophy for how we would organize force. forces on the battlefield. What effects do you want to achieve? Um, not
38:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): until like middle of my career when some colleagues and I and others really started thinking about these things after after we saw China do these weapons tests.
38:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
38:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the second piece was
38:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
38:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the lack of defense industrial base investment. So
38:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
38:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): defense industrial base, you
38:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
38:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think before modern defense tech play. players, like largely have been contract manufacturers and contract engineering shops. They will do whatever the requirements require. And their RD budgets are also cost plus like RD budgets. They're they're really there to kind of not fund ultra advanced tech. They're really there to uh to
39:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to, I think, like, in my view, advance the the junior the careers of like junior engineers. that need to work on some some like the it's basically to like to keep to keep the labor force engaged, right? I think is is by 90% of RMD in in big defense tech in the early 2000s and into the teens.
39:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
39:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): defense industrial base isn't making the investments. The United States didn't have a service focused on space superiority, Priority wasn't developing the doctrine and tactics. And so everybody, all the stakeholders are kind of pointing at each other, going like, what do we do about this threat that's coming out of China? And this was the theme through my career. So as I went from my first assignment, space operations, flying satellites that
39:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were designed. I mean, quite literally the requirements were written in in the Cold War. And then we figured out how to repurpose those Cold War capabilities for the modern battlefield. Field. Um, nobody was a record requ what writing kind of new requirements for space warfare. And as I went through my career from that side, satellite the satellite operations to then threat replication, uh, and then eventually flight test,
40:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh, and then eventually joint when I was a joint task force space defense as a fires officer, I just saw like capability versus threat continue to diverge. And I like to say like I was the only one with the romanticism, the stupidity, and the hubris, like that perfect combination that's required to be, I think, to be a founder to. uh to
40:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like get out of the military and start the company. So I started True Anomaly 12 days after I left uniform. I mean, I left the military to start this business and didn't know anything about VC, didn't know anything about operating a company or or really like frankly building a product. And I've just learned along the way through uh by like
40:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contending with reality and having good mentors and a good team.
40:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How did you convince the first couple of people to join you?
40:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It really started with relationships between
40:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a couple of my co-founders and uh, you know, in particular, like on the engineering side, one of my co-founders, Kyle Zakchesky, who was a ball aerospace, he grabbed a couple of folks from ball airspace and said, Hey, do you guys want to work on space defense? And and um it just seemed like the kind of the right time. And then that snowballs, right? So
41:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you have you have the capital, you have good investors, good backers, you have a good idea. And then you hire just that that the that first person and that second person. And then you go to that person, you say, Hey, give me a list of your the five most important and credible and interesting people that you've worked with that you think would want to work on this problem. And then we try
41:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to hire as many of them as we possibly can and that kind of just like play the network effect for a long time until you finally have the the brand that kind of has a gravitational tool of its own, which I I think is what we've been able to achieve for the last probably six months.
41:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One of the things I've noticed in the founders of these very ambitious projects is almost they didn't necessarily expect that the likely outcome was going to be success. They just wanted to move
42:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
42:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): battle down the field, move the football down the field.
42:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
42:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what extent was that true? Did you expect True Anomaly to be successful, or did you just find the need to bring space tech to the next inning?
42:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I actually didn't really have an expectation for success or failure. I it what it felt to me, and it and still feels to this day, is this is just a thing that has to be done. Like there has to be a company that fill ad that creates advanced defense technologies for space superiority. And
42:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and
42:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): while sort of like there are incremental opportunities for success and f and failure that are that are really obviously really important, the
42:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the broader mission just has always felt to me like it it must.
42:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um it must be achieved. It's the same, I think it's a mentality maybe that I developed when I was in uniform, um, that like you just you execute the mission and and it's gonna come with a couple of uh
43:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
43:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know left hooks and and uppercuts. But like you do your best, you execute the mission when you fall on your face. you debrief that, which is a really important part of our culture at True Anomaly, is when you fall short, extract the lesson learned, and then
43:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): articulate that lesson to others so that they can learn. And then you I think we've done a we've done a great job of like creating a being learning culture at of True Anomaly. Uh and I think like that that fundamental capacity has been why we we've been able to continue to drive towards the mission to date. So I never almost
43:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I almost never thought about like acute success or failure as such. I always have thought about like like
43:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
43:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm gonna do everything I possibly can to make sure that the mission of the company is successful
44:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over over time. right? Over the arc of our execution, uh, by ensuring like every day we kind of like have these wins. But I it never felt to me like failure was an option for us.
44:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
44:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think I know a single CEO in the world that doesn't want to have a learning culture. What's upstream of that? What are some first principles for Or building a culture that inherently learns and it and evolves?
44:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So we've created a language around learning. We've created cultural expectations and performance expectations around adaptation and learning that uh that I think like are all upstream of of that of that outcome. Um I'll just give you a couple of examples. Like the number one and most important skill at True Anomaly is problem
44:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): solving. Learning is about problem solving, right? And we problem solve from really two perspectives. The first is from the battlefield. So we don't build anything that doesn't have an operational impact, that has an operational effect. And the second is from physics. And that reasoning from physics doesn't just apply to engineering. It actually
45:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): applies to all of our business operations. If somebody is waiting on approval for something, it's
45:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
45:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there, there's nothing in physics that would prevent that approval. from happening or the discussion from happening around like whether a decision should be made. And so, like, how do you compress the timelines as much as possible and and like get down to the get down to the bits and the atoms as much as possible from a decision-making standpoint, even if it's just NHR? Um, another example is our
45:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rubric for failure. So we
45:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
45:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have a we have a very high risk tolerance of true knowledge, element, particularly early on in prototype development.
45:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as long as three criteria are met for failure. One is you have to have given whatever you're doing a hundred percent. So that's kind of like the no yellow rule. Like you can't you can't sort of just like throw stuff at a wall a wall later in the program development. I mean, you definitely can't early on when the when the like the costs are relatively low.
45:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
45:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we learn by doing it. The second is you have to generate like meaningful data. So don't fail in a data sparse way. And that data is really important because when you go analyze the data and like extract and ask five whys for a failure, like that's that's what you're relying on to point you towards the truth. And then um finally is you can't make the same mistake
46:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twice. And so this is this is like something these rubric are like enforced broadly throughout the business. And and uh you know obviously that like that starts at the top. But I think getting those right and getting the cultural foundations right and then holding the team accountable is what generates that culture of risk-taking and of learning.
46:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
46:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): makes me really think about the two greatest organizations of the last couple of decades. One is Google early on. This is a underappreciated philosophy that Google had early on. The two co-founders, Sergey and Larry Page, they used to say that the success of a project is based on whether it makes the entire organization learn something. If they learn something valuable from the project, even if they've
46:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spent a billion dollars on it, they saw that as success. And then Facebook has a similar philosophy. They don't articulate it that way. But if you look at all these projects that Mark Zuckerberg runs, and many of them have been spectacular failures like virtual reality. But the learning of the organization, not just on
47:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
47:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exact projects and the exact know-how, but actually how to build and start projects within very established companies. That itself is not a simple task. That's why we have the innovators' dilemma where
47:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
47:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new generation of companies typically disrupt the old generation of companies. This has been one of the tacit reasons why Muse is now successful. They've they've learned the skill of how to build high failure rates. rate into an organization, make it be as innovative as humanly possible. So you see this across some of the best organizations over the last 20 years.
47:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So like in hardware development, this is easy, easier in in software, not not trivialized in software, but like in hardware, what it means, what you if you're if your goal is like learning velocity, then you actually have to have that's the mandate for vertical integration, like bringing fabrication and development in house. So it's not just I think I think a lot of times there's a little bit of a dogma around vertical integration in
48:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): aerospace and defense. And I think that is because that's like there are some core unexamined beliefs or like people spend like their information diet maybe exclusively comes from X or something like that. They're like, Well, everybody's vertically integrating. That means I have to vertically integrate. Like it's
48:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): always
48:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the the reverse dogma. So the dogma for many years is you have suppliers, and of course everyone uses suppliers, so you must use suppliers. And now it's like, of course, you must vertically it integrate every single function.
48:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. So these are end up being like religious, like quite religious conversations. And and so I think so. If you solve the problem from first principles and your desire is like organizational velocity, right? Organizational velocity comes from rapid cycles. of learning, both an input and an output. And in order to do that with hardware, you have to have the
48:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): capacity to control your own destiny. You have to get through prototypes quickly. And you the way that you get through prototypes quickly is either having very, very, very good suppliers or having your own like fabrication capacity in-house. in house. And I think as companies, the companies that really want to learn and innovate, you end up biasing towards vertical integration
49:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for this reason. Now, you can't do that necessarily.
49:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
49:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): depending on the capital intensive nature of
49:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): your
49:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business and like a risk profile, like risk acceptance of your investors and like capital capacity of your investors. Like
49:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
49:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can maybe do it right out.
49:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
49:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think one of the things that we had to do though, particularly because of one of the key pillars of our product, and I'll get back to that here in a second, is we we really
49:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like relied on suppliers for a long time. And and we felt the pain of not having the fabrication capacity and and the product development capacity in-house.
49:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Part
49:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the reason we did that is because
49:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what we're actually focused on was this interaction between software and hardware and like the point of convergence is in vehicle avionics. So like this the spacecraft's computer systems.
50:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our thesis was like performance in the battlefield is about individual system behaviors and the culmination and combination of multiple system behaviors and systems of systems. And so like
50:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
50:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you architect your systems right, you end up with like emergent. properties, one plus one equals three. So we were focused on how do you fly the system so that you have like a really effective and really efficient OODA loop. And that lent kind of lends itself towards
50:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
50:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spending most of your time on ground software, command and control, human and machine interface, flight software, autonomy, and then the avionics that allow for those for for flight software to like actuate the hardware. And so we could get away for a long with a long time for a long time with like buying commercial off-the-shelf systems and focusing on software and
50:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): avionics. Um now we're at a point where there is we are reaching the limits of our supply chain's ability to respond uh to our needs from a performance standpoint, from a cost standpoint, and from a schedule standpoint. And so it used to be just sort of like cost. And we could stomach that
51:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because we have the capital backing we do. And the lesson learned was really in like this integration between Cloud and software. Now we're at the point where everything is dependent on on driving vehicle performance and accelerating cycles of learning. And the supply chain like frankly in many ways doesn't support that. We do have phenomenal suppliers to be clear in And like every defense tech
51:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): company at scale is is gonna is not going to be 100% vertically in
51:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. Um You
51:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mentioned this term OODA loop. I believe it's an Air Force term. Tell me about Oodaloop and how does that translate into success in your business?
51:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
51:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oodaloop was a is a is a concept that was pioneered by a fighter pilot named John Boyd. And John Boyd is famous not just for the Oodaloop, Ouda loop, but also for the kind of science and tactics of air war. warfare. So if you've a lot everybody c almost everybody knows about John Boyd through the lens
52:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
52:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oud the Oodaloop. But um his philosophy is is a lot more interesting and a lot deeper than that. But we'll we'll stay on the Oda Loop. So the Oda Loop stands for UDA stands for observe, orient, decide, act. And
52:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the it really is a is a mental model for decision making and for learning. So observation covers like what you can see in your environment. I'm gonna come back to orientation in a second. Decision making is like what you do about those observations. And action is, or or rather, what how
52:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what you choose between the range of options and then action is like what you what you end up doing in time and space. What is
52:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most people focus on kind of like oodaloop, the oodaloop as a system, and equally weight
52:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
52:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): O, the O, the D, and the A. But what John Boyd's writings really point to is actually like a heavy emphasis on orientation. So this is orientation is like what you do with the data that you have available to you.
53:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
53:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do you weight? Do I care about this thing or do I care about
53:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this?
53:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that thing? If I have imperfect information, do I, how do I make good assumptions to fill in the gaps in the information that I have at my disposal? And the relationship between this and fighter tactics, which he, which he pioneered, is called 40 second boyd. He had the ability to kind of start from any 1v1 One merge between two aircraft and get
53:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on your six and beat you within 40 seconds. Um
53:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
53:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the reason he did that is because he understood how to rapidly orient himself to the relative energy problems between two aircraft. So the geometry, the airspeed, et cetera. And he noticed that like that he had what he what he actually tried to do throughout his career is like decompose his instinct into a
53:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): science, which I think, which I think is like extraordinary. And so he came up with a framework for effectively orienting oneself to like complexity. And there is almost nothing more complex in human experience than like the bat the, frankly, the battlefield. Um so so we've taken that I I studied this when I was
54:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when I was in the Air Force and many of my colleagues did as well. We've taken that as a mandate for product development, which is what drives operator and mission success and vehicle success and system of system success is like, how do you appropriately weight the information that you have at your disposal? And the science of tactics is really
54:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if I have
54:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): geometric conditions, how do I accurately orient, how do I accurately make sense of the geometric conditions of two spacecraft, for example, example? in relation to each other?
54:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
54:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we just proved this out in from a product standpoint at True Anomaly was in the Victus Hayes mission.
54:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
54:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this summer we did a we did a kind of a
55:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
55:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1v1 operational demonstration of uncooperative RPO and space-to-space engagements. And it was us versus Rocket Lab. And
55:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we demonstrated that you can take a system with less kinematic performance, and the way that you orient engagement conditions of those two spacecraft and then make decisions about what to do about it ends up resulting in mission success
55:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nine times out of ten.
55:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): 10.
55:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um
55:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
55:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so, like what's special about True Anomaly nominee spacecraft and software and avionics is we are optimizing for
55:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): certain metrics of mission success that are like
55:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were I think that probably best in the world out at outside of the Space Force. Um so I think it's a good news story
55:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from
55:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like the integration of hardware and software standpoint.
55:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We start this conversation about the sobering reality, what happens to United States
56:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from
56:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a defense standpoint, in many, in many ways, this existential question of what happens to United States on every level, even politically, even as a sovereign country, if the US does not progress in space tech.
56:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
56:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there a more optimistic way to think about the future of space technology?
56:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes. The optimistic way of thinking about space technology is like
56:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is frankly American capitalism. The capacity to innovate rapidly, the core industrial capacity and drive to win, uh, and the mechanisms that make that possible are what are going to enable the United States to regain space superiority from
56:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): China. The the force of entrepreneurship and the force, I think. of like industrial might in the United States is second to none. We've we're at risk of ceding that. But I think the good news story is that the problem, there are really, really smart people that are trying to solve this problem inside of government, inside of uh inside of industry,
57:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and it has everybody's attention. tension.
57:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
57:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, that we saw something similar in World War II.
57:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
57:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): United States didn't have really like a robust. standing military in the in the twenties and thirties. Um most of our forces were conscripted in in World War One. Um and and like we just we had a we had a antipathy against against standing militaries until until like the experience of World War II and then and then eventually the Cold War.
57:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And what made the United States capable of really fighting the fight and like posing
57:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
57:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): meaningful uh counter to
57:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
57:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Germans, to the Nazis and the Japanese, was just the ability to ramp super quickly. Uh, and that came from
57:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): latent industrial capacity repurposed, but then the explosion of that industrial capacity,
58:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
58:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the hiring of s of unskilled labor. and the skilling of that labor, and then the the allocation of and and the ability to capture capital to go solve these problems. So the United States has the has an unprecedented ability to marshal the resources of this country to go solve these problems,
58:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): assuming the sort of like mandate and incentives are there. The problem with, of course, like to your point, you were making a comment about.
58:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like
58:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
58:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the advantages that that the PRC has is the ability to lay out these like really long-term goals and and like drive execution against those goals.
58:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Democracies do not have that ability, obviously. Like they're subject to the vagaries and like lens of of of the public. And but democracies are very good at responding to a crisis. Not necessarily. preventing the crisis from existing, but like very, very good at at uh responding to the crisis. And I absolutely still have hope. Otherwise, we would be doing this.
58:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You started True Anomaly four and a half years ago. You built it into this multi-billion dollar defense company. If you could go back
59:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): four and a half years ago and you could give yourself one timeless piece of advice that you could bring into the founding of the company, what would that be?
59:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
59:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): advice. to myself would be spend all of your time on talent. Be specific about cultural expectations. Be specific about talent expectations.
59:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
59:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
59:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): score will take care of itself, which is that's not my formulation. Early on in the company, we just
59:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
59:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you come out of the military, you you under I had this conversation with JT for. from Excel. We did a podcast on on this. When you come out of the military, you lose your agency, or when you spend time in the military, rather, you lose your agency around talent. You you tend to um this is not true across the entire military.
59:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's true, it's true certainly in some parts. Your bar isn't where it needs to be when you're building a company. And you accept behaviors and you accept
1:00:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh uh performance that that you otherwise wouldn't if you just approached it objectively. But when you're in the military, the habit, the intellectual habit we develop is like,
1:00:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
1:00:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gonna go to war with what I've
1:00:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): got.
1:00:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I am gonna do my best with what I have, with the resources that I have. I know I don't have the best equipment. I may not have the best team around me, but like through sheer willpower. and leadership, like I am going to extract as much as we possibly can out of the people around me, regardless of like what their like underlying capabilities are.
1:00:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:00:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think when you go to a startup, it's
1:00:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
1:00:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you start a company, that's a really great approach because I think it can
1:00:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inspire people to do things that are kind of like outside of their typical. their uh norms. But
1:00:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sometimes like you just have to have the best team to win. And when you're in the military, you don't have the make the mechanisms, you don't have the uh you don't have like the the know-how to necessarily navigate uh navigate those issues. And so I've had to learn those over the last
1:01:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three years. So I think like the short version is spend more time on talent.
1:01:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
1:01:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Evan, this has been absolute masterclass. Thanks so much for jumping on.
1:01:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thanks, David.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

More from How I Invest with David Weisburd

How I Invest with David Weisburd

E456: Baylor Endowment on Rethinking Venture Capital, Concentrated Portfolios, and the Power of Compounding

Episode discussion: Baylor Endowment on VC Skepticism, Concentration, and Compounding

Speakers’ claims: Renee Hanna and guest discuss Baylor University's endowment strategy, emphasizing a concentrated portfolio of approximately 20 GP relationships to manage operational load and deepen partnerships. They reject early-stage venture due to inflated seed valuations, preferring expansion capital and later-stage investments that offer clearer liquidity paths and 3x-5x returns over 3-5 years. The team enforces a 15% net IRR hurdle for private investments and actively manages liquidity by selling underperforming assets early. They also highlight the role of behavioral biases and geographic location in maintaining disciplined, contrarian investment decisions.

Venture CapitalEndowment ManagementPrivate Equity
1h 3m3 assets25 claims to verify
How I Invest with David Weisburd

E455: Hunter Walk on Why Venture is Getting Harder, Picking Great Founders, and Investing Against Consensus

Episode discussion: Hunter Walk explains why Homebrew switched to self-capital to avoid fund-size incentives and how AI crowds the market.

Speakers’ claims: Hunter Walk describes Homebrew's shift from institutional LPs to self-capital in 2022 to maintain alignment and avoid the deployment pressures of large funds. He argues that as venture funds grow, GPs are incentivized to chase hot names and deploy capital volume over ownership quality, forcing founders to raise excessive capital. Walk contrasts 'pre-consensus' investing with consensus-driven punditry, noting that AI-driven crowding requires identifying opportunities before market maps form. He also discusses Screendoor, a vehicle backing emerging managers, and warns against 'dub tape' decay in multi-generational venture firms.

Venture CapitalFund ManagementStartup Investing
1h 17m0 assets26 claims to verify
All insights