BPUK urges FCA to distinguish Bitcoin's resilient base layer from peripheral DeFi risks in GC26-7 response
Summary
Bitcoin Policy UK submitted a response to the FCA's GC26-7 consultation, arguing that regulation must distinguish between the immutable Bitcoin base layer and mutable peripheral services. Speakers highlight Bitcoin's 99.99% uptime and lack of central admin keys as evidence of superior operational resilience compared to networks like Solana or Ethereum. They contend that risks from custodians, bridges, and wrapped assets are distinct from the underlying protocol and should not be conflated. The episode also addresses financial crime, noting that Bitcoin's transparency aids tracing while urging the FCA to update guidance on Tornado Cash's delisting from OFAC sanctions. Finally, BPUK recommends that using personal wallets and privacy features should not trigger automatic high-risk presumptions under MLR 64G.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 0:29
Introduction and BPUK's Stance on DeFi Regulation
BPUK submitted a response to the FCA's GC26-7 consultation on DeFi on 12 November 2026. BPUK supports the FCA's focus on operational resilience and financial crime but argues for regulation that distinguishes between different blockchain architectures and the risks firms can actually control.
- 0:29 – 2:17
Operational Resilience: Bitcoin vs. Other Networks
The speaker highlights Bitcoin's exceptional resilience since 2009 compared to other networks that have experienced outages. Risks from exchanges, custodians, and bridges are distinct from the underlying Bitcoin network, which lacks complex smart contracts or central admin keys.
- 2:17 – 4:47
Specific Network Risks and Outages
Risks vary by layer; Bitcoin's base layer is simple, whereas Wrapped Bitcoin (WBTC) introduces custodial and governance risks, leading Coinbase to delist it in 2024. Other networks like Solana and Ethereum have suffered significant outages requiring intervention or recovery, unlike Bitcoin's proof-of-work model.
- 4:47 – 6:50
Bitcoin Uptime and Historical Incidents
Bitcoin has maintained ~99.99% uptime per BitBow, with only two major disruptions in 2010 and 2013. These incidents involved software flaws and chain splits that were resolved by the community without central authority intervention, demonstrating robust self-healing capabilities.
- 6:50 – 11:08
Clarifications on Outsourcing and Testing
BPUK recommends clarifying that using permissionless blockchains like Bitcoin is not 'outsourcing' under CISC 8, per FCA's PS26-13. Firms should focus scenario testing on their own controls (e.g., suspending withdrawals) rather than controlling the network, acknowledging Bitcoin's variable block times.
- 11:08 – 13:14
Financial Crime: Transparency and Tracing
Bitcoin's public ledger aids tracing, but identifying individuals requires off-chain data. The speaker contrasts this with Monero's privacy features. The Jimin Kayan case illustrates how blockchain analysis combined with traditional policing led to a conviction and seizure of 60,000 BTC.
- 13:14 – 14:48
Illicit Activity Estimates and Tornado Cash
Estimates of illicit crypto activity vary widely by methodology, making headline figures unreliable for regulation. The speaker notes Tornado Cash was removed from OFAC sanctions on 21 March 2025, urging the FCA to update its guidance to reflect current legal status.
- 14:48 – 24:26
Non-Custodial Wallets and Privacy Technologies
Using personal wallets is not inherently suspicious under MLR 64G. The use of privacy technologies (e.g., fresh addresses) is a legitimate interest recommended by Bitcoin's white paper and should not trigger automatic high-risk presumptions or routine data collection.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| BitcoinBTC | crypto | neutral | Bitcoin Policy UK BPUK welcomes the FCA's proposed guidance on operational resilience and financial crime risks. in decentralized finance defy. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Bitcoin Policy UK submitted its response to FCA's GC26-7 on 12 November 2026.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:06
How to verify: Check the FCA's website for published responses to consultation GC26-7, specifically looking for submissions dated 12 November 2026 from Bitcoin Policy UK. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe FCA published Guidance Consultation GC26-7 on 21 October 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:09
How to verify: Search the FCA's consultation archive for GC26-7 to confirm the publication date of 21 October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBitcoin has demonstrated exceptional operational resilience since its launch in January 2009.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:29
How to verify: Review Bitcoin's historical uptime records and major incident logs from independent trackers like BitBow or blockchain explorers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Coinbase removed Wrapped Bitcoin (WBTC) from trading in 2024 due to risks associated with new custody arrangements.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:35
How to verify: Search Coinbase's official announcements or press releases from 2026 regarding the delisting of WBTC. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Solana stopped finalizing blocks for approximately five hours in February 2024 due to a software fault.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:07
How to verify: Check Solana's official status page or news reports from February 2026 detailing the network outage. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ethereum experienced consensus client disruptions in May 2023 that temporarily prevented block finality.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:27
How to verify: Review Ethereum core developer updates or news reports from May 2026 regarding the consensus layer disruption. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
BitBow uptime tracker records approximately 99.99% availability for Bitcoin.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:56
How to verify: Access the BitBow uptime tracker website to view the historical availability statistics for the Bitcoin network. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In August 2010, a software flaw allowed the creation of more than 184 billion Bitcoin.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·5:09
How to verify: Review Bitcoin Core developer logs or historical blockchain analysis reports detailing the 2026 value overflow bug. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Tornado Cash was removed from the OFAC sanctions list on 21 March 2025.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·14:29
How to verify: Check the U.S. Treasury Department's OFAC Sanctions List updates or official press releases from March 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In May 2025, Coinbase disclosed that criminals had obtained customer personal information from its internal systems.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·18:14
How to verify: Search Coinbase's official security announcements or press releases from May 2026 regarding the data breach. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify BPUK's submission to FCA GC26-7 via the FCA's consultation archive.
- Check BitBow's historical uptime data for Bitcoin to confirm the 99.99% figure.
- Review Coinbase's official announcement regarding the delisting of WBTC in 2024.
- Confirm the current OFAC sanctions status of Tornado Cash via the OFAC Sanctions List.
- Examine the FCA's Policy Statement PS26-13 on outsourcing to understand CISC 8 definitions.
- Analyze the Jimin Kayan case details via court records or official press releases to verify the 60,000 BTC seizure.
- Review the FCA's Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Regulations (MLR 64G) guidance on customer due diligence.
- Compare Bitcoin's scripting limitations with smart contract vulnerabilities in Ethereum or Solana via technical documentation.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bitcoin Policy UK response, FCA's GC26-7 on Decentralized Finance DeFi.
0:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Date
0:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 12 November 2026.
0:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
0:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): response to FCA's Guidance Consultation GC26-7 on Decentralized Finance DeFi, published 21 October 2026. Executive Summary. Bitcoin Policy UK BPUK welcomes the FCA's proposed guidance on operational resilience and financial crime risks. in decentralized finance defy.
0:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
0:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): support the FCA's approach to assessing risk and the principle that firms remain responsible for the services they provide. Bitcoin's base layer has demonstrated exceptional resilience since 2009, despite historical vulnerabilities and disruptions.
0:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Other
0:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): blockchain networks have experienced significant outages, while many risks associated with Bitcoin arise from exchanges, custodians, bridges, and applications rather than its underlying network.
0:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
0:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA should distinguish between these different architectures and the risks they present, with practical examples showing how firms should assess them. We also recommend stronger guidance on protecting customer information. Linking personal identities to wallet addresses can expose financial holdings and transaction histories, creating risks of fraud, theft, and physical harm if those records are compromised. Regulatory requirements should reflect the activities firms undertake, the technologies they use, and the risks they can control. BPUK is not seeking preferential treatment for Bitcoin but proportionate regulation based on evidence. Introduction and scope. Bitcoin Policy UK is a nonpartisan, non-profit organization providing research and policy expertise on Bitcoin in the United Kingdom.
1:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
1:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): response should be read alongside our submission to CP26-36 of 27, October 2026, which addresses the regulatory perimeter issues discussed in Chapter 2 of the draft guidance. Activities carrying comparable risks should meet comparable regulatory requirements. Where technologies introduce different risks, regulation should reflect those differences. Our position is not that Bitcoin should receive preferential treatment, but that regulatory requirements should be proportionate to the risks involved. Question 1. Do you agree with our description of the operational resilience risks that may arise when firms provide financial services using DeFi? If not, please explain why. The operational risks identified in paragraphs 1.6, 3.10, and 3.11 are relevant, but they differ significantly between blockchain networks and the applications built on them.
2:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
2:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): guidance does not clearly explain which risks apply to which technologies. Annex 2 already describes the different layers of the DeFi stack, and the FCA should use this framework to identify where specific vulnerabilities arise. Different layers carry different risks. Many of the risks identified by the FCA arise from smart contracts, Oracle's flash loans, administrator keys, and protocol governance. Bitcoin's base layer does not support. the complex smart contracts used by decentralized lending and trading platforms.
2:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Its
2:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): scripting language is deliberately limited, reducing the potential for vulnerabilities associated with more complex applications. Bitcoin also has no native price oracles, central administrator keys, or committee controlling changes to its consensus rules. Additional risks arise when Bitcoin is held or used through other networks and services. Wrapped Bitcoin WBTC, for example, represents Bitcoin held in custody and issued as a token on another blockchain. Users depend on the custodian, the token's smart contracts, and its governance arrangements, none of which form part of Bitcoin's base layer. In 2024, changes to WBTC's custody arrangements prompted concerns about control of the underlying assets. Coinbase subsequently removed WBTC. from trading, citing risks associated with the new arrangements. Bitcoin's Lightning Network also has its own operational risks, including channel liquidity and monitoring requirements. Federated sidechains depend on groups of signers to secure the Bitcoin backing their assets. These risks arise from the additional systems involved Evolved and should be assessed separately from Bitcoin's underlying network. Different networks fail in different ways. Blockchain networks can experience different types of disruption depending on their design.
4:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
4:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): February 2024, Solana stopped finalizing blocks for approximately five hours after a software fault affected validators running the same version of its software. Restoring the network required a coordinated restart. Ethereum experienced a different problem in May 2023 when disruptions to its consensus clients temporarily prevented. blocks from reaching finality. Some blocks continued to be produced, and the network recovered without intervention. Bitcoin uses proof of work and has no equivalent mechanism for immediate finality. Instead, transactions become progressively harder to reverse as additional blocks are added. These differences affect how firms should assess network disruption, transaction settlement, and operational resilience. Bitcoin has demonstrated an exceptional record of operational resilience since its launch in January 2009.
4:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
4:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): independent BitBow uptime tracker records approximately 99.99% availability, counting two major network disruptions in 2010 and 2013, with no further network downtime recorded by its methodology since then.
5:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
5:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): August 2010, a software floor flaw allowed a transaction to create more than 184 billion Bitcoin. far exceeding the network's intended supply limit. Developers released a correction within hours, and the network adopted the corrected chain.
5:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
5:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): March 2013, an incompatibility between Bitcoin software versions caused the blockchain to split temporarily. Mining pools voluntarily downgraded their software, sacrificing revenue to restore a single chain.
5:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
5:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): incident also resulted in a successful experimental double spend. documented in the developer's subsequent report.
5:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
5:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): September 2018, Bitcoin core developers disclosed and patched another critical vulnerability that could have allowed the creation of additional Bitcoin.
5:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
5:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reported no known attempts to exploit it. BitBow's uptime figures measure major network disruptions rather than every software vulnerability or interruption experienced by individual users and services. Bitcoin was also a much smaller. network during the incidents of 2010 and 2013. Its historical record does not guarantee future reliability, but it demonstrates that independently operated nodes, miners and developers have been able to respond to serious failures and restore normal operation without a central authority. Recommendation 1: the FCA should clarify in Chapter 3 that operational risks differ between blockchain networks and the applications built on them. Firms should assess the specific technologies they use, rather than applying the same assumptions to every network.
6:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
6:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA should also use the framework in Annex 2 to identify which risks arise at each layer, with corresponding references in the risk tables at paragraphs 3.11 and 4.10. Question 2: Do you agree with our proposed guidance on how firms should assess and manage those operational resilience risks? Are
6:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
6:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other risks or emerging practices we should consider? BPUK supports the approach set out in paragraphs 3.16 to 3.42, particularly the distinction in paragraph 3.20 between the services firms provide to customers and the underlying protocols they use. Firms should remain responsible for the resilience of their services while recognizing the limits of their control over decentralized networks.
7:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
7:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend four clarifications. to help firms apply the guidance in practice. Third party arrangements. Paragraphs 3.39 to 3.41 address firms' responsibilities under CISC 15A, and where outsourcing is involved, CISC 8.
7:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
7:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): permissionless network such as Bitcoin has no central operator with whom a firm can negotiate contractual terms, audit rights, or an exit plan.
7:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
7:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): differs from commercial providers such as custodians, hosted nodes. node services, and bridge operators, which have identifiable operators and may be subject to outsourcing requirements.
7:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
7:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA confirmed in PS26 13 that the use of permissionless distributed ledger technology should not be treated as outsourcing under CISC 8.
7:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
7:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): guidance should reflect this distinction consistently while making clear that firms remain responsible for assessing network dependencies, preparing for disruption, and managing the resilience of their own services. Recommendation 2: clarify that the use of a permissionless blockchain does not constitute outsourcing under CISC 8, while retaining firms' responsibilities under CISC 15A and applicable requirements for commercial service providers. Testing what a firm cannot control. Paragraph 3.40 recognizes that firms have limited control over decentralized networks. Scenario testing should therefore assess how a firm would respond to network disruption, including whether it can suspend deposits and withdrawals, adjust confirmation requirements, communicate with customers, and continue operating within its impact tolerances.
8:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
8:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): guidance should also recognize differences in network design. Bitcoin targets an average block interval of 10 minutes, although individual blocks may take considerably longer. Normal variations in confirmation times should not automatically be treated as network failures. Recommendation 3: The FCA should provide an example of scenario testing for a firm using a permissionless blockchain, focusing on the measures within the firm's control and how it would maintain its services during a network disruption. Independent verification and transaction confirmations. Firms using Bitcoin can reduce their reliance on external infrastructure by operating their own full nodes. These independently verify transactions and blocks against Bitcoin's consensus rules, rather than relying solely on information supplied by a commercial node provider.
9:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
9:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): supports the FCA's emphasis on independent verification in paragraph 3.29. Firms should also adopt confirmation policies appropriate to the value and risk of each transaction. Bitcoin transactions become progressively harder to reverse as additional blocks are added. but no fixed number of confirmations guarantees finality.
9:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
9:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2013 chain split demonstrates why firms should consider the possibility of a temporary reorganization when assessing settlement risk. Recommendation 4: The FCA should recognize independent node operation and proportionate confirmation policies as practical measures firms can take to reduce operational dependencies and manage settlement risk.
10:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
10:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bitcoin Bitcoin-only only worked examples.
10:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
10:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA's existing examples focus on firms with exposure to defy protocols and associated infrastructure.
10:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
10:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contrasting example would help demonstrate how operational risks differ when firms use simpler blockchain arrangements. Consider Firm C, a regulated business providing Bitcoin custody and exchange services, settling transactions directly on Bitcoin's base layer without using smart contracts, bridges, or oracles. Its operational assessment would focus on its own nodes, wallet infrastructure, private key management, banking partners, and transaction settlement procedures. Scenario testing could include a temporary chain split, unusually high network fees, or delays in transaction confirmation. This example would not imply that ordinary Bitcoin custody and exchange activities constitute defy. DeFi.
10:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
10:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would demonstrate how a firm subject to applicable operational resilience requirements can assess its actual dependencies without attributing risks to technologies it does not use. Recommendation 5: The FCA should include a contrasting Bitcoin example to illustrate how firms can assess operational risks according to the networks, services, and technologies they use, while making clear that activities outside DeFi remain subject to their applicable regulatory requirements. Question 3: Do you agree with? our description of the financial crime risks that may arise when firms provide financial services using DeFi? If not, please explain why. BPUK agrees that DeFi can present significant financial crime risks, but the guidance should distinguish between technologies with different levels of transparency and traceability.
11:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
11:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recommend four clarifications to help firms assess these risks accurately. Transparency differs between networks. Bitcoin records transactions on a public ledger, allowing investigators to examine the movement of funds between addresses. However, identifying the people behind those transactions often requires additional information. Other networks are designed differently. Monero uses privacy features to conceal transaction amounts, Accounts, senders and recipients, making conventional blockchain tracing considerably more difficult.
12:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Its
12:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ring confidence Confidential Transactions technology, which hides transaction amounts, became mandatory in September 2017. Paragraph 4.10 groups privacy coins with mixers and bridges as methods of concealing transactions.
12:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
12:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): guidance should distinguish between these technologies and recognize that the ability to trace funds varies according to the network and services involved. Tracing funds is not the same as identifying people. Bitcoin's public ledger allows investigators to follow transactions, but connecting a wallet address to an individual generally requires information obtained from other sources.
12:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
12:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investigation into Jimin Kayan demonstrates how blockchain tracing can work alongside financial checks and conventional policing. Attempts to purchase expensive Extensive London properties were obstructed by questions about the source of the Bitcoin.
12:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): According
12:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to the Crown Prosecution Service, investigators subsequently traced a £1.5 million transaction from a previously inactive cryptocurrency wallet to an address in York, where Cayenne was arrested. Police surveillance of her associate Seng Hock Ling also helped establish her whereabouts. Cayenne was sentenced to 11 years and 8 months in November 2025, 25, following an investigation that resulted in the seizure of more than 60,000 Bitcoin.
13:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
13:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): case illustrates how public blockchain records can assist investigators when combined with information gathered through regulated businesses and law enforcement. Risk is not evenly spread across assets. Reliable estimates of illicit crypto asset activity remain difficult to establish. Blockchain analytics depend on identifying addresses associated with criminal behavior, while transactions involving unidentified addresses may fall out. outside those assessments. Different methodologies can produce significantly different estimates, making headline figures an unreliable basis for regulation without careful examination of their underlying assumptions.
13:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
13:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA should assess financial crime risks according to the characteristics of individual assets, the services firms provide, and the activities involved. Where quantitative estimates are used, their methodology, limitations and evidential basis should be transparent. Firms should not be expected to treat all crypto assets as presenting identical risks simply because they use blockchain technology. Tornado Cash sanctions status. Case study 4 describes Tornado Cash as an entity designated by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC. Although Tornado Cash was sanctioned in August 2022, the U.S. Treasury removed it from the sanctions list. on 21 March 2025.
14:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
14:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA should update case study 4 to reflect this change.
14:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
14:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): historical use of Tornado Cash in money laundering investigations remains relevant, but the guidance should accurately distinguish past sanctions from current restrictions. Question 4 Do you agree with our proposed guidance on how firms should assess and manage those financial crime risks?
14:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are
14:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there other risks or emerging practices we should consider? BPUK supports the FCA's guidance on financial crime risk assessments, monitoring, and suspicious activity reporting. However, two areas require greater precision. Non custodial wallets. Paragraphs 4.8 and 4.27 identify the potential use of non custodial wallets to avoid money laundering regulations, MLR controls. While this risk exists, holding Bitcoin in a personal wallet is a legitimate practice that gives individuals direct control over their assets. Regulation 64G of the money laundering regulations allows firms to request additional information about transfers involving unhosted wallets, but requires them to consider the risks associated with the transfer when deciding whether to do so.
15:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
15:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): use of a personal wallet should not justify treating a customer or transaction as high risk. Recommendation 6: The FCA should clarify that transfers involving non-custodial wallets require an assessment of the actual risks involved, rather than an automatic presumption of heightened risk or routine collection of additional personal information. Privacy Technologies. Paragraph 4.19 identifies the use of privacy technologies as a potential financial crime risk without adequately distinguishing their legitimate use from ever. evidence of criminal activity. Financial privacy is a legitimate interest, and individuals should not be regarded as suspicious simply because they choose to protect their transactions from public scrutiny. Bitcoin's original white paper recommends using a new key pair for each transaction to reduce the ability to link transactions to an individual. Fresh Bitcoin addresses, lightning payments, and other technologies that enhance privacy can serve legitimate purposes.
16:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
16:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deliberate use of such technologies does not establish criminal intent. The ability to conceal transaction information may be relevant to a firm's risk assessment, but it should be considered alongside other evidence and the circumstances of the transaction. Customers should not have to surrender their financial privacy merely to demonstrate that they have nothing to hide. Recommendation 7 The FCA should clarify that the use of privacy technologies, including those deliberately designed to obscure transaction details, is not inherently suspicious. Firms should assess financial crime risks using relevant evidence and context, rather than treating a customer's decision to protect their financial privacy as an indicator of wrongdoing. Question 5: Are there other risks or emerging practices related to DeFi which we should consider? The security of customer data.
17:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
17:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA's guidance addresses financial crime controls but gives insufficient attention to the risks created when firms collect and retain information linking customers to their cryptocurrency wallets. Such records can expose individuals to fraud, targeted theft, and physical harm if compromised. Bitcoin's public ledger makes these risks particularly serious. When someone's identity is linked to a Bitcoin address, anyone with access to that information may be able to examine associated transactions and identify holdings.
17:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
17:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): BPUK highlighted in its January 2025 commentary on the crypto asset reporting framework, collecting more information can create additional security risks for the people regulation is intended to protect. Unlike funds held in a conventional bank account, Bitcoin transferred to an attacker cannot ordinarily be recalled or frozen by a financial intermediate. intermediary. Firms should therefore consider the consequences of exposing customer identity and wallet information, alongside their obligations to collect and retain it. The risks are documented.
18:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
18:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): May 2025, Coinbase disclosed that criminals had paid customer support contractors or employees to obtain personal information from its internal systems.
18:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
18:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compromised records included names, addresses, identity documents. account balances, and transaction histories. Coinbase said it would reimburse eligible customers who were tricked into transferring funds as a direct result of the breach. Research published in 2024 by the University of Cambridge and University College, London, also documented physical attacks against cryptocurrency holders, including threats, kidnapping, and violence.
18:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
18:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): researchers found that these attacks were underreported and warned that no your customer requirements can create security risks alongside their intended benefits.
18:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
18:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Coinbase incident demonstrates the consequences of collecting sensitive financial information without sufficient safeguards.
19:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
19:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): academic research establishes that physical attacks against cryptocurrency holders are a concern, although it does not establish that these attacks generally originate from data breaches. Recommendation 8: the FCA should provide. explicit guidance on protecting customer information that links identities to wallet addresses, transactions, and holdings. Firms should A collect only the personal information necessary to meet their legal obligations and respond to identified risks. Consistent with the data minimization principle in UK GDPRB, restrict and monitor access to records linking customer identities with cryptocurrency holdings, including access by contractors and external service providers. See protect these records through appropriate security measures. including encryption and delete. These measures would help firms meet existing obligations while addressing the particular risks associated with identifiable cryptocurrency holdings. BPUK will raise the separate question of statutory data retention periods with HM Treasury. BPUK also questions whether existing requirements to collect and retain personal information are proportionate to the risks they seek to address.
20:03Compliance with current law does not remove the need to examine whether those obligations expose individuals to unnecessary risks of fraud, theft, or physical harm. The FCA should consider these consequences when developing its guidance and identify where existing requirements may warrant review. BPUK recommends that HM Treasury reassess the necessity and proportionality of customer data collection and retention obligations, particularly where they link identifiable individuals to cryptocurrency holdings and transaction histories. BP UX Privacy Toolkit. BPUX Privacy Toolkit provides practical guidance on protecting financial information and using Bitcoin privately, including personal wallets and direct transactions between individuals. These are legitimate activities, and choosing to protect financial privacy should not create a presumption of wrongdoing.
20:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
20:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): toolkit also encourages people to consider their personal security. Research by the University of Cambridge and University College London found that 25% of the physical attacks examined in their study occurred during transactions between individuals. This reinforces the need for appropriate precautions when trading in person, without suggesting that such transactions are inherently suspicious. BPUK supports compliance with existing legal obligations while questioning whether current requirements to collect and retain personal information are proportionate. Regulation should protect individuals from financial crime without unnecessarily increasing their exposure to theft, surveillance, or physical harm. Proportionality for smaller firms. Paragraph 1.10 states that the guidance clarifies existing requirements and therefore does not require a cost-benefit analysis. However, the way firms interpret regulatory guidance can affect their compliance costs, particularly smaller businesses with limited resources.
21:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
21:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): firm using Bitcoin's base layer without exposure to lending protocols, bridges, or oracles should not be expected to undertake the same assessments as a business operating across multiple DeFi protocols. Regulatory expectations should reflect the services firms provide, the technology they use. and the risks they can control. Firm size may affect the resources available but should not replace an assessment of actual risk. Recommendation 9: the FCA should clarify that operational resilience and financial crime expectations must be proportionate to a firm's activities, scale, and technological exposure. Guidance intended to address complex DeFi arrangements should not impose unnecessary compliance burdens on firms that. do not use those technologies. Question 6: Are there other steps that could be taken to reduce financial crime risks in DeFi? Are there other regulatory measures that we should consider to reduce the financial crime risks in DeFi? Financial crime controls should focus on businesses providing regulated financial services, including exchanges and custodians. These
22:47businesses can identify customers, monitor transactions, and respond to suspicious activity. Independent developers, node operators, and miners do not necessarily have the same access to information or control over customer transactions.
23:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
23:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do not support extending financial crime obligations to independent software developers, Bitcoin node operators, miners, or providers of personal wallet software merely because their technology can be used to transfer or hold Bitcoin. Regulatory obligations should reflect the activities undertaken and the control exercised, consistent with our response to CP26-36.
23:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
23:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA should distinguish the provision of technology from the operation of a regulated financial service. Any additional measures should also be assessed for their impact on financial privacy and personal security. Requirements to collect or retain customer information must be justified by evidence and accompanied by a appropriate safeguards, as discussed under question 5. Conclusions:
23:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
23:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): FCA's proposed guidance would benefit from clearer distinctions between the risks associated with different blockchain networks, the services built on them, and the responsibilities of regulated firms. Our recommendations aim to ensure that regulation reflects the technologies firms' use and the risks they can control. They also address the security consequences of. collecting information that connects individuals to their cryptocurrency holdings. Financial crime prevention should not come at the expense of legitimate financial privacy or expose customers to unnecessary physical risks. These changes would help firms apply the guidance proportionately while maintaining appropriate consumer protections. Bitcoin Policy UK would welcome further engagement with the FCA on these recommendations.