Art Berman argues oil glut forecasts are 'alternate reality' ignoring geopolitical shifts and inventory dynamics
Summary
Art Berman contends that oil price is a poor indicator of system health, with near-zero correlation to supply and demand, and that inventory levels are more predictive. He dismisses IEA and Goldman Sachs forecasts of an impending oil glut as 'alternate reality,' arguing they ignore lasting geopolitical disruptions and the system's adaptability. Berman highlights that supply and demand have historically tracked each other closely, with a 0.95 R-squared correlation, making prolonged imbalances unlikely. He attributes the glut narrative to assumptions of normalized Persian Gulf flows and demand destruction, which he views as market mechanisms for testing models rather than definitive predictions. The discussion also covers the shift in refining capacity to Africa and Asia, and the limited role of renewables in replacing fossil fuels for industrial needs.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 6:06
Price vs System Health
Speaker_0 argues that oil price is a poor indicator of the petroleum system's health, with near-zero correlation to supply and demand. He emphasizes that stocks (inventories) are more predictive than flows (supply/demand) and criticizes the focus on current prices for long-term investment decisions.
- 6:06 – 12:23
Adaptability and Geopolitical Changes
The speaker highlights the adaptive nature of economic and petroleum systems, noting that geopolitical disruptions like the Iran war have permanently altered logistics and insurance costs. He asserts that even if peace were signed, the system would not return to its previous state due to these structural changes.
- 12:23 – 25:19
Critique of Oil Glut Forecasts
Speaker_0 challenges forecasts of an impending oil glut from the IEA and Goldman Sachs, calling them 'alternate reality.' He points out that these forecasts ignore the lasting impact of geopolitical disruptions and the system's ability to adapt, noting that supply and demand have historically tracked each other closely.
- 25:19 – 35:57
Refining Bottlenecks and Underinvestment Narrative
The discussion shifts to bottlenecks in refining capacity and product distribution, citing the diesel shortage and Russia's need to import gasoline. Speaker_0 challenges the narrative of 'underinvestment' in refineries, arguing that long lead times and energy transition uncertainty make such investments risky for private entities.
- 35:57 – 38:33
Supply, Demand, and Inventory Dynamics
Speaker_0 distinguishes between production/supply and consumption/demand, noting that demand includes inventory changes and trade flows. He argues that the EIA tracks production/consumption while OPEC tracks supply/demand, and that focusing on stocks (inventories) is more predictive than flows.
- 38:33 – 40:01
Critique of Oil Glut Forecasts
Speaker_0 calculates a marginal oversupply of a few million barrels in Q2 2027, quickly returning to balance, contradicting narratives of a massive, prolonged glut. He attributes the glut narrative to assumptions of normalized Persian Gulf flows and demand destruction due to high prices.
- 40:01 – 45:47
Market Psychology and Model Assumptions
Speaker_0 explains that oil price forecasts rely on transparent or opaque assumptions about geopolitical normalization and investment returns. He views the 'glut narrative' as a market mechanism for testing models and adjusting expectations through dialogue, rather than a definitive prediction.
- 45:47 – 51:20
Geopolitical Fragmentation and Resource Competition
Speaker_0, citing colleague Michael Every, describes a baseline of escalating conflict between the US and Iran, and Saudi Arabia and Houthis. He argues that geopolitical fragmentation is driven by resource scarcity, leading to a zero-sum game where nations form camps around energy and materials.
- 51:20 – 54:39
Houthi-Saudi Dynamics and Regional Conflicts
Speaker_0 characterizes the conflict in the Bab el-Mandeb as specific to Saudi Arabia and the Houthis (who control 80% of Yemen), rather than a direct proxy war controlled by Iran. He suggests these conflicts are distinct but interacting, with no easy solutions.
- 54:39 – 57:11
Role of Renewables and Nuclear in the Energy Transition
Speaker_0 argues that renewables and nuclear are not ready to replace fossil fuels for industrial needs (80% of energy) but will become increasingly important at the margins. He notes that while the Iran war may boost marginal renewables, it won't fundamentally shift civilization's energy source.
- 57:11 – 1:02:24
Refining Capacity and Investment Opportunities
Speaker_0 highlights that refineries are not being built in Europe and North America but are being constructed in Africa and Asia, citing a recent refinery in Nigeria and plans for another in East Africa. He suggests these adaptations create investment opportunities in marginal energy sources and infrastructure.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | commodity | neutral | The International Energy Agency recently said we already have an oversupply of oil. Four million barrels, Goldman Sachs, and all kinds of other reputable, credible organizations are jumping on that that narrative. |
| Gold | commodity | neutral | we have more of oil or natural gas or coal or gold or diamonds certain times of the year or in certain time cycles than we do in others. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Demand differs from consumption by including inventory withdrawals/additions and imports/exports.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:40
How to verify: Check EIA definitions of 'Petroleum Supply' vs 'Consumption' in monthly reports; verify via basic accounting identity: Demand = Consumption + Inventory Change + Net Trade. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The EIA provides production and consumption data, while OPEC provides supply and demand data.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:13
How to verify: Review EIA 'Petroleum Supply Monthly' for production/consumption figures; review OPEC 'Monthly Oil Market Report' for supply/demand balances. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
There is a marginal oversupply of a couple of million barrels in the second quarter of 2027, quickly returning to balance.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:44
How to verify: Compare the speaker's calculated forecast against the actual Q2 2027 EIA/OPEC data when available; verify the calculation method if disclosed. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Supply and demand correlate at an R-squared of 0.95.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:32
How to verify: Retrieve historical monthly supply and demand data from EIA or OPEC; perform a linear regression analysis to calculate the R-squared value. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Forecasts assume normalized oil flows out of the Persian Gulf.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:44
How to verify: Review IEA or OPEC forecast assumptions documents for statements regarding 'normalization' of Gulf flows or geopolitical risk premiums. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Michael Every's baseline view is more escalation between the US and Iran, and Saudi Arabia and Houthis.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·46:26
How to verify: Search for Michael Every's published reports or tweets on 'Galloping Pegasus' or 'Alliance Global Research' discussing US-Iran and Saudi-Houthi tensions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Houthis control 80% of Yemen.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·52:23
How to verify: Review reports from UN OCHA, SIPRI, or reputable news outlets (e.g., Reuters, AP) on Houthi territorial control in Yemen as of 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A giant refinery was completed a year ago in Nigeria, with another planned in East Africa.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·57:11
How to verify: Search for news releases from major refining companies (e.g., Dangote Refinery, TotalEnergies, Shell) regarding completion dates in Nigeria and planned projects in Kenya/East Africa. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Nuclear energy accounts for 20% of global energy consumption.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·58:23
How to verify: Check IEA 'World Energy Outlook' or 'Energy Balance' tables for the share of nuclear in total primary energy supply. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Renewables are not ready for prime time for powering civilization's industrial needs.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·54:57
How to verify: This is a subjective claim; verify by comparing the speaker's statement against industry reports on industrial heat/electricity requirements vs. renewable capacity factors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify EIA and OPEC weekly data on crude inventories and production flows to assess current market tightness.
- Review IEA and Goldman Sachs oil demand forecasts for Q2 2027 to compare assumptions on Persian Gulf flows.
- Analyze historical R-squared correlation between oil supply and demand to evaluate the likelihood of prolonged imbalances.
- Check recent refinery construction permits and operational status in Nigeria, East Africa, Europe, and North America.
- Assess geopolitical risk premiums in oil prices by monitoring Iran-Houthi-Saudi Arabia conflict developments.
- Examine energy transition investment trends in industrial sectors to determine the actual displacement of fossil fuels by renewables.
- Review insurance and logistics cost changes in the Persian Gulf region following recent geopolitical disruptions.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's not like the war is over. If they all sign a peace agreement tomorrow, nothing really changes. The International Energy Agency recently said we already have an oversupply of oil. Four million barrels, Goldman Sachs, and all kinds of other reputable, credible organizations are jumping on that that narrative. People understand resources are either less available or more expensive or both. Underlying all of these geopolitical conflicts is that reality.
0:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Art Berman, petroleum geologist and renowned energy market expert, it's a true pleasure to host you on Pelicans Gold Radio today.
0:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
0:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thanks for having me back. It's uh always a great pleasure to talk to
0:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
0:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's truly my pleasure. It's always it's great to talk talking you, Art. Now there's a lot going on in the world, and instead of putting the latest headlines in front of you, I'd actually like to start off quite wide with lens wide open by asking you what is currently on your radar? What is truly happening in the world of energy and what are the key trends one might miss if to they were just follow the the headlines in the mainstream media?
1:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
1:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm I'm glad you put it that way Steen because um the the reality of of the energy system and I'm I'm interested in in systems because I think there we're we we we tend as a as a as a civilization to be so focused on trying to predict what's going to happen next and and how to solve whatever whatever problems we we see that we often do that without understanding very well what those problems are and and what they mean. And so just to give you an example, I mean in in uh in my work in you know particularly in the oil industry and with the Iran War, everybody wants to know well what about price? What about price? And and and okay, great. I mean I get it. Price you know price is i is important. But the the irony is is that uh price is a lot more important to humans than it is to the petroleum system,
2:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
2:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which is not It's to say that price doesn't matter because obviously it does. But
2:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um price
2:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is is not
2:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
2:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what I would call a uh a state variable of the petroleum system. It's part of a feedback loop. And and so it's it's just so interesting because if you talk to most people uh in my business, if you read the headlines, you would think that that price is you know like 90% of what matters. And and what I'm telling you is that from a system standpoint, it's probably 10%. And and and what does that mean, you know, to the average person? Well to the average person, what that ought to mean is that whatever is affecting prices today, let's just say I think Brent is about $93 ninety three dollars a barrel or something this morning. uh, which is down from what it was a few weeks ago. It was close to one hundred and twenty. It's quite a bit higher than it was before the war. It was in the mid sixties, so it's a comfortably high price. The point is is that ninety three dollars a barrel or whatever it is has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone's decision to drill
3:38a well. to upgrade a refinery, or to build a pipeline. The prices that are important for those decisions are what people expect prices will be when they start making money on those investments. So if you're talking about a refinery, I mean it could be five years from now. That's the price that matters, not what's happening today as a result of whatever, uh certainly the the war in the Middle East. If I'm going to go drill an oil well, you know, maybe a quick one in the Permian Basin,
4:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
4:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in West Texas, Because that well, the first oil from that well will not
4:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
4:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hit the market. for two years. And so, you know, maybe the price is $150 a barrel today, but that's not the price that I that I need to pay attention to. I need to know what's the price two years from now. So so the my my point is that people have uh a very immediate or like a recency bias on on what price ought to be. And I'm not saying that they're wrong. You know, see some people think price should be higher than it is. Okay, great. But but that's not the price that matters for anybody who's investing
5:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
5:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in oil or in infrastructure or in downstream products. much less uh the the subsidiary industries that depend on oil. So so that that that's that's what I pay attention to is is trying to establish some sort of a framework and a context for understanding what matters to me. And I I'm you know I'm I'm not saying I'm immune from you know from from having my own personal reactions and oh my God, you know, two tankers hit mines today, and you know that the price is gonna go up. Sure. I mean I I I participate in those kind of dramas as well. But I think we also have to think about
5:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
5:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what does all this mean in in the bigger picture? And uh, you know, I I I I don't know that the Iran war is going to be over anytime soon, but you know, it obviously it's evolved in terms of the way the system has adapted to it. And that that's another key thing that I think about all the time, which is just how incredibly adaptive,
6:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh,
6:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well, life on Earth in general, but certainly, you know, human beings and uh our economic systems, our petroleum systems. Now, it doesn't mean that that they adapt the way we want them to. It doesn't mean that we always have a happy ending to our story, but they are incredibly adaptive. And I I see that an awful lot of people, you know, particularly people that take a you know a dark view or kind of a doomy view of of what's about to happen, they they somehow don't see that adaptive aspect or creative aspect, if you will, of of everything in our earth system. And as I said, I'm I'm not trying to be an optimist here.
7:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
7:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that you know, just because we adapt doesn't mean we adapt well. But but we do. adapt. And and the idea that, oh my God, you know, because because of this I know something, you know, why is gonna happen. I don't think any of us are smart enough. So th those are the kind of big picture things I I'm thinking about.
7:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Certainly lots to drill deeper on, um, but not necessarily intended there.
7:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
7:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): continue that big big picture assessment. where would you say we we find ourselves right now? Of course the system has adapted wildly compared to how it was running just earlier in January. Where are we with production versus consumption? Are are those two balancing and and what are the real bottlenecks today?
7:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, that's uh that that's a good leading question. Um, for for anyone who who follows uh what I write either on my website. or on X or you know anywhere else, uh those are two topics that I I have strong opinions on. And so uh just to give you the flavor of those opinions,
8:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
8:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): certainly supply and demand are important in any market, whether you know I don't care what it is. if it's you know, if it's uh platinum or gold or oil or you know, corn, I I don't care. I mean, obviously supply and demand are important. But again, um back to my point about is price really the thing that we ought to be principally focused on. Today's
8:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): episode all of Palisades Gold Radio is proudly brought to you by our parent company, Palisades Gold Corp. Canada's leading junior resource investment vehicle trading on the Toronto Venture Exchange under ticker symbol PALI, with equity and warrant positions in over 200 companies, ownership of mineral projects and royalties, and a significant stake in newfound gold. Palisades offers investors powerful leverage. leveraged exposure to precious metals, uranium, copper, and other critical minerals. Palisade shareholders directly benefit from our team's extensive industry knowledge and access to deal flow. Opportunities historically reserved for a small group of investors. To learn more, visit us at Pelisade.ca and join us in our mission to level the playing field for investors. Now back to the show.
9:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so I did a
9:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
9:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a study recently, which followed studies I've done over the years, where I actually looked at oil supply and demand and how it correlated to oil price. And the correlation is absolutely awful.
9:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
10:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, looking at it from any perspective you want. to, uh, but certainly looking at say the last 10 or 11 years, I mean, the correlation is statistically meaningless. It's uh I think the correlation that I arrived at was something R squared of 0.004. That means that the supply-demand balance predicts oil price less than 1% one percent of the time.
10:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
10:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right away we ought to be asking ourselves, uh, gee, I I wonder I wonder why we get it wrong so often. And and and so when I look at this and I say and I go back again and and say I I you know supply and demand are clearly important variables. in understanding any system, but they are flows. And there are two key elements in any system, and those are stocks and flows. And stocks, those are, you know, for for an oil system, those are things like proved reserves and inventories. Flows are things like supply and demand. And so when I then take a look at inventories, for instance, and I do something called comparative inventory that I think you and I have talked about, where I simply just normalize inventories compared to their five year average, if I do the same exercise
11:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
11:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I did with supply and demand, I get like uh a seventy 70% percent. prediction factor between inventory and price. And again, maybe price is not the most important thing, but I'll take 70% over 1% any day of the week. But why? Because systems care about stocks more than they care about flows. It's just that simple.
12:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
12:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I and I'm not here criticizing anyone or trying to say, you know, you should be doing things differently. I'm merely pointing out some things that that occur to me. So so to your question, you know, with with that in mind, what I think what what we're seeing is that people generally feel that prices are too low or something. And that's been the predominant view for, I don't know, the last eight months. And suddenly, in the last three or four weeks now, we're starting to hear this this narrative arise that, oh, we're we're we're gonna have a we're gonna have a glut of oil. We're gonna have way too much oil. You know, the IEA International Energy Agency, you know, just recently said we already have an oversupply of oil. And their forecast is that we're gonna have four million barrels of oversupply
13:07coming up sometime very soon in 2027, and uh Goldman Sachs and all kinds of other reputable credit. credible organizations are jumping on that that narrative, and now they're revising all their oil prices down. And so uh, you know, I I look at all of this and I and I think, my goodness, um, you know, what kind of an alternate reality are we living in here? How I mean, it it's not like the war is over. In fact, I don't see any any indication that it is over. So, you know, these are the kinds of things I think about. I uh to me, the whether the war is over or not, I don't want to say it doesn't matter because it clearly does matter, but but from a perspective of energy,
13:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
13:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if Iran, the United States, Israel, and whoever else, you know, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, whoever is involved in that, in that party, you know, if if if they all sign a peace agreement tomorrow, nothing really changes. At least not not in the near term. And when I say that, I mean I mean all the rules have changed. The I mean there was just just yesterday, I think there was some congressional, some testimony in the U.S. Congress where the the price to insure a tanker has gone from, I think it was $54,000 to $64 million as a result of things going on in the Persian Gulf. Now, I I can't verify that that you know those precise numbers are correct, but I think your viewers will get the point, which is that the cost of insuring a tanker has gone up several orders of
15:07magnitude.
15:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
15:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so even if there's a if the war is over, uh those insurance rates are not going to go back to where they were. before. They will presumably get lower, hopefully, but that will take time because insurers need to have some kind of a of a history to say, okay, we've gone how many weeks or how many months without a tanker exploding or hitting a mine or something. So, and and the other thing I've learned about systems. is that they almost never return to where they were. They may recover, they may improve, but we never actually return to the state we were in before because you know insurance rates interact with perceived liabilities, with things like supply, demand, inventories, uh, geopolitics, economics, there are all these feedback loops that are forming. And when when adaptation occurs, that's a good thing, but it doesn't mean you're back to normal, whatever normal was.
16:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
16:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so to me, even with lower oil prices and whatever comes along with that, uh at ninety-three dollars, we still have like a twelve or fifteen dollar risk premium. So the premium has reduced from twenty-five to twelve, but it's still considerable. And my guess is that there will be a risk premium going forward almost no matter what. So everything has changed. And that risk premium isn't some imaginary number that's based on, you know, the midnight fears of oil analysts and insurers. These are real costs that are added to getting oil around the world. Logistics, how many tankers do
17:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we have?
17:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): does it take to
17:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): get a
17:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): barrel of oil out of the Persian Gulf? Well, two or three times as many as it did before, because now we have all these, you know, these smaller vessels that are shuttling between tankers. And so we have a concentration of tankers much greater than normal in the Persian Gulf, which means a shortage of tankers everywhere else. So our distribution system has changed. The cost of doing business has changed. Everything has changed. And anyone who says that they know how all that's going to work out, I think is, you know, either lying or delusional. Nobody knows. I don't know.
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19:07Wouldn't one actually expect that? Because is i isn't it a causation relationship rather than a correlation? Doesn't the balance between supply and demand impact the stock number, which is the one that's correlating? So does it have a predictive power of price instead?
19:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, well that's that that's uh that's a wonderful question and and and I I can't I can't really give you an answer that but but
19:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
19:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one of the one of the quotes I love um from uh
19:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
19:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Donella Meadows who was one of the originators of of systems thinking is uh whenever somebody asks me
19:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
19:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know whether A causes B, I always ask them, well what happens when whatever happened to B comes back around and changes the way A behaves? And and so you know the I I think what you're talking about here, Steen, is I mean, this is this is an emergent behavior that you that you're describing. And and and so at some point, you know, cause and effect become confused because of of of not only the interaction and entanglement, but the emergen the emergence of of other factors. So uh yeah, I I I think it does make sense that supply and demand might not predict price, but that doesn't all that tells me is that you're using supply and demand for the wrong purpose. That that supply and demand are are are super important.
20:51They just don't happen to have a very good result when it comes to predicting price. And so again, if you look at at the longer term, which I like to do and I like to look at time series, the the correlation between supply and demand over the past 40, forty, 50 fifty years globally in oil, uh is I can't remember the number. I th I think it's like an R squared of 0.95. That's an awesome correlation. Okay, that's telling you something. That's telling you that, you know, that that that the system is very much about adapting either supply to demand or demand to supply. or s but they're both going up. They're both going up in time. And so the message there I think is that there is a kind of a survival mechanism or a persistence
21:52trend that is somehow incorporated into the petroleum system in in the same way that you know I I I want to live. I don't want to die tomorrow. That doesn't mean I get to control that. But there's something about my physical system, my body system that works very hard to repair to repair itself when I'm sick or I hurt myself and to get regulation, medical tests. My system wants to survive, so does the petroleum system, so does the economic system. They want to grow for better or worse. But when we look at the long-term-term behavior of these systems, what we see is that supply and demand. track incredibly well, which kind of brings me back then to so how is it that a credible agency like the International Energy Agency or Goldman Sachs thinks that supply and demand are going to get out of balance for a year or two years or three
23:11years? They must be looking at a completely different system than I am. am, because with a correlation coefficient of ninety-five percent, sure, there are going to be imbalances at the margin that are going to occur. But to think that those are going to persist not only seems unlikely, but when we actually look at historical data and say, okay, when have these things gotten way out of balance? And COVID is a great example. Okay, so how long were supply and demand radically out of balance? Four months, five months?
23:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
23:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, it's it's it's it's amazing how quickly the system adapted to
23:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
23:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): biggest disruption in our economic system, certainly in the last ten years. Uh that's assuming that you think that the great financial crisis was comparable or similar. And if you if you take that away, then COVID was probably the biggest economic disruption in modern history. And yet supply and demand of oil equilibrated quite quickly. And so again I'm not I'm not here to to criticize the people that make these, you know, these these these forecasts. I'm here to say they they must be looking at a at something very different than I
24:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): am.
24:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because I don't think I don't think the the petroleum system is going to behave that way based on its past history. Now, you know, past history doesn't predict future performance. Um but it's a pretty good place to start.
24:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): One argument I guess you could make, just thinking top of the head, is that that was the easy direction for supply and demand to to rebalance as we had an excess of supply. Um
25:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
25:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can of course shut down production. Now we we might be looking at the barrel of having too little supply, which needs uh capital reinvested capital reinvested. reinvestiture, building of infrastructure, etc.
25:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, that that that's a good point too. And and so we can look at something like like diesel diesel supply. Okay. Diesel's in in scarce supply in many parts of the world.
25:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
25:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): certainly in Europe it is, certainly in many parts of Asia. it is. And so
25:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
25:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the question is: well, we're we we keep talking about crude oil.
25:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Is
25:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it possible that we can have a surplus of crude oil at a shortage of diesel? Absolutely. Which is more important? Well, I I'm not willing to say that one is more important than the other. other, but I've never bought a barrel of crude oil in my life, and probably never will. I have bought diesel, I have bought gasoline. I've I mean I think this is true for most investors, most consumers. The The only people I know that buy crude oil are refiners. Okay, so uh um you know now we're talking about about something else. And and when we're talking about the products we actually use, then logistics becomes a factor. Well, obviously, logistics is a factor for getting crude oil out of the Persian Gulf. Again,
26:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
26:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): headlines make us think the Persian Gulf is the entire petroleum system. And it's certainly an important component. But on a good day, it's 20% of the petroleum system.
27:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
27:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's a whole lot of other things going on that are not remaining static while whatever is disrupting things in the in the Persian Gulf is happening. And so it's interesting, we look we at at Russia, for instance, at the moment. And Russia, as you know, and I think many people, but certainly people in Europe understand, uh there's a war that's been going on for four years between Ukraine and Russia. And Ukraine has gotten very effective at targeting Russian oil refineries with its drones and
27:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the other.
27:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ballistic missiles. And so Russian refinery capability is down probably 30, 35% on average over the last month or two.
27:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
27:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so what does that do? Well, so that means that Russia may have plenty of oil, but it doesn't have the refinery capacity. to turn it into products. What's happening as a result? Russia is exporting record amounts of crude oil because it can't process them, and it's importing gasoline.
28:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
28:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, Russia never imports gasoline. And it's report it's importing gasoline from funny places like India, you know, and Korea. So, you know, the the when the when the the system gets gets distorted, it often adapts in very peculiar ways. And so I I I think the you know the issue with with price and and you know the price is well which price?
28:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
28:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you talk about oil price? Well which oil price? I mean there are many oil prices. There are dozens of oil prices. And they depend on things like supply and demand and inventories in certain regions. But then there are product prices. And that's what that's what that's what we use. That's what runs the economy. Cril doesn't run the economy. If there's one product that runs the economy, it is diesel or distillate. And so that that deserves our very close attention. And that brings us to another subject that we hear a lot about, which is underinvestment.
29:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
29:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, there's a lot of analysts, good analysts, by the way, who I respect, that use that word a lot. And they say, oh, well, you know, the petroleum industry, you know, hasn't been putting enough investment into refineries, and that's why we have this problem. Well, underinvestment from whose perspective? I mean, is uh is a refining organization uh uh a philanthropic service? Is it a a government agency that's designed to adjust to the perceived public need? Well, no, it's not.
30:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
30:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe it should be. I mean, that that's another conversation. we can have. But I mean it is a it is a for profit organization which is not only beholden to, you know, its its shareholders and boards of directors, but partners and etc. And so if if if I'm uh
30:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
30:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an investor
30:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
30:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): someone says hey you know we got to a shortage of diesel.
30:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
30:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe, maybe you would be interested in uh raising some capital so we can build more refineries.
30:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
30:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I might say, okay, that's an interesting proposition.
30:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um how
30:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long does it take to build a refinery? And what are we talking about in terms of cost? Oh, well. you know, it it'll probably take five or six years, maybe five billion dollars. Oh wow, that's a lot of money. Uh and so this investment,
31:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
31:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what what's the what's the life of a refinery? Oh, thirty years? Oh wow. Are we gonna be using diesel in thirty years? I mean, what about, you know, solar panels and wind turbines and what about the energy transition and and peak demand? I mean uh I don't I don't want to put money into something that you know is going to be a a stranded asset in in 15 or 20 years. And and so and and and what's the what's the return on on on capital of that investment? You know you're talking about billions of dollars of upfront fixed costs. Uh when does it pay out? Does it pay out in five years, ten years? fifteen years? How does that work? You know, tell me, you know, show me the show me the spreadsheet, man. And so all of a sudden we get into a whole nother a whole nother area. And and and I don't know
31:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
31:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't want to say the right answer, but I'm inclined to think that the people who who make those decisions and investments. are smart people and what you might call, not you personally, uh but somebody might call underinvestment, I might call just exactly the right investment, given all the factors that I just mentioned and and a few more. And again, uh you know I'm not I'm not arguing that the market always does the right. right thing, but it usually does the efficient thing. And if if you don't like what markets are doing, well, you know, now let's talk about what we you know, you you want to have a you know state capitalism, that that's an option. You know, we could say, well, we can't leave it to markets to build refineries. And so, you know, governments need to get involved and and a immediately there will be hundreds or thousands of people that say, no, no, no, you know, keep government out of it. Government screws everything up. So again, you know, these are complicated questions. But my point is that
33:07is that it's easy to make judgments and it's easy to follow narratives. that seem to make sense until you ask the question do you understand the implications for the bigger picture? Or or or are you are you simply reacting to you know to short short-term term needs? And and I'm not saying that that one is better than the other, it's just that from my perspective. as a consultant,
33:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
33:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my clients are more interested in understanding the situation before they make a decision to commit capital.
33:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
33:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's not always true. Occasionally somebody will come to me and say, you know, I'm about to make this investment. I want you to tell me you know, should I do it or shouldn't I? Fair enough. But more often than not, people say, I'm thinking about this investment. Can you help me understand the bigger picture so that I can make a better decision? Or can you create some scenarios for me so that I can
34:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
34:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I can weigh the risks?
34:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
34:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an incredibly interesting point that you're making, Art. And I would actually you mentioned this earlier. Analysts seem to believe we are staring down a barrel of a superglut um on the back of of a return to peace in the Middle East, which kind of seems fantastical to me. And I would love to ask you what would actually be required for there to occur for us to have that superglut.
34:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I let me let me say first of all that
35:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
35:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had the same question, but before I allowed myself to to proceed with that question, I wanted to understand the information, the data. that led those various agencies to come to that conclusion. And so I gathered the information that I had from OPEC and the U.S. Energy Information Administration. I could have used the IEA also, but in this case I didn't. And I said, well, let me take the historical data, the supply and demand data, which OPEC provides. The EIA doesn't provide exactly the same data. They provide production and consumption.
35:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
35:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to those who don't deal with the oil industry, um, I you know I I understand your your confusion. You know, what's the difference? And the answer is there are differences. Production is not exactly the same as supply, and consumption is not exactly the same as demand. So let's just talk about consumption briefly. Consumption is what we use, okay? And
36:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
36:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): where does consumption? come from? I mean consumption of of petroleum products comes out of a refinery. And actually the you know most people calculate consumption indirectly by the the barrels of product that leave a refinery and they say that's consumption. Okay. Well what about inventories?
36:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh
36:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well that's something different.
36:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
36:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right. So most of us understand that we have more of oil or natural gas or coal or gold or diamonds certain times of the year or in certain time cycles than we do in others. Just like, you know, I I I have an I income. stream, but I also have a savings account. Because occasionally I get a surprise. I have, you know, suddenly I, you know, have a a big expense. Um, you know, I have a a big repair to my house or one of my children needs me to help support them because they lost their job. That's not covered by my cash flow, so I go to my savings account. Well that's an inventory. A savings account is an inventory. And so demand differs from consumption because it's consumption plus inventory, withdrawals, and additions. It's also imports and exports. So my supply is not just what I produce.
37:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
37:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, if I'm a country like the United States, I produce a lot of oil. If I'm a country like United
38:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): States, I'll be able to
38:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Netherlands, I produce almost nothing. So imports and exports become very important. So so th my point is that the EIA provides production and consumption, OPEC provides supply and demand. And so I said, okay, I want to look at historically how those things have worked. and then focus in on the present and the near future, the forecasts.
38:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
38:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when I did those calculations, I came up with what I mentioned before: a marginal oversupply, which is to say a couple of million barrels in the second quarter of 2027. very quickly coming back to balance
38:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
38:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the third and fourth quarter. And that's a completely different outcome than, oh, we're going to have this massive oversupply of four million barrels a day that's going to go on for a year or two.
39:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
39:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yet, and but I'm not interpreting anything. I'm just using, I'm using the data that exists, and for sure. I mean I had to do some conversions between how do you get from consumption to demand? And I'm not going to bore you with how I did that, but you can trust me that I did a a good job of that. And yet I came up with a completely different outcome. Which doesn't disprove
39:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
39:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): oil glut narrative, but it it's much more consistent. with the fact that supply and demand correlate at you know an R squared of 0.95, that they're not going to be out of balance for long periods of time. So
39:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
39:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right away, you know, now we now we have something interesting going on here. So now I'm saying, well, this supply and demand. imbalance may or may not even affect prices because that is a terrible correlation. But let's put that aside for a second and answer your question how does this come about? And I think I think the answer is that it assumes, and there are always assumptions in any model, which are fine. I love models.
40:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
40:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't care if they're wrong because they give me something to okay, now we have something we can talk about. And that that that's that's useful, whether we agree that it's correct or incorrect or close to correct or ridiculous. Now at least we have something we can talk about. So the assumptions that go into that are that that oil flows out of the Persian Gulf normalized. So now we have either normal flows or something approaching normal flows. And that because oil prices have been elevated, that there's been incentive for a lot of investment in production facilities in places like South America and North America, and people want to make a profit, and so suddenly we're going to have return. returning a supply from the Persian Gulf colliding with increased supply because of higher oil prices. And that's going to lead to more supply.
41:28The second part of the story is that we've had higher oil prices for some time. And even these oil glut scenarios don't have prices getting anywhere close to where they were just a year ago, and that's because of demand destruction. So we have higher supply, lower demand, you subtract demand from supply, and you get a big imbalance.
41:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
41:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that gives you a glut. Okay.
41:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
42:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so I'm not I'm not disputing the logic. behind any of that. The logic makes perfect sense. But there are there but there are but there are assumptions in there that that we don't, you know, first of all, they're not transparent. I I just I I I said them like they were, but actually you can read the documents from which that data comes, and it it's it's it it doesn't spell it out in the way that I just did. So I'm taking a little bit of poetic license here in my interpretation.
42:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
42:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): point is that these are projections. And by their very nature, I've done thousands of projections, and the one thing I know before I even do them and after I finish is that they will be wrong. They will be wrong.
42:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
42:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and as I said to begin with, I I not only respect but admire other people who do projections because it takes courage. Because you know you're going to be wrong. And people will criticize you for being wrong. They'll criticize you, oh well that's stupid. You can't do that. But I I I think we we need people who do that. We really do. Because those are how else are we going to
43:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): test
43:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or allow markets to test the models that we come up with? And that's that's part of what this oil glut narrative is.
43:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
43:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's, you know, it's like if if I'm worried about something,
43:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
43:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm gonna talk to you about it. I'm gonna tell you my concerns, and maybe you're gonna say, Oh, Art, that's silly. You know, you're blowing this completely out of proportion. And maybe I am, but part of the way that I deal with it is by talking to you about it. And and so an oil glut narrative is sort of how markets talk to their friends about it. Okay, I'm going to put this out there. You know, and and and my friend on the other side is like, oh, you know, you're blowing this out of proportion. This is silly. And so maybe I'll pull back. You know, maybe next month we'll see a, you know, a slightly more conservative uh projection from the IEA or from the EIA or something. Um, you know, markets are, I mean, they they they are us, and and and so they're human and and economics is, you know, psychol psychology is is a big part of uh of economics. So I I think the you know the answer to your question is first of all, no one knows. Uh second of all
44:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
44:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what happens will surprise us.
44:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
44:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are unable to to you know to understand all the interactions, but I think back to where I began uh a while ago,
44:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um the
44:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): system will adapt, it won't go back to the way it was, and the adaptations in some ways will be both impressive and surprising, and in others will be very disappointing and disturbing.
45:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Perhaps something we can also talk about is the resilience of the system, which you've already touched base based on. The adaptations have been truly truly incredible. Of course, there one can imagine a scenario in which the disruption increases in intensity and it doesn't die down and we don't have a piece of court signed tomorrow. In that scenario, how resilient, how much resiliency is still in the system? How much adaptation can Can it it have further? Especially if we were to see disruptions at the BAP Pep al-Manetrade Elman trade as well as the straight trade over. of hormous? How many more tankers can we see taken out? How many refineries can blow up before we really start to see feel the pinch?
45:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, well, another really good question. Um my my friend uh Michael Every, uh, who specializes in geopolitics, and uh he and I are well, we're friends, but we also are colleagues we share information daily um
46:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
46:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I provide a lot of energy input he provides a lot of geopolitical they're they're they're entangled the you you can't you can't separate them um you know his view and he's published this is that his baseline is more escalation
46:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): more
46:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): escalation between the United States and Iran, more escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and generally increasing conflict in Europe between uh Russia and its neighbors, not just Ukraine, but you know, Finland and Latvia, Estonia, Poland, et etc. cetera.
46:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
46:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so, you know, that that's his view, and and I think that's that's a that's a reasonable scenario. So we are in a a a geopolitical fragmentation which didn't begin with this war or the last one, or which is Ukraine or COVID. Uh it's been,
47:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
47:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this fragmentation has been going on
47:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
47:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't know how far back you want to go, but certainly, you know, to the end of the the fall of the Soviet Union, uh, which looked like everything is coming together as one, but we got surprised very quickly and and that didn't happen. And and so my my my sense is is that um
47:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
47:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, this is uh
47:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): th
47:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we we are dealing with a situation which um
47:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
47:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ba my my view i is that the key players in in this drama,
47:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
47:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whether they're great powers or smaller powers, I mean I I think I think everyone understands at some level that resources are what all of these struggles are about ultimately. Sure, there are, you know, there are all kinds of, you know, rivalries and hatreds and revenges and animosities. I mean, I just I just spent a couple of weeks in the southwestern part of England. And believe it or not, I mean, the the people in Cornwall have a a hundred hundreds of years of of culture. war with the people in Devon next door over the order of, you know, do you put your clotted cream on your scone before the jam or does the jam go before the clotted cream? And they've been fighting about this for hundreds of years. This is a big deal to people in in that part of the world.
48:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
48:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but but I I so I I I think the that the the theme that runs through everything that we're looking at in the world right now is that on some level people understand that we've reached a a size, a scale of our civilization in which resources
49:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
49:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): either less available or more expensive or both. And that underlying all of these geopolitical conflicts is that reality. And unless the world population suddenly changes, which I don't think it will,
49:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
49:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unless we suddenly discover resources that we don't know about right now, or some new form of energy that we don't understand. Uh those fundamentals are are kind of locked in. And therefore we are on some level engaged in what at least our leaders I think see as a zero-sum zero sum game. That my my my gain is your loss. And the world is reorganizing into camps around those resources. And you know, we we have
50:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
50:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, she Xi and Putin and Trump
50:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
50:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know getting together right now. in in in China. And those are in many ways the three great powers of the world. Not that Russia is exactly in the same category from a military or economic standpoint, but from a resource standpoint it is. Russia's uh you know a uh an absolute powerhouse of resources of of every kind imaginable
50:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
50:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe more than China, uh at least in terms of uh of energy and and and materials.
50:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
51:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so so that's you know that that that that's kind of a worldview situation which says that we may achieve some kind of approximation of peace in the Persian Gulf. But that doesn't change the overall calculus of fragmentation and conflict. The Houthis and and I mean that that that's a that's a fascinating story because
51:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean
51:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Houthis have a very specific
51:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
51:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): conflict with Saudi Arabia, which doesn't change the fact that the Houthis have certain
51:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
51:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): alignments with Iran. But I don't personally see what's going on in the in the Babel Mandeb as being an extension of the Iran US Israel war. It could become that way. and it certainly interacts with that. But but I I think that that conflict is is is is at least for now fairly specific between Saudi Arabia and and and these I mean we call them the Houthis, but I mean they ru they they control 80% of Yemen. We could call them you know the Yemenis if we if we want wanted to, give them the dignity of the of that.
52:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
52:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm not I'm not minimizing that in any way. I'm just saying that it i it's a little bit different. And uh
52:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
52:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think that that the Houthis are uh are you know are the puppets of Iran.
52:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um they
52:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they certainly have benefited and probably continue to benefit. from Iranian money and missiles and all sorts of things. But I don't think they're I don't think they're controlled by Iran, at least not directly. So I think we are, you know, we're in a situation where we we want we want to see solutions. We love solutions. We're a problem problem-solving solving species. species. And I think we may have reached a point where we just have to live with the fact that a lot of these situations we're in are do not have solutions. Or if they do, we're really just moving a problem from one area to another. And and I don't I don't I I don't say that because I'm passionate. pessimistic. I I I just that just seems to be the reality of of what we're what we're dealing with. And and at the end of at the end of the proverbial day, I mean the economy is about energy and materials.
53:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
53:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so we're having economic wars, whether, you know, you mean we hear, oh well this is World War III. Well, I don't know if it's World War III and what that even means. But but these are economic wars on on some level. They're about energy and materials.
54:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell I
54:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would love to squeeze in one more big question, which is regarding opportunity in these inefficiencies or adaptations. Of course, whenever a system adapts or is inefficient temporarily. there's an opportunity there to benefit from. Tankers, refineries, two of the obvious ones. Are are there any ones hiding perhaps in plain sight that are still ripe for the taking?
54:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's uh another great question. Um I have been um critical in some ways of renewables because I I don't think that they are ready for prime time. Um, that they're they're not they're not they don't ri they're not really fit for for purpose for powering our civilization. And and and I I I I still hold that view. And I and and and I I I don't say that. in a critical way. I'm not against renewables. I just think that you know that the people who think that our civilization can run on well on just electricity probably need to read a book and and understand how how all of that works. But but at the same time from a system standpoint,
55:41when systems come under stress, whatever kind of system they are, you know, biological, ecological, economic, they diversify. And and I I'm I'm not keen on the argument that the Iran war has given a tremendous boost to renewables. The people want energy security and so they're going to go to renewables. Then for as much as you might like that to happen, it's not going to happen. But but if if we think about
56:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
56:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we think about renewables as as as a as something on the margin, then there I think there is substance to that argument that the system is going to to give increased preference to to to marginal supplies. And so if we get our if we can get our our our our models away from we're going to run civilization on renewables, no, we're not going to run civilization on renewables, but
57:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
57:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will become increasingly important at the margins. Then I think there's an opportunity there. I think they're there refined refineries are not being built in Europe and North America, but they are being built in Africa and Asia.
57:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
57:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean the giant refinery was completed a year or so ago in Nigeria. The same company is planning another refinery. I can't remember, I think it's in Kenya or someplace in East Africa. And so there there are, I mean there, there are places where things like that are happening. Nuclear, I think, is another, you know, it it's it's almost like renewables, and that I w I don't I don't see we're going to run our civilization on nuclear energy. I mean if we it if we commercialize fusion tomorrow,
58:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um, which
58:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're not going to do,
58:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
58:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I I'm not really sure what that solves because nuclear is still just electricity. I mean, I say just electricity. I mean we're using electricity right now. It's incredibly valuable. But but it's uh my point is, you know, it's twenty percent of our energy consumption. So
58:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um, you
58:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, m
58:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
58:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if we can supply all of our electricity with nuclear? Well, great. That's wonderful. And and and maybe that's really good for emissions, but it still doesn't address the 80%. And the 80% still supports all of our industrial needs, which run our economy. But so so I think that you know we have maybe we have to start thinking about
58:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
58:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this adaptation aspect and and that that may in fact mean that that the returns that we expect might be somewhat more conservative. But but so might the fixed capital requirements. And and and so uh you know again and this is not a
59:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
59:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm I'm I'm responding to your question. I haven't given this deep thought, and it's certainly not investment advice, but I'm starting to think a little bit differently about uh about these these marginal uh sources of energy. And and and maybe you know maybe that's something I'll pursue a little bit further. Uh do a couple of essays to see if I still agree with. myself, talk it out with myself, if you will.
59:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Certainly lots to uh ponder on there. And now, Ert, please tell us more about your consulting work as well as where anywhere else you would like to direct if you are still with us.
59:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sure. Well I I consult on on all sorts of things, but uh I mean I think for for your viewers, uh I I I'm available for uh you know one on one calls just like this one.
1:00:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
1:00:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and and if someone has uh you know a specific issue, uh an investment uh decision that they're looking for, you know, not financial guidance on, but background, uh, you know, we we can we can set up a call or two or three that doesn't cost a whole lot and doesn't require a whole lot of time. And uh you know, we we we we can talk that out.
1:00:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
1:00:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm obviously available for for bigger projects. Um but yeah, go to my website, artberman.com. You can you know find me uh pretty regularly on X uh at AE Berman12. and twelve And uh I'm pretty free with my information and I
1:00:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do
1:00:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that. um because
1:00:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
1:00:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just because that's what I do but uh my my experiences is that uh for as much as I put out there uh and and somehow people still don't quite know what to do with it uh because it's complicated. And uh and so I'm available for you know to to talk to you one on one and and work through some of those problems.
1:01:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Excellent. We'll certainly put the uh links and contact details in the description. Art Berman, thank you very much for your time and especially your insights today. Tremendously appreciate it.
1:01:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
1:01:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thanks for your great questions. Always a pleasure.
1:01:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This podcast is for general information purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any securities.
1:01:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:01:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): views expressed are those of the host and guest and do not necessarily reflect the views of the company or their affiliates. Guests on the show are not compensated for their appearance. Certain discussions may include forward-looking statements subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. Listeners should do their own research, consult a licensed financial advisor. and not base any investment decisions solely on the information discussed. For a full disclaimer, please visit our website. For full disclosure and risk factors of any companies referenced, please see full available disclosure and risk factors under CDARplus at www.cdrplus.ca.
1:02:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And then we'll do that.