ONS Revision Reveals UK Productivity Crisis Was a Statistical Error
Summary
Jon Adair and Neil Woodford argue that the UK's perceived productivity crisis stemmed from a 17-year error in the Labour Force Survey, which overcounted work hours by including holidays. This correction significantly raises historical productivity growth figures, showing the UK outpaced most G7 nations since 1997. The speakers contend that official forecasts from the OBR and Bank of England were flawed, leading to unnecessary fiscal tightening and interest rate hikes. Woodford asserts that actual productivity growth was nearly 9% from 2019 to Q3 2026, undermining the Bank's rationale for restrictive monetary policy. They conclude that inflation is driven by energy shocks rather than wage pressures, suggesting rates should remain stable.
Key takeaways
- 1 Three weeks ago in the budget, the OBR said productivity in Britain would grow by 0.7% next year. That figure is the main reason it thinks the economy only grows 1% in 2027.
Jon Adair · 1:01
- 2 On corrected numbers, UK productivity growth since 1997 has been faster than every G7 country except the US.
Jon Adair · 10:26
- 3 the Bank of England says it explicitly it it the productivity growth is effectively designed. just non-inflationary speed limit for the economy. And so if the economy grows more strongly than that speed limit, which is what's happening now, you have members of the NPC saying we've got to put rates up.
Neil Woodford · 2:13
- 4 So last November the OBR downgraded its long-run productivity growth form forecast from 1.3% to 1%.
Neil Woodford · 14:41
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 1:01
The ONS Productivity Revision and Its Origins
Jon Adair explains that the ONS corrected a 17-year error where the Labour Force Survey overcounted work hours by including holidays, leading to an artificial productivity crisis. This revision impacts the OBR's tax forecasts and the Bank of England's interest rate decisions.
- 1:01 – 2:04
Impact on OBR Forecasts and Interest Rates
The OBR's 0.7% productivity growth forecast led to a 1% GDP growth projection and influenced the Chancellor's budget. The Bank of England's assumption of 1% productivity growth justified raising interest rates to 4%.
- 2:04 – 7:29
Neil Woodford's Historical Critique and Data Discrepancies
Neil Woodford notes he predicted this error years ago. He highlights a divergence between HMRC payroll data and the Labour Force Survey, where HMRC shows falling employment while the survey shows growth, indicating the survey is flawed.
- 7:29 – 10:51
Corrected Productivity Growth Figures
With corrected hours, UK productivity per hour grew 1.3% annually pre-COVID (vs old 0.7%). Since 1997, UK productivity growth outpaced all G7 nations except the US. Post-2019, output per worker rose 5.6% on new methods vs 2.6% on old.
- 10:51 – 14:25
Debunking Productivity Myths and Pandemic Impact
Woodford rejects explanations like underinvestment or Brexit for poor productivity, calling them myths. He states actual productivity growth from 2019 to Q3 2026 was nearly 9%, nearly 2.6 times the ONS's previous 3.4% estimate.
- 14:25 – 18:33
Implications for Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy
Lower productivity forecasts reduce fiscal headroom, affecting tax and borrowing. For the Bank of England, higher actual productivity means the 'non-inflationary speed limit' is higher, suggesting rates may have been too high.
- 18:33 – 28:22
Bank of England's Defense and Woodford's Rebuttal
The Bank argues GDP is unchanged, only the denominator (hours) changed. Woodford counters that the 'speed limit' for inflation has risen, meaning the economy can grow faster without inflation, undermining the Bank's rate hike rationale.
- 28:22 – 35:48
Inflation, Energy Prices, and Rate Outlook
Woodford argues current inflation is driven by energy shocks, not second-round effects. He notes Brent Crude and gas prices have fallen, suggesting the Bank's rate hikes are ineffective and rates should not rise further from 4%.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil | commodity | neutral | Interest rates don't affect gas prices and they don't affect um crude prices. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The ONS counted more than 100 million hours a week of work that nobody did due to survey methodology errors.
Jon Adair ·0:00
How to verify: ONS Labour Force Survey methodology documentation and revision notes published November 17, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The OBR forecast productivity growth of 0.7% for 2027, leading to a 1% GDP growth projection.
Jon Adair ·1:01
How to verify: OBR Economic and Fiscal Outlook report published November 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Bank of England raised interest rates to 4% based on a 1% productivity growth assumption.
Jon Adair ·1:21
How to verify: Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) Interest Rate Decision statement, November 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
HMRC data showed payroll employment down 180,000 since the October 2024 budget.
Neil Woodford ·5:54
How to verify: HMRC National Employment Statistics (NES) data releases for late 2026 and 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Corrected productivity per hour grew 1.3% annually pre-COVID, up from the old 0.7% figure.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·7:29
How to verify: ONS Productivity data release, November 17, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Post-2019 output per worker grew 5.6% using new ONS methods, compared to 2.6% on the old survey.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·9:47
How to verify: ONS Productivity data release, November 17, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Productivity growth from the 2019 average to Q3 2026 was nearly 9%, versus the ONS's previous 3.4% estimate.
Neil Woodford ·13:01
How to verify: ONS Productivity data release, November 17, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brent Crude prices fell over $25 a barrel since the Bank of England raised rates.
Neil Woodford ·29:48
How to verify: ICE Futures Brent Crude price data, comparing levels at the time of the rate hike to current levels. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Core inflation (CPI excluding energy) was 2.6% in October.
Neil Woodford ·29:26
How to verify: ONS Consumer Price Index (CPI) data release for October 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Bank of England forecast 3.7% inflation for October, which came in at 3.6%.
Neil Woodford ·30:22
How to verify: Bank of England Inflation Report (November 2026) vs. ONS actual CPI data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the ONS Labour Force Survey methodology change regarding holiday hours and the specific 100 million hour overcount.
- Check HMRC PAYE data against ONS Labour Force Survey employment figures for the period post-October 2024.
- Review the OBR's November forecast documents to confirm the downgrade of long-run productivity growth from 1.3% to 1%.
- Analyze Bank of England Inflation Reports to see if they acknowledge the revised productivity 'speed limit' and its impact on rate decisions.
- Compare UK productivity growth rates against G7 nations using updated ONS data to validate the claim of outperforming all except the US.
- Examine Brent Crude and UK gas price trends to assess Woodford's claim that inflation is driven by energy shocks rather than wage pressures.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Jon Adair: For 17 years, the official figures have been counting work in Britain that nobody did. By this summer, it had reached more than 100 million hours a week. It happened because the statisticians worked out the hours by contacting people at home and asking them, and the people who were away on holiday that week were the ones they couldn't reach. The survey ended up describing a country that hardly ever took time off. Those hours are in the sum that says Britain has a productivity crisis. And that sum is what the OBR and the Bank of England work from when they decide how much tax the Chancellor needs and where interest rates should be. On Tuesday, the Office for National Statistics took the hours out. I'm John Adair and I'm with Neil Woodford, who has been telling anyone who'd listened for the last two years that this number was wrong.
0:46Neil Woodford: I'm speechless, frankly. I don't quite know how to get my head around the fact. that this profoundly, probably the most important single thing, they just got completely and utterly wrong.
1:01Jon Adair: Three weeks ago in the budget, the OBR said productivity in Britain would grow by 0.7% next year. That figure is the main reason it thinks the economy only grows 1% in 2027. It's why John Healy had £15 billion of room and why he went after savers and landlords to keep it. A week later, the Bank of England put interest rates up to 4%.
1:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:22Jon Adair: bank's working assumption is that productivity grows at 1% a year. Then, on Tuesday, the ONS published what productivity actually did over the last 12 months, and it grew 2.5%. two point five percent. Neil, you've got a piece being published this week, and in the first paragraph, you own up to a hint of smugness. What did Tuesday tell you?
1:45Neil Woodford: Um i it was it was one of the most sort of extraordinary days, really, uh I can recall. Of course it didn't really feature prominently in the headlines, but it was most extraordinary because it blows up, it literally blows up a core belief of the economic establishment in the UK. Now, it's not it this is not something peripheral. This is absolutely fundamental
2:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
2:13Neil Woodford: the Bank of England, the OBR, and the economic establishment's understanding of how the economy works, what's actually happening in the economy. I mean, the Bank of England says it explicitly it it the productivity growth is effectively designed. just non-inflationary speed limit for the economy. And so if the economy grows more strongly than that speed limit, which is what's happening now, you have members of the NPC saying we've got to put rates up. It could not be more important. And what it shows is that the economic Big establishment has been wrong about this for years. And I'm a little bit smug because I did call this out firstly about three years ago and have been wittering on about it for certainly for the last two years.
2:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
2:58Jon Adair: Neil's Full Piece has every chart that we're about to show you, and it's in the noise cancelling app. The app's free on iPhone and Android. Just go to the App Store, search for Noise Cancelling, and it will read every piece to you if you'd rather listen to
3:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
3:10Jon Adair: But before we get into this episode, I need to correct something that we told you in August. We did an episode on this where we said there were 500,000 missing employees on the thumbnail, because the tax records showed about half a million fewer people in work than the survey did.
3:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
3:25Jon Adair: that gap is still there, but what the ONS has found since is a bigger error in the hours, and it goes all the way back to 2009. Neil's going to take you through how he found this and why he thinks the ONS still hasn't got to the bottom of it. After that, we'll get into the Bank of England's answer, which is the best argument against him and what it means for interest rates and for UK shares, if Neil is right. Neil, take us back to when you first saw this. What was in the numbers that just didn't add up for you? And how did you get from there to the hours?
3:54Neil Woodford: First of all, my my favorite economist had had suspicions about the the Labour labor Force survey data. years back. And we talked about it probably for the first time about three years ago.
4:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
4:09Neil Woodford: and the f I rem I seem to recall the first article I wrote about this was one that sort of focused just on the manufacturing sector. Because the what the data was showing for the manufacturing sector It just made no sense to me as an investor. So what the ONS data showed is that. since the pandemic, manufacturing output in the UK had declined. But because they were mismeasuring the labor inputs, what it showed at the same time was that the manufacturing industry across the UK had employed significantly more people. So in summary, manufacturing businesses in the UK, according to the ONS, had employed more people to produce less output.
4:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
4:52Neil Woodford: I s I wrote at the time that just makes no sense. I can see that that's what the data tells the ONS is going on, but that in the real world makes absolutely no sense. Businesses don't employ more people to produce less output. I've never come across a business that did that. And if any were in business doing that, they wouldn't be in business for very long. There was some mismeasurement problem. Now I didn't know whether it was an output mismeasurement or a labor force input mismeasurement, but the answer just made no sense to me. And since then, I've just drilled into this subject in quite a lot more detail and discovered more recently a huge anomaly between. the Labour Force Survey, which is what all of this data's been based on, and other data series measuring employment in the UK. So particularly HMRC data. And what it what those two data series show,
5:54HMRC data who who do know how many people are in work, they know who they're collecting tax from. That data is showing, for example, since the election, employment in the UK, payroll employment is down 180,000 since the first budget, actually since the October 2024 budget. But the LFS survey just shows
6:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people
6:17Neil Woodford: in work growing rapidly, frankly, for a for a labor market, uh continuously through this period. So the two the two curves are sort of separated. It can't be relied upon. And yet the Bank of England and the OBR continue to rely on it. Anyway, long story short, I felt that there was a more recent last three-year problem between the LFS and and what was really going on in the economy. What I didn't know is that that is that the LFS survey had been mismeasuring hours' ours work. worked for years, since 2009. Um, I didn't know that. I I couldn't get that sort of insight into into the errors uh in this survey, but that's what's now been revealed. So it's a combination of new information that I that I hadn't twigged. But what I did know was that the LFS survey was giving a very bad guide to
7:18the number of people in work, the number of hours worked, and therefore a terrible denominator to work out what's going on with UK um productivity.
7:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
7:29Jon Adair: is the ONS's own chart from Tuesday. One line is the hours from the survey and the other is the hours from employers' payroll records with holidays and sick days taken off. which is how most other countries have counted this for years.
7:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
7:42Jon Adair: two lines sit on top of each other until 2008 and then move a bit further apart every year. By this summer, the survey was counting more than 100 million hours a week that the payroll records just can't find, which is about four hours a week for each of us. With the hours corrected, productivity per hour in the 10 years before COVID grew at 1.3%. a year, where the old figure was 0.7. Per worker, it only goes from 0.9 to 1. And the ONS takes that to mean it had the number of people about right and their hours wrong. Neil, you don't think the number of people is right even now. What are you seeing?
8:20Neil Woodford: Yeah, I I I think the number of people uh in work is a problem in the with the L. LFS data as well. So this what the what the what this massive correction, this revelation reveals is is is a really long-run mismeasurement of hours worked. There is an element of overstating the number of people in work, but I think that particular part of the problem has got worse in the last three years. And I conclude that. by just comparing HMRC data with the LFS data. And those two curves have moved apart really quite dramatically over the last three years. Fortunately, the ONS has now recognized that the LFS survey is fundamentally flawed and they ditched it and they now have a new, what they call, component approach, which is. to all intents and purposes, I believe, similar to the way other our peer economies measure uh uh their labour market and number of people in work. So it's it's much a much better basis on which to compare what's going on in the UK with what's going on with with in other G7 or other
9:35developed economies.
9:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
9:36Jon Adair: ONS's own release partly agrees with. you, Neil. Since 2019, output per worker is up 5.6% on the new methods and 5.5% on the tax data.
9:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
9:47Jon Adair: the survey, the old survey, it's 2.6%.
9:50Neil Woodford: Yeah, in other words, John I mean to suggest that that's not a mismeasurement problem is is laughable. I'm laughing, obviously. Um In other words, if you just looked at the the mismeasurement of the number of people in work, it looks like the productivity data is twice as good as the the ONS had assumed. But it's worse than that when you when you factor in the mismeasurement of hours worked as well.
10:17Jon Adair: Before the financial crisis, productivity grew at about two percent a year, and for the decade after it, we were told not 0.7%. point seven percent. The corrected figure is 1.3. one point three.
10:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Since
10:26Jon Adair: nineteen 1997, on the corrected numbers, the UK has grown its productivity faster than every G7 country except America. An hour of work in France, Germany, or America still produces more than an hour in the UK, but Tuesday's numbers close about a quarter of that gap. Neil, you've been back through the reports that were written to explain the old numbers. Which explanation do you find the hardest to forgive?
10:51Neil Woodford: Um it's hard really because there is literally so much guff that's been written about the UK's poor productivity record. I I I I mean, just in a in a in researching for this piece, I mean I came across 40 or 50 different articles from economic research houses. from well-respected economists, from the Bank of England, from the OBR, from the House of Commons line that showed or sought to show why the UK's productivity had been so poor. I mean, they even gave it a title, The Productivity Puzzle. The most ludicrous sort sorts of explanations were chronic underinvestment. That's been a favourite. of the um of the economists that I looked at. Chronic underinvestment, structural headwinds, Brexit legacies. I mean that's a that's a really popular one amongst the establishment. Brexit destroyed the
11:54UK's um uh productivity performance, obviously totally total rubbish. There are there are other ones that blame climate. change, net zero. I mean, I I think it's a massive headwind for the for the economy, but but uh others have explained it by reference to the UK's aging population, poor resource allocation, poor management. I mean, there've been all sorts of very worthy, very thick documents that have sought to explain this terrible productivity performance with all. sorts of rubbish, frankly, because it was a myth. The UK's productivity productivity performance has been improving dramatically over this period. Not as fast as it improved before the financial crisis, but in the period up to the uh in the in the period between the financial crisis and the pandemic, the UK's productivity performance was twice as good as the ONS was saying. Now, what's happened since is even more remarkable because
13:01um the the pandemic was it was argued had had sort of blown up again, had sort of further undermined the legacy of the pandemic, had further undermined um the UK's productivity uh performance. And what we now know is that instead of the 3.4% growth in productivity in total from the average of 2019 through to the Q3 2026, instead of the 3.4% that the RNS had previously estimated using rubbish data, instead that performance has been nearly 9%. 2.6 times better. I'm speechless, frankly. I don't quite know how to get my head around the fact that this profoundly, probably the most important single thing that economists measure to predict how the economy will grow in the future and how living standards will change over time. The most important thing, they just got completely and utterly wrong.
14:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
14:02Neil Woodford: And um I don't know whether to laugh or cry. It it it is uh it's it is incredible. But anyway, there is it's good news, frankly. It's very good news for the economy.
14:14Jon Adair: Just help people understand. We explained this back in August, but just help people understand how a number like this ends up in someone's tax bill and in their mortgage rate.
14:25Neil Woodford: Well, let's let's guess the tax. bill first. Let's look at that. The the OBR, the output from the OBR's economic analysis has a profoundly important impact on the tax and spend and borrowing decisions
14:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
14:41Neil Woodford: the UK government. So last November the OBR downgraded its long-run productivity growth form forecast from 1.3% to 1%. And because that because productivity is the is the essence really of how the economy will grow in the future, essentially think of the the two components of growth are productivity and the number of additional people that join the workforce. If you add those two things together, in an effect you get economic, the sort of the economic growth outcome for the economy. So when you've lowered the productivity growth forecast, you are fundamentally lowering your view or reducing your view about how fast the economy can grow, which is exactly what the OBR did. They reduced their growth forecasts as a result of the lower productivity forecast. And as a result of that, the fiscal deficit at the end of the period that they were forecasting, the five years, effectively looks less good than it would if the economy grew more strongly. And as a result of that reduced headroom at the end of the forecast period, tax and borrowing and spending decisions
15:59are made today. So it couldn't be more important. to our lives. Everybody's life. Everybody who's been taxed more, everybody who's received more in benefits is in part that that outcome has in part been driven by the numbers that the OBR has plugged into its model. And the most important number it plugs into its model is its price. productivity forecast. That's for the Bank of England. That's for the OBR. The Bank of England is slightly different, but it's as important.
16:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
16:37Neil Woodford: the Bank of England, productivity growth, which they believe is going to be about one percent going forward, so very similar to the OBR. If anything slightly more bearish about productivity growth than the OBR going forward.
16:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
16:51Neil Woodford: Bank of England sees productivity growth as a sort of non-inflationary speed limit for the economy. So for example, and it admits this, it said it basically monetary policy has been tighter than it would otherwise have been if productivity growth had been stronger. So going forward, when the OBR was when the MPC NPC sits down every six weeks and mulls over what to do with interest rates, at the back of its mind, it's always thinking, well, if the economy grows slightly more than 1%, that must be generating some sort of inflationary potential in the economy. And therefore, we've got to err on the side of caution because inflation will will probably not come back to our 2%. target. So it again, for the Monetary Policy Committee, it's been pivotally important. And of course, I've been saying for a long time, rates are too high in the UK.
17:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
17:51Neil Woodford: the re one of the reasons they're too high is that the UK, the the MPC has been mismeasuring, because the ONS has been mismeasuring, productivity.
18:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
18:03Neil Woodford: as a result of that, interest rates, I'm very confident that interest rates in the UK have been higher than they should have been because of this. So we've all felt this through our wallets, through the tax we pay, through the uh the interest rates we pay on our mortgages, through the interest rates we pay on the money we borrow from the bank, through the interest rates that come. companies pay when they borrow from the bank. This number could not be more important.
18:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
18:33Jon Adair: the OBR publishes what happens if it's wrong about all of this. If productivity growth comes in half a point higher than it expects, borrowing ends up about fifty billion pounds lower, and the Chancellor's whole margin in the budget, remember, was £15 fifteen billion. pounds. So the ONS has just measured the last year. at 2.5% against the OBR's 0.7 and the bank's 1%.
18:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
18:56Jon Adair: bank dealt with this in its November reports, and its argument is that the economy didn't produce any more than we thought. GDP is unchanged. Tax is raised on GDP and all the correction does is take hours out of one side of the sum and add output per hour on the other.
19:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
19:11Jon Adair: that basis, the bank says the effect is modest. Neil, I think that's probably the best argument against you. If nothing extra was produced, why should any forecast actually move?
19:22Neil Woodford: No, we we haven't found any more output. Absolutely not. But what we now know is that the inputs into producing that produced that output were far lower. A 100 hundred million hours a week? Of course, there's no more. output found. But what this says, and I'm not, I'm just quoting the Bank of England back to itself. Um, what the Bank of England effectively now has to change is that that what I just mentioned. The non-inflationary growth, the speed limit, the growth speed limit on the economy is now much higher than they thought. That must have an impact on how policy is evolved. It must have an impact. I mean, to suggest that it doesn't blows up everything that the Bank of England has been saying hitherto about how it decides what interest rates should be. I mean, it it's it's fundamental. So to dismiss this as sort of not very important, nothing to see here, is frankly even more ludicrous. Um,
20:33it compounds the error. This is profoundly important, uh, profoundly important for the way the OBR looks at how the economy will grow over the future. And we already know that productivity is growing significantly faster
20:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
20:49Neil Woodford: than the OBR had assumed. That makes a big difference. Uh, it should make a big difference to their forecast for growth going forward. And it should also make a big difference to what the NPC decide to do with interest rates. What they now know is that the economy can grow much faster without generating higher inflation. That is profoundly important.
21:12Jon Adair: But if they muck mark up productivity. can't they just mark the hours down by the same amount and end up with the same economy?
21:20Neil Woodford: Yes, they could. But um what we also know, it this this can't be seen in isolation. I've been writing for the last two or three years about the failure of the Bank of England and the OBR to accurately forecast how far. fast the economy would grow. And almost without fail, both of those institutions have underestimated the growth outcomes in the UK economy. And they've massively failed to do that. They've made the same mistake again this year.
21:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
21:56Neil Woodford: I've written very recently in noise cancelling pieces, the economy is growing something like, well, we will explain. exit 2026 at a growth rate quarter on quarter. So the four-quarter growth rate in
22:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
22:11Neil Woodford: the end of this year is likely to be about 2%. I sit back and I'm not surprised about that because underlying productivity
22:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
22:20Neil Woodford: growing at about 2.5%. And a half percent. Two and a half percent growth in productivity ought to be consistent with growth that is a about two percent. More recently, because those productivity growth assumptions have collapsed, and because we've been mismeasuring productivity for so long,
22:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
22:36Neil Woodford: Bank of England and the OBR have come have been persuaded that that actually those days are now gone, that the economy really can barely grow at more than one to one and a half percent. That's a direct product, I believe, of their changed view about what's uh uh about productivity. Now it's been revealed that their productivity growth assumptions are completely wrong. And now that it looks like productivity growth is something like per hour worked in the economy, two and a half percent, we should not be surprised by growth that is way better than uh the the OBR and the Bank of England have assumed.
23:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
23:17Neil Woodford: that's why they've been upgrading all year. And that's why they'll be wrong for next year as well. And the year after. Until they get their heads around the importance and the significance of this shift in productivity and and the fact that they've been mismeasuring it, they're going gonna to continue to get their numbers wrong.
23:36Jon Adair: The bank has got a second line of defense and it accepts. that productivity's been running above its 1% target for two years now. It says that firms finally are letting go of stuff they've been hanging on to and that that will eventually fade. How do you read this over the last two years?
23:53Neil Woodford: Without really confessing to the fact that they got it it's wrong, they've tried to take the new data and sort of and provide a series of excuses. about oh well, yeah, okay, so we we we we were mismeasuring productivity by off by more than a factor of two, but but yeah, it it's only very temporary. Yet again, the EOR sort of instinct of the Bank of England comes through. So, yeah, firms were shedding labour, excess labour. They talked about this in their monetary policy reports. Firms are now shedding. excess labour that they had previously been hanging on to, and now they're shedding that labor. But but that you know that that is a well that's going to run dry effectively. And uh and therefore we will sort of this sort of short-term boost to productivity growth will, I presume they're suggesting that it will wane. They're wrong. Okay. So part of the story is correct. Yes, I I think since the government massively increased the cost of employing people, naturally, companies have looked to reduce the number of people they employ.
25:01It was predictable as night follows day. When the government decided to do that in the budget in 2024,
25:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
25:08Neil Woodford: I wrote and said exactly this. I said that companies would shed labor. When the government increased the minimum wage and changed employment rules and regulations, what it meant was that firms would employ fewer young people.
25:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
25:25Neil Woodford: that's exactly what's been happening. Anyway, that's part only part of the story. What is also happening, and this is something that the sort of the Bank of England hints at, but doesn't really attack. attach that much significance to yet. I think it will have to in time, is the is the impact of AI. We now have an AI industrial revolution rippling through the UK economy. It is undoubtedly going to improve productivity further. And I think there are already signs that that's happening. So you've got labor shedding going. on because of what the government did. That's going to continue. It may well, but we that may well normalize. The labor shedding may well normalize. But then I think it's very clear that the AI Industrial Revolution will continue and to ripple through the economy and will have an increasingly important impact, particularly on
26:25service-based industries. The UK economy is the most service-based economy in the developed world. A far bigger proportion of the economy than any other developed economy. We are, as an economy, ideally suited to deploy AI technology uh and and to harvest the the benefits for the productivity benefits that will that flow. will from that so i i i have a completely different view i don't see i don't see this sort of productivity revelation as as a sort of a story that will come to an end as as the uk runs out of labor shedding potential in the in in in in in the economy what's clearly happening is that is that businesses are responding to to a number of different factors that are overlapping. And I see, I see the productivity growth accelerating, if anything, going forward. And I see that continuing. It's not going to run out of steam. Um it we're at the start of this process, not at the end of
27:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
27:33Neil Woodford: And the important, the other important thing from this is that. is that that stronger growth is not going to generate the sort of inflation that the Bank of England, the NPC have been worrying about because they've had the wrong view on productivity. With a with a much faster productivity growth going on in the economy, the economy can grow faster without generating inflationary potential. And that has to be a good outcome. And it must mean that the interest rate should, all other things being equal, be lower.
28:07Jon Adair: Well, let's talk about that because if you're right in productivity is growing at 2% and continues to do so, the speed limit is much higher than the bank thinks. The market has the bank rate at about 4.9% by the end of next year. What do you think?
28:22Neil Woodford: The I the notion of rates race being a 4.9%, four point nine percent, I think, is ludicrous. Um the reason that the market well, the reason that the that people like the the institutions like uh the National Institute of Economic and Social Research or or or the market more generally is forecasting much higher rates is because they're massively overestimating these second round effects, which so far this year have not emerged at all. So let's look at October's data. What October's inflation data shows yet again is that all of the inflation in the UK economy right now, frankly, is a product of the energy price shock that has followed the wall that kicked off in February. All of the inflation is effectively attributed to energy prices, high gas prices, high petrol prices, high diesel prices. When you look at core inflation, for example, in October, core inflation X energy. So you look at CPI X energy, it's at 2.6%,
29:26the same rate it was in September.
29:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
29:28Neil Woodford: you look at food price inflation, it actually fell below 1% in October. There is no evidence of the second round effects that the Bank of England and all these other forecasting bodies keep. talking about. We have an energy price problem because of the war. Now, when you look at what's going on in energy prices since the bank put rates up, Brent Crude has fallen over $25 a barrel since they made the uh since they increased rates, or made the decision anyway. Gas prices have fallen about 50p a therm
30:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from
30:02Neil Woodford: 250p. to about 200p a therm. I said that inflation, the the the the Bank of England's inflation forecast for October, November, and December were too high. The bank was forecasting 3.7% in October. It came in at 3.6. I think they got 3.8% Point eight percent in for November and December. And I think 4.4%. four point four percent for January. I think they're too high. I I think inflation will go up between now and the end of the year. Maybe it'll go up a bit more from the three point um the three point six percent um uh that we record in October. But let's not forget, petrol prices are going down. So my view on inflation is is much more benign than the markets, and I don't see any need whatsoever to put rates up uh to the sorts of levels that the market is discounting. In fact, I don't see any reason for the for rates to rise further from 4%. It won't make any difference to
31:02to the uh to inflation at all. Interest rates don't affect gas prices and they don't affect um crude prices. Um that it's just a very blunt. and ineffective weapon. And energy prices and energy price inflation will start to fall dramatically in the relatively near future. And so I'm much more relaxed about what happens to inflation.
31:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
31:32Neil Woodford: I don't see any need to for the bank to put rates up any further. And much of the rationale. that that I've heard from the hawks on the committee about why they put rates up is now fundamentally undermined by what we now understand about productivity data.
31:52Jon Adair: Neil, here's the question that anyone who's an investor would want to know: which is which parts of the UK market are still priced as if the OBR's 0.7% is the right number?
32:03Neil Woodford: I think it would be wrong for me to say that, you know, th the the that that productivity mismeasurement issue has had a direct impact on and you can I and you can isolate that impact and you can see it in in individual sectors. I think that would be um
32:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
32:20Neil Woodford: uh that would be a misrepresentation. But what you can do is
32:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
32:25Neil Woodford: you like input this much better news on productivity, which I believe I I've been, you know, I've been suggesting that the UK's productivity performance was much better than the official data suggested for a long time. It is sort of embedded in my more uh optimistic view of where the economy is going. I it's i embedded in in my view that inflation will be lower than the the government thinks, lower than the NPC thinks, lower than the OBR thinks. It's embedded in my view about how the economy can grow faster uh than than consensus economics believes and I've been right on that. I've been right on the inflation numbers this year as well. So
33:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
33:09Neil Woodford: know I I I think I think this is fundamentally good news. because it supports that more positive narrative about w how the economy will perform in the future. Despite the headwinds of higher taxes, um uh I I I I I'm I'm I am much more confident about that sort of more optimistic scenario as a result of what I've learned in the last few days.
33:39Jon Adair: Now, if the OBR and the bank don't change their numbers and rates stay where they are through next year, does your case for the UK still stand?
33:49Neil Woodford: Yes. Yes, it does. Um
33:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
33:52Neil Woodford: case still stands. If the NBC and the Bank of England remain out of touch, that's a polite Like way of putting it, with with the fundamentals of the UK economy, which I think they are, I don't think
34:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
34:03Neil Woodford: the policy errors will uh undermine that underlying growth potential in the economy. So I think the outcome is still going to be better than people think. It could be even better if policy was adjusted appropriately for the environment that's going to unfold. If they did. the right thing, frankly, sat on their hands and then started cutting rates in the first half of next year, then the outcome could be even better than I think.
34:37Jon Adair: Neil, where can people read your whole argument, including all of the charts?
34:42Neil Woodford: Right. So, along with this episode, uh, I've written a piece, uh, a research piece. It you can read that at noisecancelling.c. noisecancelling.co
34:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
34:52Neil Woodford: along with all the other research pieces that I've sort of alluded to, and we can provide links to what I was saying a long time ago about the UK's productivity data as well.
35:03Jon Adair: Well, for the last 17 years, the official figures counted hours that nobody worked, which made Britain's productivity growth look about half what it was. And the ONS has now taken those hours out.
35:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
35:15Jon Adair: Bank of England thinks that changes very little, and Neil thinks it changes the forecast behind your taxes and your interest rates. We'll find out more from the Bank of England on the 17th of December, the industry figures on the 4th of March, and the OBR in the spring. Neil's piece with every chart from this episode is in the noise cancelling app. It's free to join on iPhone and Android, Androids, and you'll find the link down in the description down below. Neil and I will of course be back with more next week. Until then, take
35:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): care.