The Forum with Becky Quick

Kalshi CEO Tarek Mansour discusses prediction markets, regulation, and trader demographics

21 min Listen to the original
Prediction MarketsRegulationKalshiCommodities Exchange ActMarket Structure

Summary

Tarek Mansour, CEO of Kalshi, distinguishes prediction markets from gambling by emphasizing their role in price discovery and economic efficiency. He highlights that Kalshi's top traders are predominantly from 'Main Street,' with 80% attending public schools and many having retail backgrounds. Mansour describes Kalshi as a federally regulated exchange that spent four years obtaining its license, advocating for pro-regulation policies that protect vulnerable traders. He outlines strict policies against insider trading and moral hazard, including bans on markets involving violence or terrorism. Finally, he addresses legal battles with approximately twenty states, arguing for federal preemption to ensure national liquidity and prevent market bifurcation.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 0:37

    Introduction and Economic Club of New York

    Becky Quick introduces the Economic Club of New York, a 115-year-old nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization.

  2. 0:37 – 5:25

    Prediction Markets vs. Gambling: Price Discovery

    Tarek Mansour distinguishes prediction markets from gambling by emphasizing price discovery and economic value, citing Taylor Swift's wedding at Madison Square Garden.

  3. 5:25 – 8:11

    Trader Demographics and Main Street vs. Wall Street

    Mansour addresses a Wall Street Journal report, claiming Kalshi's top performers are predominantly from 'Main Street,' with 80% attending public school.

  4. 8:11 – 10:24

    Regulatory Stance and Responsible Trading

    Mansour describes Kalshi as a federally regulated exchange that spent four years obtaining regulation, advocating for policies protecting vulnerable traders.

  5. 10:24 – 16:10

    Insider Trading and Moral Hazard Prevention

    The discussion covers Kalshi's policies on insider trading and moral hazard, including bans on markets involving violence and verification processes.

  6. 16:10 – 20:43

    Legal Battles with States and Federal Preemption

    Mansour discusses lawsuits from approximately twenty states attempting to ban prediction markets, arguing for federal regulation to ensure national liquidity.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
AppleAAPLequityneutralOr the alternative is imagine we bifurcated the New York Stock Exchange to 50 state New York stock exchanges, like 50 national stock exchanges, where you can only buy Apple stock and Oregon from someone who's in Oregon.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Kalshi pays MSG approximately $1 million per year for a partnership, and the value of that deal tripled after Taylor Swift announced her wedding at the venue.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:50

How to verify: Check Kalshi's public disclosures or press releases regarding partnerships with Madison Square Garden; verify MSG's corporate filings for significant revenue sources if disclosed. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

70 billion dollars of private equity have gone into sports.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·2:27

How to verify: Search for private equity investment reports in the sports industry for the relevant period; verify via sources like Preqin or S&P Global Market Intelligence. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

80% of Kalshi's top traders went to public school and are 2x more likely to have worked in retail than in Wall Street or banking.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·7:24

How to verify: Locate the public studies or reports published by Kalshi on their website or investor relations page detailing trader demographics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Federal Reserve published a paper titled 'Kalshi and the Rise of Macro Markets' finding Kalshi's forecasts for inflation, GDP, and interest rates were more accurate than Wall Street's.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·7:44

How to verify: Search the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or Federal Reserve Board publications for the specific paper title and authorship. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Kalshi spent the first four years of its existence getting regulated as a federally regulated exchange.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·8:11

How to verify: Review Kalshi's SEC filings (e.g., Form C or registration statements) or press releases announcing its regulatory approval timeline. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Kalshi has a partnership with the NBA to share data on potential insiders.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·13:42

How to verify: Search for press releases or news articles from the NBA and Kalshi announcing a data-sharing partnership. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Kalshi is suing approximately twenty states that have tried to restrict or ban prediction markets.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·16:10

How to verify: Search court dockets for lawsuits filed by Kalshi against state attorneys general or regulators; verify the number of states involved. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Commodities Exchange Act was enacted in 1974, following legal battles over grain futures.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·17:47

How to verify: Consult the text of the Commodity Exchange Act of 2026 (CEA) and historical records of the Chicago Board of Trade litigation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Kalshi bans markets involving violence, war, terrorism, assassinations, and wildfires.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·11:37

How to verify: Review Kalshi's Terms of Service or Market Rules on their official website to confirm prohibited market categories. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Kalshi verifies customers using Social Security numbers and checks against FEC reports and politically exposed persons lists.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·13:42

How to verify: Review Kalshi's KYC (Know Your Customer) policy documentation or regulatory filings detailing their identity verification processes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Do your own research

  • Verify the Commodities Exchange Act of 1974 provisions regarding federal preemption of state-level gambling bans.
  • Check the list of approximately twenty states that have sued or attempted to ban prediction markets.
  • Review Kalshi's CFTC registration and compliance filings to confirm the 'four years' timeline for regulation.
  • Analyze the demographic data cited by Mansour regarding the 80% public school attendance and retail work experience of top traders.
  • Research the specific markets banned by Kalshi related to violence, war, or terrorism to understand moral hazard policies.
  • Compare Kalshi's revenue model (trading fees) with traditional gambling houses (house edge) to assess the 'profit from customer losses' distinction.
  • Look for recent court rulings on state vs. federal jurisdiction over prediction markets.
  • Verify the economic impact claims surrounding Taylor Swift's Madison Square Garden event as a case study for market efficiency.
Full transcriptexpand

0:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm

0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Becky Quick of CNBC, and your host of the forum. I'll be guiding you through exclusive conversations among some of the world's global leaders, conversations previously held behind club doors, but today we invite you in.

0:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

0:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Economic Club of New York serves as the premier forum for nonpartisan discussion dedicated to connecting the world's brightest minds with preeminent public and private sector leaders. A nonprofit, 501c3, the club is a 115-year-old platform. for the conversations that help shape the future of our world.

0:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

0:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Economic Club of New York, brightest minds, critical conversations, catalyst for innovation.

0:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You have said that prediction markets are different from gambling.

0:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): They're

0:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not gambling, it's about price discovery. And I'm sure that the per the uh viewers online and the participants in this room will agree there is great value in price discovery, it helps market. markets function uh more efficiently. But why is it important for markets to price who wins the Cardinals Cowboys football game? Or who gets eliminated on dancing with the stars uh this week?

1:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Two

1:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actual two actual bets, by the way, on CalG.

1:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I don't have any. I'm surprised by

1:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the number of people that care about dancing with the stars. I

1:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean, Yeah.

1:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You know,

1:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

1:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): mean who am I to say with whether that dancing thing with of the stars matters or not? I mean, really, it's it's like this it's always interesting. the the interesting thing to me about this is like certainly we have markets that are more socially useful to some people than others. And there's there's markets that are more, some people would find them frivolous. And it and you know, and this is where the rule of a federal regulator can come and put some lines and decide, okay, these are too frivolous, these are like in the public interest and have enough economic consequence. But you know, I'm sure you can find some markets that are funny on Cal Sheet because some s set said set of people really care about them. And one example I I've always quoted, it's so interesting. I've gotten so much inbound about our Taylor Swift markets. And and it's always been interesting to me because the general public, when you think about Taylor Swift, you think it's a gimmick. You think it's like some sort of funny side show. Oh, okay, Taylor Swift is doing one thing or the other. I can tell you, I have a partnership with MSG. You know, I'm not gonna say exactly how much we paid for it per year, but let's let's assume we paid for it a million dollars a year. That's my deal value with MSG. After this woman decided to get married there, I can resell that thing for three million dollars now.

2:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

2:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): went up by three ta 3x. That is the economic impact of Taylor Swift just showing deciding to do her wedding at MSG. And the and this is true for the weather, it's true for economic economics, it's certainly true for sports. I mean the notion that sports is a sort of sideshow or a game It's is a bit outdated now. Like it's big business. 70 billion dollars of private equity have gone into sports. Whether the World Cup was going to be played in certain cities, I mean, that has invigorated the city in many different ways. Go to Kansas and ask them what did the World Cup did to the city? I

2:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean,

2:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): there's a real inflection point that happened. A lot of people that were hedging on Calci, I mean, some people bet on Calci. They trade, and a lot of people do it the way they bet on the stock market or the way they bet on traditional grain futures as a way to make money. But there are some people that are actually using it to offset risk, to essentially hedge themselves against an adverse. consequence. And you know, sports, one of the typical examples is like, you

2:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,

2:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we have a we had a bunch of media rights buyers that know that okay, if Team America loses early, that investment they made in the advertisement is gonna get marked down by fifty, sixty, seventy percent. Why? Because Americans stop watch watching the the the World Cup. And so to me, what's interesting is you know the difference between markets like and gambling has never been about behavior. Gambling is a behavior. There are people that bet and gamble and trade, whatever you want to call it, any name, on Calci, the same way they do it on Robinhood, the same way they do it on Coinbase, say they do it on the stock market and on Nasdaq. That is true. But that doesn't make a market not a market. You know, the structure is is it a market that promotes open price discovery? That actually, if somebody is smart and doing research in the world, they come to the market and get rewarded for it. And the reason they're getting rewarded, because a lot of you are actually looking at the prediction market forecasts when it comes to politics and so on and so forth, there's a public good that comes out of it, which is this prediction, it's making us smarter of the word. And then some people are hedging their risk. And then you need for every hedger, you need a speculator. And that's true for prediction markets, it's true for sports, weather, economic, it's true for grain futures, and it's

3:55true for oil futures. The the topic can change, the market doesn't. Or is it gambling where the sole purpose of the model, it's a business model, you're going to a house, and if you're doing anything that's smart, and if you're showing any indicative behavior of doing research and getting sophisticated and calibrating the odds or being smart about what you're doing, you get banned. Because that's not what the purpose of this thing is. It's not price discovery or promoting getting smarter about something. The purpose of it is for you to lose money to the house. That's really what structure. You're betting against the house, the house revenue is equal to the customer's losses, and over time you root out the winners and you figure out how. to get the losers coming back and so on and so forth. And so oftentimes people, you know, they have this conception, which the casinos have done a very good job at like seeding the scenario of the prediction markets, these young men that are gambling these life savings. I mean, if you look at like the percentage of the volume that comes from these young men, it's tiny on CalC. It's pretty much irrelevant. Really, the 70 to 80% of our volume comes from these the people, maybe the best way to imagine it, a lot of you probably here have watched. The Big Short. You know, the two kids that like uh were living in their mom's garage, but like did all the research, they were going crazy doing the research on like the mortgages and like read every single one of them and all of that. That's what we're doing. You're adding that level of rigor to politics, to sports, to economics. And 70, 80% of that is those people. They're setting up teams and they're doing copious amounts amount of research, the same way that uh

5:14Morgan Stanley Allen does research on Apple stock and then trading it on the open market. And if they have a good piece of information, they make money. And if they don't, they get punished. And that's I think what's so exciting about this next generation of markets is anyone can participate.

5:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh

5:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you mentioned that there are uh a few participants who have outsized participation in these markets, outsized um volume. The journal actually found that there's a small number of accounts on Polymarket and Calci. CalShi, Um often pros using sort of a a more data-driven algorithmic trading model, who take home most of the winnings,

5:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not

5:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just participation, but most of the winnings. And they phrased it as there are a few sharks and a lot of losers potentially losing their shirts. What duty do

5:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

5:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): marketplaces like yours have to ensure participants are informed about the risks they take and ensure that they are not gambling away their life savings.

6:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Let me

6:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): ask, I want to answer the risk question. It's been interesting. I I did see that Wall Street Journal article. Most of the data was from Polymarket, but Cash's data is a bit different. And I also don't know how they sample that data. But you know, it's always been interesting to me. Like,

6:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how

6:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): many hedge funds outperform the SP every year? Like what percentage of hedge funds outperform the S P?

6:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's

6:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): pretty much an eighty 80-20 twenty thing. 20% Twenty percent of hedge funds win and eighty 80% percent lose. And it's but it's always been interesting to

6:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.

6:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): It's as if there's some sort of standard that an open competition, a market, should be 50-50. It's like you know, you're like 50%, 50% of people win and 50% of people lose. Imagine like, but then there wouldn't be skill, then what are we even doing? Like in there's been this sort of supposition that like it should be like a competition should be uniform. Imagine like you

6:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,

6:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we run the NBA finals and every year we pick one team and uniformly at random, and that's the one that wins. I mean, what's the point of a competition? A competition is a game of skill. The same way in the stock market and prediction markets, you will reward people that will be better. You know, some athletes put more effort, energy, resources into their research than others, and they will be rewarded disproportionately than others. And that's what you see. Some people put way more money, effort, resources to get better at this than other people. And that's what an open compet competition and open market does. The thing that's unique about prediction markets. though, is that, and we put out some trader uh some some of you may have seen this, we put out some studies, and it's all public, about who are the top traders, who are the people that are performing the best in prediction markets. And it's amazing. You see it, 80% of them went to public school. They're 2x more likely to have worked in retail than have worked in Wall Street or banking. I mean, think about that. They're 2x more likely to have worked in retail than real Wall Street or banking. You know, the Federal Reserve put out a paper about uh you know the forecast. from Calci, which I think is Main Street, it's people, millions of people, laymen, average people, against Wall Street on economics, on like inflation, GDP, interest, uh, a bunch of economic indicators. And they found that Main Street, Calci was actually more accurate than Wall Street. And that's a paper that's public. It may be in the pack, but it's called Calci and the Rise of Macro Markets. And after that paper was put out, it's like, is how is Calci Cashi so predictive on inflation? Like, who are these traders? Are

7:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they

7:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like Wall Street, et etc.? cetera? And you look at the top traders, like our top trader on inflation is random dude in Kansas, never traded financial markets, uh, likes reading about the economy for 25 years, and he's now a way to monetize

8:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. I

8:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): certainly think though that Calchi, like Robin Hood, like the NASDAQ, we do have a very I and I believe, you know, we are regulated as a federally regulated exchange. We spend the first four years getting regulated. And my person, and we are doing a lot of things that are beyond the regulation. My personal beliefs, and I've been very big advocate of this, I'm pro-regulation. pro regulation. I'm pro-related. pro free markets, but also pro regulation. I don't think they're counter to each other. I actually think that if you do it right and if you solve the hard problems that are not usually sexy headlines, you can actually get to a better outcome where free markets grow even faster and better, but you have sensible guardrails around it. I believe it's totally the platform's responsibility to make sure that we're policing a responsible use. And a responsible use is not people losing money.

8:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): People

8:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): losing in a competition or losing anything. in life, that's what you do. You got outcompeted by somebody else, and that's okay. It's losing money that you cannot afford. If doing things that can harm you and harm your life. And that's true for Calci, it's true for traditional gaming, like whatever sports, sports books and draftings, it's true for Robinhood, and it's true for NASDAQ. And I think that the rules need to be updated to reflect the reality that financial markets now have millions of people, not just institutions that are participating in them, whether it's in options and so on and so

9:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): forth.

9:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And but the key thing about prediction markets is when somebody is doing things that are harmful to them and keep losing money and they're clearly vulnerable and have addiction issues, they don't they're not losing money, that money to Cal Sheet, they're losing it to somebody else in the open market. So we don't have an incentive to keep promoting it. In fact, we use the same tools that the sportsbooks

9:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do

9:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that to send predatory marketing to these customers to actually ban these customers or add more friction to their accounts because again, the sportsbooks their business model is reliant on these most vulnerable customers that keep losing money to the sports book that you know they send them a drink or get them a suite or whatever. But on Cash, like I'm reliant on these informed traders that make the markets more efficient and more accurate over time. And sure, some people are gonna lose, that's a competition. But those people that are really doing it irresponsibly, in some ways, we want wanna to kind of

10:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): put

10:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): them out of the system. I think of it as a long probability. It's like there's all the youth and then on both extremes there's all the smart informed trader and then on that very extreme of those is the insider traders. The people that are actually cheating on the one side. Those you want to ban. And then there's people that are gonna be losing because you know they're got out copied by somebody else and then on the other end of that spectrum you have the people that are like doing it irresponsibly and you also want to basically put those out of the system. And that's what the regulation needs to basically target.

10:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There have been some other very high profile cases of insider trading. The teleprompter guy, the Trump teleprompter guy, just as an example. How do you go about detecting insider trading? Because I imagine that in the George Santos case, maybe it was relatively easy if he was doing it under his own name. But maybe somebody has a cousin, maybe the cousin of the teleprompter

10:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): guy.

10:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It seems very difficult. Um, unlike in some of these other competitions. that you were talking about with sports and things like that. For

10:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): politics

10:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and yeah.

10:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For

10:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well, for politics or or any of these other markets uh where it really would be an unfair playing field.

11:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's right.

11:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh if there is somebody who has insider information at the heart of what the the bet is, or even worse, you might have some moral hazard problems, right, where they

11:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can

11:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they can effectuate the outcome that they are betting on. They can set the wildfire or or what have you. So can you can you talk a little bit about how you try to prevent it or how you detect it insider trading? Ex post.

11:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, I mean a few things. Let me address the moral hazard because I think it's a bit easier and then I'll get to insider trading. So we

11:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there's

11:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a bunch of regs that ban essentially markets that pr pr prevent like present moral hazards, like

11:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): violence,

11:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): war, terrorism, sounds assassinations, etc. Like those are never been listed, including wildfires. We've never listed wildfires. Those have been listed offshore. So on bricks markets that are unregulated that run offshore. Um and that's one of the challenges that we've had, and you know, and I always say this, and I say this pretty publicly at this point. Like I like competition. I love competing with Robin Herr and Coinbase. Now Goldman is entering the space. There's so many competition is good. An industry doesn't really come become an industry without competition. I think the things that I've always struggled with a little bit with some one of our big competitors, poly markets, I think we have principal, like principles differences. I think they went offshore, did it unregulated, and then the results show like they listed some of these missile strike markets, et cetera, that have really infuriated people for good reason. They infuriated me too. They're bad markets, they shouldn't exist because they present moral hazards. So really the line there is like, you know, there are regs that ban them, like, and you know, we shouldn't allow any operators to do these types of things. And if there's certain markets that are on the line, my view is we should be conservative and not let them happen. Now, insider trading is a is a is a more interesting issue. And I always go back to,

12:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,

12:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): initially when in the beginning of the year, when the first insider trading case, which is the famous Maduro trade, happened, um, you know, there was a bit of a debate in the industry. Like we came out very strongly to say we've you

12:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know

12:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we spent the first four years building systems to ban insider trading, and we're very against insider. And some of the industry players who've now come around initially were saying, well, well, actually, no, we should let insider trading happen because it makes market prices more efficient. Like if you let insiders trade on the information that they have, it should in theory make the market price more efficient. And

13:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that is

13:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a completely moronic take, basically, because like you know, there is sure theoretically that would happen, but what would happen if you let corruption go rampant in a in a in a in a in a free with in a supposedly free and fair competition? People stop believing it's fair. and what happens if people stop believing it fair? They stop participating. The thing breaks. People stop using it. And that's why it's banned in the stock markets, banned in traditional markets, it's banned in prediction markets. There's a few layers. I mean, one is we verify all customers. So when you onboard Takashi, we take your name, Social Security. Number two is we send it to a bunch of vendors that usually the banks use. So after the Banking Secrecy Act was enacted, banks have a duty, the same way as a regulated exchange like us, we have a duty to figure out who we're transacting for, who we're moving money for, so who the customers are. And then you can cross-divide it against a bunch of lists. So FEC reports, politically exposed people, their families, their close families. And there's all sorts of lists now, also with sports leagues. We now we just announced a partnership with the NBA. The core tenants of that partnership is they share data with us about who may be an insider in the league, so we can ban them from trading.

14:02And then we ban all these people from trading on things that they proactively uh uh pro we proactively ban them on things that they might have an insider information or influence over. That ban is actually self-regulation. That's not currently law. We're pushing for this to be law. I'm strongly advocating for this to become law. But what's law is also the after the trade, like post the fact, which we had discussed last time. Um after a trade happens, the thing that's interesting with fraud is like there's always something suspicious. Like somebody, you know, all of a sudden is buying in larger size, something that's an asymmetric long shot or other things. And then that can go and that goes to an investigation team that like can impose fines all the way to criminal prosecution. And the way that really combat crime or bad actors is you catch them, and when you catch them, you have to enforce heavy consequences. And that you know, that's like true for any financial crime or any crime really on the street. And so that the next person that considers doing it is gonna reconsider it because of how bad it would be for them to get caught. Now, here's the thing I will say about prediction markets. Have I I'm sure a lot of you have seen, especially the young people in the room, you

15:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know

15:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the meme about the plane from World War II around survivorship bias, where like, you

15:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,

15:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the plane was shot in certain places, and we make, you know, we make the completely wrong conclusion about where we should shoot the plane or not should shoot the plane. Like, I think that's a bit what's happening in prediction markets. Like it in in the the thing is. prediction markets are incredibly transparent. All the trading activity is public. You see it. Everybody sees it. You can go to cash.com right now, click on whatever you want to click on, and you see all the trading activity publicly available as a log for anyone. Which is not really true for traditional markets. You cannot easily, the reporters and press and the general public and our customers cannot Not see it so publicly. And so it's interesting because I there's more basically the TLGR TLJR is there's more way trading happening in the stock market. We're just catching way less of it. Whereas in prediction markets, we're just actually catching much more of it because it's so blatant. It's right there for everybody to see. When somebody you know is moving the price from 10% to 25%, well everybody, you know, starts freaking out about what happened. And that's a good thing because then we can go and police it.

15:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Would you like to be a part of the conversations at the Economic Club of New York? Learn more about membership, the New York City and National Festival. Fellows programs, and other opportunities for engagement in the club at www.econclubny.org.

16:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I have faced lawsuits in I think about twenty states up trying to restrict or ban But

16:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we're the ones suing in most of them.

16:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're suing in most of them.

16:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah.

16:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um because they're trying to regulate you.

16:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): No, it's not exactly right, because they're trying to like sue us, so we sued them first.

16:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay. Okay. Fair enough.

16:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

16:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as I understand it so far, appeals courts have issued conflicting

16:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): rulings.

16:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, they've issued conflicting rulings. Do you think that there is any legitimate state interest in regulating products that look and feel like sportsbeds?

16:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Not exactly the not framed the right way. So so

16:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I don't

16:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): have my phone now because it's just turned off a batter battery, but you know, I recently I've been really obsessed with this court. opinion. There's a court opinion that goes, you know, we we believe I don't have the exact language, I think I read to you last time. So so we believe that uh dealing in these types of markets is void by the common law because it is contrary to public policy. It is not only contrary to public policy, it is a crime against the state, a crime against uh uh the country, a crime crime against humanity. And they go on and on about how the species of gambling is the permanent premanent sin, and it's emphatically the worst thing. that's happening to society. That's an opinion about uh uh from eighteen eighty eight about grain futures. It's like amazing. Like it's the states were suing the Chicago Board of Trade because some farmers were betting on the price of grain. They're gr gambling on the price of grain. Some of them were losing their house which was bad. And states were like, well this is gambling. It's the same thing as people, you know, betting in on the bucket shops, which is was the original version of the casinos and and the the sports books at the time. And you know, that whole thing played out. A bunch of states, there were like 20, 30 states that through the Chicago Board of Trade, and it went up to the Supreme Court.

17:47And then we handled it with the Commodities Exchange Act, which came in 74, which is like, okay, yes, there is gambling, speculating, trading, whatever you want to call it, in all financial markets. If the line is, if anyone is going to use a certain market to gamble, then you know we the Nasdaq should be staying. state-by-state regulated. Like it and there's an argument to be made for that because there are people that lose their shirts gambling on options markets. It's true. And

18:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so

18:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): how do we draw a line? The line is goes back to is it a market or are you betting against the house? Because the house's incentives are to basically ban out the winners and screw the losers. The market's incentive is to promote price discovery and open market that can produce the public goods of the price forecast, which is says gives farmers predictability about the future, the same way that prediction markets give us predictability about a bunch of different things, and risk management. There's some speculators on one side and hedgers on the other side.

18:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

18:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the reason why a market needs to be regulated, there's a reason why it needs to be regulated at a federal level, is because of liquidity. Like when you want to buy something, you mentioned the piece of some state state races have low volume or low liquidity. Why? Because I'm not taking the other side. Every time, if you're on one side of the market, you have to be on the other side of that market. And so at the time it's a little bit like they were thinking about, well, well we we have two options. Either let New York Stock Exchange be a nationwide market with nationwide rules rules. Where the rules of who's an insider in California are the same as New York.

19:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

19:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that when I match the two of you abiding by the same rules in the competition.

19:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

19:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then we enable liquidity so you can trade against someone in Texas. Someone in Texas can trade against someone in California, against Hawaii. Like that global liquidity, that diversity of trades is critical for an open market. Or the alternative is imagine we bifurcated the New York Stock Exchange to 50 state New York stock exchanges, like 50 national stock exchanges, where you can only buy Apple stock and Oregon from someone who's in Oregon. What would happen? You can't buy the Apple stock. It wouldn't work. It would bifurcate liquidity, make markets inefficient. It's a very anti-free markets way to approach things. It would just not work. And so the message is always like: it's not about cash not wanting to be regulated. We spend the first four years proactively getting regulated when our main competitor became the Uber of the space, Polymarket. Two years ago, you didn't even know who we were. I've always been very pro-regulation. I want regulation.

19:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

19:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if there's a delta with the states, I always tell them like about how the marketing is being done, et cetera. Like, let's have that conversation. We're open to

19:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

19:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): If you want to tax it, certainly you can tax it. It's more about whether we want this market to be, to live as a market onshore, or we want to drive it offshore to give another yet another monopoly to the casinos. That's really the fundamental question that's going on. here. And, you know, I'd like to choose the free open market competition, which is America what America has chosen historically.

20:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You've been listening to the forum by the Economic Club of New York, a nonprofit 501c3 dedicated to connecting the world's brightest minds for critical nonpartisan conversations. Be sure to subscribe now to be alerted to future new episodes. Would you like to be a part of the conversation at the Economic? Club of New York? Learn more about membership, the New York City and National Fellows programs, and other opportunities for engagement in the club at www.econclubny.org. I'm your host, Becky Quick. Thanks for listening.

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