Berkshire Hathaway 1989 Letter: Insurance Cycles, Zero Coupon Bonds, and Investment Philosophy
Summary
The speaker analyzes the insurance industry's structural lack of price discipline and Berkshire's strategy of retaining catastrophe risk during capacity shortages. He critiques the use of zero coupon bonds and EBDIT metrics, arguing they obscure true cash expenses like depreciation. The speaker reflects on his evolution from 'cigar butt' investing to buying wonderful companies at fair prices, citing Coca-Cola as a key lesson. He also details Berkshire's acquisition criteria, tax efficiency strategies, and the performance of its diverse subsidiary businesses.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 6:27
Insurance Industry Economics and Capacity
The speaker describes the insurance industry's structural tendency toward subnormal profitability due to overcapacity and lack of price discipline, contrasting it with historical cartel-like behavior. He argues that profitability only improves during rare periods of capacity shortage when insurers are frightened.
- 6:27 – 13:33
Berkshire's Catastrophe Reinsurance Strategy
Berkshire capitalized on a post-catastrophe shortage by offering $250 million in catastrophe coverage, retaining the risk entirely rather than reinsuring it. This strategy leverages Berkshire's massive net worth and willingness to accept volatility for higher expected returns.
- 13:33 – 20:39
Investment Portfolio and Coca-Cola Reflection
The speaker lists major stock holdings and reflects on a missed opportunity with Coca-Cola, admitting he watched the company for 52 years before investing in 1988. He attributes the delay to a failure to connect his observation of the product's strength with its financial value.
- 20:39 – 26:16
Convertible Preferred Stock Investments
Berkshire invested in convertible preferreds of Gillette, USAir, and Champion International to secure high dividends and upside potential while linking with trusted management. These investments are structured to protect capital while allowing participation in equity growth.
- 26:16 – 31:42
Zero Coupon Bonds and Tax Efficiency
Berkshire issued zero coupon convertible bonds to raise capital with a low effective interest rate due to tax deductions on accrued interest. The speaker contrasts this with other zero coupon bonds, criticizing those used for deceptive purposes while praising the utility of stripped Treasury coupons for institutional investors.
- 31:42 – 38:04
Zero Coupon Bonds and EBDIT
The speaker describes how zero coupon bonds allow issuers to defer interest payments, creating a false sense of solvency. He criticizes the use of EBDIT (Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest, and Taxes) as a metric for debt service, arguing that depreciation is a real cash expense that cannot be ignored.
- 38:04 – 44:22
Investment Banker Critique and S&L Crisis
The speaker labels investment bankers as 'promotees' who enable reckless deals by ignoring accrued interest and depreciation. He notes that savings and loan associations, using federally insured deposits, bought these bonds and are now in trouble, potentially shifting losses to taxpayers.
- 44:22 – 49:28
Mistakes of the First Twenty-Five Years
The speaker reviews his past errors, starting with buying Berkshire Hathaway textiles. He explains the 'cigar butt' investing approach, where he bought cheap businesses with poor long-term prospects, and contrasts it with the superior strategy of buying wonderful companies at fair prices.
- 49:28 – 53:19
Institutional Imperative and Leverage
He discusses how corporate inertia and peer pressure (the 'institutional imperative') lead to irrational decisions. He admits to avoiding leverage due to a small chance of distress, prioritizing safety over higher returns, and emphasizes avoiding difficult business problems rather than solving them.
- 53:19 – 55:55
Acquisition Criteria and Business Preferences
The speaker outlines six criteria for new acquisitions: large size ($10M+ earnings), consistent earnings, high returns on equity with little debt, existing management, simple businesses, and a known price. He prefers the 'Blumkin Friedman Heldman' model where owner-managers want cash but wish to stay involved.
- 55:55 – 1:04:09
Operational Updates and Shareholder Meeting
He highlights the success of Harry Bottle in turning around subsidiaries. He praises the NYSE specialist for reducing trading spreads. He announces the sale of a corporate jet and details the logistics for the 1990 annual meeting, including venue changes and hotel arrangements.
- 1:04:09 – 1:05:50
Berkshire's Intrinsic Value Growth and Market Valuation
The speaker notes that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded faster than its book value due to a shift from discount to premium valuations of its holdings. This double benefit of portfolio company growth and market correction is expected to diminish, leaving only the organic growth of business values.
- 1:05:50 – 1:10:40
Limits of Growth and Tax Implications
Citing Carl Sagan, the speaker explains that high growth rates self-destruct as the base expands. He details Berkshire's tax situation, noting a $1.1 billion deferred tax liability on unrealized gains, which he characterizes as an interest-free loan from the Treasury rather than a true liability.
- 1:10:40 – 1:36:26
Mathematical Advantage of Long-Term Investing
An example illustrates that a single investment doubling twenty times over twenty years yields vastly superior after-tax returns compared to reinvesting after-tax proceeds from twenty separate doubles, due to the compounding effect of deferred taxes.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| AMERICAN EXPRESS COAXP | equity | neutral | In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one time huge but solvable problem, as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. |
| COCA COLA COKO | equity | bullish | twelve million dollars last year, not counting large capital gains realized by Geiko and Coca-Cola. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Incurred losses in the insurance industry have grown at an 11% annual rate over the last 25 years, while premium growth lags, leading to underwriting losses.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check historical insurance industry loss ratio data from the Insurance Information Institute or NAIC filings for the period 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe combined ratio increase in 1989 was a little more than expected because catastrophes led by Hurricane Hugo accounted for about two points of the increase.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:57
How to verify: Review Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report or NAIC combined ratio data for 2026, adjusting for Hurricane Hugo losses. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire's premium volume may drop to $150 million in 1990 from a high of $1 billion in 1986.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·5:56
How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for actual premium volume figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Hurricane Hugo generated $4 billion or more of insured loss.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:20
How to verify: Review insurance industry loss estimates for Hurricane Hugo (2026) from sources like the Insurance Council or major reinsurer reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire offered to write up to $250 million of catastrophe coverage in 1989.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·9:38
How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report section on reinsurance operations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire has a net worth in its insurance companies of about $6 billion, the second highest in the United States.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·10:42
How to verify: Review Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for insurance segment net worth and compare with industry peers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Year-end 1989 common stock holdings over $100 million cost $1.67 billion and had a market value of $5.19 billion.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·14:17
How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for investment portfolio details and market values. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Coca-Cola holdings increased from 14,172,500 shares at the end of 1988 to 23,350,000 shares.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·14:49
How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for share count changes in Coca-Cola. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire purchased $600 million of Gillette preferred stock with an 8.75% dividend and conversion at $50 per share.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·20:39
How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for details on the Gillette preferred stock transaction. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire issued $902.6 million of zero coupon convertible bonds at 44.314% of maturity value, due in 15 years.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·26:16
How to verify: Check Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report for details on the zero coupon bond issuance and terms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Zero coupon bonds and pay-in-kind bonds allow issuers to defer interest payments, making it impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:23
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section on 'Zero Coupon Bonds'; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEBDIT (Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest, and Taxes) was used as a test of a company's ability to pay interest, ignoring depreciation as an expense.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:47
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe speaker's first mistake was buying control of Berkshire Hathaway, a textile manufacturing business, in 1965.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:42
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section 'Mistakes of the First Twenty Five Years'; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe speaker acquired a Baltimore department store, Hoakshild Cone, through a company called Diversified Retailing, which later merged with Berkshire.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·46:45
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire Hathaway's per share book value grew from $19.46 to $4,296.01 over the last twenty-five years, at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:03:25
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section 'To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated'; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or 44.4% over the last twenty-five years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:03:05
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter, Section 'To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated'; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceHarry Bottle turned around Dempster Mill Manufacturing in 1962 and later KW Products, quadrupling profits at KW.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·55:55
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceJim McGuire of Henderson Brothers maintained dealer spreads on Berkshire stock at fifty points or less, well under one percent.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·56:52
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire sold its corporate jet purchased for $850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for $6.7 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·57:32
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceContributions made through the shareholder-designated contributions program were $5.9 million, with 2,550 charities as recipients.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·59:50
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Shareholder Letter; verify via SEC EDGAR filing for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2026 Annual Report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBerkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate exceeding its 23.8% annual book value growth.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:04:09
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders, Section 'Mistakes of the First Twenty-Five Years'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire's 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after a $712 million tax charge, with $540 million deferred.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:07:35
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Financial Statements, Note on Income Taxes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire's share of income taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about $175 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:07:35
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders, Section on Taxes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A single investment doubling twenty times over twenty years yields ~$1,048,576 before tax, versus ~$25,250 from reinvesting after-tax proceeds of twenty doubles.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:11:16
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Letter to Shareholders, Section on Taxes (Mathematical Example). For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Berkshire's share of operating earnings after taxes and minority interest was about $300 million in 1989.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:14:22
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway 2026 Annual Report, Business Segment Information. For recent events, verify 2026-08-03 through 2026-11-03. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the 1989 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report for the specific list of holdings and their cost vs. market value.
- Check the definition and calculation of EBDIT versus EBITDA to understand the speaker's critique of ignoring depreciation.
- Review the 1989 tax laws regarding deferred tax liabilities on unrealized gains to assess the 'interest-free loan' claim.
- Analyze the combined ratio trends in the property-casualty insurance industry for 1988-1989 to validate the claim of premium growth collapse.
- Research the performance of the 'Sainted Seven' businesses (Borsheims, C's Candies, Nebraska Furniture Mart, etc.) to assess their historical returns on equity.
- Compare the 'cigar butt' investing strategy with the 'wonderful company at a fair price' approach using historical performance data of both styles.
- Investigate the use of zero coupon bonds by S&Ls during the savings and loan crisis to understand the speaker's critique of their risk profile.
- Verify the tax implications of holding investments long-term ('Rip Van Winkle' style) versus frequent trading for high-net-worth individuals.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow by about ten percent annually, even in years when, you know, general inflation runs considerably lower. Actually, over the last twenty five years, incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate, eleven percent. If premium growth, meanwhile,
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): materially lags that ten percent rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to underreserve when business turns bad. may obscure their size for a time. Last year we said the climb in the combined ratio was almost certain to continue and probably will accelerate for at least two more years.
- 0:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 0:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year we will not predict acceleration, but otherwise must repeat last year's forecast. Premium growth is running far below the ten percent required annually. Remember also that a ten percent rate would only stabilize the combined ratio, not bring it
- 0:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): down. The
- 0:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): increase in the combined ratio in nineteen eighty nine
- 0:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 0:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a little more than we had expected because catastrophes led by Hurricane Hugo were unusually severe. These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase. If nineteen ninety is more of a normal year,
- 1:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe swollen base of nineteen ninety nine. eighty nine.
- 1:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen ninety one, though, the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree. Commentators frequently discuss the underwriting cycle and speculate about its next turn. If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities, it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry's fundamental economics.
- 1:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated. to conduct the business in cartel fashion. At that time, the combined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags. First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new, corrected rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all
- 1:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one to three year term,
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): meant that it took a considerable time for miserable. mispriced policies to expire, delayed the impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be
- 2:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): satisfactory.
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a commodity like price. product at independently established prices. Such a configuration, whether the product being sold as steel or insurance policies,
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances, but one,
- 2:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 2:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shortage of usable capacity. Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question.
- 2:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 2:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most industries, capacity is destroyed. described in physical terms. In the insurance world, however, capacity is customarily described in financial terms. That is, it's considered appropriate for a company to write no more than dollars of business if it has UI dollars of net worth. In practice, however, constraints of this sort have proven ineffective.
- 3:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Regulators, insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to discipline companies that strain their resources. They also acquiesce when companies grossly overstate their true capital. Hence, a company can write a great deal of business with very little capital, if it is so inclined.
- 3:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 3:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bottom, therefore, the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers.
- 3:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 3:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this understood,
- 3:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 3:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry's profits. Good profits are will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity. Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened. That happens rarely,
- 3:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 3:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most assuredly is not happening
- 3:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now.
- 3:54
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- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's catastrophes. Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake
- 5:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): will
- 5:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cause. prices to strengthen significantly. We disagree. These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices. Therefore, premium volume won't grow by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse.
- 5:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 5:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability, matching that of the average American business.
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): course it does. So does the steel business. But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long term profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices,
- 5:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 5:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're a long way from that point. Berkshire's premium volume may drop to one hundred fifty million dollars. or so in nineteen ninety from a high of one billion dollars in nineteen eighty six, partly because our traditional business continues to shrink, and partly because the contract under which we received seven percent of the business
- 6:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of firemen's fund expired last August. Whatever the size of the drop, it will not disturb us. We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss. We experience
- 6:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 6:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit. However, our appetite for appropriately priced business is ample, as one tale from 1989 will tell. It concerns cat covers, short for catastrophe covers, which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance companies and also reinsurers
- 6:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): themselves buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe, such as the
- 6:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): process of the process of the process
- 6:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a tornado or hurricane, that produces losses from a large number of policies. In these contracts, the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of, say, ten million dollars, buying various layers of reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the retained amount, the
- 7:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reinsurer typically pays ninety ninety-five five percent of the excess up to its contractual limit. with the primary insurer paying the remainder. By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5% of each layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer's money. CAT covers are usually one year
- 7:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement, which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium. This provision protects the primary company from being bare for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event. The
- 7:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): duration of an event is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary company. Under this definition, a widespread storm causing damage for three days will be classified as a single event. if it arises from a single climatic cause.
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 8:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the storm lasts four days, however, the primary company will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage. Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event.
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1989, 1889, two unusual things happen. happened. First, Hurricane Hugo generated four billion dollars. or more of insured loss at a pace, however, that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean. Second, the California earthquake hit
- 8:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): within weeks, causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate even well after the event, slammed by these two, or possibly three, major catastrophes, and some primary insurers, and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought cat protection, either used up their automatic second cover, or became
- 9:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uncertain as to whether they had done so.
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At that point, sellers of cat policies had lost a huge amount of money, perhaps twice because of the reinstatements,
- 9:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and not taken in much in premiums, depending upon the
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): money.
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): many variables, a cat premium might generally have run 3% to 15% of the amount of protection purchased. For some years, we've thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business. But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare,
- 9:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and also left most cat riders licking their wounds, there
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was an
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): immediate shortage after the earthquake of much needed catastrophe coverage. Prices instantly became attractive, particularly for the reinsurance that cat writers themselves buy. Just as instantly Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to two hundred fifty million dollars of catastrophe coverage, advertising, that proposition, Position in trade
- 9:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): publications. Though we did not write all the business we sought, we did in a busy ten days, book a substantial amount. Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world. There are, of course, companies that sometimes write two hundred fifty million dollars,
- 10:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or even far more, of catastrophe coverage, but they do so only when they can, in turn, reinsure a large percentage of the business with other companies.
- 10:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When they can't lay off in s in size, they disappear from the market. Berkshire's policy conversely is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off. When rates carry an expectation of profit, we want to assume as much risk as is prudent.
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in our case, that's a lot. We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other company because of two factors. First, by the standards of regulatory accounting, we have a net worth in our insurance companies of about six billion dollars,
- 10:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 10:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second highest amount in the United States. And second, we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly or even annually, just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings or losses were reached intelligently. Obviously, if we write two hundred fifty million dollars of catastrophe coverage and retain it
- 11:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all ourselves,
- 11:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
- 11:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is some probability that we will lose the full two hundred fifty million dollars in a single quarter. That probability is low, but it is not zero.
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we had a loss of that magnitude, our after tax cost would be about one hundred sixty five million dollars. Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter, the damage would be a blow only to our pride. not to our well being. This posture is one few insurance managements will assume. Typically they are willing to write
- 11:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity, but they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single quarter loss, even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises over time to produce superior results. I can understand
- 12:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 12:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their thinking. What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers. Fortunately, Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders.
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are willing to look foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly. Our method of operation, incidentally, makes us a stabilizing force in the industry. We add huge capacity when capacity is short. and we become less competitive only when capacity is abundant. Of course we don't follow this policy in the interest of stabilization.
- 12:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action. Nevertheless, our behavior steadies the market. In this case, Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised. Currently, we hold anything. an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume.
- 12:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989. Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment income from policyholder funds large. This pleasant situation, however, will gradually deteriorate as our float runs off.
- 13:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 13:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some point, however, there will be an opportunity.
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for us to write large amounts of profitable business. Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred, Dinos Yordanou, Ajit Jane, Phil Urban, and Don Worster continue to position us well for this eventuality. Marketable securities.
- 13:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 13:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we generally choose among five major categories.
- 13:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): First, long-term common stock investments, second, medium-term fixed income securities, third, long-term fixed income securities, fourth, short-term cash equivalents, and fifth, short-term arbitrage commitments.
- 13:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 13:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax after tax returns as measured by mathematical.
- 14:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expectation, limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings. Our goal rather is to maximize eventual net worth.
- 14:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 14:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year end, our common stock holdings with a value of over $100 million dollars were these Capital Cities slash ABC Incorporated, the Coco Coca-Cola Cook,
- 14:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the COVID, the C
- 14:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Company, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, GEICO Corporation, and the Washington Post Company. Together, these five positions cost us about $1.67 billion and had a market value at year end of about $5.19 billion. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns
- 14:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): less than 100%.
- 14:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 14:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): list of companies is the same as last year's, and in only one case has the number of shares changed. Our holdings of Coca-Cola increased from 14,172,500 shares at the end of 1988 to 23 million, three hundred fifty thousand.
- 15:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 15:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Coca-Cola investment provides yet another example of the incredible speed with which your chairman responds to investment opportunities. No matter how obscure or well disguised they may be, I believe I had my first Coca-Cola in either nineteen thirty five or nineteen thirty six. Of a certainty, it was in nineteen
- 15:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thirty six that I started buying Cokes at the rate of six for twenty five cents from Buffett and Son, the family grocery store, to sell around the neighborhood for five cents each. In this excursion into high margin retailing, I duly observed the extraordinary consumer attractiveness and commercial possibilities of the product. I continued to note
- 15:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these qualities for the next 52 years
- 15:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 15:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Coke blanketed the world. During this period, however, I carefully avoided buying even a single share, instead, allocating major portions of my net worth to street railway companies, windmill manufacturers, anthracite. producers, textile businesses, trading stamp issuers, and the like. If you think I'm making this up, I can
- 16:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): supply the names. Only in the summer of nineteen eighty eight did my brain finally establish contact with my eyes.
- 16:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
- 16:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I then perceived was both clear and fascinating. After drifting somewhat in the nineteen 1970s, seventies, Coca-Cola had, in nineteen 1981, eighty one, become a new company with the move of Roberto Guizueta to CEO. Roberto, along with Don Keo, once my across the street neighbor in Omaha, first rethought and focused the company's
- 16:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): policies and then energetically carried them out. What was already the world's most ubiquitous product gained new momentum with sales overseas virtually exploding. Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial skills, Roberto has mastered. maximized both the growth of his product and the rewards that this growth brings to shareholders. Normally
- 16:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the CEO of a consumer products company, drawing on his natural inclinations or experience, will cause either marketing or finance to dominate the business at the expense of the other discipline. With Roberto, the mesh of marketing and finance is perfect and the result is a shareholder's dream.
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of course,
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we
- 17:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
- 17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should started buying Coke much earlier, soon after Roberto and Don began running things. In fact, if I had been thinking straight, I would have persuaded my grandfather to sell the grocery store back in nineteen thirty six and put all of the proceeds into Coca-Cola stock. I've learned my lesson. My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be slashed to well under
- 17:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fifty years.
- 17:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 17:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mentioned earlier, the year end price is prices of our major investies were much higher relative to their intrinsic values than theretofore. While those prices may not yet cause nosebleeds, they are clearly vulnerable to a general market decline.
- 17:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 17:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): drop in their prices would not disturb us at all. It might in fact work to our eventual benefit,
- 17:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 17:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it would cause at least a one year reduction in Berkshire's net worth. We think such a reduction is almost certain in at least one year of the next three years. Indeed, it would take only about a ten percent year to year decline in the aggregate value of our portfolio investments to send Berkshire's net worth down.
- 18:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our portfolio companies. They are high grade, talented, and shareholder oriented. The exceptional results
- 18:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are the most important.
- 18:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we have achieved while investing with them accurately reflect their exceptional personal qualities.
- 18:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 18:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): told you last year that we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989,
- 18:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 18:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's the way it turned out. Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short term cash equivalents, and during part of the year, we held relatively low levels of cash. In the rest of the year, we had a fairly good size sized cash position.
- 18:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage. The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic sense to us. Arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing the greater fool game.
- 19:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 19:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wall Streeter Ray DeVaux says, Fools rush in where angels fear to trade. We will engage in arbitrage from time to time, sometimes on a large scale,
- 19:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but only
- 19:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when we're we like the odds. Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in the next section, we substantially reduced our holdings in both medium and long term fixed income securities. In the long terms, just about our only holdings have been Washington Public Power Supply Systems or WPPS S bonds carrying
- 19:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): coupons ranging from low to high. During the year we sold a number of the low coupons. coupon issues which we originally bought at very large discounts. Many of these issues had approximately doubled in price since we purchased them and in addition had paid us 15 to 17% annually tax free. Our prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical
- 19:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): high grade tax exempts than commanded.
- 19:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 19:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have kept We've all of our high coupon WPPSS WPSS issues. Some have been called for redemption in nineteen ninety one and nineteen ninety two,
- 20:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 20:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we expect the rest to be called in the early to mid nineteen nineties. We also sold many of our medium term tax exempt bonds during the year.
- 20:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 20:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we bought these bonds we said we would be happy to sell them, regardless of whether they were higher or lower than at our time of purchase. If something we liked better came along, something did.
- 20:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and concurrently, we unloaded most of these issues at modest gains. Overall, our 1989 profit from the sale of tax exempt bonds was about fifty-one million dollars pre-tax.
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year, and that generated later through earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we purchased six hundred million dollars of the Gillette Company, preferred with an eight and three quarters percent dividend, a mandatory
- 20:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): redemption in ten years, and the right to convert into common at fifty dollars per share. We next purchased three hundred fifty-eight million dollars of USAIR Group preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years,
- 21:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 21:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dividend of nine and one quarter. percent, and the right to convert into common at sixty dollars per share. Finally, late in the year, we purchased three hundred million dollars of Champion International Corporation preferred with mandatory redemption. In ten years, a nine and one quarter percent dividend, and the right to convert into
- 21:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): common at thirty-eight $38 dollars per share. Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks, the issues we have. own are either non saleable or non convertible for considerable periods of time, and there is consequently no way we can gain from short term price blips in the common stock. I have gone on the board of
- 21:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Gillette, but I am not on the board of US Air or Champion. I thoroughly enjoy the boards I am on, but can't handle any more. Gillette's business is very much the kind we. like. Charlie and I think we understand the company's economics and therefore believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess about its future. If you haven't tried
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Gillette's new sensor razor, go right out and get one. However, we have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business in which we have a uh position through our nineteen eighty seven
- 22:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 22:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchase of Salmon Convertible.
- 22:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 22:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): preferred the airline industry or the paper industry. This does not mean that we predict a negative future for these industries. We're agnostics, not atheists. Our lack of strong convictions about these businesses, however, means that we must structure our investments in them differently from what we do when we invest in a
- 22:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business appearing to have splendid economic characteristics.
- 22:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 22:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one major respect, however, these purchases are not different. We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust. John Gutfron at Salaman, Coleman Mockler, Jr. at Gillette, Ed Kalodney at US Air, and Andy Sigler at Champion meet this test in spades.
- 23:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They in turn have demonstrated some confidence in us, insisting in each case that our preferred have unrestricted voting rights on a fully converted basis in arrangement that is far from standard in corporate finance. In effect, they are trusting us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are trusting them to be
- 23:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intelligent managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.
- 23:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 23:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): preferred stock structures we have negotiated will provide a mediocre return for us.
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if industry economics hinder the performance of our investies, but will produce reasonably attractive results for us if they can earn a return comparable to that of American industry in general. We believe that Gillette, under Coleman's management, will far exceed that return and believe that John, Ed, and Andy
- 23:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will reach it unless industry conditions are harsh. Under almost any conditions, we expect these preferred to return us our money plus dividends. If that is all we get, though, the result will be disappointing because we will have given up flexibility and consequently will have missed some significant opportunities that are bound to present
- 24:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): themselves during the decade. Under that scenario, we will have obtained only a preferred stock yield during a period when the typical preferred stock. will have held no appeal for us whatsoever. The only way Berkshire can achieve satisfactory results from its four preferred issues is to have the common stocks of the investee companies do well. Good
- 24:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): management and at least tolerable industry conditions will be needed if that is to happen. But we believe Berkshire's investment will also help and in that the other shareholders of each investee will profit over the years of each. ahead from our preferred stock purchase.
- 24:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 24:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): help will come from the fact that each company now has a major, stable, and interested shareholder whose chairman and vice chairman have, through Berkshire's investments, indirectly committed a very large amount of their own money to these undertakings. In dealing with our investees, Charlie and I will be supportive, analytical, and
- 25:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): objective. We recognize that we are working with experienced CEOs who are very much in command of their own businesses, but who nevertheless, at certain moments, appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone without ties to their industry or to decisions of the past.
- 25:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 25:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a group, these convertible preferreds will not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects that is unappreciated by the market, nor will the returns be as attractive as those produced when we make our favorite form of capital deployment, the acquisition of eighty percent or more of a fine business with a fine management. But both
- 25:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): opportunities are rare, particularly in a size befitting our present and anticipated resources. In summation, Charlie and I feel that our preferred stock investments should produce returns. returns moderately above those achieved by most fixed income portfolios,
- 26:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 26:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that we can play a minor but enjoyable and constructive role in the Investee companies. Zero coupon securities.
- 26:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 26:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): September, Berkshire issued nine hundred two point six million dollars, principal amount of zero coupon convertibles subordinated to ventures, which are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Salomon Brothers handled the underwriting in superb fashion, providing us helpful advice in a flawless execution. Most bonds, of course,
- 26:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): require regular payments of interest, usually semi annually. A zero coupon bond, conversely, requires no current interest payments. Instead, the investor receives his yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of
- 26:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): time between issuance and maturity.
- 26:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 26:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% five and a half percent current payment compounded semi-annually. semi annually. Because we received only forty four point three one cents on the dollar, our
- 27:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): proceeds from this offering were four hundred million dollars, less about nine and a half million dollars of offering expenses.
- 27:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 27:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bonds were issued in denominations of ten thousand dollars, and each bond is convertible into. four five one five shares of Berkshire Hathaway because a ten thousand dollar bond costs cost four thousand four hundred
- 27:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dollars.
- 27:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thirty one dollars, this means that the conversion price was nine thousand eight hundred fifteen dollars per Berkshire share,
- 27:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 27:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fifteen percent premium to the market price then existing, Berkshire can call the bonds at any time after September twenty eighth, nineteen ninety two at their accreted value.
- 27:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 27:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): original issue price plus five 5.5% and a half percent compounded semi semi-annually. annually
- 28:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and on two
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spring specified days, September 28th of 1994 and 1999,
- 28:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 28:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their accreted value. For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5% interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to the bondholders, thus, the net effect to us resulting from the reduced tax. taxes is
- 28:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): positive cash flow. That is a very significant benefit. Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating our exact effective rate of interest. But under all circumstances it will be well below five and a half percent. There is meanwhile a symmetry to the tax law. Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year on the five
- 28:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
- 28:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the five and a half percent interest, even though he received receives no cash.
- 28:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Neither our bonds, nor those of certain other companies that issued similar bonds last year, notably Lowe's and Motorola, resemble the great bulk of zero coupon bonds that have been issued in recent years. Of these Charlie and I have been and will continue to be outspoken critics. As I will later explain, such bonds have often been used in the most
- 29:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deceptive of ways and with deadly consequences to investors.
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But before we tackle that subject, let's travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple had not yet been bitten.
- 29:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 29:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're my age, you bought your first zero coupon bonds during World War II by purchasing the famous Series E United States Savings Bond, the most widely sold bond issue in history. After the war, these bonds were held by one out of two United States households. Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero coupon bond, a term in
- 29:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact that I doubt had been invented. But that's precisely what the Series E was.
- 29:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): These
- 29:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bonds came in denominations as small as eighteen dollars seventy five cents. That amount purchased a twenty five dollar obligation of the United States government due in ten years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual return of two 2.9%. point nine percent.
- 30:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At the
- 30:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At time, the time, this was an attractive offer.
- 30:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 30:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): two point nine percent rate was higher than that generally available on government bonds,
- 30:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 30:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the holder faced no market fluctuation risk since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest.
- 30:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 30:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second form of zero coupon United States Treasury issue, also benign and useful, surfaced in the last decade. One problem with a normal bond is that. even though it pays a given interest rate, say 10%,
- 30:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 30:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10% return will be realized. For that rate to materialize, each semi annual coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is received.
- 30:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 30:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): current interest rates are, say, only 6% or 7% seven percent when these coupons come due,
- 30:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 30:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): holder will be unable to compound his money over the life of the bond at the advertised rate. For pension funds or other investors with long term liabilities, reinvestment risk of this type can be a serious problem. Savings bonds might have solved it, except that they are issued only to individuals and are unavailable in large denominations. What big buyers needed was huge
- 31:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): quantities of savings bond equivalents. Enter some ingenious and in this case highly useful investment bankers led I'm happy to say by Salomon Brothers, they created the instrument desired by stripping the semiannual coupons from standard government issues. Each coupon, once detached, takes on the essential character
- 31:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of a savings bond since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future. For example,
- 31:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 31:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you strip the forty 40 semiannual coupons from a United States government bond due in the year twenty ten, 2010, you will have 40 coupon bonds
- 31:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
- 31:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maturities from six months to 20 years, each of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed. If current interest rates are say 10% for all maturities, the six-month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity value, and the 20-year 20 year issue will sell for 14.20%.
- 32:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 32:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a compounded rate of ten percent for his entire holding period. Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years as long term investors, ranging from pension funds to individual retirement accounts, recognize these high grade, zero coupon issues to be well suited to their
- 32:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): needs.
- 32:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 32:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as happens in Wall Street all too often, with the wise what do in the beginning, fools do in the end. In the last few years, zero coupon bonds, and their functional equivalent, pay-in-kind bonds, which distribute additional pay-in-kind bonds semi-annually as interest instead of paying cash, have been issued in enormous quantities by
- 32:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ever junkier credits. To these issuers, zero or pay-in-kind paying kind bonds offer one overwhelming advantage. It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing. Indeed, if less developed country governments had issued no debt in the 1970s other than long-term zero coupon obligations, they would now have a spotless record as debtors.
- 33:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This principle, at work,
- 33:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 33:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you need not default for a long time, if you solemnly promise promised to pay nothing for a long time, has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking to find finance ever shakier deals, but its acceptance by lenders took a while.
- 33:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 33:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the leveraged buyout craze began some years back, purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis in which conservatively estimated free cash flow, that is, operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less normalized capital expenditures,
- 33:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 33:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): adequate to cover both interest and modest reductions in debt.
- 33:42
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- 34:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Later, as the adrenaline of dealmakers surged, businesses began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest. That left nothing for the paydown of debt. In effect, a Scarlet O'Hara, I'll think about it tomorrow position in respect to principal payments was taken
- 35:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by borrowers and accepted by a new breed of lender, the buyer of original issue junk bonds. Debt now became something to be refinanced rather than repaid. The change brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank's lending officer and gushes,
- 35:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 35:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know how I'll ever repay you. Soon borrowers found even the new lax standards intolerably binding. To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions. they introduced an abomination, EBDIT, earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes,
- 35:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 35:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the test of a company's ability to pay interest. Using this sought-off yardstick, the borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it did not require a current cash outlay. Such an attitude is clearly delusional. At ninety-five ninety five percent of American business. businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly approximate
- 36:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as real an expense as labor or utility costs. Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car, he must have income that covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also realistically calculated depreciation.
- 36:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 36:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would be laughed out of the bank if he started talking about EBDID. EBDIT,
- 36:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): capital outlays at a business can be skipped, of course, in any given month, just as a human can skip a day or even a week of eating.
- 36:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 36:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if the skipping becomes routine and is not made up, the body weakens and eventually dies. Furthermore, a start and stop feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy organism, human or corporate, than that produced by a steady. diet. As businessmen, Charlie and I relish having competitors who are unable to fund capital
- 36:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expenditures.
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): might think that waving away a major expense such as depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a good one hits the limits of Wall Street's ingenuity. If so, you haven't been paying attention during the past few years, promoters needed to find a way to justify
- 37:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even pricier acquisitions, otherwise they risked, heaven forbid, losing deals to other promoters with more imagination.
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stepping through the looking glass, promoters and their investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured against cash interest only, which meant that interest accruing on zero coupon or pay in kind bonds could be ignored when the financial feasibility of a transaction was being assessed. This approach not only relegated depreciation expense
- 37:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to the let's ignore it corner, but gave similar treatment to what was usually a significant portion of interest expense. To their shame, many professional investment managers went along with this nonsense, though they usually were careful to do so only with clients' money, not their own. Calling these managers professional. professionals is actually too kind.
- 38:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They should be designated promotees. Under this new standard, a business earning, say, one hundred million dollars pretax and having debt on which ninety million dollars of interest must be paid currently might use a zero coupon or pay in kind issue to incur another sixty million dollars of annual interest that
- 38:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would accrue and compound but not come down. due for some years.
- 38:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 38:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rate on these issues would typically be very high, which means that the situation in the second year might be $90 million, cash interest, plus sixty nine million dollars, accrued interest, and so on as the compounding proceeds. Such high rate reborrowing schemes, which a few years ago were appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon
- 38:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): became models of modern finance at virtually all.
- 38:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When they make these offerings, investment bankers display their humorous side. They dispense income and balance sheet projections extending five or more years into the future for companies they barely had heard of a few months earlier. If you are shown such schedules, I suggest that you join in the fun. Ask the investment banker for the one year budgets that his own firm prepared as the
- 39:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): last few years began. and then compare these with what actually happened. Some time ago, Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful The Great Crash, coined a new economic term,
- 39:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 39:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bezel, defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement, this financial creature has a magical quality. The embezzlers are richer by the amount of the bezel, while the embezzlees do not yet feel poorer.
- 39:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Professor
- 39:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Galbraith established astutely pointed out that this sum should be added to the national wealth so that we might know the psychic national wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, wealth would balloon, though not an erg of productive work had been done. Dunn.
- 39:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 39:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): satirical nonsense of the bezel is dwarfed by the real world nonsense of the zero. coupon bond. With zeros, one party to a contract can experience income without his opposite experiencing the pain of expenditure. In our illustration, a company capable of earning only one hundred million dollars annually,
- 40:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 40:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): therefore capable of paying only that much in interest, magically creates earnings for bondholders of one hundred fifty million dollars.
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long as major investors willingly don their Peter Payne. Pan wings and repeatedly say, I believe, there is no limit to how much income can be created by the zero coupon bond. Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm less enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the plow. Here, finally, was an instrument that would let the
- 40:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): street make deals at prices no longer limited by actual earning power. The result obviously would be more transactions. Silly prices will always attract sellers,
- 40:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 40:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as Jesse Unru might have put it, transactions are the mother's milk of finance.
- 40:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 40:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): zero coupon or pay in kind bond possesses one additional attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched out. This is no small benefit. If the period before all costs must be faced as long, is promoters can create a string of foolish deals
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): take in lots of fees before any chickens come home to roost from their earlier ventures. But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or financial, fails. A base business cannot be transformed into a golden business by tricks of accounting or capital structure. The man claiming to be a financial alchemist may
- 41:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): become rich.
- 41:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 41:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gullible investors rather than business achievements will usually be the source of his wealth. Whatever their weakness is, we should add, many zero coupon and paying kind bonds will not default. We have in fact owned some and may buy more if their market becomes sufficiently distressed. We've not, however, even considered buying a new issue from a weak
- 41:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit. No financial instrument is evil per se. it's just that some variations have far more potential for mischief than others.
- 42:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 42:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): blue ribbon for mischief making should go to the zero coupon issuer, unable to make its interest payments on a current basis. Our advice: whenever an investment banker starts talking about EBDIT,
- 42:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or whenever someone creates a capital structure that does not allow all interest, but both payable and accrued, to be comfortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital expenditures. Zip up your wallet, turn the tables by suggesting that the promoter and his high-priced entourage accept zero coupon fees,
- 42:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deferring their take until the zero coupon bonds have been paid in full. See then how much enthusiasm for the deal endures.
- 42:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
- 42:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comments about investment bankers may seem harsh, but Charlie and I,
- 42:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 42:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our hopelessly old fashioned way, believe that they should perform a gatekeeping role, guarding investors against the promoter's propensity to indulge in excess. Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercised the same judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have exercised in accepting liquor. At a minimum, therefore, the bank
- 43:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): banker's conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender who, when necessary, refuses the profit from the next drink to avoid sending a drunk out on the highway. In recent years, unfortunately, many leading investment firms have found bartender morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard. Lately, those who have traveled the high road in Wall
- 43:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Street have not encountered heavy traffic. One distressing footnote.
- 43:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 43:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cost of the zero coupon folly will not be borne solely by the direct participants. Certain savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds, using cash that came from federally insured deposits, straining to show splendid earnings these buyers recorded, but did not receive ultra high interest income on these
- 43:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): issues. Many of these associations are now in major trouble. Had their loans to shaky credits worked, the owners of the associations would have pocketed the profits. In the many cases in which the loans will fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill.
- 44:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
- 44:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): paraphrase Jackie Mason, at these associations, it was the managers who should have been wearing the ski masks. Mistakes of the first twenty five years
- 44:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To
- 44:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): quote Robert Benchley, having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, power. perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down. Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last twenty five years. My first mistake, of course, was in
- 44:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buying control of Berkshire, though I knew its business, textile manufacturing, to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy. because the price looked out cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965, I was becoming aware that the
- 45:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strategy was not ideal.
- 45:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 45:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long term long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the cigar butt approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has
- 45:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the bargain purchase will make that puff all profit. Unless you were unless you're a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original bargain price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all.
- 45:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 45:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces.
- 45:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Never is there just one cockroach
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for eight million dollars that can be sold. or liquidated for ten million dollars and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint
- 46:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if the business is sold for ten million dollars in ten years,
- 46:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 46:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Uh time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.
- 46:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 46:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way.
- 46:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 46:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hoakshild Cone, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire.
- 46:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): First class, and the deal included some extras, unrecorded real estate values, and a significant last in first out inventory cushion. How could I miss? So oh
- 46:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three years later, I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hoaxhild Cone, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song My Wife Ran Away with my best friend and I still miss him a
- 47:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): lot. I
- 47:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could give you other personal examples of bargain purchase folly, but I'm sure you get the picture. It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early. I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first class
- 47:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses accompanied by first class managements.
- 47:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 47:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): leads right into a related lesson. Good jockeys will do well on good horses. but not on broken down nays. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hoaxhield Cone had able and honest people running them.
- 47:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 47:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records, but they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand. I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.
- 48:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 48:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples.
- 48:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
- 48:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): behavior has matched that admitted by May West.
- 48:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 48:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was Snow White, but I drifted.
- 48:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 48:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): further related lesson: easy does it. After twenty-five years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over
- 48:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven footers.
- 48:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 48:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments, it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult.
- 48:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 48:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): occasion, tough problems must be tackled, as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one time huge but solvable problem, as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding
- 49:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dragons than by slaying
- 49:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
- 49:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): My most surprising discovery the overwhelming importance.
- 49:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If
- 49:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you're not sure if
- 49:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're
- 49:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not sure if you're not
- 49:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sure
- 49:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if you're not sure if
- 49:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're Automatically make rational business decisions.
- 49:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not going to be able to do that, you can't do it. But
- 49:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play. For example, first, as if governed by Newton's first law of motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction. Second, just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or
- 49:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds. Third, any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate of return and strategic studies prepared by his troops. And fourth, the behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be
- 50:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mindlessly imitated.
- 50:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): set businesses on these courses which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative,
- 50:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 50:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.
- 50:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire.
- 50:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 50:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success.
- 50:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 50:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second class textile or department store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner, or investor,
- 51:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
- 51:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join.
- 51:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sin to miss a great opportunity, you know, outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were uh served up to me on a platter, and that I was fully capable
- 51:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of understanding.
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb sucking has been huge. Our consistently conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view, we're not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher.
- 52:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the twenty-three point eight percent we have actually averaged. Even in nineteen sixty five, perhaps we could have judged there to be a ninety-nine percent probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but
- 52:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a one percent 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.
- 52:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 52:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wouldn't have liked those ninety-nine to one odds, and never will.
- 52:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 52:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns.
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your actions are sensible, you will be are certain to get good results. In most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry. We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds. Though we have learned to live with those also.
- 53:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 53:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope in another twenty five years to report on the mistakes of the first fifty. If we are around in twenty fifteen to do that, you can count on this section occupying. many more pages than it does here. Miscellaneous.
- 53:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 53:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or preferably write. Here's what we're looking for. First, large purchases of at least ten $10 million dollars of after tax earnings. Second, demonstrated consistent earnings. earning power.
- 53:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Future projections are of little interest to us, nor are turnaround situations. Third, businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt. Fourth, management in place. We can't supply it. Fifth, simple businesses.
- 53:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 53:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's lots of technology, we won't understand it. And sixth, an offering price. We don't want to waste our time or that of the seller. by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown.
- 54:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Customarily within five minutes, as to whether we're interested.
- 54:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For cash, but we'll consider issuing stock when we receive as much and intrinsic business value as we give.
- 54:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
- 54:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin Friedman Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they
- 54:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for
- 54:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the company.
- 54:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests. We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker
- 55:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction like sales will be
- 55:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a very good idea.
- 55:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can best be expressed by a Goldwynism. Please include me out. Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in capital cities Salamon, Solomon, Gillette, US USAIR, Air, and
- 55:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Champion. Last year, we said we had a special interest in large purchase. purchases of convertible preferreds. We still have an appetite of that kind, but it is limited since we now are close to the maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of investment. Two years ago, I told you about Harry Bottle, who, in nineteen
- 55:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sixty two, quickly cured a major business mess at the first industrial company I controlled, Dempster Mill Manufacture. Manufacturing,
- 56:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
- 56:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of my bargain purchases.
- 56:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And who 24 years later had reappeared to again rescue me, this time from problems at KW Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. As I reported, in short order, Harry reduced capital employed at KW, rationalized production, cut costs, and quadrupled profits.
- 56:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 56:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): might think he would then have paused for breath, but last year Harry, now 70,
- 56:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 56:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attended a bankruptcy auction and for a pittance acquired a product line that is a natural for KW. That company's profitability may well be increased 50% by this coup. Watch this space for future bulletins on Harry's triumphs. With more than a year behind him of trading Berkshire's stock on the New York stock. Exchange,
- 56:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
- 56:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): specialist Jim McGuire of Henderson Brothers continues his outstanding performance. Before we listed, dealer spreads often were three percent or more of market price. Jim has maintained the spread at fifty points or less, which at current prices is well under one percent. Shareholders who buy or sell benefit significantly from this reduction in transaction
- 57:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): costs. Because we are delighted by our experience with Jim, Henderson Brothers, and the New York Stock Exchange, I said as much in ads that have been run in a series placed by the exchange. Normally I shun testimonials, but I was pleased in this instance to publicly compliment the exchange. Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we
- 57:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): purchased for eight hundred fifty thousand dollars three years ago and bought another used jet for six point seven million dollars.
- 57:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Those of you
- 57:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who recall the mathematics of the multiplying bacteria earlier in this letter will understandably panic.
- 57:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 57:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our net worth continues to increase at current rates,
- 57:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 57:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the cost of replacing planes also continues to rise at the now established rate of one hundred percent compounded annually,
- 57:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 57:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will not be long before Berkshire's For entire net worth is consumed by its jet. Charlie doesn't like it when I equate the jet with bacteria. He feels it's degrading to the bacteria. His idea of traveling in style is an air conditioned bus, a luxury he steps up to only when bargain fares are in effect.
- 58:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm sure, to St. Augustine, as he contemplated leaving a life of secular pleasures to become a priest. Battling the conflict between intellect and glands, he pled, Help me, O Lord, to become chaste. But not yet.
- 58:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Now hockey fans in Alberta can get in on the action from the opening face-off face off with goal in first ten, 10, a betting market where you can call whether a goal will be scored by any team in the first ten minutes. 10 of a game. From pregame to live bets, same game parlays, player props, and more. BetMGM has over 500 NHL betting markets to choose from. And the BetMGM app has instant deposit and
- 59:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): fast withdrawal options, including Interact eTransfer, Visa, MasterCard, and Apple Pay, and more. Download the BetMGM app and don't miss a second of the opening minutes. BetMGM, an official sports betting partner of the National Hockey League. Your home for hockey bets all season long. See BetMGM.com for terms. 18 plus only, bet responsibly. Alberta only,
- 59:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): subject to eligibility requirements.
- 59:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): If gambling is affecting your mental health or well-being, 211 Alberta is here to help. Call or text 211 or visit ab.211.ca. Standard message and data rates may apply. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with the Alberta IGaming Corporation.
- 59:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Naming the plane has not been easy. I initially suggested the Charles T. Munger. Charlie countered with the aberration.
- 59:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 59:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): finally settled on the indefensible. About ninety-six point nine percent of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's nineteen eighty-nine eighty nine shareholder-designated Shareholder Designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million,
- 1:00:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and $2,550 charities were recipients. We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder designated contributions program that appears later in this report. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the
- 1:00:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank, or depository. Shares not so registered on august thirty first, nineteen ninety will be ineligible for the nineteen ninety program.
- 1:00:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:00:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): annual meeting this year will take place at nine thirty in the morning on Monday, april thirtieth, nineteen ninety. Attendance grew last year to about one thousand, very close to the seating capacity of the Witherspoon Hall at Joslin Museum. So this year's meeting will be moved to the Orpheum Theater, which is in
- 1:00:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): downtown Omaha, about one quarter of a mile from the Red Lion Hotel. The Radison Redick Tower, a much smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from the Orpheum. Or you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which is in West Omaha, about one hundred yards from Borshimes, we will
- 1:01:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have buses at the Marriott that will leave at eight thirty and eight forty five for the meeting and return after it ends.
- 1:01:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We get, we have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent owner related questions.
- 1:01:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An
- 1:01:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use.
- 1:01:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:01:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attachment also contains information about them. As usual, we will have buses to take you to the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheimes after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores.
- 1:02:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Those of you arriving early can visit the furniture mart any day of the week. It is open from ten in the morning to five thirty in the afternoon on Saturdays and from noon to five thirty on Sundays. Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to six in the evening on
- 1:02:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sunday, april twenty ninth. Ike likes to put on a show, and you can rely on him to produce something very special for our shareholders.
- 1:02:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:02:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this letter we've had a lot to say about rates of compounding. If you can bear having your own rate turn negative for a day, day, not a pretty thought, I admit. Visit Ike on the twenty ninth. Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, March second, nineteen ninety. To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated,
- 1:03:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
- 1:03:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gain in net worth during nineteen eighty nine was one point five one five billion dollars, or forty four point four percent over the last twenty five years, that is. since present management took over, our per share book value has grown from nineteen dollars and forty six cents to four thousand two hundred ninety six dollars
- 1:03:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and one cent, or at a rate of twenty three point eight percent compounded annually. What counts, however, is intrinsic value, the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth
- 1:03:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business in and out
- 1:03:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:03:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all businesses from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones become economic equals.
- 1:03:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Back
- 1:03:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when Berkshire's book value was $19.46, nineteen dollars and forty six cents, intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried.
- 1:04:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 1:04:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our twenty three point eight percent annual growth in book value.
- 1:04:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:04:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rearview rear view mirror is one.
- 1:04:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one thing, the windshield is another. A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that with minor exceptions are carried on our balance sheet at current market values. At year end, these securities were valued at higher prices relative to their own intrinsic business values than has been the case in the past. One
- 1:04:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reason is the buoyant nineteen 1989 eighty nine stock market. More importantly, important, the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not now.
- 1:04:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 1:04:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced, relative to intrinsic business value. This till death do us part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire's value. in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance
- 1:05:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to date has benefited from a double dip. First, the exceptional gains and intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved, and second, the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately corrected the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business. We will continue to pay. benefit
- 1:05:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our catch up rewards have been realized, which means we'll have to settle for a single dip in the future.
- 1:05:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 1:05:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): face another obstacle.
- 1:05:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:05:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a finite world, high growth rates must self destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time, but when the base balloons, the party ends. A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor. Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon,
- 1:06:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every fifteen minutes, says Sagan. That means four doublings an hour and ninety six doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram. its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much
- 1:06:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as a mountain. In two days, more than the sun, and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria. Not to worry, says Sagan, some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth.
- 1:06:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:06:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing. in public. Even on bad days, Charlemunger, Berkshire's vice chairman, and my partner, and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium, nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every fifteen minutes.
- 1:07:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing financially. In public, nevertheless, Sagan's observations. apply.
- 1:07:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): From
- 1:07:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Berkshire's present base of four point nine billion dollars in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to average fifteen percent annual growth in book value than we did to average twenty-three point eight percent from the twenty-two million dollars we began with. Taxes.
- 1:07:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
- 1:07:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen eighty-nine eighty nine gain of one point five billion dollars was achieved. after we took a charge of about seven hundred twelve million dollars for income taxes. In addition, Berkshire's share of the income taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about one hundred seventy-five million dollars. Of this year's tax charge, about one hundred
- 1:07:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seventy two million dollars will be paid currently, the remainder five hundred forty million dollars is deferred,
- 1:08:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): almost
- 1:08:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all of the deferred. portion relates to the nineteen eighty nine increase in unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this increase, we have reserved a thirty four percent tax.
- 1:08:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 1:08:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized profits generated in nineteen eighty seven and nineteen eighty eight. But as we explained last year, the unrealized gains we amassed before nineteen 1987, eighty seven about one $1.2 point two billion dollars.
- 1:08:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then prevailed.
- 1:08:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 1:08:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability and decrease our net worth by about seventy-one seventy one million dollars.
- 1:08:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:08:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): result of raising the reserve on our pre nineteen eighty seven gain by six percentage points, because the proposed rule has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear, we have not yet made this change.
- 1:09:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 1:09:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you can see from our balance sheet, we would owe taxes of more than one point one billion dollars were we to sell all of our securities at year year-end end market values. Is this one point one billion dollar liability equal? or even similar to a one point one billion dollar liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not,
- 1:09:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.
- 1:09:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale? of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no. In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest free loan from the United States Treasury that comes
- 1:09:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): due only at our election, unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized. This loan is peculiar in other respects as well.
- 1:10:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 1:10:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can be used only to finance the ownership of the government. particular what's appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size. Daily, as market prices change, and periodically if tax rates change. In effect, this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from
- 1:10:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989, nineteen eighty nine, incurring about seventy six million dollars of transfer tax on two hundred twenty four million dollars of gains. Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor, if successful, has an
- 1:10:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let's look at an extreme comparison. Imagine that Berkshire had only one dollar, which we put in a security that doubled. by year end and was then sold. Imagine further that we use the after tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next nineteen years, scoring a double each time.
- 1:11:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At the end of the twenty years, the thirty four percent capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about thirteen $13,000 thousand dollars to the government, and we would be left with about twenty $25,250. five thousand two hundred fifty.
- 1:11:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled twenty times during the twenty years, our dollar would grow to one million forty eight thousand five hundred seventy six dollars. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a thirty four percent tax of roughly three hundred fifty six thousand
- 1:11:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): five hundred dollars and be left with about six hundred
- 1:11:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dollars.
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ninety two thousand dollars. The sole reason for this de staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from the second scenario in exactly the same twenty seven to one ratio as we, taking in taxes of three hundred fifty six thousand five hundred dollars
- 1:11:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): against thirteen thousand dollars, though admittedly it was. would have to wait for its money. We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago,
- 1:12:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's exactly what Charlie and I did.
- 1:12:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 1:12:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly lower returns. Our reason is simply simple. We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good, though perhaps not
- 1:12:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): optimal, financial results. Considering that we think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for. time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to average.
- 1:12:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 1:12:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would be akin to marrying for money,
- 1:12:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 1:12:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one is already rich. Sources of reported earnings.
- 1:13:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:13:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): table in the annual report shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of goodwill is and other major purchase price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our
- 1:13:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles or GAAP, which require purchase price adjustments to be made on a business by business basis.
- 1:13:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:13:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to threat, the gap total in our audited financial statements. Further information about these businesses is given in the business segment section and in the management's discussion section. In these sections, you also will find our segment earnings reported on a
- 1:14:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): GAAP basis. For information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger's letter. In addition, we have reprinted Charlie's May 30, 1989 letter to the United States League of Savings Institutions, which conveyed our disgust with its policies and our consequent decision to resign. Design.
- 1:14:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:14:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): summary, Berkshire's share of operating earnings after taxes and minority interest. interests was about $300 million in 1989 against about $313 million in 1988. Insurance investment income rose again, and the Buffalo News, C's, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group all advanced,
- 1:14:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 1:14:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a larger underwriting loss, higher interest expense, and slight declines at Fetchheimer, Kirby, Nebraska, Furniture Mart, World Book, and Wesco's non non-insurance insurance business. businesses more than offset those gains. Including gains from sales of securities, total earnings came to about four hundred forty seven million dollars, against about three hundred ninety nine million
- 1:15:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dollars the year before.
- 1:15:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 1:15:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): refer you also to the pages where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for first our insurance operations with their major investment positions itemized,
- 1:15:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second our manufacturing, publishing, and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non operating assets and purchase price accounting adjustments. Third, our subsidiaries engaged in finance type operations, which are mutual savings and Scott Fetzer financial, and fourth, an all other companies. category that includes the non-operating assets, primarily marketable securities
- 1:15:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): held by the companies in the second segment, all purchase price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
- 1:15:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 1:15:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you combine the earnings and net worths
- 1:15:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 1:15:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our Gay GA A app statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four category presentation. does not fall within the purview of our auditors who in no way bless
- 1:16:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. In
- 1:16:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from significant earnings of investees that standard accounting rules do not permit us to report. We list five major investies from which we received dividends in nineteen eighty nine of about forty five million dollars after taxes. However, our share of the retained earnings of these investies investees total about totaled two hundred
- 1:16:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twelve million dollars last year, not counting large capital gains realized by Geiko and Coca-Cola. If this two hundred twelve million dollars had been distributed to us, our own operating earnings, after the payment of additional taxes would have been close to five hundred million dollars, rather than the three
- 1:16:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hundred million shown in the table.
- 1:16:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): question you must decide is whether these undistributed earnings are as valuable to us as those we report. We believe they are, and even think they may be more valuable.
- 1:17:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:17:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reason for this A bird in the bush may be worth two in the hand conclusion is that earnings retained by these investies will be deployed by talented, owner owner-oriented oriented managers. who sometimes have better uses for these funds in their own businesses than yeah, we would have in ours. I would not make such a generous assessment of most managements, but
- 1:17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it is appropriate in these cases.
- 1:17:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:17:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our view, Berkshire's fundamental earning power is best measured by a look through approach in which we append our share of the operating earnings retained by our investies investees to our own reported operating earnings, excluding capital gains in both instances. For our intrinsic business value to grow at an average of 15% per year, our look
- 1:17:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through earnings must grow at about the same pace. We'll need plenty of help from our present investees and also need to add a new one from time to time in order to reach this 15% goal. Non insurance operations.
- 1:18:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:18:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the past we have labeled our major manufacturers manufacturing, publishing and retail operations the Sainted Seven. With our acquisition of Borsheim's early in nineteen eighty nine, the challenge was to find a new title, both alliterative and appropriate.
- 1:18:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This divine assemblage, Borshimes, Borsheimes, the Buffalo News, Fetchheimer Brothers, Kirby, Nebraska, Furnish. Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, C's Candies, World Book,
- 1:18:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 1:18:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a collection of businesses with economic characteristics that range from good to superb. Its managers range from superb to superb. Most of these managers have no need to work for a living. They show up at the ballpark because they like to hit home runs. And that's exactly what they do. Their combined financial
- 1:18:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): statements, including those of some smaller operations, illustrate just how outstanding their performance is. On an historical accounting basis, after tax earnings of these operations were fifty seven percent on average equity capital. Moreover, this return was achieved with no net leverage. Cash equivalents have
- 1:19:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): matched funded debt.
- 1:19:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 1:19:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I call off the names of our managers,
- 1:19:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:19:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Blumkin, Friedman, and Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stipsey, and Ralph Shay.
- 1:19:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:19:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): feel the same glow that Miller Huggins must have experienced when he announced the lineup of his nineteen twenty seven New York Yankees. Let's take a look, business by business.
- 1:19:37
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- 1:20:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 1:20:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): gambling is affecting your mental health or well-being, 211 Alberta is here to help. Call or text 211 or visit ab.211.ca. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with the Alberta Eye Gaming Corporation. Standard message and data rates may apply.
- 1:20:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 1:20:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's time to scale your business, it's time for Shopify. Get everything you need to grow the way you want. Like all the way.
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- 1:21:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim's met all expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim's managing
- 1:21:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): genius, and I mean that, has only one speed, fast. forward.
- 1:21:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 1:21:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you haven't been there, you've never seen a jewelry store like Borsheim's. Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one third that prevailing at
- 1:21:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): jewelry stores, offering comparable prices. merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices in turn generate even more volume, and so the circle goes round
- 1:22:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and round. The end result is store traffic as high as four thousand people
- 1:22:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on
- 1:22:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seasonally busy days.
- 1:22:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman, but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side.
- 1:22:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 1:22:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler, makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.
- 1:22:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 1:22:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much. Every two years, I'm part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and explore
- 1:22:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 1:22:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop's Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business. Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha about twenty million dollars of
- 1:23:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:23:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): particularly fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive. Bishop's Lodge is no Fort Knox,
- 1:23:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:23:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation. Ike took me aside. See that safe? he said.
- 1:23:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 1:23:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): afternoon we changed the combination, and now even the hotel management doesn't know what it is.
- 1:23:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:23:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): breathed easier. Ike went up.
- 1:23:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:23:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ike leaned closer.
- 1:23:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:23:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): besides, Warren, he confided, the jewels aren't in the safe. How can we miss with a fellow like that? Particularly when he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan, Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.
- 1:24:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 1:24:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): C's Candies, we had an 8% increase in pounds sold, even though 1988 was itself a record year, included in the 1989 performance were excellent same-store poundage gains. Our first in many years. Advertising played an important role in this outstanding performance. We increased total
- 1:24:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): advertising expenditures from four million dollars. dollars to five million dollars, and also got copy from our agency, Hal Reine and Partners, that was 100% on the money in conveying the qualities that make C's special.
- 1:24:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:24:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): our media businesses such as the Buffalo News, we sell advertising. In other businesses such as C's, we are buyers. When we buy, we practice exactly what we preach when we sell. At C's, we more than tripled our expenditures on newspaper advertising last year to the highest percentage of sales that I can remember.
- 1:25:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:25:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal Reine and the power of well directed newspaper advertising for this result. C's splendid performances have become routine, but there is nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins.
- 1:25:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 1:25:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales imparts a quality and service message to the thousands of employees we need to produce and distribute over twenty-seven million pounds of candy annually.
- 1:25:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:25:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a company with two hundred and twenty-five shops and a massive mail order and phone business, it is no small trick to run things so that virtually every customer leaves happy. Chuck makes it look easy.
- 1:25:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:25:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent earnings in nineteen eighty nine, but there was one sad note, misses B
- 1:25:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Rose Blumkin, who started the company fifty two years ago with five hundred dollars, quit in May after disagreeing with other members of the Blumkin family and management about the remodeling and operation of the carpet department.
- 1:26:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mrs.
- 1:26:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): B. probably has made more smart business decisions than any living American.
- 1:26:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:26:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in this particular case, I believe the other members of the family were entirely correct. Over the past three years, while the store's other departments increased sales by twenty four percent, carpet sales declined by seventeen percent. That was not because of any lack of sales ability Salesability by misses Mrs. B, who has always personally sold far more merchandise than any
- 1:26:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other sales person. salesperson in the store.
- 1:26:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:26:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will be pleased to know that Mrs. B continues to make Horatio Alger's heroes look like victims of tired blood. At age ninety six she has started a new business selling what else?
- 1:26:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Carpet and furniture. And as always she works seven days a week.
- 1:26:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 1:26:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Mart, Louis, Ron and Irv Blumkin continue to propel. what is by far the largest and most successful home furnishing store in the country. They are outstanding merchants, outstanding managers, and a joy to be associated with. One reading on their acumen, in the fourth quarter of nineteen eighty nine, the carpet
- 1:27:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): department registered a seventy five point three percent consumer share in the Omaha market, up from sixty seven point seven percent a year early. earlier and over six times that of its nearest competitor.
- 1:27:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:27:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): furniture mart and boreshemes follow precisely the same formula for success. First, unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location, second, the lowest operating costs in the business. Third, the shrewdest of buying made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased. Fourth, gross margins and therefore prices far below
- 1:27:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): competitors. And fifth, friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times. Another plug for newspapers:
- 1:27:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:27:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): furniture mart increased its lineage in the local paper by over 20% in 1989,
- 1:27:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): off
- 1:27:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a record 1988,
- 1:27:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:27:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): remains the paper's largest run of paper advertiser afar. Run of paper advertising is the kind printed in the paper as opposed to the
- 1:28:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): paper.
- 1:28:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The news continued to star in nineteen eighty nine in three important ways. First, among major metropolitan papers. Both daily and Sunday, the news is number one in household penetration.
- 1:28:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:28:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): percentage of local households that purchase it each day, second in newshole,
- 1:28:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:28:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): portion of the paper devoted to news,
- 1:28:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:28:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): paper stood at 50.1% in nineteen 1989, eighty nine, against forty nine point five percent in nineteen eighty eight,
- 1:28:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 1:28:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): level again making it more. news rich than any comparable American paper. Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major papers, the news set its seventh consecutive profit record. To some extent, these three factors are related, though obviously a high percentage news hole, by itself reduces profits
- 1:29:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): significantly. A large and intelligently utilized newshole, however, attracts a wide spectrum of research. readers and thereby boosts EO penetration. High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper particularly valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk to the entire community through a single megaphone. A low penetration paper is a
- 1:29:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): far less compelling purchase for many advertisers and will eventually suffer in both ad rates and profits.
- 1:29:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 1:29:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): should be emphasized that our excellent penetration
- 1:29:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is neither an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County, home territory of the news, has been falling from one million one hundred thirteen thousand in nineteen seventy to one million fifteen thousand in nineteen eighty to an estimated nine hundred sixty six thousand in nineteen eighty eight. Circulation
- 1:29:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): figures tell a different story.
- 1:30:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:30:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): nineteen seventy five, shortly before we started our Sunday edition, the Courier Express, a long established Buffalo paper, was selling two hundred seven thousand five hundred Sunday copies in Erie County last year, with population at least five percent lower.
- 1:30:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:30:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): news sold an average of two hundred ninety two thousand seven hundred copies. I believe that in no other major Sunday market has there been anything close to that increase. in penetration. When this kind of gain is made,
- 1:30:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:30:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when a paper attains an unequaled degree of acceptance in its hometown, someone is doing something right. In this case, major credit clearly belongs to Murray Light, our longtime editor who daily creates an informative, useful, and interesting product. Credit should go also to the circulation and production departments. A paper that is
- 1:30:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): frequently late because of production problems or distribution weaknesses will lose customers, no matter how strong its editorial content. Stan Lipsy, publisher of the news, has produced profits fully up to the strength of our product. I believe Stan's managerial skills deliver at least five extra percentage points in and profit margin
- 1:31:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compared to the earnings that would be achieved by an average manager, given the situation. same circumstances.
- 1:31:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): His early years in the business were spent on the news side, and he played a key role in developing and editing a series of stories that
- 1:31:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 1:31:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1972 won a Pulitzer Prize for the Sun Newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have worked together for over 20 years, through some bad times, as well as good, and I could not ask for a better partner.
- 1:31:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 1:31:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fetchheimer, the Heldman clan, Lan, Bob, George, Gary, Roger, and Fred,
- 1:32:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): continue
- 1:32:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their extraordinary performance. Profits in nineteen eighty nine were down somewhat because of problems the business experienced in integrating a major nineteen eighty eight acquisition. These problems will be ironed out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested capital at Fetchheimer remains splendid. Like all of our managers, the Heldmans have an
- 1:32:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exceptional command of the details of their business. At last year's annual meeting,
- 1:32:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:32:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mentioned that when a prisoner enters San Quentin, Bob and George probably know his shirt size. That's only a slight exaggeration. No matter what area of the country is being discussed, they know exactly what is going on with major customers and with the competition.
- 1:32:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Though
- 1:32:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we purchased Fetchheimer four years ago, Charlie and I have never visited any of its plants or the home office in Cincinnati. We're much like the lonesome Maytag repairman. The Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is never needed. Ralph Shea continues to do a superb job in managing our largest group, World Book,
- 1:33:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer manufacturing companies. Aggregate earnings of these businesses have increased every year since our purchase, and returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional. Ralph is running an enterprise large enough to
- 1:33:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be able to do that.
- 1:33:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were it standing alone, to be on the Fortune 500, and he's running it in a fashion that would put him high in the top diesel, measured by return on equity. For some years, World Book has operated out of a single location in Chicago's merchandise mart. Anticipating the imminent expiration of its lease, the business is now
- 1:33:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): decentralizing into four locations. The expenses of this transition are significant. Nevertheless, profits in nineteen eighty nine held up well. It will be another year before costs of the move are fully behind us. Kirby's business was particularly strong last year, featuring large gains in export sales. International
- 1:33:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business has more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled Tuppled in the past four. Its share of unit sales has risen from five percent to twenty percent, our largest capital expenditures in nineteen eighty nine were at Kirby, in preparation for a major model change in nineteen ninety. Ralph's operations contribute about forty percent of the
- 1:34:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): total earnings of the non insurance group.
- 1:34:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 1:34:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of nineteen eighty six, our acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our acquisition of the businesses.
- 1:34:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:34:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): addition to generating extraordinary earnings, Ralph also manages capital extremely well. These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that in turn have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments. And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees
- 1:34:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Insurance Operations. Here is an updated look at the key figures for the property casualty insurance.
- 1:34:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industry.
- 1:34:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:34:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the early nineteen eighties, premiums written grew only about four or five percent a year, while incurred losses grew faster. The combined ratio after policyholder dividends therefore climbed steadily, from one hundred six in nineteen eighty one to one hundred and eighteen in nineteen eighty four, before, when incurred losses jumped almost seventeen percent.
- 1:35:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Premiums then surged, growing about twenty. two percent in both nineteen eighty five and nineteen eighty six, which pulled the combined ratio down to one hundred eight and then to one hundred four point six in nineteen eighty seven. But premium growth has since collapsed, just four point four percent in nineteen eighty eight and only two point one
- 1:35:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): percent in nineteen eighty nine, while incurred losses grew five point five percent and then eight point seven percent.
- 1:35:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:35:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio has duly climbed back to one hundred five point four in nineteen eighty eight and an estimated one hundred ten point four in nineteen eighty nine. General inflation, measured by the GNP deflator, meanwhile ran in the three to four percent range.
- 1:35:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:35:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): combined ratio represents total insurance costs, losses incurred plus expenses, compared to revenue from premiums,
- 1:36:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 1:36:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ratio below one hundred. 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds, the float, is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 to 111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on
- 1:36:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the funds provided by shareholders.
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