Robin Wigglesworth traces bond market history from Venice to modern fragility
Summary
Robin Wigglesworth discusses the evolution of sovereign and corporate debt, starting with Venice's 1171 Prestiti and the Dutch East India Company's 1622 bonds. He highlights the UK's consolidated annuities as a risk-free benchmark that funded the British Empire and Industrial Revolution. Wigglesworth argues that modern Treasury market fragility stems from hedge fund leverage in the basis trade. He suggests potential solutions like synthetic duration instruments or a Fed backstop, though political toxicity hinders permanent facilities. The episode concludes with a critique of radical debt restructuring proposals as operationally impossible for the US.
Key takeaways
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 6:56
Intro and Guest Background
David Beckworth introduces Robin Wigglesworth, editor of FT Alphaville and author of 'Trillions' and 'A Fabulous Debt'. Wigglesworth mentions his podcast 'The Story of Money' with Gillian Tett and discusses balancing journalism with long-form writing.
- 6:56 – 12:24
Bond Market Size and Importance
Wigglesworth cites BIS data stating the global bond market was approximately $188 trillion at the end of 2025, larger than the global stock market and banking system. He notes the US public debt stack recently crossed $40 trillion, with the Treasury market around $35 trillion.
- 12:24 – 25:01
The Innovative, Ill-Fated Doge
Wigglesworth recounts the 1171 creation of the first tradable bond (Prestiti) by Venice to fund a war against Constantinople. The Doge, Vitale II Michiel, imposed a forced loan with a 5% yield. The campaign failed due to plague and delay, leading to the Doge's murder by an angry mob in 1172.
- 25:01 – 29:27
The Netherlands: Land of Bogs and Bonds
Wigglesworth explains how Dutch waterboards used bonds to finance dike and waterway construction. These bonds later funded the Dutch War of Independence against Spain, leveraging the Dutch reputation for credible borrowing against Spain's history of defaults.
- 29:27 – 33:43
The Dutch East India Company and Early Corporate Bonds
The speaker discusses the Dutch East India Company as the first proper corporate bond issuer in 1622, noting its use of bonds for funding rather than equity. This period also saw the rise of the Bank of Amsterdam, which acted as an early central bank focused on price stability rather than government financing.
- 33:43 – 43:32
British Consolidated Annuities and Perpetual Bonds
The UK established the consolidated annuities market in the mid-1700s, creating the first true risk-free sovereign bond market. These perpetual bonds, yielding around 3%, provided the financial backbone for the British Empire and indirectly financed the Industrial Revolution through capital gains.
- 43:32 – 53:48
US Treasury Market and Fiscal Dominance
The transcript highlights the US Treasury market's role in financing national expansion and wars. It notes that during WWII, the US experienced true fiscal dominance with yield curve control, raising questions about the feasibility of similar policies today given the market's size and global nature.
- 53:48 – 58:44
Hedge Funds and Treasury Market Fragility
The discussion shifts to the role of hedge funds in the Treasury market, particularly through the basis trade. While they provide liquidity, their leverage creates technical risks. The speaker suggests potential solutions like a Fed bailout facility for the basis trade or Treasury forward sales to manage fragility.
- 58:44 – 59:24
Proposals for Treasury Synthetic Futures and Policy Receptivity
Speaker_1 suggests the Treasury could issue synthetic duration instruments or futures to satisfy mutual fund demand and reduce hedge fund basis trade incentives. He notes that while technically feasible, there is no current policy uptake, though Secretary Bessent might understand the mechanics.
- 59:24 – 1:00:54
Fed Backstop and Political Toxicity of Permanent Facilities
Speaker_1 argues that policymakers view permanent liquidity facilities as politically toxic, preferring ad hoc interventions. He asserts that market participants are no longer worried about a Treasury meltdown because they believe the Fed will always intervene to save the market.
- 1:00:54 – 1:02:30
John Cochran's Perpetual Debt Proposal
David Beckworth outlines John Cochran's proposal for a debt structure consisting of short-end floating-rate perpetuals (replacing reserves) and long-end nominal perpetuals. Speaker_1 describes the idea as conceptually brilliant but politically and operationally impossible for the US to implement.
- 1:02:30 – 1:05:50
Gradual Return of Perpetuals and Market Structure
Speaker_1 suggests that while the US cannot swap its debt stack, other countries might gradually reintroduce perpetual bonds over decades. He notes that Debt Management Offices (DMOs) are inherently conservative, making radical changes like this difficult even in small nations like Norway.
Claims worth verifying
The Dutch East India Company issued its oldest known bond in 1622, paying 6.5% interest for five years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·30:36
How to verify: Check historical records of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) bond issuances; verify interest rates and maturity terms in historical financial archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Bank of Amsterdam was the direct inspiration for the Bank of England after the Glorious Revolution.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·33:26
How to verify: Review historical accounts of the Glorious Revolution and the founding of the Bank of England (1694) for references to Dutch financial models. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The UK consolidated debts into consolidated annuities in the mid-1700s, specifically around 1750.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:27
How to verify: Consult UK Treasury historical records or economic history texts regarding the Consolidation Act of 1751 and the creation of Consols. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
British consols yielded around 3-4% during the mid-1700s.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:47
How to verify: Check historical yield data for British government debt in the 18th century from financial history databases. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ben Bernanke discussed yield curve control at the FOMC in 2022.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·45:15
How to verify: Review the FOMC meeting minutes released in 2022 and any public statements or transcripts from Ben Bernanke during that period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Hedge funds own more of the Treasury market than Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia combined (approx. 8%).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·56:45
How to verify: Check Federal Reserve data on international holdings of Treasury securities and hedge fund position reports (e.g., from the Treasury International Capital data or hedge fund surveys). For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The basis trade almost blew up in March 2020.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·56:25
How to verify: Review financial news reports and Federal Reserve reports on market functioning during March 2020 regarding Treasury and repo market stress. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Brookings Institution published a paper by Anandil, Neil Kashyap, and Josh Younger on the Treasury Market and Central Bank role.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·57:45
How to verify: Search the Brookings Institution website for the paper titled 'Trends in Treasury Market Dysfunction and the Role of the Central Bank' by the named authors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Stephen Williams proposed Treasury forward sales on FT Alphaville.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·58:25
How to verify: Search the FT Alphaville blog archives for articles by Stephen Williams discussing Treasury forward sales as a solution to market dysfunction. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Trump administration's policies acted as a stress test for the dollar and Treasury market.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:54
How to verify: Review economic data on Treasury flows during the Trump administration (2026-2026) and analyze the impact of trade policies and tariffs on foreign demand for US debt. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Treasury could sell a 10-year treasury bond that settles in five years to deliver synthetic duration, satisfying mutual fund demand and reducing hedge fund basis trades.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·58:44
How to verify: Review Federal Reserve H.4.1 reports for mutual fund holdings of Treasury futures and CME Group data on Treasury futures open interest to assess demand for synthetic duration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Secretary Bessent has a trading mentality and a fine-tuned understanding of Treasury market issues.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·59:55
How to verify: Check public statements, interviews, and voting records of Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent regarding financial market operations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Market participants are not worried about the Fed not saving the Treasury market from a meltdown because the Fed has shown its hand many times.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:28
How to verify: Analyze CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) and Treasury volatility indices during past liquidity stress events (e.g., March 2026, September 2026) to assess perceived Fed intervention probability. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
John Cochran's proposal involves short-end fixed value floating rate debt instruments and long-end nominal perpetual treasuries.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:00:54
How to verify: Search for publications or white papers by John Cochran detailing his debt restructuring proposal. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Bank of England finally repaid its console bond a few years ago.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:04:47
How to verify: Search Bank of England archives or UK Debt Management Office records for the redemption date of the last outstanding Consol (perpetual) bond. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Debt Management Offices (DMOs) are not known for their radicalism and are supposed to be predictable and sober.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:03:04
How to verify: Review mission statements and operational guidelines of major DMOs (e.g., UK DMO, US Treasury, Japan MOF) regarding risk management and debt issuance strategies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify BIS global bond market size data for end of 2025.
- Check US Treasury public debt outstanding figures against Treasury.gov.
- Review historical records of Venice's Prestiti and Doge Vitale II Michiel's fate.
- Examine Dutch East India Company (VOC) bond issuance records from 1622.
- Analyze UK Consolidated Annuities yield curves and historical performance.
- Assess current hedge fund leverage ratios in Treasury basis trades via SEC filings.
- Monitor FOMC statements regarding potential liquidity facilities for Treasury markets.
- Research John Cochran's debt proposal details and technical feasibility critiques.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:01
- David Beckworth: Welcome to Macro Musings, where each week we pull back the curtain and take a closer look at the most important macroeconomic issues of the past, present, and future. I am your host, David Beckworth, a senior research fellow with the Merqueta Center at George Mason University. And I'm glad you've decided to join
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us.
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
- 0:25
- David Beckworth: guest today is Robin. Wigglesworth. Robin is a veteran correspondent and the editor of the FT Alphaville, a leading blog at the Financial Times newspaper. He is also an acclaimed author with his first book, Trillions, and provided the definitive history of index fund industry and passive investing.
- 0:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Today
- 0:43
- David Beckworth: he joins us to discuss his more recent book, Hot Off the Press: A Fabulous Debt, the epic story of how bonds built the modern world. It's a sweeping, colorful book that looks at the history of bonds through storytelling. And I'm delighted to have Robin on the show. Robin, welcome to the podcast.
- 0:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Hi, David. I'm delighted to be
- 1:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): here. Well,
- 1:02
- David Beckworth: it's great to have you. Juana, of course, I followed your work on FT Appoville, your first book, Trillions, and then this one. And of course, I will give a shout-out to your new podcast, the story of money. Tell listeners quickly about that and why they should listen.
- 1:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, it's a financial history podcast that I do with my colleague Gillian Tet. We love this stuff. We're not necessarily podcasters, but I just think it's a phenomenal medium to go really in-depth in some of the most interesting, fascinating financial or economic or business aspects of the world, really. You and I know you
- 1:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know money matters. It really does. And sometimes in mainstream histories, it kind of gets washed out. So it's been just a real fun, a passion for both Gilly and I to work on the story of money.
- 1:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,
- 1:49
- David Beckworth: as someone who's not in the journalism industry, but I look in and I see people like you, what is it like to write a book and also be a journalist? How do you balance those two demands?
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think maybe you better ask my wife how I balance. balance those two demands on my children. I feel there are synergies in that. Like I deal with some of this stuff at work and that feeds my curiosity. And it's I find it quite nice to have a big titanic project alongside the shorter form, almost
- 2:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): daily or weekly, or monthly stuff you do. So I I find it quite nice to do both. And if I didn't have both, I'd probably miss. it. But it does lead to certain logistical challenges and and very few holidays. But I'm a lucky person. I I love what I do. It's a real privilege. So uh I'll figure I'll take holidays when I'm dead.
- 2:39
- David Beckworth: Yeah. So as the saying goes, find a job you love and you'll never have to work another day. So
- 2:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exactly.
- 2:45
- David Beckworth: Yeah. So that sounds like you and me as well. I feel fortunate to have this job as well. And I love your writing as well. We'll come back to one of those articles that complements the book that you wrote recently, a long piece on hedge funds and their increasingly important role in the treasury market and some of the challenges that presents. But let's talk about your book. Again, it's it's called
- 3:04
- David Beckworth: The Fabulous Debt. I'm gonna hold it up here. I see it's behind you as well. Oh
- 3:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah.
- 3:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 3:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): my publisher makes me put it everywhere. My entire wool wall would be Fabulous Debt if if it was up to the them. But I thought being Anglo Norwegian, I have to make sure it's a little bit tasteful and not overly gross.
- 3:21
- David Beckworth: Okay. And we we should note you are coming to us live from Oslo, Norway. I'm I'm here in a bunker down in southern United States. Sometimes I'm in Washington, D.C., but it's great that we're in a day and age where we can talk to each other across the world. I was just there, though, with your fellow Norwegians in Oslo. I just missed you by a few days. I was visiting the
- 3:41
- David Beckworth: Nordic spank. I as I mentioned to you before the show, I met an actual Thor, Thorvald. Now apparently that's a common name, but I felt special, meaning I got a thunder.
- 3:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, no, we have a few Thors and variants of it here in Norway. There's, you know, you
- 3:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
- 3:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quite here to sta throw a rock and you'll hit one, but you know, the odds are okay at least. Whilst Robin Wigglesworth, you know, there there is there's only one Robin Wigglesworth in Norway. Yeah. Luckily or unluckily.
- 4:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 4:05
- David Beckworth: one other thing about my journey there, so I I was taking photos, I was posting on X, on LinkedIn, and and another prominent Robin, Robin Brooks, says, Share more, share more. So I had to share the the image of the screen, which you have there in Oslo in the National Museum. And I was like, Robin, this is the perfect image for the treasury market. So that
- 4:25
- David Beckworth: is a nice hook and segue. into your book that about bonds, treasury markets. And tell me about the motivation for this. Why write this now?
- 4:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, so I was years ago, almost a decade ago, I was playing around with the BIS database, as all cool
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): people
- 4:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do on a Friday evening. And I discovered that the bond market, the data that the BIS has on the international debt securities market. essentially, was larger than the data that it had on the assets of the banking system. Now there are there are some asterisks around that data that the BIS actually doesn't have great data on the Chinese banking system, which is a big one. But I just thought it was fascinating. I wrote a
- 5:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): column about the FT that you know the bonds are now fixed income securities and now over half of all global debt. And I think there were many downstream consequences from that. But then I started digging into the history because I knew some parts of it, but I didn't know where it all started, where it ended, all the different sort of intermediate steps. But I just did it for my own sake.
- 5:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But it was really in in 2022, after I'd written my first book on the pa history of passive investing. I thought I'd return to this. This is my first love as a financial journalist. My first job as a journalist was covering Sukkuk, Sukuk, Islamic Bonds in the Middle East. And they kind of walk, talk, and quack a bit like conventional bonds are structured to look a lot like them.
- 5:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Get around the prohibition on usury and interest payments. But I just think, look, I I love the history. I think the history is fascinating and it helps me understand the present day. But I also think the reason why I felt it warranted a book wasn't just the fact that the bond market's history is so colourful and vibrant and fun, and it's shaped the world. we live in, but it is
- 6:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also hugely important to understand where we're going. I mean, it's a cliche that George Santayana quote about you know, to understand the the present, you have to understand the past. But today, I'd argue too many people do not understand the global financial system because they don't have an understanding or an appreciation for the role that the capital markets and
- 6:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fixed income in particular plays. And I think. that's become quite painfully apparent over the past 20 years. I think it's going to become even more apparent over the next 20.
- 6:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 6:34
- David Beckworth: you even your introductory chapter, you outlined some of the these issues, some of the implications. You noted, for example, that the one thing that did discipline President Trump was the treasury market, the bond market, right? Yeah. And of course you you bring up the famous James Carville quote if he had to be reincarnated, he'd like to do it as a bond market. not the Pope.
- 6:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 6:56
- David Beckworth: Yeah. But tell us, give us an overview maybe of the bond market, maybe the Treasury market in particular, since it's it's like the anchor part of that that market. How big is it? How important is it? I mean, we've touched on this, but kind of paint the broad strokes here so we can then jump into your book.
- 7:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so I mean the ha the size of the treasury market is is a moving target giving the the scale of the issuance we're seeing from the US government lately. But it's around what $35 trillion? And there's a few more trillion here and there of government debt. So the US famously hit across the $40 trillion mark recently, its public debt stack.
- 7:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is huge. That is the pillar of the global financial fixed income system. But it's just one pillar. The entire global bond market, again, the data gets very sketchy on this. But the latest BIS data puts it at around $188 trillion at the end of 2025. Wow. So
- 7:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fair bit larger than the global stock market and bigger than the banking system, certainly, where frankly a lot of the assets are in the form of fixed income securities. So it's it's huge. And when we talk a lot about shadow. banking and the non bank financial system, that you know we know is an issue and what has been an issue ever since 2008, albeit not maybe
- 8:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gets the same attention as the banking part, the bond market is by far the biggest part of that. So, you know, private credit, it's like two, three trillion, crypto, another two, three trillion, they're all basically little, you know, ants compared to the the elephant. of the bond market.
- 8:29
- David Beckworth: Yeah. And some of the recent stories again highlight this importance. We we touched on Liberation Day, which you you noted was then called Liquidation Day when President Trump responded. But even some of the more recent activities by the Trump administration, so Treasury Secretary Scott Besson's desire to intervene in the Japanese yen market was indirectly
- 8:49
- David Beckworth: tied to wanting to keep. downward pressure on the yields, talk of reforming the Fed's FEMA facility. It's a repo facility for foreign government entities. So a lot of talk about how can we we step in and keep yields. Now, interestingly, Robin, as you know, yields went really high in ten year treasure. They're back down quite a bit. We don't
- 9:09
- David Beckworth: need to spend much time on this, but do you have a good theory for interest rates before we jump into the bonds themselves? and sells?
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't have a good theory. Uh I've got a theory, I've got probably ten theories, and I I pick and choose which one suits me every day. I do think people have been too quick to look at inflation break-even rates and dismiss inflation expectations as a cause for the sell-off. I think there are many factors rolling in. There are some technical
- 9:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): factors and maybe some demand from these the the the bonds. bond splurge from the AI hyperscalers. All these are small things. I think broadly speaking, there are two big things, and it's rising global growth. The global economy has actually been very resilient this year. Far more resilient than you would have expected given the scale of the shock we've had over the past
- 9:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two years. And inflation has been higher than targeted by most central banks for a while now. And the war in Iran with the energy shock. that flows from that is naturally not great. And I think some people have looked at breakeven's staying so calm this year and have overly wistfully said it's all global growth expectations.
- 10:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's just a real move. I
- 10:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 10:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that misses the fact that obviously the fact that the Fed has not lost all its credibility. I think Kevin Walsh has been quite good about saying after these doubts that we will take this. seriously. And that has crimped the breakeven rate. Like the inf the Fed still has the credibility that when it signals we're gonna get on top of this problem,
- 10:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 10:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's why breakeven rates have stayed relatively calm. Avon gone up, what, 20 basis points or so this year, if that. Whilst the move in the real yields is is kind of a natural flow from ri higher expect exp rate expectations than we had at the beginning of the year. And where that leaves us, I I don't know if I knew for sure where things were going, I'd
- 10:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have my own private island in the Caribbean, but uh but it's gonna be fun to see how it all plays out.
- 11:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah. In
- 11:01
- David Beckworth: the meantime, gives you plenty of material to write about and
- 11:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to cover. God bless
- 11:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bessant and Kevin Walsh
- 11:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 11:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everybody involved because they keep people like me and you gainfully employed.
- 11:11
- David Beckworth: Oh, absolutely. I've told this story on here before, but when I started this podcast back in 2016, my superiors were like, I don't know if there's a market. I could
- 11:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): see maybe
- 11:20
- David Beckworth: five or six episodes. I said, no, trust me, we
- 11:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): never
- 11:23
- David Beckworth: settle anything in macro and finance. There's
- 11:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): always
- 11:26
- David Beckworth: debates. And there's always something new, some new shock, some new controversy. I mean, this is this great material.
- 11:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, it really is. Look, I mean for a for a different article, I once spoke to Harry Markowitz, the Nobel Prizer Prize wrote about more financially financial economic economics, of course. And I just was marveling that even in his late 80s, he was working on a five-volume series of books about
- 11:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): something.
- 11:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And he had as many questions for me as I had for him. And I think there's something about this world that we live in that maybe in the
- 11:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nothing ever stays the same. Nothing is settled. I think there's always new regimes and it kind of keeps us young for a long time. So let's
- 12:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let's
- 12:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hope so. So a bit of exercise and and staying in interested financial matters keeps people young, I say.
- 12:05
- David Beckworth: Yeah, no, I mean just one anecdote to that. You know, I as I mentioned I was just in Norway. I actually traveled to several central banks. I was talking to them about their operating system. And to me it's it's quite shocking, even surprising that the Federal Reserve is now talking about, you know, it r rethinking its operating system its balance sheet.
- 12:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A year ago
- 12:23
- David Beckworth: this was sacrosanct. You didn't touch this. Just the the the overton window has shifted to me as again an example. There's always something new to talk about, always something popping up that we did not expect to happen. So
- 12:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
- 12:35
- David Beckworth: let's talk about your book and your book begins with this incredible story. I learned a lot about Italian city states. I didn't realize they're such an important part of the beginning of our bonds.
- 12:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. No, I mean I I learned a lot as well researching it. I mean that's part of the the the joy of it. That I like learning stuff and I like reading. I do like doing research. And I have to write at the end of it to get paid and be gainfully employed. But the fun part is the research. And yeah, the Italian city states, you know, I mean, we know that a lot of modern finance stems
- 13:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from really the Italians and the Dutch. The Italian, the modern banking approach is as at it work, were, kind of the word bank comes from the bank. banky wooden tables that Italian moneylenders would have in the in the market squares of Venice or Florence or Milan. The Italians, uh specifically the Venetians, invented
- 13:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): by accident the first bond, the first tradable fixed income security in 1171 in amid lots of drama.
- 13:35
- David Beckworth: Now tell us about a character in particular that was. behind this story. And I and as I read the name, I had to do a double take because it it sounds like it looks like Doge, which we has a different history here in the United States.
- 13:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, no, it was the Doge. He's the elected leader of Venice. Venice is it's have you been there, David?
- 13:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 13:54
- David Beckworth: have not.
- 13:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, no, I I went as a as a feckless student, and I wish I could go back now knowing a bit more about the city's history. Yeah. It's just an incredible town. It was founded by refugees feeding the Vandals, so basically German barbarians at the time. And they fled to Venice because it was a swampy hellhole that nobody else wanted. There was nothing of natural resources, nothing, no wood,
- 14:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): no stone, no nothing. No nobles were interested in it. But they had therefore Therefore, had to they live off their own ingenuity, and they became probably the most amazing merchant explorer. explorers and and commercial entrepot in the world. And they became a republic in in this era of frankly mass despotism in Europe and serfdom.
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, though there's examples of people literally rising from slavery to being the doge of Venice within two generations, which for Europe at the time, I mean, even today that's an incredible story.
- 14:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But for
- 14:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Europe in the twelfth century is is incredible. But they technically owed religious fealty to Rome, to to the the Vatican City, the Pope there, because it was a Catholic town and it was in Italy. But they are actually ruled by the Byzantine Empire based then in Constantinople or today's Istanbul. But because they were so uppity and nouveau Over rich Rish
- 15:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and would trade with everybody, even Muslims, even the Saracen, they annoyed everybody and eventually Constantinople arrested, they got so annoyed, the emperor they got so annoyed he ordered the arrest of every Venetian they could round up in the entire Byzantine Empire. And the doge Vitali, who was the doge at the time, was a very cautious guy. He
- 15:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): decided, well, you know, I don't really want to go to war. War is bad for commerce. Let's let's try to let's try first peace. But then literally, as they were debating this, in the ducal palace, basically in Venice, one ship of fleeing Venetians who managed to escape the clutches of the Byzantine Empire sailed in and told everybody
- 15:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about this injustice. And it was a republic. So you kind of had to do what the people said. The people were so angry. And Venice was not like a it was a city state, but it was a very wealthy, successful one. They thought they could take down Constantinople at notch. a So to pay for it, because they didn't really have much in tax revenues, they it was the city said it was wealthy,
- 16:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but it was small. They they forced everybody in the city to pay a one-off proportional wealth tax, essentially. But to soften the blow, they made it pay five percent a year, so they oh it's a loan. You'll lend government govern the government government money until we can take Constantinople down a notch. We'll pay you five percent a year
- 16:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and we'll make the receipts tradable. And that was the the crucial bit because then anybody could go down to the Rialto, which is the main square in Venice, then and today, now you can buy fresh vegetables there and fish. Back then you could buy I mean anything on the planet really, but you can buy and sell the receipts of this Prestiti, pristiti, as it was
- 16:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): called, this loan and then buy yourself a five percent income stream for perpetuity in theory, or sell one if you need to raise cash, or or use it as collateral for a loan and so on. So it became quite powerful.
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 17:02
- David Beckworth: the big innovation was a tradable loan that people could like sell if they didn't want to hang on to they needed liquidity, they needed need some funding quickly that they could sell to someone else, and they would get that income stream, those payments, and then it became a market. So this was an innovation. Necessity is a mother of innovation, right? So this is a case where the the local city needed the funds.
- 17:22
- David Beckworth: They came up with this innovation. And just again, the history, I encourage people to read the story, but the history, so they they go as you as you outlined, they go to war with Constantinople, but they're on their journey. They build a huge fleet, but they're cautious and and they get hoodwinked by. the emperor. Tell that part.
- 17:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, the Port Doge was a peace-loving, very careful man, uh unusually for the era as well. And so they they managed to pay for this huge fleet. They set sail to attack the Byzantine Empire. We're going to attack some of the Greek little cities on the way, as
- 17:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 17:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were, they were part of the Byzantine Empire. And then some of the the Greek citizens are said, say, okay, no, please stop attacking us. We will send emircies, emissaries, to the emperor in Constantinople, begging him to release all the Venetians and pay reparations. And the doge just said, Well, that sounds fine. So they they just they were too cautious, they were too
- 18:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): slow. So they wintered, and the emperor realized that he could just play for time. Wars are very expensive. Keeping this going is very expensive. So he just kept fobbing the Venetians off. And until, and this is really where things used to went horrifically wrong. That anchored fleet got hit by the plague of some sort of pestilence or plague. We don't
- 18:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know exactly which
- 18:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one,
- 18:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but we know hundreds and eventually thousands of people died. In the end, they the force wasn't large enough to sail on Constantinople, so they had to return to Venice, tail between their legs, and and basically admit that they'd lost this war. They were not able to free their. compatriots in in Constantinople. And worse, the poor doge had brought the
- 18:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): plague back to Venice with
- 18:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
- 18:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And because it's a republic and there was a direct democracy, there was a public inquiry, and this is by 1172. The doge has to have all these citizens in that start screaming at him for messing everything up. He was too cautious, too cowardly. and you they get angrier and angrier. And slowly, and the Doge
- 19:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): should have realized this was a red light moment. His advisors start slipping out. They're all in there with him, but eventually they start tiptoeing towards the exits because people are getting angry and angry. One speaker is running up the next speaker, and he's just sitting there taking it until he also has to make a dash for it, but is caught on the streets of Venice
- 19:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and murdered.
- 19:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 19:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I always joke that it shows that financial innovators get no respect whatsoever. But most of them don't get murdered or clubbed to death or stabbed to death on
- 19:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the streets of their
- 19:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hometown.
- 19:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 19:53
- David Beckworth: you you do go on to say though that he was uh vindicated, you know, after his death. People are like, What do did we think? And this was a great leader. And so he is, you know, his death. he becomes a hero. But the big insight here was though that the the tradable loans. Also you you highlight the Catholic Church gave an endorsement. That was pretty important too, right? Given the issue of of usury
- 20:13
- David Beckworth: during the time. Aaron
- 20:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Ross
- 20:14
- David Beckworth: Powell
- 20:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. So some of these bankers had been getting around the injunction against usury for for a while before this, typically by structuring things like it as a profit share or fees or or some way around it. You know, money like life to use that quote from Jurassic Park, money finds a way. It always does. But the church
- 20:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tacitly blessed this and eventually later on explicitly blessed it as basically because it was a loan, a forced loan, it wasn't really making money from nothing. You were buying an income stream. You were buying something essentially. The Romans had used uh invented annuities for much the same reason. And the fact that it was tradable just because it became a commodity you
- 20:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): could trade. So it was generally accepted. And Venice lost this war, so they weren't able to pay back that loan, but it actually became so powerful in the hands of a commercial city as collateral. So one of the first use cases, well, there are two. One is collateral. You could use it as a you can then
- 21:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): endow,
- 21:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 21:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can endow. can't your favorite church, you could leave it to your own descendants, you could make your money work for you, you could use it as surety for trade credit. So it started getting used as trade credit. And also in a world where you know there's no paper money, there's quite often a shortage of species of coins, silver and gold
- 21:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): coins
- 21:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that people wanted. This became kind of big money. Like it was a
- 21:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): piece
- 21:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of paper from a very credible rich government that still paid five percent a year, every year, and that became very powerful. In fact, buying, being able to buy this pristiti became a privilege that only Venetian citizens and a few selected honored foreigners were allowed to do. The other Italian city states saw this and
- 21:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): basically copied the the invention en masse. So you see the exactly the same thing crop up in in for Florence, in Milan, in Genoa, and Pisa, Rome, and eventually it just kind of spread around Europe.
- 22:09
- David Beckworth: One of the interesting themes that runs through the story as well as the next story we'll get to in the Netherlands is this notion of empowerment that everyone got to participate. So if you're in Venice, again, you mentioned the Rags-Riches story. I mean, everyone got to be a part of something, an activity. It kind of connected them. And with the Dutch, it actually the whole the whole republic was connected. So it this is almost
- 22:29
- David Beckworth: like a libertarian paradise, except for the some of the outcomes. People get killed and they go to war. But it was it's really interesting. And and one of the things I was left wondering, and and I don't want to spend too much time on this because your book's not about this, but I I was wondering the counterfactual. What if Doge had sailed all the way down to Constantop? Constantopol, How would the world be very different today?
- 22:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, it that's a a great question. that I was pondering myself. And I thought about writing, not necessarily counterfactual, but you know, we could have seen, let's say if Venice had won that war very quickly, raided Constantinople, seized its treasury, and paid back the loan as soon as they came back the next year. Maybe the Venetians would have still,
- 23:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in that sort of intervening period, realized realize the magic of a tradable fixed income security. Like how powerful a tool that is. But maybe not. And we don't really know. And I do agree on your broader point that I don't even think it's a libertarian fancy. It's more that actually debt and anything that binds, I
- 23:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean, the word bond itself, bonds and financial securities can, And in a weird way, help bind us together. So one thing that I did not expect before doing
- 23:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exhaustive, if uh highly delightful, research into all of this period is to what extent the bond actually helps strengthen Venice by binding citizens together as creditors. So, because if they lent money to the government, they had a vested interest in that government being well run. And the government had a vested Invested interest in making sure it
- 23:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): seemed to be transparent. So they set up a sort of a finance ministry that would share government finances, all the data. They they passed laws saying creditors ranked below even the sailors and the soldiers of the city. So it helped strengthen, it actually as a pro-cyclical tool, almost a helped strengthen the accountability and the
- 24:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): governance of the city. And lo and behold, the best cities, the best or city-states city states and eventually nations
- 24:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 24:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the the Dutch or the British, the ones that were the best run, the most accountable, the most transparent, they could borrow more cheaply, and Urgo they generally became more powerful. That is is the the feedback loop there. And I thought, you
- 24:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 24:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm not gonna say that the bond market helped usher in democracy in in Europe, because that would be comically overdone. But I definitely think it is one of a many myriad factors, like a small F factor
- 24:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 24:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): definitely helped usher this in. We see it later on, of course, but I think the Venetians were the first to really show how the bond market can help bind a people together rather than just pull it apart.
- 25:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 25:02
- David Beckworth: I that was a beautiful part of the story for me. It's just an important technology, especially in this day and age where we social trust is low, it's broken down. It's like something to restore that sense of community that they had there.
- 25:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It was
- 25:13
- David Beckworth: And it was through a financial instrument. of all things. Well, let's let's move on to the Dutch. Now we the innovation in Venice was the first tradable loan. The innovation for the Netherlands was what? What was what did they add to the story?
- 25:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 25:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we don't know exactly what the first Dutch bond is. And we we definitely see this bond, a tradable loan, start migrating around Europe by the sort of 1300s. thirteen hundreds And their there are ronds Ronce and in France or Renten in in the Germanic states, then there's no Germany yet, and Renton in Dutch uh in the Dutch states. But don't forget there is
- 25:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): no Netherlands yet. Generally a ro rule by the Spanish Empire. Lots of wars going on, but it's fairly swampy. Large parts of the Netherlands is is below sea level, so it's called the Bog of Europe, which I rather uh cruelly title my chapter on on the Dutch bond market. Uh, but they use them to begin with
- 26:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): overwhelmingly to fight the elements. Like I said, it's mostly below sea level, or large parts of below sea level. So that incredible, intricate system of dikes and waterways that the Dutch have built, which really is, I'd say, uh a wonder of the modern world, because it's one of the first times where humans on a massive and truly remarkable scale adapted the kind of
- 26:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): climate to suit our needs. That was to a large extent financed by the bond market. So different Dutch towns and villages and areas would band together into these waterworks, these were waterboards. And they would basically pay taxes to the waterboard. And these waterboards survived even as the the s this the borders
- 26:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of the states kept waxing and waning over the centuries. And some of them existed. exist to this very day. But they uh they issued bonds, and then the Dutch also, I think, took this invention and used it to pay for their war of independence against Spain eventually. So it was part of the Spanish Netherlands.
- 27:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The more Protestant part or the Catholic parts stuck to Belgium and France, really but France at the time, but the Protestant bits managed to secede. after a very bloody long conflict lasting around eighty years. But the reason why the Dutch could fight the superpower of the era, the Spanish Empire, to a standstill in the
- 27:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1600s was because they could finance themselves so adeptly with the bond market that they helped nurture forth and they nurtured by being very credible borrowers. So they mobilised mobilized essentially the capital of the Dutch burgers, the Dutch merchants, the Dutch business people and ordinary people to
- 27:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fight
- 27:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for independence. Whilst the Spanish crown at the time was infamous even for the era for defaulting all the time, uh ruining many banking families in the process.
- 27:53
- David Beckworth: So an understated part of the Protestant Reformation is the bond market. I mean, the Protestants today need to give more credit, more recognition to the support they got from the bond market. Trevor
- 28:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus, Jr.
- 28:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Everybody needs to give more credit to the bond market.
- 28:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's my
- 28:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): strong conviction.
- 28:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 28:08
- David Beckworth: general.
- 28:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In general.
- 28:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 28:10
- David Beckworth: long-run economic growth. And we'll talk
- 28:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about the UK in a minute
- 28:12
- David Beckworth: and the Industrial Revolution also. But the other thing, I mean, that was interesting about this, and you mentioned it just a minute ago is that because Spain did not take that approach, they borrowed and they defaulted. It actually impacted it not only was that the the uh Dutch were funded efficiently, this new technology called bonds, but the Spaniards were so poorly financed
- 28:32
- David Beckworth: and that the default history so strong. You tell the story in 1576 of a mutiny of these Spanish soldiers because they're not getting paid, which then allowed made it again made it easier for the Dutch to defend themselves. So finance is such an important part of history in the storytelling.
- 28:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, no, it's it fascinating. So I would say, like, in a way that m more modern day historians have looked at some of the financial details on the banking families in Germany and especially Italy that would lend to to King Philip of Spain at the time. And and his defaults, multiple they're kind of weird because he's actually he was famous for being a very cunning administrator. He was not some
- 29:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spendthrift, useless royal, as was sometimes the rule, but he did default several times, and especially this one default was was so important. People have realized that later on that the bankers actually managed to extract such good interest rates and sometimes collateral out of the Spanish king that they weren't as mad as it might seem to lend to him again and again
- 29:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and again. But clearly, sometimes these defaults happen at very strategically inopportune times. And around
- 29:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
- 29:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mutiny that caused, uh, first of all, it was an important time militarily in this war. for independence for the Netherlands. But the mutiny soldiers, I've remember correctly, I remember they forget the date, but they basically sacked Antwerp. Brutally sacked Antwerp to get their money somehow. And that was
- 29:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): such
- 29:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a brutal moment in the history that actually it helped really solidify the revolutionary fervor in the the Netherlands Netherland states, the process. provinces around them. There's certainly the Protestant ones. So it's a bit like the British reaction to the tea getting thrown the Boston Harbor, right? That certainly
- 30:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these
- 30:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): moments, whether they're financially or militarily important, we can debate, but they certainly became symbolically hugely powerful.
- 30:20
- David Beckworth: So it was a perfect storm of many, many events, including finance coming together. But I think one of the big insights from that chapter. and that story is then they go on to use these bonds to help fund the Dutch East India Company. So this was the first corporate bond. Is that right?
- 30:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. So in 1622. I mean, it depends a little about what you call a a corporate or a company, but like broadly speaking,
- 30:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 30:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think we can call the Dutch East India Company the first proper company company with a decentralized broad shareholder list. It was the first listed company. Amsterdam had the first proper stock market. And it issued the oldest bond I could find in 1622. Because the interesting thing is that even today, right, the stock market,
- 31:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I sometimes cruelly joke that it's like trading Pokemon cards. Like it's really just secondary market activity. It doesn't actually fund companies. Like if I
- 31:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): buy
- 31:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an Apple share, it's not giving money to Apple. I'm just giving money to another person who owns. an Apple share. So the Dutch East India Company hardly ever issued any shares apart from that first initial public offering. But it funded itself all the time through bond issuance. And the oldest one we found is in 1622, and that almost certainly is the first proper corporate
- 31:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bond. And I think it paid 6.5% interest rate for five years. And typically at the era, bonds were perpetual,
- 31:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but the
- 31:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): corporate bond market, though those first few corporate bonds, they were had a firm maturity date. So you can start to see how that starts spreading as well afterwards.
- 31:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 31:47
- David Beckworth: want to give a quick shout out to the uh Bank of Amsterdam in this story. I know it's not a big part of your book, but I had previous guests on Will Robert Steve Cohen, they have a book
- 31:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
- 31:56
- David Beckworth: Ledger became a central bank. And I I just bring it up because I do think this is an important contributing factor, maybe to some of the success. of the Netherlands. This effectively became a central bank and it was a city, it was an urban-based, and because of that, they didn't have this seniorage incentive. Like most national central bank Bank of England, they have an incentive to help fund the government.
- 32:16
- David Beckworth: This bank was set up for price stability to keep markets running, a medium of exchange, very different incentive structure, which I think kind of plays into you trust the corporate bond market there.
- 32:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as well.
- 32:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, I think the the whistle bank is fascinating. And I have to admit, when I was writing this book, you'll be unsurprised to hear that there were so many separate interesting adventures, as it were, I could have gone on. The history of central banking, the history of banking, the history of money, the history of financial securities in general. But I tried try
- 32:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to as much as possible to stick to my my my hero, the the bond. But the Mistel Bank
- 32:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 32:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fascinating and I I I I actually I haven't read that book yet, but I have it downloaded on my phone to save now that I'm finally catching up on all my non
- 33:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): bond
- 33:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): related literature, I'm planning to enjoy that very soon.
- 33:05
- David Beckworth: Well the the nice thing about that story is if you ask the question, who was the original central bank? Well you could say, well the Rixbank, Riksbank, you
- 33:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 33:13
- David Beckworth: it's it's in existence. but it's the oldest central bank still in operation. The Bank of Amsterdam is arguably the oldest and the original central bank. So
- 33:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it seemed to have been the direct insp inspiration for the Bank of England when that was set
- 33:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up
- 33:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): after what became known as the Glorious Revolution, where the British just basically copied a lot of Dutch I mean, first of all, imported the Dutch prints, Prince, but
- 33:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): also
- 33:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): imported a lots lot of Dutch financial practices as well.
- 33:37
- David Beckworth: Well that's a nice segue. weighted roll there, uh Rob. Let's talk about that.
- 33:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So it
- 33:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): handed it right over, yeah.
- 33:43
- David Beckworth: You did. You're perfect. You're pro at this, obviously. But you had a number of chapters, but let's let's talk about the big contributions the UK has made to the bond market over the years.
- 33:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so the there will be some pedants that say the first true government bond is the bond that basically sort of set up the Bank of England. Okay. Because all the other bonds unpelled until then had generally been city-states or provinces or towns or royal families or individual companies
- 34:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or individual people or waterports. But the tr first true sovereign nation that explicitly sold a sovereign bond backed by the entire country of it was Great Britain, it wasn't the United Kingdom yet.
- 34:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Was a the basically the bond that the Bank of England bought as part of its founding. That they sort of set up the Bank of England as basically a way to lend money to the British government. Now, I'd argue that's not true because that bond did not trade. It was structured like a bond, but it didn't really trade. It was symbolically repaid on the
- 34:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bank Bank of England's 300th birthday. But you can see the English, they'd had this incredible hodgepodge of debt-like securities that they'd issued in the years up to this. There'd been a sovereign default before the Glorious Revolution as well. It was one of the motivations for importing a Dutch prince and getting a new royal family.
- 35:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But over time, you can see this government debt stock, and it had like it was it was a mess of all sorts of different things. Some of it's like more like lottery sales and annuities, and it was all sorts of it was not very well thought out. But you can see the emergence of what became known as the consolidated annuities market, which really is
- 35:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the first true the first risk-free market, really, if you can say anything is truly risk-free. Free. But that was they they took in the 1700s, the mid-1700s and 1750s 1750, if I remember correct. correctly, it was one of the first of several operations where they consolidated all these different debts, did a big massive debt exchange and swapped them
- 35:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for a homogeneous security of consolidated annuities that first paid some three and a half, four percent, three percent around that. And that became the financial backbone for the British Empire. And the a large reason why I'd argue.
- 36:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Britain became the world's leading power for a couple of centuries on the back of the consolidated annuities market or the console market. It was it was in very to a large extent the treasury market before the treasury market existed.
- 36:17
- David Beckworth: So there are many key inputs into the Industrial Revolution, but an important one is a good financial technology. And this was it. This was this and you're talking about the perpetual bonds. Is that what you're you're
- 36:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): doing? Yeah,
- 36:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these are still
- 36:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): perpetual
- 36:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): securities, typically yielding 3%.
- 36:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 36:32
- David Beckworth: so this is a fascinating story because effectively they they inherit the culture or the thinking of the Dutch financial system. And you highlight some people were critical of that, but that actually was a blessing for the nation. But tell us about the perpetuals, because that is such a fascinating security. Because later in the conversation, I want to come back to there's been some people like John Cocker. Cochrane proposed that the US
- 36:52
- David Beckworth: government should issue it. So tell
- 36:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us more
- 36:53
- David Beckworth: about how do they operate.
- 36:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, it's just a bond without a maturity. So almost all government securities or state-linked securities, bank bonds, were essentially perpetual for several centuries. So the British didn't sort of invent perpetuals at all, but I think they both they kind of perfected it and and took it several degrees before that. The prestige pristiti that the
- 37:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Italians also issued, that was also perpetual. So what happened is that you you issued Pristiti or consoles at a three percent of fixed interest rate. But if, for example, you were hard up and there was a war and you had to borrow a lot, you might sell it below par. So you might sell a hundred pounds worth of
- 37:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): consoles for ninety 90 pounds. So the interest would still be three 3%. percent. But in practice, of course, you you you might it might be as little as 80 cents, pence on the pound.
- 37:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The market clearing mechanism is really the price, not the yield.
- 37:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 37:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the yield is typically fixed to make sure that these are interchangeable. That one 3% console is exactly the same as the next 3% console, even if they're issued 10 years different times. And then the government would retire. them whenever it won the war, for example, or raised taxes, and it would retire them ideally proportionally. But
- 38:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sometimes if they'd issued something quite cheaply or with a higher interest rate, because sometimes they would do those countries, they'd say, Well, we won't redeem it for at least 10 years. It was actually sometimes obviously they'd rather retire something paying five 5% percent rather than three 3%. percent. But essentially the debt stock would wax. and wane and ebb and flow with wars, almost certainly, or
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big disasters, like the South Sea bubble. And when times were good, you paid down that debt, you bought back these consoles. And when times were lean, you issued more of them. And that's how things operated for a very long time. And there are pros and cons to that. But it worked reasonably well for the
- 38:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): British because
- 38:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yes, you could sell something below par, and that was annoying, but you could generally always sell it as such a big discount that you get some buyers. So even at the depths of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain was able to sell consoles at a far higher price and at a lower effective interest rate or bond yield than the French were. And that helped bankroll
- 39:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Britain's victory in the Napoleonic Wars and helped them subsidize. allies in Portugal and Prussia and elsewhere and keep them with material. But also
- 39:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 39:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Industrial Revolution, and this was something I hadn't really quite appreciated enough until I started researching a fabulous debt. But when Britain won the Napoleonic Wars, the famous of Rothschild sending carrier pigeons, hearing that the Battle of Waterloo had won and that he bought lots of consoles to let the price go up as is actually not entirely
- 39:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): accurate. But console prices obviously rose. And you can imagine the entire British populace who should have been stuffed to the gills and kind of encouraged to buy all these consoles that went from trading at maybe 60, 50, 60, 70 pence on a pound, suddenly went trading at 100, not overnight, but quite
- 40:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quickly traded up. It was this massive capital gains, this huge tax-free
- 40:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): recapitalization of Britain, just as these new technologies were coming on stream. So it proved transformative and helped finance to a large extent the Industrial Revolution. That was something that I had never really quite appreciated, the extent to which that kind of that like the console market actually helped almost indirectly finance that. The financial gains in Britain.
- 40:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that British investors made on consoles helped pay for the investments of the Industrial Revolution.
- 40:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 40:32
- David Beckworth: such an intriguing story and an idea for a debt security. And a key thing, again, is this every security is interchangeable no matter when it's issued. So it's a very liquid market. You have no uncertainty. It's not like holding a 10-year treasury treasure bond today. It's It's like everything the liquidity of all treasury bills, but everything's completely interchangeable. and everything lasts forever.
- 40:52
- David Beckworth: So it's super fascinating. And I'll just have to throw out there it's it's interesting to compare the the British and and the French. So clearly had they had this technology. They also were very much more disciplined. I I've had some previous guests. I had George Hall, who's written papers with uh Tom Sargent, and they talk about how the the British what they did is they
- 41:12
- David Beckworth: effectively followed the Robert Barrows text. tax smoothing view that when you have a big war, you you don't want to raise taxes because it's a big sh it's distortionary. You want to borrow, but then you run primary surpluses. But the French never did the British did this, the French did not. So the British had technology, they also had the fiscal discipline that the French seemed to lack.
- 41:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, also a So a certain amount of and you again see that democratic aspect of it that the French
- 41:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): said
- 41:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the French would have periodically incredibly brilliant finance ministers or prime ministers or chief ministers to the king that would try to institute changes, would sharpen things up, but inevitably this is unpopular, and they'd fall out with the king. So Jacques Necker before the French Revolution, a brilliant Genevan
- 41:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banker who was highly regarded, but was eventually ejected before he could have really m bring meaningful change to France. Same thing with Spain and other countries. That actually the fact that the UK had managed to sort of defang its royal family and shift his sovereignty over to Parliament and
- 42:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): enfranchise not most of its population, let's face it. It was mostly wealthy men, but and you know, only a small section of that. But but at least the there was some sort of accountability. And I think having read I didn't spend as much time on the French or Italian or Spanish history, but I
- 42:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
- 42:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Itali Italy broke up into different parts and was only unified later. But but it's very clear that you can see that they had opportunities to turn a certain way and they didn't take them.
- 42:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 42:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Whilst the British consistently for a long period of time, even when they were massively indebted, like the British debt stock after the Napoleonic Wars, I think it was north or three hundred percent of GDP, still the biggest debt burden we've ever seen in history of a major country. But again, they kind of made the right choices afterwards and didn't crush
- 43:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the economy, but they started paying it down very slowly, but let economic growth do most of it, of course. And they were lucky with the timing as well.
- 43:32
- David Beckworth: But I'm going to jump ahead because we don't have a lot of time left to the US Treasury market.
- 43:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 43:35
- David Beckworth: I'm going gonna to just read a quote from actually an FT article you wrote just to summarize. It's you you worded beautifully here, Robin, so I think it's a nice summary, and then we can jump to some questions I have. But you say it was the bond market that bound the colonies together politically after the American Revolution. It was the bond market that financed the Louisiana Purchase. It was the bond market that bankrolled the Union's victory in the Civil War. It
- 43:55
- David Beckworth: was the bond market that then knitted the country together physically by financing the vast network of railroads that transformed America into the world's industrial powerhouse. Bonds were the essential financial fuel that helped the U.S. triumph in both world wars. Even today, it is the bond market that pays for the homes that Americans live in, the cars they drive, the Hulking data centers that now power artificial
- 44:15
- David Beckworth: intelligence. And its heart is the treasury market, the bills and bonds the U.S. government itself sells to investors. And this comes from an FT article titled The Treasury Market's Toxic Codependency: the U.S. government bond market has. become a hedge fund playground. I'll come back to that in a minute, but just for reference, that's where I got that. But I want to jump ahead. Again, there's so much we could talk about. But
- 44:35
- David Beckworth: I want to jump to World War II in this story. Because during World War II, we actually had, I think, true, unquestionable fiscal dominance. The Federal Reserve is subservient to to the the Treasury. Obviously, they're fighting the war. We had actual yield curve control in Utah. and you talk about that
- 44:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 44:51
- David Beckworth: the book.
- 44:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 44:52
- David Beckworth: here's my question to you, since you study bond markets so thoroughly and so closely, is it even possible to do yield curve control today, given the you you mentioned in your book it's bond markets are bigger than credit from banks. It's it's so big. Could we even do that if we you wanted to do
- 45:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that?
- 45:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Unquestionably, yes. And and my, you know, this is not
- 45:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a good idea.
- 45:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): something I think is probable, but if I if you ask them with stuff that most people say is impossible, but I think is is certainly more possible than most, I'd say Yilko control. We know that it was discussed. We saw earlier today Minutes release from 2022. It was under discussion at the FOMC in 2022. Ben Bernanke discussed it several times
- 45:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as well. We know this has been talked about, mostly in the context of is this a more optimal form of QE essentially? That, you know, every policy comes with intended and unintended consequences, positive and negative. And if the idea for me it's is it it flows from the fact that you know Yieldkov control under
- 45:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): by the Fed in in World War II, it was kind of a classic we are s every part, every sinew senior of the American government. of America is subservient to this one effort, the winning the war. So everything was kind of under supposed that. But even in a world where m the bond market is so big, where over half of all
- 46:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): global credit is being extended in the bond market, I think that if we continue to think of central banks as sort of the the temperature regulators, it is not just necessary, it's inescapable. that they start having a heavy hand on the bond market as much as sometimes it might make us feel uncomfortable. And the question is then
- 46:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is the least distortive way to do this by just buying lots of treasuries unlimited or buying a hundred billion,
- 46:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): two
- 46:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hundred billion, or like having a number that sounds really big and impressive in a press release, or saying unlimited as the Fed did in March 2020, or is it less this sort of to literally dictate a target like the the Bank of Japan eventually did? I don't actually know
- 46:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 46:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't I I don't know what I think is is the best way, but I definitely think that yield curve control is not as unthinkable in the US
- 47:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 47:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Europe or or the other countries, although So it, you know, those financial systems are very different from Japan. So I don't think it would be a smooth sailing. to put it that way.
- 47:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Do you think it would be
- 47:16
- David Beckworth: harder today? Do you think it would be harder today than back then? Because the market was much smaller, more
- 47:22
- David Beckworth: globalized.
- 47:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is
- 47:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 47:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'd say that back then, yes, it's just a smaller market of control and the government controlled both the supply and it kind of enforced a lot of the purchases as well. And
- 47:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 47:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there was like marketing and propaganda schemes that first started during America's the American Civil War. and got supercharged during World War I with a liberty loan program and kind of copied in World War II. And the market is far more international now. But I also think the Fed is far more credible than it is in during World War II.
- 47:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That if the Federal Reserve decided that actually we think yield curve control is less distortive somehow, uh, we're going to say the 10-year treasury will. load rates to zero. We're not going to go below zero, because that definitely does seem to be something
- 48:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 48:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): most central banks have decided is not worth experimenting with. But we're going to cut target a 10-year yield of 3%. And we will buy an unlimited amount of treasuries to do that. Now, people will test
- 48:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them,
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but I think the Fed has an immense amount of credibility that it would be able to do so. I do think politically, it would be toxic in America. It
- 48:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is not
- 48:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): difficult to see how people would extremely quickly scream about socialism and and things like that. But I I I don't think that should detract from whether this is a useful policy or not. But I'd love to see more debates. I'd love to hear what you think about yield
- 48:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): code control versus
- 48:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): QE.
- 48:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 48:49
- David Beckworth: no, I I think there's a place where QE for or any tool you need if in the right circumstance, right?
- 48:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 48:55
- David Beckworth: fighting a war, zero lower bound, definitely. And I guess you know one could argue, you know, 21, 2021, that was maybe a form of fiscal dominance then briefly then as well. So maybe I need to be careful. What I was going to say, I was hoping, Robin, you would give me some hope that the markets will impose more discipline and get the
- 49:15
- David Beckworth: US government's finances in line, and we can't tinker as much as we used
- 49:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to.
- 49:18
- David Beckworth: But you're saying no,
- 49:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sorry, David.
- 49:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, I have to look so this is definitely one of my stronger held opinions. Okay. I think Americans are massively over afraid of the near-term prospects of any major bond market disruption or debt crisis in kind of inverted commas. But arguably a lot of the same symptoms or the
- 49:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): advantages that the US has that inoculate the US against that kind of classic acute kind of debt crisis. Like the what we think of is in in emerging markets, like a sudden stop of capital flows, interest rates and bond yields spike higher, the currency collapses, and austerity has to come. Finally, the government kind of wakes up,
- 50:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or there's a new government comes in.
- 50:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 50:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that is crystal. crystallized very much by our experience of developing countries that are not monetarily sovereign. I think in a country like even of France or the UK, this plays out very differently. And in a country as unique as America, I think the advantage of that and basically make America virtually immune. And I I say virtually
- 50:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because there is always a possibility for some horrifically stupid accident. of some economic mismanagement or financial mismanagement, but makes that kind of classic acute debt crisis almost impossible. It makes a chronic debt crisis that slowly builds up over a generation
- 50:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or two. That makes it more likely because there will never be that firm discipline of the bond market. That actually this will continue to worry about this for the next 10, 20, 30 years. But over time, no politician wants to raise cases, nobody wants to cut spending, the budget deficit stays high. There's no countervailing force. There's
- 51:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): enough demand for treasuries in the US financial system, the global financial system, that over time, debt servicing as a percentage of American GDP or the budget just keeps rising and rising and rising and rising. So it's a chronic crisis that just manifests in a very different way and in a
- 51:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): slow-moving way. That's my sort of 10 cents or my
- 51:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 35 trillion cents.
- 51:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 51:27
- David Beckworth: I I'm sympathetic to m most of that. You know, there is no alternative to the US dollar system.
- 51:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 51:32
- David Beckworth: mean, whether it's public bonds, treasuries, or private, it's just that's the thing. If you're going gonna to run on a bank, there's got to gotta be another bank to run too. Yes.
- 51:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That
- 51:39
- David Beckworth: has balance sheet capacity the same. And there is no other balance sheet capacity.
- 51:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I've
- 51:44
- David Beckworth: mentioned this before many times. I'll do one more time because it fits well here. But Mark Carney's proposal in 2019 for this synthetic hegemonic currency, the SHC. Yeah. It was this crazy idea that you would each central bank would have a C B D C and then would it have a synthetic currency on top of that that would displace the dollar. But I you know, there was some simply not enough balance
- 52:04
- David Beckworth: sheet capacity around the world to displace the dollar, even if you wanted to follow through on that plan.
- 52:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No. I I I just think, I mean, uh the the cliche that gets banded around a lot is the the America's the least dirty shirt. Uh and it's
- 52:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 52:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pretty dirty shirt, but you should see some of the others. They are stinky. Uh and they're
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just not
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big enough. We're We're too
- 52:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): too big, right?
- 52:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. I mean, if you just think about that, like the what I can't remember what the current estimates are for how much of the treasury market that the just Europe holds, but several trillions of dollars. Where this where's
- 52:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 52:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): money gonna go? Like into Italy?
- 52:36
- David Beckworth: Right.
- 52:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): France? Japan? Uh China? Do we feel as much as you know the coherence and competency of American policymaking is being severely questioned at the moment, do we really feel safer lending money to Beijing? than we do DC? I don't think so. So I think
- 52:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 52:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Trump administration has engineered deliberately and by accident a massive stress test of the world's ability and willingness to stick to the dollar and the treasure market. And lo and behold, money is still going into the treasure To market all the time. There's a few months here and there where the tick date indicates there's some outflows and
- 53:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and journalists like me will write, oh, this is worrisome. In practice, I just see zero real evidence of that changing. It's not for want of wanting an alternative, but it's for a lack of anything that looks remotely possible.
- 53:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 53:29
- David Beckworth: we'll have to wait for the aliens and disclosure data, maybe provide a true alternative.
- 53:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, no.
- 53:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mars, Mars
- 53:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bonds, Mars bunds. I don't know what we'd call Mars bonds.
- 53:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Maybe that's what we'll have to.
- 53:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wait for.
- 53:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 53:39
- David Beckworth: that'll be the only alternative.
- 53:48
- David Beckworth: And I want to bring up one in particular. And again, it's just the treasury basis trade that you wrote about and the FT article. Again, the title was The Treasury Market's Toxic Codependency. The US government bond market has become a hedge fund playground. And and we know look, there's good reasons for this.
- 54:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 54:04
- David Beckworth: may not like the outcome, but I mean, post-you
- 54:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 54:07
- David Beckworth: great financial crisis, we have Dodd-Frank, which really kind of constrains balance sheet capacity of primary dealers and traditional banks. And we yet we continue to issue all the sets, somebody has to step in and provide liquidity support. And so hedge funds have done that. They're also very fickle though. They're not like primary they they can leave on a on a dime. This is the point you make. Yeah. But they also are
- 54:27
- David Beckworth: doing something I think really underscores the point you just said. They are converting, effectively converting long-term treasuries into short-term liquidity through this basis trade, through the repo market, which suggests to me, and I've had other people say this, that the Treasury should be issuing more treasury bills if there's some unmet demand. And that might solve the problem. I want you
- 54:47
- David Beckworth: to respond to that. Is that a fair assessment? of
- 54:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the Peter B.
- 54:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so I say like chances of a debt crisis in America happening near term, I think are preposterously overdone. Although there can be ruptions and there'll be bad headlines. I think the risk of a technical breakdown on the treasury market is far greater. Although it's low, it's far greater than people appreciate.
- 55:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And given how much of the global financial system is built on the idea of or treasure market as the solid bedrock underneath, I think that's a scary thing. And I do agree that I'm glad that you're saying that, you know, I sometimes try to catch myself. I don't want to bad mouth or be mean about hedge funds because this I'd feel that's a classic sort of journalistic bogeyman trope, as it were. And
- 55:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's a hedge funds are not doing this to be mean or bad, they're actually providing a valuable service both to asset management clients. So basically, this is driven by the fact that normal mutual funds and insurance companies and such like pension funds want a lot of duration for all sorts of annoying
- 55:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): technical reasons. I don't know if you know what to get into, but there is, they are willing to pay up for treasury futures. So treasury futures trade very rich to treasury cash bonds, and hedge funds are then just arbitraging it. that. So they're buying treasury bonds and selling treasury futures. And they are providing a service and then also helping in some way
- 56:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): intermediate demand and making sure that demand filters into the ordinary American taxpayers. And the reason why they don't isn't just that they are more price sensitive than a boring pension plan, but it's also they use mass massive amounts of leverage. And as much as
- 56:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this is
- 56:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): supposedly perfectly hedged. we know the financial system is very bad at stress testing these things. So we've seen times when this has come undone. The basis trade is the one that gets the most attention after 2020, March 2020, tw when it almost blew up. But there are many other hedge fund strategies. All we know is that now the Fed has released data that shows that hedge
- 56:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): funds in total own more the treasury market than Japan and China and Saudi Arabia put together. We are talking 8% in the entire treasury market overwhelmingly leveraged many, many multiples. In some cases, it's saying that multiples because it's, you know, it's all based on the fact that the treasury market so vol uh so has so little volatility.
- 57:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But I do think the real solution is not less more bills, because the the the treasury market, uh the treasury is issuing more bills now, mostly to kind of keep bond borrowing. costs capped. And I think that actually introduces another potential fragility in that the average tenor of the American debt stack is shortening and shortening. I actually think so there's I
- 57:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guess there's two solutions I've s seen. I've seen many people talk about this, but the two solutions that I've really loved. One is Andil Neil Kash Yap, Josh Younger, and a few others came up out with a Brookings paper. I've got it here. The trend Treasury Market Dysfunction and the Role of the Central Bank, where they essentially, it's a sort of a palliative
- 57:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where they said that the Fed should introduce a basis trade bailout facility in practice, where they lift both sides if that trade hits a hard patch and the hedge funds have to liquidate it. The Fed can buy both sides at the same time because obviously the Fed has zero funding worries. It can literally create money. So it would
- 58:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): essentially be it would be bailing out the hedge funds, but it would probably make money doing so because it would only be doing this at times of stress. It would encourage moral had because obviously anybody doing the basis trade would know that you could sell out to the Fed if you hit a bad path. pat, but But it strikes me as an elegant way of of taking
- 58:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it out, minimizing. funding stresses or like how technical problems it can cause and also potentially even making a a bit of money from the treasury itself. And the second one is a a guy called Stephen Williams who's proposed on on Alphaville, the blog I run at the FT, where he said essentially the Treasury itself can just sell Treasury bonds forward.
- 58:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
- 58:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can They sell a 10-year ten year treasury bond that you only settle, that you only receive in five years time. Because in practice, that is delivering the synthetic duration that mutual funds are buying through Treasury Futures. Like, why can't the Treasury m itself essentially sell Treasury futures or something that kind of walks, talks, and
- 59:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quacks like a treasury future with synthetic duration, thereby satisfying that demand and just lessening the incentive for hedge funds to do all these very complicated trades? but also fund itself that way. And I think that's also a simple, quite elegant way that could potentially help or certainly ameliorate this issue.
- 59:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 59:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): least on the base basis trade.
- 59:26
- David Beckworth: Yeah. So on on this, these proposals, have you heard any like feedback from policymakers or anyone like whether there's receptivity to this?
- 59:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, I haven't. The first one, Stephen Williams only uh so he's a uh relative value bond trader, so he had an idea. And I think he ran it, it was very much like a speculative thing, but he I've talked to people, is this technically feasible? And it is. But I haven't heard whether that's going to happen. I think
- 59:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 59:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the administration today there are many other priorities. I I think it might appeal
- 59:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 59:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): somebody like a Bessent, who it has more
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of a
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trading mentality that I think understands these issues, despite what it sometimes might it might appear. I think Besson does have a fine tuned understanding of these issues. And then the cash yap et al. suggestion. I think I have talked to policymakers or people in those circles about this. Everybody kinda agrees they just think it's politically
- 1:00:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): toxic to set it up as a standard permanent facility. But in practice, this is what happens when the Fed yeah sprays money
- 1:00:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on the problem.
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, exactly. So you
- 1:00:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
- 1:00:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is it better to just do it ad hoc and maybe introduce a certain amount of warrior that would the Fed do this and thereby kind of keep things under control? I I think so. But I think the the Fed has shown its hand so many times that nobody doing
- 1:00:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these trades
- 1:00:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are ever worried about the Fed not doing what it takes to save the treasury market from a meltdown.
- 1:00:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Trevor Burrus Yeah,
- 1:00:49
- David Beckworth: and that's for that side. same reason, I think if push comes to shove in the stablecoin market, we'll see
- 1:00:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): something
- 1:00:54
- David Beckworth: similar happen there. But one okay, one last r related question, maybe we'll wrap the show up. But I know you're familiar with John Cochran's proposal to revamp the entire debt structure. So just briefly, he wants to see on the short end In a fixed value floating rate debt instrument, electronic treasuries. You can buy and sell on demand, but basically it could
- 1:01:14
- David Beckworth: prepare. perpetual
- 1:01:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it'd
- 1:01:16
- David Beckworth: be out. In fact, all of these will be perpetual. But he wants the the shorter end would be effectively be a substitute for like reserves from the from the Federal Reserve. Longer end, you'd have nominal perpetuals, treasuries uh the with consoles paying a fixed dollar, keep on forever, and then also index per perpetuities. And he has some other ideas as well. But what are your thoughts on on this? Is this too radical?
- 1:01:36
- David Beckworth: Great idea, somewhere in between?
- 1:01:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 1:01:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's it's a great idea that will never ever happen, is is my view. I think it is conceptually brilliant and elegant. I love it. There are technical issues with some of the short end stuff, but I I I think it's fascinating. And I think there are advantages, that that homogeneous debt stack of perpetual bonds that you can buy and sell
- 1:01:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and and trade. I think there are liquidity benefits to that with the the currents are set up with like a an auction, a sliding auction, different maturities, it is a lot of sort of games around that.
- 1:02:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:02:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just think it is impossible absent an apocalyptic crisis that we are ever going to have something like this. This is, you know, we joke a lot about like trying to fix a Boeing 747 forty seven whilst mid midair. air. I mean, this is I mean, this is like
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't I know. what it would be the equivalent. It just we couldn't do it. There is no way
- 1:02:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we'd be
- 1:02:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): able to swap the American debt stack. What you could maybe see is some countries, and this has been under discussion I think by certain debt management officers, reissuing perpetuals, like starting a perpetual market again. And over time, over let's say 50 fifty years,
- 1:02:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if we
- 1:02:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do think this is optimal, that this is a cheaper way of funding the government, in whatever country it is, that the perpetual market just broadly starts taking over. And at various stages there are sort of buybacks and exchange options and things like
- 1:03:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
- 1:03:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I just
- 1:03:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): DMOs are not known for their radicalism.
- 1:03:07
- David Beckworth: Yeah.
- 1:03:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): By their nature, they're supposed to be very predictable and and and sober. So I think
- 1:03:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even
- 1:03:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in a small country like in Norway, this would be very hard to do operationally and and logistically and politically. In a country like the United States, I I I just think it's never ever going to happen. But I think it's a fascinating idea and uh I'm glad you you raise it. 'Cause I I like I think ideas should be discussed
- 1:03:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because
- 1:03:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it helps us even if they're not going to happen, they can still sharpen
- 1:03:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
- 1:03:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): understanding about some of these issues. And the something that is Mike the the current short end US money market. I mean, you're far better on this than I am, but I do think it is
- 1:03:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 1:03:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a journalisting observer and a complete rube when it comes to these things, the hodgepodge of Fed funds and repo and different rates and and bills, it it this does look suboptimal.
- 1:04:00
- David Beckworth: Yeah.
- 1:04:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So maybe there could
- 1:04:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be some
- 1:04:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): finessing there.
- 1:04:03
- David Beckworth: I I one of the key things I like about this is that you could this would be on demand. So if the if the market wanted m more liquidity, like right now, they want more short end liquidity. There'd be less demand for the basis trade, arguably, if these were available. But, you know, as you said, this is a long journey, if one at all, you know, marketing, political appetite
- 1:04:23
- David Beckworth: and such. But with that, our time is up. Our guest today's been Robin Wigglesworth. His book is a fabulous debt. Be sure you get your copy. And thank you, Robin, for coming on the show.
- 1:04:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, thanks for having me, though. It's been lots of fun. And even talking about yeah, everything on basis and bond yields to yeah perpetuals and whether we can bring them back. I have I have a soft spot for perpetuals. I I'd like to bring see them brought back, but I think the direction of travel is pretty clear. The the
- 1:04:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Brita
- 1:04:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): British Bank of England, England finally repaid that Bank of England bond. a few years ago, signaling that the the final end of the British console market. So uh but maybe we'll bring it back to the future at some point.
- 1:05:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
- 1:05:00
- David Beckworth: right, let's make perpetuals great again.
- 1:05:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thanks so much,
- 1:05:02
- David Beckworth: Robin.
- 1:05:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thanks, David.
- 1:05:11
- David Beckworth: Macromusines Macro Musings is produced by the Mercatus Center at George Mason.
- 1:05:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): University. Dive
- 1:05:16
- David Beckworth: deeper into our research at Mercatus.org forward slash monetary policy.
- 1:05:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 1:05:22
- David Beckworth: can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. If you like this podcast, please consider giving us a rating and leaving a review. This helps other thoughtful people like you find the show. Find me on Twitter at DavidBeck. David Beckworth and follow the show at macro
- 1:05:42
- David Beckworth: underscore musings.
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