Macro Musings with David Beckworth

Darrell Duffie discusses Fed balance sheet reduction, ratchet effects, and tokenized finance.

59 min Listen to the original Episode page
Federal ReserveMonetary PolicyBanking RegulationTokenized FinanceInterbank MarketsLiquidity

Summary

Darrell Duffie argues that the Federal Reserve faces a 'ratchet effect' preventing full balance sheet normalization because banks have restructured operations to rely on abundant reserves. He suggests technical fixes like Liquidity Savings Mechanisms on Fedwire and temporary open market operations to manage reserve scarcity without causing rate spikes. Duffie also highlights the near-extinction of the interbank market and recommends tiered reserve systems to restore price discovery. Finally, he warns that tokenized finance will likely increase demand for central bank reserves, necessitating potential Fed involvement in tokenized settlement assets.

Episode sections

  1. 0:48 – 4:49

    Historical Context of Balance Sheet Discussions

    David Beckworth sets the stage by noting the current Fed balance sheet task force initiated by Chair Kevin Walsh and increased openness among FOMC members regarding shrinking the liability side. Darrell Duffie traces this trend back to the 2017 normalization efforts and Kevin Warsh's prior comments at the IMF, highlighting a longstanding reluctance among central banks to maintain excessively large balance sheets.

  2. Duffie explains the 'ratchet effect' where the Fed cannot fully unwind QE because banks restructure their operations to rely on abundant reserves. He notes that attempts to reduce reserves lead to interest rate spikes, as seen in 2019 and late 2025, forcing the Fed to halt QT. He identifies liquidity regulations and supervisory expectations as compounding factors that prevent banks from using Fed facilities like the discount window.

  3. Duffie proposes adding a Liquidity Savings Mechanism (LSM) to Fedwire to allow banks to net incoming and outgoing payments, reducing the need for reserve balances. He contrasts this with the pre-2008 scarce reserve system and explains that while Fedwire is a real-time gross settlement system, LSMs used by other central banks offer a hybrid approach that minimizes credit risk while economizing on reserves.

  4. 26:35 – 32:14

    Other Options to Shrink the Fed's Balance Sheet

    Duffie discusses temporary open market operations (TOMOs) as a tool to neutralize shocks to the reserve supply caused by fluctuations in the Treasury General Account (TGA). He argues that while the Fed prefers a demand-driven system, banks' reluctance to use Fed facilities due to regulatory stigma limits its effectiveness, making proactive TOMOs a viable alternative to maintain smooth markets.

  5. 32:14 – 38:42

    Tweaks to the Operating System

    The discussion covers the Fed's stylistic preference for a less activist role in money markets and its aspiration for a demand-driven system. Duffie suggests that until banks overcome their regulatory fears and begin using overdrafts and standing repo operations more liberally, the Fed may need to employ more active tools like TOMOs or LSMs to prevent market stress during balance sheet reduction.

  6. 38:42 – 48:21

    Tiered Reserves and Interbank Markets

    Duffie discusses tiered reserve systems used by the Norges Bank and Reserve Bank of New Zealand to reduce balance sheets by paying lower rates on excess reserves. He argues that reviving the interbank market (Federal Funds) provides essential price discovery and counterparty discipline, which is currently missing as banks rely on the Fed's balance sheet.

  7. 48:21 – 53:39

    Tokenized Finance

    Duffie explains that tokenized finance will create a bifurcation between conventional and programmable money, potentially increasing the demand for central bank reserves due to fragmentation. He states that stablecoins are not yet safe enough for multi-trillion dollar settlements, requiring central bank money as the settlement asset.

  8. 53:39 – 58:45

    Duffie's Recommendations

    Duffie recommends that central banks must accommodate increased reserve demand from tokenization and consider providing tokenized reserves. He notes that while the ECB and SNB are moving quickly, the Fed is likely to wait, possibly allowing private firms to provide tokenized deposits backed by central bank reserves.

Claims worth verifying

The Fed's balance sheet task force was initiated by Chair Kevin Walsh.

David Beckworth ·1:32

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve press releases or official statements from late 2026 regarding the formation of a balance sheet task force and the appointment of Chair Kevin Walsh. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Kevin Warsh gave a speech at the IMF meetings last spring stating the Fed's balance sheet was too big.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:06

How to verify: Search IMF archives or news reports for Kevin Warsh's speeches in Spring 2026 regarding the size of the Fed's balance sheet. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The FOMC wanted the minimal balance sheet consistent with efficient monetary policy implementation during the 2017 normalization.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:27

How to verify: Review FOMC meeting transcripts and statements from 2017-2026 for language regarding balance sheet size and policy implementation efficiency. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Fed's balance sheet bottomed at $1.4 trillion in 2017-2018 and recently bottomed at approximately $3 trillion.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:45

How to verify: Consult the Federal Reserve's H.4.1 statistical release for historical balance sheet totals to verify the 2026 low and the late 2026 low. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Jamie Dimon stated on a 2019 earnings call that banks did not lend because they feared violating the spirit of liquidity regulations if they overdrafted.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·10:33

How to verify: Locate the transcript of JPMorgan Chase's Q3 2019 earnings call and search for Jamie Dimon's remarks on liquidity and the September 2019 repo crisis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Bank of Japan runs its Liquidity Savings Mechanism six times a day.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·25:23

How to verify: Review Bank of Japan payment system documentation or academic papers on Japanese monetary operations to verify the frequency of LSM cycles. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Interest on reserves was authorized by Congress before the financial crisis to address scarce reserve stress, not primarily due to QE.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·22:45

How to verify: Check the Federal Reserve Act amendments or Fed historical records regarding the timeline of interest on reserve authority (e.g., Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2026) versus the 2026 crisis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Fedwire processes approximately $4.5 trillion in payments per day.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·17:40

How to verify: Access Federal Reserve payment statistics or annual reports on Fedwire volumes to verify the daily transaction value. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Fedwire Securities processes over $2.5 trillion in payments per day.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·17:59

How to verify: Access Federal Reserve payment statistics or annual reports on Fedwire Securities volumes to verify the daily transaction value. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Fed bought Treasury bills in 2025 to keep the supply of reserves ample.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·6:27

How to verify: Review Federal Reserve Open Market Operations data or H.4.1 releases for 2026 to confirm purchases of Treasury bills during that period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Temporary open market operations can reduce reserves by at most tens of billions or perhaps a hundred or two hundred billion, not trillions.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:54

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve Open Market Operations data and Duffie's paper for historical usage volumes and projections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Fed clarified that liquidity drawn against highly liquid assets (HLA) parked at the Fed counts as the bank's own resources in meeting Regulation YY.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:36

How to verify: Search Federal Reserve Board press releases or supervisory guidance documents from 2026-08-02 to 2026-11-02 regarding Regulation YY and discount window collateral. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Fed implemented a two-tiered interest rate system for a few weeks after the Lehman Brothers failure.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·42:01

How to verify: Review Federal Reserve historical policy statements and FOMC minutes from late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US domestic interbank (Federal Funds) market has a daily volume of approximately $5 billion.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·45:41

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve H.14 statistical release data for domestic interbank borrowing/lending volumes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The repo market has a daily volume of $8 to $10 trillion.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·46:01

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve H.14 statistical release data for total repo market volumes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Broadridge does on the order of $8 trillion a month of intraday repo contracts.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·55:05

How to verify: Review Broadridge corporate disclosures or industry reports on repo market activity volumes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The ECB is moving hard on providing tokenized central bank deposits to its financial system.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·56:27

How to verify: Check ECB press releases or digital euro/tokenized asset project updates from 2026-08-02 to 2026-11-02. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Swiss National Bank has already provided tokenized central bank deposits.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·56:27

How to verify: Check SNB press releases or project updates regarding tokenized central bank money from 2026-08-02 to 2026-11-02. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Stablecoins have a price that fluctuates close to a dollar but is not exactly a dollar, making them unsuitable for multi-trillion dollar settlements.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·50:25

How to verify: Analyze historical price data for major stablecoins (e.g., USDC, USDT) against the USD to verify deviation from parity. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Fed is watching and waiting to see what technology to use for tokenized reserves, rather than being an early mover.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·56:47

How to verify: Check Federal Reserve statements, speeches by Fed officials, or project updates from 2026-08-02 to 2026-11-02 regarding digital dollar/tokenized reserves. For recent events, verify 2026-08-02 through 2026-11-02. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify the 'ratchet effect' paper by Rajan and Chakravarthy (2017) and compare its assumptions to current bank balance sheet structures.
  • Check the Federal Reserve's H.4.1 report for current reserve balances and compare them to the $1.4T and $3T benchmarks mentioned.
  • Review FOMC transcripts from 2017-2018 and recent meetings for evidence of the stated reluctance to maintain large balance sheets.
  • Examine current bank regulatory filings (10-K/10-Q) for disclosures on Reg YY, CLAR, and ILST compliance constraints.
  • Research the operational mechanics of Liquidity Savings Mechanisms (LSMs) in the Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and ECB systems.
  • Analyze Federal Reserve data on Federal Funds vs. Repo market volumes to confirm the claimed ~$5B vs $8-10T disparity.
  • Assess the safety profiles and settlement mechanisms of major stablecoins to evaluate the basis risk claims made regarding multi-trillion dollar settlements.
Full transcriptexpand
0:01
David Beckworth: Welcome to Macro Musings, where each week we pull back the curtain and take a closer look at the most important macroeconomic issues of the past, present, and future. I am your host, David Beckworth, a senior research fellow at the Merqueta Center at George Mason University. And I'm glad you've decided to join
0:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): us.
0:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Our
0:25
David Beckworth: guest today is Derek. Daryl Duffy. Daryl is a finance professor at Stanford University and one of the leading authorities on financial market design and monetary policy implementation issues. He joins us today to discuss both based upon some papers he's recently done and presented at Brookings and at Jackson Hull. Daryl, welcome back to the program. David,
0:45
David Beckworth: it's great to be back. Thanks for having me
0:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on. It's
0:48
David Beckworth: great to have you. It's a real treat. Now, the last time you were on was way back in 2020. We talked about the treasury market challenges of that time and reforms and a number of proposals that are now being implemented, like central clearing. But today we want to talk about the Fed's balance sheet and what its future might look like. And as
1:08
David Beckworth: I mentioned in the intro, you have several wonderful papers on that.
1:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:13
David Beckworth: I I want to maybe begin before we jump into your two papers by just kind of setting the historical context where we are. So as you know, Daryl, in fact, you may be a part of these conversations behind the scenes, but we have a Fed balance sheet task force that's happening right now that was initiated by the new
1:32
David Beckworth: chairman, Kevin Walsh. We also have what seems to me at least is a change in openness. among FOMC members, and I would I would say just the those in the policy space writ large who care about this topic. And there's a few of us who've been beating this drum for a long time, but it just seems to me there's more openness, more
1:52
David Beckworth: discussion. Maybe not everyone wants to go to a different operating system, but there seems to be an openness at least to shrink the liability side of the balance sheet. And I'm wondering, how do we get here? How how do you think about this moment that we're in?
2:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
2:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I th I think it goes back even before the current chair or the speech by Kevin Warsh that he gave before he was chair at the IMF meetings last spring when he said that in his view the Fed's balance sheet was too big. It goes back even further than that. The FOMC itself seemed to have been
2:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reluctant to have such a large balance sheet when it started normalizing in 2017. And the FOMC was very clear that it wanted the minimal balance sheet consistent with efficient monetary policy implementation. It's always been, I think, a point of sensitivity, although not a not a vividly
2:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sensitive topic at the Fed, that they they didn't like the look of a very large
2:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that shows up in their transcripts. So I think we've been coming this way. But with Kevin Warsh's strong interest in reducing the Fed's balance sheet, I don't think it's surprising that this is on the tip of everybody's tongue today if you're interested in central banking.
3:06
David Beckworth: Yeah. So you recently had a paper out titled The Payment System Puts a Floor Under the Fed's balance sheet. It was given at Brookings, and we're going to use that. to motivate our discussion here in a minute. But the timing of it was interesting because I think the same day you gave that, Stephen Moran gave a talk as well, where he he put out a paper, a user's guide to shrinking the Fed's
3:26
David Beckworth: balance sheet. And soon after that, Lori Logan, Sam Schulhofer Wolf gave out their paper. And it just seems It like this crescendo is building. We're reaching this point where people are talking about it. And so I it's great to see. this moment. And again, I think it's it's important that we have this conversation now because of this moment. One more question related to this moment, though.
3:46
David Beckworth: Do you think that the movement around the world in other advanced central banks toward demand-driven operating systems also is kind of a tailwind for this conversation?
3:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I think it's this comes part in parcel with what's happening at the Bank of England. the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan, even, which is reducing its appetite for JGBs. So central banks are generally reluctant to have such huge balance sheets. They're in the past were willing to do that. I think they're going to be less willing in the future. And in the
4:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meantime, they want to get smaller, but of course, I'm sure it'll come up in our conversation that it's not as easily uh done as. said.
4:28
David Beckworth: Yeah. Your paper again is titled The Payment System Puts a Floor Under the Fed's balance sheet. We'll provide a link to it in the transcript. I'm sure many, if not most of our listeners have already seen it. That's who our audience is, Daryl. So this is the perfect audience for you and your your work here. Let me begin with with a question to kind of like motivate this conversation on the balance sheet and
4:48
David Beckworth: shrinking it. Why is it that when the Fed does QT, it can't fully unwind QE? And I want to be very careful here. I don't mean
4:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): going
4:59
David Beckworth: back to the absolute level before it starts QE, but just, you know, that that upward moving trend path. So we we would expect it to be higher no matter what as the economy grows. But why why is it so challenging for the Fed to return fully and offset the QE?
5:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
5:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'd go first to uh a fan. famous hypothesis presented at Jackson Hole in 2017 when Ragu Rajan presented his paper with Varalacharya on a ratchet effect. And the idea of their paper is that when the Fed blows up its balance sheet, it's doing that by creating a lot more reserves. Those are the deposits that
5:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): commercial banks have at the Fed. And the banks, the commercial banks, they like those deposits. They're really useful. They solve a lot of problems, including payment system issues, liquidity, they pay lots of interest, market interest rates. So once they get used to those new supplies of
5:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reserves, they rejigger their operations so that they depend on having a lot of reserves. And if the Fed tries to go back down in the size of its balance sheet, eventually the banks find that they don't have enough quickly available to meet their needs, and market interest rates get very spiky. And
6:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Fed tends to throw in the towel at that point and say, look, we got it as small as we could get it. We're not going to get any smaller. And that happened again just recently at the in 2025, where the Fed's balance sheet is was starting to be
6:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): able to do that.
6:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): grow again when the Fed started to buy treasury bills to keep the supply of reserves ample.
6:33
David Beckworth: Do you think that's a good way to also look at the twenty nineteen repo moment where the rates soared during that time?
6:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. I mean that was the first major normalization. 2017 and 18, the Fed brought down
6:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): its
6:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): balance sheet. Then along the line of your question, it got as low as one point 1.4 four. trillion, which seems like a lot. It wasn't enough at the time. But then more recently, the Fed was only able to get it down to about $3 trillion, which is more than twice as much. So this ratchet effect described by
7:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Acheria Rajan, it seems to be batting a thousand in terms of its prediction that when the Fed increases its balance sheet, it can't seem to get it back down as far as
7:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's not.
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it was to begin with.
7:17
David Beckworth: So that is an interesting paper and finding. And like you said, it seems to be robust empirically. How much of that finding is in effect just gonna happen no matter what else is happening versus an interaction effect because of all the liquidity regulations? We'll get to those in a minute. But all the post-crisis liquidity regulations that are implemented,
7:37
David Beckworth: does that make it harder? for banks to wind down their liability side, or is it something unique to QE and how banks respond behaviorally?
7:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Ross Powell, I
7:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think there's definitely an interaction effect with liquidity regulations. But if there is a ratchet effect and it hasn't been thoroughly tested yet, I think it could be that bank operations become based on the assumption of plentiful reserves. And, you know, once you've given your counterparties
8:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): abundant lines of credit, allowed them to hold demand deposits in large volumes. And you've no longer need to use interbank funding as much because you have tons of reserves, then these systems atrophy and your counterparties start to depend on these sources of liquidity. And then when you have to have
8:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): less, it's hard to re-engineer your systems to do that. Now, of course, in the reason it interacts with liquidity regulations is that if you were to run out of reserves, you could in principle go to the Fed and get more, but that would demonstrate something counter to the original spirit of the
8:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidity regulations, which say you're supposed to be self-sufficient. And being self-sufficient should in principle mean you don't need to go to the Fed to get more. And I think that's that's when the tire meets the pavement and you get these spikes in interest rates as as banks start to become reluctant to lend money when
9:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're running out of enough to run their business operations.
9:10
David Beckworth: So banks would on their own, you know, assuming no regulations or are are in play, would have this ratchet effect, but is compounded by the fact that they're afraid or unwilling to go to the Fed to tap into the discount window or daylight overdrafts or City Repo facility because of these regulations. Now, you mentioned a number of them. I'm going to throw them out there
9:30
David Beckworth: liquidity coverage ratio, internal liquidity stress tests, regulation, YY, CLAR, resolution planning, these are all in your paper. Which one of those do you think are are the most important? Are they all binding? Are they all creating this tendency to not want to use Fed facilities?
9:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): For the purposes of our conversation, I think you can take the liquidity coverage ratio off the table. That's not the one
9:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because that's a 30-day test of sufficient liquidity. And what we're really seeing is evidence of intraday reserves balances. being the binding constraint. When interest rates start to spike and markets get very volatile, it's because banks are holding back in the middle of the day on how much
10:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're lending and the speed with which they're paying each other. And the other regulations that you mentioned, Reg YY, RLAP, the ILSTs, which are stress tests, and the CLAR, which is another test, those are all playing a role. They were all mentioned by Jamie Dimon famously after
10:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the September 2019 liquidity crunch when he was asked, why didn't you you had lots of reserves, why didn't you lend them early in the day when repo rates were skyrocketing, you could have made money? And his reply on that earnings call was that the Fed is aware.
10:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that there is a red line at zero, basically, in terms of these liquidity regs. If you're or at least JP Morgan had the sense at the time that if they were to go below zero, that would violate the spirit of these liquidity regulations because it would demonstrate that they were not self-sufficient. Now there's nothing in the regs that say
11:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you shouldn't overdraft. And my impression is that the largest banks are starting to
11:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): view these facilities or overdrafting as more available. And I think the Fed is the Fed has been kind of coaching them. You know, we're here for you. If you need liquidity, come to the Fed. That's what these facilities are for, rather than viewing these regulations as preventing you from coming to the Fed.
11:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So we may see some some melting of that ice coming forward.
11:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
11:45
David Beckworth: that that's interesting because I I often will invoke the LCR, and I've heard a number of officials invoke the LCR in these conversations, for example, about let's make collateral at the discount window count towards the LCR. CR. So there's a lot of emphasis on this, but what you're saying is, well, that may not be the most important one to look at. It Maybe may be more important to look at what these G SIBs are
12:05
David Beckworth: facing, like the regulation YY.
12:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
12:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that's the case when you're talking about the sufficiency of reserve balances in the system.
12:13
David Beckworth: Okay.
12:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And what is minimally ample depending on in terms of liquidity regs? I'm quite confident it's more about the intraday-based regulations.
12:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
12:24
David Beckworth: And again, as a consequence of these regulations, these banks are less willing or not willing at all in some cases to go do daylight overdrafts, discount window usage, and standing repo operations. Although that is a newer facility as well. And of course, discount window has some stigma, some other things associated with it. But your point, which is I think is so so true,
12:44
David Beckworth: is there's not much use of it. So therefore you you lose your muscle memory. How do you use these facilities? And and when to use them? And then let's speak to the another point that's related to all this, and that is the supervisory expectations tied to this. It also compounds this problem, is that right?
13:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. I mean, it's a question of perceptions. The regulations say one thing, and then the banks wonder, well, what is my supervisor going to say if I overdraft or if I go to the discount window or the standing repo operations? Now I have to say that there we're starting to see green shoots in terms of banks. The largest
13:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banks, or at least one of them is, I think, now drawing, overdrafting in the middle of some days. You saw at the end of the year $75 billion drawn from standing repo operations. You won't see any action at the discount window by the largest banks because that's still highly, highly stigmatized.
13:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But I
13:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do think
13:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Fed is, you know, if the Fed's going to reduce its balance sheet, it's going to be encouraging the largest banks to use overdrafts and standing repo operations more liberally. And I think we're going to start to see that. It's still early days.
13:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
13:54
David Beckworth: And again, just to reiterate this point, when we talk about these changes and in and reducing the liability side of the Fed's balance sheet, we we need to really look at the big banks more than the other smaller ones. Is that right?
14:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's true. It's the smaller banks are actually willing to overdraft, but it's the largest banks that make markets for repurchase agreements or repos. And that's the most important money market interest rate by far. It's a ten 10 trillion a day market, and it's the largest dealer banks that make markets. in repos. And so
14:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when they're willing to lend funds overnight at rates close to the Fed's administered rate, which is called interest on reserves, then you know markets are fine. And it's a decision of those largest dealer banks that really matters.
14:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
14:45
David Beckworth: So we've talked about the Ragu Rajan Ratchet effect, we talked about liquidity regulation, we've talked about supervisory expectations. All of these are reasons why QT cannot completely unwind QE. But there's another story that you bring up in your paper, and this is kind of the central point of your paper. And this is the inefficiency of the payment
15:05
David Beckworth: system with Fedwire. And you you propose a solution. So maybe walk us through that story and what your solution is for it.
15:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sure. David, that's um pleased that. you had a look at my paper. Well, that's one of the options that I put forward in my paper. Should the Fed want to reduce its balance sheet,
15:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
15:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of the things that it could do is to add to its largest payment system, which is called Fedwire, a new piece of software, which is known as a liquidity savings mechanism or LSM. This is a piece of software that almost all large developed market central banks have, whether it's the Bank of
15:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Canada, Bank of Japan,
15:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
15:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bank of England, the European Central Bank, these central banks all have a piece of software that basically looks at the payments that the large banks are proposing to make and tries to match them against each other so that in you know, if you are, for example, Bank of
16:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): America and you've indicated you want to make a $10 billion payment to me,
16:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
16:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't necessarily have to take $10 billion out of your balances and make sure that you have those balances available, because that $10 billion that you're going to pay me might actually be offset by $10 billion I'm going to pay you or $15 billion that you're going to receive from Citibank. And so the liquidity savings mechanism
16:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is going to look for the opportunity to cancel your outgoing payments with your incoming payments. And if it's able to do that, then you don't need to use reserve balances to make that payment. And one of the options that I looked at in my Brookings paper is based on some research that I did with Chao
16:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Juan Wong, a professor of
16:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
16:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at the University of Pennsylvania, and Shrisht Singh, who's at the University of Toronto Computer Science Department. And we discovered a very, very simple way to match those outgoing and incoming payments in a way that banks would want to use. We show that it's a dominant strategy for them
17:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to put their planned payments into the liquidity savings mechanism. get this cancellation, and avoid the use of so much reserve balances. And that would allow the Fed to supply less reserves to the system and still have plenty of reserves for banks to use for other purposes.
17:29
David Beckworth: And to be clear, this is on the Fed wire system that you would apply this innovation?
17:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So we looked at a number of the Fed operates, as you probably know, a number of different large payment systems.
17:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The Fedwire system is the largest. It's about $4.5 trillion of paid payments per day. Fedwire Securities is also quite large. It's over $2.5 trillion per day. But Fedwire Securities, which is the system by which you pay for treasury securities with reserves, most of those payments,
17:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
17:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, they're not really subject to much discretion in terms of
18:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the government.
18:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): timing. They most of them have to be made early in the day anyway. So banks are not holding back on those. It's the Fedwire payments that are more discretionary and can be delayed significantly. And when you delay your Fedwire payment to me because you're worried you might not have enough, then I'm going to delay my FedWire payment payment to another bank.
18:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
18:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then that's going to cause feedback because you're going to be getting later payments from the other banks.
18:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it can get into a vicious circle where we're all waiting for each other. That's called receipt-reactive payments. And it's quite common in when reserves are tight. As I showed in another paper with Adam Copeland at the New York Fed and Elin Yang at the University of Minnesota, we showed that when reserves are tight, banks hold back on their
18:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): payments to each other and market interest rates spike. away from where the Fed wants them to be.
18:54
David Beckworth: Can we tie this back into the liquidity regulations as well that part of this reluctance to use the system efficiently is because they don't want to be seen as as not holding enough reserves, not h holding that buffer, not being self-insured.
19:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, it's it's sometimes called the a last taxi problem. You know, they have these buffers. but if they use them, they might be violating the liquidity reg. So a lot of this liquidity is trapped by regulation. And yes, that's one of the problems, this interaction effect with liquidity regs. Liquidity regs may serve a useful purpose, but if they weren't there, then
19:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banks then banks would say, Well, I don't really care if I, you know, run short in the middle of the day. I can always go out and get some from the Fed or I can overdraft.
19:38
David Beckworth: Right.
19:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And then, you know, you wouldn't have some of these spikes that we've seen in 2019 and more recently in late 2025. Aaron
19:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell Yeah,
19:47
David Beckworth: I was just wondering, and maybe you cover this in your paper, but Fedwire has been around for a long time, right? And did it fundamentally change with the advent of these liquidity regulations?
19:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Fed
19:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fedwire Water has been around since about 1980 in its current form. It was the world's first real-time gross settlement system. It was a major achievement of the Fed at the time, leading all the other central banks. But the issues with scarcity of reserves were actually more dominant even before the financial crisis.
20:16
David Beckworth: Oh, okay.
20:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
20:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And banks did overdraft a lot in those days in order to make their payments.
20:21
David Beckworth: Yeah.
20:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But in those days, and you are one of the experts on this, David, in those days, the Fed wasn't running a monetary policy based on administered interest rates. It was actually steering market rates by making reserves very scarce. And in 2000 early 2007, for example, the whole system had about ten billion dollars
20:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of reserves. Today we have about three trillion dollars, so around three hundred times as much.
20:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
20:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): back in those early days, banks, you know, were really having conniption fits some days trying to meet
20:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): their
20:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): needs to make payments and balancing that against the available supplies or reserves that they had. So I'd say it's it's better now, not worse than it was uh pre-crisis in terms of stress on the system.
21:07
David Beckworth: The only difference was back then they were more comfortable going to the Fed to get the make up for the shortage if they didn't have it. Aaron
21:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell Indeed.
21:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Indeed. Not the discount window, but they didn't mind overdrafting. Aaron
21:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell And
21:17
David Beckworth: you know, I did since you mentioned the system, I'll I'll just throw this out there kind of as an aside. If you go pre 2008, I don't think we want to go back to that system to be very clear, because I don't think we will go back. Or we could go back because we didn't have interest on reserves. We had what I would call an asymmetric corridor system. I mean, we we
21:37
David Beckworth: did have an implicit interest on in reserve, 0%. But when rates went to, you
21:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
21:42
David Beckworth: Fed funds rate goes to 5%, that's a wide corridor. And banks would work overtime to get rid of reserves because they're losing, the opportunity cost is so high. So you could imagine a world pre 2008 where you had a true corridor where maybe interest in reserves was Say 50 basis points below the Fed funds rate. Banks would still try to
22:01
David Beckworth: economize on reserves. but they would hold more of them because there was some kind of compensation for them. So we had a very unique system pre-2008. I don't think anyone in this debate wants to go back to because of that. And then on top of that, what we've been talking about, liquidity regulations, they're not going away. We can tweak them, but we can't we don't want to get rid of them altogether, but we could maybe make them more
22:21
David Beckworth: efficient.
22:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Can I just add to that? Go ahead.
22:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Your last point, David. There's a common problem. perception that the Fed started to pay interest on reserves because of the financial crisis when it had to do quantitative easing and increase the quantity of reserves in the system. That's actually not the case. It was the problems that you described with a scarce reserve system that caused
22:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Fed to go to Congress much earlier than the financial crisis to get the authority to
22:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do that.
22:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pay interest on reserves so that they wouldn't have to deal with the scarce reserves regime and all of the stress that that put on both the Fed and the banks. Now, it happened that they accelerated the implementation of that with the financial crisis, but it wasn't the original motive of the Fed.
23:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
23:11
David Beckworth: that's that a great point. And in my mind, completely understandable. It's it's an implicit tax on the banks. And I would say an inordinate one, again, when when the Fed funds rate's 5% and you're earning 0% on your reserve, that's a pretty big opportunity cost that the banks would face. So you can see why that change was needed during that time. Going back to the Fedwire,
23:31
David Beckworth: just one other question here, maybe two more questions. So the FedWARE FedWire is a real-time settlement, gross settlement payment system. When you start to
23:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): net,
23:41
David Beckworth: maybe that's too strong of a term, but you're netting, I mean, does that move you in the direction of a net, a netting system? Because the you
23:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
23:47
David Beckworth: one of the challenges of a netting system is as you know, you it creates other demands upon you. The whole point of going to real-time is to get away from complete netting. So what you're suggesting isn't a return Turn or a movement to that, correct? It's kind of a hybrid.
24:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's uh something in between. So
24:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
24:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the old system, which is still used for ACH, which is one of the large payment systems, uh, was based on what's called deferred net settlement. And with deferred net settlement, you would wait till the end of the payment period of the day, and then you would basically match all of your outgoing and incoming at that time,
24:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and you'd only have to pay the net, which is involved a big risk. reduction in the amount of reserves that you needed. And that involves, unfortunately, credit risk, because if you wait till the end of the day, maybe you won't get paid some of the money you're due, and you'll be left holding the bag. So almost all central banks followed the Fed to RTGS, which
24:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): avoided this credit risk associated with deferred net settlement. But over time they found that indeed it required. a lot of reserves because you have to stock up the reserves at the beginning of the day to make sure that you have enough and there's no deferred settlement. So netting is not very effective in a pure RTGS system.
25:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The other central banks other than the US figured out over time, well, we can economize and get some of the benefits of netting by running these liquidity savings mechanisms more multiple times a day. So the Bank of Japan does it six times a day. And that means there's not much credit risk, but they get to cancel a lot of the
25:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): outgoing payments against incoming. So the quantity of reserves that are needed is much smaller.
25:29
David Beckworth: I love this about your work, Daryl. You you look abroad and you find these examples overseas. Hey, let's try this at home. Look, this of course you have some models, to be clear, your your work's very robust and rigorous, but you've you've looked overseas and you see where other central banks are doing these things that we can learn from. And and I I invoke that because I'm doing the same one right now as I think about what could be an alternative operating
25:48
David Beckworth: system if the Fed were to go there. Now, I'm not sure the Fed will go there, but and later in our program we'll I'll bring up a few examples. Okay, so that was the first proposal, the main one, I think, in your paper, in terms of how you could shrink the Fed's balance sheet or refer. a reform that could happen. But you bring up several others. So let's walk through them. You also bring
26:08
David Beckworth: up the proposal to deal with unexpected shocks to reserves or volatility and reserves from autonomous factors like the TGA, Treasury's General Account, or we may be saying plain English, the federal government's checking account of the Fed. Also, there's there's the uh the FEMA repo account, so foreign monetary authorities. they can come in and out of those. So
26:28
David Beckworth: walk us through how that's important to shrinking the Fed's balance sheet and what could be done about it.
26:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, good. I want to make sure that it's clear. I'm not proposing that the Fed reduces its balance sheet. The purpose of my paper was to help with tools that could be used to do that if the Fed chooses to. reduce its balance sheet. And I think it's very important that the Fed has those tools so that
26:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it doesn't get backed into a political corner where it doesn't have any way to respond to Congress or the administration with methods for reducing its balance sheet if told to do that, or if told what would be the consequences of not being able to reduce your balance sheet. Maybe you'd be required, the Fed could be required if it lost its independence.
27:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to buy assets that others might prefer. So again, these are not proposals per se, but they're tools that I think the Fed should build and have available. Now, the one the one that you just asked about used to be used quite frequently by the Fed. It's called temporary open market operations. And I'm not the first to propose that. It was
27:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): proposed by Bill Nelson some years ago, by Annette Business. Bissing Jorgensen at the Federal Reserve Board. And these tomos or temporary open market operations would be ways for the Fed to neutralize shocks to the supply of reserves so that they didn't leave banks short on a given day. Think of it as a smooth
27:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): road that you're traveling down, and then there's suddenly a pothole. And if somebody doesn't come in ahead of you and fill in that pothole, you're a weakness. your wheel is gonna go into the hole and you're gonna have a big bump. So these tomos are basically filling potholes that are created in a number of ways. The m the most simple one is the
28:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fact that one of the biggest account holders at the Fed is the federal government. They have an account called the Treasury General Account or TGA. And sometimes they pump up the size of that account.
28:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And the only way to do that is to take money out of reserves. So the reserves supply goes down one for one with the TGA. Tax season is an example of that. When everyone pays their taxes, they're taking money out of their banks. The banks are taking money out of their reserves at the Fed and then paying the federal government into
28:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its TGA. When TGA goes up, you get a pothole
28:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the path of reserve balances. And the Fed could, if it wanted to, temporarily fill that hole. It's not been the policy of the Fed to do that for the last several years. Instead, the Fed wants kind of a less activist policy on market operations. The problem is
29:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if the operations are less active, then the road is bumped. bumpier. And so you can either have smooth operations or a smooth road, but
29:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can't have both. Temporary open market operations, in the end, they wouldn't make a huge difference in the quantity of reserve balances the system would need. It would be in the small hundreds of billions, if that. But it's somewhat easier to do than adding a liquidity savings mechanism or some of the other things. that I
29:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): discuss in my paper.
29:41
David Beckworth: So it's better to fill the potholes ahead of time than deal with the broken car down the road. I mean, it's just it's take care of things before they become a problem. And you mentioned the Feds not doing them. And I wonder why. Why isn't you you said they're reluctant to be activists, but where does that hesitation w come from? Why why
30:01
David Beckworth: are they so reluctant to
30:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be able to do that?
30:03
David Beckworth: actively go in and do it? Is it because they're it's not part of the vision of the floor system, or or what else could it be?
30:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, there it's this is a complicated question. So one of the reasons is that the Fed has in the back of its mind what is called a demand-driven system for monetary policy implementation. What does that mean? Demand-driven means that when the banks discover a pothole, they will
30:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): demand liquidity from the Fed. The Fed doesn't have to come along in advance and fill those holes. And if you rely on the banks to come to the Fed,
30:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then you'll have a little bit more volatility of interest rates and the reserves will appear because the banks will go to the Fed to get them. Now the question is, will the banks actually do that? And we
30:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): discussed
30:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the first part of this call the reluctance of the banks to demonstrate that they weren't self-sufficient in terms of liquidity. And hopefully the banks will get over that, but until they do, this demand-driven aspiration of the Fed is only partially fulfilled. In addition to this hope-for
31:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): demand-driven approach, I think the Fed is just a little bit has a kind of stylistic preference to have a less activist role in money markets, not to be, you know, if you think of the machines that are filling in these potholes, scurrying up and down the road, finding the holes, filling them in, and scraping off the bumps. You know,
31:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's busy work. And I think the Fed, some people at the Fed at least prefer to just set the level of the road and then see how it goes.
31:45
David Beckworth: That's interesting. So the Fed would love for the banking system to become demand-driven in terms of like the growth in reserves, but we have all these other obstacles we've just talked about: liquidity regulations, loss of muscle memory that are preventing that from happening. So at least the Fed's heart isn't is in the right place. It's just there's these obstacles
32:05
David Beckworth: to manifesting. That's so interesting. And that leads us maybe to our next conversation, which gets into some tweaks to the actual operating system. So you also mentioned the tiered reserve system, but I'm going to hold off on that a minute, Daryl, because I'm going to throw that out with some other possibilities. But of all the ones you've listed so far, yeah, I think you've answered this already,
32:25
David Beckworth: but just again reminds remind
32:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
32:27
David Beckworth: the listeners, how would you rank that? Like if you're advising Chair Warsh, what is the easiest one, the next easiest, and go down the list.
32:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. That's uh terrific. So in my paper, I I ranked, I do rank them, and I it turns out that the ranking is also in order of how impactful they are on the quantity of reserves that the system needs. So I would start with temporary open market operations being the relatively easy. easiest to implement. Fed already has the authority. It's used the tools
32:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the past. It's been supported, you know, as I said by Bill Nelson and Annette Bissing Jorgensen. It's pretty much a decision of the FOMC to go ahead and start doing that. But although it's relatively easy, it's not that impactful. You know, at most tens of billions or perhaps a hundred or two hundred billion, but not certainly not, you know, we're talking
33:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): three trillion, not gonna lop off the quantity that people are hoping to get rid of. It's not in the trillions for sure. Then if you go to liquidity regulations, those are somewhat harder to communicate in a way that is gonna generate a demand driven system. So the Fed will have to do a lot of
33:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): job owning, it'll have to coach its supervisors, its supervisory staff, not to lean on banks that are drawing on reserves from the Fed. It'll have to convince banks it's okay. We're not going to slap your fingers if you come to the Fed for reserves. And it can also, as it has done recently,
33:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): clarify that their liquidity regulations don't rule out going to the Fed for reserves. So that's number two on the list. Number three on my list, which is more impactful, would be the liquidity savings mechanism. And that's likely to be in the hundreds of billions, although I wouldn't want to put a number on it without doing more studies. I
34:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): am continuing that research, and hopefully we'll have some empirical work soon showing more of a prediction on how big that could get in terms of savings of reserve balances.
34:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
34:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then the last one, the biggest one, and perhaps. the hardest to implement, mainly because of the communication difficulty and the pushback that the Fed might get, is the tiering of interest paid to banks on the reserve balances so that after they have enough to meet their business operations, the Fed
34:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would pay them at a lower interest rate. That would discourage banks from holding those reserves. You mentioned earlier. what bank wants to hold reserves that are earning an interest rate well below the market rate, it would try to eject those excess reserves, and that would allow the Fed to lower the quantity of reserve balances quite a lot.
35:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): On the other hand, it's hard to do because
35:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
35:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banks are not going to like it, and it's also it's a complex rule to implement. Although the Fed did use it at one time.
35:16
David Beckworth: Yeah.
35:20
David Beckworth: But going back to the liquidity regulations, since we didn't actually spend a lot of time there in terms of the actual reforms of it, one of the ones that have been suggested a lot is to count collateral and other assets at the Fed's discount window towards some of these internal liquidity stress tests, LCR. What would we do with like reg YY though? What would we do with that? big one that you mentioned
35:40
David Beckworth: earlier to make it less onerous?
35:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
35:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's along the lines of what you just described. So the regulation itself could actually stay as written. The regulation
35:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): says
35:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that regardless of the circumstances that a bank finds itself in during a day, it must have the ability to meet its liquidity needs from its own resources. Now that's the reg.
36:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What does its own resources mean? Does that include being able to draw liquidity from the Fed? Is that the bank's resources? Or is that going outside of the bank's resources to get additional liquidity from the Fed? That's a question of interpretation. And as you mentioned a moment ago, the Fed
36:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is dealing with what counts as the bank's own resources
36:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
36:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's drawing from the Fed. Right now,
36:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
36:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fed has clarified that if a bank has parked collateral, highly liquid assets or HLA at the Fed, the liquidity that it draws from the Fed against that collateral counts as the bank's own resources
36:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
36:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meeting right YY and the other regulations.
36:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So that's a big plus if banks are convinced that that's true, because then they can draw on highly liquid assets. Bill Nelson, in one of his excellent papers on this topic, mooted the idea that the Fed could count not only highly liquid assets, but other assets. that are parked at the Fed, you know,
37:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): appropriately haircut for quality. And if they were to be able to count those other assets towards their own resources, then it would be even easier for them to meet these liquidity regulations.
37:30
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Ross Powell So
37:31
David Beckworth: what what's the big but here though? Is it that supervisors and bank management hasn't yet adapted to this new possibility?
37:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, two things. One is the Fed hasn't done anything about collateral at the Fed that's not highly liquid. So it doesn't let a
37:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): bank
37:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): count less than HLA. HLA is things like treasuries.
37:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So if
37:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's if it's loans or other types of securities, they don't count towards a bank's own resources. The banks are still able to draw from the Fed based on those other forms of collateral. but they won't count towards the bank's own resources. The other thing that the Fed can do, other than clarifying collateral, is to coach the
38:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banks into the idea that if you draw on these resources, our supervisors are not going to bite you.
38:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
38:22
David Beckworth: So that that all takes time to change expectations and also to deal with the non-high quality liquid assets. All right, let's let's move on and talk about potential alternative operating systems. Now I know in your paper you didn't list tiered reserves as an alternative operating system, but some might say that's the case. So I'm gonna group that with some
38:42
David Beckworth: other I proposals. But let's let's do tiered reserves first. This is in your paper. And I've done a lot of reading on at least the the Norwegian example, and you mentioned that in your paper. The Swiss National Bank also does it. And some other countries had done it, but they've they've since left. But those are the two, I think, best examples currently. And what I love about the Nordist Bank, it actually had a
39:02
David Beckworth: floor system up until 2011. And then it it they've had experience with this for a number of years, long before we're having this conversation today, or even, you know, at the Fed a year or two back. So Nordist Bank in 2011, they they actually go from a floor because they're having many of the similar problems that we're talking about now. If you read some of the speeches, and I've written this up on some of
39:22
David Beckworth: my subspects, but if you read the speeches from the the officials at at the Nordist Bank, they're worried too about all this liquidity hoarding. It's becoming something they hold, not something they use. And there were also something else that's really interesting, you know this, Daryl, but they're also really worried about the breakdown of the interbank market. Banks aren't lending to each other, so reserves aren't being
39:41
David Beckworth: efficiently distributed to where they're needed within the banking system. So they bring this system online. And as you note in your paper, you've got a great chart that shows interbank lending. It picks up. It's almost like a this effect. If you look at total reserves, it had been growing
39:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): under
39:57
David Beckworth: the floor system and it comes down and it's been level ever since. Now, to be clear, there are some other accounts at the at the central bank that are more of term deposits. It's not quite as clean as just looking at reserves because there's other liabilities as well that the bank holds that's tied to excess liquidity. But nonetheless, it seems to have worked
40:16
David Beckworth: relatively well, creating all the incentives that you've just outlined. You mentioned in your paper and you mentioned a minute ago that it it's radical. It would seem really radical and something some people have said, I don't like the Federal Reserve picking quotas. That's very non-markety, very heavy-handed. So you suggest a voluntary
40:36
David Beckworth: reserve target. Let the banks pick the quota for themselves. So how would that work?
40:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, well, that uh voluntary reserves targeting was actually introduced by a committee within the Fed coming out of the financial crisis. when the Fed realized it was going to pay interest on reserves, it charged a secret committee. I mean, later its report was revealed publicly and about uh seven or eight years later. And
41:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this committee suggested uh one way to implement reserves tiering would be to have the banks report their own threshold at which they would get paid a lower interest rate. And you might say, well, w why would a bank ever want to say anything other than, you know, my threshold is
41:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): enormous because I want to get paid the high interest rate forever. Right. But there are rewards and penalties for undershooting and overshooting that are in the voluntary reserves targeting regime. And that's been analyzed in a Fed paper by Garth Baumann, by the way, and Francesca Carapella. And in their paper, they they study the
41:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): impact of VRT-based tiering. Well, I wouldn't want to lend the impression that this is all theoretical. The Fed actually had a two-tiered system in for a few weeks following the failure of Lehman, it was already in their monetary policy
42:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): implementation. They had a strict separation between a high-tier rate for required reserves and then a low-tier rate for excess reserves. And that was activated as soon as the Fed started to pay interest on reserves at the fall of Lehman. But then, as we all know, the crisis turned out
42:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to be so severe that within a couple months,
42:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
42:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fed dropped its interest rates to the zero lower. bound. And so both the upper tier and the lower tier got squashed to zero. And so that's effectively a one-tier system. And when eventually the Fed lifted its administered rates above zero, it did them together. So then we've never gone back to two tiers. But I again
42:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I just want to emphasize this is not a only a theoretical possibility. The Fed did this for a short period of time. and it could do it again. It would be radical, mainly because of well, two reasons. One is banks are going to say, what the heck? What are you doing to us? You're not going to pay us the interest rate on all of our reserves, only on us
43:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on some of them. And we don't like that. And they might complain about that, including to their congressional representatives. And the second concern is the one you mentioned: how do you know it
43:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how much reserves a bank needs and which would be the basis for the high interest rate? And how much is excess, which would be the basis for the low interest rate? That's hard to determine. And if you do it liberally, you're still going to save a lot of a lot of reserve balances for the system. You mentioned earlier the
43:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Nordist Nordis Bank, the Central Bank of Norway being one of the early implementers of this approach. Even earlier than that, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which is a leader among central banks in new monetary policy operational approaches, implemented a two-tiered system very successfully in 2007 with the express
43:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): purpose of reducing the size of its balance sheet. And it said explicitly we don't want banks holding reserves as an investment. We want them to have enough to meet their payment needs, but not more. So if we tier, then they won't want to hold the extra balances and we can reduce the size of our balance sheet.
44:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
44:14
David Beckworth: nothing new under the sun. These are questions that other central banks have looked at before. The floor system isn't something unique to the U.S. Other central banks have dealt with the challenges and have adapted. Then And tiered reserves seems to be at least among several central banks, a tried and true way to deal with this. And again, I want to stress the interbank angle on
44:34
David Beckworth: this. So if you go to a tiered reserve system, what happens is some banks maybe short one day reserve, some are long. And so they start lending to each other. And to me, a Marcus guy, that I think that's that'd be a wonderful development. There's price discovery, there's counterparty discipline. discipline. I'm not saying you bring back the federal funds
44:54
David Beckworth: market like its glory days, but you do something that there's extra price signals, extra price discovery. And I I would note that it's not just David Beckworth, Bill Nelson who's making this point. Many of the central banks around the world that are going Go to into demand-driven systems, they explicitly state they want to see interbank lending
45:14
David Beckworth: resurrected again. And so we'll we'll go to that, but maybe Daryl, speak to that. Do you think that is a goal worthy in itself? Because I have brought this up with other guests and I've read other accounts. And they're like underwhelmed by like, so what? We got, you know, we got repo markets, we got stocks on banks. Why do we need another market for
45:33
David Beckworth: banks? And how would you respond to that? Or maybe more generally, what's the point? of reviving the interbank market?
45:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Ross Powell
45:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Well, I mean, consistent with your remark, David, we now have a federal funds market that is almost inactive among U.S. domestic banks. It's on the order of $5 billion a day between U.S. domestic banks borrowing and lending from each other in the federal funds market. And the repo
46:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): market, as I mentioned, is on the order of $8 to $10 trillion per day. So why not, you know, forget about FedFunds? Why not we just use the repo market? Well, not all banks want to use the repo market. It requires setup costs. It's mostly a large bank phenomenon. And there's a lot of medium and smaller banks in the U.S.
46:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that would use the federal funds market if they had enough incentive to go to it and if the frictions were smaller. In some research that's ongoing with two Stanford PhD students, Tanawat Sarnwani and Francesco Spitsuoko, we show that in fact the difference between the
46:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): upper-tier interest rate and the lower tier interest rate needs to be big enough to overcome the reluctance to trade due to frictional cost of access. accessing the intrabank funds market. And yes, reinvigorating that market would probably reduce some of the ratchet effect that we
47:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spoke about earlier in this call, by which banks maybe have lost their facility with accessing the federal funds market because they've over the last ten, 10, 15 fifteen years, they've had tons of reserves. They haven't needed it. And then when it comes time that they need it, they're not really they don't have a well-oiled
47:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): operation. So access reinvigorating the federal funds market would, in my view, be a good idea. And I think uh I haven't talked to anyone that's disagreed with maybe I have a different set of friends than you do, but everyone
47:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that I've
47:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): talked to said you it yeah, I'm not sure how important it is, but yeah, it would be a nice thing to have.
47:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
47:38
David Beckworth: Extra price to discovery, extra signals. It's it's it's useful. And again, better allocation of reserves in the banking system, I think, is is a key point. Well, I'm gonna have to jump to your second paper due to time, but I'll just mention what I was gonna ask you, Daryl, is you know, we have again these demand-driven systems in Europe and I think the Reserve Bank of Australia is probably on the cutting edge
47:57
David Beckworth: of it. And I will direct listeners and watchers to my Substack. I have an article there. I find that really intriguing what the possibilities are there. It would it would take some changes at the Fed for that as well. And then as you know, Darrell, because I've sent you my stuff, I'm really enamored with the Rix Bank. They they targeted term deposit facility rate, which I think might also
48:17
David Beckworth: deal with some of the challenges of the ratcheting effect and I'll direct listeners and watchers there. But I want to get to your awesome paper that you just delivered at Jackson Hole, because it it again, has a bearing on the question about the size of the Fed, its balance sheet, and what the Fed can do. And its title is Tokenized Finance and Perimeter of Central Banking. Maybe give us the quick executive
48:37
David Beckworth: summary of it, and then we can delve into the details.
48:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I think the executive summary is that it's not about Bitcoin, it's about the back end of the financial system where or Treasury repos and large foreign exchange trade. trades are done, security settlement. That's going tokenized in, you know, you can't say exactly how many years, but the largest
49:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banks, the DTCC,
49:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): international, central banks, they're all sharpening their knives to prepare for the ability to trade traditional financial securities on programmable. ledgers. Now, they might not be exactly blockchains, but they're going to have the features that we think about on a blockchain-based system
49:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where the assets can be exchanged using smart contracts, which are forms of software that allow a lot more programmability of your trades as to when you trade, under what conditions you trade,
49:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
49:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ability
49:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to trade.
49:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trade without requiring a central counterparty for every trade, and so on. So the world's going that way sooner or later. And my paper basically describes why is that happening and are central banks prepared for it?
49:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The answer is no, they're not prepared yet, although the some central banks are moving quickly in that direction. The reason that the ground is not properly prepared for tokenization is that once that movement gets big enough, there's no safe enough cash settlement
50:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): asset available
50:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
50:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): programmable ledgers today. You might say, well, why not stable coins? That's a programmable form of cash, but there are no stable coins safe enough
50:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
50:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): settle multi-trillion dollar. a day markets. Any stable coin that I know about has a price that fluctuates close to a dollar, but it's not exactly a dollar. And if we do a billion-dollar repo, and I assure you that the cash I'm sending you in the form of stable coins
50:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): will be worth at least 0.999, you're going to say, what?
50:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm not giving up 0.001 of a billion dollars. No way, I'll lose my job. So it the unit of account for the largest financial markets must be central bank money or equivalent. It has to be, there's no question about what the price in dollars is. It should be the dollar.
51:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that's actually, that was long ago agreed, even before. the advent of tokenization, that large-scale financial market infrastructure should be settled only in central bank money. You don't want to have financial stability resting on whether commercial bank deposits or some other form of money is safe enough. Because otherwise on
51:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a day in which it might not be, you could get a sudden stop and the in the largest financial markets could come to a halt and cause a financial crisis.
51:40
David Beckworth: Yeah. So tokenized finance has lots of potential, lots to offer 24-7 trading settlement. You talk about atomic delivery versus payment in there. So lots of potential, but currently it's it doesn't have the payment infrastructure to handle large-scale transactions. So you talk about there's this potential for fragmentation, and that
52:00
David Beckworth: could increase the demand for the Fed's balance sheet. sheets. Maybe talk about the fragmentation concern and the demands it would put on the Fed.
52:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
52:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we've just spent the previous half hour, David, talking about the fact that central banks are interested in having smaller balance sheets. But if tokenization starts to get big, which it eventually will, then you're going to have a bifurcation between conventional money and programmable money.
52:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And same thing with securities. You'll have conventional securities and tokenized securities. So every large financial market participant will have to have two forms of everything, and they won't be immediately fungible with each other. And so the quantity of money and securities you need to start each day will be
52:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): larger. Your funding costs will go up. Central bank will try to mitigate that by supplying more reserves to meet the greater need for cash. And central bank balance sheets will, at least initially, probably get larger. So that's the cost of fragmenting between conventional and new
53:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): forms of payment and settlement systems. And even within the new forms, it's not settled yet, you know, what kind of ledger. We're going to have multiple different ledgers on which this is all happening. A leading candidate right now is called Kenton, but other programmable ledgers could come along. And if they don't talk to each other
53:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on a high frequency basis, that will also increase fragmentation costs, as everybody will have to preload these different ledgers, each with the amount of money that they need for the day.
53:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Ross Powell So
53:40
David Beckworth: what are your recommendations? What's the ideal path forward to solving this dilemma?
53:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Ross Powell
53:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, first, the central banks will have to accommodate. They can't
53:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be
53:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stingy with creating enough reserves to serve the increased needs for reserves, because otherwise, we get back to the conversation we had a little while ago. Market interest rates will spike when there's not enough reserves in a system. So central banks will do. that. That's the first order of the day. To make the system safe, as I said, they would need to provide
54:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reserves in a tokenized form in addition to conventional form, or figure out how to make their existing ledgers programmable so that they can do both with one pool of cash. The next order of the day is really up to the private sector. How are they going to make better use of these new forms of the
54:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): market?
54:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of payment and settlement to do more frequent funding, a more frequent settlement so that they don't need as much cash? That's a different dimension, which is the frequency with which you replenish your accounts. In today's conventional markets, funding is a one-day or more
54:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): transaction. You know, overnight repo, a huge market we discussed. that's one day settlement. In the new world of programmable finance, you will be able to do funding cycles multiple times a day. We already see Broadrich doing on the order of $8 trillion a month of
55:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): intraday repo contracts that settle within the day, not on the next day, allowing banks to manage with less liquidity at the start of each day.
55:16
David Beckworth: So you mentioned the central bank, the Fed itself using a programmable ledger, maybe even smart contracts. So kind of circling back to our earlier conversation, uh Daryl, when we think about could central banks have a demand-driven operating system. So can you imagine like the discount window, daylight overdrafts, standing repo
55:36
David Beckworth: operations, those being done on a programmable ledger? with smart contracts. So it's basically liquidity on demand or just-in-time liquidity. You don't even need to worry about logistics. It just happens automatically. Therefore, you could offset some of this need for extra liquidity, pre-funded liquidity in the system.
55:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that I mean that exact question came up from Don Cohn during the Jackson Hole, just after my Jackson Hole presentation, he asked a question you know, how will central banks meet this high. high-frequency 24-7 programmable financial market when they provide liquidity to the markets? And I reacted as you just did. They will have to provide them in a way that's accessible
56:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at least to programmable ledgers and probably overnight and on weekends as well. And they're already moving in that in that direction. By the way, I want to clarify, I'm not expecting the Fed to be one of the early movers in
56:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the world.
56:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this among central banks. The ECB is moving hard on providing tokenized central bank deposits to its financial system. The Swiss National Bank has already done that. The Bank of England is figuring out how to do this with conventional reserves that are available on programmable ledgers. Other central banks are moving ahead.
56:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Australia, you mentioned the RBA is moving ahead in this area. The Fed, I mean, at least by in terms of what we've seen at this point, I think it's watching and waiting to see, you know, what technology should we use? Should we let the private sector lead on this? Should we supply tokenized reserves or should we
57:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): allow special purpose firms to provide tokenized deposits backed by central bank deposits so that one step
57:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is a good thing?
57:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): removed, but still very safe. That's a distinct possibility in the United States. But I don't expect the Fed to be an early mover on providing tokenized reserves.
57:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
57:26
David Beckworth: that's probably a good thing. We're the big ship that slowly moves. Bank in New Zealand, maybe the Swiss National Bank, they're small, All nimble, they can, you know, turn quickly in and the experiment and we can learn lessons from them. But it's still a pretty exciting vision of the future, right? If the Fed had a programmable ledger, smart contracts with this liquidity facilities, I think that'd be an amazing world, something to look forward
57:46
David Beckworth: to. Daryl, thank you so much for your time today. Again, his his papers we've discussed, you need to check out the payment system, puts a floor under the Fed's balance sheet and tokenized finance in the perimeter of central banking. Daryl, thank you once again for coming on the podcast.
58:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): David, it's such a pleasure to be with you and thank you for inviting me.
58:05
David Beckworth: Macro Musings is produced by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Dive deeper into our research at Mercatus.org forward slash monetary policy. You can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. If you like this podcast, please consider giving
58:25
David Beckworth: us a rating and leaving a review. This helps other thoughtful people like you find the show. Find me on Twitter at David Beckworth and follow the show at macro underscore musings.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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