Guests discuss sovereign debt sustainability, rating methodologies, and fiscal risks in Europe and the US
Summary
Host Justin Patri introduces rising government bond yields and record debt-to-GDP ratios, noting aggregate debt in the 10 largest developed markets rose from 70% to 110% over 20 years. Guests James Longston of Fitch Ratings and Anwita Basu of BMI Research discuss debt sustainability, with Basu highlighting that developed market debt rose by 25% over 25 years, citing specific ratios for Spain, Italy, and France. Longston explains Fitch's rating model, which weights structural features like governance at over 50%, significantly more than public finances. Both speakers analyze transmission mechanisms of high yields, US fiscal dynamics, and the specific risks facing France and Italy.
Key takeaways
- 1 So they are demanding higher borrowing despite lower inflation expectations, which essentially means that investors are going to increasingly punish uh developed markets because their spending needs have increased.
Anwita Basu · 12:53
Episode sections
- 0:16 – 1:08
Introduction and Debt Context
Host Justin Patri introduces the topic of rising government bond yields and record debt-to-GDP ratios, noting that aggregate debt for the 10 largest developed markets rose from 70% to 110% over 20 years. He introduces guests James Longston of Fitch Ratings and Anwita Basu of BMI Research.
- 1:08 – 3:15
European Debt Levels and Historical Context
Anwita Basu states that developed market debt rose by 25% over 25 years, with Spain at 100%, Italy at 138%, and France at 116% of GDP. She notes that deleveraging since 2014 was disrupted by the pandemic and energy crisis, leading to higher debt stocks in a high-interest-rate environment.
- 3:15 – 6:26
Sustainability and Interest Rate Dynamics
Basu explains there is no 'magic number' for debt sustainability, relying instead on the relationship between nominal GDP growth and interest rates. She warns that when interest rates exceed nominal GDP growth, sustainability becomes problematic, especially with high inflation and political tensions.
- 6:26 – 8:27
Fitch Ratings Methodology and Weights
James Longston describes Fitch's rating model, which is publicly available but requires payment. He states that structural features (governance, rule of law) account for over half the weight, macro factors 10%, external factors 17%, and public finances only 20%.
- 8:27 – 10:52
Impact of Yield Shocks on Ratings
Longston argues that recent yield shocks have not materially changed Fitch's ratings thinking because the median debt level for developed markets is 55%, and average maturities are around eight years, insulating governments from immediate refinancing costs. Interest costs as a percentage of revenue are currently around 3.5-4%.
- 10:52 – 14:15
Macro Transmission Mechanisms in Europe
Basu outlines three transmission mechanisms of high yields: higher borrowing costs reducing investment, interest payments crowding out tactical spending, and investors demanding higher risk premiums for developed markets despite falling inflation expectations due to rising structural spending needs.
- 14:15 – 22:58
France's Sovereign Risk Profile
Longston details France's negative outlook, citing a 116% debt-to-GDP ratio, a projected 5.5% deficit, and a rising debt trajectory of 2.5 percentage points annually. He contrasts this with Italy, which has higher debt but primary surpluses and political consensus on consolidation.
- 22:58 – 30:54
US Fiscal Dynamics and Political Polarization
Longston notes the US was downgraded in 2023 to AA+ with a stable outlook, supported by reserve currency status and strong growth. He highlights that while deficits are high (7.5% of GDP), the US has high debt-carrying capacity, though political polarization hinders fiscal consolidation.
Claims worth verifying
Aggregate debt to GDP for the 10 largest developed markets has risen from around 70% to 110% over the past 20 years.
Justin Patri ·0:16
How to verify: IMF World Economic Outlook database or OECD Economic Outlook for aggregate debt-to-GDP ratios of G10 economies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Spain debt to GDP is 100%, Italy is 138%, France is 116%.
Anwita Basu ·1:42
How to verify: Eurostat national accounts data or IMF Article IV consultations for these specific countries. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Fitch Ratings model weights structural features at over half, macro at 10%, external at 17%, and public finances at 20%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·7:27
How to verify: Fitch Ratings 'Sovereign Methodology' publication or their publicly available rating model documentation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Median general government debt for developed markets is 55%.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:47
How to verify: IMF Fiscal Monitor or OECD Economic Outlook calculating the median debt-to-GDP of developed market economies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Average maturity of sovereign debt in the top 10 developed markets is about eight years (6 in US, 13 in UK).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·9:27
How to verify: BIS (Bank for International Settlements) data on external debt maturity or national treasury reports on debt issuance profiles. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Interest costs as a percentage of revenue are about 3.5-4% for developed markets.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·9:37
How to verify: IMF Fiscal Monitor 'Government Finance Statistics' showing interest expenditure as a share of general government revenue. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
France debt to GDP is 116%, with a projected 5.5% deficit and debt rising 2.5 percentage points a year.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·15:12
How to verify: French Ministry of Finance budget documents or IMF Article IV report for France. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Italy is running primary surpluses.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·16:11
How to verify: Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) data or IMF Fiscal Monitor for Italy's primary balance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
US was downgraded in 2023 to AA+ with stable outlook.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·23:28
How to verify: Fitch Ratings press release dated July 2023 regarding the US sovereign rating change. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
US general government deficit is about 7.5% of GDP, rising at 2.5 percentage points a year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·24:28
How to verify: US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) budget outlook or IMF Fiscal Monitor for US general government deficit projections. For recent events, verify 2026-08-16 through 2026-11-16. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Fitch Ratings' public methodology document to confirm the weightings for structural features versus public finances.
- Check the latest IMF or OECD data for current debt-to-GDP ratios and deficit projections for Spain, Italy, and France.
- Review US Treasury Department data on average maturity of outstanding public debt to confirm the ~8-year average cited.
- Analyze the difference between nominal GDP growth and the effective interest rate on new sovereign debt for target countries.
- Read Fitch Ratings' official rating action reports for France and the US to understand the specific rationale for outlooks and ratings.
- Compare primary surplus/deficit figures for Italy and France using national finance ministry publications.
- Assess the impact of political polarization on US fiscal consolidation by reviewing Congressional budget resolutions and historical debt ceiling negotiations.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to Above the Fray, where we cut through the chaos and get to what really matters. No spin. Just smart takes and stories shaping our moment. So settle in, tune out to Static, and join us as we go above the Fray.
- 0:16
- Justin Patri: Welcome to Above the Fray, a Fitch Group podcast. I'm your host, Justin Patri. Today we're talking government debt, and for some very good reasons. Government bond yields for many major countries. have hit multi-year highs this year, at a time when debt to GDP ratios are at records. Aggregate debt to GDP for the 10 largest developed markets has risen from around 70%
- 0:36
- Justin Patri: of GDP to 110% over just the past 20 years. So, what does this all mean for macro and credit? With me today to discuss what's ahead for government debt dynamics and its implications, I'm pleased to be joined by James Longston, Longsen, the global head of sovereign ratings for Fitch Ratings, and Anwita Basu, the head of European country risk for BMI research. Welcome.
- 0:57
- Justin Patri: Let's start off with some historical context of of where government debt is right now. Anuita, can you just kind of explain uh where you see uh government debt right now relative to history?
- 1:08
- Anwita Basu: Thanks, uh thanks, Justin, for having me um on the podcast today. Uh, this is a special honor to be speaking about this topic with James alongside. So as you rightly say, the short answer to your question would be: yes, uh deck levels are high and they are of concern to us. Uh
- 1:28
- Anwita Basu: to put that into context, over the past 25 years, um, we've seen uh deck debt levels uh among sort of developed markets, right? rise by about 25%.
- 1:42
- Anwita Basu: And for most of the larger markets, they are now sort of close to above 100% of GDP. So now we have Spain at 100% of GDP when it comes to debt to GDP. Italy is at 138, France is at 116. So those are pretty punchy numbers. The
- 2:03
- Anwita Basu: real important point here is that what we've seen over the past is that we have seen some deleveraging
- 2:11
- Anwita Basu: since 2014, since the Eurozone debt crisis, but that deleveraging cycle was disrupted by the pandemic. And since then, European uh governments have had to essentially absorb crisis uh
- 2:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 2:27
- Anwita Basu: uh uh as essentially absorb various uh crisis points uh at various instances. So we've had um obviously the pandemic and then the energy crisis uh in Russia and so on. And so this is ha this has come at a time when the environment is also extremely changeable. So governments accumulated much of this
- 2:48
- Anwita Basu: debt when interest rates were exceptionally low, and now they are carrying larger debt stocks into an environment of high real borrowing costs at at a time when macroeconomic um weakness is setting in and structural spending needs are rising.
- 3:06
- Justin Patri: You know, you mentioned that there's a differentiation right now between, say, you know, some of the the debt issues, you know, fifteen or twenty years ago and one of them being kind of higher interest rates.
- 3:15
- Justin Patri: Is there a you know, is is are we reaching a point of unsustainability? Is there a sort of magic number of uh of a debt to G debt to GDP ratio that, you know, would would trigger a crisis that you're thinking about?
- 3:29
- Anwita Basu: Well, I mean, that's a million dollar question. Obviously, there's no magic number uh that we can immediately point to. Um, we have seen in the past that countries have carried
- 3:39
- Anwita Basu: exceptionally high debt to GDP
- 3:43
- Anwita Basu: and
- 3:44
- Anwita Basu: emerge fairly well. The arithmetic identity that
- 3:49
- Anwita Basu: macroeconomists would use would be a relationship between nominal GDP growth and interest rates, essentially. And you know, in a situation where nominal GDP growth is
- 4:04
- Anwita Basu: effectively higher than interest rates or the effective interest that is paid on new debt,
- 4:12
- Anwita Basu: that's a sustainable situation. And when when the situation reverses, and essentially that's where the concerns lie now, because as I said earlier, that we were gonna we were in an environment in very high. interest rates that are likely to remain the case over the medium term. I'm sure James
- 4:32
- Anwita Basu: will speak to why. Uh it that that becomes a problem, especially in developed markets where there are structural weaknesses, there are concerns around nominal
- 4:43
- Anwita Basu: or uh the ability of certain markets, particularly in Europe, to be able to sustain um nominal uh GDP growth. against a backdrop of high inflation as well, which is sort of causing political tensions and so on. So it's a difficult situation, really, where the concerns are coming from.
- 5:03
- Anwita Basu: Maturity matters as well, longer average maturities sort of insulate governments from the immediate increase in borrowing costs because of existing. fixed rate, debt doesn't kind of reprice overnight. But again, if you're already holding a large stock of debt, you're constantly having to
- 5:23
- Anwita Basu: refinance and you're refinancing at a very high level. Now, all of this pragmatic,
- 5:29
- Anwita Basu: pragmatic science, if you call it, is entirely contingent on anchored investor confidence. Um And you we're know, in a in a world where investor confidence is highly volatile and there's a lot of kind of geopolitical stress that's also making people um and investors generally jittery.
- 5:49
- Anwita Basu: Um the minute, you know, investors start demanding extremely high yields, um, we face another Eurozone death debt crisis. So you know it it it
- 6:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it i i
- 6:01
- Anwita Basu: it it's it we we're in a difficult situation right now.
- 6:06
- Justin Patri: James, I'd like to turn to you. So high government debt has contributed to sovereign ratings downgrades um in the past, but it's not necessarily incongruous with high ratings. Uh we we see um you know many uh sovereigns with with historically high government debt and maintaining strong ratings. Can you just walk us through how a ratings agency like
- 6:26
- Justin Patri: like Fitch you know, balances various factors in determining a sovereign rating?
- 6:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, sure. Um, thank thanks very much, Justin. Um
- 6:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
- 6:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): absolutely. I mean, it it ultimately comes down to sort of debt carrying capacity, debt sustainability. And then we think there are a lot of factors that that influence that. And probably maybe the easiest way to look at that is the way we sort of build our criteria. Um
- 6:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 6:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): actually have a model um which we use to kind of do a lot of the heavy lifting. It's a publicly available model. You can you can, well, you have to pay, I think, but you can you can you can access it from our from our website. Um and and that model is is pretty good at doing a lot of the heavy lifting. Approximately three-quarters of our ratings end up being within one notch of what the model score ends up coming out
- 7:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): at. So maybe that's probably the easiest way to look at it. And if you look at what we how we build the model, just over half of the weight in the model. goes down to what we call structural features. So that's things like governance, political effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, those sorts of things. The size of the economy also matters. The wealth of the economy, you um, yeah,
- 7:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the wealth of the economy matters, you know, relative wealth matters. That has a very, very powerful, we think, um, impact on you know, debt sustainability, debt carrying capacity. On top of that, we look at your macro, obviously is important, but not that important. 10% of the model, roughly external. So you're talking about reserve currency status, you
- 7:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, sovereign net foreign asset positions. That's quite a lot of the weighting. 17 public finances is 20%, which I think surprises people. But it kind of speaks to the fact that, yeah, you're right, a country with certain structural benefits or maybe large sort of a net foreign asset. positions or something, or very stable growth, or whatever it
- 8:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): might be, can have a lot more debt carrying capacity and therefore maintain quite a high rating, even if debt levels are quite high.
- 8:15
- Justin Patri: Now, we we've already talked about the a bit about the rise in yields this year. I mean, has that changed any of your thinking, um, especially in Europe, uh, about uh debt sustainability or rating? ratings risk?
- 8:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I'd say very much not really, if I'm honest at the moment. Um I think there are a few reasons for that. Um listen, absolutely, yeah, the yield shock has been pretty big. Uh if you look at it, you know, we date uh it's come off a little bit in the last few days. It's been pretty big. The rise in yields has been pretty sharp and certainly not what we're expecting, yeah, until until the war kicked in, basically. Um
- 8:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 8:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): reason why why isn't it made a huge, heapy difference to what we're thinking at the moment? I suppose still, when you look at the level of debt, I mean, then we know the levels of debt are very high in aggregate. If you look at the actual median level of debt for general government debt for developed markets, it's 55%. Okay? So big countries are much more indebted. But as a median, the median's 55%. That's not
- 9:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that bad. That's not that for a The developed development market, that's not that severe. So kind of when you think about it, immediately you're discounting half. of the population, the sovereign population, where you say, well, they haven't actually got that much debt anyway. Um, and at a time when, for example, your average maturities is roughly like the average maturity is about eight years, probably. Yeah, it ranges a bit. If
- 9:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you take at the largest ten, the average is about eight, it ranges from about six in the US to I think thirteen years in the UK. Even if you've got a lot of debt, you know, like the UK has a lot of debt, France has a lot, of
- 9:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it,
- 9:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it takes quite a long time for that to feed through. uh into the into the into the financial metrics. So it does take a little bit of time. Um, and to give you a rough idea, it's also important to say that you know, when you look at the whole level of interest cost as a percentage, let's say a revenue, it's about three and a half, maybe four percent, that sort of level. It's not the biggest, you know, compared that to sort
- 9:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): of entitlements or social security and things like that. So listen, I don't want to give the impression we're sort of relaxed about it. It is it is a headwind at a time when there are plenty of headwinds for public finances. So any increase is unwelcome. But for the majority we're not talking about substantial additional fiscal headwinds from interest rate costs. If you are highly
- 10:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): indebted, you know, where the where the interest differential is a lot higher, you know, your current effective interest Yeah, interest rate on your current debt stock and your 10 10-year year bond yield is a big gap, you know, even for Germany is it's 120 base points, then that's where we'd have a bit more concern. But but ultimately it's not really yet feeding into our ratings uh in a material way.
- 10:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Aaron Powell
- 10:35
- Justin Patri: So not so much a ratings issue, but on WIDE, is it kind of a a macro issue? I mean, when when sovereign bond yields rise, that that lifts corporate borrowing costs, uh, you know, household borrowing costs. Have you have you made any uh changes to your macro forecasts in in in Europe as a result of kind of the the shift in bond markets?
- 10:52
- Anwita Basu: Well exactly. As you say, Justin, um, they are to kind of a benchmark for for um other borrowing costs. And I would point to three things, essentially, three sort of transmission mechanisms uh if you may. Uh two which are kind of structural, we we we have seen in the past, one which is um uh
- 11:12
- Anwita Basu: especially interesting now. So the the the the first is as you say, they're kind of benchmarks for other types of borrowing. Uh and obviously increased borrowing costs means less investment and less spending and and all the rest. So mortgages will be affected, corporate borrowing will be affected at a time when Europe really needs
- 11:32
- Anwita Basu: investment. Uh so that's that's the first sort of transmission I see. Um, and uh therefore we have a fairly uh sort of cautious uh growth outlook for 2027. Uh even though there's a lot of investment intent, um it's about where the financing is coming from and and how much
- 11:52
- Anwita Basu: leverage companies can uh can afford. Um the second is is is more cumulative. Uh so over time, um as James points out. that you know, we see interest payments uh to revenues right now is about four to five percent, three to four percent, I think you said. Uh but you know that could
- 12:12
- Anwita Basu: increase and eventually crowd out um a government's capability to um you know invest in in um uh particularly ta tactical spending needs, which are rising in in Europe.
- 12:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 12:25
- Anwita Basu: then the final one I think is. is particularly interesting is that you are seeing um, you know,
- 12:33
- Anwita Basu: despite the fact that inflation expectations over the long term is f ugly arguably falling because you know these the the the latest shocks are are expected to eventually kind of peter out. Um I think investors are factoring in higher risk uh particularly for DMs over time.
- 12:53
- Anwita Basu: So they are demanding higher borrowing despite lower inflation expectations, which essentially means that investors are going to increasingly punish uh developed markets because their spending needs have increased. So not only are structural
- 13:13
- Anwita Basu: spending needs, so I would classify that as pensions, healthcare, structural spending needs are rising because of the demographics, right? Tactical spending needs in Europe have increased markedly since the Russia-Ukraine war. So we do need to become more self-sufficient from a defense perspective. All of that has to be carried on
- 13:33
- Anwita Basu: the public finances. And then you have, you know, the frequency of crises. So crisis. absorption requirements have increased. So the fiscal room effectively is increasingly falling, while primary deficits are arguably going to rise because there are the you just these spending needs are
- 13:53
- Anwita Basu: essential.
- 13:55
- Justin Patri: James, um can we go a bit into detail about one of those large developed markets that's been in the news uh quite a bit? recently, and that's France. Because it seems very clearly that that France is a point of investor concern, that the spreads of the French 10-year bond yield over German 10-year bond yield have soared. You can
- 14:15
- Justin Patri: look at any chart, and that's in addition to the rise in yields. And certainly there's a lot of high-profile news on governance and political issues with an election coming up.
- 14:25
- Justin Patri: Why is so much attention being paid to? France? And can you provide some credit context around the French sovereign?
- 14:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, sure. Yeah, thanks, Justin. Um
- 14:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 14:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah, France is interesting. It's one that we we downgraded in 2023 and again in 2025, and we put it on a negative outlook uh just last week. Um it's in many ways, it'd probably use this to compare it with somebody like Italy, because it it's an interesting comparison in that Italy, you know. France's debt has sold off more than Italy's. It's its bonds are
- 14:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yielding more than Italy is at the moment. Yet, you know, when according to our estimations, we would expect even at the end of the decade, say 2030, somewhere off still, we'd expect Italy still to have something like nine percentage points debt to GDP, higher debt to GDP ratio than In France at the end of the decade. So
- 15:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 15:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): does raise that question, what what is it that they're looking at? in France? Now clearly the debt level is one thing. It's 116% at the moment. That's high. I think there are there are four developed markets with more debts, a worse debt to GDP ratio than that, the US, Italy, Japan, and one other that escapes me at the moment. Greece, obviously Greece. So that's one thing. But I
- 15:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): suppose what you know, Yeah, that that's not that much of an explainer. I think the debt trajectory is probably the biggest explainer. So France ha is running a deficit of around about five, five and a half percent, we estimate over the next year. So we've got it down as five and a half percent, I think, for next year. So that's a pretty punchy deficit. Uh and at current growth rates, that means the debt to
- 15:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): GDP ratio is rising quite fast. Uh two and a half percentage points a year, we'd estimate over the next couple of years. So I think that absolutely is one of the things we're looking at. Whereas if you compare that with Italy, a higher debt stock, they're actually running primary surpluses in in Italy. We upgraded them last year because of their sort of improved fiscal discipline. So we
- 16:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): see their debt stock being debt level being pretty stable over the next several years, uh by comparison. So I think that has to be one of the things. And France doesn't have a great record of fiscal consolidation. I think its last primary surplus was in nineteen 1974, seventy four, um, for example. They did they were consolidating reasonably well in sort of the early President Macron era, but then it's
- 16:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): sort of slipped since. So that's the second reason. And I think the third reason you alluded to, I guess, is politics and the sort of social context. It's a very, very polarised government legislator. That makes it very hard to take these decisions. I think actually there's broad buy-in in the population that consolidation is needed, the debt needs to be stabilized and brought down. But of course, through there are many ways of doing that,
- 16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and they can't agree on that. And then with all these social protests as well, that makes it even harder, I suppose, to satisfy the population, the voting population with the election elections probably next year. Um so yeah, th those would be the three output.
- 17:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 17:06
- Justin Patri: you, James. And and and we know, so what what you know, play play out a scenario in your head from from a macro perspective. What would do you how would how would a real crisis of confidence in in in French government bonds look like for Europe? I mean, we we saw a a a sovereign debt crisis in in Europe not too long ago, uh well, fifteen years ago or so, I guess
- 17:26
- Justin Patri: by now. Um, and and that certainly caused tremors, an earthquake arguably, throughout global financial markets. So what what do you think would happen if if investors just started to flee French government bonds?
- 17:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 17:37
- Anwita Basu: Justin, that is a very concerning scenario because France obviously is one of the larger or largest markets in the Eurozone. Back then, we were talking about Greece and some of the southern Europeans, which weren't as integral to the Eurozone mechanism. What we are
- 17:56
- Anwita Basu: seeing now is not as concerning as we had seen in uh Greece back then. because investors, you know, bond auctions and so on. I I do remember as a young analyst sort of frantically uh looking at the big recover ratio uh for Italy and and Spain at the time. But at the moment, uh bond auctions for
- 18:16
- Anwita Basu: France are still oversubscribed, so you do see sort of a fair healthy demand flow. Um CDS is anchored arguably relative to what they were back during the height of the Eurozone debt crisis. So we're not quite there yet. Investor
- 18:36
- Anwita Basu: confidence is wavering, but it is not lost. So that's one thing. The institutional backdrop, I think, in Europe is also important to consider. I think there were lessons learned since the Eurozone debt crisis. There are backstops now in place, both at the
- 18:55
- Anwita Basu: ECB as well as the European level. So you have the European sort of stability mechanism, which is sort of a ready fund. It's never been deployed since the Eurozone crisis, really. So it still needs to be tested, but it is um you know uh uh uh 500 five hundred billion. euros, so
- 19:15
- Anwita Basu: it's still a considerable amount. And then you or obviously have the transmission um sort of protection instrument that the ECB um has to avoid um debt market uh yield fragmentation, uh which again was something that we saw um took took hold ahead of the eurozone crisis. So there are instruments now
- 19:35
- Anwita Basu: in place um to offset that, but it would again going back to my point earlier, it would be yet another crisis, not just in Europe, but it would be something that would affect uh global markets.
- 19:48
- Justin Patri: Thank you. And Enrique. James, you we you we've touched on governance. Uh and and certain we we talked a bit about uh you know what's what's challenging France. Aaron
- 19:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Powell
- 19:57
- Justin Patri: Is this a broader issue in in Europe or arguably you know the developed world in entirely entirely a about
- 20:05
- Justin Patri: governance challenges, political divisions in capable other sort of structural factors that are making governments or or challenging governments to address fiscal issues? Or as you say, is it is this really just kind of an issue with specific countries and the median among your sovereigns is actually generally okay? Aaron
- 20:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Ross Powell
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think I think it I think it it does vary. Absolutely, it does vary. I think I it's simple. important to say, I don't think there are many governments who are just sort of putting their heads in the sand where they have large deficits and and the debt's going up and going, well, we don't care about this. I I just don't think that's true. I mean, you could have countries with low debt who are who are making the political choices like Germany to do it, and and and you know,
- 20:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's a political choice. We also know that Germany has an extremely strong record of consolidation as and when it needs to, it's doing it because it wants to get its economy going. So, but it is also true. So I don't think there's that sort of head in the sand, there's no problem here type thing. The issue is where you have very polarized politics, you know, and and that is certainly true in a number of places. You know, even in Spain,
- 21:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they haven't passed the budget for I can't remember how many years, and we might remember, but but they haven't put um but it hasn't mattered for them because they're growing quite well, so the debt's sort of coming down. But um, yeah, France, yeah, you have the US as well, if you move across the pond, yeah. polarized politics does make it very hard. You know, you have one side of the house wanting to raise revenues, the other wanting to cut costs, and there the two shall
- 21:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): meet, type thing. So that does make it different. But but it's also true to say that you can find plenty of examples of where it kind of does work. You know, if you look back and we talked about the Eurozone crisis, and you think about some of the other smaller Eurozone crisis countries, you look at Portugal's Portugal, Cyprus, yeah, Greece. There, there's very, very
- 21:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): strong across the floor political consensus that there's a need to consolidate debts. But you know, it's my idea, you know, that they have you didn't even have to have particularly long memories to remember why. You know, you had in Cyprus uninsured depositors and some banks took a haircut. I mean, can you imagine that? Uh Greece, you didn't have a full acidity laxity bank account for five years. So it's quite easy in those
- 22:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): situations. to get the population on board and there's a very broad consensus. What happens then? When you're running, you know, we when we look at it at some of these crisis countries, they're growing well, but so Spain. Um, the real reason that they're doing so well, their debt numbers are falling so fast, and their ratings are rising pretty fast, by the way, is because they're running large primary surpluses Isn't and everyone's on board with it. You know,
- 22:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the population are on board with it. We've upgraded Cyprus nine times in ten years. I think. Um, Portugal four times in five years. I don't know what they were doing in the in the other year, but uh probably COVID, I suspect. But um, but you know, it it does show that political will,
- 22:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): yeah, it it can happen. Yeah, there there is a way it can happen. Countries can consolidate their debts and very effectively and very fast where that's a political way the population is on board. Trevor
- 22:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Burrus,
- 22:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah,
- 22:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Jr.:
- 22:49
- Justin Patri: so so you mentioned the US there. and you mentioned deep political divisions, James. So just staying on you for the time being,
- 22:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 22:59
- Justin Patri: we've also had a major election in the U.S., uh midterm election, which has seen major political change in Congress coming up.
- 23:07
- Justin Patri: How situate kind of U.S. fiscal dynamics in the sense of this is also, like France, a very large deficit country with very high government debt. There doesn't seem to be any, you know, as you say, political momentum to change that.
- 23:22
- Justin Patri: What are your your views on kind of the US situation?
- 23:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. So
- 23:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): absolutely you're right. We downgraded the US in in I think 2023. Um since then, when I look at the sort of debt trajectory, they're probably tracking a little bit better. in terms of slightly lower debt to GDP ratio now than we thought it would be. And that's mainly because growth has been better than we anticipated. The
- 23:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): deficits have been higher, but the growth has been better, and the one has slightly more offset the other. So debt to GDP is actually slightly better. But yeah, you're right. You know, at the end of the day, yeah, we have the rating as double A plus. Uh it's on stable atlet, it has very, very high debt carrying capacity. I think the reserve currency status of the dollar, the very large, diversified, and extremely dynamic economy. You know,
- 24:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): these sorts of things and the size of the economy, sheer size of the economy, yeah, give it a very, very high debt carrying capacity, arguably higher than any other sovereign uh for a given level of debt. Um, but it's also true to say that the the trends are the trends are are deteriorating there, you know. Um, yeah, and mainly around the fiscal situation. We see debt rise. rising at around about two and a
- 24:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): half percentage points a year over the next two years, deficits at a general government level, so not not not the federal, but the general government level of about seven and a half percent of DDP GDP. So yeah, that does put pressure on the rating, certainly, but but absolutely it has a much higher debt carrying capacity, I think, than than than any other sovereign, probably. And it's probably one
- 24:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): sovereign where, you know, when you look at the AR. AI build out, you look at the potential economic benefits from AI, you you would have to put the US right up there as one. So although we have growth at a little bit over 2% at the moment, you know, clearly that's one that could could surprise on the upside.
- 25:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 25:06
- Justin Patri: Enrique, do you see from your perspective in Europe uh the US debt or economic uh outlook affecting uh European markets or European macro? at all?
- 25:16
- Anwita Basu: I think I think the US has been extremely interesting for Europe. Uh of course, over the past few years, uh they've been a very unreliable uh partner in so many ways, right? So from a strategic perspective as well as from a trading perspective, uh, because of the tariff policy. And so Europe has been
- 25:36
- Anwita Basu: uh trying to sort of essentially der de-risk uh away from uh from the US as much as it as possible. It's not very possible given that it is um its biggest trading partner still, and tariffs now seem to have had a stabilizing effect. Um, so you haven't really seen uh as big a shock um
- 25:56
- Anwita Basu: uh on European trade as uh you'd initially expect, because the tariffs um really have. increased considerably. Uh you know, you're talking um from 0% to 10%. So that's because is it it is an inflationary effect on on exports to the US. Um of course as James pointed out because the market's
- 26:16
- Anwita Basu: um performing so well and demand is very strong um that hasn't directly impacted uh European trade uh with uh with the US uh in a material way yet. Um and a lot of the offset has also been strong sort of intra-eu trade um which is which has uh kind of offset uh any of the kind of
- 26:36
- Anwita Basu: initial tariff shocks. So that's one area uh of course if if uh as James points out if there is a uh a push for deleveraging in the US or um treasury yields remain um fairly high because markets want to punish um that 2.5% growth of
- 26:55
- Anwita Basu: debt over time. Um that does mean that it might have some sort of uh impact on the US economy itself, uh investment cycles kind of slowing down despite the AI capex and so on. Uh so that's going to have obviously an impact on external demand there. Uh the other element
- 27:15
- Anwita Basu: that is probably more worrying for for the Europeans is actually, you know, the the the repricing and yields that would happen linking to sort of higher uh treasury yields, right? So um again, going back to our initial conversations to why interest rates and yields do matter from a macroeconomic perspective, you're
- 27:35
- Anwita Basu: basically seeing higher borrowing costs lasting for longer. And this uh
- 27:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 27:40
- Anwita Basu: higher yields, higher treasury yields basically would anchor that. Um and again, that does mean that some intent and uh financing around investments will uh get crowded out.
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 27:55
- Justin Patri: you, and we and and James, just very shortly, um uh uh
- 27:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
- 27:59
- Justin Patri: we've we've talked a bit about US and France. Are there any other kind of developed market sovereigns on negative outlook or are ones which are kind of on watch from the debt issue that that uh that maybe Fitch is thinking
- 28:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about
- 28:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it? Yeah,
- 28:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I just about I mean, obviously we we we assign outlooks to ratings. And you know, if we look in developed markets, we're very, very slightly negative. We've We got slightly more negative outlooks than positive, you know, France being being being sort of the the main. main one there. Emerging markets were slightly positive, where we're a bit more positive on emerging markets. But that's kind of on a numbers gain. Actually, if you I did a little look at sort of
- 28:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): a debt-weighted game, and sort of you've got actually, I think negative out, you know, general government debt of sovereigns on negative outlook is about 7.3 trillion. That's not bonded debt, that's general government debt. So general is about 7.3 trillion. So that's 13 times higher than the general. government debt sums on positive outlook. So there's a definitely a size bias. And in
- 28:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): developed markets, yeah, the main one on negative outlook is France. But there's some quite punchy one emerging markets on negative outlook as well. You know, um, if you look at Indonesia, we've got a negative, we've got Poland, Romania. These are kind of big names in the emerging market space. So that's kind of where the most pressure is. Yeah, in developed markets, you know, as I was saying earlier, the way ratings kind of work are. it
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): just because you have negative trends, yeah, in deck, it doesn't mean to say the rating is at imminent risk of a downgrade. And that's because you know we've only got 22 ratings. So there are only 22 options you can pick and and in in practice in a rating committee or pick you're picking between one of two, you know. So there are only 22 options. So often when something's something is downgraded,
- 29:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it then sits there for a while, even if the trends are negative because there's what we call headroom rating. headroom. Um so I think when you look at that, I'd still say, you know, things on stable outlet, you still always, yeah, when you're sitting in a committee, yes, you would still be looking at ones where the trends are consistently negative. We mentioned the US, for example, a stable outlook, but yeah, Germany is a triple A,
- 29:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's it's got the most debt of a triple A. You know, it is debt is rising quite fast, although that's a policy choice. But you
- 30:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 30:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it it it means it that you sort of focus on those. Um, but it doesn't mean to say they're any more at risk, I suppose, than some sovereigns where the metrics aren't changing much, but they've got sort of wafer-thin headroom or much smaller headroom. But yeah, so as with all these things, you know, the best way to look at the likely rating trajectory is with the rating outlooks, if I'm honest.
- 30:19
- Justin Patri: Thank you very much, Anwita and James, for joining us on Above the Fray.
- 30:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 30:24
- Justin Patri: you enjoyed the discussion, be sure to like, subscribe, and join us. next week for more sharp analysis on the forces shaping global markets. Until then, stay above the fray.
- 30:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a wrap on today's episode. Thanks for spending your time with us. If you enjoyed it, subscribe, share it with a friend, and leave us a review. Until next time, stay curious, stay grounded, and we'll see you above the fray.