Above the Fray

Judge Peck and Mark Leitner discuss Lehman lessons, AI infrastructure risks, and private credit trends.

32 min Listen to the original Episode page
BankruptcyLehman BrothersAI InfrastructurePrivate CreditSystemic RiskLegal Risk

Summary

Judge Peck and Mark Leitner reflect on the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, emphasizing the independence of the U.S. bankruptcy court and the random nature of judicial assignments. They argue that while systemic risk is managed differently today, new vulnerabilities have emerged in AI infrastructure and private credit. The guests predict that future major financial failures will likely result in government bailouts rather than court-led bankruptcies due to political pressure. They also outline specific legal risks in AI, including IP and liability issues, and highlight current credit market trends like liability management exchanges.

Episode sections

  1. 0:16 – 2:37

    Introduction and Lehman Bankruptcy Context

    Host introduces the podcast and guests, noting Lehman Brothers' 2008 bankruptcy and the ongoing distributions from its estate, including a recent payment in October 2026. The discussion frames the conversation around lessons learned from the crisis and current risks in private credit and AI.

  2. 2:37 – 6:45

    The Lehman Filing and Examiner Role

    Judge Peck recounts the random assignment of the Lehman case and the unusual quietness of the first week. Mark Leitner explains the role of the bankruptcy examiner, who was appointed to investigate specific issues and the comprehensive reasons behind Lehman's failure.

  3. 6:45 – 10:11

    Lessons Learned and Systemic Risk

    Judge Peck argues that the U.S. bankruptcy system is flexible and that systemic risk is no longer primarily a bankruptcy court issue due to regulatory changes. He suggests that while major bank failures may be prevented, new risks have emerged elsewhere.

  4. 10:11 – 13:13

    Misconceptions About Lehman and Judicial Independence

    Judge Peck clarifies that his assignment to the Lehman case was random, not strategic, and highlights the independence of the U.S. bankruptcy court system, noting no government officials attempted to influence his rulings during the five-year process.

  5. 13:13 – 18:54

    Current Risks: AI and Private Credit

    Judge Peck expresses concern over the rapid, potentially irrational build-out of AI infrastructure, comparing potential failures to AIG-style government interventions rather than Lehman-style bankruptcies. He notes the interconnectedness of the AI stack.

  6. 18:54 – 21:42

    Legal and Regulatory Risks in AI

    Mark Leitner outlines four categories of legal risk in AI: IP/copyright, model output liability, regulatory/antitrust, and financing/build-out risks. He notes that litigation firms are actively researching these areas, potentially using AI itself.

  7. 21:42 – 28:05

    Market Psychology and Restructuring Trends

    Judge Peck discusses the dangerous combination of buoyant markets and worried, skittish investors. Mark Leitner highlights current credit market flashpoints, including liability management exchanges (LMEs), antitrust concerns, and the 'Texas two-step' restructuring strategy.

  8. 28:05 – 32:22

    Future of Bankruptcy and Next Crisis

    Judge Peck predicts a globalized restructuring landscape with competition between U.S. Chapter 11 and English/Singaporean schemes. Both guests identify AI infrastructure or sovereign debt as likely sources of the next major financial blowup.

Claims worth verifying

The Lehman estate made its 33rd distribution on October 1, 2026, for roughly $15 million, on top of roughly $129.5 billion already distributed through 32 prior payments.

Host ·0:39

How to verify: Check the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bankruptcy estate distribution records or press releases from the Lehman estate administrator for October 2026.

Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15th, 2008, which was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.

Host ·0:20

How to verify: Review U.S. Bankruptcy Court filings for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Case No. 08-13555) and historical financial news archives from September 2008.

Judge James Peck was randomly assigned the Lehman case on the rebound after another judge recused himself.

Judge James Peck ·11:03

How to verify: Review court assignment logs or biographical interviews with Judge James Peck regarding his appointment to the Lehman case.

The North American broker-dealer business of Lehman Brothers was sold in the first week of the filing.

Judge James Peck ·7:17

How to verify: Review SEC filings or press releases from Barclays regarding the acquisition of Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and markets business in September 2008.

The proposed IPO of Anthropic might be a two trillion dollar notional value.

Judge James Peck ·14:11

How to verify: Check financial news reports or SEC filings (S-1) from Anthropic regarding any proposed IPO valuations or filings in 2026.

Judge Peck handled the Lehman case for five years before retiring from the bench, and no government officials contacted him to influence the case.

Judge James Peck ·11:58

How to verify: Review Judge Peck's judicial biography and court records for the Lehman case to confirm the duration of his tenure and any ex parte communications.

The bankruptcy examiner produced a thousand-page report detailing the investigation into Lehman's failure.

Mark Leitner ·5:53

How to verify: Locate the 'Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner' (the official Lehman Examiner's Report), which is publicly available through court archives or legal databases.

Mark Leitner wrote an AI quarterly report for Fitch Group covering legal and regulatory issues associated with data center infrastructure.

Host ·19:08

How to verify: Search the Fitch Group website or publications for an 'AI Quarterly' report authored by Mark Leitner discussing data center legal risks.

The 'Texas two-step' is a process where a company splits itself in two, bankrupts the bad company, and keeps the good company out of bankruptcy to manage mass tort liabilities.

Mark Leitner ·27:16

How to verify: Review legal case law or articles discussing the 'Texas two-step' bankruptcy strategy, such as cases involving Purdue Pharma or similar entities.

Judge Peck moderated a panel on systemic risk a year before Lehman filed, featuring a banker, a retired Fed governor, and a law professor.

Judge James Peck ·22:39

How to verify: Search for records of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges education committee events or Judge Peck's speaking engagements in 2007.

Do your own research

  • Verify Lehman Brothers bankruptcy estate distribution records via the Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. website or court filings for the October 1, 2026 payment.
  • Review recent U.S. bankruptcy court case assignments to assess the randomness of high-profile case distribution.
  • Analyze AI company financial disclosures for capital expenditure trends and debt structures to evaluate 'irrational exuberance' risks.
  • Check for recent legal filings or regulatory actions related to AI IP/copyright and model output liability.
  • Monitor credit market data for trends in liability management exchanges (LMEs) and 'Texas two-step' restructuring strategies.
  • Review Federal Reserve and Treasury statements on systemic risk frameworks and potential intervention protocols for non-bank financial institutions.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker: Welcome to Above the Fray, where we cut through the chaos and get to what really matters.
0:06
Unidentified speaker: No spin.
0:07
Unidentified speaker: Just smart takes and stories shaping our moment.
0:10
Unidentified speaker: So settle in, tune out the static, and join us as we go above the fray.
0:16
Unidentified speaker: Welcome back to Above the Fray, a Fitch Group podcast.
0:20
Unidentified speaker: On September 15th, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
0:25
Unidentified speaker: history.
0:26
Unidentified speaker: That same day, I started my career in investment banking at Waukovia, a bank that didn't make it through the crisis as an independent company.
0:35
Unidentified speaker: 18 years later, the Lehman estate is still paying creditors.
0:39
Unidentified speaker: Its 33rd distribution went out on October 1st, 2026 for roughly 15 million, on top of roughly 129.5 billion already distributed through 32 prior payments.
0:52
Unidentified speaker: But this conversation isn't just a look back.
0:55
Unidentified speaker: It's about what the financial crisis taught us about risk and whether those lessons hold up as capital floods into private credit, AI, and data centers in a very different political and regulatory environment.
1:07
Unidentified speaker: To help us unpack this, I'm joined by two guests with a front row seat to Lehman.
1:12
Unidentified speaker: First, Judge James Peck, the U.S.
1:15
Unidentified speaker: bankruptcy judge for the Southern District of New York, who presided over the Lehman Brothers, Chapter 11 and SIPA cases.
1:22
Unidentified speaker: Today, he's an international judge of the Singapore International Commercial Court and a mediator of some of the most complex restructuring disputes in the market.
1:32
Unidentified speaker: Then we have my colleague Mark Leitner, head of legal strategy at Credit Sites, and an adjunct professor of bankruptcy law at Arizona State University.
1:41
Unidentified speaker: Mark clerked at the very court where Lehman filed during the great financial crisis, and he later served as counsel to the court-appointed bankruptcy examiner in Lehman Brothers.
1:51
Unidentified speaker: Judge Peck, thank you so much for joining.
1:53
Unidentified speaker: Oh, it's a pleasure to be here.
1:54
Unidentified speaker: Thank you.
1:54
Unidentified speaker: And Mark, thank you for being here as well.
1:56
Unidentified speaker: It was a pleasure.
1:57
Unidentified speaker: All right.
1:58
Unidentified speaker: So let's set the stage a little bit.
2:00
Unidentified speaker: Let's travel back in time to 2008.
2:03
Unidentified speaker: Although I don't know that I necessarily want to go back to those days.
2:08
Unidentified speaker: During my first week as an actual investment banker at Walkovia, I got a front row seat to a lot of confusion, a lot of chaos.
2:17
Unidentified speaker: And what was really striking to me, and I still very vividly recall this, is people did not understand what was happening.
2:23
Unidentified speaker: People in investment banking who theoretically should have comprehended just kind of the magnitude at play were totally lost by it all.
2:34
Unidentified speaker: So, Judge Peck, I want to start with you.
2:37
Unidentified speaker: When did you learn that Lehman was coming to your courtroom?
2:40
Unidentified speaker: And what was that first week like?
2:43
Unidentified speaker: I learned that Lehman filed when I saw the front page of the New York Times, and I learned that I was getting the case as I was walking to my uh chambers that morning.
2:55
Unidentified speaker: The clerk of the court was walking right in front of me, and the hallway sort of resonates with footsteps on hard surfaces.
3:05
Unidentified speaker: And she heard my steps, looked around and said, Oh, Judge Peck, uh you have the Lehman case.
3:13
Unidentified speaker: That was very nonchalant.
3:15
Unidentified speaker: Yeah, that's exactly how it was.
3:16
Unidentified speaker: Uh and um I was in meetings that that morning and it was uh eerily quiet.
3:24
Unidentified speaker: Nothing happened.
3:26
Unidentified speaker: Ordinarily, when a um big mega bankruptcy case files anywhere, there are all kinds of first day motions and activities and emergency hearings, it was absolutely quiet.
3:39
Unidentified speaker: And that was, I think, uh the first major indication that this was a crazy case that hadn't been planned.
3:48
Unidentified speaker: And because it was a free-fall bankruptcy, that's I think one of the reasons that you may have experienced and others may have experienced sort of the shock and awe of it all.
3:59
Unidentified speaker: Um it it was both expected and unexpected at the same time, but it happened suddenly over what's known, I think, in the trade as Lehman Weekend.
4:10
Unidentified speaker: There was an attempt to to bring Lehman to some kind of soft landing.
4:14
Unidentified speaker: It didn't happen, and it was as a result, uh, something of a catastrophe.
4:19
Unidentified speaker: Something of a catastrophe, absolutely.
4:22
Unidentified speaker: Mark, I would be curious to hear from you.
4:24
Unidentified speaker: You were clerking in the same courthouse and then one went on to work for the examiner.
4:29
Unidentified speaker: First, can you tell us what the examiner is?
4:31
Unidentified speaker: What does that mean?
4:33
Unidentified speaker: Sure.
4:33
Unidentified speaker: A bankruptcy examiner is sometimes appointed, typically uh in larger bankruptcy cases, to examine a particular issue that the parties or the court uh may be uh unsure about.
4:45
Unidentified speaker: And so, you know, this is a case of tremendous, you know, public importance.
4:49
Unidentified speaker: It's important to the creditors.
4:50
Unidentified speaker: There were a lot of unknowns uh, you know, related to how Lehman got to where it is.
4:55
Unidentified speaker: There was a lot of money that was missing.
4:57
Unidentified speaker: And so uh a few parties moved to the bankruptcy court, and Judge Peck uh appointed a bankruptcy examiner to look at a list of specific issues, but also to do a comprehensive investigation of why Lehman got to where it is.
5:10
Unidentified speaker: All right.
5:11
Unidentified speaker: Was there anything on the outset that you were focused on that you were thinking to yourself, like, wow, this is really very major?
5:19
Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I mean, so so just to put it into perspective, so you know, I clerked on the bankruptcy court.
5:24
Unidentified speaker: I didn't clerk for uh Judge Peck at the time.
5:27
Unidentified speaker: Uh, but so but I did have a front row seat to a lot of stuff that was going on with Lehman.
5:32
Unidentified speaker: So I at least kind of knew what a lot of the issues were.
5:34
Unidentified speaker: So when I started in private practice a year later, um, you know, the the bankruptcy uh court ordered that we would examine, I think it was 10 specific issues and then conduct, you know, basically a comprehensive investigation.
5:47
Unidentified speaker: And that's kind of the way that like we we look, we we approach this is kind of like w what do we not know?
5:53
Unidentified speaker: And so, you know, we produced a thousand-page report that kind of detailed all of you know the unknowns.
6:00
Unidentified speaker: Do you have that report?
6:01
Unidentified speaker: I do have that report.
6:02
Unidentified speaker: It's on my desk in my in my office.
6:04
Unidentified speaker: It's this huge bound volume that uh nobody has actually read the whole report.
6:09
Unidentified speaker: I'm sure there are some mystery details in there.
6:12
Unidentified speaker: Could be really good for trivia night somewhere.
6:15
Unidentified speaker: So, Judge Peck, you said something at the outset, which was Lehman, everybody kind of saw it coming, but nobody really saw it coming.
6:24
Unidentified speaker: And I think that that is just true of every crisis, of every credit squeeze, of every kind of market pullback.
6:31
Unidentified speaker: And so, of course, we're trying to figure out what did we learn from Lehman?
6:35
Unidentified speaker: What can we take into the future so we don't make those same mistakes going forward?
6:40
Unidentified speaker: I'd be curious to hear from you, front row C, what did we learn from Lehman?
6:45
Unidentified speaker: And are we safe today from those very specific risks that brought it down?
6:52
Unidentified speaker: That's a pretty uh heavy-duty question.
6:55
Unidentified speaker: I'll try to That's what I'm here for.
6:56
Unidentified speaker: I'll try to answer it uh succinctly.
6:59
Unidentified speaker: I I think we one of the things we learned is that the bankruptcy system is remarkably uh flexible and has the capacity, probably more so than any other uh comparable insolvency system in the world to respond to a crisis.
7:17
Unidentified speaker: And one of the things that happened in Lima was that the North American broker dealer business was sold in the first week of the filing.
7:25
Unidentified speaker: That's unheard of.
7:27
Unidentified speaker: And I think the f that flexibility and responsiveness to risk is uh frankly a a credit to the bankruptcy system.
7:37
Unidentified speaker: Uh I think we also learned that uh systemic risk doesn't really belong in bankruptcy courts because uh I was curiously prepared for the assignment that was totally random, but I had been paying attention to systemic risk uh in my spare time and I was oddly prepared for the assignment.
8:05
Unidentified speaker: If the case had been assigned randomly to somebody that didn't know anything about systemic risk, uh the case uh the th this is not a self-aggrandizing statement.
8:16
Unidentified speaker: Uh the case probably wouldn't have gone in the same trajectory.
8:21
Unidentified speaker: Uh I also think that because Lehman was such an accelerator of panic in the financial markets, it's never gonna happen again.
8:35
Unidentified speaker: I mean, anybody who has a position as a regulator, um uh prudential regulator in the United States or any place else in the world that's dealing with a similar financial institution that's in distress will do pretty much everything possible to avoid another emergency filing of this sort.
8:56
Unidentified speaker: So I I think that's a lesson learned.
8:58
Unidentified speaker: Now, what it tells me about what's going on right now, though, is that the lessons learned and the you know Dodd-Frank and uh having more capital at major financial institutions than they had in the past, all those things that suggest a more robust financial system, that's great, but that's not where the risk presently lies.
9:24
Unidentified speaker: And so the next battle that we're gonna fight is not going to be a repeat of the one we just had.
9:30
Unidentified speaker: It's gonna be something very different, and we're probably not prepared for it.
9:34
Unidentified speaker: You sound like a credit person for sure.
9:36
Unidentified speaker: You would you like to join the strategy team?
9:38
Unidentified speaker: You'd be you'd be great.
9:40
Unidentified speaker: What would you pay me?
9:42
Unidentified speaker: I'll have to talk to my boss about that.
9:44
Unidentified speaker: Let's listen to that conversation.
9:48
Unidentified speaker: So I think that that point around we can never eliminate risk.
9:53
Unidentified speaker: We just kind of reshuffle it.
9:54
Unidentified speaker: We move the deck chairs around.
9:56
Unidentified speaker: It's so important, especially as capital markets get bigger, as companies get bigger, as things get more interconnected.
10:04
Unidentified speaker: I'd be curious before we kind of move on to what's ahead, do you have anything that you kind of want to clear the record on with Lehman?
10:11
Unidentified speaker: Are there misconceptions or things that people say about the Lehman bankruptcy that you just think, oh, that's not quite right?
10:17
Unidentified speaker: Or maybe we were getting it right.
10:19
Unidentified speaker: I don't know.
10:20
Unidentified speaker: I I think that Lehman is a pretty well studied event.
10:23
Unidentified speaker: I think one of the misconceptions, and this is a global misconception, is that I was selected to be the bankruptcy judge.
10:32
Unidentified speaker: Um it was totally random.
10:34
Unidentified speaker: And when I travel the world, and I do that quite a lot, especially now, um other systems do not have random assignments.
10:45
Unidentified speaker: And it's it's very American.
10:48
Unidentified speaker: Um and the thought was with s with a case of this extraordinary significance, surely somebody must have pulled the strings to get it to you because they knew you had already been studying systemic risk.
11:00
Unidentified speaker: Answer Not at all.
11:03
Unidentified speaker: It was in fact, the case was assigned to another judge, and I got it on the rebound because the other judge had to recuse himself.
11:12
Unidentified speaker: So I got Lehman on the rebound and it changed my life.
11:15
Unidentified speaker: And Judge, uh one of the things that's we've talked about this before that that I think is so interesting, the fact that it was random and the fact that, you know, in our system, our bankruptcy system, the uh the bankruptcy courts are truly independent, right?
11:30
Unidentified speaker: You you you're not you're not answering to anyone.
11:32
Unidentified speaker: You really acted as an independent actor in this process.
11:35
Unidentified speaker: What value does that have to the process itself and to the perception of the process?
11:42
Unidentified speaker: It is the essence of the rule of law.
11:46
Unidentified speaker: And it is a um a rare system of justice that doesn't have government influence somewhere within it.
11:58
Unidentified speaker: Um I handled the case for five years before I retired from the bench, and in that entire period of time, nobody from the government ever contacted me.
12:10
Unidentified speaker: Nobody from the government ever knocked on the door to pay a visit to my chambers, nobody ever sought to influence me in a way that I perceived it.
12:19
Unidentified speaker: Uh the government did, however, participate actively as a party in the case.
12:25
Unidentified speaker: The Department of Justice was there.
12:27
Unidentified speaker: The the government was present, but only as a represented party.
12:33
Unidentified speaker: That's an extraordinary gift that we have in this country that also makes our insolvency system, I think, more credible, more robust, and frankly, more effective at getting to good commercial outcomes.
12:48
Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
12:48
Unidentified speaker: I mean, what a refreshing perspective, especially heading into election season, which can be particularly fraught, to hear from someone who was at the center of it around this still the independence that the judicial system has in most cases.
13:06
Unidentified speaker: I'm very proud of it.
13:07
Unidentified speaker: Yes, and as you should be.
13:09
Unidentified speaker: So I want to move on to looking ahead a little bit.
13:13
Unidentified speaker: People are always trying to figure out where is the next systemic risk percolating.
13:18
Unidentified speaker: And as an enthusiast of systemic risk, I would be very curious to hear as you look at private credit, which has become a very large asset class with a lot of interlinkages across the financial system, or the AI data center infrastructure complex, which is also similarly, you know, very interconnected and also just a massive part of the financial system at this point.
13:45
Unidentified speaker: How are you thinking about where the risk could be building going forward?
13:51
Unidentified speaker: Well, you've certainly identified two of the leading contenders.
13:55
Unidentified speaker: Um I am very concerned, not that I'm a a student of AI, I barely understand it, um, of what's going on in the AI system generally.
14:06
Unidentified speaker: And one of the reasons I'm so concerned is that it's happening so fast.
14:11
Unidentified speaker: Um I saw that the uh proposed uh IPO of Anthropic might be a two trillion dollar notional value.
14:21
Unidentified speaker: Who knows if that's right, but let's just use that as a as a as a point of of relevant information.
14:29
Unidentified speaker: It's a startup from five years ago.
14:31
Unidentified speaker: How do you go from zero to two trillion in five years without making some terrible mistakes along the way because you haven't thought about everything?
14:42
Unidentified speaker: And even though, and I'm not picking on anthropic, but even though uh they're sort of viewed as the the more conservative of the of the labs, uh there's tremendous risk here that nobody fully understands.
14:54
Unidentified speaker: And one of the problems with AI isn't just its build-out, it's the economic model on which it is being built, which seems to be uh irrationally exuberant, to use an Alan Greenspan term.
15:07
Unidentified speaker: And so I think there's I think there's risk there.
15:10
Unidentified speaker: Is it gonna blow up?
15:12
Unidentified speaker: I don't know, and I I certainly hope not.
15:14
Unidentified speaker: Is it is it going to miss projections?
15:18
Unidentified speaker: Absolutely.
15:19
Unidentified speaker: There's absolutely no doubt in my mind that's gonna happen.
15:22
Unidentified speaker: And there is so much interconnected debt and interconnected relationships within the system.
15:30
Unidentified speaker: It's um it's very scary.
15:36
Unidentified speaker: I'm not saying anything's gonna happen in the near term and and and something may not happen at all.
15:43
Unidentified speaker: But if it does happen, it I don't think it's gonna be like Lehman.
15:46
Unidentified speaker: I think it's going to be a different sort of event and if I were going to project, and I I sh I I shouldn't.
15:54
Unidentified speaker: Some so I hasten to caution anybody listening to this, it's just one guy's making a comment and I don't see the future.
16:05
Unidentified speaker: I think it's going to be more like AIG.
16:09
Unidentified speaker: I think it's going to not go into court.
16:12
Unidentified speaker: I think that if there's a problem along the way, whether it's in private credit or within some of the big players in the in the AI system, um the and it's and it's causing major shocks in the financial markets, the government is going to have to step in.
16:29
Unidentified speaker: Judge, one of the things when you're talking about the interconnected relationship of the AI stack with with everyone from the hyperscalers all the way down to the property owners uh for data centers, it and you said it happens so fast.
16:43
Unidentified speaker: This this harkens back to me of the subprime mortgage crisis and RMBS and all of the litigation and the you know the quagmire that came out of that.
16:52
Unidentified speaker: Do you do you see parallels to that looking forward or uh am I off base here?
16:57
Unidentified speaker: I don't I don't think you're off base.
16:59
Unidentified speaker: There are parallels, but I think it's I think there are false equivalences too.
17:03
Unidentified speaker: I I think that the financial engineering that went into the subprime mortgage mess um ended up with um these structures on the balance sheets of banks all over the world.
17:20
Unidentified speaker: And so the systemic risk involved, among other things, a subsidence in asset values that were affecting the banking system globally.
17:32
Unidentified speaker: I think the problems that may affect the AI build-out are more like the railroads or the canals or electrification or the US highway system.
17:46
Unidentified speaker: These are these are innovations that people don't yet they know they need, but they don't fully understand what's gonna happen once it's been fully built out.
17:59
Unidentified speaker: And one of the things they do know, there are gonna be some casualties along the way.
18:06
Unidentified speaker: I don't know who the roadkill is gonna be, but there's gonna be some.
18:09
Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's especially interesting because this has been positioned as a national security issue as well.
18:15
Unidentified speaker: The AI build out is not just, oh, I want fancy search on my phone, it is truly a competitive edge versus other countries, specifically China, and we effectively need to get there first.
18:28
Unidentified speaker: And if we don't, then you know, catastrophe.
18:32
Unidentified speaker: And so there is that kind of moral hazard that creeps into it if the government is either implicitly or explicitly backing that build-out, then we end up with, you know, 120 billion of data center being pushed off of balance sheets into SPVs.
18:49
Unidentified speaker: And that starts to get the markets feeling a little bit nervous.
18:52
Unidentified speaker: So, Mark, I'd be curious.
18:54
Unidentified speaker: You did a great write-up in our AI quarterly, which just came out, looking at a number of the different legal and regulatory issues associated with the off balance sheet, the data center infrastructure, all of these things.
19:08
Unidentified speaker: Just some of the highlights.
19:10
Unidentified speaker: What happens in the world of data center defaults or AI infrastructure challenges?
19:16
Unidentified speaker: Well, the short answer is uh we don't know.
19:19
Unidentified speaker: Uh that there's a lot of unknowns here, um, and it's very complicated.
19:23
Unidentified speaker: And so it's very hard to get your head around the whole thing.
19:26
Unidentified speaker: The way that I think about the AI stack is I really think of kind of four broad categories of legal risk, right?
19:32
Unidentified speaker: You've got legal risk associated with training the models, and that's your intellectual property and copyright.
19:38
Unidentified speaker: You've got uh risk associated with what comes out of the models, and that could be everything from class actions for harming consumers to agents gone rogue.
19:47
Unidentified speaker: The third category that I think about is regulatory risk, right?
19:51
Unidentified speaker: Um there are, you know, in the United States, it's relatively lax in terms of regulation.
19:56
Unidentified speaker: That may very well change, particularly if things go sideways.
19:58
Unidentified speaker: You know, in Europe, they're much more uh progressive in that respect.
20:01
Unidentified speaker: So you've got all kinds of regulatory risk, but including like antitrust risk, right?
20:05
Unidentified speaker: The interconnected web of the AI stack creates all kinds of antitrust inquiries.
20:11
Unidentified speaker: Um and then the last kind of bucket, which is probably most relevant to you know the creditor or the investor community, is uh risk associated with the build-out itself and the financing of that build-out.
20:22
Unidentified speaker: And we're really just starting to see, you know, scratching the surface of what some of those risks are.
20:27
Unidentified speaker: We're seeing securities uh disclosure risks, we're seeing potentially solvency risks.
20:32
Unidentified speaker: One of the things about a lot of these structures is credit enhancements.
20:35
Unidentified speaker: So you've got you know, guarantees and backstops and whatnot.
20:38
Unidentified speaker: And so what triggers those, right?
20:41
Unidentified speaker: And then, you know, even more recently, we're seeing uh at least some signs, I'm not suggesting this it's gonna happen, that people may invoke uh contractual provisions like force majeure clauses to get out of obligation that they've already made.
20:53
Unidentified speaker: And so that just kind of scratches the surface of the various kinds of risk.
20:58
Unidentified speaker: And I can guarantee you, as I sit here right now, that every major litigation shop in every major litigation firm is studying what these claims are, both on the offensive and on the defensive.
21:10
Unidentified speaker: And so, and and a lot of firms right now are actually publishing, you know, what I'll loosely describe as we're smart papers, you know, they outlining all of these risks.
21:19
Unidentified speaker: So people are really focused on this and they see this potentially as like a growth area if things go sideways.
21:25
Unidentified speaker: And the Alice in Wonderland part of this is that they're doing the research with AI.
21:29
Unidentified speaker: Oh my gosh, absolutely, which is fascinating to ask AI about AI.
21:34
Unidentified speaker: I've done that.
21:36
Unidentified speaker: Sometimes the answers are good, sometimes the answers make me a little nervous.
21:40
Unidentified speaker: So, Judge Peck, I'd be curious.
21:42
Unidentified speaker: You kind of proclaimed yourself an enthusiast of cycles and systemic risk.
21:47
Unidentified speaker: Oh my god, I proclaim myself.
21:50
Unidentified speaker: You're a judge, you get to proclaim.
21:51
Unidentified speaker: Isn't that one of the benefits of the job?
21:54
Unidentified speaker: I make the proclamations.
21:56
Unidentified speaker: Well, I think you should.
21:57
Unidentified speaker: I think that you are the kind of judge you should be proclaiming.
22:00
Unidentified speaker: What made you interested in systemic risk?
22:03
Unidentified speaker: Like, how did that come on your radar in the first place?
22:07
Unidentified speaker: And when you are just kind of observing market cycles, like what jumps out at you as things that we should just be keeping in mind?
22:15
Unidentified speaker: Okay, so in my case, and that's just kind of a my my personal story, um I was uh a bankruptcy judge who knew a lot of other bankruptcy judges.
22:25
Unidentified speaker: And a friend of mine who was um on the education committee uh for the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges asked me to moderate a panel on systemic risk a year before Lehman filed.
22:39
Unidentified speaker: And so I started studying it, and my panel included a banker, uh a retired governor of the Fed uh and a professor of law, very mixed bag of people, all thinking about the issue before Lehman filed.
22:57
Unidentified speaker: And I found it completely fascinating.
23:01
Unidentified speaker: And when Lehman was assigned to me, uh I ended up uh in the midst of the vortex.
23:10
Unidentified speaker: Uh the sale to Barclays, which took place the first week, was uh was a a stunning experience that still stays with me.
23:19
Unidentified speaker: So I'm very conscious of it as something that ended up in my courtroom but should never actually end up in anybody's courtroom again unless the person who is there is an expert.
23:34
Unidentified speaker: More than I more of an expert than I was.
23:36
Unidentified speaker: I was uh I was uh a a superficial uh uh person who knew a little bit about it more than most people at the time.
23:46
Unidentified speaker: I think a lot of people know about it now.
23:48
Unidentified speaker: There have been books written about it.
23:51
Unidentified speaker: Uh there's a a s a really wonderful book called Crashed, um that's written by a a professor for uh at at uh Columbia.
24:00
Unidentified speaker: Um and I read that book.
24:03
Unidentified speaker: It's huge.
24:04
Unidentified speaker: It's it's about as big as the as the Lehman Examiner's report.
24:08
Unidentified speaker: It's a very it's a gigantic book.
24:10
Unidentified speaker: Which is which is more riveting?
24:11
Unidentified speaker: I think I think I think crash is actually more riveting.
24:14
Unidentified speaker: Okay.
24:15
Unidentified speaker: And I get I get I get no benefits from the writer.
24:18
Unidentified speaker: Um but this is something that people know about.
24:22
Unidentified speaker: And at a certain level, what's going on today is the is the downstream effect of what happened in Lehman.
24:34
Unidentified speaker: What's going on today is that people are more risk-averse today than they might have been before Lehman.
24:40
Unidentified speaker: They're more focused on systemic risk and even know what it is now than they were at the time.
24:46
Unidentified speaker: And I think systemic risk, even though people aren't using that term in common speech, is just something that people are more f worried about.
24:56
Unidentified speaker: There's both a combination of very buoyant markets and very worried market participants.
25:06
Unidentified speaker: And that's a very dangerous kind of combination because when you have really buoyant markets and really worried participants, you have skittish investors and they are likely to hit the panic button at the first sign of distress.
25:23
Unidentified speaker: Yes.
25:24
Unidentified speaker: Absolutely.
25:25
Unidentified speaker: That mismatch is so crucial.
25:28
Unidentified speaker: And when you consider the unlocking of retail funds in a lot of these asset classes that have typically been more institutionally aligned, especially private credit.
25:38
Unidentified speaker: But then we can also speak to the infrastructure and all of that, which has become much more available to retail investors.
25:45
Unidentified speaker: There's there's a true gap between my time horizon or my tolerance for risk as a retail investor versus an institutional investor and some of these big things that worry me on a regular basis.
25:57
Unidentified speaker: But I'm a bond person, so I'm supposed to always be a little bit pessimistic.
26:01
Unidentified speaker: That's just how it goes.
26:03
Unidentified speaker: This would be a different interview with an equity strategist hosting it.
26:07
Unidentified speaker: Okay.
26:08
Unidentified speaker: Mark, I'd be curious to hear from you.
26:10
Unidentified speaker: We know that, you know, the big blow-ups command a lot of the headlines, but in the day-to-day, there's a lot of nitty-gritty happening right now within the world of restructuring and bankruptcy.
26:21
Unidentified speaker: You know, we hear creditor-uncred violence and a number of other topics that come across your desk regularly.
26:28
Unidentified speaker: What are some of the big flashpoints that you are focused on?
26:31
Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I mean, look, in the credit markets, and as a result of, you know, a variety of factors, there's been uh a proliferation of liability management exchanges.
26:41
Unidentified speaker: Uh, we refer to those as LMEs.
26:43
Unidentified speaker: There's a lot of litigation uh surrounding those.
26:45
Unidentified speaker: Those often end up in chapter 11 at some point.
26:48
Unidentified speaker: So we're gonna see a lot of LME activity uh continuing.
26:52
Unidentified speaker: Um, we're going to see uh we still don't have resolution on a really important issue in our world uh related to whether when creditors work together, they potentially violate the antitrust laws.
27:03
Unidentified speaker: And so we're still waiting on some judicial guidance on that.
27:06
Unidentified speaker: Uh one really important topic that uh may very well uh be the subject of you know further discussions that we have at some point uh relates to the Texas two-step.
27:16
Unidentified speaker: Um and that's uh uh a process by which a company splits itself in two and then bankrupts the bad company and keeps the good company out of bankruptcy.
27:24
Unidentified speaker: A lot of clever lawyers have attempted to do this to help uh large corporations manage uh their mass tort liabilities.
27:31
Unidentified speaker: Uh and so that that those are just a few uh uh big picture items that we're we're following and tracking in the credit markets.
27:38
Unidentified speaker: A lot to keep you focused on busy with.
27:41
Unidentified speaker: And at the beginning of this year, I was uh I was long lawyers, it seemed like, given the regulatory and data center and just everything that was happening, you know, being constructive on lawyers staying busy sounded like a good place to go.
27:54
Unidentified speaker: Although it seems like the the law the legal industry is also a little bit in its old world of chaos right now.
28:01
Unidentified speaker: Indeed.
28:02
Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
28:03
Unidentified speaker: So let's kind of wrap things up.
28:05
Unidentified speaker: We'll do a little speed round myth versus reality, which is always fun.
28:09
Unidentified speaker: Judge Pack, I'd be curious to hear from you.
28:12
Unidentified speaker: Do you think we're going to continue to see these full-blown chapter 11 cases?
28:16
Unidentified speaker: Or will it emerge that LMEs and the more surgical restructurings under the type of English schemes of array of arrangement kind of take over and rule the day?
28:28
Unidentified speaker: I think we're going to see all of that.
28:30
Unidentified speaker: Uh, I don't think one's going to necessarily prevail.
28:34
Unidentified speaker: Chapter 11, as I said earlier, is a remarkably uh flexible and useful tool.
28:40
Unidentified speaker: And uh there will still be Chapter 11.
28:42
Unidentified speaker: The problem with Chapter 11, in my view, and I say this as a judge who used to approve fees, um, it's too expensive.
28:50
Unidentified speaker: And it needs to uh trim down the cost of the process in order to be truly competitive.
28:58
Unidentified speaker: I have a lot of experience lately in dealing with uh English um restructuring plans and also uh pre-PACs in Singapore.
29:08
Unidentified speaker: And the world is um available to companies that wish to restructure.
29:15
Unidentified speaker: It's not just the United States, and companies are going to London and Singapore and other major centers.
29:23
Unidentified speaker: And for that reason, I think we're going to see a much more global approach to the way cases migrate and the way companies choose to restructure.
29:32
Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
29:33
Unidentified speaker: It also makes sense as companies just get more and more global in general and have operations in so many different jurisdictions at this point, it can get a bit overwhelming.
29:44
Unidentified speaker: Mark, what is one misconception that investors have around how courts handle major failures?
29:50
Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
29:51
Unidentified speaker: I mean, and and and this this this comes up whether it's in the context of Lehman or a small case.
29:56
Unidentified speaker: One of the things that I'm constantly having to remind our clients and investors is that when a particular court decides a particular issue, particularly a lower court, like a bankruptcy court or even a district court on appeal, that does not settle the legal issue for all being.
30:12
Unidentified speaker: And, you know, investors want certainty.
30:15
Unidentified speaker: I mean, that's part of their risk assessment, is they want at least some guidance in terms of, you know, if it's a binary outcome or what have you.
30:22
Unidentified speaker: But you know, one decision is not the final.
30:26
Unidentified speaker: And so I think that's probably the most common misconception that I uh you know talk to clients about on a daily basis.
30:33
Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
30:33
Unidentified speaker: So, Mark, what's the next lehman-sized blowup that we get to deal with in the market?
30:38
Unidentified speaker: Where's it coming from?
30:39
Unidentified speaker: Is it AI, banks, prov private credit, sovereigns?
30:43
Unidentified speaker: Oh, well, with all the stuff going on in the news uh with with France and and Brazil and the like, uh sovereigns would be an easy one.
30:51
Unidentified speaker: But my gut tells me that there's gonna be some problems in the AI stack.
30:54
Unidentified speaker: All right.
30:55
Unidentified speaker: Judge Pack, I'd love to hear from you.
30:56
Unidentified speaker: I know that you're not gonna proclaim, but without proclaiming, I would say that we don't know where it's gonna happen or when it's gonna happen, but it's gonna happen.
31:08
Unidentified speaker: And it's more likely than not gonna happen within the AI build-out because it's happening without a lot of obvious thought.
31:18
Unidentified speaker: And one of the things about human beings, it takes time to exercise good judgment.
31:25
Unidentified speaker: And you have to question whether or not everybody who's involved in this race to be the first and the best and the biggest, whether they're all thinking about whether or not it's the right thing to do at all.
31:41
Unidentified speaker: Those are very wise words to end on.
31:43
Unidentified speaker: And so I think we are going to wrap it there.
31:45
Unidentified speaker: That brings us to the end of today's conversation.
31:48
Unidentified speaker: Many thanks to JudgePack and Mark for joining us today.
31:52
Unidentified speaker: If you enjoyed the discussion, be sure to like, subscribe, and join us next week for more sharp analysis on the forces shaping global markets.
32:01
Unidentified speaker: Until then, stay above the fray.
32:06
Unidentified speaker: That's a wrap on today's episode.
32:08
Unidentified speaker: Thanks for spending your time with us.
32:10
Unidentified speaker: If you enjoyed it, subscribe, share it with a friend, and leave us a review.
32:16
Unidentified speaker: Until next time, stay curious, stay grounded, and we'll see you above the fray.
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