Debate on Total Market Index vs Small-Cap Value Tilts at Bogleheads Conference
Summary
Speaker 0 discusses a debate with Dr. Jim Dahle regarding total market index funds versus small-cap value tilts, citing academic research and historical performance data. The speaker argues that small-cap value offers higher long-term returns with manageable risk increases, contrasting this with the S&P 500's volatility and tax inefficiencies. Key metrics presented include a 1% to 2% annual return enhancement from a 30% small-cap value tilt and lower turnover rates for DFA and Avantis funds compared to Vanguard. The episode concludes that while fees and psychology are critical, a diversified multi-factor strategy may outperform a pure total market approach.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 7:42
Bogleheads Conference and Debate Context
Speaker 0 recounts attending the Bogleheads Conference, highlighting a debate with Dr. Jim Dahle regarding total market index versus small-cap value tilts. He mentions interactions with other experts like Bill Bernstein and Rick Ferry, and a new project involving biblical investing perspectives.
- 7:42 – 13:11
Total Market Index vs. S&P 500 Performance (2000-2026)
The speaker presents data showing the Morningstar Total Market Index grew $10,000 to $90,121 from early 2000 to October 13, 2026, yielding ~8% CAGR. In contrast, the S&P 500 grew to $92,377, indicating the total market index underperformed the S&P 500 in both return and risk-adjusted metrics during this period.
- 13:11 – 17:39
Academic View on Asset Class Selection
The speaker cites academic research stating that choosing an equity asset class accounts for 90-99% of return variance. He argues that higher volatility asset classes like small-cap value historically offer higher returns, though future performance is uncertain.
- 17:39 – 23:17
Small-Cap Value Volatility and Historical Context
Performance of Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) small-cap value is shown to have high volatility, including significant drops between 2000 and 2010, before recovering. The speaker compares this to the 1925 case for stocks, noting that long-term gains can be wiped out by crashes if investors cannot stay the course.
- 23:17 – 28:40
DFA vs. Traditional Index Funds and Size Factors
A DFA fund (DFSVX) is cited as growing $10,000 to $170,000 over 25 years, outperforming other small-cap value funds. The speaker notes that funds with slightly larger average company sizes (mid-cap exposure) may outperform during large-cap rallies, and he expresses a bias toward non-traditional index funds like DFA/Vontus over traditional ones like Vanguard VBR.
- 28:40 – 34:47
Jim Dahle's Argument on Fees and Short-Term Performance
The speaker summarizes Jim Dahle's argument that VTI outperformed DFSVX over a 15-year period (15.23% vs 12.56% before advisory fees). The speaker critiques this by noting that DFSVX returns were for institutions/advisors, while retail investors might face higher costs, and argues that Vanguard's low fees are a key benefit for total market investors.
- 34:47 – 37:40
Critique of 'Buy the Haystack' and Expense Justification
The speaker challenges the 'buy the haystack' philosophy by arguing that the 'haystack' has evolved from the S&P 500 to a diversified portfolio of asset classes. He disputes the value of paying higher fees for index funds that merely emulate benchmarks, while acknowledging that active/non-traditional management may justify higher costs through alpha generation.
- 37:40 – 42:13
Expense and Tax Efficiency Arguments
Speaker 0 contrasts traditional index funds with formula-based funds like AVUV and DFSV, arguing that the latter avoid front-running costs. The speaker then addresses Jim Dahle's points on tax efficiency, noting that while value funds have higher turnover than some indices, AVUV and DFSV have low turnover (6-7%) compared to VBR (25%). The speaker disputes the tax inefficiency argument by citing Morningstar data showing low tax costs for DFA and Avantis funds and highlights VTI's high unrealized capital gains as a risk.
- 42:13 – 45:28
Complexity and Academic Diversification Strategy
The speaker refutes the claim that a multi-fund strategy is too complex for investors, arguing that adding small-cap value funds is simple. They introduce an academic four-fund strategy (S&P 500, Small Cap Blend, Large Cap Value, Small Cap Value) as a superior diversification tool, citing Daryl Ball's work. The speaker emphasizes that these asset classes are distinct and do not move in sync, providing a hedge against being fully exposed to the worst-performing asset class in any given year.
- 45:28 – 52:01
Historical Performance and Market Timing Risks
Speaker 0 presents year-by-year performance data from 1928 to 2025, showing that the S&P 500 and Small Cap Value rarely perform similarly, with one often being the best and the other the worst. The speaker highlights the 2000-2006 period where Small Cap Value outperformed the S&P 500 in almost every year, arguing that this diversification helps investors avoid the behavioral trap of buying at market tops, a common issue with industry sales practices.
- 52:01 – 58:16
Volatility, Risk, and Long-Term Returns
The speaker analyzes compound returns and volatility, noting that the S&P 500 was the best performer 40% of the time and the worst 50% of the time between 1928-2025. They argue that a two-fund or four-fund strategy reduces volatility and avoids extreme bottom-quintile outcomes. The speaker challenges the notion that investors only face a 20% loss, stating that equity portfolios can lose 50%, and that a 50-50 stock/bond portfolio still carries a significant risk of a 25% loss.
- 58:16 – 1:03:16
Expense Ratios and Active vs. Passive Comparison
Speaker 0 critiques Jim Dahle's comparison of Heartland Value (an actively managed fund) to Vanguard index funds, pointing out that Heartland's higher fees (over 1%) explain its underperformance. The speaker argues that if Heartland had Vanguard-like fees, it would have outperformed the S&P 500, suggesting that the fee advantage of index funds is the primary driver of their success, not just the strategy itself.
- 1:03:16 – 1:07:34
Impact of Small-Cap Value Tilts on Returns and Risk
The speaker details Table G1B, showing that tilting 10-30% of a portfolio into Small Cap Value increased compound returns from 11% to 12% (for 30% tilt) from 1970-2025, with only a marginal increase in standard deviation (16.9% to 17%). The worst 60-month drawdown increased slightly from -6.7% to -7%, and the worst 12-month loss increased from -43.3% to -45.1%. The speaker concludes that the return enhancement is substantial relative to the minimal risk increase.
- 1:07:34 – 1:17:40
Period-Dependent Performance and Dollar-Cost Averaging
Speaker 0 breaks down performance by decade, noting Small Cap Value crushed the S&P 500 from 1970-1983 and 2000-2013, but underperformed from 1984-1999 and 2014-2025. The speaker highlights that while Small Cap Value outperformed 29 times and underperformed 29 times since 1970, its average outperformance (16.5%) was larger than the S&P 500's average outperformance (11%). They also mention Daryl Ball's relative performance chart showing explosive growth periods for Small Cap Value.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | It it if you had invested in that same period of time with the S P 500, the next chart shows what would have happened. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The Morningstar Total Market Index grew $10,000 to $90,121 from early 2000 to October 13, 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·8:07
How to verify: Check Morningstar index performance data for the Total Market Index (or equivalent broad US market index) for the period Jan 2026 to Oct 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The S&P 500 grew $10,000 to $92,377 over the same period (early 2000 to Oct 2026).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·9:13
How to verify: Check S&P 500 total return index data for the period Jan 2026 to Oct 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The total market index had a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of over 8% through the end of 2025, compared to 17.2% for the previous 25 years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·8:39
How to verify: Calculate CAGR for the Total Market Index for the periods 2026-2026 and 2026-2026 using historical index data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe standard deviation of the total market index is higher than that of the S&P 500.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·10:49
How to verify: Compare historical volatility (standard deviation) data for the Total Market Index and S&P 500 from Morningstar or similar data providers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
DFA small cap value index (non-traditional) had higher volatility and returns than the S&P 500, including a crash between 2000 and 2010.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·19:12
How to verify: Review historical performance charts of DFA small-cap value indices versus S&P 500 for the 2000-2026 period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
DFA fund DFSVX compounded at 12.56% over a 15-year period before advisory fees.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·29:37
How to verify: Check DFSVX historical total return data for a 15-year period ending around 2026, excluding advisory fees. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
VTI compounded at 15.23% over the same 15-year period.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·29:31
How to verify: Check VTI historical total return data for the corresponding 15-year period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Vanguard VBR has an average company size of six or seven billion dollars.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·26:33
How to verify: Check Vanguard's fund factsheet or portfolio holdings for VBR to determine average market cap. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
DFA funds are considered non-traditional index funds because they do not follow strict rebalancing and selling rules like the S&P 500.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·17:59
How to verify: Review DFA's methodology documentation or AAII articles referenced by the speaker regarding non-traditional index management. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
John Bogle advocated for the S&P 500 as the 'haystack' when Vanguard started in 1957.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·35:17
How to verify: Review Vanguard's historical founding documents or John Bogle's writings from the late 1950s/1960s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Formula-based index funds can buy/sell without announcing trades, preventing front-running costs that affect traditional index funds.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:40
How to verify: Check prospectuses for DFA and Avantis funds for trading disclosure policies; compare to Vanguard/BlackRock index fund prospectuses which require public announcement of rebalancing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
AVUV and DFSV have lower expenses than VBR, but higher expenses than VOO.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:40
How to verify: Check expense ratios on Morningstar or fund provider websites (Avantis, DFA, Vanguard) for AVUV, DFSV, VBR, and VOO. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
VBR has 25% turnover; AVUV has 6% turnover; DFSV has 7% turnover.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:32
How to verify: Check 'Portfolio' or 'Statistics' sections on Morningstar.com or fund provider websites for VBR, AVUV, and DFSV. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
IWN (Russell 2000 Small Cap Value) has 30% turnover.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·39:32
How to verify: Check 'Portfolio' or 'Statistics' sections on Morningstar.com or iShares website for IWN. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
DFA and Avantis small-cap value funds have a tax cost of about 0.5% per year, versus 0.33% for Vanguard traditional index funds.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:06
How to verify: Check Morningstar's 'Tax Cost' metric for specific DFA and Avantis ETFs/mutual funds and Vanguard index funds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
VTI has 59% unrealized capital gains; AVUV has 11% unrealized capital gains.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:42
How to verify: Check Morningstar's 'Unrealized Capital Gains' metric for VTI and AVUV. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
From 1928 to 2025, the S&P 500 was the best performer 40% of the time and the worst performer 50% of the time.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·52:20
How to verify: Calculate annual rankings of S&P 500 vs. other asset classes (Small Cap Value, Large Cap Value, Small Cap Blend) using data from Kenneth French Data Library or Ibbotson/Morningstar. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Heartland Value has total operating expenses over 1%, while Vanguard index funds are nearly free.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·59:36
How to verify: Check expense ratios on Morningstar or fund provider websites for Heartland Value and Vanguard index funds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
From 1970 to 2025, a 30% tilt to Small Cap Value increased compound return from 11% to 12% and standard deviation from 16.9% to 17%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:05:48
How to verify: Recreate Table G1B using historical data from Kenneth French Data Library or Ibbotson; calculate weighted returns and standard deviations for 100% S&P 500 vs. 70/30 S&P 500/Small Cap Value portfolios. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
From 1970 to 2025, a $1,000 initial investment increasing by 3% annually grew to $5.8 million in S&P 500 and $9.4 million in a 50-50 Small Cap Value/S&P 500 portfolio.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:12:40
How to verify: Recreate Table C9 using historical data from Kenneth French Data Library or Ibbotson; simulate dollar-cost averaging with 3% annual contribution increases. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Dr. Jim Dahle recommends AVUV, VU, DFSV, AVDV, and DISV.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:13:25
How to verify: Check Dr. Jim Dahle's published investment recommendations or White Coat Investor website for fund lists. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The speaker's portfolios offer recommended Avantis, DFA, and Vanguard funds in all ten academic recommended equity asset classes.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:14:05
How to verify: Review the speaker's portfolio allocation documents or website disclosures regarding fund offerings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The S&P 500 fell 1% a year from 2000 to 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:14:31
How to verify: Calculate the annualized return of the S&P 500 Index using total return data from Yahoo Finance or CRSP for the period Jan 2000 to Dec 2009. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The worldwide ultimate buy and hold had a 7.3% gain from 2000 to 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:14:51
How to verify: Identify the specific 'worldwide ultimate buy and hold' portfolio construction referenced in Table H2 of the associated presentation and calculate its annualized return using historical market data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The worldwide forefund had a 6.1% gain from 2000 to 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:14:51
How to verify: Identify the 'worldwide forefund' portfolio construction referenced in Table H2 and calculate its annualized return using historical market data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Morningstar Total Market Index vs S&P 500 performance data for the period early 2000 to October 2026 using Morningstar or Yahoo Finance.
- Check turnover rates and tax cost ratios for DFSVX, AVUV, VBR, and VTI via fund prospectuses or Morningstar Direct.
- Review Daryl Ball's academic work on four-fund diversification strategies and their historical performance claims.
- Analyze unrealized capital gains distributions for VTI versus AVUV to assess tax efficiency risks in a downturn scenario.
- Compare expense ratios and advisory fees for DFA, Avantis, and Vanguard funds to understand net performance differences.
- Examine historical drawdowns and volatility metrics for small-cap value tilts versus total market indices using Fama-French data.
- Read Dr. Jim Dahle's counter-arguments on fees and short-term performance to ensure a balanced view of the debate.
- Confirm the specific fund recommendations (AVUV, VU, DFSV, AVDV, DISV) and their current holdings and fees.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, this is uh
- 0:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
- 0:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is going to be very special for
- 0:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
- 0:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I just had the honor, and I truly mean it was an honor to be invited back one more time
- 0:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to the
- 0:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bogleheads conference.
- 0:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And uh
- 0:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is there are few things more fun in in my my life than a Boglehead conference.
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it is very special. because
- 0:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we are surrounded by people. I think there were 700 people there.
- 0:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But we are surrounded by people who truly have every one of them an interest in the investing process. And they may have very different beliefs than that I have. In fact I know that to be true true. But it is a group that will sit
- 0:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and listen and ask questions and and test you at a level that we just don't get many chances. And it was particularly special for me because not only
- 1:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): did
- 1:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I have the fun of presenting a couple of times from the stage. once in the debate that I'll talk about here today,
- 1:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with Jim Dolly, but also with some good friends
- 1:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in a
- 1:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): discussion about investing,
- 1:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bill Bernstein and Rick Ferry and Jim Dolly and Alan Roth. Really, it was just great fun.
- 1:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But even before the whole thing started,
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I was invited,
- 1:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I couldn't say no, I was invited to spend some time with a family. There were five either children or cousins and a father or uncle
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who were in the room with me. and we talked about how they should uh uh start the investing and maintain the investing process, what kinds of strategies uh and uh and paths to go, whether it be 401k or IRA, whatever uh the
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): situation might uh call for. But boy, what a treat. Uh again, uh working in a room full of people that really truly are committed to learning.
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then I had a chance to to to meet uh with a minister,
- 2:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 2:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Pastor Chad,
- 2:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 2:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and talk about a a program,
- 2:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a project that uh he has suggested that I'm all in on because he is looking at investing from a biblical view.
- 2:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I will not be there to talk about the biblical view, not my area of expertise, but to then see whether the kinds of things that we recommend fit with what would be viewed uh from.
- 3:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a biblical viewpoint. So that is going to be a new project. And I'm I'm actually quite excited about that.
- 3:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then just the opportunities to to sit and and answer questions. There's a point at which
- 3:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as a part of the program
- 3:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 3:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they they give individuals an opportunity to sit for a while with one of the so-called experts uh and ask questions. And I did that uh for an hour uh before uh the the period was over, but there were some who wanted to stay and we talked for
- 3:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): another hour. Again, when if somebody wants to teach and you have a student who wants to learn. it's just almost nothing that's more motivating. Maybe the only thing that's more motivating is standing in front of
- 4:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 50 college kids who aren't sure they want to learn, but you've got an hour or two to try to motivate them to take this seriously and see how this is all a life changer.
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I promised
- 4:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that uh to the people that were there to watch the presentation,
- 4:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 4:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I checked with Jim Dolly to make sure that he was okay with this. I promised that I was going to sit through a uh
- 4:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 4:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a presentation that would be without all the drama. of the uh of
- 4:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): speaking in front of hundreds of people and having a time constriction as uh restriction as you will see in just a minute. But I don't have that here. And I will try my best to make the case that Jim made for the total market index.
- 5:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We had actually before we even d did the debate, uh he asked me if I would be willing to take the total market index and it he would uh speak on behalf of of small cap value and and he was kind enough to let me do the only thing I would feel
- 5:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comfortable about doing. But I could.
- 5:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 5:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could it just
- 5:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It just is that my reason for telling people to do the
- 5:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): total market index instead of uh whole entirely, by the way, as opposed to tilting towards some small cap value,
- 5:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 5:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it wouldn't take me more than about three minutes to make my case. So um so I'm glad. I thank Jim for giving me the right to argue on behalf of something that is near and dearer to my heart. And by the way, I do think the total market index
- 6:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a really great place to invest for the long term. But I start out by addressing that as the first question. Is it really what you want? If what you want is to have the return of the market?
- 6:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I am now going to go through the PowerPoint
- 6:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I will take my time on the part that I am responsible for, but I'll also I'll also make the case uh along with James. Jim for what he was trying to say in his part of the presentation. So here it is the great debate. I
- 7:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): really that's tongue in cheek.
- 7:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is not the great debate, but it's an important consideration and
- 7:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to tilt or not to tilt. And what I was given was the first opportunity
- 7:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to speak, and I was given five minutes. I might take less, I might take more here today, but I'm certainly not going to be as emotionally charged as I was, because I definitely got into my preacher mode in front of that audience, and that may or may not
- 7:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be my best presentation mode. Uh, but here is the first thing I showed
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
- 7:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because here is the total market index according to Morningstar, with uh dividends uh and capital gains and everything that could be reported, reinvested for the future. And you can see that with a $10,000 investment back in the very early part.
- 8:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of 2000 and taking it through
- 8:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): October 13, 2026, that $10,000 grew to $90,121.
- 8:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
- 8:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that is not a great return for the market. This was not the best $25 or 26 years in history. As a matter of fact, I don't know the exact amount, but I think through the end of 2025,
- 8:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was over an 8%
- 8:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compound rate of return. If you looked at the previous 25 years, it was 17.2%.
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, what did people think they were going to get for this 25 year period? Well, I'll almost guarantee you they thought it would be more than the 8 to 8.5% that it actually made. But here's the thing that is important
- 9:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because it tells part of the story in a very quiet way.
- 9:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It it if you had invested in that same period of time with the S P 500, the next chart shows what would have happened. It would have totaled 92,377%.
- 9:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So about a $2,000 higher return. Now that obviously is not a life-changing difference.
- 9:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But one has to ask a question right there that Jim did not ask. If small cap and mid-cap, because the total market index has both mid and small cap,
- 9:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 9:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and if if those asset classes
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): had
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a better than
- 10:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): S
- 10:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): P 500 or large cap blend return,
- 10:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how is it possible that the total market index didn't have a better rate of return? What defense do I have trying to suggest that instead of that 10 to 15 percent that might have been in small? cap and mid-cap,
- 10:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): why not redirect that all to small cap value? Because it doesn't look like it would have helped. And you would have taken more risk. And how do I know that? Because the volatility, and I know there's a big question about whether volatility itself is the risk that we should
- 10:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be worried about, but I can tell you the standard deviation of the total market index is a wee bit higher. I mean a wee, but it is higher according to Morningstar.
- 11:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so in essence, what we can say at some level is that if you did invest in the total market index, you got a lower rate of return per unit of risk
- 11:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and an actual lower rate of return than the S P 500. So if somebody came to me and said they didn't want to take
- 11:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the t risk of just owning the market, uh it is is having the total market index, which has some small and some mid, is that a better way to go? Well, I don't think so. As a matter of fact, we know a lot today about the past that we didn't
- 11:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know when the S P 500 was started.
- 11:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh,
- 11:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it might be a kind of an interesting thing to see.
- 11:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How did the S SP P 500 do against the SP 100? What if you only owned the 100 largest companies? Well, we have a little bit of history about that. I'm not going to talk about that right now, except that
- 12:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I can say that over this period of time you might have done better just owning 100 a hundred companies instead of the 3,000 that you might. own with the total market index. That is, if you wanted to have the impact of the largest
- 12:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exposure to public companies that you could, that would be safe.
- 12:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 12:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, because what we all would like to have is to have probably a 10% return for life
- 12:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 12:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the least risk
- 12:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that we could possibly take. And it might be the 100 would be a better decision than the 500, but we'll save that argument and discussion for another day. So then what I had I had to go to quickly is to make the case that
- 13:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): adding small cap value. is a it's just a totally different asset class. Now, here's what we know from the academics.
- 13:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They believe that the single most important decision that you make, beyond deciding to be diversified, is diversified how are you what equity asset class are you in? Because if you choose
- 13:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): large cap blend like the SP 500, you are headed down a path of volatility and returns that are going to just just having picked that is going to be the reason for 90 to 99 percent of the return you're going to get.
- 14:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Just that one decision.
- 14:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 14:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's a pretty big deal. Particularly if that is the big decision. And then the next one is where can you get it most efficiently at the least cost? And then where can you put it to give you the best tax advantage? I mean, it's a pretty simple
- 14:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): path. to putting together a portfolio for a lifetime. Because
- 14:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 14:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we want to take the academic seriously, all we have to do is to pick an equity asset class. Now they go on to teach us, and I'll talk more about this later, that there are other equity asset classes that have a history
- 14:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 14:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): giving a higher rate of return.
- 14:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 14:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it isn't because of the individual stocks they're saying that. It's because of the asset class.
- 15:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 15:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if I took it to an extreme, just think what we believe about the fixed income asset class. That's not an equity asset class. That's fixed income. That's bonds. Well, we have a pretty clear understanding from history that bonds are
- 15:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): going to give us a much lower return because they are less risky. Which means that, and then if we follow that to what the academics are teaching us, what that says then,
- 15:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 15:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): least suggests, is that higher volatility, more risky equity asset classes are likely to lead to higher rates of return. And of course, we want proof, by the way,
- 15:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that that has not only happened in the past, and this came,
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this came out came many times in the couple days I was there
- 16:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
- 16:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that Boglehead conference. Because they weren't denying what's happened in the past, whether it's about the S P 500 or small cap value. They're not saying that didn't happen. They're asking me, uh and remember, I'm the one that uh has no idea what the future's going to
- 16:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be. bring. I'm only trying to be a teacher about the past and saying that according to people who know a lot more about this than I do, there is likely to be a premium if you take more risk.
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so these people, I mean, they were legitimately asking me, how do you know you're going to get that extra return in the future?
- 16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And if you do, could it be less? Well, of course it could be less. We already just talked about the S P 500. 25 years it compounds at 17.2,
- 17:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 17:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then it compounds at 8, 8.5% for the next 25?
- 17:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What do are we to make of that? Is 10% in the long run now a pipe drive? dream? Maybe. Maybe by adding small cap value or large cap value, we will in fact get a 10% compound rate of return. That may be what it takes.
- 17:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 17:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we can't know the future. But when I look at this graph here, I see it as green, the upper line. That is the actual
- 17:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): return of dimensional funds small cap value index. Now, when I say index, remember that even the US government considers managers like DFA and Avantis and others as
- 17:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): non-traditional index fund managers. because they don't follow the exact same rules as the S P 500. They don't live within the tret, the tight restrictions of when things can be rebalanced, when they can sell something that no
- 18:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): longer lives up to the expectations of the mechanical system they use to determine what that portfolio is. There's just a whole bunch about
- 18:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the non-traditional ETFs, and I will have a link to an article that I wrote for AAII about the traditional versus non-traditional. That if you don't have background on it, that may be of some help. But
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the point is, is that here was actual performance. I'm not talking about hypothetical. This is actual. And and and what we have here are a couple of really quick lessons. We can see the higher volatility. Just look here in that period of uh
- 19:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with the small cap value in the 2000
- 19:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh uh through 2000,
- 19:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 19:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): almost 2000, well, through 2010. You can see it went up big and it went down big and didn't go all the way down to where it started, but it went down a lot.
- 19:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 19:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then it came roaring back faster. This is the history of small cap value. I'll be showing you some history that goes. back to uh 1928 in a few minutes, but you can see here, in fact, after all of those years of it producing much higher returns than the
- 19:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): SP 500, it came crashing down to being virtually at the same point. So somebody could claim that it has been.
- 20:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that you have taken a lot more risk to end up at exactly the same place as the S P 500. Folks, this is the nature of investing.
- 20:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A very famous book was written in 1925.
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 20:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe it was written earlier than that, but it was or 2025. 24. It was became very successful. It was the first case for investing in stocks versus bonds. Because up to that point, people really believed stocks were just these speculative
- 20:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gambles that people took. But The bonds were real.
- 20:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so they showed
- 20:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one
- 20:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of those long. term charts that we see today going back to nineteen twenty eight until today, and all that big mountain chart of how you made so much money in the stock market, except the chart started in 1866, if I recall right.
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 21:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so there they are in 1925, somebody making the case for stocks, and people saying, hey, that's a much better place to be. Look at the difference between stocks and bonds. It was huge, just as it is today. I mean, literally, a $100 investment
- 21:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in bonds today, and I'm going back to 1928 in long-term long term bonds has grown to about $12,000.
- 21:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A long term investment in the S P $500, $100,
- 21:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over that same period of time is over $1.4 million.
- 21:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But guess what happened to investors? Investors who believed that chart, and it was true. But if they if they did what the chart suggested to do, they would walked right into the crash.
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so all of that great money that was made for for 50 years plus,
- 22:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all of that great money was lost. So, in a sense, when I look at this this this graph here, this chart, I see when I see the DF, the dimensional fund small cap value fund.
- 22:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): going up to over $60,000 before it goes back down to about $30,000.
- 22:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm saying, yeah, that is the way this market works from time to time. But notice it takes back off.
- 22:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And historically, when you've gone through a rough period and things turn around, you will note there's a particular pretty good liftoff comes out of small cap value.
- 22:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So
- 22:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think this right there, if I had said nothing more in that debate, I might have made my case. But having said that, there's more. There's another fund at DFA, actual management. This is not hypothetical. that started at the at
- 23:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the beginning of the early 2000, that the $10,000, instead of growing to $92,000 or $139,000, grew to $170,000. It is a slightly different small cap value fund than what Dimensionals
- 23:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small cap value fund.
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is. And this is a fund that the average size company, instead of being around $4 million, is today around $5 million. It has a little more mid-cap in. Even the small cap fund at DFA has a little bit of mid-cap. Mid cap, but the But this
- 23:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dimensional fund, DFFVX. DFVX, has uh uh a little more
- 24:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 24:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mid cap in it. So there is a difference, and you will see here the return was different, and one of the reasons, and this is this is I hope you'll take this is as an important lesson. How is it that the the
- 24:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): liftoff
- 24:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over this period of time, particularly during 2020, how is it that that company that had slightly larger size small cap companies, why did it lift off faster? And this is one of the lessons about uh about investing.
- 24:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I just I just love, and that is that I don't care.
- 24:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 24:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when I say I don't care, I'm saying that I find most of the time, not always, but most of the time, when large cap companies, I'm talking about large cap blend companies like those in the S P 500, when they are going faster.
- 25:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): than small cap value, if you look carefully, you will see that the large cap value funds that are larger small cap value.
- 25:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Let
- 25:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): me make sure I make that clear.
- 25:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That the small cap value, part of the style box at Morningstar, is going to include some companies that have very small companies compared to have others who have bigger small cap value companies. I think you got it. So here has what
- 25:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): happened. During a period of time that larger companies make more money in the large cap blend group, you'll see that those in the mid-cap that are larger on average do better. And in the small cap value arena, they will do better.
- 26:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 26:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it can be very tempting
- 26:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 26:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want to move your money into, or maybe when you start investing in small cap value, you may be attracted to a small cap value fund that has. larger companies, like
- 26:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 26:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Vanguard has VBR.
- 26:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 26:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think the average size company there is six or seven billion dollars. So that small cap value company could do better
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): than
- 26:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one that only has an average size company of three $3 billion dollars.
- 26:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 26:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there are small cap value funds that the average size company is three, some four, some five, some six.
- 26:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): All of those differences make a difference. And of course, to us,
- 27:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to Chris and Daryl and myself, and to most of the people that I know that work within the DFA Vontus university. universe,
- 27:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we look to the work, the non-traditional index funds, to get even an additional kick in the pants in terms of returns. So if you were looking to be in a larger average size small cap value fund, we'd be wanting you to look at a DFA or
- 27:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a Vontus fund before. we would have you look at one of the traditional index funds. That I'm just saying that's our bias. I don't feel it's a conflict of interest, but it's definitely a bias. And it's not a conflict of interest because I'm not trying to sell you anything. I'm
- 27:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): simply trying to teach you as best I know how this all works. And of course, having said that, I also have to admit I have no idea how it'll all work out. But I do know this. Two non-traditional funds,
- 28:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): managed in a similar fashion, similar, but with slightly different directions as to what they're trying to do, had a marvelous return over that 25, 26 year period.
- 28:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now then Jim got up and he had five minutes. And I'm not going to take very long, but I want to tell you what he said, and I'm going to tell you why.
- 28:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 28:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I disagreed with what he said or thought it wasn't the whole story, I'll share why. The first thing that he said.
- 28:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and
- 28:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 28:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): isn't that he was trying to mislead people, but the first thing he focuses on is a shorter period of time, 15 years, and he points out that the total market index, remember, he's there to get you to understand why
- 29:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you should put your money in the total market index. And over this 15-year period, which of course is a recent period of time. And humans, by their nature, think that what happened recently is way more important than what happened sometime in the past. So, what do we know?
- 29:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We know that VTI compounded at 15.23
- 29:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and DFS. DFSVX compounded at 12.56. And then he says, before advisory fees. Now I want to just be real careful here that we don't get off track. Because
- 29:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 29:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he is talking about is that DFA for some people. particularly the public,
- 30:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had to invest
- 30:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through an advisor who was approved by DFA.
- 30:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 30:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there was a reason why they only wanted to go through their advisors, these particular advisors. And for full disclosure, my old investment management firm was one of the. those advisors starting in the mid-90s. But the reason they wanted to eliminate the ability of the public to just
- 30:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): go buy DFA is because they didn't want investors who were not likely to stay the course. They believed, just like John Bogle, that it the the key to long-term success is staying the course.
- 30:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But also everybody I know, including John Bogle and Warren Buffett, and all the experts say that the biggest enemy of the individual investor is
- 31:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 31:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): face they see in the mirror in the morning. In other words, we as individual investors have a more difficult uh uh
- 31:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): problem in staying the course than an investment advisor whose job it is to make dog on sure you stay the course because you're paying them to make you do that.
- 31:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so they felt it was in the best interest of their shareholders, most of which were institutions,
- 31:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh,
- 31:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to only go through. these advisors. And what Jim is saying here is that if you had owned DFSVX, you would not have gotten 12.56%.
- 31:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I got 12.56% because I didn't have to pay that. Institutions got it because they didn't have to pay that. But that doesn't change the fact that the mutual fund got that past return. That had nothing to do with the payment to other
- 32:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): folks. And having said that, to be fair, there are a lot of people who own VTI through advisors who are charging them 1% to own it because they are making sure they stay the course. So if he's gonna, if he's gonna say before advisory fees
- 32:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for DFA, in a sense he should be saying that after VTI, because some people do pay an extra percentage. Now, let me also say,
- 32:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I must have said a thousand times, there is no risk in the past.
- 32:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We always know what we should have done. And what should we have done? Once we know this,
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well,
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we would have put our money in VTI, of course. On the other hand, had I put money in VTI
- 33:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 33:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it got me a 12.56% return.
- 33:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 33:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's more than I was expecting. And so I will tell you that I would not have been unhappy. But it's not the way the individual investor tends to look at
- 33:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 33:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And the only return that I care about, and I know this is true for a lot of bogleheads, they are not in competition with. anybody else. What they are using the Vanguard funds for is to have access to very, very
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): low-cost funds.
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they aren't looking for any special job in their index funds. They just want to get the market rate of return, and they want the lowest cost way to get that market rate of return.
- 34:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 34:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not exactly sure how they deal with the fact that Fidelity offers uh a uh total market uh r fund uh without an expense. Well that's another story. I mean there's a lot of allegiance and and and loyalty uh to uh to to John Bogle and what he he did, and
- 34:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I understand that. But what I'm saying is I'm ready to make less. The only return that I really care about is a return that my wife and I, and the family, and Western Washington University, where I have to pay up a whole bunch of money when I die. I want to make sure that
- 34:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money is there to pay that bill.
- 34:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 34:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then he went
- 34:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 34:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the don't look for a needle in the haystack just by the haystack. buy haystack. Well, I love that quote too.
- 34:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 34:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it means a lot to
- 34:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
- 34:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But I want people to also remember the haystack that John Bogle was advocating when he started Vanguard was the SP S P 500. It was the haystack that started in 1957. That was when
- 35:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that benchmark actually was established. And so he he learned all about that benchmark. He thought that was the right benchmark to have in his portfolio. But the reality is, we've learned a lot. By the way, we haven't learned a lot from me.
- 35:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We've learned a lot from the academics and what they understand about how that haystack might look. And so I I would take the academics' viewpoint from what they have found out about putting together a portfolio. Don't look for a needle in the haystack. Just
- 35:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buy by the haystack that has a portfolio built. with a diversified group of equity asset classes. It's a haystack as well. And there's no reason
- 36:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 36:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be looking for these companies one by one, but it's a very different haystack from what Jack Bogle believed
- 36:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in.
- 36:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then Jim went into the expenses and made the point. yes, he made a great point that the expenses at Vanguard are less than the expenses at Avantis and the expenses at DFA.
- 36:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But we really, whenever we talk about expenses for something, you still have to ask: what do you get? What are you paying for? See, I do not believe, not even for a second,
- 36:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that a mutual fund that is built to emulate, to copy the S P 500 and is being charged a half of 1%.
- 37:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't know any way at all they're going to give you a better rate of return for that extra
- 37:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): almost a half a percent. Let's call
- 37:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 37:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh 47 basis points, 47 one hundredths of one percent. So so that's one case. On the other hand, the other case is that
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is that when somebody manages a mutual fund
- 37:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that does a lot more, let's just call it. work.
- 37:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 37:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, you could question the value of that work,
- 37:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but these non-traditional index funds that have formula based, just like SP 500 has formula based, has a formula that can respond quickly to major changes. And when they want to buy, they don't have to tell the world what they're buying. And when they want to sell, they don't have to sell the
- 38:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tell the world what they're selling. Now that doesn't sound like a big advantage, but boy is it ever. Because the public and the professionals can't front run you. And that costs.
- 38:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When all the S P 500s at one time are buying a bunch of companies and at the same time selling a bunch of companies, there is a cost to the shareholders. shareholders.
- 38:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But they're trying to eliminate that. Not only eliminate maybe a five-month wait before you make the adjustment to the portfolio,
- 38:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but but also
- 38:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to eliminate the cost of front running. So yes, yes, it is true. DFSV or D
- 38:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
- 38:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): AV. or AVUV are are funds that have a lower expenses.
- 38:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean excuse me, higher expenses than like VBR. But all VBR has to do and all uh um uh the VOO has to do is every once in a while to rebalance the portfolio and manage it day to day. It's actually a fellow to represent. relatively low cost
- 39:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): way to manage the money.
- 39:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 39:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then Jim went on to talk about tax efficiency.
- 39:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 39:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he talked about turnover and yield. Well, you you will notice that uh some
- 39:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um
- 39:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): index funds like IWN uh has a 30% turnover.
- 39:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 39:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): IW IWN, I believe, is a Russell 2000 small cap value.
- 39:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And VBR has 25% turnover. On the other hand, AVUV and DFSV, those are two ETFs for Van for DFA and Avantis, are 6 and 7%. So I'm not worried about. the turnover in these two funds that we have been
- 40:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): advocating. And by the way, you're going to find out pretty soon that Jim advocates for those same two small cap value funds and has them in his own portfolio.
- 40:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But then he focused on the yield because there's a tax inefficiency in value companies because they do. pay a uh dividends. Value companies, uh, stocks do tend to. And so, yes, they are a little
- 40:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher, but notice with VBR a traditional index, they're even higher, and that's because the size Besides of companies are larger and more stable and more likely to pay out more. in dividends.
- 40:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But I do not, in the whole scheme of things, see this as a huge problem because you can go to
- 41:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Morningstar and you will see that
- 41:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the tax cost of DFA and Avantis are about a half a percent a year in their. small cap value funds, as opposed to about a third of a percent in the Vanguard traditional index funds. And if you don't check out the that
- 41:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tax efficiency, you might find something else quite uh revealing, and that is how much do they have in unrealized capital gains? VTI, according to Morningstar, is sitting on about 59%
- 41:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unrealized capital gains. Have a meltdown in the market, and a lot of uh VTI could be sold, and a lot of those
- 41:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shares may have to be liquidated because of heavy selling. Now, but that but that would require massive selling. I'm I know it's not highly likely. but it could happen. Whereas, for example, AVUV, I believe, has an 11% unrealized capital gain holding.
- 42:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then he made the argument for total marketing kind of an overview. He says total market approach, higher returns, but then look what he has the asterisk to. period dependent. Well, yeah, and I'm going to tell you in periods that I think are more relevant than his
- 42:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): period, that the small cap value funds have a higher return. Taxes, well, if they are higher, it's not by much. Complexity. When I saw that, I thought immediately, he's talking. to a roomful of 500 or
- 42:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 400, whatever, however many plus people that we were talking to in that debate. And the idea of having 80% in in in VTI and 10% in DFSV and 10% and in AVUV, A V U V, if that's what you wanted to do,
- 43:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that is complex. for all those frugal engineers sitting in
- 43:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that room. No way is it complex. Now, for a first-time investor, now we're talking about maybe a level of complexity that needs to be addressed. But the good news, and I'm not getting into it today,
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 43:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): DFA and Avantis.
- 43:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have similar to VTI, except that small cap value is built right in. And we'll talk about that in the coming weeks with Chris and Daryl. And then behavior, well, I guess that if you just have one fund to worry about, uh you
- 43:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): only have to address the question of uh holding on with one fund.
- 44:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): On the other hand,
- 44:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it may even be that a little rebalancing and having that second fund, and you'll see that in my argument in a few minutes, could be a good deal.
- 44:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 44:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then I got three minutes.
- 44:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 44:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what I did was, and many of you have already seen this, I know, but I'm just going to take a minute.
- 44:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
- 44:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the academics believe. This is, I only believe it because the academics believe. I took I took the course in mid-90s and I learned this stuff. And
- 44:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think that DFA ever made the pitch with a quilt chart like we have. That's Daryl Ball's uh work, not mine. But the bottom line is it represents what's coming out of the academic community, and that is to put these things together. Now, this happens to be a presentation
- 44:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): where you're using four of them. As you'll find out later, sometimes we use two, sometimes we use five, sometimes we use ten.
- 45:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 45:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think this is probably the greatest teaching tool that I've ever seen in this. industry about diversification, because now we can look from 1928 through 2025, one year at a time, and find out who was the best in that year.
- 45:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1928, it was the SP 500, up 43.6. Who was second best? Small cap blend, up forty-two 42.8. point eight.
- 45:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Who was the uh well, and then the fourth, I mean the third best was an average of the four, 35.8. Small cap value, 32, large cap value 24.6. Obviously, these four asset classes
- 45:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are not all in the same asset class. And you can see it in the range of returns. And you can see as you look over this uh 50, I mean, uh almost 100 years.
- 46:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
- 46:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are 98 years here of performance. So
- 46:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
- 46:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you I can talk a lot about from 70 on, and I talk a little,
- 46:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 46:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh I think the information going all the way back to nineteen twenty-eight is valuable, if nothing more than to see that not only is there a big difference between small cap value and the S P 500 today, there always has been.
- 46:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And you can see there are times when the S P 500 is up at the top, and then it's down at the bottom, and then it's up at the top, then it's down at the bottom, and then it's both at the top and the bottom, and then it's both at the top and the bottom, and then it's both at the top and the bottom, then more. Well, wait a minute, more at the bottom, then more at the bottom, then
- 47:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): top and bottom, and then it ends all at the top.
- 47:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 47:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, this bouncing back and forth not being dependable
- 47:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is the history of it. This is nothing new at all.
- 47:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 47:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this is what we know so well. And this is what we hear the premium for small cap value is dead.
- 47:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, what certainly isn't dead, I can say for sure, is the difference between the SP 500 here in 2020 up 18.4 2020 for small cap. value, up 3.8, large cap value minus 2.1.
- 47:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They are still not the same. They're not moving up and down together. Oh, but what we'd love to talk about, and we talk about it a lot, we love to talk about the four fund strategy. Why? Because the four four-fund fund strategy produces never productive. productions is not good at the top,
- 48:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's not good at the bottom. In fact, it's great not to ever be at the bottom. In between, this is the whole idea of diversification. When you put 500 companies in your portfolio, you are making sure that you don't have everything in Enron
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you don't get everything in NVIDIA.
- 48:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At the same time, by the way, when Enron was replaced, it was replaced by Nvidia for what it's worth. But anyway, you get the idea. You see the sales pitch, if you want to make it the case for diversification of equity asset classes.
- 48:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But for those who will listen to me, particularly for young investors,
- 48:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the idea of combining the SP. 500
- 48:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 48:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small cap value in almost half of the 98 years here,
- 49:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one is at the top while the other's at the bottom.
- 49:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Look
- 49:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at this 2000 through 2006.
- 49:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In all but one year, small cap value was at the top. And in every one of those years, S P 500 was at the bottom.
- 49:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What a joy
- 49:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 49:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have something that could go up. Could, I didn't say will, could go up while something else is going down. And 2000, well, 2000. being up almost 20 versus being down nine. Two thousand one, being up twenty-eight while being down twelve. Two
- 49:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thousand two being down seven while being down twenty-two. Two thousand three being up sixty-seven versus being up twenty-nine. Two thousand four being up twenty-three 23 while being up ten 10 or eleven. 11, And then finally,
- 50:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well
- 50:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no not quite five. finally, small cap value up 7.6 versus the SP 4.8, and the last in this run up 21 for small cap value versus up 16 for S P 500. And just think if Wall Street can get a hold
- 50:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of a run like this, how easy it is to sell our new. small cap value fund
- 50:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because it is so easy to sell people investments that have been going up recently. Merrill Lynch has their famous two new funds that came out at almost the same day that the technology boom in 2000 decided to become the technology
- 50:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bust.
- 50:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 50:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they raised a ton of money right at the top of the market.
- 50:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 50:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've been around this business since 1966. And I will tell you, everybody tries to make money. In fact, I will tell you what I was told when I went into the industry, where I only stayed for about two years because of the conflicts of interest. But what I was told.
- 51:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 51:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you got to sell like mad when the market's
- 51:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): up.
- 51:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because I will tell you, almost guarantee it, when you try to get people to buy when the market's down, it's hard to find anybody. So if you're gonna
- 51:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 51:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gonna put together a little uh uh a little
- 51:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
- 51:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): little money to put aside for tough times, put it aside at the top of a bull market.
- 51:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's not exactly in the best interest of investors. And one of the things I disliked about the business, but it was true. That's when you make your money. Okay.
- 51:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then this, I I had what, 10 seconds to talk about this Uh during that debate? But this is important
- 52:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because it it it in one table, it very easily gives you some idea of how these things did over time, starting first with the SP 500. Its compound rate of return was 10.2%.
- 52:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And nobody seems to think that isn't a great return. In 40% of the years, individual years, it was in the top quintile.
- 52:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It was the best performer.
- 52:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then in 50% of the years, it was the worst performer.
- 52:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's an important lesson. That is how it should be.
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this can be confusing to a first-time investor. Why should the S P 500 be at the bottom of performance in most years? And that reason is because, according to the academics, the more risk you take, the
- 53:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): higher the expected rate of return. Now they are talking about in investing, not cryptocurrency, not the prediction markets, but in and not the penny stock market, which is not an investment,
- 53:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but in an investment asset class that represents a high probability of a premium as a group, by the way. And they also know
- 53:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
- 53:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about half of the public companies that ever went public ended up in bankruptcy or not making any money. Okay?
- 53:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 53:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, that's all in essence built into these long-term returns, the losers, along with the winners.
- 53:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 53:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I want you to look at the two fund strategy. Well, no, the four fund strategy.
- 54:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 11.9%.
- 54:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now we
- 54:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know. just having looked at it, there was a lot less volatility in the returns of that uh of that particular combination of equity asset classes. And we also know that um uh uh that 50% of the time it was
- 54:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): right here in the middle.
- 54:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 54:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you went to the two-fund strategy.
- 54:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it is going to have some periods. It's at the uh, excuse me, I'm sorry I take it back. It never was in the top and it never was in the bottom. And
- 54:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most of the time, well, in fact, all of the time, it was in these three uh quintiles, but 37% of the time it was right in the middle. S P 500 was in the middle. 3% of the time.
- 54:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So at some level, I'm feeling that the two fund strategy actually
- 55:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would represent a less volatile investment than the SP 500 itself.
- 55:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 55:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then Jim got the floor back for three minutes.
- 55:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And he said, and he's so right, the period of time is important. But then he went on to
- 55:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): make the point that I started at a really good time because it was a really bad time.
- 55:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I look at that entirely from a different viewpoint.
- 55:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When we started building tables,
- 55:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we took all the information we could get.
- 55:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 55:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm not even talking about these tables. I'm talking about the studies that go back to 1970 that we update every year. Why do we go back through 1970? Because we want to pick up 73, 74 as a part of the trip. We want wanted it to pick up 2000 through 2000. 2002.
- 56:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We want it to pick up 2007 through the early part of 2009. We want bad times to be part of the process because that's what you're going to go through. And so when Jim, if he cherry picks the last 15 years, where's the downside? Where's the
- 56:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): picture of what the right ride is really going to be? looking like? One of the things that is so common when you when you see these tests about you see the tests about how uh how you mu how much risk you're willing to take, and they'll ask, would you be willing to lose twenty percent of your
- 56:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money? That is the worst that they tell you about.
- 56:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 56:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you say, Yes, I would. Well, I think to be to be honest with people,
- 56:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how are you willing to lose half of your money? That's when you're in the equity, if you're all equities in particular, you're set up to lose half of your money. I can't say guaranteed, but I I can say that's as likely as making a 10% compound rate of return.
- 57:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
- 57:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): my
- 57:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wife and I, we're 50-50 still. stocks and bonds.
- 57:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 57:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we believe at some point we're likely to lose 25%.
- 57:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's built into a 50-50 portfolio. And if you're not willing to do that, you shouldn't be 50-50 unless you have to for some reason. So I have a very different look of this to what I think is a reasonable period of time to look at.
- 57:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 57:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he does it again going back to twenty ten, and he and he wants to highlight the fact that yes, you did come back down from time to time, which I of course had highlighted as well, but not like he did, which by the way, is right. This is not like uh a
- 57:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stair stepping stair stepping to the best returns over your lifetime.
- 58:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And again, more looking at the periods. And then he did something else I thought was really interesting.
- 58:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 58:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I had to think long and hard why it why what to say about
- 58:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 58:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There was, there is a fund that's been around since 1984, Heartland Value. Now, what he showed is that Heartland Value over a long period of time had been outproduced by the SP 500 deal. He went all the way back to
- 58:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1984.
- 58:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, first of
- 58:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): all,
- 58:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you have to remember here that Heartland Value is an actively Effectively managed fund.
- 58:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Since DFA came on
- 58:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 58:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the uh um uh to the market,
- 58:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 58:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Avanas has come to the market, they have way outperformed Heartland value. But there's one more part, and it didn't come to me at first. I I really had to think, what else is wrong about this table? Well, John Bogle
- 59:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made it very clear
- 59:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 59:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the reason of above all reasons, that index funds are likely to give you a better return is because of the lower expenses. And what do we know about Heartland Value? Forget about the fact that it's actively managed, which means there are extra
- 59:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expenses because of that. But
- 59:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what? what
- 59:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What is their management? fee?
- 59:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Their total operating expense? Over one percent.
- 59:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Whereas the Vanguard fund is almost free. So there's probably an 80 basis point, eighty one hundredths of one percent advantage to Vanguard.
- 1:00:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that you're paying at Heartland.
- 1:00:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But the question you might ask, how would Heartland have done if they weren't so greedy so and had the same expense ratio as the uh as as the Vanguard index funds? Well,
- 1:00:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): not
- 1:00:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gonna surprise
- 1:00:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you. They
- 1:00:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): beat Vanguard. They got a better return than the SP five hundred. So it
- 1:00:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it it it I had to wait a long time to find that and think about it. But it is the way we should theoretically be comparing, but nobody's gonna do that. And then and then he brought up uh a lot of other issues, but the one I wanna I I I want to focus on. because I don't want to lose this one and I made this point
- 1:00:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): earlier.
- 1:00:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:00:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): one I want to focus on is the fact that if you look at DFA's returns, you you you can't say that you would have gotten the eleven point five versus BTI's ten 10.7. point seven.
- 1:01:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:01:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by the way, that's that's not a huge difference, but over a long period of time it is.
- 1:01:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:01:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most of the people who are adding small cap value for sure, I hope, are young people where there's a long
- 1:01:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a long period of time that this will be compounding. Remember, for every this is what we teach college kids. For every extra half of 1% we can make,
- 1:01:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 1:01:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it can be turned into about 1.3 $1.5 million more over a lifetime with an investment of no more than $6,000 a year for 40 years.
- 1:01:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I'm not going to get into that study right now, except to say if the addition of small cap value only led
- 1:01:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
- 1:01:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1% advantage, that's about a $3.5 million impact over that same. period of time with that same investment. So the beauty is, and the reason that I don't want this argument about fees to enter the discussion is because you
- 1:02:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't have to pay anybody anything to get to DFA that is just as good as the DFA that goes to all those people who. have an advisor that offers DFA because they now have ETFs that actually are more tax
- 1:02:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): efficient than the DFA regular mutual funds. So whether you're at Avantis or you're at DFA, you can go to Vanguard and buy them commission free
- 1:02:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through the their brokerage. arm.
- 1:02:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The one small advantage for some people who do it at Fidelity
- 1:02:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is that they also have them commission free, but you can buy them in marginal share so that you uh marginal shares, partial shares uh that allow you to invest exactly $100. I think you get the idea.
- 1:03:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:03:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in that three minutes, I took them very quickly through table G1B, another one of my favorite tables of all time. And I know you may not be able to see the fine print here, but let me just, if I might, share
- 1:03:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what it is because some people I know aren't seeing this because this is a podcast, an audio podcast as well. I'm sorry, but here's what I know. Down one column we have the annual returns from 1970 through 2025, the annual returns of the S P 500. Down the other column, we have
- 1:03:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh 100% of the money in small cap value and the returns for those same years in small cap value. Uh we We also have off to the front. far right, Darrell added another couple of rows that show if in one year the SP 500 was the best performer as it
- 1:04:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was in 1970, they put 5.4%
- 1:04:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there. That's how much it beat small cap value. The next year, small cap That value beat SP by 0.6.
- 1:04:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Anyway. what is so interesting there to see
- 1:04:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in that table is at the bottom. Because when we talk about how are we going to put this to work, if we are going to add small cap value to either the SP 500 or VTI, because they're virtually the same historically, did what what happens, you'll see here. is that
- 1:04:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you just put your money in the S P 500 from 1970 through 2025 after expenses, an 11% compound rate of return. That's a great rate of return. And and and and when you think about the fact that it went through three gigantic
- 1:05:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bear markets, it's it's just marvelous. If if you had taken 10% of your money and put it into small cap value and 90% into the SP 500, you would have made 11.4.
- 1:05:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:05:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): next 10%,
- 1:05:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now it's 11.7, and now you're 20% and 80. And for this discussion, I'm just going to go to the next level and At 30% small cap value, you are 12%. So you have added 1%. So if we think in terms of an
- 1:05:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all-equity portfolio for a part of a bigger portfolio, and we do that for life, that potentially is an extra three and a half million dollars if we want to look at it like that. for the young people. The standard deviation
- 1:06:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 1:06:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the one case for the S P 500 by itself, 16.9. The standard deviation for 30%,
- 1:06:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 17. You increase the standard deviation one-tenth of one 1%. percent. The worst 12 months. 43.3% for the SP, 45.1 for 3070. The worst 60 months, minus 6.7
- 1:06:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compound rate of return over that 60 month period.
- 1:06:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For the 30%, 7%, you lost three-tenths more in the worst. worst 60-month period, the worst drawdown, 51% versus 53.5. In other words, unless you were really looking closely, you would not have
- 1:07:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seen that there would have been any difference in risk, but a substantial difference in return.
- 1:07:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:07:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by the way, if you look at the 50-50 for just one second, it was a 12.5% return versus the original 11%. A meaningful, meaningful difference.
- 1:07:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then I did a, and I'll do this quickly. But I looked at 1970 through 83,
- 1:07:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a period that the S P 500 only was a winner in four years. All of the rest, small cap value was ahead. And it didn't beat by a little. 8, 28, 34, 29, 16, 16, 25, 15, 26,
- 1:07:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 0.8.
- 1:07:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Then, the next period of time, from 84 to 99, small cap value. uh was was the best. Only four times. All the rest were the SP 500. Now they weren't as as as as high. The numbers weren't as big.
- 1:08:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 4, 3, 10, 11, 18, 21, 0.1, 8, 0.6, 2.6, 35, 8, but they were still substantial. The point is, for a very long period of time, small cap value definitely looked like a waste of energy until 2000 to 2013.
- 1:08:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Only two years did the S P 500 outperform small cap value. And just as I mentioned earlier, you know, after that long, it reminds me of uh uh Bill Miller from the um mutual fund. I can't think of the name of the fund right now. Uh Leg Mason, Leg Mason
- 1:08:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Value, outperformed the S P 500 15 years, only to become one of the worst managers in the business uh the following period. Anyway, this was what small cap value did. It crushed the S P 500.
- 1:09:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But then 2014 through 2025, small cap value has won three times, and the SP 500 has won all the rest. I think you get the picture. This doesn't go.
- 1:09:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To doing anything that you can kind of depend on. But the summary,
- 1:09:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:09:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): summary, and I think this is important. The years the S P five hundred outperformed?
- 1:09:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Small cap value, twenty-nine. The average outperformance for the S P five hundred, eleven. The average outperformance for small cap value sixteen point five. And then, and we did not show this that day,
- 1:10:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:10:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): got to tell. the telltale chart that that uh Daryl Balls put together. And and we'll we're we're gonna have, by the way, the uh PDF for this whole PowerPoint will be in the note field of the uh of the podcast, the audio, so that you'll be able to take a look at this if you
- 1:10:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want. But it shows in relative performance.
- 1:10:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh how the small cap value did compare to the SP 500.
- 1:10:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:10:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if we had started it, if we had started it, and nobody would have argued, I think, if we had started post-World War II, so we eliminated all of that time from 1929 or 28, actually, it or or 20, maybe 26, it starts. But anyway, if we go all the way back and and
- 1:10:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and included the depression, then it it reduces the advantage by a lot. But even including the depression at the end of this period, ending in June of 2026,
- 1:11:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the return of the small cap value is over 11 times. that of the S P 500 over that entire period. But it was one wait, wait, wait, wait, explosion to the upside. Another wait, wait, wait, wait. I mean, it's it's it's uh
- 1:11:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): seven years, 14 years, uh, 17 years, 16 years. There were lots of periods of waiting, waiting, waiting, and waiting, and
- 1:11:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): then
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): another explosion. But
- 1:11:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 1:11:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wasn't so different for the SP 500 if you compared it to bonds. You have 20-year periods that bonds did better than the S P 500 and then the explosion.
- 1:11:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:11:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I also threw in
- 1:11:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 1:11:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you had dollar cost averaged over all these years?
- 1:12:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For
- 1:12:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small cap value, 20 twenty times.
- 1:12:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): For half and half, five times what the S P 500 did.
- 1:12:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:12:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then I included shorter periods of time for those who really want to dig deeply into Daryl's work. And by the way, Daryl's work, it's absolutely fantastic.
- 1:12:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:12:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then I showed show just because some people want to see the two fund strategy for a beginner, a first timer, what could you show your 18, 19, 20-year-old kid that they might do? I here's a here's table C9. You can compare putting away a thousand years and increasing the the investment by three percent a
- 1:12:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year uh over the entire period nineteen seventy through two thousand twenty-five.
- 1:12:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:12:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what you'll see is with the S P five 500, hundred,
- 1:12:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 1:12:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): total was
- 1:12:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 5.8 million, starting with 1,000 increasing by 3% a year in the contribution.
- 1:13:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:13:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the other hand, for that, over that same period of time,
- 1:13:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
- 1:13:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 50-50 portfolio, 9.4 four million. So I think you get the idea, and and and and uh also Jim got up and talked then how much to tilt and he said the same thing. I I absolutely don't tilt more than you believe. He happens to d
- 1:13:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to tilt thirty percent. So it's it's not like he doesn't believe in small cap value. And he also recommends, by the way, the uh uh the A AVUV V U V and DFSV and international, the same as we recommend AVDV and
- 1:13:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): DISV. I mean, that could not have been a better ending for me right there. And my final thoughts were simply to show people that we, in fact, offer a recommended Avantis and DFA and Vanguard fund in all ten 10 of the academics. recommended equity
- 1:14:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): asset classes, as well as our portfolios. And
- 1:14:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I did stop for a minute and talk about Table H2, where Daryl again has done a yeoman's job of helping people understand the difference. But here is one difference that I think could change the thinking. The S P 500, as an individual equity asset
- 1:14:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): class, from the period 2000 to 2009
- 1:14:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fell 1% a year. Now just assume for a second,
- 1:14:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:14:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it would have been easy to trust all of your equities. I don't mean that you would be all equities,
- 1:14:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
- 1:14:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that all of your equities would have been in the SP S 500. P
- 1:14:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for that decade. The worldwide ultimate buy and hold had small cap value and others, 7.3% gain. The worldwide forefund, including small cap value, 6.1.
- 1:15:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The U.S. 4 four fund, four 4.8. point eight.
- 1:15:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:15:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): worldwide all value.
- 1:15:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): eight point five.
- 1:15:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:15:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): US all value, six point nine.
- 1:15:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 1:15:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not going to tell you what the worldwide all small cap value. I wouldn't recommend anybody put all their money there, particularly in retirement.
- 1:15:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 1:15:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the two fund strategy was 4.2. They weren't all home runs, but but none of them. uh would have made an investor think it was the end of the world.
- 1:15:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 1:15:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so I hope.
- 1:15:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh, and then Jim came back on. He had one last shot, and he did what Jim does so well. He's one of the finest teachers in this industry. I as you know, because you that get my weekly newsletter and I and I show you what the the truth is. tellers are telling you, he does his pieces like
- 1:16:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everything you should know about bonds. By the time you're done, you know a lot about bonds, I'll bet. So he talked about where all of this matters in your investing uh and and and and how to be a good investor and uh tilt uh no more than what you believe because you'll you'll have to
- 1:16:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have. faith in small cap value as uh you will be tested, he says. And then he talks about the importance of a plan. I think he's absolutely right. And then he said, Thank you, and I happen to know that he meant it. Uh he, by the way, is is uh part a of the backbone,
- 1:16:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh, as is Christine Benz, as is Bill Bernstein, as Mike Piper. I mean, I I I I feel so blessed to have them for years as truth tellers because uh they're they're and this is what I'm looking for in those truth tellers are good teachers. These folks know what they're talking about, but in this
- 1:17:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): case, uh I I have the upper hand because Jim I know would have rather been trying to make the case for the total market index. Or he'd rather be making the case for small cap value. Thanks for listening. And if you make sure if
- 1:17:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you are just listening to the podcast that you download the PDFs, I think it'll help
- 1:17:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 1:17:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh kind of cement the information I just talked about. All the best. See you ya next week.
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