CPKC's post-merger growth slows as integration pains and debt dilute shareholder returns despite a unique three-country moat
Summary
Speakers analyze Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC) as a railroad with an irreplaceable geographic moat connecting Canada, the US, and Mexico, but question its current valuation. They note that while CPKC achieved exceptional EPS growth from 2012-2020, recent performance has slowed due to the $31 billion Kansas City Southern acquisition, which diluted shares by 37% and increased debt. The hosts highlight that reported ROIC has fallen to 6.9% due to goodwill, though returns on incremental capital remain healthy at over 12%. Concerns include management's low insider ownership, the removal of ROIC from CEO compensation metrics, and regulatory risks from the proposed Union Pacific-Norfolk Southern merger. Ultimately, the speakers pass on the stock, citing a 12% hurdle rate and the belief that the moat is already fully priced in.
Key takeaways
- 1 CPKC is the only railroad connecting Canada, the US, and Mexico on a single network, creating a unique geographic moat.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:00
- 2 Class One railroads in North America are defined by having operating revenues exceeding one billion dollars.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 2:16
- 3 CPKC achieved 26% EPS growth from 2012 to 2020, driven by margin expansion rather than just volume growth.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 6:28
- 4 goodwill onto the balance sheet. And the diluted share count increased by 37% just to fund the deal. So, you know, while the business is much bigger, the per share results have definitely been a lot less exciting. than the decade that came before it.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 7:52
- 5 operating ratio suggests, he was right on that part. So at this time, Canadian Pacific had an operating ratio of 80%, which is just plain bad.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 12:13
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 0:32
Intro and CPKC Overview
Speakers introduce Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC) as having a visible moat with 20,000 miles of track and being the only railroad connecting Canada, the US, and Mexico. They note that after a decade of compounding, a $31 billion acquisition has left shareholders waiting for returns.
- 0:32 – 2:16
Podcast Intro and Host Backgrounds
The hosts introduce the Intrinsic Value Podcast and their respect for portfolio manager Chris Hone, who owns Canadian railroads. Speaker 0 shares a personal connection to railroads and notes that while they are boring, they are highly modified business models.
- 2:16 – 3:43
Class One Railroads and BNSF Performance
Speaker 0 explains that there are only six Class One railroads in North America, defined by over $1 billion in revenue. Speaker 1 discusses Berkshire Hathaway's ownership of BNSF, noting that while it generates cash, its revenue and pre-tax income have compounded at less than 3% since the purchase.
- 3:43 – 6:08
CPKC History and Land Value
Speaker 0 recounts how the Canadian Pacific Railway helped shape Canada, specifically connecting British Columbia in 1885. He shares an anecdote about the Arbutus Greenway in Vancouver, where CP sold the land rights back to the city for $55 million after the line was abandoned, highlighting the value of owned land.
- 6:08 – 7:12
CPKC vs BNSF Financial Performance
Speaker 0 contrasts BNSF's low growth with CPKC's exceptional shareholder returns from 2012-2020 (26% EPS growth). Speaker 1 notes that CPKC's recent five-year performance has slowed to mid-single digit EPS growth and 5.5% share price compounding, making it less attractive than before.
- 7:12 – 8:23
Impact of Kansas City Southern Merger
Speaker 0 attributes CPKC's recent lackluster growth to integration pains from the $31 billion acquisition of Kansas City Southern in 2023. He notes the deal increased debt, goodwill, and diluted the share count by 37%, masking the scale of the combined business.
- 8:23 – 9:12
CPKC Scale and Network
CPKC reported over $15 billion in revenue in 2025 with 20,000 route miles of track. The network connects Vancouver to Montreal, down to Kansas City and Texas, and through Mexico to the Pacific and Gulf Coasts, offering diversification across three countries.
- 9:12 – 30:56
CPKC History and Political Role
Speaker 0 explains that British Columbia joined Canada in 1871 on the condition that a railroad be built, which was completed in 1885. The railroad later became a conglomerate owning hotels, ships, and airlines before splitting in 2001, leaving the railroad as a standalone entity.
- 30:56 – 33:23
Competitive Landscape and Moat Durability
Speakers discuss how Uber achieved profitability through operating leverage after burning cash, drawing parallels to CPKC's entrenched market position. They highlight CPKC's unique three-country network, the Laredo Bridge, and exclusive freight rights in Mexico until 2047 as irreplaceable assets that protect the business from disruption.
- 33:23 – 37:38
Regulatory Environment and Customer Segmentation
The discussion covers the competitive threat from trucks on shorter routes and CN in Canada, contrasting with captive shippers who have no alternatives. Speakers note that while regulators in the US, Canada, and Mexico can cap rates or grant access, the Staggers Act has protected the industry's stability for over 45 years.
- 37:38 – 43:51
Operational Efficiency and Switching Costs
CPKC maintains a ~60% operating ratio and improved metrics like train speed and dwell time through precision scheduled railroading. Customers face high switching costs due to sunk investments in rail spurs and logistics integration, making reliability more important than minor price differences.
- 43:51 – 49:05
Post-Merger Returns on Invested Capital (ROIC)
CPKC's adjusted ROIC fell from 14-17% (2016-2020) to 6.9% in 2025 following the $31 billion Kansas City Southern acquisition. The decline is attributed to the large capital denominator and the time lag for synergies to materialize, rather than a deterioration of the underlying business model.
- 49:05 – 51:41
Goodwill Accounting and Incremental Returns
Goodwill from the merger sits on the balance sheet indefinitely, suppressing ROIC until it is amortized or impaired. However, returns on incremental invested capital have risen to over 12% (2024-2025), suggesting that new capital is being deployed effectively despite the lagging overall ROIC.
- 51:41 – 1:19:28
Share Buybacks and Leverage Concerns
CPKC bought back 54 million shares since 2022, reducing share count by ~1%. Speakers criticize buybacks funded by leverage (debt to EBITDA ~3.2x, net debt to FCF ~10x) as potentially value-destructive if done above intrinsic value, especially given rising interest rates.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Canadian Pacific Kansas City LimitedCP | equity | mixed | Canadian Pacific Kansas City has a moat you can actually see 20,000 miles of steel that almost nobody can replicate, and it's the only railroad that connects Canada, the US, and Mexico in a single line. |
| Uber Technologies, IncUBER | equity | bullish | And so I would be much more excited, for example, to put more capital into a company that uh we're really excited about like Uber instead. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
CPKC is the only railroad that connects Canada, the US, and Mexico on a single line.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Company website or SEC filings (e.g., 10-K) describing CPKC's network geography. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCPKC made a $31 billion acquisition of Kansas City Southern.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:10
How to verify: SEC filing (e.g., Schedule TO or 8-K) announcing the merger consideration of approximately $31 billion. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThere are only six Class One railroads in North America, defined by operating revenues exceeding one billion dollars.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·2:16
How to verify: Surface Transportation Board (STB) definition of Class I railroad and industry reports listing the six carriers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
BNSF revenue and pre-tax income have compounded at less than 3% since Berkshire Hathaway purchased it.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:14
How to verify: Berkshire Hathaway annual reports and BNSF financial statements to calculate CAGR since the acquisition date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC sold the Arbutus Greenway land to the City of Vancouver for about $55 million in 2014.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:47
How to verify: City of Vancouver press releases or land transaction records from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC's diluted share count increased by 37% to fund the Kansas City Southern acquisition.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·7:52
How to verify: CPKC proxy statements or 10-K filings detailing share issuance for the merger consideration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCPKC had over $15 billion in revenue in 2025.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·8:23
How to verify: CPKC 2025 Annual Report or Q4 2025 earnings release. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC's operating ratio was 80% in 2011 before the activist campaign.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·12:13
How to verify: CPKC historical financial statements or proxy statements from 2026-2012 detailing operating expenses and revenue. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC carries over $57 billion in property value on its balance sheet.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·28:43
How to verify: CPKC latest 10-K or 10-Q filing under Property, Plant, and Equipment line items. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe estimated replacement cost for CPKC's assets is between $250 billion and $500 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:20
How to verify: This is a speaker estimate; verify by checking if any third-party valuation reports or analyst notes cite this range, or calculate based on land value per mile estimates provided. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Uber has stopped subsidizing rides to the same extent and is generating billions in free cash flow.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:16
How to verify: Uber Technologies Inc. Form 10-K filings with the SEC EDGAR database for recent fiscal years. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCPKC has exclusive freight rights on its main Mexico corridor through 2047.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:56
How to verify: CPKC (CP.TO) Investor Relations website or annual reports detailing the Mexico concession agreements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Air freight costs about $5,000 per ton, compared to roughly $50 per ton for rail freight.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·33:03
How to verify: Industry reports from logistics firms (e.g., DHL, FedEx) or academic studies on freight cost per ton-mile. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 largely deregulated the US freight rail network.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:13
How to verify: US Code Title 49, Subtitle I, Part IV (Staggers Rail Act of 2026) or Surface Transportation Board historical documents. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC's operating ratio is about 60%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:58
How to verify: CPKC (CP.TO) quarterly earnings releases or Form 10-Q filings with the SEC EDGAR database. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCPKC's adjusted return on invested capital (ROIC) was 14-17% from 2016 to 2020.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:10
How to verify: CPKC (CP.TO) annual reports or investor presentations from 2026-2026 detailing adjusted ROIC calculations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC's adjusted ROIC fell to 6.9% in 2025.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·44:51
How to verify: CPKC (CP.TO) 2026 annual report or Q4 2026 earnings release. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC acquired Kansas City Southern for $31 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·45:23
How to verify: CPKC (CP.TO) and Kansas City Southern (KSU) merger proxy statements or press releases from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC bought back 37 million shares in 2025 for about $4 billion and 17 million shares in H1 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·51:41
How to verify: CPKC (CP.TO) Form 8-K filings reporting share repurchases or quarterly earnings releases. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCPKC's debt to EBITDA is about 3.2 times, up from 3 times a year earlier.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·54:13
How to verify: CPKC (CP.TO) quarterly earnings releases or investor presentations detailing leverage metrics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CEO Jim Creel's total stake is worth about $27 million, representing about 0.01% of CPKC's total share count.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:02:35
How to verify: CPKC DEF 14A proxy statement for insider holdings and share count; calculate percentage of total shares outstanding. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Total insider ownership at CPKC is 0.1%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:02:55
How to verify: CPKC DEF 14A proxy statement for insider ownership percentage. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern merger will have a regulatory decision by sometime in 2027.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:05:16
How to verify: SEC filings for UP and NS merger announcements; STB (Surface Transportation Board) docket status. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceOn July 1st, the USMCA had its first review, and the US chose to decline the option to extend it automatically.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:05:57
How to verify: USMCA text and official US Trade Representative statements regarding the 2026 review. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
CPKC's fastest growing business segment is in automotive, energy, and commodities exposed to trade policy.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:06:37
How to verify: CPKC quarterly earnings presentations or 10-K filings showing segment revenue growth. For recent events, verify 2026-08-15 through 2026-11-15. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify CPKC's 2025 revenue and operating ratio against the company's latest 10-K or quarterly earnings release.
- Check the current share count and dilution impact from the Kansas City Southern merger using CPKC's SEC filings.
- Review the proposed Union Pacific-Norfolk Southern merger status and regulatory timeline via Surface Transportation Board records.
- Analyze CPKC's returns on incremental invested capital (ROIC) trends for 2024-2025 in management presentations.
- Assess CEO Keith Creel's compensation structure changes and insider ownership percentages in the latest proxy statement.
- Monitor USMCA trade policy developments and potential tariff impacts on automotive and commodity freight volumes.
- Compare CPKC's operating ratio and train speed metrics against peers like CN and BNSF using industry reports.
- Evaluate CPKC's debt leverage (Debt to EBITDA) and interest coverage ratios against historical averages and peer benchmarks.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Canadian Pacific Kansas City has a moat you can actually see 20,000 miles of steel that almost nobody can replicate, and it's the only railroad that connects Canada, the US, and Mexico in a single line.
- 0:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But after a decade of double digit compounding, it made a $31 billion acquisition. And since then, shareholders have mostly been left waiting at the crossing.
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is Canadian Pacific Kansas City a great business about to reignite the compounding engine? Or is it just a great business at the wrong price? Let's find
- 0:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out.
- 0:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You're listening to the Intrinsic Value Podcast by the Investors Podcast Network. Since 2014, with over 180 million downloads, we've learned directly from the world's best investors. Now, we're applying those lessons to analyze businesses and investment opportunities every week, helping you understand. uncover intrinsic value.
- 0:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): This show is not investment advice. It's intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. All opinions expressed by hosts and guests are solely their own, and they may have investments in the securities discussed. And now, here are your hosts, Sean O'Malley and Kyle Greeb.
- 1:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to the Investors Podcast, episode 861. Our co-host Daniel recently pitched GE Aerospace to you, Sean. And while I also like that business, I also agreed with a decision to not add it to the intrinsic value portfolio. But I also know one of the reasons for that idea being presented in the first place was to clone a very, very impressive portfolio manager, Chris Hone,
- 1:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who I highly respect. Now, another of his ideas that I found interesting but haven't really covered on the show were in railroads. And as far as I can tell, his fund owns both Canadian railroads. But today, we're going to focus on just one of them that has a very sizable footprint, not just in Canada, but also in the US and even Mexico. And that business is Canadian Pacific, Kansas City. Now, railroads have interested me
- 1:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): since I was a kid. And you know, obviously my son, who's now four years old, is absolutely obsessed with them as well. But until I started to invest my own money, I don't think I ever really gave the business case for railroads any thought. And maybe that was a mistake because even though railroads are these big, boring businesses, they're also one of the most modi business models that you can find out there. In
- 2:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): North America, there are only six class one railroads. Now, just to understand what a class one railroad is, they must have operating revenues exceeding one billion dollars. Now, many of our listeners will be familiar with one of them as we own it inside of the intrinsic value portfolio through our ownership of Berkshire Hatway, and that's Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway.
- 2:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I I know that I certainly enjoyed uh playing with my railroad set probably just as much when I was a kid, but similar to you from an investment perspective, I haven't really given railroads much of uh a second thought as an adult. And and to be fair, we did sort of cover BNSF. on our Berkshire Hathaway pitch since it is a pretty
- 2:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meaningful revenue contributor for that company. But I I didn't walk away from the business being particularly impressed though. And if you look back at how this business has performed since Berkshire purchased it, it's really not all that inspiring, right? I mean it has grown, but revenue and pre-tax pre tax income have basically compounded at less
- 3:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): than three percent
- 3:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So while it is a decent business for Berkshire to own and it generates a ton of cash and allows them to deploy a lot of capital and will continue to do so for decades to come, it's definitely not a business with growth rates that would really make you look twice at it, right? It's a it's a boring business
- 3:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and an old industry, but an industry that has been nearly impossible to disrupt for really the better part of almost two centuries.
- 3:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. And funny enough, part of the reason that I'm actually interested in Canadian Pacific, Kansas City was another bout of nostalgia. So I live in an area of Vancouver where I'm just literally half a block away from what's called the Arbutus Greenway. Now today it's a beautifully paved path where people like to walk their dogs, push their strollers, or maybe ride a bike or an electric scooter to work or school. So I
- 4:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): personally still walk on that pathway pretty much on a weekly basis. But up until 2001, that greenway didn't exist as it does today. So before that period, it was the Canadian Pacific Railway line. And the story of how the city got this greenway in the first place is actually kind of a cool story on its own. So after the train stopped running, the line basically just sat there empty for many years.
- 4:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Neighbors ended up planting community gardens all over the tracks.
- 4:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in 2014, Canadian Pacific decided that it wanted to get paid for that land. So it sent crews to clear out those gardens to show that it still had the right to run trains there, even though it didn't. Now, after a few more years of very public back and forth between CP and the city of Vancouver, the city of Vancouver ended up buying the corridor for about $55 million. dollars. So even on a line that
- 4:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they weren't even using in the middle of the city that just wasn't happy with it, Canadian Pacific had. held its ground and still ended up making a little bit of money on that uh asset. I think that's kind of the power of owning land that nobody else can touch.
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The conversation today makes me sort of nostalgic for uh my college days because the small town I went to college in had a railroad going through the middle of it. It's I can definitely see why people don't want to live near them. And my dorm was actually right next to the tracks, and the trans train's horn would go. every night at midnight. And then again at 6
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a.m. So it was just completely brutal. I didn't have trouble waking up from my 8 a.m. though. So I guess that was that was a perk of it. But uh yeah, I I also do appreciate a good train trip too. A lot of the times when we go to New York City for our mastermind community events, I actually take an Amtrak there. And you know, it's slower, but it's nice in its own way, right? I can just
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): work the whole time. The seats are more spacious and on a plane. And then you get dropped off right in the middle of Manhattan rather than having to worry about Ubering from LaGuardia, which can be just an absolute nightmare.
- 5:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
- 5:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I love that. And I know exactly what Ubering from LaGuardia means. So I'm definitely a little bit jealous of how you can get there. So the closest that I ever get to a train trip these days is just pushing my son's wooden train around the living room while he tells me that I'm doing it wrong. Apparently, I don't respect the schedule well. enough. So this is something that we'll find out later, is a very, very serious no-no, specifically in the
- 6:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): railroad business. But I wanted to come back to your BNSF point because I think it's one of the strongest arguments against owning railroads as an investment. Because if I look at the numbers for BNSF, my mind goes to thinking, great moat, lousy growth. And if you'd asked me what I thought about the K railroads before researching for this episode, I probably would have leaned towards putting it in the exact same bucket. But Canadian Pacific,
- 6:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Kansas City before COVID was putting up some exceptional numbers. So the real head turner was the growth in shareholder returns from about 2012 until 2020. 26% growth in EPS while the share price grew about 20% plus a 1% dividend. Really, really good stuff.
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 6:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): numbers then looked really good, but if you take a look at the numbers over the last five years or so, they're a lot more B BNSF and SF. like than you'd want to see. Earnings per share has slowed considerably into mid single digit growth while the share price has compounded at just five and a half percent correspondingly. And so while I would say uh
- 7:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Canadian Pacific, Kansas City and BNSF both have significant motes, neither of them have really seemed to look like screaming buys.
- 7:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 7:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think if you look at those numbers without context, I completely agree. They aren't that pretty, frankly. But Canadian Pacific, Kansas City has been part of a very large restructuring. So it only bought Kansas City Southern back in 2023, and it was a very large acquisition at about $31 billion. Now, because of the large acquisition, there have been some very, very large, I guess you could say, integration pains. And I don't
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): really think that they're over yet, which is why the growth hasn't looked very good. But the pure scale of the combined business is really quite hard to compete with. It's the first and only railroad to run through three different countries in North America. So strategically, it's really a masterpiece. No other railroad currently can replicate the network that they have. But the deal also added a large amount of debt, new shares, as well as
- 7:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): goodwill onto the balance sheet. And the diluted share count increased by 37% just to fund the deal. So, you know, while the business is much bigger, the per share results have definitely been a lot less exciting. than the decade that came before it.
- 8:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is uh some pretty painful dilution. And and I can see how that has affected its per share earnings. And these are important things to account for because if you expect the business to pick up again toward historical rates, and it might all make sense, but really if not, then this business just becomes a whole lot less interesting.
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, totally. And I just want to give everyone a sense of Canadian Pacific can. Kansas City scale here. So it's very, very massive. So in 2025, they did over $15 billion in revenue. They have roughly 20,000 miles of track. And that's enough track to get from Toronto to Mexico City and back 10 different times. So that's a lot of Toronto Blue Jay games and tacos to go
- 8:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through.
- 8:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I definitely think that's uh that's one way to to get the picture a bit. And we have a great business that is maybe starting to lag a bit. here, is how I would think about it. And the picture is like it always is, not entirely clear. So hopefully we can get a little bit of clarity for for the listeners today and start with the very beginning,
- 9:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because I don't think many of our listeners, especially the US-based ones, will know the story of just how important this railroad is to Canada.
- 9:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, and this is one of my favorite parts of the story simply because Canadian Pacific isn't just a railroad. It's really a big reason that Canada exists in the shape that it is today. So we have to go all the way back to 1871 when my home province, British Columbia, agreed to join Canada. But in order to do so, it had one very, very large condition. The federal government had to build a
- 9:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): railroad that connected BC to the rest of the country. And without that railroad, BC was basically a giant island surrounded by thousands of kilometers. of prairie and Rocky Mountains. So in 1881, the Canadian Pacific Railway was formed to build that railway out. Now the deadline was a long way out, about 10 years or so later, but they actually ended up finishing it in only half the time that was allotted to them. And the last
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spike was driven in 1885. So when I say BC joined Canada because of the railroad, I'm really not exaggerating. And as a proud, born and raised British Columbian, I think it's only fair that I get a small discount on shares. I'll take that up. with the investor relations team.
- 10:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, yeah, let me know how that goes. Uh yeah, hey, I'd like to request a British Columbian discount. I'm not sure it's gonna work out for you, but uh it is worth mentioning that the whole railroad in Canada it does have a a good bit of of negativity associated with it. And and from my understanding, much of the construction was carried out by
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Chinese laborers, many of whom lost their lives. building it. And I don't think that's really all that different from the story with how railroads in the US were built either.
- 10:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I think you're completely correct. And obviously, building these railroads wasn't all sunshine and roses. And to make matters worse, I uh attached a photo that Sean can see right now on YouTube of them putting in the final nail. And they apparently got all of the Chinese laborers who built that entire railroad network out just to leave the frame, despite the fact that
- 10:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the children's air.
- 10:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they did, you know, most of that work in building it. So I don't want to get too down here thinking about railroads. So from this point on, Canadian Pacific grew into a full-blown conglomerate, which is kind of a weird thing to say. It owned things like hotels, ocean ships. It had an airliner called CP Air and even had a hand in energy and mining businesses. It was almost like a Berkshire Hathaway of Canada. But in 2001,
- 11:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it ended up splitting into five separate public companies, and the railroad was kind. of left as a standalone entity. Now, for about a decade after that split, Canadian Pacific was honestly pretty mediocre. So one of the KPIs used in the railroad industry is called the operating ratio. It's the percentage of revenue spent on operating expenses. You could basically think of it as the inverse of
- 11:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operating margins. So if your operating expenses are 60%, then that means that your operating margin would be 40%. During this time, CP had one of the lowest operators. operating ratios in the entire industry. And this helped set the stage for one of the most famous activist campaigns in all of Canada's history.
- 11:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is where an investor comes in, Bill Ackman, that uh I think we've talked about a bunch of times on the show in the past.
- 11:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's exactly it. So in 2011, Bill Ackman sensed that there was some blood in the water for Canadian Pacific. And he liked the business, but he definitely understood that it needed a push in the right direction. So he built a stake in the business and he decided that he would be the one to push it. The thesis was pretty simple. Canadian Pacific had a great network already, but it was just being run very, very poorly. And as the
- 12:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): operating ratio suggests, he was right on that part. So at this time, Canadian Pacific had an operating ratio of 80%, which is just plain bad. So once Ackman had built up a decent chunk of shares, he launched a proxy fight, which he ended up winning in 2012. After which, winning it, he brought in this legendary railroader named Hunter Harrison in as the next CEO. Now, Harrison
- 12:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had started working on railroads just as a teenager, and he worked his way all the way up to the CEO of Canadian National, which is Canadian Pacific's primary Canadian competitor. Now, Hunter Harrison was best known for this thing called precision scheduled railroading.
- 12:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 12:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so that precision scheduled railroading was a very interesting and contrarian method for railroading. The basically the traditional method was called a hold for tonnage system. And it basically meant that trains would depart a rail yard only after they were filled to maximum capacity. And under precision scheduled
- 13:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): railroading, Harrison completely flipped Flip that model. And so trains were to run on these strict, fixed schedules moving from one point to another And instead of catering to the individual shippers' demand, the railroad would dictate the schedule, and customers were basically forced to conform. And so he turned the rail shipping industry into something more like an airline, right?
- 13:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Where you run fewer, longer trains and you cut out the idle locomotives and rail cars and you reduce the amount of time spent sitting in rail yards. And his system worked like crazy. Uh Canadian Pacific. Pacific's operating margins went from the mid-teens all the way up to over 40%. And the stock price compounded at over 17% a year
- 13:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): during that same period. And Harrison stepped away in in 2017 to take over CSX, one of America's largest railroads. So he did leave the picture.
- 13:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's right. And just to get back to that part on Bill Ackman, it ended up being a very, very successful investment, as you could probably tell. from the uh returns that Sean just said. So he reportedly made about 2.6 billion in profits over the course of about five years. So, you know, he really nailed this bet. But yeah, I think Hunter Harrison's moves were very, very transformative for CP at this time. For basically any
- 14:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business to go through a rapid margin expansion like that is very, very impressive. Usually you expect to see this in a scaling business, not a boring railroad. So after Harrison left, his right-hand man, Keith Creel, ended up taking over, and Creel remains the CEO today. And here's a fun fact: Creel also worked under Harrison at Canadian National before coming over to CP. So you've got two
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): former Canadian national executives who came over and made Canadian Pacific even better than Canadian National Railroad.
- 14:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So lots of uh railroad acronyms to sift through today, but uh it does remind me a bit of what happened with Reddit, even though the PISA. the business models couldn't be further from each other. And the difference with Reddit is that it went from having these deeply negative operating margins a few years ago. I'm talking worse than negative 25% margins all the way up to
- 15:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): almost positive 30% margins more recently. And so really that can make sense for a tech-based tech based business, but it's even more impressive that Canadian Pacific. was able to do this just by changing the frequency of their departures. So if we uh we think about that and we get back to
- 15:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the present day, one question I have is what does Canadian Pacific Kansas City actually look like today in terms of its structure and then how much money does it make?
- 15:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. So I think at its core, the business model is really very simple. So Canadian Pacific Kansas City owns. this vast network of track, and customers basically have to pay it to move their freight from one point to another. I mean, that's really it. So they charge based on how much freight they're hauling, how far it's going, and then on what kind of freight it is.
- 15:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 15:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the network, like I mentioned, now runs 20,000 route miles. It's just incredibly, incredibly vast. So it goes from the port of Vancouver, east across the prairies to Montreal and St. John on the Atlantic coast. Then it goes south through the US Midwest down to Kansas City and then all the way through Texas across the US-Mexico border at Laredo. And then inside Mexico, it goes to the
- 16:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industrial heart of the country before splitting off to both the Pacific and the Gulf Coasts. Now, by revenue, they have very good diversification. 48% of it comes from Canada, 24% from the US, and about 18% from Mexico. So the next question is what are they moving? It can kind of be broken down. into three major buckets. The first is bulk, which makes up about 40% of freight
- 16:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): revenue. This includes items such as grain, potash, and fertilizers. Then you have merchandise, which is another 40%. This makes up things like energy and chemicals, forest products, metals, minerals, and automotive. And then lastly, you have intermodal, which accounts for about 20%. That's, you know, the shipping containers that you see stacked maybe too high on trains, which are typically full of consumer goods.
- 16:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's a more balanced mix than a lot of the companies that we've actually looked at lately. Reddit being uh one that comes to mind where you basically have one revenue line for advertising. And even with uh a company like GE Aerospace that we looked at recently, um, it rises and falls tremendously just based solely on
- 17:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): commercial engine demand. Whereas with Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, it's spread across three countries and then three different freight buckets. So a weak year in one commodity or one economy does get cushioned by the others, which goes a long way toward explaining how this industry has survived two centuries
- 17:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of business cycles and how it's been able to to have a pretty steady growth up and to the right, at least in in recent decades. And I believe grain is a pretty big piece of the business that they do today. I mean, I would imagine with all the prairies they go through, it has to be one of their biggest customers, which is sort of weird to think about because as an end
- 17:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): customer, you really don't think a lot about how many different food items that grain goes into. But everything from bread to breakfast cereals to crackers, goldfish, pasta, noodles, and beer. and a whole lot more. Uh really our modern lifestyles run hugely on grain.
- 18:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it makes a lot of sense when you think more about it, but you know, it's also something that I haven't given too much thought to in the past. So usually when I think of grains, I think of bread and that's about it. But you are correct. Grain is their single largest business line, making up well over 20% of its freight revenue. Now, railroads measure measured their volume in something called revenue ton miles or R2. RTMs, which is literally just one
- 18:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ton of freight moved just one mile. So in Q2 of 2026, revenue ton miles were up about 4% and total revenue is up 13% to about 4.2 billion. So this business is moving a lot of freight.
- 18:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So volumes were up four percent, but then they actually had revenue rise 13%. So that that's a pretty big gap. Is that down to just pricing power or um is there some sort of operating leverage there? Or what am I what am I missing?
- 18:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 18:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): good catch there, Sean. And while it would be wonderful to say that it's all pricing power, that would unfortunately be incorrect. So I think a lot of that gap comes from things like fuel surcharges. So when fuel prices go up, which I'm sure everyone is very well aware of is happening right now, railroads tend to pass that cost on to their customers through something called a surcharge. So in
- 19:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Q2, the fuel surcharge revenue increased by a mind-boggling 74%, adding roughly $258 million to revenue. Now, that's a lot of money that isn't operational in any way. So while it's great that Canadian Pacific Kansas City can charge this to its customers rather than have to absorb it itself, it's also a revenue generator that is entirely cyclical and out of
- 19:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their hands. So yes, it acts as a lever to help protect its margin. margins, but it's crucial not to confuse this for organic growth. So if you strip out the fuel and the record grain harvest, underlying revenue growth comes in the mid-single digits, which is kind of closer to that revenue ton militant that we I just discussed.
- 19:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, if we were gonna maybe use an analogy here, it would be sort of like a breakfast restaurant bragging about having higher sales when all they really did was just raise prices, directly correlating to the rise in their input costs. So the cost of their eggs went up and then they passed those costs directly on to the consumer. So you aren't actually selling more omelets
- 20:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and egg benedicts or or making new margins. You're just charging more for the same food that also costs you more and there's not really a a net benefit to it.
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Precisely. And if you're looking at Canadian Pacific Kansas City, you have to separate those two. So obviously, business reports the headline numbers, which is the larger number. So it's always going to include that fuel surcharge. So just make sure to take that into account before getting overly excited about headline numbers. But there's another part of this business model that is very underappreciated. So why bother using
- 20:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): trains when we have giant trucks that can do essentially the exact same thing, but aren't constrained by going on two tracks? So the answer is that rail is roughly three to four times a more fuel efficient per ton mile than trucking. Additionally, one train can take hundreds of trucks off of the road. So for things like long hauls of very heavy stuff, like maybe pod ash going from
- 21:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Saskatchewan to the port of Vancouver, rail wins basically every single time.
- 21:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So uh back in college for me, I would look at these trains and it would feel like they would take maybe five full minutes to pass. So I I'm guessing that they're quite long.
- 21:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Well, the average Canadian Pacific Kansas City train is about 9,300 feet long. So that's about a mile and three quarters. So if you're stuck behind one, I'd recommend bringing a snack or two and probably finding a good podcast, maybe hours to listen to.
- 21:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 21:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so it's uh it's definitely a feeling I I know pretty well. And uh when we look at the core business in a nutshell, you own the track and you can run these long, efficient trains. on a strict schedule, and you charge customers for transporting that stuff, right? That's uh probably the simplest way that you could think about it. And
- 21:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of course, the profitability of the business increases significantly, the greater traffic density or frequency of train movements you can have. But how about we transition here to a part of the business that has really actually thrown a wrench into Canadian Pacific Kansas City's numbers, which was their
- 22:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): acquisition of Kansas City Southern.
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're a fundamental
- 22:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investor like me, you need financial data that actually keeps up with you. That's why me and my colleague Daniel Monka use Fiscal AI for every episode of the intrinsic value podcast. Fiscal AI is a modern financial data provider for global stocks and we use their web web-based terminal all the time on the show. It pairs a clean modern interface with institutional grade data, over
- 22:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 20 years of financial statements, plus company-specific segments and KPIs that I love digging into. You want Uber's gross bookings, it's there. You want to see Caspi's payment volumes? It's there. And I know because we pulled these metrics for our podcasts on Uber and Caspi. But what's new is that they've just launched. their own AI connector.
- 22:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What that means is you can plug all of that data, 20 years of financials, earnings call transcripts, fund letters, news, filings, and much more directly into Cloud, ChatGBT, or whatever AI you use for investment research. So your AI is working from institutional quality data straight from the source. Whether you want a powerful out-of-the-box stock
- 23:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): research terminal or a data connector to supercharge your AI, use our link fiscal.ai slash TIVP to get 15% off. Again, that's fiscal.ai slash TIVP. And you'll find the link in the show notes as well.
- 23:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, so I think this is where the story gets really interesting. So back in March of 2021, Canadian Pacific announced that it was buying Kansas City Southern, a US railroad that owned a railroad. in the US as well as northeastern Mexico. So Kansas City Southern was the smallest of the big US railroads, but it also had access to something that no other railroad had, which was this direct line into Mexico's industrial
- 23:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hub. Plus, it had ownership of the International Rail Bridge at Larido, Texas, which we briefly discussed here earlier. So just for context, Larido is the busiest trade crossing route between the US and Mexico. Then about a month later, Canadian National Railroad came in over the top with a much bigger offer for Kansas City Southern. So, you know, you had the two largest Canadian railroads
- 24:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): locked in a bidding war over this one business, Kansas City Southern. So Kansas City Southern initially accepted the larger offer from Canadian National. Of course, why wouldn't you? But Canadian National needed something called a voting trust to be approved by US regulators. And so that regulator is called the Surface Transportation Board. But the board actually ended up rejecting it, which frankly was quite
- 24:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lucky for Canadian Pacific. So they came back with a bid worth about $31 billion, including debt, and they ended up winning that bid.
- 24:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And it was a strange victory. Even after Canadian Pacific won the bidding war, the regulatory process took another year and a half. And during that time, Kansas City Southern was held in a voting trust. And so it wasn't until 2023 that Canadian Pacific added. Kansas City to its name and got the mouthful that we have the pleasure of
- 24:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): saying today. And the question I had going in was, you know, why and how did this merger even make sense? But when you look at the the network map that is formed together after the merger, I think it makes it pretty obvious. And so before the deal, if you wanted to move goods from Mexico to Canada by rail, it needed
- 25:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two or three different railroads with handoffs at each border. And so the problem with handoffs is they add delays and costs and more risk of something going wrong with the shipment. And now for Canadian Pacific Kansas City, they can do it on a single line from Mexico through the US and into Canada. And so that means the business
- 25:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): relies on one railroad, one bill, and really one point. of accountability to bring everything together.
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it's a really big selling point, which you can see is why they did this acquisition. It's kind of like one airplane taking you all the way to your destination instead of just taking multiple flights. So earlier this year, I got a chance to take a direct flight to London. And I much prefer that over taking many, many different flights where I have to continue switching to new airplanes. Switching also risks things like delays to my flight or having
- 26:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): my luggage arrive in a completely different country. But let's dig into one area of railroads in general that got me really interested. So part of why I wanted to learn about railroads was from reading a great article on Chris Hone's attraction to these things called irreplaceable physical assets. And you can think of these as basically assets that can't be replaced due to factors such as land rights,
- 26:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): permitting, or even simply the billions of dollars in capital that would be required to even attempt to compete. with existing infrastructure.
- 26:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that's a part of Chris Hound's approach that I find really compelling. He isn't out there looking for cheap AI bets or disruptive technology. I mean, he basically took the opposite approach, asking himself what would be nearly impossible to rebuild today at any price. And I think a railroad is clearly a good example of this exact situation,
- 26:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which is why he owns both uh connections. Canadian Pacific Kansas City and Canadian National in his fund. But I want to give you a little pushback on this advantage that Canadian Pacific Kansas City has as kind of a toll booth business. And so the fact that pretty much nobody can go out and build a new railroad doesn't mean that
- 27:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Canadian Pacific Kansas City can go out there and just charge whatever price they want. So it doesn't give them unlimited prices. pricing power. And for instance, we look at BNSF under the Berkshire Hathaway umbrella, they have the same functionally irreplaceable asset, these these rail lines. And as we discussed earlier, that really hasn't
- 27:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): translated into any growth worth mentioning. So from your perspective, where where do you think the real advantages come from for Canadian Pacific Kansas City?
- 27:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 27:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that's a great point. And you really nailed it. So while railroads are great assets because of their kind of lasting power, they aren't always the best investments. So if you told me about a potential investment that was going to grow at just 3% per year, I wouldn't even bother spending 10 seconds on it because it's just so far below my hurdle rate that spending time on it would be a complete waste. But I think in Canadian Pacific Kansas
- 27:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): City's case, they have quite a few other strengths. So let me go over that first and we can discuss some of the weaknesses
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 28:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in my view, their biggest competitive advantage is the railroads as a scarce resource. So nobody has really gone out and built a new major railroad in America in the last century or so. And if you wanted to even try to compete with Canadian Pacific Kansas City's network, just imagine how big of a headache that would be. You'd first need to buy contiguous strips of land in
- 28:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three different countries, all of which are currently at odds with each other. to some degree. And getting that done just seems completely next to impossible. But if you did that, you'd also need tens of billions of dollars before you even started generating a cent of revenue. So Canadian Pacific, Kansas City carries over $57 billion in property value on their balance sheet, as well as about $22 billion in
- 28:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): goodwill and intangible assets. And that $57 billion is a very interesting number. So if you think that's what it would cost to replace or represent. replicate what they have built, you'd actually be underestimating the real number by quite a long shot. So the legacy Canadian Pacific Business values its railroads at about $2 million per mile. The actual price today should probably go in
- 29:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a range more like between eight and twenty million per mile.
- 29:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 29:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when you add the other components like rail yards, terminals, major structures like tunnels and bridges, right-of-way land, as well as the rail cars themselves. Well, then the estimated replacement cost is probably somewhere between $250 billion to $500 billion.
- 29:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's just one of those modes where you don't need to sit down in a spreadsheet to grasp why it's so hard for a competitor. I mean, if you were to start a railroad business tomorrow, you wouldn't stand a chance. And so I can only imagine how difficult it would be to get a permit to run a new train line anywhere close to
- 29:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the train.
- 29:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where I want to live. And that's not even taking into consideration the capital cost, too.
- 29:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. And that's the exact same thing that I would have where I live as well in Vancouver. Just to get a permit to build a duplex, you know, home takes forever. A new railroad, though, I mean, I'd have a better chance of watching the Canucks win three straight Stanley Cups in a row.
- 29:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, to make the advantage even more powerful in Canada, the railroads are a duopoly between. Canadian Pacific, Kansas City and Canadian National. And in the US, it's one of these six class one railroads you mentioned at the top of the show. And then when you consider Mexico, it's yet another duopoly there with
- 30:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): FerroMex, which Union Pacific owns about a quarter of. So in each geography that they operate in, they are either a duopoly or a very tight oligopoly. And that structure is a big part of why we have gravitated toward these businesses. When there are only a handful of rational players in the market, nobody has much of an incentive to start a price war.
- 30:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so pricing tends to drift upward over time, and returns on capital tend to improve accordingly. And so Uber is a really great example of what happens once you have that discipline set in and when the market sort of lands. on an oligopoly, right? Basically, after it and Lyft settled on
- 30:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): approximately what their market share was going to be in North America, for example, uh, they both have stopped subsidizing rides, at least to the same extent that they did in the past. And for them, take rates have continued to climb and prices for customers have risen, but from the business perspective, they've been able to, you know,
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they burned cash to fight for market share. And then now the battle lines are kind of set and you know everything's entrenched. And now you have a company like Uber generating billions of dollars in free cash flow. And it all happened in just a couple of years. And there were people not so long ago who would have told you that they thought Uber could never be
- 31:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): profitable.
- 31:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 31:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And I think that's the power of operating leverage, right? And it's hard to uh get that operating leverage, but if you can, I mean, wow, you're looking at an incredible investment like Uber has been. So I think the super interesting part about the structure that you just mentioned is that there's only one railroad operator in all three of these countries: Canada, US, and Mexico. And I think that's on
- 31:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): its own a tremendous advantage. And even inside of that existing network, there are a couple of assets that are also irreplaceable. So the Laredo. Bridge, which we mentioned earlier, is one of those. And then the other is a Mexico concession. And this gives Canadian Pacific Kansas City exclusive freight rights on its main Mexico corridor all the way through 2047.
- 32:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I think the advantages that Canadian Pacific Kansas City has against other railroads are are pretty strong. But as we've kind of touched on a bit today, when it comes to freight, rail is not the only vehicle used. to move things from point A to point B. It's sort of like how a podcast, our only competition, isn't only other podcasts,
- 32:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's all forms of entertainment for trains. Their competition isn't just other railroad lines, but anything that can move goods. And that's also trucks and airplanes.
- 32:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. And I think that's a competitive Of battle that this business basically has to fight every single day. I will say, though, that air freight is just so expensive compared to rail that it probably doesn't even actually belong as a competitor. So to ship things overseas, sure, that's not a business that Canadian Pacific, Kansas City is in. But just to give you an idea of how much air freight
- 33:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): costs per ton. So it's about $5,000. And that compares to roughly $50 per ton by rail freight. So trucks are really the only other competitor that I think is probably worth worrying about here. So the moat that we just discussed. definitely protects Canadian Pacific Kansas City's existence. But because there are different ways to move freight, it doesn't really protect its pricing power. So on things like
- 33:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shorter routes, then trucks are going to be faster and much more flexible. And then if you look in Canada, you know, there is Canadian National CN, which competes directly with Canadian Pacific Kansas City on a lot of bulk traffic that's coming out of the prairies. So, you know,
- 33:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I guess
- 33:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'd split Canadian. Pacific Kansas City's customers into kind of these two groups. First, you have captive shippers. You know, if you picture a potash mine in Saskatchewan or maybe a grain elevator in Alberta sitting right on top of a Canadian Pacific Kansas City railroad track with no other railroad nearby. Well, that customer really has no alternative if they're shipping deep into the
- 33:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): US. Canadian Pacific Kansas City would be pretty much the only option that they can use to ship.
- 34:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And the second group would then be customers who do have a degree of choice. And so if they have access to multiple railways or need to move shorter distances, they'd have other railroads or trucks that could haul the freight. And so picture a shipping container that can easily be moved by a truck, for example.
- 34:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Exactly. So we can't know for sure what the allocation for their customers would be in each of these two groups, but I think it's clear that there is a large portion of their customer base that is relatively uncontestable. And I know this is an area that you like to spend time on, Sean, which is regulation. Because if an industry has the ability to operate with zero competition, well, then you can bet that regulators will be
- 34:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sniffing around, making sure that their constituents aren't being taken advantage of, at least to, you know, some degree.
- 34:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Between booking guests, coordinating with the team, and answering listener emails, my inbox doesn't shut off when the workday ends. I'd sit down to dinner and I'm still thinking about the thread I never answered. Superhuman mail, fix that. It is the most productive email app I've ever used, and
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's part of the superhuman productivity suite. So it works inside the tools and sites I already use. My go-to go to feature is. ask AI. Instead of digging through a month old thread for what a guest said, I just ask and it pulls the answer in seconds. And on the mobile app,
- 35:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): write with voice turns what I say into a polished draft in my own tone so I can reply on the go without getting pulled back into work mode. Email should be a system built for the long haul, not a daily fire drill. Get back to what matters. One month of superhuman mail free at
- 35:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): superhuman.com slash TIVP. That's superhuman.com slash TIVP.
- 35:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's a fact. And in the US, shippers can can bring rate cases to a board called the Surface Transportation Board. Very exciting name. Uh, but they rarely have succeeded in in doing that. So in 1980, under something called the Stagger's Rail Act, the freight rail network became largely deregulated
- 36:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): across the US, but the Surface Transportation Board can still step in to basically help cap rates to help protect captive shippers who are particularly vulnerable. And then in Canada, Western grain revenue is capped. So regulators do have some power there. And then in Mexico, regulators can actually set rates or even
- 36:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): grant competitors access to your tracks if they decide there isn't enough competition. And so the regulator's real job here is to keep captive shippers from being gouged and not to try and break railroad companies and their business models. And the fact that the Staggers Act has stood for more than 45 years tells you
- 36:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): both are reasonably comfortable with this arrangement. And probably where I'd get a little nervous is actually in Mexico, right? Where a regulator can hand a competitor access to your tracks. That seems like a very troublesome lever to resolve disputes for shareholders.
- 37:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 37:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I guess I kind of see it as a double-edged sword. You know, regulators obviously do cap some of the upside on the pricing, but it also keeps the industry somewhat stable. And yet it's another reason why nobody else really tries to get in in the first place. And even with all the regulation in all three countries that K Pacific Kansas City operates in, class one railroads have pushed through price increases above
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): inflation for most of the last two decades. So, you know, the pricing power is still there, but there's definitely a ceiling in place.
- 37:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 37:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the next advantage. that Canadian Pacific Kansas City has is in processing power. Although you can argue this is maybe less of a moat because Hunter Harrison, their former CEO, helped implement this precision scheduled railroading at four of the six Class One railroads. But that simple system which he did implement has greatly improved Canadian Pacific Kansas City's margins. And
- 37:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it stuck around for long after he's left. Canadian Pacific Kansas City still has operating ratio. ratios of about 60%, which is among the best in the industry, but I will admit, not by the widest of margins. So another few benefits of Canadian Pacific Kansas City that would support processing power advantages was its increase in their average train speed, which went up about 7% year over year. They also
- 38:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): decreased their terminal dwell time by 16% and then marginally improved their locomotive productivity as well as uh fuel efficiency.
- 38:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Even with those increases, I mean that average. train speed sounds just really slow, right? I mean, 20 miles an hour, that feels like uh, you know, back in my days on the basketball court, I could have reached that that uh same speed. I don't know about you, Kyle.
- 38:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, I
- 38:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pay good money to see that, Sean. So while the numbers for the speed do seem slow, that's still you know a three or four-minute four minute mile pace. So I don't think either of us could maintain anywhere close to that speed today. So the average in includes a lot of variables as well that you have to take into account. So it includes things like how long the trains spend stopped, waiting at sidings and slowly
- 38:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): creeping through rail yards. So you know the figure really is all about consistency. The faster and more reliable your network is, well then the fewer locomotives and rail cars you need to move the same freight Rate and the same weight. The highest efficiency will obviously be best for the business.
- 39:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 39:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's another advantage that Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, and I think many major railroads have that you touched on a little earlier with your example on potash and grain elevators. And that is when a customer builds a plant to produce and ship a commodity, whether that's grain, coal, or whatever it is, they are
- 39:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): making really decades-long decisions, right? The business itself will have spent money on. things like rail spurs, sometimes even their own rail cars, all while designing their whole logistics process around Canadian Pacific Kansas City's schedule. And basically, the customer has already paid to physically tie its facilities
- 39:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and operations into Canadian, Pacific, Kansas City's lines and their loading infrastructures. So if a grain elevator has that setup in place, it's really unlikely that they're going to try and switch to Canadian National because it would have to spend a lot of time and money and energy moving and setting things up all over again to make its product be able to flow
- 40:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): through a different network. And on top of those sunk costs, I think there's just a lot to be said for reliability too. And Canadian Pacific Kansas City's efficiency is really a huge advantage that keeps customers around. If for instance, you're an automaker running just in time production and your parts either don't show up or
- 40:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): arrive late because the competitor isn't as reliable, then your whole plant won't be running anywhere near peak efficiency. So saving a few percentage points on freights just really isn't worth it.
- 40:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's right. And when I ran Canadian Pacific Kansas City through my customer loyalty framework, they scored very, very well, especially on things like sunk call. costs, high failure costs, and setup costs. These are other areas of the business that force repeat customers. The place that they score the lowest in is brand, which probably isn't a surprise by any means. I don't think anyone's, you know, picking a railroad freight service based on a
- 41:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): logo. I'm not sure I've ever seen someone walking around with a, you know, Canadian Pacific Kansas City hoodie.
- 41:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 41:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I don't know. I wouldn't be so sure. I I bet you've got some train enthusiasts in the uh prairies of Canada or the Midwest of the US that might be donning Canadian Pacific Kansas City hoodies out there. I'm sure they exist.
- 41:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 41:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm sure my son actually would be very glad to wear one of those if he ever finds out that they exist. But speaking of brand, I think the closest thing that K Pacific Kansas City has to some sort of brand is this holiday They train. So each year around Christmas, they run a train covered in Christmas lights around their entire network. They also have things like live music and they collect food and money for local food banks. So
- 41:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in 2025, they raised a few million dollars, collected 175,000 pounds of food in a few hundred different communities. So with how obsessed my son is with trains, I'm about 70% sure he would rather see this that other than meeting Santa.
- 41:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 41:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the mode is Is certainly real. All right. You've got the the three-country three country network that we talked about, the Laredo Bridge, and then the switching costs that we've also walked through. Those are all things that I would feel pretty comfortable in as an investor as being lasting assets for decades to come. And none of them are going anywhere. And what I'd want
- 42:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to see more of is that mode actually, again, showing up in the numbers because an irreplaceable Replaceable asset with uh you know such tied in relationships with its customers. is only interesting to me if they can actually use that power to translate into better pricing and better returns on capital
- 42:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): over time, especially better than B and SFs. And that is the part that Canadian Pacific Kansas City still needs to prove on the other side of this big merger that they've done.
- 42:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Overall, I think Canadian Pacific Kansas City has one of the largest modes. moats in a business that I've ever seen. You know, it can't be disrupted by technology. And if someone had half a trillion dollars to spend, chances are they'd just go build data centers, not train tracks and rail yards. And even if they had that kind of money, well, getting the know-how, the permits, and the land to even approach Canadian Pacific Kansas City's network just seems very
- 43:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unlikely. Existing railroad operators can't even build out the same network that Canadian Pacific Kansas City now has, which just shows you how difficult it is. So they'd probably be better off just buying one of the other class one railroad companies, even though they still wouldn't get the same geographic range that Canadian Pacific Kansas City currently has. But with all that said, Sean, when you are speaking about a moat, I think it's clear that Canadian
- 43:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Pacific Kansas City has one. But where things get a little more complicated is kind of what you just discussed there, which is okay, they are doing these things based around a business that has a moat, but is it actually general? generating a meaningful return to shareholders? Or is Canadian Pacific Kansas City just kind of another BNSF type situation?
- 43:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 43:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I've got a feeling this is uh the part of the episode we're gonna bring up returns on invested capital, Kyle.
- 43:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You know me very well, Sean. So let's start with the good news here. So before the Kansas City Southern deal, Canadian Pacific was a very capital efficient business, at least for a railroad. So from 2016 to 2020, it earned adjusted returns. on invested capital of about 14 to 17%. So I think that's a very, very good number and well above its cost of capital. And that basically meant that
- 44:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reinvestment was producing shareholder value. Now, these numbers are great. And while they aren't, you know, software numbers by any means, these are numbers that I personally can still get around. And the fact that they were consistently above 14% is a very obvious signal that this business had some durability. But if we look at how this number unfortunately, has changed since the Kansas City Southern deal,
- 44:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that obvious strength has faded quite a bit. So the company's own return on invested capital, which it calls adjusted ROIC, fell about 8% in 2021 and then 7% in 2022. And then for 2025, the number is just 6.9%. So a quick note on the adjusted return on invested capital, it's still a good number that they use internally. However, they do exclude deferred tax liabilities.
- 44:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from this figure. So if you add them back in, the return on invested capital is about a percentage point lower. But you know, at the end of the day, whether I use my own numbers or the companies, they're still just a long way from the historical numbers that were once quite impressive.
- 45:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 45:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean six to seven percent, neither of those figures really inspire a ton of confidence in me. And especially when you consider that this company doesn't seem too likely to be disrupted by competitors. Uh, you would expect better returns. But we've also looked at this figure for a number of businesses. And with MA, these
- 45:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): large deals can sometimes really obfuscate the real return figures, at least in the short term. And so for instance, the Kansas City Southern deal was just absolutely massive at $31 billion. So my assumption would be that these numbers for a deal that size tend have significantly increased Canadian Pacific Kansas City's
- 45:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): capital denominator. And that uh requires a significant increase in returns just to maintain the the same efficiency levels. Uh and it sort of can take time often for those synergies to to prove themselves out in the actual income statement results of the combined distance.
- 46:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): business.
- 46:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 46:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think you really nailed it there. And that can be a pretty big problem for these larger companies doing larger deals where, you know, MA isn't necessarily their forte. You
- 46:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 46:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they go out, they buy businesses, they get these instant increases in their fixed assets and in things like working capital. And this just serves, unfortunately, to fatten their invested capital. But it often takes time for synergies to form. So even when the invested capital number increases, it can take years for the top part of the return on invested capital numbers to catch up. And I think
- 46:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this is probably what has happened to Canadian Pacific, Kansas City.
- 46:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): When you take on something as big as a steal, the balance sheet changes overnight. But the income statement, again, as I alluded to, I mean, it takes its sweet time. And it's kind of like a business owner who wants to decrease competition. So they buy out their competition, who have happens to be across the street. And on the day that deal closes, they will own twice as many locations,
- 46:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but they've also already ridden a very large check. All the cash went out the door at once, even if that's not immediately reflected in their uh income statement. But all the customers who can synergize with both businesses, they're not going to show up on day one, right? It will take time to figure out which overlapping
- 47:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): expenses can be cut and who to cross-promote most effectively to. And in the meantime, you have to be patient while the two businesses basically learn to work together as optimally as possible as a single consolidated unit. So if that's what's happening right now with Canadian, Pacific, Kansas City, then the assumption should be that
- 47:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): their capital efficiency number, their returns. on capital, will recover once those synergies show up. And after all, the railroad, I don't think, got suddenly a worse business to be in just because it got bigger. And as we've discussed, if anything, the growing network should actually improve the business. So, how do you see returns
- 47:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on invested capital moving over the next few years?
- 47:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, so the deal closed a few years ago, so we can look back at 2022, which was the first year that the numbers were consolidated on the balance sheet. And we can see that they had a pretty large spike in things like equity debt as well as working capital. But to your question, you know, it's kind of tough to answer because we've had three years of pretty mediocre return on invested capital numbers. But there are some
- 48:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): positives. So they have shown some synergies as profits have continued to go up a little bit. The network is running. well, and it appears that synergies are starting to hopefully come through. And even though operating margin definitely took a hit after the deal closed, it seems to have actually recovered well and operating margin seems to be trending in the right direction. But when it comes to capital
- 48:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): efficiency, you know, the numbers just have barely budged. I think enough time has now passed that if this were a timing issue, we'd probably see the capital efficiency number at least approximate historical levels or get closer to that. but it's just not really moving. So, in my view, if this deal worked out perfectly, well, then we would see a drop in the return invested capital number. Then it would
- 48:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): steadily rise back up towards these historical numbers. But I think the numbers, you know, so far just don't support this.
- 49:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
- 49:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this can mean a few things. The main issue is probably baked into the price that they ended up paying for the Kansas City Southern acquisition. Because they paid this large premium for Kansas City Southern. it's permanently going to change their invested capital base. So things like goodwill, you know, they just don't wear out and they don't get depreciated. And even though profits have increased, it's going to take time for the return on invested capital
- 49:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to continue to trend upward.
- 49:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's not the greatest situation, but there is a light at the end of the tunnel, right? You mentioned there that goodwill, and for those who are unfamiliar, uh, is basically the premium paid above the fair. value of the identifiable net assets that you're acquiring, meaning the fair value of the identifiable assets minus the
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liabilities you take on. So if you pay $10 billion for an acquisition and these identifiable net assets are worth a billion dollars, then you're going to book $9 billion of goodwill. And the identifiable term matters a lot here. That's why I keep saying it, because intangible. intangibles, sort of like these customer relationships, or in Canadian,
- 50:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pacific, Kansas City's case, the Mexican concession that they got on their own line on their balance sheet, um, those are all valued at at fair value. And and goodwill is just whatever is left over after all of that. And as you mentioned there, goodwill typically does not get amortized. So it sits on the balance sheet.
- 50:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at full value indefinitely. And it does have to be tested though for impairment at least once a year, or sooner, if something happens that suggests the acquired business is worth less than what's been accounted for on the books. And so if goodwill were written down, it would actually improve Canadian Pacific Kansas City's capital
- 50:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): efficiency metrics by reducing invested capital. But it it'll also be an admission that they seriously overpaid for the deal. And I'm sure they would rather not openly admit that kind of thing to the market.
- 50:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, that's completely true. And I think it's one of those kind of quirks of accounting. If Canadian Pacific, Kansas City were forced to write down a big chunk of goodwill at some point, which I don't see happening, well, then yes, their return on invested capital would jump instantly. But I think the real light at the end of the tunnel is if you look very very much behind the scenes. So it does appear, if you look in some ways, that things are
- 51:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): improving, but you need to look at an adjacent number to returns on invested capital, which is returns on incremental invested capital, to really see this. So the number for that period from 2024 until 2025 has actually crept up to over 12%. So while management's goal is to get return on invested capital back up to the mid-teens, you know, it does seem difficult to do, but it's definitely promising. that returns
- 51:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are starting to creep back up.
- 51:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is a business that is a railroad, and most businesses in that industry are known for paying dividends and also doing buybacks at scale. And so in 2025, Canadian Pacific, Kansas City bought back 37 million shares for about $4 billion. And then in the first half of 2026, they bought back another
- 52:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 17 million shares. or so. So even though the acquisitions significantly increased their diluted share count, the buybacks have been pretty meaningful too. And since 2022, they've actually reduced their shares by about a 1% kager. Uh I I do have an issue with the buybacks though. I I think
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): much of the buybacks over the past few years, they seem to have been done at sort of uh what I would call a rough approximation of uh exactly at intrinsic value or perhaps above it. And so the mechanics of why this is a bad thing are are pretty simple. A buyback is the company buying back a stake in
- 52:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): itself on behalf of the shareholders who are staying and continuing to own the business. So if it pays less than what the shares are actually worth, then every dollar spent buys more than a dollar of value for those remaining owners. And so that is a good case of buybacks. But if it pays more than the
- 53:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shares are worth, then the value transfers from the holders who stay to the ones who sell at this premium. And the company then would have been better off just paying off a dividend or holding the cash. So unless I'm wrong on my intrinsic value estimate, then really these buybacks were not then best use of
- 53:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): capital.
- 53:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 53:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think I'm right there with you, Sean. And I have yet another issue to layer on top of what you just mentioned. So these share repurchases were partially completed using leverage. So if you look purely at operating cash flow, it definitely does cover their dividends and of buybacks. But you have to remember that Canadian Pacific, Kansas City does have reinvestment needs that might must be attended to on an annual basis. So part of these
- 53:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buybacks were funded by issuing new bonds and selling a stake in the Panama Canal Railway. Now it was a small amount of leverage, to be fair, but you know, leverage still increased just to help fund these buybacks.
- 53:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, if parts of the buybacks were funded by debt, it's definitely worth peeking into what the balance sheet looks like today. And Canadian Pacific Kansas City is carrying about $25 billion in debt as of the most recent quarter. And so if we view this through management's preferred debt to EBITDA metric, which I'll add is pretty
- 54:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): similar to net debt to EBITDA, it comes out to about 3.2 times, and that's up slightly from three times a year earlier. And this is in the same ballpark as most railroad competitors. So I don't think there's two. too much to worry about here. Railroads, after all, are businesses whose assets produce steady cash, and that
- 54:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cash should continue to flow to them for decades to come. So lenders are more than happy to lend against them. And if I look at some comps like Union Pacific and CSX, they're running pretty similar leverage profiles. And for really a business like this with cash flows that are about as predictable as you'll find for any business outside of
- 54:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a utility, I'm definitely more comfortable with them having leverage than with a cyclical or even uh some tech companies, to be completely honest. And what I actually care about more than the headline ratio is which direction that leverage is is drifting in and why. And is leverage the creeping up to fund buybacks rather than
- 55:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): growth. That kind of thing makes me uh uncomfortable as a shareholder.
- 55:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. I agree. And I think that management metric is fine by me. I like to also use a similar metric, but I also like to look at how net debt compares to free cash flow. So I also would prefer this number to be very low, preferably at maybe three times or less trailing free cash flow. So the idea behind this is quite simple. If things go south, I'd like to know that the business could pay off its debt within
- 55:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): three years. This kind gives the business some robustness, which I'm obviously a very big fan of. So Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's net debt to free cash flow is actually 10 times. So they aren't planning on increasing CapEx. So perhaps that ratio comes down to eight or nine as free cash flow expands over the next year or so. But either way, it's definitely a lot higher than I usually like to see. In fairness, though, So, kind of
- 55:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to what you just uh alluded to, railroads definitely do deserve some leeway, I think. when it comes to debt. Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's debt is structured very conservatively, and most of it's fixed rate debt, and interest is covered more than six times by operating income. So, because the cash flows are very secure over long time periods, lenders are definitely going to be willing to
- 56:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): offer these kind of long-term maturities. And I'm talking very, very long, like decades long. So one of their bond matures all the way out in 2115, by which time we'll probably be long gone. So if any of my great grandchildren are listening to this, go check if their principal was paid
- 56:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): back.
- 56:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That is uh that is one heck of a of a payback period there. And and if we look at debt, the bigger risk isn't the debt that they carry right now, but really whether or not they will need to refinance Finance at some point in the near future. And and uh if they do, uh that will likely be at significantly higher rates given the
- 56:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uptick in inflation we've seen and really the bottom falling out of the treasury market in the last few months. And so they were uh very smart to refinance debt in 2020 and 2021 when interest rates were at really rock bottom. But all of those debts will come due Do at some point, and one of them actually even comes due at the end of 2026. And again,
- 57:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at today's rates, the the interest. costs for them going forward just structurally are going to increase significantly until the next round of refinancing comes, hopefully at lower rates. And basically what we've already seen is uh in this last quarter, the company's interest expense increased uh by double digit
- 57:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): percentages.
- 57:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I think overall I'm not super concerned about debt when it comes to Canadian Pacific Kansas City. It kind of reminds me a little bit of American Tower, where you have these assets that are just in a very, very strong oligopoly, and therefore lenders will just allow you to both lever up as well as have these very long maturity dates. It's a pretty nice advantage. But if they do see a slowdown in business for a time,
- 57:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then they risk failing to deliver shareholder returns. They'd have to pay back debtors first, which would mean cutting things like dividends or buybacks and investors into those businesses. really do not like to see that.
- 58:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And these can all affect management's decision making to uh sometimes a large degree. It's really important to take into account just what management is prioritizing. And it's not the same at every company. So how how about we try and look at management a little closer here? And at the top, you've got Keith Creel, who you mentioned earlier has been the
- 58:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): CEO since 2017, and that makes him. the longest tenured CEO of any class one railroad. And that's definitely a bit surprising. Uh, when you think about how stable these businesses are, you would think that uh the CEOs would would tend to stick around here. And when Canadian Pacific announced the Kansas City
- 58:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Southern deal back in 2021, the board gave him a special grant of about 517,000 stocks. stock options specifically to keep him retained until at least 2026. And in exchange for that grant, his annual long term incentive awards were trimmed as basically an offset.
- 59:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. And that retention window closed at the beginning of this year. So for the first time since the merger, Creel doesn't have, you know, these golden handcuffs that are keeping him inside the business. But it also doesn't seem like he has any plans to leave. Um I think it's worth mentioning here because if I were a shareholder, I'd at least be thinking about what kind of succession planning there would be. Now, given how Creel has come
- 59:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): into Canadian Pacific Kansas City and helped integrate the Kansas City Southern uh merger, I think he's done a pretty fine job. But the value creation for shareholders since this deal has gone through just hasn't been amazing by any means. So since 2023, shares have compounded at about four and a half percent with a one percent 1% dividend. yield. I won't pretend like I have any special insights into how hard it is to
- 59:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): integrate a railroad. I would assume it's very hard. So perhaps I'm being a little hard on him, but this is just what the numbers tell me.
- 59:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's tough to say because before the deal, Canadian Pacific was doing pretty well, but growth and attractive returns on capital have been harder to come by after the deal. So maybe we're biased, but how about we take a closer look at what Creole Creel is. incentivized on these days and and how that has changed?
- 1:00:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sure. So the good thing about Creel's incentive program is that about 93% of target pay is at risk. So part of his bonus is tied to things like financial and safety measures. So the financial part is split evenly between operating ratio and operating income. The safety part is split between factors such as train accident frequency and personal injury frequency.
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:00:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2025, the operating ratio landed right on target, but operating income was actually below the target. So, you know, these are decent figures since they do reflect operating margins and operating income. But I think it's missing something that Canadian Pacific was actually really well known for before, which was incentivizing based on returns on invested capital. So they have said that they want to
- 1:00:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): get back to that at some point, but they'll return to this KPI at the appropriate time. I'm not really sure what that means though, or how to perceive it.
- 1:00:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 1:00:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): given how returns on invested capital have dropped so far since the acquisition, I I think that it did make some sense to temporarily get rid of that measure simply because the only way to uh be able to to fairly keep it would be to drastically cut their target and expectations. And doing that doesn't really
- 1:01:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): send the right message to shareholders longer term. Uh, why accept mediocrity in a company that had allocated capital quite well for such a long period of time? And right now the other performance measures are based on things like free cash flow and then comparing the share price to a benchmark of businesses in similar
- 1:01:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): industries. And free cash flow is what replaced ROIC. So it's not a bad metric at all. but it's always a yellow flag when the compensation framework shifts. And the fact that the chair of the compensation committee has brought it up in proxies is quite a powerful signal that shareholders want this return on invested capital KPI
- 1:01:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to come back.
- 1:01:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:01:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think the swap really does matter. You know, yes, free cash flow is a decent number, and that at least takes into account things like capital expenditure, but you know, it's more of an absolute number. So if Canadian Pacific Kansas City grows, it will get more cash flow. But the mere fact that they bought, you know, Kansas City Southern means that free cash flow should also grow simply because they just added another cash flowing
- 1:02:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): business to themselves. Returns on invested capital captures both the increase in cash flow, but also a bunch of other, I think, very, very big adjustments that do matter. And that's things such as what type of interest. investment was needed to get that larger amount of cash flow into the future. And so if you look just purely at free cash flow, it just doesn't have quite the same function.
- 1:02:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:02:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we can't forget ownership stakes either here. Creel's total stake is worth about $27 million, but that includes options. And when we consider what he actually owns today, it comes out to about point 0.01% zero one percent of Canadian Pacific Kansas City's total. share count. And it's not terribly surprising because unless you're an
- 1:02:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): original founder of a company, uh it's hard to have a massive equity stake built up, especially for a company that's nearly 200 years old. And uh total insider ownership though, I I think is still a bit disappointing at just 0.1%. point one percent. So um the rest of the management team has some alignment. Um And
- 1:03:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm sure it's a good chunk of their net worth. But at least in theory, you would like to see that number probably being higher.
- 1:03:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:03:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): me too, Sean. And I wasn't able to find any meaningful insider buying as well. So most of their exposure to increased ownership is mainly through things like options. So if you compare that to some of the other businesses that we've looked at, like Heiko, ICO, for instance, you know, the family's entire wealth is tied to the success of the company. Unfortunately, you just don't see that same type of alignment. with Canadian Pacific, Kansas City. But like Sean just mentioned, it's a
- 1:03:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 200-year-old business. It's very hard to get that kind of alignment. So, you know, my overall take on management is that they are good at what they do. And I give them kudos for having very, very good communication and transparency. But, you know, I'd really love to see the incentive system tip back to being more capital efficiency focused. I think that this would get this incentive structure back to being an A, whereas today I'd give it more of
- 1:04:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maybe a B grade. So I'm hoping to see that they get back to that at some point, which would make me much more excited about management incentive structure. I'd also love to see some maybe open market buys as well to know that if I'm buying, that management also has conviction in uh that decision.
- 1:04:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So what do you think could knock this thesis off the tracks, pun intended? Uh we told you there there would be some train puns today. The the business is clearly strong, but uh what could go wrong? right? It it's a business that we agree is is hard to disrupt, but there is competition out there, and it's clear that these businesses are all
- 1:04:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trying to take market share from each other. And one risk, maybe that I could think of uh that would leave them more vulnerable is the potential for another merger in the industry that would make one of their competitors more of a heavyweight, which would be union Pacific. uh, and and their at least announced plans to merge with Norfolk
- 1:04:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Southern.
- 1:04:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I think this is definitely a potential risk for Canadian Pacific Kansas City's interest, especially in regards to the United States. So Union Pacific is one of those two giant western railroads, and Norfolk Southern is one of the two biggest railroads in the East. So putting them together gets you this gigantic coast-to-coast coast to coast railroad in the US. And as Canyon Pacific in Kansas City
- 1:05:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Southern Deal, there is a very lengthy regulatory period. So this deal won't have a decision by regulators until sometime in 2027. It's a little complicated to understand all the little nuances that go on in a deal like this, but K Pacific Kansas City has called for regulators to reject the deal, which we probably wouldn't be surprised about. So it comes down to a few different partnerships that these railroads tend to
- 1:05:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have with each other. For instance, in a merger, Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's transcontinental positioning, which I've discussed as being one of their largest competitive advantages, would actually be at risk. So I don't think the merger would necessarily kill the thesis for the business by any means. You know, Canadian Pacific, Kansas City would still have a lot of business, but it probably would put a bit of a dent in the growth
- 1:05:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): story.
- 1:05:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And the other big risk here, uh, that's sort of an elephant in the room. It'd be hard for us not to. talk about is is on the trade front, right? On July 1st, the US Mexico Canada agreement had its first review. And Canada and Mexico like the deal that's already in place and want to extend it, but the US
- 1:06:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chose to decline that option. And it it's not all bad as the deal is fortunately in place until twenty 2036, thirty six, fortunately from the perspective of uh of shareholders here. but it will be reviewed on an annual basis. And that does mean the US is going to have some political leverage uh over the deal. And if the relationships between uh
- 1:06:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nations fray any further, uh they can dangle uh the agreement to try and get favorable concessions. And I think that matters because Canadian Pacific, Kansas City's fastest growing business segment. is in things like automotive, energy, and commodities that are very much exposed to trade policy
- 1:06:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and rely a lot on going across borders. And if tariffs between any of these countries are to go up dramatically and near shoring slows down, then Canadian Pacific, Kansas City is going to be uh a real victim of that and and feel the pain of it.
- 1:07:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:07:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think this is true, but there actually are a couple of advantages that K Pacific Kansas City has that offered a little bit, not full, but a little bit of protection that we should probably touch on here. So the US actually exempts the United States Mexico Canadian Agreement compliant goods. So this makes it, from my understanding, possible to move a lot of these goods across the US
- 1:07:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): without incurring these massive tariffs. If for instance, you know, Canada wanted to move freight directly from Mexico or vice versa, well, then that helps mitigate some of these risks.
- 1:07:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:07:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the fact that volumes are continuing to rise shows that they are still shipping more and more products through the US. But I'd be lying if I said there wasn't a significant amount of uncertainty in this exact area. The last risk that I'll mention here is in their debt. So I think we covered that enough earlier, but it's still a risk worth mentioning. I'd want to make sure that their leverage ratios aren't moving up too high. And I definitely would be paying
- 1:08:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attention to how easy. easily they can service their debt expense here into the future.
- 1:08:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We've been pretty tough on Canadian Pacific Kansas City today. So let's look at some of the bright sides of the business because yes, it it does have some. When you consider Canadian Pacific Kansas City, what are the main catalysts that you think can help make this business continue to grow?
- 1:08:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 1:08:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So if you look at their latest presentation, they guide for low double digit adjusted diluted EPS growth. So, you know, they clearly think there are growth levers in this business that can help them get there. Many of North America's railroads have had pretty flat volumes for about two decades. The merger helped Canadian Pacific Kansas City's volume increase by a decent amount.
- 1:08:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So since the merger, if you exclude coal, their volumes are up twenty 22% two percent as seen by revenue track miles. That's pretty rare growth in the industry. One other big growth engine is converting truck freight into rail freight. So much of the freight between, let's say, Mexico and the US is actually truck freight. So in 2025, trucks carry about 74% of
- 1:09:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mexico's trans border trade. Interestingly, the all-time record year was back in 2024, but 2025 dipped slightly. Now I'm not sure that I can say that that's purely because Canadian Pacific, Kansas City is, you know, now. there, but it's certainly making the decision easier to help ship freight using rail car versus a truck. So they currently aim to divert about
- 1:09:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 64,000 truckloads away from the highway annually, and they are at about 40% of that target today. So, you know, this is a pretty good lever because it removes competition from the railroad industry Road entirely. So on this advantage, they they're are looking to take market share from the trucking industry, which is much more. much fragmented compared to railroads. And I know that I personally would prefer to
- 1:09:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): steal market share from a fragmented industry than a consolidated
- 1:09:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one.
- 1:09:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that's exactly right. Because when you take share from a fragmented industry, nobody on the other side is big enough to fight back in a coordinated way. Whereas taking share from another class one railroad means picking a price war with a competitor that has the same cost structure and and the same patience that that you do. And trucking
- 1:10:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is thousands of small operators who who can't match Rails fuel economics on a long haul, no matter what they do. So that is share that Canadian Pacific Kansas City can win on structural advantage rather than just by cutting price. And the merger has also opened up some other opportunities. For instance, automotive just grew 19% nineteen
- 1:10:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): percent last quarter. and that lines up with Mexico increasingly becoming a major car manufacturing hub. And then now you have grain moving from Canada into Mexico, a route that really only became economical uh once the merger removed some of the handcuffs standing in the way. And and coal is a net negative, although it's
- 1:10:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): worth noting that Canadian Pacific Kansas City's coal is mostly metallurgical coal. out of uh British Columbia's Elk Valley that goes into steel making in Asia. So the real risk there is is steel demand more than than decarbonization. And it's really unlikely for that to to go to zero anytime soon.
- 1:11:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. And I think coal is also just basically a pretty small part of the revenue now. So it makes up just about six percent of revenue. While a decade ago, that number was close to ten percent. So I'm not super concerned about how the downfall of coal is gonna affect Canadian Pacific, Kansas City long term.
- 1:11:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And on top of the the volume growth, there there's also the potential to improve operating leverage. Since management has guided for higher earnings per share growth than revenue, that mostly has to come from buybacks and operating leverage. The additional operating leverage can come from moving more freight per train and things that
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): affect this are average train speeds and average train lengths, average train weight and fuel efficiency as well. And they've improved on really all of these metrics this year. The one place you don't want those gains to come from is at the expensive safety metrics like personal injuries and train accidents.
- 1:11:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:11:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these are all metrics that I think shareholders definitely have to continue to pay attention to. If those metrics can continue to be improved, well, then there's a nice little tailwind. you get simply from just moving more volume with less incremental cost. But they definitely have to improve efficiency on a very consistent basis to get those benefits into the future.
- 1:12:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 1:12:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think it's that uh time of the episode to look at just what you think Canadian Pacific Kansas City is worth.
- 1:12:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's do it. So before I go into the intrinsic value, let me give you kind of my high-level high level view of Canadian Pacific Kansas City. So in my view, it's a very interesting. business. It has lots of moats that seem to be very difficult to disrupt. And it has very minimal technological disruption. So normally I'd be very excited about a business that has this setup, but I also think
- 1:12:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's a lot of variables involved with understanding this business. You need to know the railroad industry well, and you need to know how each player is interacting and why they're having these specific advantages and disadvantages compared to one another. And unless I'm very passionate about railroads, this seems like an industry that I'm just not so sure that I want to spend too much time on. I know my son would be disappointed to hear this.
- 1:12:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But given how mature the industry is, I'm just not sure. It's an industry I feel like I could probably put too much time into understanding simply because my preferred return benchmark is likely a lot higher than the returns that I'm going to get from owning an admittedly great business.
- 1:13:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, that's I think that's fair enough. So let's get into some of those assumptions that you're making to figure out if Canadian Pacific Kansas City would make for a decent investment, because even if you don't like the growth, if it's cheap enough, it could still make for a decent investment.
- 1:13:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 1:13:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's do it. So in my base case for revenue growth, I assume about a 6% growth rate over the next five years. Now, this is on the low end of management's revenue targets in the high single. digits, but I'm stripping out things like short-term fuel and harvest boosts that they've had and leaving room for things like merger and trade risks. So I think they're doing a pretty good job on margins. And as we just discussed,
- 1:13:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there is probably some room for further improvement. So I'm using EBITDA margins of about 53%, which is about a point and a half above the current margin. So I don't think this is too much of a leap of faith. I think the EV to EBITDEM EBITDA multiple probably goes down slightly and reaches maybe 14 times. in the terminal year. The average multiple was significantly elevated compared to a few of the post-COVID years. So
- 1:14:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think 14 times is a pretty solid number for a base case on you know on a very high-quality business like this. So with those assumptions, I get a value of about $165, which offers a return of about 7%, including dividends.
- 1:14:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm looking at your bull and and bear case model right now. So let's put it all together and and see and what your intrinsic value is.
- 1:14:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 1:14:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So with the bull case, I assume, you know, Mexico takes off. The Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern merger gets blocked or heavily conditioned. And then I also assume that management's guided growth comes to fruition. In the bear case, the merger goes through with minimal conditions and trade with Mexico slows. With all that, I get a value of $111, which is still below the current share price of what
- 1:14:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): $120. $122 today. So
- 1:14:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
- 1:14:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the company's share price being right around intrinsic value, I'm perfectly fine taking a pass on this business. It's not a business that has particularly exciting growth potential. You know, some businesses have a lot of variants and the potential upside can greatly improve the intrinsic value of the company. You know, something like App Lovin', Loven, for instance, has a lot of that growth potential if everything tends to work out. But,
- 1:15:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know, when it comes to Canadian Pacific, Kansas City, I'm just fine waiting on the sidelines here. Perhaps if shares were to get somewhere in the low 90s or below, I could maybe see this getting a little more interesting. But um I'm not really in any uh rush to have this uh in the intrinsic value portfolio.
- 1:15:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I'm there with you on passing it. And I think the way to frame it is that Canadian Pacific, Kansas City is a great business that is also already priced like one, which is a common theme on this show. And so the moat that we spent a lot of the episode admiring is pretty much fully reflected, if not more so, uh, in the stock. And we haven't seen enough evidence of the growth
- 1:15:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): story really coming to fruition yet to uh be more bullish than the market uh currently has priced the company. And you know, if you have a base case of roughly 7% seven percent a year, um, it just doesn't move the needle for the portfolio. that we're trying to build and manage. And we already have indirect railroad exposure through Berkshire Hathaway and their
- 1:16:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ownership of BNSF. And then we have our 12% hurdle rate that uh your your kind of projections here would would fall short of clearing. And so I would be much more excited, for example, to put more capital into a company that uh we're really excited about like Uber instead. And so I do think that at the right price, it would be a very interesting asset to have to
- 1:16:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): diversify our portfolio and hedge some of the uncertainty of AI where we don't know how severely our digitally based businesses will be impacted. Whereas the railroads, uh, we can sleep pretty well at night knowing that there are no fundamental disruptions to that business model looming.
- 1:16:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, that's all we have for you today, folks. And as usual, I'd like to leave you with a quote. So one of my favorite writers ever, Ralph Waldo Emerson, wrote, Railroads iron is a magician's rod in its power to evoke the sleeping energies of land and water. And he was correct on this, even though it was written a very long time ago. But you know, railroads truly offer incredible economic benefits to
- 1:17:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): people who ship freight, Rate, which really underpins the economies of the US, Canada, and Mexico. So I do see his magician's metaphor. And as long as we continue to require goods to be shipped, well, railroads aren't going anywhere. That's all we have for you today, and thanks so much for listening.
- 1:17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Just a quick note before you go, this episode would not be possible without our friends at Fiscal AI. It is the complete stock research terminal that Daniel, Kyle, and I use on every single episode, with every company we dig into pulling 20 years worth of financials, digging into segment level data, and grabbing quotes from the latest earnings calls,
- 1:17:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): real-time, institutional grade data, all in one place. And now with their new AI connector, you can plug that same data: financials, transcripts, fun letters, news, filings, and more straight into Cloud, Chat GPT, or whatever AI you use for your own research. If you want to try it yourself, head to fiscal.ai. fiscal.ai/slash T I
- 1:18:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): V P to get 15% off. The link is in the show notes. That's fiscal.ai slash T I V P. Thanks for listening.
- 1:18:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thanks for listening to TIP. Visit the investorspodcast.com for show notes and educational resources. This podcast is for informational and entertainment purposes only and does not provide financial, investment, tax, or legal advice. The content is impersonal and does not consider your objectives, financial situation, or needs. Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principle, and
- 1:18:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Listeners should do their own research and consult a qualified professional before making any financial decisions. Nothing on this show is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security or other financial product. Hosts, guests, and the investors podcast network may hold positions in securities discussed and may change those positions at any time. without notice. References
- 1:18:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to any third-party products, services, or advertisers do not constitute endorsements, and the investors podcast network is not responsible for any claims made by them. Copyright by the Investors Podcast Network. All rights reserved.
More from The Intrinsic Value Podcast - The Investor’s Podcast Network
TIVP108 (Video): Mercado Libre ($MELI): We Doubled Down on Meli w/ Daniel Mahncke & Shawn O’Malley
Episode discussion: Speakers detail Mercado Libre's ecosystem moat and margin recovery thesis amid Shopee competition
Speakers’ claims: The hosts argue that Mercado Libre's integrated marketplace, payments, and logistics flywheel creates high switching costs that protect its dominant market share against competitors like Shopee and Amazon. They note that while operating margins are currently depressed by strategic investments in credit loss provisions and logistics infrastructure, these are viewed as long-term growth drivers rather than signs of competitive weakness. The speakers highlight Mercado Pago's evolution into a standalone financial ecosystem with significant assets under management and a data advantage in underwriting. Despite Shopee's rapid user growth and aggressive logistics expansion, the hosts believe Mercado Libre's scale and ecosystem entrenchment will lead to margin recovery and sustained profitability.
TIVP107 (Video): McDonald's ($MCD): Generational Compounder in Historical Drawdown w/ Daniel Mahncke & Shawn O’Malley
Episode discussion: McDonald's Franchise Model, Real Estate Value, and GLP-1 Risks Discussed
Speakers’ claims: Speakers analyze McDonald's business model, highlighting its transition from food sales to a real estate and franchising powerhouse that generates high operating margins. They discuss historical investment theses from Warren Buffett and Bill Ackman, noting Buffett's regret over selling his stake. The episode examines the impact of GLP-1 drugs on consumer behavior, estimating current sales impact at only 1% despite long-term uncertainty. Franchisee financial health is addressed, with speakers noting declining cash flows and McDonald's $8.5 billion support package to fund modernizations. Finally, the stock's correlation with Treasury yields and management's buyback incentives are evaluated.