Speakers detail Mercado Libre's ecosystem moat and margin recovery thesis amid Shopee competition
Summary
The hosts argue that Mercado Libre's integrated marketplace, payments, and logistics flywheel creates high switching costs that protect its dominant market share against competitors like Shopee and Amazon. They note that while operating margins are currently depressed by strategic investments in credit loss provisions and logistics infrastructure, these are viewed as long-term growth drivers rather than signs of competitive weakness. The speakers highlight Mercado Pago's evolution into a standalone financial ecosystem with significant assets under management and a data advantage in underwriting. Despite Shopee's rapid user growth and aggressive logistics expansion, the hosts believe Mercado Libre's scale and ecosystem entrenchment will lead to margin recovery and sustained profitability.
Key takeaways
- 1 Meli is now one of our top five positions, so it feels timely to give an update. Margins are depressed because of the current investment cycle, but Meli has accelerated growth and improved user metrics across the board.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 0:00
- 2 lists on Meli gets paid through Mercado Pago. And once Melly knows how much that seller sells, how seasonal their business is, and how reliably they ship their products, it can offer them a working capital loan to help them buy more inventory. And the the seller uses that loan to stock up and sells more on Mercado Libre. And then the data gets better,
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 7:15
- 3 just one of them generate about 70% more GMV than someone who only shops on Mercado. Libre, and about 90% more payment volume than someone who only uses Mercado Pago.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 8:21
- 4 Assets under management in the Mercado Pago wallet reached $23 billion, up nearly 70% year-over-year, driven by high inflation and the utility of the wallet for everyday transactions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 10:06
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 1:21
Intro and Thesis Update
Speakers note Mercado Libre is a top five position with accelerated growth but depressed margins due to an investment cycle. They discuss whether margins will return to pre-investment levels, which is critical for future returns, and mention other investors like Bill Miller and Tom Gaynor who have taken positions.
- 1:21 – 5:33
Marketplace Flywheels and Ecosystem Synergies
The hosts compare Mercado Libre's integrated flywheel (marketplace + payments/credit) to Amazon's scale-economy flywheel and Casper's ecosystem lock-in. They argue Meli's model is more powerful because payments and credit are deeply integrated, unlike Amazon's reliance on advertising.
- 5:33 – 13:09
Mercado Pago's Evolution and Data Advantage
Mercado Pago has evolved from a marketplace enabler to a standalone financial ecosystem, processing more off-marketplace volume than on-marketplace. It leverages transaction data for superior underwriting of merchant and consumer loans, creating a strong data moat and reducing customer acquisition costs.
- 13:09 – 22:19
Credit Growth, Accounting, and Risk Metrics
The credit book is growing rapidly, driven by consumer credit cards, which causes upfront loss recognition that depresses reported margins. Despite this, early delinquency metrics are stable or improving, and the book is well-capitalized with significant allowances for credit losses.
- 22:19 – 30:19
Competitive Landscape: Shopee and Market Growth
Shopee is a significant competitor in Brazil, challenging Mercado Libre on both low-end and mid-tier markets. However, the Latin American e-commerce market is large and growing, allowing multiple players to coexist, with Mercado Libre holding a dominant 43% share versus Shopee's 18%.
- 30:19 – 32:26
Shopee vs. Meli User Growth and Ecosystem Entrenchment
Shopee briefly surpassed Mercado Libre in monthly active app users in Brazil in early 2026, but Meli regained the lead by Q2 2026 with 134 million users versus Shopee's 130 million. The speakers argue Meli's ecosystem—combining marketplace, payments, credit, and logistics—creates high switching costs that make it difficult for competitors to capture high-quality customers.
- 32:26 – 35:13
Mondee and Shopee Credit Risks
The speakers identify Mondee (a C Limited subsidiary) as a potential threat to Mercado Pago, though it currently has only 1-2 million active credit users compared to Meli's 22 million. Shopee's credit book shows rising delinquencies, with 90-day delinquencies reaching 3% in Brazil, up from a group-wide 1%, suggesting risks as the loan book expands beyond buy-now-pay-later products.
- 35:13 – 37:05
Logistics Infrastructure and Scale
Shopee has expanded its Brazilian logistics network to 26 distribution centers (16 at start of year + 10 new), aiming to eventually surpass Meli in volume, though Meli remains 2.5-3x larger with 3 million square meters leased versus Shopee's 1 million. Meli plans to spend $5.7 billion in Brazil in 2026, including 14 new fulfillment centers, maintaining a significant infrastructure gap.
- 37:05 – 38:30
Amazon's Limited Impact in Brazil
Amazon invested ~$20 billion in Brazil in 2025, five times its average annual spend, yet maintained an 11% market share while Meli and Shopee each gained 3 percentage points. The speakers note Amazon's growth in Mexico has slowed due to tax reform and weak consumer demand rather than competition from Meli.
- 38:30 – 39:08
Market Structure: US vs. China Model
The speakers debate whether Brazil's e-commerce market will consolidate like the US (dominant platforms) or fragment like China (multiple players with thin margins). They argue Brazil is more likely to follow a US-like structure due to the high capital required to build logistics infrastructure, the dominance of Mercado Pago, and political incentives to support local companies.
- 39:08 – 43:28
Margin Compression Drivers
Operating margins fell from 12% to 6.3% due to credit loss provisions (4 percentage points in Q1, 2 in Q2), free shipping initiatives, and first-party retail investments. The speakers emphasize these are strategic investments to grow the ecosystem, not price wars, as Shopee is raising seller fees rather than cutting them.
- 43:28 – 52:52
Pix and Payment Strategy
The government-run PIX payment rail is seen as a neutral infrastructure that does not generate lending revenue, unlike Mercado Pago. Meli offers discounts for PIX payments to acquire customers cheaply, betting they will eventually convert to higher-margin credit and payment products within the ecosystem.
- 52:52 – 1:03:38
Valuation and Investment Thesis
The speakers updated their valuation model, projecting 2026 revenue of $40 billion (up 45%) and operating margins recovering to 13-14% by 2030 as investments scale back. They view Meli as a long-term hold, valuing the company at ~$3,000 per share with a 20% margin of safety, driven by the high-margin fintech side of the business.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| AmazonAMZN | equity | neutral | Amazon's e-commerce business, for example, was always a low margin business. They make money through ads and AWS and Meli's ads business is still growing fast. And instead of |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Mercado Libre is one of the speaker's top five positions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:00
How to verify: Check the Intrinsic Value Portfolio holdings disclosure or the speaker's personal portfolio updates on their website/social media. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bill Miller recently started a position in Mercado Libre.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:25
How to verify: Search Bill Miller's Miller Value Fund 13F filings for Q3 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMercado Pago is the sixth-largest credit card issuer in Brazil.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·8:01
How to verify: Check Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) reports on credit card issuance or Mercado Libre's investor presentations detailing market share. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Mercado Pago processed $101 billion in payments last quarter, more than four times the marketplace's $22 billion in goods sold.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·11:41
How to verify: Verify against Mercado Libre's Q3 2026 earnings report (likely released Nov 2026) or press release. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Mercado Pago has 88 million monthly active users, compared to 89 million buyers on Mercado Libre.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·12:01
How to verify: Check Mercado Libre's Q3 2026 earnings report for user metrics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Fintech revenue is 43% of total revenue, excluding currency effects.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·12:21
How to verify: Check Mercado Libre's Q3 2026 earnings report for segment revenue breakdown. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The credit portfolio was $16.5 billion at the end of June, up 75% year-over-year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·13:29
How to verify: Check Mercado Libre's Q2 2026 earnings report for credit book size and growth rate. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Mercado Libre added $2.1 billion of new money to its credit portfolio in Q2.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·13:49
How to verify: Check Mercado Libre's Q2 2026 earnings report for net lending activity. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Non-performing loans (15-90 days late) were 7% in Q2, down from 8% in Q1.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·18:12
How to verify: Check Mercado Libre's Q2 2026 earnings report for credit quality metrics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Brazilian household delinquency hit 6% in August, up more than a percentage point year-over-year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·19:18
How to verify: Check Brazil's Central Bank (BCB) financial stability reports or credit delinquency data for August 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Shopee had 120 million monthly active app users in Brazil compared to Meli's 115 million at the start of 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·30:19
How to verify: Shopee/C Limited investor presentations or earnings reports for Q1 2026; Meli Q1 2026 earnings report for user metrics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In Q2 2026, Meli had 134 million monthly active app users versus Shopee's 130 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·30:39
How to verify: Meli Q2 2026 earnings report; Shopee/C Limited Q2 2026 investor updates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Mercado Pago processed $109 billion in payments in Q2 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·30:59
How to verify: Meli Q2 2026 earnings report; Mercado Pago segment data in Meli's SEC filings (Form 20-F or 6-K). For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMercado Pago's credit book is $17.9 billion and growing 62% annually.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·30:59
How to verify: Meli Q2 2026 earnings report; Mercado Pago financial disclosures in Meli's SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceShopee's 90-day delinquencies in Brazil reached 3% in early 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:47
How to verify: Shopee/C Limited investor presentations or earnings reports for Q1/Q2 2026; Meli's analysis of competitor credit quality in earnings calls. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Meli leases 3 million square meters of warehouse space in Brazil, paying ~$100 million monthly rent.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:38
How to verify: Meli Q2 2026 earnings call transcript; Meli's SEC filings (Form 20-F) for lease commitments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceShopee leases 1 million square meters of warehouse space in Brazil, paying ~$33 million monthly rent.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·35:38
How to verify: Shopee/C Limited investor presentations; Meli's comparison of logistics scale in earnings calls. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Amazon invested ~$20 billion in Brazil in 2025.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:32
How to verify: Amazon Q4 2026 earnings report; Amazon's capital expenditure disclosures for International segment. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Amazon maintained 11% e-commerce market share in Brazil in 2025.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·37:52
How to verify: Market research reports from firms like Statista, Euromonitor, or local Brazilian market trackers; Amazon's investor presentations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Meli's operating margin fell to 6.3% in Q2 2026.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:08
How to verify: Meli Q2 2026 earnings report; SEC filing (Form 6-K or 20-F). For recent events, verify 2026-08-11 through 2026-11-11. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify Mercado Libre's Q2 2026 financial filings for credit loss provisions and operating margin compression details.
- Check Mercado Pago's assets under management and off-marketplace transaction volume growth in recent earnings reports.
- Compare Mercado Libre's market share and user growth metrics against Shopee and Amazon in Brazil using third-party market research firms like Statista or SimilarWeb.
- Review Shopee's (C Limited) quarterly reports for delinquency rates on its BNPL products in Brazil, specifically 90-day delinquency trends.
- Analyze Mercado Libre's capital expenditure plans for logistics infrastructure in Brazil, including the $5.7 billion 2026 spend and new fulfillment center openings.
- Assess the impact of Brazil's PIX payment rail on Mercado Pago's revenue mix and customer acquisition costs.
- Monitor Amazon's market share stability in Brazil despite its increased capital investment.
- Evaluate the sustainability of Mercado Libre's projected 13-14% operating margin recovery by 2030 based on historical investment cycles.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Meli is now one of our top five positions, so it feels timely to give an update. Margins are depressed because of the current investment cycle, but Meli has accelerated growth and improved user metrics across the board.
- 0:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Big question will be what we think about margins. If Meli can turn the switch and return to the margin profile pre-investment, this will be a stock returning well over 20% for the next few years. If not, there could be some more downside.
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we're not the only ones with a bullet. bullish outlook either. Bill Miller recently started a position and so did Tom Gaynor, although a small one for now, so we're in good company.
- 0:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Million downloads, we've learned directly from the world's best investors. Now, we're applying those lessons to analyze businesses and investment opportunities every week, helping you uncover intrinsic value. This show is not investment advice, it's intended for informational and entertainment purposes only. All opinions expressed by
- 1:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): hosts and guests are solely their own, and they may have investments in the securities discussed. And now, here are your hosts Sean O'Malley and Daniel Monk. Monka.
- 1:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What's
- 1:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): interesting is that Mercado Libre has been your starting point to cover really a whole number of e-commerce companies. And of course, you pitched Amazon as your first, but I think Melly gave you a different appreciation for really the flywheel effect of marketplaces, especially when combined with payments and credit. and logistics and advertising and all
- 1:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these other things. And after Melly, you covered C Limited, which I believe also made it into your personal portfolio. And then there's another company, Caspi, which I think might have also made it in your personal portfolio.
- 1:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I think it's uh safe to say I very much like how these businesses work together and also reinforce each other. And uh yes, I do own C Limited in my personal portfolio. I looked very smart. when I first bought it at about $70 and then went up to $130. So I thought this is you know a fantastic investment. Now I gotta say it's back in the 70s, so I don't look as smart anymore. And I haven't yet bought
- 2:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Caspi, but I might eventually do so too, because it's a fantastic company, and we will actually talk to management and our community soon. So the last couple of questions that I have, we might be able to ask them at that point. And then Amazon, which is you know another one of those companies, to me, it's is just a bit of a different business, primarily because you don't have the same flywheel effects, because the marketplace is just not as connected to the
- 2:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): other parts of the business. So Amazon's flywheel is primarily based on Nick Sleep's concept of scale economies share, the model that we often discussed in the past.
- 2:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 2:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sort of the mythology behind the idea of the flywheel is that it was actually written down on a napkin by Jeff Bezos in the early days of Amazon. And I don't know, I is that even true?
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's how the legend goes. You know, I see these photos. I don't know if they're actually 100% accurate. And whenever I hear about something written down on a napkin, I immediately think about Messi. That story might not land as well with our North American listeners, but back when a young Leonard Messi, who's the best football player of all time, and I don't go into any debate about that, he was trying out at Barcelona's Legendary
- 3:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Youth Academy. And the scouts there were so impressed, they wrote basically the first contract of Messi on a napkin to make sure that there is no other team snapping him up because he was still looking out for some other teams in Spain. And that napkin was actually sold at an auction, I think just a couple of years ago, for about a million dollars. But that's a totally different story. I sometimes digress, talking about football. Back
- 3:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to Amazon and its self reinforcing Self-reinforcing cycle. So the entire idea is that Amazon uses cost savings derived derive from obviously scale. to then lower prices, which improves convenience for people who buy there. And then also they invest that money into logistics, which then again leads to faster shipping and it's just a much better offering for other people buying on Amazon. And then in turn, that attracts more
- 3:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shoppers, and more shoppers also lead to more volume and then obviously scale. And that is how you have this flywheel starting to spin.
- 3:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 3:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then from the merchant side, high traffic on Amazon attracts. outside merchants and brands to offer their products in Amazon and use their logistics network for fulfillment. And the more merchants Amazon attracts, the better the variety of products, and then the better the prices become because of increased competition. And thus it becomes more valuable
- 4:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for buyers again. And it really is one of the most beautiful flywheels out there, perhaps rivaled only by our favorite Uber.
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, there's not one episode where we won't talk about Uber. It doesn't matter which company we actually cover. I would actually argue though, it gets a bit more beautiful. And that's when you combine that marketplace flywheel we just talked about with payments and credit. I know you don't like payments standalone, but here I think it's quite powerful. So Amazon basically depends heavily on advertising dollars, and as we've talked about plenty of times
- 4:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recently, that business seems at least much more uncertain than let's say six months ago. And Mellie's profit driver comes from its payment in credit arm, so not yet from advertising. I would say that advertising is still a great opportunity for them, but there's no dependence on that yet, at least not to the same extent as Amazon is experiencing it. And I don't see how payments or credit would be disintermediated through AI
- 5:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or agents, and in fact it might yet actually turn into another advantage looking out for the next five to ten years.
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 5:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): comes up with its own risk, but perhaps we start there just because it is such an important topic for Meli. And so let me ask you, I mean, has anything changed in terms of how you think about Mercado Pago or Mercado Gredito in the Meli thesis here?
- 5:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 5:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was a very good pronunciation. I almost thought you were Brazilian for a moment here.
- 5:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But I
- 5:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would say for anything, um I'm just more bullish. But just to give some background, especially for listeners who didn't listen to the first episode. So Mercado Pago and Mercado Creditor are why they're so powerful for the flywheel, right? So what Mercado Pago is doing, it's basically the payments arm for Mercado Lieper. And people often compare to PayPal. I think we might need to choose something else eventually as a comparison, since
- 5:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that might not be a compliment for much longer. Maybe it has stopped being a compliment for quite some time already. And
- 5:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pain PaynePow. pal.
- 5:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Pain pal,
- 5:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 6:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's not what you want to be compared to. I think if you're uh a striving. business as Mercado Pago is and basically what they do is they make money through online checkout and QR codes and so forth. And they also have these point of sales devices in physical stores. It's a very small part of how they actually make money, but at least they get some dominant market share in parts of the market that you know they don't have on the
- 6:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): marketplace. So on Mercado Libre. And what they do is that they take a small fee per transaction. And now we actually see that Mercado Pago processes more volume off Melly's marketplace than on it. And I think that's a very important step in the evolution of Mercado Pago because initially it was created to basically enable more people to order online on Mercado Libre. So it was
- 6:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a clear extension of the marketplace viral. But so you
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
- 6:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you had buyers in Latin America that didn't trust the product would actually arrive, and then sellers didn't trust that they would actually get paid when they sent out the product. So then Pago basically sat in the middle and held the money until both sides were happy.
- 6:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And Mercado Pago could offer great deals for shoppers. So it made a lot of sense for Mercado Libre customers to use Mercado Pago. And Pago customers, in turn, shopped more often on Mercado Libre because of the offer. So it was a great engine for customer lock-in. lock in. And then with scale, Pago also turned into a really important data aggregator. And so a seller who
- 7:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lists on Meli gets paid through Mercado Pago. And once Melly knows how much that seller sells, how seasonal their business is, and how reliably they ship their products, it can offer them a working capital loan to help them buy more inventory. And the the seller uses that loan to stock up and sells more on Mercado Libre. And then the data gets better,
- 7:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then you have more supply and it lowers prices. And it's all again part of this flywheel. that is very, very strong for Mercado Libre.
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And on the buyer side, when for example you had checkout, Meli can offer you a Mercado Pago credit card or even an installment plan right there, which in Brazil that's how a lot of people pay with using these installments whenever they check out. And that offer directly improves conversion, obviously. And then more conversion Version means more GMV. And then more GMV means you get now even more data than you had before. And the
- 8:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): data makes the next credit. decision even better. So then basically the customer acquisition engine is driving down a cost, where in the end, your custom acquisition cost is essentially zero. And by now, Mercado Pago is the sixth largest credit card issuer in Brazil. And as you said, so-called ecosystem customers. So basically, customers that use Pago and Mercado Libre instead of
- 8:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just one of them generate about 70% more GMV than someone who only shops on Mercado. Libre, and about 90% more payment volume than someone who only uses Mercado Pago. So the share of those users, the ones that use both, has actually increased 8% points since the end of 2023. And that's the flywheel of pago off the marketplace and
- 8:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the marketplace.
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you mentioned GMV. And so just to clarify, stands for gross merchandise value and refers to everything sold on the platform. all the transaction, the total transaction value of the commerce that Mercado Libre facilitates, not necessarily the revenue that it takes. And another term that we're going to be using a lot today is flywheel. And I think we might even use it at a
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): record-breaking rate. It seems like we can't stop saying it.
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We might, but I would say it's not our fault. Melly's just incredibly good at building them. And perhaps we can call it a mix of a network and scale effect for the part outside of the market. marketplace. So how Pago basically works off the marketplace is that you have a small shop in, for example, Sao Paulo or Mexico City that puts a Mercado Pago point of sales device on the counter or it just prints a QR code.
- 9:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And Meli actually has a lot of these devices. Again, they don't make a lot of money from it because it's a very low margin business, but it helps them expanding the business. So for example, in Mexico alone, you have 1.4 million of these devices. And now that those shops sales basically flow through Mercado Pago, Mali can also lend to a merchant that has never sold anything on Mercado Libre because it still
- 9:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sees all the shops' actual daily revenue. And then once you as a consumer pay at your local corner store with Mercado Pago, it only makes sense for you to also keep money in the wallet because Mercado Pago Parko is actually paying your return. And that matters a lot, especially in these countries where usually inflation is quite high and it's a needs way to you're weigh your savings. And it's also why assets under management are now
- 10:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty-three billion dollars. And that's up almost 70% in a year. So incredible growth there at basically every part of the business. And again, once your money's in the app, you basically pay your bills through it, you send money to friends, and you also use the card for things that have nothing to do with the e commerce. So imagine groceries, maybe gas, or just going out regularly.
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I
- 10:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think the data advantage of the off-marketplace use is that Mercado Libre now has a complete picture of someone's financial behavior. And so we talked about how people are more likely to repay Meli loans because they don't want to lose access to the Meli ecosystem, which is really essential to everyday life in some ways. But with the off-market place data, Meli
- 10:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can now also spot when consumers are more cautious with their spending with unrelated merchants. And that's really crucial. to doing better underwriting, which helps make credit cheaper overall and safer to offer. And then that can bring in more users, and around and around the flywheel we go.
- 11:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There it is again, the flywheel. But this is actually something that we saw at an even more extreme level at Caspi, where Caspi is so entrenched in the everyday life Day of people in Kazakhstan that the first loan they would pay back is always Casped Caspie's because they can't afford to lose. access because there you also talk about all these government services that basically run through the app. And you can see that in numbers when, for example, you're checking
- 11:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how many loans they would cover even after no payments have been made in 90 days. Usually that number is incredibly low. It has been quite high, at least relative for Caspian. If Meli ever comes close to that, I think that would be the ultimate bull case. But that's unlikely given that I don't ever see them reaching super app status. And I also don't think they would need that. So the numbers already show
- 11:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how strong this second flavor is. For example, the marketplace sold about $22 billion of goods last quarter. Mercado Pago processed about $101 billion of payments. So payment volume is more than four times the size of the marketplace. And Mercado Pago has 88 million monthly active users. That's roughly the same as the 89 million people who
- 12:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bought something on MacDonald. Mercado Libre in the last quarter. And again, we're always talking about all that growth. This one is growing 30% a year. So fintech is already 43% of revenue, excluding currency effects. And it grew even faster than CallMerts in each of the last three quarters. And that's why I don't think it's actually crazy to say that Mercado Pago could one day, and maybe that day is not even
- 12:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that far away, be bigger than Mercado Libre, the legacy business, basically. We've seen this before. by the way. You know, PayPal was spun out of eBay in 2015, and the payments company ended up being far more valuable than the marketplace that created it. Now we see how their market caps slowly, unfortunately, go down and narrow in terms of the gap there. And then even Alibaba's Ant Group was set to
- 12:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have the largest IPO in history in 2020 before Chinese regulators pulled it. So I don't think Meli would ever spin off Mercado Pago. But then again, C Limited just announced. plans to spin off money, which is their payments arm, so you never really know. And I'm actually quite interested to hear what they will say about that going forward because to me it makes sense to raise money to
- 13:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): grow the book. But if they lose any of the synergies between the marketplace and the payments arm, I think that would be a big negative, in my opinion.
- 13:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The difference with PayPal is obviously that Mercado Libre has this massive lens. lending business and they lend to both consumers and merchants. And the credit portfolio is growing fast. It was $16.5 billion at the end of June, up 75% year over year. And in January, we said it had been compounding at 80 to 90% a year for five years.
- 13:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So it's still growing at similar rates, despite having this much bigger base. And in the second quarter alone, Melly Meli put $2.1 billion of new money into it. And you always want to be careful when credit portfolios are growing that fast, but especially so when it happens with South American consumers, where the market there just tends to be a bit riskier for
- 13:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lenders.
- 13:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The markets are definitely less stable and the lending business is called Mercado Credit too, just to say it once again. And it's become a major profit driver for Meli, especially in recent years. And it's not a new business unit. So Meli first started underwriting loans in the mid-teens, I think it was 2016. And then they quickly followed up with consumer loan. So they first started loaning money to merchants and then they went into
- 14:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): consumer loan, which is how a lot of companies do it, also the ones that we covered. So they basically have a track record already of lending money for about a decade. And merchant loans, again, a pretty safe bet to start off, which is why so many companies start out with them. Even Grab didn't, which is a company that we discussed in a prior episode. It was you actually who covered the company. And if you're a seller on Meli and for example you need inventory
- 14:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for Black Friday, which is coming up, a bank would ask for collateral and probably years of tax returns before they would actually give you a loan. Meli, on the other hand, they know exactly how much that seller sold last Black Friday and how often customers actually come back, and then also how reliably they ship. So it can basically offer a short working capital loan and then collect the repayment straight
- 14:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): out of the seller's future sales on the platform because they go through Mercado Piper. So the risk is pretty low because Meli has the best information possible and it also controls the cash flows. And basically, you know, that's how the loan gets repaid.
- 15:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The focus now is on the consumer side and credit cards, though, is my understanding. They're almost half the entire lending book. And Melly keeps issuing effectively two and a half to maybe three million new credit cards. each quarter, which is just insane. And as you said earlier, Mercado Pago is now the sixth largest credit card
- 15:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): issuer in all of Brazil, which is a huge market.
- 15:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sometimes the numbers are so big that I just have to Google if they actually make sense. Two and a half to three million credit cards per quarter. That's just an insane amount. But you know these are the numbers that a company like Meli can pull off because they just operate in one of the biggest markets. in the world, which is why we find it that they have incredible tailwinds, which is why we like to invest in them. And you just mentioned that with this shift, basically the
- 15:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mixed shift to credit cards, it's also the reason for why the margins have shifted. And we will get to that. But the difference between the merchant loans and the consumer loans through credit cards is especially the time horizon. So a merchant loan is usually quite short. Meli Melly sees, you know, the merchant sales and it pays back within months. A credit card is obviously a sort of revolving line to a consumer with a
- 16:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long tail. And the only thing that Melly sees is that person's behavior. So that's still a lot of data, more than a bank sees, but it's also a different kind of risk compared to these merchant loans. And on the accounting and margin front, what changes is that when Mercado Pago issues a new card, it has to book the expected losses over the upcoming period for that card more or less on day one. While
- 16:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the interest income from the card comes in at a lag. So if you grow a cardbook slowly, you would barely notice that. But if you grow it 90% a year, you're recognizing losses on millions of cards that haven't earned anything yet. So basically your reported profit looks worse the faster you grow it, even if every one of those cards is profitable over its lifetime, at least
- 16:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): potentially.
- 16:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 16:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Meli's Melly's cards are very profitable, we've found once they mature. The card portfolio as a whole is still loss making. Its net interest margin after losses was minus two and a half percent last quarter versus roughly break-even a year earlier because card issuance had accelerated. But management says a cohort of cards
- 17:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reaches breakeven within about 12 to 18 months. And as a result of the Q4 results, about three three-quarters quarters of the Brazilian card cardbook book had already. reached that point. And the estimates are that the card business will lose a bit less than 450 million in operating profit this year. And that will break even by 2028. And then it should
- 17:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): earn around 1.5 billion a year by the end of the decade. And obviously that also depends on this continued growth and on the credit card side of things. So the bull case for credit really is that today's loss is. losses are tomorrow's profits, right? And the bare case is that those losses aren't just timing, but they're really structural
- 17:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): issues for the business model. So how would you say uh we tell the difference between those two things?
- 17:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well what you usually do is you look at the loans that go bad, not the provisions, which is basically the money that is booked as losses up front. So the metric is the non performing loan ratio. And you check two points in time usually. So there are loans that are fifteen to ninety days late, and that's essentially your early warning sign. And then there are loans that are late more than 90 days, which
- 18:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in most of the cases that means they're gone. So the 15 to 90 day ratio was about seven percent in Q two, down from eight percent in Q one. So there was a slight improvement there. And then for cards Card specifically, it's only about four and a half percent, which the company says is close to an all all-time time low. So despite seven 75% growth, credit quality hasn't deteriorated, at least in the early pockets. And then
- 18:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the 90-day plus NPLs, they did move up slightly. So they went from 17.5% to 18.5%. So you also saw lost provisions for the Brazilian consumer go up earlier this year, since merely stretched, and I think this is what we discussed in the latest update, the length of the personal loans from five months to eight months to reach new customers. And that all already normalized in
- 18:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Q2, but it definitely does show that the book does react when they push into these new segments of customers.
- 18:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And they're really doing this at a pretty tricky moment, honestly. According to Brazil's central bank, household delinquency hit six percent in August, which is up more than a percentage point in a year. And across the whole financial system, delinquency is at its highest level since 2011. So Meli is trying to grow its cardbook 90% year over year
- 19:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): into what is really the worst Brazilian consumer credit environment we've seen in 15 years.
- 19:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 19:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): isn't it kind of reassuring how well they are holding up? And also the fact that you can follow the numbers so well and just see how they change within just a quarter and what you know Meli Melly can do to change and basically adjust to what the numbers are telling them. And maybe that's just me showing my confirmation bias here. Maybe it's uh a bigger risk than I portray it as here. But up until now, the book
- 19:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): has never been through an actual Brazilian recession of significant size at least. And Melly does resolve heavily, as we just said. So the allowance for credit losses is four and a half billion dollars against sixteen and a half billion dollars for the entire book. So more than a quarter of the portfolio is already set aside for potential losses. And they're also adding lower risk for. products. So I do
- 20:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expect the book to get less risky over time, the more it's maturing, basically. So in July, Mercado Pago started offering payroll loans to private sector workers in Brazil, where repayment basically comes straight out of the borrower's salary. And they signed, I think, 5,000 contracts in the pilot for just the first four days. And again, while Mercado Pago takes more risk
- 20:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): per loan than, for example, another portfolio company of ours, which is Newbank, it does get paid roughly twice as much as Newbank. So the net interest margin after losses across the entire book was 21% in Q2, lower than the 23% a year ago, because cards are having a bigger share of the book now, but it's still a very profitable lending business.
- 20:43
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- 20:43
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- 22:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): de-risking the portfolio from credit cards because I think I would rather have less margin with much less risk of a significant blow-up occurring.
- 22:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm with you on that. I think we discussed the sort of bad asymmetry of having such a finance business. So the less risk there is, the better it is for the business.
- 22:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 22:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think we're agreed on that. So let me ask you about just the competitive front. I mean, you also own C Limited, as we talked about, and uh I take it to you believe that Shopee, which is the subsidiary of C Limited, can be successful in its expansion in Brazil and South America too. Is that right?
- 22:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, again, I bought C in the 70s per share. So I thought at that point it was just an incredibly cheap stock. So I don't think you need Brazil to succeed in a way that they would actually replace Meli as the number one. I think that's definitely not my base case. It's not actually my bull case for C Limited or Shopee, at least not in Brazil. So the good thing is, I'm saying this somewhat jokingly, that this is
- 22:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): also an emotional hatch for me where Meli is a much larger position. So while I want C to perform well, if it doesn't, at least in Brazil, that means at least a competitor is struggling. So jokes aside, I I feel like C Limited keeps performing well fundamentally. And I do believe that the South American e-commerce market. and this is what we said in our original pitch, is probably big
- 23:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enough for two or three players. So it's expected to grow roughly 11% a year over the next decade, mostly driven by higher e-commerce penetration. As I said in the original episode, e-commerce penetration in Latin America is only around 14 to 15%. In the US, you see that roughly 25%. The UK is actually close to 30%. thirty percent. And China, unsurprisingly,
- 23:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is well above 30%. thirty percent. So usually I would say that you can't blindly compare such rates just across countries and even continents. But in this case, I believe Latin America and especially the big markets like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, which are the biggest ones for Mercado Libre too. I think they have all that it takes to reach those levels of e-commerce penetration too.
- 23:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We're definitely seeing a wave of digitalization in all of those countries, especially in the financial system. which is why we like Mercado Libre and also New Bank. And you have this really young and tech savvy generation in this part of the world. And countries like Brazil also have a lot of money by global standards. Brazil's GDP per capita is about 10 to
- 24:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 11,000 US dollars. And just for context, in many Southeast Asian countries, that number is closer to $5,000. So the average Brazilian, at least in GDP terms, is effectively twice as wealthy.
- 24:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 24:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it took a while for private companies like Meli to build out the logistics and the payment systems to even enable e-commerce. So the infrastructure wasn't there as it was in the US and Europe. So obviously there was a time lag that they basically had to close, and that was the private sector, not the public sector. But we all say this basically to show that the market is big enough to have multiple players grow profitably for a
- 24:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long time. And that said, obviously. the economics are better the more concentrated the market is. And the two competitors worth talking about, I think, especially when it comes to competing with Meli on the big scale, are C Limited and Amazon. Although I personally consider C to be the fiercest competitor. So for anyone who missed our C Limited episode that we also did, the short version is
- 25:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): C Limited has three businesses. So they have Garena, Garina, which is a gaming company, and they have this one. massive hit, which is called Free Fire. And that's an evergreen game that is their cash engine and also their engine to expanding into different and global markets. Then you have Shopee, which as you just alluded to is the e-commerce marketplace of C-Limited, which is especially dominant in
- 25:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Southeast Asia, but it has also expanded successfully into Brazil. And then you have Money, which is their fintech arm. So they basically compete with Meli Melly in Brazil in e-commerce. fintech, and also in lending.
- 25:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The really impressive part is that they built a substantial logistics business and delivery network in Brazil in just a couple of years. And since Amazon, we've always had this belief that logistics is a huge moat. But C really showed that hey, with perfect execution and some investment, it can actually be recreated and copied much
- 26:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): faster than most. people would have thought possible.
- 26:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Shoppy definitely outperformed all the expectations I had for them just a couple of years ago. Also, as I said, you didn't have the same infrastructure as NDS. So basically you expected the mode to be an even bigger one for Melly because they had to build the logistics all by themselves. And now you had a player coming in that is using a lot of third parties and is basically creating a pretty good experience itself. And it's not easy to
- 26:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): imagine how the two would coexist without constantly being a threat for each other. I hear a lot of Meli Bulls somewhat neglecting Shopee as a player for mainly the lower end of the market because of Meli's GMV dominance. You know, Meli's GMV is still about two and a half times higher than Shopee's GMV, despite Shopee now being on par and even slightly ahead when it
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): comes to the total amount of items sold in Brazil. And I don't think you can view Shopee as a low end commerce place. I think they have already been successful at expanding into higher end products in other markets through what they call Shopee Mall. And that's basically where they partner with these high quality brands in all kinds of industries. And Shopee Mall has more than doubled in the first quarter and is now
- 27:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about 15% of Shopee's Brazilian GMV. And that obviously helped increase its average order value in Brazil too, where Shopee now signs deals with major electronic dealers in Brazil. to offer more electronics on its side, which is a typical product. As we also discussed with some of these other companies that we looked at in the e-commerce space, it's a critical product to attract higher quality
- 27:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): customers. And just like Mercado Libre, Shopee expanded into pharmacy after Brazil's health regulator lifted a 2022 ban. So licensed pharmacies can now sell medicines on platforms like Shopee and Mali. Meli.
- 27:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So you can see how they're uh continuing to clone the Amazon playbook, right? You can get prescriptions delivered through Amazon. Surprisingly, that's the one thing I don't get delivered through Amazon. But uh Shopee in its own right launched a loyalty program called Shopee VIP, and it's priced at exactly the price of
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Meli's basic tier, but it offers free shipping on orders above 10 Reyes, while Meli's melee's free shipping is starts at 19 reyes and so for context 10 reis conversion rate on that is about two US dollars so it's a five to one ratio and and that's a pretty attractive offering which is why it has
- 28:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): already gained a million users in just the last six months and for context though Meli does not disclose its subscriber numbers but estimates are around the sort of 12 to 15 million range. and they're still growing 70% year over year. So I expect the gap to remain pretty material going forward. I'm not too worried about it.
- 28:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 28:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would be surprised if it closes meaningfully, but average order value is an important metric for me at least that I track to see whether Shopee will gain significant share among higher end customers in Brazil, or better said, whether customers will choose Shopee for those purchases in the future. because many customers are already using both apps. So they use Meli and they use Shopee, and then Meli
- 28:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): usually for the high quality and the high trust product and Shopee for the lower tier of the mark. But again, I don't think that's where Shopee has to be for the entirety of their presence in Brazil.
- 29:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What I do like is that Meli is not only trying to defend And the upper market, but also the lower end of things. So they don't just lose those customers to Shopify. Shopi. And then sort of the innovators' dilemma where Shopee can start on the low end and slowly build scale and move up market to better challenge Mercado Libre. And while it costs them some margin right now
- 29:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to focus on the lower end, I think lowering the threshold for free shipping and these similar moves that they're making is really a great way for them to win market share and is correspondingly a great long-term long term investment as they try to fend off. Shopee.
- 29:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's definitely working. I mean, the Brazilian e-commerce market was estimated to be about $100 billion last year, and Meli has about a 43% share in that market, and Shopee has 18%. And both actually grew through percentage points. So Shopee's not taking share from Meli, but mostly from legacy incumbents, just like Meli is. And they're not doing well at all. I mean, these
- 29:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): legacy players, you have Casas Bahia, which basically filed for judicial recovery in August. And then you have another big player, or what used to be a big player, Americanas, whose online sales fell almost 70% last year. So Meli also made a comeback in at users, which is important because more and more commerce is obviously moving to mobile. And that's where Shopee is
- 30:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): extremely strong. First of all, given its roots in mobile gaming, but then also because of the Southeast Asian company, and obviously e-commerce over there has basically skipped the desktop era entirely. So Shopee had more monthly active app users in Brazil than Meli just a year ago, which was about 120 million compared to Meli's 115 million. In the second quarter of this year, Meli was back
- 30:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ahead actually with 134 million against 130 million for Shopee. So Meli's user base significantly outgrew Shopee, at least if we trust these estimates. And the reason it's so important that Meli keeps serving. all customers is that Meli's biggest strength, in my opinion, is its ecosystem, which just becoming increasingly entrenched. So a customer finds a product on the marketplace, perhaps
- 30:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even through a Melee ad, then pays for it using Mercado Pago, and then potentially even getting credit from Mercado Credito. And then it gets delivered by Mercado Envious, which is Melee's least logistics the business. And then at some point a customer is just so entrenched that it will be incredibly hard for him to, you know switch to a different marketplace, at least for these high quality products that matter.
- 31:19
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- 31:39
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- 31:58
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- 32:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): superhuman.com slash T-I-V. That's superhuman.com slash T I V P.
- 32:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 32:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so that's why it's also important for us to watch out for money spelled M-O-N-E-E. And that is another subsidiary of C Limited. And if money were to grab share from Mercado Pago, I think that would be another warning sign.
- 32:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Definitely. But I think that's another huge market where technically both can coexist for a while. That said, I would probably see money gaining shares even more of a problem than children. Shopee, just because it would make the entrenchment theory much more difficult for Mali. Because by now, a huge differentiator is that people can go to Shopee to buy some of these products, but the entrenchment where you have the
- 33:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): marketplace, you have the payments, and you have the credit, that's mostly happening on Meli for Brazilian customers.
- 33:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fortunately for the time being, C Limited's money business is not really even close to rivaling Pago or Credito. And so Shopi hasn't launched a credit card in Brazil, even though they have the license to do so. And its main credit product is still the Shopee Pay Later, sort of the buy now pay litter at checkout product,
- 33:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which accounts for about 10% of its Brazilian gross merchandise value. And those loans have an average term of about three months and carry interest of almost 10% a month. And we're also starting to see delinquencies tick up. Last time you said you'd be very surprised if C could hold its non-performing loans at 1% of their
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): total. And so C's group wide 90-day number is still 1% for now. But in Brazil specifically, the funds that hold Shopee's loans show 90 90-day day delinquencies up to about 3% in a little over a year. And the more they expect, expand that loan book, especially into categories outside of buy now, pay
- 34:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): later, the more we should expect that number to go up.
- 34:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm pretty confident the trend will continue. And it's more of a mechanical thing in the end. So the loan book is growing so fast, just as it is for Mali, that some bet loans are simply not yet accounted for in the 90 day number. Numbers. So there's a time lag, once again, between when they actually go bad and then when it shows up. And C doesn't disclose. 15 to 90 day NPLs as Melly does. So you don't see
- 34:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that number going up anytime before the 90 days where we actually get the new number. And we should emphasize again, officially, the NPLs of money are still at 1%, not 3%. But money is generally still more of a digital wallet, whereas Pago has obviously evolved into much more than that. So that's why money has only an estimated one to two million active credit users in
- 34:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Brazil. whereas Meli has more than 22 million.
- 34:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Do
- 34:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have any updates on C's logistics network compared to Melee? Because I heard that C had expanded its footprint quite significantly. And they had something like 16 distribution centers at the start of this year, but built another 10 in the last 12 months. And five of those are fulfillment centers. Is that all sort of right? And how does that frame the
- 35:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): competition here?
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's correct. And we should clarify that's just in Brazil, obviously. And C CFO has said the goal is to eventually have a bigger fulfillment network than its competitors in absolute volume. Obviously he's talking about Meli in that term. And he said that might take a few years. I doubt they will get there, but it definitely means they're not planning on stopping spending money.
- 35:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You say you'll doubt they'll get there because we're talking about a pretty big gap between them cell, so right?
- 35:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yes.
- 35:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a very big gap. So Melly leases about three million square meters of warehouse space in Brazil and Shopee about one million. So Meli pays about almost a hundred million reasons a month in rent, Shopee about thirty-three million. So Meli's network is still roughly two and a half to three times bigger than Shopee's. And Meli will spend another fifty-seven 7 billion in Brazil this
- 35:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): year alone, including 14 new fulfillment centers, which is why I'm saying I don't see the gap closing anytime soon.
- 36:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 36:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when you say lease, it's really just about warehouses there. Both companies lease their warehouses to keep the businesses from being more capital intensive, to keep them less capital intensive. And the real difference is in how much of the delivery network each one controls. And so Melly Meli runs its last mile through dedicated carriers, where it is usually
- 36:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the main or only. customer. And its new one hour delivery in Sao Paulo runs through its own network. And so Shopee's delivery arm, on the other hand, handles most of its orders, but it does crowdsource drivers, and its four-hour service runs through basically these partner stores. So Meli
- 36:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): has tighter control over speed and reliability, but Shopee has. a cheaper, looser network to maintain. And before we go any further, is there anything about Amazon that we should talk about? Because basically, Amazon is a competitor in Latin America, not nearly as dominant as it is in the US, but Amazon will
- 37:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): seemingly be there to compete more directly with Meli for the highest quality tier of customers in e-commerce.
- 37:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 37:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think a couple of years ago, basically before Shopee. showed up, most investors were concerned about Amazon, yes. But I think now we could say that still not too much has changed. In 2025, Amazon invested close to 20 billion raise in Brazil, which was about five times its average annual investment there since it entered the country. So it's expanded its logistics primarily,
- 37:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): launched an ultra fast delivery service, and also ran a campaign at the beginning of this year, letting new sellers join without paying. any commissions. Sharewise, though, that didn't seem to move the needle because Amazon is still sitting at the same 11% of market share that it did last year, while Meli and Shopee again both grew three percentage points. So just for context,
- 37:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 20 billion raise is a lot of money, but Meli invests three times that this year. So Mexico is probably the market where it's a closer fight. Amazon's Mexican network is about 30 thirty times bigger than when it started and reaches more than five hundred cities. And Mexico is where Meli's common growth actually slowed this year, which we will get to later. But management is saying that it's still growing faster than its
- 38:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): competitor, which in this case Meli is referring to Amazon, and the slowdown had more to do with the tax reform and the weak consumer overall than with competition of Amazon.
- 38:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you were to have to summarize how you currently view the dynamic between Meli and its competitors, what would be the best way for you to do that?
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think we hype up Meli so much that I also want to be very honest, even though some Melee bullets might not want to hear that, more competition is never good. And Shopee has clearly been more competition than I assume anyone would have thought when they entered Brazil. And as Mango once Monset, said, we have found in a long life that one competitor is frequently enough to ruin a business. So
- 38:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't think this will be the case here. Otherwise, obviously we wouldn't be invested in the stock. But I don't believe either that Meli will ever be without a competent competitor again. And that has been the case for many, many years before Shopee and some of these other competitors entered the market. So the question is: what does that mean for the mature margins of the business?
- 39:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 39:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that's a question. Any uh fundamental industrier investor in Meli is asking themselves, um, and what has really happened here to current margins is it's been a downward slope from 12% to a little less than 7%. And that's the lowest margins have hit in four years. And now it seems you really have two camps of investors and how they
- 39:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think about things. And so one camp says, you know, hey, look, Meli will never get Ever back to 12% margins because it now faces its most intense competition yet. And competition's only going to intensify. And so that's one perspective. And then the other camp compares these investments to say what Amazon was doing in the US in the early
- 39:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2000s, where short-term investments result in an even stronger moat and thus even more earnings power and margin potential in the long Long-term, term, even if short-term margins are compressed by that reinvestment spending. And what underlines that view is really how successful these investments have been at
- 40:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): acquiring new customers and improving usage among long-term customers. And Melly posted its fastest revenue growth in four years up 50%. And then it posted its first quarter above $10 billion in revenue.
- 40:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's definitely incredible, just at this scale, how fast the business is still growing. And I know we all want a definite answer to this question of where margins will be. And I also know many pretend they have it. I admit that I don't. I can only look at the facts, then compare things to, for example, Amazon back then with their investment cycle, and then add the knowledge that I hope I've gained after looking at all the
- 40:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Asian e-commerce players and how they typically operate. And I think people often forget that things seem obvious after the fact. So when Amazon started reinvesting massively in its business, the majority of the market believed Amazon simply had an unprofitable business model. And they faced all the same criticism Melly does today, even more so since the model back then was completely
- 41:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unproven. And it's also important to know that Amazon operated in the strongest and most advanced e-commerce market in the world. So they were able to reach a monopoly-like monopoly like position before any competitor was actually able to recreate really create something similar. And that's not Melly's situation. Although the market share numbers would actually look quite similar, I think a major difference in the US is that you have
- 41:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): competitors like Walmart and Target that people don't consider typical e-commerce competition. But ultimately a sale that goes to Walmart can go to Amazon. So the big question for Melly is whether Brazil, Deal, Argentina and eventually also Mexico will look more like the US and Europe or more like China with you know multiple major players and much more dynamic
- 41:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): competition generally.
- 41:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To me, the former seems probably more likely. While there's still plenty of room to grow, Brazil is not some young market that could still go in any direction by any means. And then it's hard to imagine where all the other competitors are really supposed to come from and what role they would serve that's not yet being catered to. And as you mentioned, there's also a
- 42:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): real political incentive here to help South American companies succeed instead of flooding the market with Chinese players in their products.
- 42:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): If you compare the characteristics one to one, it seems definitely more likely that Bozilla would end up with a US like structure. So on logistics, for example, the reason new e commerce players in China could expand so quickly is that the third third-party party career carrier infrastructure is so incredibly good. So the so-called Tongda franchise plus carriers like
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): JT, they move more than 70% of China's parcels at incredibly low prices. In Brazil, on the other hand, an Antwint needs to build the entire infrastructure itself. So for payments, many problems are now solved, but Mercado Pago still had the first move advantage. And then if you compare that to the US, you had neutral card networks, which is why no competitor could.
- 42:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): use payments as a sort of weapon or at least major advantage against the competition. And then in China, you have a duopoly outside the marketplaces with Alipay and WeChat. So Ten Cents Rail basically powered Alibaba's challenges like Pindu Aduo and Duyin. So all of this could be an important differentiator because Mercado Pago is already highly
- 43:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dominant and it's owned by Meli, obviously, which opens up all sorts of ecosystem benefits. And the same goes for credit. Amazon never had a lending book, and in China, this space is much more regulated since and financial. So this is the sort of advantage that is pretty unique to Melly.
- 43:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm gonna show my ignorance here on payments again, but my understanding is that there's a government-led government led payment network called PIX, P-I-X. P I X. And is that something that could cause any pressure on Mercado Pago's business, or are they doing different things? How much overlap is there?
- 43:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes and no is the uh the short answer. I would say that it could be a problem, but also there are a couple of benefits that Pago actually has because of Pix. So, for example, the more benefits for Mercado Pago customers are in the app, especially when they use Meli, the more sense it makes for customers to use. Pago to pay. So I think I'd rather have a government
- 44:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): created Pix as a competitor than an alternative created by a competitor. So PIX is a problem, but it doesn't do any lending. It's only a rail for basically payments to go through. And that's not where most of the value is coming from with Mercado Pago and Creditor.
- 44:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so another difference from when Amazon built its e-commerce business is that the barriers to entry have come down since platform. platforms like TikTok have been able to expand into the space and customers no longer have to come through product search, but you can actually have hundreds of millions of people find their way through social media, which clearly makes it
- 44:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): easier to spawn an e-commerce business out of nothing, especially when that delivery infrastructure is already effectively in place.
- 44:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which I should say is only partly the case in South America. We also need to consider obviously the massive size difference between countries like Brazil and China. So for example, China's physical goods e commerce is about $1.8 trillion and an industry-wide GMV margin of 2%. That would mean there's a profit pool of roughly $36 billion a year. So I would personally
- 45:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): say that's enough to have four players fight for that pool. And then even in the US, the market is $1.2 one point two trillion. dollars. So if you compare that, Brazil's market is only estimated to be sixty to eighty billion dollars, depending on the definition of GMV. It could also be slightly higher. So it's obviously growing fast, but for players currently getting into Brazil, they would need to spend billions
- 45:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of dollars while mathematically not being able to make any profits because the market is just not big enough yet. So most public companies, I would assume, don't want to burn through billions of dollars for years to potentially open up a new market that is far away from their core market, which is true for basically all of the global e-commerce players not yet in Brazil,
- 45:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): especially when you already have a dominant and well executing player like Melly in the market, and also a player like Shopee, who is catering to the lower end of the market.
- 45:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Just to get back to the margin story, I think the reason that margins are down supports the thesis that it's not really all competitive pressure. I mean, sure, Melly wouldn't need to spend all that money if Shopee didn't exist. But we don't see price wars happening where either one of them are really significantly cutting their take rates. And actually, Shopee has been
- 46:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): raising seller fees for a while now. So if you want to enter a price war to take market share, that's really the opposite of what you would want to do. And so the margin compression really is coming from. investment sending credit and free shipping. And then of course expanding logistics, but not from cutting their take rates to undermine each other.
- 46:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Booking the provisions, which is what we talked about before for the loans, is actually the biggest part of the margin compression. And that has nothing to do with Shoppy or competitive pressure. So in Q1, that alone cost four percentage points of operating margin. And then in Q2 was slightly lower, but it was still two percentage points. So the biggest impact after that is free shipping. And that's definitely a reaction to
- 46:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Shopee. And while it's expensive, I think it's a classic Amazon move to take market share. And it worked pretty well. So Mellu was outgoing Shopee, despite the much larger base. And I should also note that they have done that before. Even before Shopee existed, from time to time, they have lowered Lower the free shipping threshold because it's a fantastic way to get new people into the ecosystem. And then another part of the
- 47:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Amazon playbook is the investments into first-party retail, where Meli basically buys inventory and then sells it itself instead of just taking a fee from a third party offering their products on the marketplace. And that's about $5 billion of sales a year, now growing 70 to 80%. And the CFO actually said it's still not profitable on its own once you
- 47:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): allocate corporate costs. So Meli does this to win high quality categories. where selection was thin before. And for example, we're talking whenever that's the case, it's now a leader in cell phones in Brazil with three times the share that it only had three years ago. So it's definitely working. It's expensive for now, but that's how you grow the business.
- 47:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Those are really exactly the type of categories you want to win to keep the high spenders on the platform. But unlike Shopee, Meli has lowered. some seller fees, right? And it added discounts for buyers who pay with picks, which is a bit of a counterintuitive thing to do, at least as it seems to me at first. I mean, isn't that sort of preventing more of
- 48:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its customers from using Mercado Pago to pay or using Meli's credit cards and promoting an alternative?
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It is. I mean, it's essentially a bet on acquiring customers cheaply and then turning them into long long-term term Mercado. Libre and eventually Mercado Pago customers, and that's where you make the money. So the idea is that they will still pay through Mercado Pago, but you can use Pix through Mercado Pago, which in that case is just your digital wallet. So it's not as straightforward, but you can imagine that, for example,
- 48:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you would use PayPal going to your wallet, and then you use a locate credit rail, which in this case is Pix picks to send the money. So that means that PayPal is not making any money on this case. Macato Paco is not making any money with the transaction, but you still have the customer in your wallet. So eventually you might be able to make money with them in any other way. And Meli again doesn't earn transaction
- 49:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fees. But if you can make money, for example, from the customer funds, that's still a plus. And as mentioned, perhaps eventually they will turn into customers that have had, you know, credit cards for Meli. Melly. So that's basically how you make the money back. But as you said, it's a trade trade-off, off, right? Where you know, if you use picks and you don't pay any money, most likely you will not switch from that. And then the bet is that you make money with them in
- 49:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a different way. So to me, this seems like a smart investment in the long term, especially because picks will not go away. And I don't think you'll make a lot of money with the simple pay through Mercado wallet anyway. That's basically, you know, the pretty legacy business model of paper that is clearly not working anymore, especially in a world and in a country where picks PICs exist. So Melly delivers value on the
- 49:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit side, BNPL, credit cards, payback, and so forth.
- 49:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To just name some of the results of Melee's investment cycle recently that go beyond revenue growth, due to more volume, you have the cost of shipping one package in Brazil actually fall 11% in Q4 and 17% in Q1 in and local currency, while volume was up. more than 50%. And the
- 50:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): more packages you get through the system, the more efficient the operation gets. And Meli said some price range is below about 80 Reyes, which is the free shipping threshold for non-Meli Plus subscribers, are already at break even. And you also see that more people start building a habit around ordering at these levels. So conversion in Brazil,
- 50:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meaning the share of visits that end. in a purchase is up about 1.1 percentage points and has stayed there for a full year. And purchase frequency is up around 20%, while daily active users have grown faster than monthly active users in every quarter since the cut, which tells you that the app is becoming part
- 50:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of people's routine and not just a routine, their daily routine. And Meli Plus subscribers, as mentioned, are a up 72% year over year. So really the numbers on all fronts look really good.
- 50:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 50:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it actually shows you how the scale economy shared model works. Because for the longest time, when Meli was going down with the free shipping threshold, they lost money on those packages. And now they have so much more volume that they basically start to make money or at least break even on the free shipping threshold. So you can imagine that the more volume goes through their logistics system, in some years' time they can lower the
- 51:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): threshold again and they don't lose money on that. Whereas Shopee, for example, they have to pay up for lowering the free shipping threshold because for them it's not profitable because you don't yet have the volume. Although I should say that part of the advantage of Shopee is that if you're in these lower-term, lower quality goods, you send a lot of volume through your system. So that's why they can
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): also have these low free shipping thresholds. But again, I also want to emphasize. that you don't even need Meli to have a highly profitable e-commerce business. The fact that Meli had one for such a long time was an outlier if you compare it to any global player. Amazon's e-commerce business, for example, was always a low margin business. They make money through ads and AWS and Meli's ads business is still growing fast. And instead of
- 51:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): AWS, they obviously have Macado Pago and that business again earns roughly 20% margins after credit losses on its book and it's already 43% revenue. It grows faster than commerce. So I think that's a very good outlook for Meli in the next couple of years. And in a competitive market, I think it's fine for the commerce side to basically run at a thin margin if that's what keeps 90 million
- 52:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buyers in the ecosystem. And as long as the fintech side actually earns the profits on those same customers. So Shopee can match Melee Meli on shipping, but it's much harder to match it on credit. So the most important thing is to build the credit business responsibly so it doesn't blow up in bad times, which always comes at some point.
- 52:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay. Well, why don't we bring it all together? Is there anything that has changed about the valuation since we last looked at Meli? I would assume it's mostly unchanged, but perhaps you can just walk us through the assumptions again that you use in your model to help explain why we decided to add Meli Melly to our portfolio. in the first place and then add to it
- 52:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): more in our portfolio review live stream. And so it's been a lot of fun to be able to take our normal portfolio conversations that would just be in a kind of a meeting with me and you and Kyle and turn them into live streams on YouTube where we can get feedback from listeners in real time. So if you haven't checked that out, you can go to do the intrinsic value podcast on YouTube and
- 53:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you'll find our archive of live streams. and some of the recent portfolio discussions we've had.
- 53:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 53:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is a lot of fun. And we mostly stream on Wednesdays, but sometimes the days alternate. So um you can go to our community tab. Often we do announce when exactly we'll stream and also the time right there. So for everyone interested, tune in and getting to the evaluation. I did update my Meli model with the newest numbers and some slight adjustments for growth and the margin estimates. Not dramatic though. So
- 53:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the difficult thing generally about forecasting the next few years is that it basically entirely depends on what strategy Milly takes. So in my model, I assume the massive investments that we currently see will be scaled back year by year, which causes revenue obviously to grow slightly slower, but margins to tick up again. So given management comments, they might
- 53:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): keep investing for a while, and I can't blame them, seeing how much they grow, not only the headline numbers, but as you just showed us, also the numbers that actually show how entrenched the new customers basically become in the Melee ecosystem. And it's only smart to keep that momentum going, even if markets don't like the investments, and especially when competitors like C Limited are currently getting punished even
- 54:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): harder for their investment cycle by the market, because likely you know they will stop at some point. And if you keep investing, the benefits of that will be even larger. So to put it all in numbers. I have 2026 revenue going up another mind-boggling 45% to over $40 billion. But then it slows down starting in 2027 with commerce going 25% and fintech
- 54:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 32%. And then from there, Commerce and FinTech both decelerate a couple of percentage points per year. And again, this would basically assume investments will be scaled back. And because of that, the operating margin that currently stands at only 7%. seven percent will creep higher again, reaching thirteen to fourteen percent by the end of the decade, which sounds like a lot, but it was twelve percent just
- 54:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): two years ago.
- 54:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's a pretty hefty earnings growth there, about $177
- 55:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in earnings per share projections for 2030. And today we stand at 40 dollars. But I think that's really not that crazy to predict. And it's just the kind of thing that happens when you have a company with the growth track record and the growth runway that Meli has. And they're sort of relentlessly reinvesting back into the business and
- 55:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): harvesting the fruits of what they currently make to keep spinning that flywheel that we've been talking about. And just a reminder for listeners, Meli is the only company ever at significant size that was able to grow 30% or more for 30. consecutive quarters straight. So these growth numbers are really more obtainable and reasonable and actually maybe even
- 55:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): conservative than it might seem at first. And actually it would imply that they're going to break their streak of 30% plus growth sometime next year. And really the bigger question for me is on the margin front, but looking at your model, you've got Mercado Pago growing to be the same size as the commerce. business by 2030, meaning
- 56:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the higher margin part of the company will actually grow the fastest, which would be another tailwind for businesses' overall profitability and for earnings growth.
- 56:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Melly definitely is a margin story right now. Assuming a mid twenties multiple and a ten percent discount rate, the fair value based on the above estimates is close to three thousand dollars with a twenty percent margin of safety, which is what we usually have in the end. to four model, you would get to twenty four hundred dollars. But then again, these models always are based on the timeline and our assumptions for the timeline.
- 56:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And this model assumes that the investment slows down in the next one to three years, which might not be the case. So I own Melly not because I believe that you know in the next five years they will get significantly better or improved margins. I believe this will simply be a better and bigger business in 10 years' time. And I don't think you need to be able to forecast the next year or even the next three years. Just have an idea in mind
- 56:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of what growth should roughly look like and what the mature margin is. And with those numbers that I have in mind, I think Melly looks incredibly attractive here, especially the longer you look out.
- 57:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think both camps in the margin debate may actually be arguing about the wrong number. And of the five points of margin that Melly Meli gave up, the biggest piece is this day one loss provision. provisioning on credit cards, which is really an accounting timing issue more than anything, and not due to competition from Shopi. And the free shipping piece is
- 57:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a competitive response, but it's also one that's working pretty well where conversion is up, frequency is up, cost per package is falling, and Meli has grown faster than Shopi And Shopee while off of a bigger base, right? Sort of define the law of large numbers. And the thing that would actually scare me would be if we saw any take rate cuts. And we haven't seen those.
- 57:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And Shopee, as we've mentioned, is raising seller fees. And that's not what happens in a price war. You don't have companies increasing take rates when they're trying to undercut each other. And commerce really can run at a thin margin forever, as long as it keeps 90 million buyers inside the Meli ecosystem, because the fintech side of things. is
- 58:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where the profits come from. And you can almost say that the commerce side of the business is just a vehicle for facilitating the fintech part of it, whether that's with the credit card lending or the payment processing. And so it's already 43% of revenue, the fintech businesses, and it's growing faster than commerce, and it earns 20% after credit losses. And
- 58:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): having that loyal ecosystem of customers obviously also creates. huge advertising opportunities too, as we've seen Amazon prove. They've become one of the biggest advertising marketplaces in the world. And so the credit book is probably the one thing that gives me some pause and maybe some anxiety, especially when you pair it with the position that we have with our
- 58:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): existing stake and new bank, making us pretty highly leveraged to the Latin American market and more specifically the Latin American consumer. at a minimum. And that will make for a volatile ride if history is any guy. But I do love the idea of owning great companies and to be cliche, just letting them do their thing. And we talk
- 59:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a lot about hurdle rates and trying to find investment opportunities that can clear a twelve percent rate of return for us over a several year period. And I feel pretty confident that with Meli's growth prospects and then at the price we're buying into at this moment, which isn't an outrageous valuation given the growth, I feel pretty good that it can meet
- 59:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): our IR hurdle requirement.
- 59:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's the bet we're taking it, right? Like owning a great company and then just letting them do their thing. When I was still doing my research, you basically asked me whether we should also cover the political debate currently going on in Brazil with all the elections. And I looked at the Brazilian elections. and you know what the win of either Bolsonaro or Lula could mean for Meli, Newbank, and so forth. But to be honest, both
- 59:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): candidates don't seem to be highly popular. And I can see why when I look into what the program actually is. And while the atmosphere towards businesses in general might be better under Bolsonaro, I don't feel comfortable at all predicting any outcome. And not only for the election itself, but also for what a win of either of them would actually mean for the Brazilian
- 1:00:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): economy going forward. And ultimately, I think I take comfort in the fact that Meli performed phenomenally under the presidency of left-leaning candidates and then also under the presidency of right-leaning candidates. And not only in Brazil, but in basically all of Latin America. And as we worked out in our original episode, Meli works the way it does today because they were able to
- 1:00:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): make a strength out of these shortcuts. the shortcomings of Latin American politics, right? We talked about some markets that were basically completely gone and how they have these logistic networks that are not as capital intense because they never know what happens to a specific market. And as you just said, the idea is to own a phenomenally run business with a strong flywheel and lots of runway. And if I believe the
- 1:00:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): president of Brazil would make a significant difference, honestly, I wouldn't even want to be invested in Meli anyway, or Nubank for that matter. And with that, if uh you have nothing to add to the politics of Brazil, let me close it for today with a quote by Meli founder Marcos Gaparin. And basically on that exact topic where he said, quote, unfortunately, the stereotypes about that market
- 1:01:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are true, infrastructure is not as developed, regulations are backward, regulators are just trying to optimize for themselves, not for the people, and it's a very volatile environment. And all of a sudden you have elections and then a new government comes in and changes everything. So with Melly's management team being aware of that, I feel quite confident that they can manage that quite well. And um
- 1:01:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that's all we have to say. With that, have a great day and see you in the next one.
- 1:01:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Just a quick
- 1:01:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): note before you go. Episode would not be possible without our friends at Fiscal AI. It is the complete stock research terminal that Daniel, Kyle, and I use on every single episode, with every company we dig into pulling 20 years worth of financials, digging into segment level data, and grabbing quotes from the latest earnings calls, real-time,
- 1:01:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): institutional grade data, all in one place. And now with their new AI connector, you can plug that same data financials, transcripts, fun letters, news, filings, and more straight into Cloud ChatGBT. Chat GBT, or whatever AI you use for your own research. If you want to try it yourself, head to fiscal.ai slash T I V P to get
- 1:02:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fifteen percent off. The link is in the show notes. That's fiscal.ai slash T I V P. Thanks for listening.
- 1:02:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thanks for listening to TIP. IP. Follow the intrinsic value podcast on your favorite podcast app and visit the investorspodcast.com. for show notes and educational resources. This podcast is for informational and entertainment purposes only and does not provide financial, investment, tax, or legal advice. The content is impersonal and does not consider your objectives, financial
- 1:02:39
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TIVP107 (Video): McDonald's ($MCD): Generational Compounder in Historical Drawdown w/ Daniel Mahncke & Shawn O’Malley
Episode discussion: McDonald's Franchise Model, Real Estate Value, and GLP-1 Risks Discussed
Speakers’ claims: Speakers analyze McDonald's business model, highlighting its transition from food sales to a real estate and franchising powerhouse that generates high operating margins. They discuss historical investment theses from Warren Buffett and Bill Ackman, noting Buffett's regret over selling his stake. The episode examines the impact of GLP-1 drugs on consumer behavior, estimating current sales impact at only 1% despite long-term uncertainty. Franchisee financial health is addressed, with speakers noting declining cash flows and McDonald's $8.5 billion support package to fund modernizations. Finally, the stock's correlation with Treasury yields and management's buyback incentives are evaluated.