Industry Primers

North American railroad history from 1885 to 2023, covering deregulation, mergers, and operational turnarounds.

1h 31m Listen to the original Episode page
Railroad HistoryDeregulationMergers & AcquisitionsOperational EfficiencyCorporate Governance

Summary

Speakers trace the evolution of North American railroads from the 1885 completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway through the 2023 formation of Canadian Pacific Kansas City. The narrative highlights the contrast between subsidized US transcontinental lines that faced scandals and James J. Hill's efficient, debt-free Great Northern Railway. Key regulatory shifts, including the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, are credited with enabling private sector efficiency and intermodal partnerships. The episode details major consolidations such as the creation of BNSF and the privatization of CN, emphasizing leadership decisions that shaped industry profitability.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Northern Pacific, the Union Pacific, and the Santa Fe were all. in receivership. The Great Northern cut its prices instead. In the year to June 1894, its average charge for hauling a ton one mile fell from about a penny and a quarter to a little over a penny, a cut of 11%. Its annual report told the owners what the railroad had still managed to pay: its interest and guaranteed obligations, and its usual dividend.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 8:47

  2. 2
    The Northern Pacific stock cornering in 1901 caused nearly half of Wall Street brokerage houses to become technically insolvent, highlighting the systemic risk of concentrated equity positions in the pre-modern financial system.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 13:33

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 0:59

    The Story of North American Railroads: Part One

    Introduction to the episode scope from 1885 to 2023, highlighting the transition from government-subsidized construction to private, deregulated operations.

  2. 0:59 – 5:11

    Canadian Pacific Railway Completion and Construction

    Details the 1885 completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the roles of George Stephen, James J. Hill, and William Cornelius Van Horn, and the rapid project execution under government contract.

  3. 5:11 – 7:22

    US Transcontinental Railroads and Financial Scandals

    Contrasts the Canadian Pacific with the 1869 US transcontinental lines, describing scandals involving government bonds and insider trading that led to bankruptcies.

  4. 7:22 – 9:58

    James J. Hill and the Great Northern Railway

    Profiles James J. Hill's construction of the Great Northern Railway without federal land grants, focusing on efficiency and profitability during the Panic of 1893.

  5. 9:58 – 12:33

    E.H. Harriman and the Union Pacific Reorganization

    Describes E.H. Harriman's 1897 takeover of the bankrupt Union Pacific, his infrastructure investments, and his rivalry with James J. Hill.

  6. 12:33 – 14:51

    The Northern Securities Trust and Supreme Court Ruling

    Details the 1901 stock cornering of Northern Pacific, the formation of the Northern Securities holding company, and its 1904 breakup by the Supreme Court.

  7. 14:51 – 19:11

    Penn Central Bankruptcy and the Conrail Era

    Covers the 1970s Penn Central bankruptcy, the failure of private mergers, and the 1976 creation of Conrail to operate bankrupt Northeastern lines.

  8. 19:11 – 31:33

    Hayes Watkins and John Snow on Deregulation

    Highlights the collaboration between Hayes Watkins and John Snow in passing the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which deregulated pricing and contracts.

  9. 31:33 – 32:45

    Corporate Restructuring and Santa Fe Pacific

    Discusses the 1988 sale of Southern Pacific to Rio Grande Industries and Union Pacific's dismantling of its conglomerate structure, setting the stage for Santa Fe Pacific's challenges.

  10. 32:45 – 34:53

    Mike Haverty's Leadership at Santa Fe

    Details Mike Haverty's 1989 presidency at Santa Fe, including union pay cuts, selling 20% of track to shortlines, and ending national union negotiations.

  11. 34:53 – 38:08

    Haverty and J.B. Hunt Partnership

    Describes the 1989 intermodal partnership between Santa Fe and J.B. Hunt, which grew to $1.5 billion in revenue by 2018, enabled by deregulation.

  12. 38:08 – 41:49

    BNSF Formation and Union Pacific's Counter-Move

    Covers the 1995 merger of Santa Fe and Burlington Northern to create BNSF, and Union Pacific's 1996 acquisition of Southern Pacific, which was later cited as a mistake.

  13. 41:49 – 42:30

    Norfolk Southern and CSX Split Conrail

    Details the 1996-1997 contest where Norfolk Southern and CSX divided Conrail's assets, with lines transferring in June 1999.

  14. 42:30 – 1:30:57

    Paul Tellier and CN Privatization

    Profiles Paul Tellier's 1992 appointment to run CN, his efforts to strip bureaucracy and prepare the company for privatization despite political pressure.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
S&P 500indexneutralCounting dividends and measured on the New York line in US dollars, Canadian Pacific's shares under him did nearly a fifth better than the S P 500, though the Canadian dollar fell in those years.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

A $1,000 investment in a small railroad became about $4,700, compared to about $1,150 in the market.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:39

How to verify: Check historical stock performance data for early US railroads (e.g., Union Pacific, Central Pacific) against a broad market index from the late 19th century; verify via historical financial archives or academic studies on railroad stock returns. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The last rail of the Canadian Pacific was laid on Saturday, November 7, 1885, in Eagle Pass, British Columbia.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:59

How to verify: Consult historical records of the Canadian Pacific Railway, specifically the completion date and location, available in CPR archives or historical texts like 'The Last Spike' by Pierre Berton. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

George Stephen was the president of the Bank of Montreal and led the syndicate incorporating the Canadian Pacific Railway Company in February 1881.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·2:12

How to verify: Verify George Stephen's role at the Bank of Montreal and the incorporation date of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company via Bank of Montreal historical records or CPR corporate history documents. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

James J. Hill built the Great Northern Railway without federal land grants.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:27

How to verify: Review historical accounts of the Great Northern Railway's financing, such as biographies of James J. Hill, to confirm the absence of federal land grants compared to other transcontinental railroads. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Great Northern's average charge for hauling a ton one mile fell from about a penny and a quarter to a little over a penny in the year to June 1894.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:47

How to verify: Check the Great Northern Railway's annual reports for the fiscal year ending June 1894, available via historical railroad archives or the Minnesota Historical Society. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

James J. Hill forecasted that the cost of transportation would be reduced to one quarter of a cent per ton per mile.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:26

How to verify: Locate James J. Hill's letter to Baring Brothers in London from September 1899, available in historical business correspondence archives or biographies of Hill. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Penn Central petitioned for reorganization on Sunday, June 21, 1970, in Philadelphia.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·16:11

How to verify: Verify the filing date and location of Penn Central's bankruptcy petition via US Bankruptcy Court records or historical news archives from June 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The Staggers Rail Act was signed by President Carter on Tuesday, October 14, 1980.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:49

How to verify: Check the official US government records for the signing of the Staggers Rail Act, available via the National Archives or the White House historical archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 1979, the railroad industry earned 2.7% on its net investment, against over 10% for comparable industries.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·23:12

How to verify: Review President Carter's written statement issued on October 14, 2026, or the text of the Staggers Rail Act legislative history, available via the National Archives or Congressional records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Rob Krebs cut thousands of jobs at Southern Pacific in less than two years, including closing the mechanical shop at Roseville.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·28:17

How to verify: Check Southern Pacific Railway's operational reports or biographies of Rob Krebs, such as those from the National Railroad Hall of Fame, to verify the timeline and scope of job cuts and the closure of the Roseville shop. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Southern Pacific was sold to Rio Grande Industries for about $1.02 billion on October 13, 1988.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:33

How to verify: SEC EDGAR filings for Rio Grande Industries (e.g., Schedule 13D or proxy statements from 1988-2026) or historical news archives from 1988. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Rob Krebs became chairman, president, and CEO of Santa Fe Pacific in June 1988.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:01

How to verify: SEC EDGAR proxy statements for Santa Fe Pacific from 1988-2026 or company press releases from June 1988. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Santa Fe signed agreements on crew size and work rules in 1990, changing the industry.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:33

How to verify: Labor union records (e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers archives) or Santa Fe Pacific 10-K filings from 1990-2026 detailing labor costs. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The J.B. Hunt partnership revenue grew from $30 million to $1.5 billion by 2018.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:53

How to verify: BNSF or J.B. Hunt financial reports from 2018, or SEC filings if either company disclosed specific partnership revenues. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Union Pacific's first offer for Santa Fe was $17.33 a share.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:23

How to verify: SEC EDGAR Schedule 13D or proxy statements filed by Union Pacific or Santa Fe Pacific in late 2026/early 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Union Pacific withdrew its bid for Santa Fe on January 31, 1995.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:49

How to verify: SEC EDGAR filings or news archives from January 2026 confirming the withdrawal. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

BNSF was formed on September 22, 1995.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·40:52

How to verify: SEC EDGAR proxy statements for BNSF or Burlington Northern from 2026 confirming the merger completion date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

CN sold its shares at $27 a share on November 17, 1995, raising about $2.25 billion.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·49:39

How to verify: CN's prospectus filed with the Ontario Securities Commission or SEC (Form F-1) for the 2026 IPO. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Hunter Harrison's operating ratio at Illinois Central fell from 68.2% in 1993 to 62.3% in 1997.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·55:10

How to verify: Illinois Central 10-K filings for fiscal years 2026 and 1997, specifically the 'Operating Ratio' section in the Management Discussion and Analysis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

CN agreed to pay $39 a share for Illinois Central on February 10, 1998, totaling about $2.4 billion.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·59:18

How to verify: CN's proxy statement or press release from February 2026 regarding the Illinois Central acquisition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

S&P 500 returned about 1.25x over the same years referenced for KCS performance (2000-2010).

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:02:57

How to verify: Calculate S&P 500 total return from Dec 2026 to Dec 2026 using Yahoo Finance or S&P Global data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Kansas City Southern Industries owned Janice Mutual Funds and a small railroad running to Beaumont and Port Arthur.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:03:50

How to verify: Review KCS 10-K filings from 2026-2026 for segment reporting and asset holdings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

KCS bought 49% of the company owning the Texas Mexican Railway in November 1995.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:05:26

How to verify: Check KCS press releases or SEC filings from Nov 2026 regarding the Texas Mexican Railway acquisition. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Mexico amended its constitution on March 2, 1995, to end the state's exclusive hold on railways.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:06:11

How to verify: Search Mexican government gazette or constitutional records for amendments dated March 2, 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

KCS and TMM won the right to buy 80% of the Northeast Line for about 11.07 billion pesos (approx. $1.4 billion) in Dec 1996.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:06:56

How to verify: Review KCS announcement from Dec 2026 and Mexican government concession awards for the Northeast Line. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Do your own research

  • Verify the $4,700 vs $1,150 return figures using historical market data sources like Robert Shiller's dataset or CRSP.
  • Check the text of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 to understand the specific regulatory changes regarding pricing and contracts.
  • Review Union Pacific's 2021 earnings calls or SEC filings for Dick Davidson's admission regarding the Southern Pacific integration mistake.
  • Analyze Canadian National Railway's 1995 IPO prospectus for the $27 share price and $2.25 billion raise details.
  • Examine Berkshire Hathaway's 2009 proxy statements or annual reports for Warren Buffett's rationale and the $44 billion valuation of the BNSF acquisition.
  • Research the operating ratio trends for Illinois Central under Hunter Harrison using FERC or company financial reports to verify the 68.2% to 62.3% improvement.
  • Look for regulatory filings related to the CN-BNSF merger attempt in 1999-2000 to understand the basis for the merger moratorium.
  • Verify the current status of Union Pacific's application to buy Norfolk Southern using STB (Surface Transportation Board) records as of November 2026.
Full transcriptexpand

0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to a new Latticework Audio program, brought to you by the research team at MOI Global. This is part one of our industry primer on the North American Railroads, the story of a network finished by 1916, written off 60 years later, and remade by builders who won the freedom to price it and run it to a timetable. Table. From Montreal to Chicago, Kansas City, and Mexico City, it follows a conduct. conductor's son, a Memphis yard hand, a civil servant, and a banker's son. A state railway's shares nearly doubled within a year of its sale. You will hear how $1,000 in a small railroad became about $4,700 against about $1,150 in the market.

0:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): North American Railroads. Part 1. The story. The network nobody could build again. Full Fair.

0:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

0:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about 9 on the morning of Saturday, November 7, 1885, in Eagle Pass, high in the mountains of British Columbia, the last rail of the Canadian Indian Pacific was laid.

1:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): railway that bound British Columbia to Canada now ran unbroken from Montreal toward the Pacific. One spike remained to be driven. By common consent, the task went to Donald Smith, the senior director present.

1:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spike was an ordinary iron one, and the first one he struck bent. Sanford Fleming, the engineer who had come west with the directors on their private car, wrote down what he saw. The work was carried on in silence. Nothing was heard but the reverberation of the blows struck by him.

1:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

1:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the spike was home, Fleming added a judgment of his own. A more solemn ceremony has been witnessed with less solemnity. Then came a cheer, and after it, a single voice, in what Fleming called the most prosaic tones. All aboard for the Pacific!

2:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

2:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): man who had brought the rails to that spot had been chosen. four years earlier by an American. In February 1881, a private syndicate incorporated the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.

2:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

2:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was led by George Stephen, the Bank of Montreal's president. Its members included his cousin Donald Smith and a St. Paul railroad man named James J. Hill. Stephen needed someone to drive the construction across the prairie and through the mountains. and he asked Hill. Hill named William Cornelius Van Horn, an American railroad superintendent from the Milwaukee Road. Hill told Stephen, as Van Horn's biographer records it: You need a man of great mental and physical power to carry this line through. Van Horn can do it. But he will take all the authority he gets and more, so define how much you want him to have.

2:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Van

2:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Horn did not. answer at once.

2:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

2:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went up to Winnipeg with Hill and drove out over the plains to look at the crops in the settlers' fields. Satisfied with the land, he resigned from the Milwaukee Road and became the Canadian Pacific's general manager on January 1, 1882. Hill himself would soon go his own way and build a rival line to the Pacific south of the border.

3:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

3:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): syndicate's members were rich, and some of them were old. and their railway ran short of money again and again before it was done. Van Horn later wrote down a story he heard when he joined the company. At the very start, one member of the syndicate had written to Stephen that they might only be courting trouble for their old age, and that they ought to think twice. To this, Once Stephen answered in one word, Craigeliki, Cragelic, which appealed to the patriotism of his associates. and not another doubt was expressed. Kragelicy is a rock in the Scottish Valley where Stephen and Smith grew up, and the name of the rock was a clan's war cry. Van Horn resolved that if he was still with the company when the last rail was laid, the place would carry that name. So it did. But Van Horn would not have a celebration there. Before the day, he had made his view of ceremony plain. The last spike will be just as good an iron one as there is between Montreal and Vancouver, and anyone who wants to see it driven will have to pay full fare. Gathered at the spot were the directors, Fleming in a tall hat, and hundreds of the workmen who had built the line. The station built at the spot was named Craigellike. Craigelli. The government's contract had allowed the company 10 years to finish the line. Van Horn had done it in less than five. In 1875, Canada's prime

4:31minister had doubted that such a line could be finished in 10 years at all. A private company had finished it, carried through its crises on its members' own credit. The next summer, on June 28, 1886, the first scheduled transcontinental train would leave Montreal for Port Moody.

4:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

4:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the voice called the passengers aboard, the director's train pulled out westward over the rail that had just been laid. It reached Port Moody, on the Pacific, the next morning. Behind it, in Eagle Pass, an iron spike held the last rail to the mountain. The best possible line. 16 Sixteen years before. Eagle Pass, the United States had joined its own coasts with more ceremony.

5:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

5:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Promontory Summit in Utah Territory on May 10, 1869, the Central Pacific and the Union Pacific met. Spikes of gold and silver were set into a tie of laurel wood, tapped with a silver-plated maw, maul, and then taken away. An iron spike went in their place. and an iron hammer was wired to the telegraph so that the country could hear the blows. Leland Stanford of the Central Pacific swung and struck the tie, and a railroad worker drove the spike home.

5:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

5:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 12:47 in the afternoon, the operator sent three letters. DONE.

5:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

6:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): blows reached New York at five minutes past three. by the city's clocks, and a hundred guns were fired there.

6:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

6:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Philadelphia, the bells of Independence Hall rang, and crowds ran into the streets, taking them for a fire alarm.

6:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

6:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company's message to the Associated Press opened with three sentences: The last rail is laid. The last spike is driven. The Pacific Railroad is completed.

6:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

6:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Chinese workers who built most of the Central Pacific do not appear in the best known photograph of the day.

6:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

6:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): line had been built fast, on public money.

6:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

6:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Union Pacific's insiders built it through their own construction company, paid for with bonds the government guaranteed, and congressmen were given shares.

6:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

6:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the scandal broke, the House of Representatives censured two of its members in February 1870. 1873. The historian Richard White, speaking on plain English with Derek Thompson in August 2025, described what became of the roads built this way. Virtually all the Transcontinentals go bankrupt, most of them more than once, some of them three times.

7:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): An

7:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): old description called the first Transcontinentals Streaks of Rust Across the Continent. White's account of how those roads were financed ends on a name. That becomes a model for building Western railroads until the Great Northern.

7:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

7:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Great Northern was James J. Hill's railroad, and he built it the other way. In 1878, Hill and his partners, Stephen and Smith among them, had bought a bankrupt Minnesota line, the St. Paul and Pacific, from its Dutch bondholders.

7:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

7:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1890, he was ready to push it from Montana to Puget Sound. That summer, he sent his chief engineer a general order on where to put the line. We do not care enough for Rocky Mountain scenery to spend a large sum of money in developing it, either on the Spokane or elsewhere. What we want is the best possible line, shortest distance, lowest grades, and least curvature that we can build between the points to be covered. The order was about the cost of hauling a ton. A locomotive pulls far more freight up a gentle grade than up a steep one, so every foot of climb the surveyors avoided would be repaid on every train that ever ran.

8:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

8:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new line ran from the Montana Plains over the Rockies and the Cascades to Everett, on the Sound. In the first week of January 1893, its last rail was in place. The Great Northern had reached the Pacific without a federal land grant. Early that year, Hill had set the rate he shared with the other western roads higher than his own railroad needed, so that his weaker rivals could stay on their feet. Then, the country fell into a financial panic and a long depression. Before the year was out, the Northern Pacific, the Union Pacific, and the Santa Fe were all. in receivership. The Great Northern cut its prices instead. In the year to June 1894, its average charge for hauling a ton one mile fell from about a penny and a quarter to a little over a penny, a cut of 11%. Its annual report told the owners what the railroad had still managed to pay: its interest and guaranteed obligations, and its usual dividend. Hill kept building. By 1899, he was rebuilding his line from North Dakota to the summit of the Rockies for longer trains at lower cost. That September, he wrote to his banker at

9:26Bering Brothers in London about where the rebuilding was meant to take the cost of carrying a ton. I look for the cost of transportation on the whole system to be ultimately reduced to one quarter of a cent per ton per. mile. This may seem extravagant, but it is not by any means impossible. It was a forecast.

9:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

9:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came from the owner of a railroad that had come through the depression, still paying the people who had put their money into

9:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it. A

9:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thousand dollars a share.

10:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

10:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): New York in 1897, four years after the panic, the bankrupt Union Pacific was being reorganized by Jacob Schiff of the banking house of Kuhn Loeb. His committee was meeting resistance everywhere it turned. Schiff asked J.P. Morgan who was behind it.

10:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

10:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): few weeks later, Morgan sent for him with an answer. It's that little fellow Harriman, and you want to look out for him.

10:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): E.

10:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): H. Harriman was then the financial. manager of the Illinois Central, a railroad whose credit stood among the best in the country. Schiff went to see him and told him plainly what he had heard.

10:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As

10:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Schiff told it to Harriman's biographer, Harriman's reply was four words: I am the man. Schiff asked him why. Because I intend to reorganize the Union Pacific myself. Harriman wanted control.

10:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Schiff

10:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): offered him less, a seat on the board and on its executive committee, and the chairmanship if he proved to be the strongest man on it. Harriman accepted. In the autumn of 1897, the railroad was sold at foreclosure to the syndicate Kuhn Loeb had organized, and within months, Harriman was running its executive committee.

11:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

11:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the early summer of 1898, he went out to Omaha and ordered a special train. made up backward. An observation car rode in front, the locomotive pushed from behind, and Harriman sat at the front and rode the whole line to the Pacific by daylight. He noted every grade, every curve, the rail and the ballast, and stopped to question shippers at every important station. He ordered that no more than $10 be spent repairing any one of the old light cars.

11:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His

11:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banker, Otto Kahn, speaking in 1911, described how he struck the railroad's men in the West. The nervous, rapid-fire little man who came blown in like a whirlwind, sweeping fresh currents of air into all sorts of dusty nooks and corners.

11:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

11:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): few weeks into the trip, Harriman telegraphed the board in New York. He wanted authority to buy cars, locomotives, and rail, and to begin improvements costing. as Khan remembered it, something like $25 million. His reasoning was that prosperity was coming back while labor and materials were still cheap. One director warned that the spending would put the Union Pacific back in receivership within two years. Harriman carried the board. His engineers cut the grades, straightened the line, and took out the equivalent of 22 complete circles of curve between Omaha and Ogden. Three years later, the two builders, Hill and Harriman, wanted the same railroad. The Burlington ran into Chicago, and early in 1901, Hill's Great Northern and Northern Pacific bought it. Harriman asked for a share and was refused. So, he set out to buy control of the Northern Pacific itself in the open market. By Friday, May 3rd, 3, his side held a majority of the Northern Pacific's stock taken as a whole, though not of its common shares, which could decide the matter. On Saturday morning, May 4th, ill at home, Harriman telephoned an order to Kuhn Loeb to buy 40,000 more common shares. On Monday, he asked why he had heard nothing. As he later told it, he told me that before giving out the order, he had to reach Schiff, who was

13:13at the synagogue. Schiff instructed him not to execute the order and said that he would be responsible. Morgan's brokers bought the shares instead, and between the two camps, the common stock was cornered. Hill, in a statement he signed that December, gave the price it reached. The common stock in three or four days went up to $1,000 per share. On Thursday, May 9, 9th, the day it touched that price, the rest of the market broke. Traders who had sold the shares short could neither buy them nor borrow them, and before noon, nearly half the brokerage houses in Wall Street were technically insolvent. The piece that followed was a holding company, Northern Securities, to hold the two Northern Railroads together. The government sued, and on March 14, 1904, the Supreme Court broke it up, five votes to four. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. dissenting for the four, wrote: Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. From then on, the government would decide how far the railroads could combine. The Burlington stayed with Hill's Railroads, and in 1970, the three would be merged as Burlington Northern. Harriman died in 1909. Hill died in St. Paul on May 29, 1916. A month later, on June 30, 1916, the miles of line in the United States reached

14:31254,251, the most there would ever be. The network was finished. Its prices were set in Washington by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which Congress had created in 1887. Too Big to Fail. More than half a century later, the trouble came in the Northeast.

14:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

14:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Cleveland, early in 1970, the finance chief of the Chesapeake and Ohio was watching the money market. His name was Hayes Watkins, and what he saw there concerned the largest railroad in the East.

15:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

15:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pennsylvania and the New York Central, rivals across the Northeast. for a century, had merged as Penn Central on February 1, 1968. The commission had required it to take in the bankrupt New Haven as well. Since 1964, Watkins had been working on the CO's answer, a merger with the Norfolk and Western and the smaller eastern roads into a system to match it. Then, the Penn Central began to fail, and the reason for the answer? went with it. Watkins told the story in 2021 for the National Railroad Hall of Fame series of recorded lives, Spirit of the Railroaders, taked at his home in Richmond.

15:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One

15:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thing that tipped me off was early in 1970, Penn Central was not able to sell its commercial paper. Commercial paper is short-term short term borrowing sold directly to investors. The railroads had relied on it for years. Watkins went to his president and said the Penn Central could not make it. He remembered the reply. And he said, they're too big to fail.

16:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

16:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sunday, June 21, 1970, 28 months after the merger, the Penn Central petitioned for reorganization in Philadelphia. It was then the largest corporate bankruptcy in American history.

16:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

16:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the days before, the government had declared. declined to guarantee its loans. Its neighbors followed it into court: the Lehigh Valley the same year, the Reading in 1971, and the Erie Lackawanna in 1972, in the wake of Tropical Storm Agnes.

16:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

16:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Midwest, the Rock Island went in 1975. By 1975, In railroads holding about a sixth of the route miles in the United States were in bankruptcy. Their owners had stopped spending on the track, and the trade coined a phrase for what followed: the standing derailment. A freight car standing still that fell off the rails. Washington had to decide what to do with the wreck. Congress created a planning agency, and its final system plan of July 26, 1975, offered the solvent railroads a share of the bankrupt lines.

17:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To

17:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Watkins's Chessie system, the CNO's parent, the planners offered most of the Erie Lackawanna and the Reading. Watkins also remembered a meeting with Transportation Secretary William Coleman, who offered Chessie and the Norfolk and Western the bankrupt east to divide between them.

17:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

17:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): young official in Coleman's department, John Snow, remembered the same plan decades later from the other side. of the table.

17:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

17:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): purchases that remained foundered on labor. On February 19, 1976, Coleman wrote to President Ford that the Chessey and Southern purchases were gravely endangered because of those railroads' inability to come to terms with the labor unions. Without them, he warned, the government's new railroad would be the only freight carrier across most of the Northeast and Midwest. Then he wrote, Time is very short.

18:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

18:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): asked the president to telephone the heads of the national unions himself. Ford's staff advised against it, and the calls were left to Coleman and the Secretary of Labor. No agreement came in time, and Chessey did not buy. In 2021, looking back over his career, Watkins returned to that meeting and to the head of the Norfolk and West Western, Jack Fishwick. I think the biggest disappointment was when Fishwick turned down Secretary of Transportation Coleman's offer to split Conrail.

18:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

18:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that it could have saved so much money and so much time and so much suffering. On April 1, 1976, a new railroad called Conrail took over the larger network, built from six bankrupt railroads and funded by the government. Within a few years, its losses would have its own planners arguing that only the freedom to set prices could save it. But on that first morning, the government of the United States was running the freight railroads of the Northeast. I vote with John.

19:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): John

19:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Snow was born in Tallinn. Toledo, Ohio, on August 2, 1939, the son of a tax lawyer who talked philosophy at the dinner table.

19:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

19:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): took a doctorate in economics at the University of Virginia under James Buchanan and Ronald Coase and a law degree in Washington. After Watergate, as a young lawyer at the Department of Transportation, he was handed the department's proposals to deregulate the railroads.

19:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Much

19:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): later, he would be Secretary of the Treasury from 2003 to 2006. Earlier attempts had failed, he concluded, for want of a case that a congressman could take home to his district.

19:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

19:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his own turn, in the same series, taped at the Ipswich Inn in Massachusetts and published in July 2026, he described his part. And what fell to me was to translate the misallocation of resources into parables. His boss by then was Coleman himself. Snow remembered Coleman pointing one way toward the White House, the other toward the Capitol, and telling his policy staff, but you've got to give us the ideas. You're the idea factory. I'm going to put it into action. The man who brought Snow into the railroad business was Hayes Watkins. Watkins was a Kentucky farm boy who had trained as an accountant. and joined the Chesapeake in Ohio on January 2, 1949.

20:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

20:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the late 1970s, he was chairman of the Chessy System, the parent of the CO. In 2021, he described where he had stood. Most railroad people were concerned about deregulation and whether the railroad industry could survive with free enterprise.

20:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

20:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): guess I was one of the very few that expressed my opinion at the AAR. that we ought to try it and see. The AAR was the Association of American Railroads, the industry's trade body. About 1977, Watkins went to the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, where Snow had landed after the change of administration. Snow offered to take Chesse on as a client. Watkins wanted him inside, as a vice president. Snow's own account of his answer. So I took it sort of reluctantly.

21:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As

21:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the deregulation bills moved through Congress, Watkins called into Cleveland.

21:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

21:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meeting was at 7 o'clock in the Terminal Tower, with all of Chesse's senior officers around the table, and Snow was to brief them on where the bills stood.

21:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

21:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): talked for about 30 minutes. Then, Watkins called for a vote on whether Chess Chessey should support the bill, and he asked the youngest and newest man in the room to vote first. Snow told them he had no assurances to offer. I'd vote to try it anyway, and if we show support for it, we'll at least have a seat at the table and can maybe help influence how it goes. Then the vote went around the table.

21:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

21:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): head of pricing said there would be chaos without the rate bureaus, the committees through which railroads set their prices together.

22:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

22:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): general counsel's counsel said the bill would leave the railroads at the mercy of their biggest shippers. Snow kept count, and years later he could still recite it.

22:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

22:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's now 2 to 1, 3 to 1, 4 to 1, 5 to 1, 7 to 1, 11 to 1, and it's Hayes, finally. He says, Well, it's my turn to vote, and I vote with John. Watkins, telling it separately, remembered the count as two. against 10. Either way, it was two votes against 10 or so, and one of the two was the chairman's.

22:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

22:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): motion carried, and Chessie would support the bill. By then, the regulator itself had changed. Carter had made an economist, Darius Gaskins, chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and under him, the commission had already opened trucking to new companies by its own rulings.

22:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

22:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2 47 in the afternoon on Tuesday, October 14, 1980, President Carter signed the Staggers Rail Act in the cabinet room.

22:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

22:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): written statement he issued that day measured how far the railroads had fallen. In 1979, it said, the industry had earned 2.7% on its net investment, against over 10% for comparable industries.

23:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

23:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): law gave the railroads two freedoms the Commission had long denied them. They could set their own prices and sign contracts with shippers, and they could leave the markets where they lost money. The Commission kept the power to protect shippers who had only one railroad to use. The act carried the name of Representative Harley Staggers, who was retiring from the House that year.

23:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

23:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spoke briefly at the signing. But I would like to also congratulate the shippers and the railroad management and railroad labor and all the rest who have entered into this agreement to try an experiment that might, and we think will, help the future of the railroad industry. Four decades later, Watkins gave his verdict on the law. I think it was the savior of the industry, really. I don't think the railroad industry could have avoided nationalization without deregulation. $1,500 a car.

24:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Rob

24:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Krebs grew up in Sacramento, the only child of a branch banker who moved the family every few years.

24:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

24:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meant to be a banker himself. He went to Stanford, spent a term at the university's campus in Italy, and then crossed the country to Harvard Business School.

24:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

24:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it came time to choose a job, the Southern Pacific was interviewing at Harvard, and its headquarters were in San Francisco, where he wanted to live.

24:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

24:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): joined it in 1966. It was the era of the railroad bankruptcies, and his roommates thought the industry was dying. Krebs recalled their advice in June 2020 in his own long interview for the Hall of Fame series, taped at his home in Lake Forest. Illinois.

24:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If

24:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you want to go to work for a transportation company, why don't you go to work for a good one, like Pan Am or TWA? His first job was assistant train master in Bakersfield in the potato season. One day he rode a train of perishables up over the Sierra, with three locomotives in front and two pushing behind, and the whole mountain shook. That, he said, got his. attention.

25:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

25:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his twenties, he was terminal superintendent at East St. Louis, a busy interchange where the Southern Pacific handed its cars to the eastern railroads.

25:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

25:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): found the managers and the switchmen at odds with each other, and he set out to get to know the men. One Christmas Eve, a switchman would not come out of the shanty to take his train because he had no money to buy presents for his children. Krebs walked him over to the railroad's hotel on the property and wrote a check. Give this guy 50 bucks, go to work.

25:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

25:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): other switchmen laughed at their superintendent.

25:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

25:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): man paid him back, and by Krebs' account, from then on they were all on the same team.

25:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

25:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the end of 1979, he was the Southern Pacific's vice president of transportation, and its lines in Texas had seized.

26:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

26:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): day after Christmas, he flew to Houston with a few operating men he had brought along.

26:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

26:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): helicopter took them up over Englewood Yard, the railroad's giant yard there. All we saw were thousands and thousands of railroad cars. There wasn't that much of a track that didn't have a car on it, and nothing was moving. By his account, 42 Forty two trains were stopped on the main lines east and west of the city because Houston was blocked. One of his men coupled whole tracks of cars together and hauled them out to an old branch line nobody used. Some of the cars held Christmas trees, and they stayed there until March. The rest was done piece by piece. Grain shippers got a lower charge if they sent their cars in solid blocks that never had to be sorted in the yard. Rock moved in whole trains that bypassed it, and an outlying yard became storage for cars of plastic. pellets. As he remembered it, it took about four months to make the terminal work. Krebs described what he did with the officers he found there. I think I changed out 24 of the 26 top operating people, and I didn't fire one of them. Some years later, Krebs rode at night with the Southern Pacific's chairman in his business car over the rebuilt line through Houston. By his account, the car ran at 79 miles an hour under green signals.

27:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

27:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): old man turned to him and said how much he was enjoying the ride. Krebs called it about the nicest thing the man ever said to anybody, and he repeated it years later at the chairman's memorial service. In May 1980, Krebs was put in charge of the railroad's operations, just as the Staggers Stagers Act was moving through Congress. Under the old system, he said, the railroad railroads had all this legalized collusion. We had these rate bureaus, and if we weren't making enough money, we just raised the rates. They got more money for each car, and the shippers moved to trucks.

27:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

27:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Southern Pacific's chairman supported the new law. Once it passed, the railroad could sign contracts with individual shippers.

27:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

27:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Krebs's account, a car of automobiles from St. Louis to Los Angeles had paid about $6,000 under the old tariff. First contract we signed, we got $1,500 a car. For that one lane, in his memory, the price had fallen to a quarter of what it had been. Then, the cost had to follow the price down. Krebs, as he told it, cut thousands of jobs in less than two years. One morning, he decided to close the big mechanical shop at Roseville and gave the work workers five days' notice. When people told him he could not do it, he told them why he had to. Because we're running out of cash. The autos still rolled west from St. Louis. Now the railroad had to carry them at the new price and make money doing

28:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

28:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Cold hard cash. Krebs's railway. railroad was soon joined to its oldest rival. In December 1983, the two old powers of the Southwest, the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific, combined their holding companies.

29:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

29:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Southern Pacific Railroad itself was set apart in a voting trust to wait for the Interstate Commerce Commission to rule on the merger. Krebs ran the combined railroads from Chicago, and the parents' other businesses passed across. his desk as well. One day he told his chairman, John Schmidt, who the subsidiary's worst enemy was. This holding company is holding these companies back from doing what they should be doing.

29:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

29:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): July 1986, Schmidt told his board that he would fly to Washington, sit in the front row of the hearing room, and watch watched the commission approve the merger five to nothing. He had the city, the building, and the room right.

29:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

29:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): commission turned the merger down, four votes to one by Krebs's count, because the two railroads ran side by side across the Southwest. Krebs heard the news in an elevator in Los Angeles. A revised plan was refused in 1987, and on Good Friday that April, the board removed Schmidt. Then came Black Monday, October 19, 1987. 1987. As the shares fell, a conglomerate called the Henley Group bought all it could, and the buyout firm KKR sent people to Chicago to make an offer of its own. Krebs thought the company was worth more than either would pay, and he asked himself a question: Why don't we just do to ourselves what somebody else is going to do, and all the benefit goes to our shareholders?

30:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

30:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his account, Santa Fe Southern Pacific borrowed to pay its shareholders a dividend of $4.2 billion. Then it spun off or sold the timber, the oil, the real estate, and the pipelines and paid down the debt with the proceeds. The commission's ruling meant the Southern Pacific Railroad had to go as well. Krebs and the company's acting chief flew round to the heads of the big railroads to offer it, and none of them. would buy. So it went to auction.

30:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

30:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Krebs's account, Philip Anschutz, who already owned the Denver and Rio Grande Western, offered $625 million.

31:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

31:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Krebs's telling, the man who ran the Rio Grande for Anschutz had first put a question to him: Would he rather have a little railroad that made a lot of money or a big one that lost a lot? Anschutz said he would take the big one. Kansas City Southern was the bidder Krebs expected to accept, and he told Anschutz what would change his mind. There's only one thing that is going to that's going to get the SP Railroad, and that is cold hard cash.

31:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

31:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next morning, Anschutz came back with far more.

31:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

31:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 13th, 13, 1988, Southern Pacific was sold to his Rio Grande Industries for about $1.02 billion. Union Pacific's parent had made the opposite bet in the same years, borrowing against its railroad to buy a trucking company and other businesses. Dick Davidson, who rose to run the corporation from 1997, spent his years at the top taking that conglomerate apart. What remained in Chicago was one railroad, from the Great Lakes to the Pacific, with without the timber or the oil to lean on. Krebs knew what the doubters said. Many people thought the Santa Fe Railroad couldn't exist without all these other assets. In June 1988, he became chairman, president, and chief executive of Santa Fe Pacific. By his account, the locomotive engineers agreed to five years without a raise. Every person on the staff took a pay cut, and the cuts were not equal. I was the only one that took 25.

32:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

32:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): railroad that was left had to earn its own living now. Its president stepped down, and the search began for a man to run

32:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.

32:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): J.B. Hunt. Mike Haverty was born in Acheson, Kansas on June 11, 1945. 1944, the fourth generation of a railroad family.

32:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

32:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): grew up on the Irish Catholic west side of town, less than three blocks from the switching yard, close enough to hear the cars banging. His father was a conductor on the Missouri Pacific, and he wanted his son in college. Haverty told the story in 2019 when he sat for the same series in Kansas City's Union Station. He said literally, his quote, was, it's a dog's life.

33:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

33:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): conductor was on call at any hour of the day or night.

33:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

33:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his 19th birthday, Haverty went to work anyway, as a switchman and a brakeman out of Acheson. Five weeks into his first term at Kansas State, his father died.

33:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

33:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): quit school, and the local superintendent gave him work through the winter on one condition.

33:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

33:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would go back to college, and the railroad would give him a job every summer.

33:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

33:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cousin, Tom Sullivan, also a conductor, gave him the creed he kept. Mick, he said, one thing you need to understand: you are a railroad, and you better take care of that road.

33:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

33:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rose through the Missouri Pacific's operating ranks. Sent back to Emporia as superintendent, he spent his first six months going from one derailment to the next. on track a manager had saved money by neglecting. Then he moved to the Santa Fe. In 1989, at 44, by his account, he became the Santa Fe Railway's president. He was also, by his account, the youngest man to hold the post in a hundred years. His first target was the old rules on cruise size and pay, set when a 100 hundred miles was a day's work. Krebs told him the industry had tried for 25 years. Haverty went into the Union Halls himself, in Winslow, Needles, and Bakersfield, and told the men that if nothing changed, the Santa Fe would be gone. As he told it, the Santa Fe signed its own agreements on cruise and work rules in 1990, and they changed the whole industry. We dropped out of the national negotiations in the industry, and that's why. when I kind of got the reputation of being a maverick within the industry. He cut the map as well. We sold off at least 20% of our railroad to shortlines, but we kept 93% of the revenues. In his telling, an officer named Carl Eis, later BNSF's chief executive, worked out for him which traffic made money and which did not, and the railroad stopped chasing volume

35:13for its own sake. His larger idea came from a thesis he had written for a marketing course at the University of Chicago. A railroad and a trucking company should work together. When he raised it at the Santa Fe in 1988, the marketing department answered that trucking companies and railroads would never be able to work together. In October 1989, In he took a McKinsey consultant and his old professor out on business cars at the back of an intermodal. train across New Mexico. Interstate 40 ran 30 yards away. The trucks almost bumper to bumper, and most of the trailers carried one name, JB Hunt. Two weeks later, he flew to Lowell, Arkansas, and walked into an office where a man stood in a cowboy hat and boots. He says, Hey, I'm JB Hunt. I said, I'm Mike Haverty. Every railroad in the country had been to C Hunt see and asked for his freight. Hunt turned the request around. He said, if we're going to do something, it's got to be a partnership. Haverty invited him to ride a train from Chicago. He had Corwith Yard cleaned until it gleamed, because Hunt liked everything clean, and he had one of Hunt's trailers placed right in front of the business car. On November 1st, 1, 1989, the intermodal train left Corwith for Kansas City. behind Santa Fe's War Bonnet locomotives at 70 miles an hour past a highway at a standstill.

36:33Before the trip was over, the trucker and the railroad had a deal. Krebs, years later, called Haverty the man who got Hunt onto the railroad. And by then, in Krebs's account, Hunt had become its largest customer. Haverty put the growth in his own numbers. The business came to about 30. million when the agreement was signed, and in 2018, as a BNSF officer told him, the revenues were about $1.5 billion. Asked whether the deal was possible before deregulation, Haverty said no and went further. And I will also tell you that under the old regulated environment, I would have never been president of Santa Fe.

37:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

37:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1991, still the Santa Fe's president. he went to a conference of chief executives in Acapulco. The negotiators of a free trade agreement for Canada, the United States, and Mexico presented their work, and Haverty came away sure it would matter. It would take effect on January 1, 1994. The Santa Fe was not interested.

37:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

37:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): left the company soon after. By his account, one railroad did not need. two people running it. That same year, J.B. Hunt asked him along on a trip south, looking for a Mexican trucking partner, El Paso, Monterrey, Mexico City. In Mexico City, they met the head of the country's largest shipping line, TMM.

37:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

37:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Santa Fe had looked away from Mexico. Its former president, a railroad without a railroad, was looking south. Green and Orange.

38:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

38:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the early 1990s, the Santa Fe ran across the southern tier of the West, from Chicago to California. Burlington Northern ran across the northern tier, much of it on James J. Hill's old lines. Krebs looked at the two maps and saw a merger the regulator could pass. because the railroads met end-to-end instead of side by side. They have all this grain and coal business. We have this premier franchise, intermodal franchise in the United States. And there's not a lot of overlap.

38:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

38:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): merger was announced on Thursday, June 30, 1994. Union Pacific's chairman had told Krebs he liked competition and would not get in the way. That changed in the autumn, as Krebs told it.

38:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

38:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 5, Drew Lewis called me up and said, I want to buy the Santa Fe. Lewis said he would be in Krebs's office in Schaumburg, outside Chicago, at 2 o'clock that afternoon.

39:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Two

39:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): black limousines drew up, and Lewis came in with Dick Davidson, who ran Union Pacific's Railroad.

39:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

39:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Krebs's account, Santa Fe's lawyer had barely begun his prepared sentence. about the contract with Burlington Northern when Lewis put an envelope on the table and walked out. Davidson put his head back in the door to say goodbye.

39:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

39:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): envelope held Union Pacific's first offer, which the press put at $17.33 a share. Santa Fe answered within the week with a condition. Union Pacific could have the company if it paid the shareholders up front and held Santa. Fe in a voting trust while the regulator decided. Krebs explained why the burden had to sit with the buyer. We think that the odds of approval are a great danger for our shareholders.

39:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

39:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two bidders raised their offers in turn all autumn. In a phrase Krebs repeated years later, it was a tennis match with Santa Fe as the ball. On January 31, 1995, Union Pacific withdrew. Krebs got the news by phone while changing planes at O'Hare.

40:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

40:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shareholders voted, the commission approved, and in August 1995, Krebs asked to meet Burlington Northern's directors, who would name two thirds of the merged company's board.

40:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

40:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was told to come to Dallas on a Sunday. A jet picked him up in Wisconsin the night before, and by his own telling, he was glad he had packed a tie and a blazer. He found a formal board meeting, the directors in coats and ties around the table.

40:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

40:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): directors asked about moving the headquarters to Chicago and about how their own railroad was performing. Krebs said plainly that it was not running well, and then made them a promise. We're not going to do this on the backs of the people who work for the railroad. After an executive session, they confirmed him as president and chief executive.

40:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

40:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next day, Burlington Northern's chairman called to say he would retire. The two companies became one on September 22, 1995. Krebs took half the senior officers from each side. By his account, he bought 500 new locomotives, and he chose their paint himself.

41:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

41:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): used the war Warbonnet bonnet Santa Fe design, but I did it in green and orange. Green and orange had been the Great Northern's colors, Hills colors, and now they ran on the Santa Fe's design from Chicago to the Pacific. Union Pacific answered by buying Southern Pacific in 1996, and the joined lines jammed around Houston the next year. Davidson, looking back in 2021, said the first mistake was trying to join the two railroads too quickly. The East settled its own map. in the same years. Conrail, the railroad Washington had assembled from the bankrupts of the Northeast and sold to the public in 1987, became the prize in a contest between CSX and Norfolk Southern in 1996 and 1997.

41:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

41:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two winners divided it: 58% of it to Norfolk Southern and 42 to CSX, and on June 1, 1999, its lines passed. to their new owners. David Good, Norfolk Southern's chief executive through the fight, gave his verdict in 2023, in the same series. But my conclusion is that overall, it was a good deal to do, and it was the right deal, and it was what we had to do. I'm sorry it cost as much as it did. Two railroads now ran each half of the country. Give me a good board. In Canada, the National Railway still belonged to the government in the early 1990s, and the man who would sell it had never worked for a railroad. Paul Tellier was born in 1939 in Joliet, At Tébec, Tibec, a town northeast of Montreal, into a family of lawyers. His father and his grandfather both practiced.

42:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

42:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was expelled from his first school, and his father later sent him to a boarding school. By his account, he was one of six children, and one Christmas he went off to work as a ski patroller until his father talked him back.

43:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

43:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): married at 20, after his first degree, and he would call it the is best decision of his life, and his wife his closest advisor.

43:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

43:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): studied law at the University of Ottawa, was called to the Quebec Bar, decided not to practice, spent three years at Oxford on a research degree, and came home to teach constitutional law at the University of Montreal. Then he went to Ottawa for a year, as a minister's executive assistant, and stayed 22.

43:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

43:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): worked on the federal government's government strategy for the Quebec referendum of 1980, and he became a deputy minister. of Indian and Northern Affairs and then of Energy, Mines, and Resources. From 1985 to 1992, he was clerk of the Privy Council, the head of Canada's Public Service.

43:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

43:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): February 2024, he gave the Railroad Hall of Fame his own account of his life, sitting in his old office at CN's Cien's headquarters in Montreal. He stated his rule for a career. When you no longer learn, get out of the job. Move to something else. Don't coast. In 1992, he was about to follow his own rule to a post at Petro Canada in Calgary. Then, the Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, asked him to run the Canadian National Railway instead.

44:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

44:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): government had assembled Cien after the First World War from railways that had gone bankrupt. Tellier named his price. I said, yes, Prime Minister, provided that you gave me the mandate to privatize Cien. And this was in the summer of 1992. He started on October 1, 1992. By his account, he timed his arrival so that the board could not approve the budget without him in the room. Within a year, Mulroney had left office, and the government of Jean Chrétien, elected in 1993, kept the mandate alive. He arrived determined to strip out as much bureaucracy as he could, and he was candid about his own limits. Of the team he assembled, he said, If you look at the people that we brought in to privatize Cienne, these people could all run circles around me before breakfast in the morning. On the first day, by his account, six vice presidents' posts were abolished. He told the unions the same. day that CN was losing money in many places and could not go on that way. He also closed the executive dining room.

45:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

45:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told its regulars what to expect. I said, Don't worry, you know, you're not being terminated, but I'm closing the dining room. And the next day, my colleagues arrived at the dining room and they realized it was closed. It took three hours, and the word spread across the organization. At an early meeting, he took off his jacket. A colleague answered in writing. She passed me a note. Mr. Tellier, people don't take off their jacket. He took it as the measure of a mindset he would have to change. The harder work followed. To make CN something investors would buy, Tellier cut thousands of jobs and by his account brought its repair shops from seven down to one. He went to the towns himself. to say so. In Moncton, New Brunswick's premier met him angry and, after half an hour with the papers, accepted the case. In Prince George, British Columbia, CN was closing its shop. At the meeting there, a mother asked him a question he repeated three decades later. I've got two kids in the hockey team in Prince George. That hockey team is not going to survive. Do you realize what you're doing? to my family? From that moment, Tedier said, he knew he had lost the room. In late 1994, the losses were heaviest east of Winnipeg. Telier and his lieutenant, Michael Sabia, walked a block across Montreal to Canadian

46:41Pacific's headquarters to talk about combining the two railways' eastern lines. In Telier's Tellier's account, CP then proposed something larger. It would take over the whole of CN's network in the east. The Federal Minister of Transport, a member of Parliament from New Brunswick, would not hand the maritime provinces to one private railway.

47:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They

47:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): met in Toronto with an advisor from the investment bank, Nesbitt Burns. The minister had a question of his own. Alright, I'm not going to sell to these guys. Can we privatize now? Tellier asked for more time. to show that CN could make money. The minister refused. The sale would happen now. Tellier told the rest of the meeting in two sentences. And he said, What can I do for you? And I said, give me a good board. Not the B Team.

47:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To

47:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sell CN, Tellier needed. buyers, and he believed the money that could buy a railway this size, and the knowledge to judge it, were in the United States and abroad. Canadian Pacific argued the opposite in public. The government had spent so much on CN since its creation that Canadians should have the first chance at the stock. Tellier's Telier's team saw the sale as an American story, and the facts, he said later, proved them right.

48:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,

48:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): CN chose Goldman Sachs to lead the offering, alongside Canadian banks.

48:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

48:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some circles, the choice was unpopular because the big fees for selling a railway the taxpayers had paid for would go to an American firm. Telier went to see Goldman's chief executive, and he made his terms plain. I want your best team. I don't want the B team.

48:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then

48:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came the roadshow, the weeks of meetings with investors. One day, Goldman's lead banker and Michael Sabia came into Tedier's office with what they called a delicate proposal. His wife should come along because she would calm him down.

48:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): She

48:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): skipped Paris and Milan and went straight to Zurich.

48:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

48:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the team arrived there, near 11 at night, with a meeting at 8 the next morning, she was waiting at the door of the hotel. In Seattle, he went looking for the office that invested Bill Gates' money, Cascade Investment, expecting a grand building with paintings on the walls.

49:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

49:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): driver who brought them from the airport on the Sunday night told them Cascade was across the street from their hotel.

49:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

49:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next morning, they found a small shopping center, and on its second floor, a small plaque. Cascade bought, and from then on, Tedier closed every pitch with Gates' name.

49:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

49:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): law that let CN go set the terms of its independence. Its head office would stay in Montreal, and no single holder could control more than 15% of the votes, a cap Parliament raised to 25% in 2018. On Friday, November 17, 1995, the government of Canada sold the whole of CN at 27. a share, about $2.25 billion. It was the largest initial public offering in Canada to that day. Tellier later summed up what the sale had made of CN. We became the largest company with the largest foreign owned shareholder base in Canada. Within a year, the shares had nearly doubled on the Toronto Exchange. Harry Bruce, who told the story of the sale in his book The Pig That Flew, in 1997, judged it, in a line CN reprinted for the sale's 25th anniversary, the most rewarding IPO for investors that the government ever pulled off. An artist's print of a pig in flight became part of CN's folklore of the sale, a reminder of the old saying about what will

50:23happen when pigs fly. Ownership changed the people inside the railway too. After the sale, CN posted its share price and its results in its buildings, so that anyone walking in could see the link between the work and the value of the company. Employees bought stock, and the senior officers were paid partly in options. Tellier liked to tell of a meeting at a yard in the West, in Edmonton or Vancouver. He could not remember which.

50:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the

50:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): question period, a worker objected to a new rule from headquarters.

50:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

50:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): crew's pickup trucks were no longer to be serviced at the gas station a block away, but 20 miles down the road. He objected as a shareholder, and the room applauded. A second man stood up to say that he owned shares too. Tedier went back to Montreal and asked whether it was true. It was, and every trip meant a second driver to bring the first one back. So, he reversed the rule. He wanted the supervisors to think the same way. Many of them could not relate to the talk of free cash flow they heard from Montreal. So he had a short course in basic business written for them, quickly, with a plain brief.

51:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

51:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): course would cover what free cash flow was, and it would get to explain that the inventory, that's cash. Union leaders. signed up for it too, once supervisors began answering their requests with talk of cash flow. Before the sale, the press had called CN a bloated dinosaur. Now, it belonged to people who could read its price on the wall. $2 an hour.

52:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

52:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the end of 1963, a 19-year-old in Memphis named Hunter Harrison took a job in the yard of the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway, the Frisco, oiling the axles of freight cars.

52:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His

52:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): biographer, Howard Green, gave the reason at Freight Waves Live in Chicago in 2019.

52:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

52:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went to work for the railroad because it paid $2 an hour instead of 50 cents an hour at the bakery. He went for the money.

52:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

52:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stayed.

52:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

52:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Burlington Northern absorbed the Frisco in November 1980, five weeks after the Staggers Act became law, Harrison rose through the bigger railroads operating department.

52:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

52:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Green's account, he was known there for tearing down signs that told employees the customer is always right. By his own account, the first time he received a Railroader Railroad of the Year honor was in 1987, from the St. Louis Railway Club, and in 2015, he said he had looked back at the speech he gave then. In 1989, an investment firm, the Prospect Group, bought the Illinois Central and took it private. Its team had already tried a new way of running trains at Mid South Rail, four short lines the firm had combined.

53:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

53:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chairman was Gil Lampfeer, then in his late 30s. Speaking in 2021 on the podcast Rail Group on Air, he described what they had bought.

53:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

53:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Illinois Central, you had the worst-run railroad in the United States.

53:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

53:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his first board meeting, he noticed where he was sitting. I'm sitting in the chair that Mr. Harriman used to sit in, the end of the table.

53:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): E.

53:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): H. Harriman had chaired the Illinois Central's Finance Committee before he took on the Union Pacific.

53:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

53:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new chief executive was Ed Moyers. Henry Chigi, one of his operating officers, remembered how he started. You had Ed Moyers, who fired every vice president in the Illinois Central in his first week on the job, except one. That year, Harrison came over from Burlington Northern to join the Illinois Central as vice president and chief transportation officer. Moyers's team had begun to run the railroad to a fixed timetable, every train, every day, at the same time. Chigi, on the same program, described what the founders thought they were doing.

54:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

54:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): those four years where the baby was born, this thing that later became named Precision Schedule Railroading, but we didn't have a name for it, we just considered it common sense. Harrison was one of the operators who carried the plan out. Years before the method became tied to his name.

54:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

54:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Lamphier's account, they used to call it precision railroading, and he added the word scheduled because the real purpose was to run the railroad to a schedule. Green, for his part, said Harrison never once called the method by its initials. In February 1993, In Moyers left the top job and Harrison became the Illinois Central's chief executive.

54:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

54:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): number that measured the work was the operating ratio, the share of each revenue dollar a railroad spends to run itself. Under Moyers, the Illinois Centrals had already come down from about 80. Under Harrison, as reported, it fell from 68.2% in 1993 to 62.3% in 1997. That was about six points in five years. without a merger on the same track.

55:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

55:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): method was simple to state. A train from Chicago bound for Nashville, Atlanta, and Jacksonville was built with the Nashville cars at the back so they could be dropped first. And it left on time, instead of waiting for more freight. In about 1996, the Illinois Central recruited a young train master from Burlington Northern named Keith Creel.

55:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He was

55:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): born in Alabama in 1968, studied marketing at Jacksonville State University, and had served as an Army lieutenant in the Persian Gulf War. By his account, Burlington Northern had been recruiting trainees with a military background, and a friend had opened the door. He chose operations over marketing, he said, because a man who would sell the business first had to understand it.

56:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

56:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had started at Cherokee Yard in Tulsa. on the old Frisco lines where Harrison had come up, and he later said he had known all about Harrison long before they met. He dated his start in a Railway Age interview published in January 2021.

56:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

56:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I went to the BN, this was in 1992, I think Hunter had already shifted and transitioned. On his first day at the Illinois Central, he was taken to meet Harrison.

56:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

56:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): office was on the 21st floor of NBC Tower in Chicago. Creel told the next story in 2022 on the podcast The Knowledge Project. He was a tower trainmaster in Memphis, coordinating the yard's trains from above. The daily train to New Orleans left at 3 in the afternoon, and one day he sent it out 10 Ten cars short of what the plan called for.

56:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

56:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thought he had done a good job. At 2 two in the morning, his phone rang and he put it on the speaker.

56:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

56:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): deep voice asked why he had left the 10 cars behind and said it was Hunter Harrison. Creel hit mute and told the yardmaster that somebody was playing a game.

57:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

57:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yardmaster looked at him. Keith, that's Mr. Harrison. For 30 minutes, Harrison took him through the arithmetic.

57:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Ten

57:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): customers would get their freight a day late. That was the small. cost. The larger one came later in the week, when shippers released the most cars.

57:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

57:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 10 cars left on Tuesday would pile up behind Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays until by the weekend there was a whole extra train to run. It needed a crew and locomotives, and both then had to be brought home empty. Creel worked for Harrison for 20 years after that night. His verdict on the man? He was more like the coach that you didn't want to let down, or the father, or the, you know, the mentor that you have in your life that you don't want to let down. Part of the Assets. Back in Montreal, Cienne's Cien's shares had been trading for little more than a year. In February 1997, Paul Tellier Cien's president and chief executive since 1992, began talking with Illinois Central's chairman, Gil Lamphire, about buying his railroad. Illinois Central ran south from Chicago to the Gulf of Mexico. Joined end-to-end with CN, it would carry a railroad that already reached the Atlantic and the Pacific to a third coast, on the Gulf, with no overlap between the two. In March 1997, Lamphier and his chief executive met Tellier and his lieutenant Michael

58:32Sabia. The talks stopped and started for most of a year, and in December, they resumed. In January 1998, the great ice storm came down on Quebec, and in its dark, the two sides settled the basis of a deal. Tellier remembered the last conversation that mattered. It was with Illinois. Central's chief executive, Hunter Harrison, the Memphis yard hand who had put that railroad on a timetable.

58:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

58:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Tellier's account, they met in a private club in Montreal, lit by candles because the power was out, and Harrison asked him when he should leave. Tellier told the story in 2024, in his old office at CN's Cien's Montreal headquarters, and gave his answer as he remembered it.

59:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We

59:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pay too much. and therefore you're part of the assets.

59:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

59:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): February 10, 1998, CN agreed to pay $39 a share for Illinois Central. In US dollars, that came to about $2.4 billion for the shares, three quarters of it in cash and the rest in CN stock, and about $3 billion counting the railroad's debt. Green, the biographer, tells the story the other way around. In his version, the buyers set their terms at the start. But they said, it's a deal breaker. You're one of the assets. If we buy this company, you're coming too. The agreement itself leans toward Green, because in it, CN undertook to make Harrison its chief operating officer.

59:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

59:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): took that job in March 1998.

59:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:00:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): regulator approved the purchase on May 21. 1999, and on July 1st, CN took control of Illinois Central. Soon afterward, Tellier took his new operator up into the tower of Cienne's big yard in Winnipeg. Cien's directors, Tellier recalled, had wondered whether a southern drawl and a French accent would understand each other. A yard is where freight cars are sorted into trains, and Harrison had spent his working life in them. Tellier remembered what Harrison said. He said, Paul, Paul, look at this! My God, the design of that yard! I mean, it was like a kid, you know, in a toy shop. Tellier drew his conclusion there in the tower. Who am I to question whether we should run a 5,000, 8,000, or 10,000 foot train? That's his expertise. From then on, the two men divided the world. work between them. Tellier put the arrangement plainly. You run the railroad and I run the company. And the company starts with the shareholders and then the stakeholders. The company, for Tellier, also meant the politicians. Harrison had little patience for them, and when a call came from Washington that Harrison would not return, Tellier returned it himself.

1:01:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

1:01:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the unions in Winnipeg picketed the American managers Harrison had brought in, Tellier went to the picket line and backed his operator's choice. Harrison, for his part, set about putting Cien on the timetable he had run at Illinois Central. He began with the people who would have to run it. At his first meeting with Cien's top 200 managers at the Hotel Bonaventure in Montreal, he taught the method himself. Green described the day to a podcast. audience in April 2021.

1:01:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:01:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spoke to that group for eight hours straight without notes. People were afraid to get up and go to the bathroom. L'Amphire, who went north with him, remembered putting the method into CN in about nine months, when people had said it could not be done. The pairing was an unlikely Likely one. A lawyer and civil servant from Jodiet and a carman from Memphis who had worked on nothing but railroads.

1:02:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:02:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lawyer had sold his railroad to the market, and he had now bought another partly for the man who ran it. The operator ran the network, and the chief executive dealt with the owners, the governments, and the unions. By Green's account, Harrison admired what Tellier and Sabia had done as men who had never run a railroad.

1:02:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

1:02:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Lamphire's account, Harrison also chose to let other railroads come. and learn the method, on the view that what helped CN helped the whole industry. Tellier stepped down as chief executive at the end of 2002, and Harrison took his place. By then, CN had been a public company for seven years, and its owners could measure what the civil servant had done for them. From late 1996, a year after the sale, to the end of 2002, its holders, reinvesting their dividends, made about two and a half times their money in US dollars.

1:02:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:02:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): SP 500 made about one and a quarter times over the same years.

1:03:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His

1:03:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): verdict on his own part, given in that office in 2024, was short.

1:03:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

1:03:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): never became an expert in railroading, and therefore I've always deferred to people who knew railroading. Expanding into Mexico.

1:03:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:03:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the year CN was sold, a small railroad in Kansas City needed a leader.

1:03:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:03:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): February 1995, the chairman of Kansas City Southern Industries, Paul Henson, went to see Mike Haverty in Naperville, outside Chicago. Haverty was the former Santa Fe. president from Acheson, the conductor's son who had made a trucker his partner,

1:03:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

1:03:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he had been out of a railroad job since about 1991. Henson's company was an odd pair of businesses.

1:03:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It

1:03:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): owned the Janice Mutual Funds, and it owned a small railroad that ran south from Kansas City to the Texas coast at Beaumont and Port Arthur. Its board had tried to sell the railroad in 1993 and again. in 1994.

1:04:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:04:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): buyers who looked, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe, merged with each other instead. Haverty had already urged the company to look south to Mexico rather than sell. Now Henson offered the railroad to Haverty to run. Haverty answered with a condition, which he recalled in 2019. The only way I would do that is if the board would be willing to consider expanding. into Mexico, and he said, We will.

1:04:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:04:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): started that May. His own description of the mood?

1:04:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When

1:04:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I came down in May of 1995, virtually people were writing the obituary of Kansas City Southern. Within months, the Great Western mergers were approved or announced, and two giant systems stood on either side of his little one. Years later, he admitted what he had not. known in Naperville. If I'd known what I was going to get into, I probably wouldn't have taken the job. The map was the problem. Kansas City Southern ended on the Gulf at Beaumont, well short of the Mexican border at Laredo. Haverty gave the distance in his own geography. It's got a 500 mile gap between Beaumont and Corpus Christi.

1:05:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:05:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): other railroads noticed.

1:05:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We were

1:05:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the laughing stock of the industry. A railroad that stopped short of the border had nothing to offer a Mexican shipper and no standing to bid for a Mexican line.

1:05:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:05:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): closed the gap in two moves.

1:05:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:05:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): November 1995, Kansas City Southern bought 49% of the company that owned the Texas Mexican Railway.

1:05:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:05:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Tex Tex-Mex Mex was a short line from Corpus Christi to Laredo, and it owned the American. half of the railbridge there.

1:05:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:05:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next year, the regulator approved Union Pacific's purchase of Southern Pacific, and it attached conditions to protect competition in Texas. One of them gave the Tex-Mex trackage rights, the right to run its own trains over another railroad's track, on about 360 miles between Corpus Christi and Beaumont. With borrowed track, Havertes Haverty's Railroad could now reach the border. and it could bid for what lay beyond it. What lay beyond it was Mexico's national railway, for sale in pieces.

1:06:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:06:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): March 2, 1995, Mexico had amended its constitution to end the state's exclusive hold on the railways. The government would not sell the track outright. It offered each line as a concession, the right to run a state railway as a private business for a long, fixed term. The first was the Northeast Line, the trunk from the border at Nuevo Laredo through Monterey to Mexico City, with branches to the ports of Veracruz on the Gulf and Lasaro Cardenas on the Pacific. Haverty remembered the expectations in the industry.

1:06:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

1:06:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it was given that Union Pacific was going to get that. Haverty had a partner in Mexico, TMM, Mexico's largest shipping. line, whose owners he had come to know, by his account, on a trip south with JB Hunt.

1:06:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:06:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): early December 1996, Kansas City Southern and TMM won the right to buy 80% of the Northeast line for about 11.07 billion pesos. By the company's own conversion in the announcement of December 1996, that came to about US$14 1.4 billion. US dollars.

1:07:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:07:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): government kept the other fifth, and the concession ran for 50 years. The smallest of the large railroads in the United States, the one that had been for sale two years earlier, was now a partner in Mexico's main line. On Monday, June 23, 1997, the new railroad began operating as Transportacion Transportación Ferroviaria Mexicana, or TFM. Kansas City Southern's letter to its shareholders for 2005 looked back on the start. In large part due to a pent-up demand for reliable rail service in Mexico, TFM was successful right out of the gate, with revenues growing in the double digits during the first few years. The arrangement had a limit that the first good years hid. Kansas City Southern and TFM were two mid-haul railroads under different owners. and TFM itself was a joint venture shared with TMM and the Mexican government. The long haul across the border could not be run as one railroad. Still, the trains were running. Two years after Haverty set his condition in Naperville, freight was moving on the trunk line every larger railroad had assumed would belong to someone else.

1:08:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

1:08:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): share of the concession belonged to the railroad nobody had wanted to buy.

1:08:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:08:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Stilwell Dream.

1:08:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:08:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the late 1990s, Paul Tellier, CN's chief executive, came to Kansas City to see Mike Haverty. He had a combination in mind: a railroad running from Canada to Mexico. Haverty pointed out that the two railroads did not even touch. Tellier then told him something almost no one outside CN knew. Haverty recalled the moment in 2019. He said, I'm going to buy the Illinois Central. With Illinois Central, the railroad Tellier had said he would buy, CN would meet Kansas City Southern in two places: at Springfield, Illinois, and at Meridian, Mississippi. By his account, Haverty told no one and never bought a single Illinois central share. The two companies then signed a marketing agreement to carry traffic between Canada and Mexico through Meridian, and their teams met every quarter. Haverty's own company was still two businesses under one roof.

1:09:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:09:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): July 12, 2000, Kansas City Southern Industries spun off its financial businesses, the Janus Janice Funds among them, as a separate company. called Stilwell Financial. Haverty became chief executive of what was left, a railroad company and nothing else. And from the first day of 2001, its chairman as well. For the first time, its owners held a plain bet on the route to Mexico, and the share price would rise or fall with the railroad alone.

1:09:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:09:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Mexican half of that route was still shared with partners. Apart, by the company's own reckoning, Kansas City Southern and the Mexican Railroad each hauled freight about 500 miles at a time. Only together could the hauls stretch to a thousand or two thousand miles or more, and under a joint venture, the traffic between them lagged far behind what the market offered.

1:10:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:10:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): partners agreed in 2003 to combine, and then spent two years in delays, further negotiations, legal proceedings, and arbitration. On January 1, 2005, with the regulator's approval, Kansas City Southern took control of the Tex-Mex, the shortline to Laredo it had first bought into in 1995.

1:10:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:10:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): April 1, 2005, Kansas City Southern bought TMM's stake in the Mexican Railroad for about $600 million in cash, shares, and notes.

1:10:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

1:10:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): settlement with the Mexican government that September gave it the whole company, and the disputes with TMM and the government ended in mutual releases. On December 2nd, 2005, the railroad took a new name Kansas City Southern de Mexico. One owner now ran the line from Kansas City across the border to Mexico City and the ports. That year's letter to shareholders, which Haverty signed with the railway's president, did not begin with the deal. It began in 1887 with the man who founded the railroad, Arthur Stilwell. Stilwell had built his line north and south, from Kansas City to Port Arthur, Texas, on the Gulf, when the great railroads of his century ran east and west. Later, he dreamed of carrying it on to a port on Mexico's Pacific coast. That part of the dream lay dormant for a century.

1:11:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:11:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): letter recalled that many had seen Kansas City Southern as a relic, bound to be swallowed by the giants around it. It conceded that putting three railroads under one owner had at times been difficult and frustrating. Of the choice the company made in 1995, to stay independent and look south, the letter said, Once the decision was made, there was no wavering.

1:12:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:12:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): owners who stayed with Haverty. were well paid for that steadiness. $1,000 put into Kansas City Southern at the end of 2000, with dividends reinvested, had become about $4,700 by the end of 2010.

1:12:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:12:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same sum in the S P 500 had become about $1,150. Over his decade at the head of the company, the broad market went almost nowhere.

1:12:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:12:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): money had been made by the route, not by cutting costs. A gateway no rival could match. Haverty had come up through the operating ranks himself, and he had his own view of the method that made Hunter Harrison famous. In 2019, at Union Station in Kansas City, whose board he had chaired from 2005, he gave it. Today, what I hear called the precision scheduled railroading. Yes. You know what I call that? Railroading 100. 101. On August 1, 2010, Haverty handed the chief executive's post to David Starling and stayed on as executive chairman.

1:12:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:12:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): railroad Tellier had sketched across three countries was still a marketing agreement, and it would take another man, a decade later, to build it. The letter of 2005 had already said what the bet of 1995 was for, in a sentence that reached back to the founder. The Stilwell dream, the KCS dream, of a railroad from the middle of the United States to the heart of Mexico and beyond had been realized. An all-in wager.

1:13:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:13:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): December After 1999, Rob Krebs heard that CN might buy Kansas City Southern. Krebs, the banker's son from Sacramento, who had turned a conglomerate back into a railroad, now ran BNSF from Fort Worth, the western system he had assembled from the Burlington Northern and the Santa Fe. He did not want CN reaching down into his part of the country on its own.

1:13:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:13:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): called Paul Tellier in Montreal and proposed something larger.

1:13:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:13:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Monday, December 20, 1999, BNS BNSF and CN announced that they would merge.

1:14:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

1:14:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Tellier's account, BNSF's directors in Fort Worth joked about his accent, and the merger was announced in Montreal, with Krebs there. The rest of the industry lined up against them.

1:14:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:14:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chief executives of the other large railroads said publicly that they wanted no more mergers.

1:14:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:14:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Tellier's memory, Dick Davidson at Union Pacific and John Snow. Jon at CSX led the opposition,

1:14:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

1:14:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Norfolk Southern's David Good was a little less forceful. Shippers were hostile because the last great Western merger had ended in the jammed yards of Houston. On March 17, 2000, the regulator imposed a 15-month moratorium on major railroad Road mergers. Krebs and Tellier met at the Boston Airport and called the deal off. Telly, Tellier, looking back in 2024, said only, it would have been quite a line and quite a network. In June 2001, the regulator wrote new rules, under which a major merger had to enhance competition, not merely preserve it. By then, Krebs had chosen his successor.

1:15:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:15:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): picked a young marketing officer, Matt Rose, and when Rose objected that he had never run trains, Krebs made him head of operations first and then president. Rose, BNSF's chief executive from 2000 to 2013, told a Fort Worth business luncheon in March 2013 that his predecessor had wanted someone young, without a lot of bad habits. Then he gave his own reading of the choice. And I was the only one available, so I got the job.

1:15:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

1:15:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Krebs's account, his last day. running BNSF was December 7, 2000, and on May 1, 2001, he retired from the board as well, so that his successor would not work in his shadow. His holders had not done well. In his five years at the head of the merged railroad, its shares returned a little more than one time the money, with dividends reinvested, while the SP S P 500 more than doubled.

1:16:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His

1:16:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): generation the men who used the freedom of 1980 to assemble the great networks, mostly lagged the market while they did it, and the gains came under the men who inherited the networks. Among those inheritors, the two largest U.S. records of the period against the index belonged to Michael Ward at CSX and James Young at Union Pacific. Krebs, speaking in 2020, judged his years by what the industry became. I was right in the middle of a transformation of a dying industry into one that was the envy of every country in the world.

1:16:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

1:16:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the time the most famous investor of the age bought his railroad, the two airlines his roommates had recommended were both gone. The purchase came nine years after he left. Rose remembered that in the worst months of the financial crisis, BNSF had wondered whether it could borrow money at all.

1:16:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:16:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Tuesday, November 3, 2009, Berkshire Hathaway, the company Warren Buffett ran from Omaha, agreed to buy the 77.4% of BNSF it did not already own. It paid $100 a share in a deal valued at about $44 billion with BNSF's debt, the largest purchase. in Berkshire's history. Buffett explained the purchase in the announcement. Most important of all, however, it's an all-in wager on the economic future of the United States. He added, I love these bets.

1:17:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:17:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): purchase closed on Friday, February 12, 2010. Rose told the Fort Worth Luncheon how his first conversation with his new owner began.

1:17:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

1:17:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): called him that day. and I said, Okay, Warren, you know, we just got the shareholder vote. You know, what do I need to do? Rose offered to fly to Omaha with slides. Buffett's instructions, as Rose recalled them, were brief. Send me the financials once a month, and then tell me how you're doing once a quarter. Buffett had bought a network that no one could build again. Its intermodal business, the trade in containers and truck trailers carried on trains, was the franchise Krebs had prized in the merger of 1995. Katie Farmer, who became BNSF's chief executive in 2021, told the Intermodal Industries Association in August 2020 where that franchise came from. Much of the infrastructure and the backbone of our intermodal franchise, much of that was done before the acquisition by Berkshire. Worst to First.

1:18:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:18:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): January 1, 2003, Hunter Harrison, CN's chief operating officer since 1998, became its chief executive. He ran the railroad by one number, the operating ratio, and he taught a whole company to read it. In 2006, CN's ratio reached 60.7%.

1:18:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:18:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): results released the next January had Harrison counting record revenues and free cash flow and its best ever annual operating ratio. Green says the tail fin of Harrison's airplane already carried the next target OR R59. 59. Cien's owners did well under him. $1,000 invested in CN. the day he took charge, in US dollars with dividends reinvested, was worth about $4,400 when he left at the end of 2009.

1:19:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:19:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the S P 500, the same $1,000 had become about $1,460.

1:19:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:19:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): April 2009, Cien's board named Claude Mongeot Mongeau to succeed him on January 1, 2010. Harrison retired at 65 to his show jumping horses in Florida. By his own account, he did some consulting and studied the case for joining Eastern and Western railroads into one.

1:19:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

1:19:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Green's account, idleness did not suit him.

1:19:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:19:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2011, the telephone began to ring. Investors who were looking at the railroads wanted his advice, and the calls kept coming. Harrison described what happened next to Railway Age in January. 2015. My wife had been pretty encouraging as far as retiring and taking it easy, and I got off the phone with one of those calls and she said, you should go back to work. The investors had a railroad in mind.

1:20:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:20:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): October 28, 2011, Pershing Square, the New York investment firm, disclosed that it owned about 12% of Canadian Pacific.

1:20:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:20:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): idea, Green says, had been paused. Paul Hillal's. Bill Ackman was the campaign's public face. Their plan was to put Harrison in charge, through a proxy contest, a vote of the shareholders on who should sit on the board. CN, his old employer, sued him, and the two sides settled in 2013. Canadian Pacific's board fought back. In its circular to shareholders of March 22, 2012, the incumbent board stated its case. The board believes that Mr. Harrison is not the right leader for Canadian Pacific. Its own plan promised an operating ratio of 70 to 72% by 2014, a target the board itself called ambitious. The shareholders sided with the investors.

1:21:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At

1:21:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the annual meeting of May 17, 2012, in Calgary, Pershing Square's nominees were elected, and on June 23, 29, 2012, Harrison became Canadian Pacific's chief executive. He described what he found. They were being called the worst railroad in North America. Nobody wants to be the worst. In February 2013, Keith Creel, a former Army officer from Alabama who had followed Harrison from Illinois Central to CN, came to Calgary as his president and chief operating officer.

1:21:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

1:21:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Creel's account, he found Canadian Pacific hauling potash from Saskatchewan east, hundreds of miles out of the way, and turned it west. Two trains then derailed on track that had been neglected, and by his account, he asked the board for $100 million to fix it.

1:21:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:21:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): remembered the answer he got from Ackman. Bill was the first one to say, you need 200 million, whatever you need.

1:22:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:22:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): railroad began. running longer trains to a schedule, with fewer locomotives, and by the end of 2016, hundreds of the engines it owned stood in storage. The results arrived ahead of the board's forecast. Canadian Pacific's operating ratio, as reported, had been 81.3% in 2011. In 2014, it was 64.7, against the old board's promise of 70 to 72%. In 2016, as first reported, it was 58.6. His holders were rewarded too. Counting dividends and measured on the New York line in US dollars, Canadian Pacific's shares under him did nearly a fifth better than the S P 500, though the Canadian dollar fell in those years.

1:22:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:22:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): March 2, 2015, Harrison spoke to the Canadian Club of Toronto in the room where, by his account, the proxy contest had begun. He told the audience a teacher's parable: A jar is filled with rocks, then pebbles, then sand, then water. And the order matters. If you want to get the big rocks in, you gotta put them in first. Then he named his own big rocks, five of them. The first was service, which he defined in a phrase. just do what you say you're going to do. The second was controlling cost while doing it. And the third was using every locomotive and car to the full. The fourth was safety, which to him meant not getting anybody hurt. And the fifth was people and leadership. Then he gave the room his verdict on Canadian Pacific. CP was the worst. Now it's on top. So we've gone from worst to first. Canadian Pacific announced his resignation on January 18, 2017. Within hours, the press reported that he had another railroad in view. This time the investor was Paul Hillal, who had left Pershing Square and started a fund of his own. On March 6, 2017, In at 72, Harrison became chief executive of CSX, his fourth railroad. with Hillal as vice chairman. That year,

1:24:05CSX's shippers complained about service as he remade it. He was ill, and by Green's account, he ran the railroad by telephone from his home in Florida. In early December, he held one more hunter camp, the weekend schools at the Breakers in Palm Beach, where he taught his managers his method. Several of the people he had trained would go on to run large railroads of their own. On December 14, CSX put him on medical leave. He died on December 16, 2017, at 73. Nearly three years earlier, in his interview with Railway Age, he had said what he hoped his railroads would leave behind. We had some influence there in showing people that those concepts would work and we could create value, that would be very nice to know. Three countries. On January 31, 2017, Keith Creel succeeded Harrison as Chief Executive of Canadian Pacific.

1:25:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:25:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had learned the business under him at Illinois Central, CN, and Canadian Pacific, and their first years in Calgary had gone into fixing the railroad. Harrison had told him early on that many managers want to do things right, but very few want to lead, and that leaders do the right thing even when it is uncomfortable. His instructions now were different. Creel described them to Railway Age in the interview published in January 2021.

1:25:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As

1:25:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): soon as Hunter left, given where we were in our journey, it was time to pivot from being the low-cost service provider to growing.

1:25:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

1:25:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the mandate I received from the board was to pivot to growth. Growth was a matter of geography. Creel described his railroads map in 2022.

1:25:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

1:25:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then I came to Canadian Pacific, and I had a very origin-rich network, but it was destination poor. One railroad could change that. Kansas City's City Southern ran from the American Midwest to the Gulf, and, through its Mexican concession, deep into Mexico.

1:26:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In

1:26:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2019, Mike Haverty, who had built that network, had named Creel as the railroad leader he most looked up to for his background in running trains.

1:26:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:26:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Wednesday, July 29, 2020, Creel had lunch in Kansas City with the railroad's chief executive, Pat Otner. Ottensmeyer, and asked whether Kansas City Southern would discuss a combination. Others were interested too.

1:26:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A

1:26:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): group of investors soon offered cash for the whole company, and Kansas City Southern's price was already high. Creel explained why he moved when he did.

1:26:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We

1:26:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came to this point in our mind, it's probably not going to get any cheaper, and that's a whole lot of risk.

1:26:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Early on

1:26:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sunday, March 21, 2021, the two railroads signed their first agreement. The two networks overlapped nowhere, so no shipper would lose a railroad. Because Kansas City Southern was so small, the deal would be judged under the rules that had applied before 2001. Creel spoke on Railgroup Rail group on air that day, and he invoked his teacher. Hunter would be proud. Hunter is all about value creation and about creating customer solutions. On April 20th, 2021, CN offered more. By his account, Creel took the call from CN's chief executive before dawn on landing in Calgary for Canadian Pacific's annual meeting.

1:27:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:27:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wished his rival luck, he said, and told him Canadian Pacific would contest the bid. His board gave him until noon to propose an answer. CN was the larger company with the deeper balance sheet, and Creel decided not to try to outbid it.

1:27:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He

1:27:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chose to argue his case before the regulator instead. He described the moment he settled it.

1:27:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

1:27:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): woke up about 3 o'clock in the morning and I said, we're going to fight with the truth. By his account, before the call that morning, he wrote out 10 truths. His argument turned on the regulator's rule. rules. Cien proposed to hold Kansas City Southern shares in a voting trust, an arrangement that lets a buyer own a railroad at arm's length while the regulator decides whether to approve the merger. In May, Kansas City Southern's board judged Cien's offer the better one and accepted it. On Tuesday, August 31, 2021, the regulator announced a unanimous decision rejecting CN's. use of the voting trust.

1:28:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:28:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): September 15, Kansas City Southern signed again with Canadian Pacific. That December, after the shareholders voted, Canadian Pacific bought the shares into a voting trust of its own and waited for the regulator's verdict. Creel's view of the final price was brief.

1:28:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We

1:28:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): didn't overpay, we certainly didn't underpay. The regulator approved the combination on March 15. 2023.

1:28:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

1:28:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Friday, April 14, 2023, the combination took effect as Canadian Pacific Kansas City, or CPKC.

1:29:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By

1:29:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the company's own description that day, it was the only railroad that ran under one owner from Canada through the United States to Mexico. That day, in Kansas City, the company drove a ceremonial spike at the only place. where the CP and KCS railroads meet.

1:29:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

1:29:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): network Haverty had assembled became the southern half of a railroad running from the Canadian ports to the Gulf of Mexico and Mexico's Pacific coast. At its creation, it ran on about 20,000 miles of track, and by revenue, it was still the smallest of the six large railroads in the United States. As this program was made, in November 2026, Keith Creel was still CPKC's chief executive. As this program was made, in November 2026, Union Pacific's application to buy Norfolk Southern and make the first railroad from coast to coast under one owner was before the regulator, the first test of the rules of 2001. On November 7, 1885, at Cragelic in the Eagle Pass of British Columbia, an ordinary iron spike was driven at the end of New Track, and the Canadian Pacific was finished. On April 14, 2023, in Kansas City, a ceremonial spike was driven where two finished railroads already touched, and no new track was needed at all. Two years before that ceremony, with the contest still undecided, Creel had told the same podcast what he wanted Canadian Pacific to become. Now, to be the railroad that we believe would drive the last spike to connect three countries.

1:30:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That concludes part one of our industry primer on North American Railroads. Part two, a deep dive for professional investors, is available to members of LatticeWork. To read the full written primer, and its companion slide deck, subscribe at Latticework.com.

This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.
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