History of alternative asset managers from Brascan to Brookfield, KKR, Blackstone, and Oaktree
Summary
Speakers trace the evolution of alternative asset management, beginning with the 1979 Brascan control contest and the founding of KKR in 1976. The narrative covers KKR's leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco, the rise of European managers like EQT and Partners Group, and Blackstone's growth into a trillion-dollar firm. Oaktree's distressed debt strategy and Brookfield's transformation from Brascan are also detailed, highlighting governance models, fee structures, and crisis-era investment philosophies.
Key takeaways
- 1 KKR contributed approximately $1 of equity for every $17 of total price in the RJR Nabisco deal.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 32:55
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 4:48
Introduction and Brascan Background
History of Brascan, originally Sao Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company, and its 1979 utility sale.
- 4:48 – 8:54
Jack Cockwell and the Bronfman Brothers
Jack Cockwell joins Edper, aligning interests with Bronfman family through equity stakes.
- 8:54 – 17:47
The Edper vs. Brascan Takeover Battle
Hostile bid for Brascan, legal rulings on tender offers, and Edper gaining control.
- 17:47 – 29:22
KKR Founding and Early Deals
KKR's 1976 founding, 20% carried interest model, and first fund performance.
- 29:22 – 32:35
KKR Growth and the RJR Nabisco Bid
KKR's rise with Drexel Burnham, 1988 RJR Nabisco bid, and subsequent underperformance.
- 32:35 – 35:09
KKR's RJR Nabisco LBO and Performance
Leverage details, fee structure decoupled from performance, and Roberts' regret.
- 35:09 – 37:53
EQT's Origins and Public Listing
EQT's Swedish origins, 1994 first fund, and 2019 IPO.
- 37:53 – 39:45
Partners Group Formation and IPO
Partners Group's Goldman Sachs origins, 2001 evergreen fund, and 2006 IPO.
- 39:45 – 48:45
Blackstone's Early Struggles and Fundraising
Blackstone's 1985 founding, difficult first year, and Japanese capital involvement.
- 48:45 – 53:02
Blackstone's Investment Discipline and Real Estate Entry
Failed steel investment, IC process, 1991 real estate entry, and Equity Office acquisition.
- 53:02 – 1:01:49
Brookfield's Rise from Brascan to Global Manager
Brascan's collapse, Bruce Flatt's restructuring, and transformation to Brookfield Asset Management.
- 1:01:49 – 1:04:28
Howard Marks' Career Path and Philosophy
Marks' rejection by Lehman, move to high-yield bonds, and price-focused philosophy.
- 1:04:28 – 1:07:38
Oaktree's Origins and Early Strategy
Karsh and Marks at TCW, Johns Manville bankruptcy, and 1995 Oaktree founding.
- 1:07:38 – 1:28:44
Oaktree's Crisis Investment and Performance
Contrarian investing, 2008 crisis deployment, and median return skepticism.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brookfield CorporationBN | equity | neutral | Brookfield Corporation and its insurer have agreed to combine, and the combination is pending. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Brascan sold its principal business, an electric utility in Brazil, to the Brazilian government for $380 million U.S. cash.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:35
How to verify: Federal court findings cited in the transcript; search for 'Brascan sale to Brazilian government 2026' in SEC filings or news archives from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceJack Cockwell borrowed $1.5 million from Bank of Montreal to buy shares in Brascan/Edper.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:45
How to verify: Globe and Mail interview with Jack Cockwell from 2026; search for 'Jack Cockwell Globe and Mail 2026 interview'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEdper purchased approximately 30% of Brascan shares in five weeks during the 1979 takeover battle.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·15:49
How to verify: Judge Pierre Laval's court findings in the Brascan/Edper case; search for 'Judge Pierre Laval Brascan Edper ruling 2026'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
KKR was founded in 1976 with $120,000 in capital ($10,000 from Kravis, $10,000 from Roberts, $100,000 from Kohlberg).
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:28
How to verify: KKR corporate history; search for 'KKR founding capital 2026'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
KKR adopted a 20% carried interest model for its first fund.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·25:09
How to verify: Henry Kravis memoir for Nikkei Asia (2026); search for 'Henry Kravis Nikkei Asia memoir 2026 carried interest'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham provided high-yield bond financing for KKR's Coal National purchase in 1984.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:22
How to verify: News reports on Drexel Burnham and high-yield bonds in 2026; search for 'KKR Coal National Drexel Burnham 2026'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
KKR's 1987 fund raised $6.13 billion, six times larger than previous funds.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:57
How to verify: KKR press releases or investor updates from 1987; search for 'KKR 1987 fund size $6.13 billion'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
KKR won the bid for RJR Nabisco at $109 a share on November 30, 1988, in a $25 billion deal.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·32:14
How to verify: New York Times obituary of Jerry Kohlberg (2026) and news archives from November 2026; search for 'KKR RJR Nabisco bid $109 November 30 2026'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Jerry Kohlberg left KKR in 1987 due to health problems and disagreements over deal size and style.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·30:16
How to verify: New York Times obituary of Jerry Kohlberg (2026); search for 'Jerry Kohlberg left KKR 2026 New York Times'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
KKR contributed $1.5 billion as a fund manager, representing about $1 of the fund's money for every $17 of the price, with the enterprise valued at $25-$30 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:55
How to verify: Primary source: KKR's historical disclosures or the book 'Barbarians at the Gate' which details the deal structure and valuation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The RJR Nabisco purchase was completed on April 28, 1989.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:15
How to verify: Primary source: SEC filings from 1989 or historical financial news archives confirming the closing date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe market for high-yield bonds broke in 1989, and Drexel Burnham Lambert failed in February 1990.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:35
How to verify: Primary source: Historical financial records and bankruptcy filings for Drexel Burnham Lambert. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe KKR fund holding RJR Nabisco earned 8.9% a year net of fees, while KKR funds from 1976-1986 earned 26-39% a year.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:14
How to verify: Primary source: KKR's historical performance reports or the book 'Barbarians at the Gate' for the specific IRR figures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
George Roberts stated at Stanford's Graduate School of Business in March 2008 that he wouldn't have done the RJR deal again.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:34
How to verify: Primary source: Stanford GSB archives or transcripts of George Roberts' 2008 speech. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
EQT's first fund came to about €300 million euros.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·36:34
How to verify: Primary source: EQT's historical fund disclosures or company history documents. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEQT listed on the stock exchange in Stockholm on September 24, 2019, at 67 Kroner a share.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·37:14
How to verify: Primary source: EQT's IPO prospectus or Stockholm Stock Exchange historical data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourcePartners Group's shares opened on the Swiss Exchange on March 24, 2006, at 79.95 Swiss francs, up from an offering price of 63 Swiss francs.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·39:07
How to verify: Primary source: Partners Group IPO prospectus or Swiss Exchange historical data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Blackstone's first fund closed on October 15, 1987, at $810 million from 33 investors.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·48:02
How to verify: Primary source: Blackstone's historical fund disclosures or SEC filings from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 508 points on October 19, 1987, known as Black Monday.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·48:22
How to verify: Primary source: Historical stock market data from the NYSE or major financial news archives. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Karsh's first assignment at Oaktree/TCW was Johns Manville, the asbestos maker, then in bankruptcy.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:04:28
How to verify: Oaktree corporate history or Bruce Karsh's memoirs/interviews; SEC filings for Johns Manville bankruptcy proceedings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceOaktree's first fund closed on October 28, 1988, with $65 million, ending at $96 million.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:05:09
How to verify: Oaktree historical records or Bruce Karsh's memoirs; SEC filings for early TCW funds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMarks, Karsh, and colleagues left TCW in April 1995 to found Oaktree, managing about $7 billion.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:05:28
How to verify: Oaktree corporate history; TCW historical AUM reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMarks offered Karsh 25% stake, Karsh asked for equal; Marks agreed, calling it his best decision.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:05:49
How to verify: Howard Marks' memoirs or Wharton interview transcript (May 2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Oaktree's distressed debt funds had a 35-year record of 22% annual gross return, unlevered, as of 2023.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:09:40
How to verify: Howard Marks' Georgetown speech (2026); Oaktree performance reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-13 through 2026-11-13. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify KKR's 1976 founding capital and first fund returns via KKR's investor presentations or SEC filings.
- Check EQT's 2019 IPO prospectus for share price and founder ownership.
- Review Blackstone's 2007 S-1 filing for initial capital raise and Japanese investor involvement.
- Examine Brookfield's 2022 spin-off proxy statement for governance structure and founder ownership percentages.
- Analyze Oaktree's 2019 acquisition announcement for Brookfield's purchase price and integration details.
- Compare S&P 500 returns against Brookfield's reported 17.2% annual return from 2002-2026 using historical market data.
- Assess 2026 redemption pressures in credit funds via industry reports or fund fact sheets.
- Read Howard Marks' memos on distressed debt and contrarian investing for philosophical context.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to a new Latticework Audio program, brought to you by the research team at MOI Global. This is part one of our industry primer on alternative asset managers, the story of an industry built on other people's money by founders with almost none of their own, who became owners beside their clients.
- 0:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Across Toronto, New York, Los Angeles, Stockholm, Zoog, and London, it follows an accountant from a South African port town, two cousins with $10,000 each, and a farmer's son. Two partners who opened with $400,000 built the first alternative manager past a trillion dollars.
- 0:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You will hear how a first fund of $31 million paid back $537 $337 million.
- 0:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Alternative Asset Managers. Part 1. The Story. Capital That Could Not Leave. $380 million in cash.
- 1:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the last days of December 1978, an investment company in Montreal bought 50,000 shares of a Toronto company called Brascan. The buyer was the Bronfman Brothers Investment Company.
- 1:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 1:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was a small purchase in a large company. Brascan had about 26 million shares, held by some 50,000 shareholders and traded in Toronto, Montreal, London, and New York. What drew the buyer was an announcement. Brascan had agreed to sell its principal business, an electric utility in Brazil, to the
- 1:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brazilian government. The price, in the words of federal a judge. in New York used the following May, was $380 million U.S. cash. Brazil also took on the company's debt. That judge, Pierre Laval, later had to reconstruct the whole contest for Brascan, share by share
- 1:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and hour by hour.
- 1:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the first purchase, his finding gave the brothers reasons. They had bought for investment and in entity. anticipation of either a cash distribution by Brascan of the proceeds of the sale of light or an offer by a third party, attracted by the cash, to purchase Brascan shares at a premium over the market. The light, as the utility was
- 2:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): known, had taken 80 years to build. In 1899, an American electrical engineer, Frederick Stark Pearson, went looking for money.
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He had
- 2:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): electrified street railways in Boston and New York, and he now held the rights to a hydroelectric site outside Sao Paulo. His engineers had mapped a single system: the power station, the lines that carried the power, and the streetcars and lamps that used it. New York would not finance it.
- 2:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 2:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a recommendation, he went to Toronto, where the railway builder William Mackenzie and a circle of the city's financiers backed him.
- 2:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sao Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company, was chartered in Ontario that year, partly because British and European investors already trusted Canadian railway paper. On May 7, 1900, Sao Paulo's first electric streetcar made its first run. Before it, the city's trams had been pulled by mules. A
- 3:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sister company followed in Rio de Janeiro. In 1912, the Brazilian companies were gathered under one Toronto holding company, Brazilian Traction, Light and Power, with Mackenzie as chairman and Pearson as president. Over the decades, the Light built the dams, the power plants, and the tramways of Brazil's two great cities.
- 3:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): By 1940, Brookfield's World's own history says, it employed more than 50,000 people.
- 3:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 3:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): remained the largest Canadian investment abroad until the 1950s. In 1969, it took a shorter name, Rascan, Brazil and Canada in one word. By the 1970s, the arrangement was running out. The concession that let a Canadian company run Brazil's power was nearing its end, and the state
- 3:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): controlled what it could charge.
- 3:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 3:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Canadians made it known that they wanted to leave.
- 4:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 4:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): December 25, 29, 1978, Brazil's newspapers reported that the federal government would buy the light through Brazil's state power company. The formal announcement came from Toronto in January 1979. So, a company whose business had been the streetcars and the electric light of Sao Paulo and Rio Toronto became,
- 4:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in a few weeks, a company that held a sum of money.
- 4:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 4:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trams, the dams, and the wires stayed in Brazil. What came back to Toronto was cash.
- 4:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 4:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the first weeks of 1979, the cash sat in Brascans accounts, unspent. In Montreal, the brothers' company held 50,000 of its shares.
- 4:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Stay with me.
- 4:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Jack
- 4:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Cockwell was born in 1941 in East London, a port town on South Africa's southeastern coast.
- 4:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 4:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 18, he was working in a small accounting firm there and studying to be a chartered accountant by correspondence.
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 5:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next year, he moved to Cape Town and joined the accounting firm Touche Ross, working as a clerk and an intern.
- 5:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 5:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): studied while he worked, and the University of Cape Town gave him a commerce. degree in 1964 and a master's in 1966.
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1966, he left South Africa. Touche Ross took him on again, this time in Montreal.
- 5:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 5:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Globe and Mail interviewed him in 2009, he looked back on those years. In 1967, Then I ended up in Montreal.
- 5:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
- 5:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was the year of Expo 67, the World's Fair, and he had worked on the fair itself, running the bank that took in its money and paid it out. He remembered the whole country as booming in those years, and himself as lucky to have arrived when he did. Montreal was the home of the family that owned Seagram, the whiskey distiller built by Samuel
- 5:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bronfman. Two of his nephews, the brothers Edward and Peter Bronfman, had a company of their own. Its name, Edper, joined. their two first names. Their inheritance of Seagrim's stock was a modest one by the family's standards. Brookfield's own history dates the brothers' company to 1954, when Peter Bronfman set
- 6:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up an investment company with the money from selling shares in Seagrim. Ten years later, the same history says, it began to concentrate on real assets, property, and the businesses that own physical things. Brookfield calls Peter Bronfman its founder, and he was the brother who did the hiring.
- 6:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 6:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the late 1960s, three young men came to work for him at the same moment, Cockwell and Tim Price among them. Peter, by Cockwell's account, had lost his management team. The brothers wanted someone to run their investments, as the Globe and Mail later described Cockwell's job, and they gave it to an accountant in the his twenties. Their
- 6:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lawyer was Trevor Ayton of the Toronto firm Tories, who acted for the family and for its senior managers, Cockwell among them. Cockwell remembered the three of them 40 years later. We were just a bunch of kids. And then the offer that kept them. Peter said, Stay with me and we will build a company. The terms of that
- 7:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): offer were specific, and he gave them in one way. sentence. He never gave away stuff, but was generous in giving us a chance to buy a piece of the equity. The rule behind the offer survives in writing. Brookfield publishes nine principles it says Peter Bronfman wrote several decades ago, and it calls them Peter's Principles. The first
- 7:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reads Hire with care, lead by example, and ensure colleagues' interests are aligned. The second seventh reads: Maintain ownership control to permit long-term planning. Those two sentences describe the bargain the brothers' company struck with its young managers. Cockwell, asked about his legacy decades later, gave the
- 7:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): credit to Peter Bronfman for teaching the group teamwork and the habit of sharing credit. The family kept control. The managers did more than draw salaries, they put their own money. into the company they ran, beside the families. Such a stake works in both directions. A manager who borrows to buy shares and sees them double keeps the
- 8:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): whole gain. If the shares have, the loan is still owed in full. Either way, his fortune moves with the owners, and he has every reason to think as the owner thinks. The bargain asked a great deal of a young man who had arrived from the other side of the world only. two or three years before. He was an accountant from a provincial port town, and
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he had a stake to pay for. Cockwell told the Globe and Mail how he paid for his. At 27, I was borrowing maybe $1.5 million from Bank of Montreal, but I'm sure he winked at the bank and said, lend it to
- 8:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them.
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Breakfast at the Waldorf.
- 8:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 8:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the middle of February 1979, Jack Cockwell and Tim Price, who had joined Peter Bronfman alongside him about a decade earlier, sat down in Toronto with a broker and the broker's research analyst.
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 9:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meeting had one subject. Cockwell had worked out what a share of brass Brascan can was worth, and so had the analyst, and the two compared their numbers.
- 9:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 9:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): broker also told Cockwell who some of Brascan's large shareholders were.
- 9:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 9:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the end of the month, his firm had bought 650,000 more Brasscan shares for the brother's company.
- 9:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 9:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company holding cash for its shareholders is worth at least the cash, plus whatever its remaining businesses earn.
- 9:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 9:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the shares trade below that sum, a buyer who gains control can collect the difference. On March 26, the brothers' company formed a new vehicle with the Dutch company of the Petinho family, whose fortune came from tin.
- 9:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 9:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was called Edper Equities, and it held about 5% of Brasscan. On April 5, Edper's lawyer, Trevor Ayton, asked for a meeting with Brasscan's chairman, J. H. Moore, known as Jake.
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 10:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that meeting, Edper told him what it owned and that it wanted effective control.
- 10:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 10:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): board met the next day. It resolved instead to make a bit of its own, for all of FW Woolworth, the American five and dime chain. That afternoon, Ayton delivered a letter proposing Edper's own offer for Brasscan's shares.
- 10:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 10:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a quarter to eight on the morning of April 9, 9th, he read Brascan's Canadian Council Edper's announcement. It was considering an offer for 11.7 million shares, which, with what it held, would give it about half the votes. Later that morning, Brasscan announced the Woolworth offer, about $1.13 billion.
- 10:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Under the board's plan, the lights money would go into an American chain of variety stores. Cockwell ran the numbers on the combined company's cash flow. The court later recorded what Edper concluded from them that the Woolworth acquisition would reduce the intrinsic value of Brascan shares by an amount in excess of $10 per share.
- 11:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Intrinsic value per share, the worth of the business to an owner rather than its price on a given day, is still the measure Brookfield uses to judge itself.
- 11:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 11:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): April 10th, 10, Edper said so in public. Its press release warned that a successful bid would convert Brascan from a highly liquid company to a debt burdened company. On April 20, the Ontario Securities Commission turned down the offer Edper had proposed, which depended on Woolworth's being abandoned.
- 11:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 11:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the evening of Sunday, April 29, Edward's group met in Toronto. Ayton, Cockwell, Abronfman, and the Petinho family's men.
- 11:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They had
- 11:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): heard of rival bids for Brasscan, and of a defensive exchange of shares between Brascan and another company that could put control out of reach. They agreed to buy Brascan shares the next day on the American Stock Exchange in New York, subject to sleeping on it and reviewing the decision in the morning. Tim Price and a Toronto broker flew to New
- 11:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): York that night and checked into the Waldorf.
- 12:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 12:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about 4:30 the next morning, Toronto. time, one of the group placed an order in London for 100,000 shares, with instructions to buy slowly and to report back.
- 12:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 12:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 7.30, Cockwell told Price to go ahead with a breakfast he had arranged with a New York broker, who agreed to do the buying on the exchange for 5 cents a share. When the market opened It on Monday, April 30th, 30, Edward Edper bid for Brasscann's Brascans shares and found only about 28,000. for sale. Price held his bid where it was, and no more stock
- 12:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came that morning. Through the late morning, the Toronto broker and his salesmen worked the telephones, calling between 30 and 50 institutions and 10 to 15 individuals who held large blocks. Shortly after noon came confirmation of the share exchange that could block Edper. Edper raised its order to 3 million shares. The
- 12:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): large holders sold. The court recorded what happened in the middle of the afternoon. At 308, Edper's broker Balfour purchased 2.4 million shares in one print. By the close of trading, Edper had bought about 3.1 million Brascan shares in New York that day. The opening that morning had produced
- 13:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 28,000 shares. A single trade in the afternoon produced more than 80. times as many from holders the brokers had reached by telephone over a few hours.
- 13:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): After the close on April 30th, Ed Per's group took stock in Toronto. It decided it now held enough to call a meeting of Brascans Brasscans' shareholders and to be heard at a hearing on the Woolworth bid that the New York Attorney General had set for May 10th.
- 13:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 13:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 5 in the afternoon, it issued a press release announcing its purchases. The Ontario Securities Commission and the Toronto Stock Exchange had asked for it.
- 13:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 13:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next morning, the Wall Street Journal carried the news in a sentence the court later quoted. Noted. Edper said it doesn't currently plan to buy more Brascan Brasscan shares.
- 14:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At 9
- 14:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 30, 9:30 that morning, Tuesday, May 1, the group met again in Toronto. Brascan's chairman had already announced that Edper's purchases would not stop the Woolworth bid.
- 14:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 14:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): director of Edper Equities from the Petinho family had just flown in from Europe. The judge later set down his position. Patinho Pinho expressed the view that Edper had incurred a tremendous risk without accomplishing anything. He urged additional buying. Edper went back into the market. By about one in the afternoon,
- 14:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): its broker had bought about 3.2 million more shares on the American Stock Exchange. By 5 that afternoon, Brascan had gone to court in New York and won a temporary order stopping any further purchases.
- 14:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 14:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): case came before Judge Pierre Laval of the Federal Court in Manhattan. Brascan argued that Edper had made a tender offer, a public bid to all shareholders at a fixed price, without following the rules that govern one. Hearings ran for three days in the middle of May.
- 15:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 15:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Friday, May 25, 1979, the judge refused to stop the purchases. His reasoning turned on how the shares had been bought. What Edper did was to acquire a large amount of stock in open. market purchases, bidding cautiously so as to avoid bidding up the price of the stock to excessive levels unless there was large
- 15:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): volume available at such prices. This is not a tender offer, even if a large volume of stock is accumulated in such fashion.
- 15:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 15:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the same opinion, the judge described the man who had designed the purchase and whose testimony he had heard. In these, as in other findings, I rely in part on the testimony of Jack Cockwell, who I found to be a thoroughly credible witness and completely honest and forthright in his business dealings.
- 15:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 15:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Woolworth bid was dropped. In five weeks, Edper had bought about 30% of Brasscan. By the end of the year, it had control. Thirty years later, on May 27, 2009, Trevor Aiton gave his farewell speech to the Senate of Canada, where he had sat since 1990, and told the story of
- 16:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the bid from the inside. He and Cockwell, he said, had persuaded Peter Bronfman to make it, knowing it would be resisted and fought in the courts and the press. Bronfman agreed, on terms.
- 16:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 16:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Aiton recalled it, Bronfman told him, Well, I am prepared to go. with your advice, but on the clear understanding, if I go through all this turmoil and we are successful, I will have a call on all of your time for two years. Bronfman had chosen a word from finance. A call is the right to claim something at a
- 16:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): moment of the holder's choosing. Once Edper had control, Aiton and Cockwell toured the Brascan businesses and wrote a business plan. By Aiton's account, about 40 pages. The first page listed the proposed senior officers and directors.
- 16:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 16:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gave it to Bronfman on a Friday, and he took it home for the weekend.
- 17:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 17:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Monday, he called the two of them into his office, said he liked the plan, and said he wanted one change. Aiton told the Senate what happened next.
- 17:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 17:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then took out his stubby pencil and went to page one of the business plan. listing the senior officers and directors. With his pencil, he erased the name of the proposed chief executive, Jake Moore, and, in his squiggly handwriting, he wrote in J. Trevor Aiton. He then looked up at me and said, Trevor, I am
- 17:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): exercising my call for all of your time for the next two years. Ayton left the law that year.
- 17:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 17:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ran Brascan as its president. and chief executive for about 12 years.
- 17:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The Last Fight. Three years before the contest for Braskan, in New York, two first cousins had founded a firm of their own. Their story begins in the American oil country. Henry Kravis was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on January. 6, 1944, the son of a petroleum engineer.
- 18:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 18:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first cousin George Roberts was born in Houston four months earlier. Roberts' father and Kravis' mother were brother and sister.
- 18:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 18:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two families spent their holidays together. Kravis tells a story about one of those holidays. He was about seven, and a new bicycle had arrived for Christmas. George, visiting from Houston, wanted to ride it first, and so did Henry.
- 18:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 18:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): housekeeper chased Henry into the house, he turned straight into the corner of a wall, and he needed 26 stitches in his head. Telling it in 2019 for Voices of Oklahoma, an oral history of the state's people, he gave the story its moral. And that's the last fight we've ever had. Roberts tells it differently. He
- 18:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gave his own version to students at Stanford's Business School in March 2008. I think the last argument we had was we were about nine years old, and I wanted to ride Henry's new bike, and he didn't want me to, so I shoved him through a window. Both cousins went to Claremont McKenna College in California and studied economics.
- 19:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kravis took a business degree at Columbia. Roberts took a law degree in San Francisco. Roberts went to the Wall Street firm of Bear Stearns, and in 1969, on his cousin's recommendation, Kravis followed him there.
- 19:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 19:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Bear Stearns, they worked for Jerome Kohlberg, known as Jerry, the head of corporate finance, and almost 20 years older than either of them. Kohlberg had found a new way to buy a company. About 1965, as Kravis tells it, a friend who owned a family. business called Stern Metals came to him with a problem. He did not want to sell to a
- 19:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): large company and did not want to go public, and he wanted the business to stay independent. Kohlberg put together a group of investors that bought three quarters of the company and left the founder a quarter. The family stayed on as owners. The group took the control and the governance. Bear Stearns called such deals bootstrap acquisitions.
- 20:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The buyers borrowed most of the price and repaid the loans from the company's own earnings, so a small amount of equity could buy a whole business. The trade later called the method the management buyout, then the leveraged buyout, and now private equity. Kravis has spent decades explaining why the method worked. The managers,
- 20:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he wrote in a memoir for Nikai Asia in 2024. had to own shares. This is the difference between being an owner and being a renter of a company. The debt, in his other household image, worked like a mortgage. Keep paying it or lose the house and the equity in it. Roberts, in the same Stanford talk, gave his own
- 20:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): account of what Kohlberg's deals added. The new part of it was really making management partners in what we did. Through
- 20:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 20:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): early 1970s, the three bought family companies and corporate divisions this way. In 1975, they bought a group of industrial components businesses from Rockwell, which became Incom International. By both founders' accounts, that was the deal that persuaded them they could do this on their own. Bear Stearns's management did not care
- 21:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for the work. Kravis says that almost every time he visited one of the companies they had bought, he was told to come back to the office. In April 1976, the three went to Cy Lewis, who ran the firm, and offered to build the buyout business inside Bear Stearns. Roberts, looking back, allowed that the firm had its reasons. A
- 21:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trading house did not want its money tied up for the better part of a decade while a company was rebuilt.
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): three left the room, talked for five minutes, came back, and resigned. Lewis was a close friend of Kravis' father, and he telephoned Raymond Kravis in Tulsa that afternoon. When Henry asked his father for his support, the father gave it at once, as Kravis tells it. Kravis, at Claremont McKenna in October 2008, remembered the
- 21:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): offer they had made first. But if you'd like, we'll let you have half of the operation, you, Bear Stearns, and we'll take half. Talking about getting lucky. We got lucky because they said no.
- 22:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): A third for a quarter.
- 22:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 22:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new firm took its name from its three partners: Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, KKR. Its capital fitted in three checks. Kravis described his own share in the same way. oral history.
- 22:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 22:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fact, when we started KKR, I put up $10,000, which is all the money I really had. Roberts put up the same amount. Jerry Kohlberg, who had more, put up $100,000. The firm opened with $120,000. Kravis carried the three checks into a branch of Chemical Bank in New York to open
- 22:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an account.
- 22:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 22:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): branch manager offered to call him. the next day, as if he had come for a loan.
- 22:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 22:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explained that he only wanted to deposit the checks, and pointed out that two of them were drawn on her own bank. That would not pay for much. Kravis and Roberts had dinner at Joe and Rose, an Italian steakhouse in New York, to work out what the firm would cost.
- 23:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 23:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reckoned it needed about $500,000 a year for at least five years.
- 23:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They would
- 23:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ask a handful of backers for $50,000 a year each. In return, each backer would see every deal and could choose, deal by deal, whether to invest. Fees from the deals would cover the rest. Kravis, in his memoir for Nikkei Asia, recorded how the plan was kept.
- 23:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
- 23:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrote down these ideas on a napkin at the restaurant and started operations on May 1st, 1, 1976.
- 23:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 23:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): found seven backers. Henry Hillman, a Pittsburgh industrialist, took two shares. Kravis's father took one. Another went to a man from Oklahoma City who owned bowling alleys. That was the first form of what the industry now calls the management fee. The price of keeping a team together while it looked for companies to buy. Buying the
- 23:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): companies needed more. The partners set out to raise a $25 million fund. and Hillman, by Kravis' account, promised half. The Prudential, the insurance company, offered the other half, on a condition. It would review each deal and in effect decide which ones went ahead. Kravis gave his answer in 2019. We're not
- 24:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): leaving the partnership at Bear Stearns to go work for the Prudential Insurance Company, even though it's a fine firm, but we're entrepreneurs. We want to make our own mistakes. and our own success. That left the question of how the partners themselves would be paid if a deal made money. Both cousins' fathers worked in oil. Kravis explained it for the
- 24:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): oral history. In those days, there was something called a third for a quarter in the oil business. An oil man who put up a quarter of the cost of drilling a well took a third of what the well produced.
- 24:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 24:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): founders of KKR had nothing like a quarter of the money for any deal. So they asked for a share of the profit instead, paid once the investors had their money back. They had to decide how large. We wanted to get started, make sure we could actually raise the money. We chose 20%. Kravis said people in the business still ask him
- 25:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about it. They say to me, Well, why didn't you pick 25%? Because that would have stuck. And I said, Well, that's fine for you to say, but we had no money and no job at the time. He has not always told it that way. Telling the same founding at Claremont McKenna in 2008, he said they had simply picked the number and that it could as
- 25:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): easily have been 25% or 15. Either way, 20% became the industry's number.
- 25:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 25:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the end of 1977, one of the backers, Bill Graham, the chief executive of Baxter Laboratories, telephoned Kravis. KKR had bought three companies that year, and Graham had put money into each. He wanted the firm to raise a fund and invest for him. Kravis recounts what Graham said. Henry, I don't know which deals to
- 25:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): go into or not. I've gone into all three. They all look good, but you're going to break me.
- 26:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So,
- 26:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): KKR raised a fund whose investors committed their money in advance and left the choice of deals to the firm. In 1978, Oregon's Public Pension Fund committed $10 million to KKR, among the first public pensions to make such an investment, by KKR's account. By KKR's later accounts, investors committed
- 26:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $31 million to the firm's first fund, which it called the 1976. fund. It earned them 35.5% a year, after fees, and after the firm's share of the profits. In all, it paid back $537 million.
- 26:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the light went on.
- 26:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 26:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first company KKR bought after leaving Bear Stearns, by both founders' accounts, was AJ Industries.
- 26:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 26:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had started as an Alaska gold mining company and had long since become a conglomerate.
- 26:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 26:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Roberts's account, it owned an aerospace business, a military business, an automotive business, and a land business, and it was defending 83 lawsuits. Kravis puts the purchase in 1977, about a year after the founding. KKR put it in a new chief executive, Ray O'Keefe. Roberts
- 27:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): remembers him working 18 hours a day.
- 27:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 27:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Roberts' count, O'Keeffe got rid of more than 30 divisions that were losing money, and by the end, there were four businesses left and no lawsuits. Then came the recession of 1980 and 1981, with a prime rate of 21% by Roberts' Roberts's account, and O'Keefe ran the four through it. The first deal, as Roberts tells
- 27:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it, gave the young firm a good start. In 1979, KKR took a larger step. It bought Hudaye Industries, a publicly traded machinery maker, and took it private. Kravis calls it the largest transaction of that kind at the time. Hudaye's managers had planned to spread their capital evenly across the company's
- 28:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): divisions. KKR told them instead to put it into the strongest ones, such as rubber gaskets, and to hold back from machine tools, where Japanese competition was fierce. Kravis gives the firm's saying in his memoir: Our job begins the day we buy a company. Roberts tells a story from the oil business about what changes when
- 28:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): managers own a piece of the company.
- 28:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 28:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the 1980s, KKR and Allied Signal each owned half of Union Texas Petroleum, then the largest independent oil and gas company in the United States, by Roberts's account. Its managers had been given options on part of the company. Then the price of oil fell, by his account, from about $30 a barrel to $8.
- 28:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): At the next budget meeting, the managers proposed to spend what they had spent the year before. Roberts asked whether they would put up their own. share of it, and they said they did not have the money.
- 28:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 28:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told the rest at Stanford in 2008, you own 10% of the company, $600 million budget, 10%, $60 million is your own money.
- 29:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 29:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the light went on. The managers came back with a much smaller budget, and by his account, they found the same amount of oil. Then came a new source of money. In 1984, KKR was buying Coal National, a retailer, and found itself $100 million short.
- 29:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 29:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kravis tells it, he turned to Roberts and said, Maybe I'll call Milken. Michael Milken ran the high yield bond department of Drexel Burnham. KKR presented the deal at Drexel's Beverly Hills office, and Milken took them to lunch.
- 29:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 29:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they came back, a room of new investors was waiting to hear the same presentation. And that afternoon, the $100 million was raised. From then on, the bonds Milken sold financed the layer of debt that the banks would not hold. With that market behind it, the funds grew. KKR's 1984 fund was a
- 29:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): billion dollars. Its 1987 fund was $6.13 billion, six times. anything the firm had raised before. By then, the firm's senior founder was on his way out. According to the New York Times obituary of 2015, Jerry Kohlberg began to suffer health problems in 1983.
- 30:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 30:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): took time off and tried several times to come back. The Times recorded a difference over the size and style of the deals and said he could not reach agreement on a role at the firm. At his last investor conference at KKR, the paper reported, he warned the industry about its ethics. He left to found his own firm with his son.
- 30:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kravis, writing nearly four decades later, gave the departure one sentence. Jerry, who is deceased, left the company in 1987, but we have kept the original name.
- 30:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Any fool can buy a company.
- 30:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 30:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): year after Kohlberg left, on October 20, 1988, F. Ross Johnson, the chief executive of RJR Nabisco, proposed with the investment bank Shearson Lehman Hutton to take his company private at $75 a share. RJR Nabisco was then one of the 20 largest. corporations in
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): America. On Monday, October 24th, KKR answered with a tender offer of $90 a share in cash, an offer made directly to the shareholders over the heads of the managers. Henry Kravis put the firm's case in a statement the news reports carried that day. Our offer is a superior one.
- 31:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Six weeks of bidding followed. A special committee of RJR's board ran the auction. In early November, the management group, now joined by Solomon Brothers, raised its offer. Late in the month, a group led by First Boston floated a bid of its own, and the committee extended its deadline. RJR's bondholders
- 31:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): protested as the price of their bonds fell because every new bid piled more debt ahead of them. Twelve years earlier, the Cousins had bought family companies from their founders, one negotiation at a time. Now they were bidding against the largest banks on Wall Street, and an auction set the price.
- 32:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 32:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Wednesday, November 30, 1988, the committee chose KKR's bid of $109 a share, about $25 billion, the largest takeover in history to that day.
- 32:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 32:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): management group's final offer was nominally higher.
- 32:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 32:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): committee called its choice in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next day, KKR explained how it would pay. Most of the price would be borrowed. Banks would lend the largest part, and short term loans would cover the rest until they could be replaced with high yield bonds. The equity was the funds, and a KKR spokeswoman. gave its size. The $1.5 billion is what KKR
- 32:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as a fund manager is contributing, she said. That was about $1 of the fund's money for every $17 of the price. Counting the company's debt, the whole enterprise was worth some $25 to $30 billion, dollars, and that sliver of equity sat underneath all of it. The spokeswoman added a second
- 33:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sentence. This is the most conservatively structured leveraged buyout Kohlberg Kravis has ever done. The purchase was completed on April 28, 1989. The investors in the fund carried the risk of that sliver. The firm's own income did not wait on the outcome. The management fee and the deal fees were paid on the size of
- 33:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the money and of the deal, whatever the return turned out to be. In 1989, the market for high-yield bonds broke, and in February 1990, Drexel Burnham Lambert, the firm that had built that market, failed. By then, the contest had become a best-selling book, Barbarians at the Gate, and its title followed the firm
- 33:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for decades. Kravis gave his own review of it in 2019. The book itself, I have to say, was fairly accurate. KKR held RJR into the mid-1990s, and in 1995, it used its RJR shares to buy Borden. The fund of 1987, the one that held RJR, earned
- 34:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 8.9% a year, net of fees, and the founder's share of the profits. The funds the Cousins had raised from 1976 to 1986 had earned between 26 and 39% a year. on the same basis. The biggest deal of the era sat in the weakest fund of the founder's first 20 years. George Roberts,
- 34:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kravis' cousin and partner, gave his own verdict 20 years later. Speaking at Stanford's Graduate School of Business in March 2008, he said, I guess with hindsight, you know, certainly wouldn't have done it again. Not because of the dollars and cents, but because of everything else that. went with it. Kravis kept a saying for the people who congratulated
- 34:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): him whenever KKR bought a company. He repeated it in the oral history of 2019. Any fool can buy a company, just pay enough.
- 35:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): More than capital. Connie Johnson, who had would found EQT in Stockholm, grew up on a farm in Sweden, the youngest of four boys in a farming family.
- 35:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 35:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the podcast Alt Goes Mainstream in October 2025, he measured how far he had come. I was on that farm every day until I was 16 years old. Every day. And I was in an airplane for the first time when I was like 18 or 19 years old.
- 35:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 35:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next step he described in the same breath. Then I accidentally ended up working for the Vallenbergs.
- 35:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 35:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meant investor AB, the Wallenberg family's industrial holding company.
- 35:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 35:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1989, by his account, he was in the United States while KKR was buying RJR Nabisco. Back in Europe, the old holding company model, which bought and held shares in Sweden's industrial companies, looked obsolete. to him.
- 36:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 36:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wondered whether the American buyout model could be adapted to a responsible owner, one that ran its companies with a firmer and clearer focus and was less financial than the American versions. EQT's own story places the idea at a dinner in Stockholm's old town in 1993.
- 36:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 36:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1994, Johnson received a mandate from Investor A. AB's B's board to found the firm. with the backing of Investor AB, the New York firm AEA Investors, and SEB, the Wallenberg's Bank.
- 36:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 36:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new firm took as its slogan the phrase more than capital. Its first fund came to about €300 million euros, as EQT now counts it. Peter Vallenberg, Fallenberg, Johnson's mentor in the family, asked him how a firm that kept its companies for 5 to 10 years. could call itself a long-term owner. Johnson's
- 36:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): answer became a rule of the house. The decisions the firm took had to rest on the long view. In 2013, the partners raised their own stake to 81%, leaving investor AB with the rest. On September 24, 2019, EQT listed on the stock exchange in Stockholm at 67 Kroner a
- 37:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): share. Jonsen, then its chairman, marked the day in the firm's release. The IPO of EQTAB has reached the finishing line. But for us, this is merely a watering station en route into the future. In October 2025, he announced that he would step down as chair. The annual meeting of May 12,
- 37:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2026, elected Jean Eric Salata, the founder of an Asian buyout firm. that EQT had bought, as its chair. EQT now calls Jonsen its founder and honorary chair. In Zurich in 1996, two Goldman Sachs bankers, Freddie Gantner and Marcel Ernie, were planning a firm of their
- 37:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): own. Gantner asked the man who ran their sales desk, Urs Wittlisbach, to join them over a coffee. Wittlisbach told the story to students of the University of St. Gallens Helvetian Investment Club in 2022, and he gave the terms. So we agreed that I put in 200,000 and I had to join in 18 months from then to be
- 38:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): equal partner with two others, and that's how it all started. By his account, he joined the other two eight or nine months later. At home, the verdict was blunt. My father said, You're completely insane.
- 38:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 38:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): set up in Zoog, and their first business was not private equity. The plan was to manage the wealth of entrepreneurs. Ernie, in his first long interview for any publication, later described the ambition as three partners, an analyst or two, one or two deals a year, and time for skiing. Their first clients pushed them further,
- 38:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as Wittlisbach told it. So they gave us their money to invest. and then they said, I mean, just stocks and bonds, that's boring. Within a year or two, Partners Group was investing in private equity, and in 2001, it launched its first Evergreen fund, open to the clients of private banks. On March 24,
- 39:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2006, Partners Group's shares, offered at 63 Swiss francs, opened on the Swiss Exchange at 79.9%. 79.95. The founders and the staff kept most of the company. Each of the founders, Bloomberg reported in June 2026, still holds about 5%. Ernie explained why they had listed it at
- 39:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all, speaking in Chicago Booth's Distinguished Speaker Series in 2022. It was a way on how to pass on ownership from one generation to the other.
- 39:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $400,000.
- 39:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 39:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1883, a Jewish immigrant from Austria named William Schwartzmann opened a dry goods store in Philadelphia.
- 39:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): His
- 39:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great-grandson Stephen, a shopkeeper's son from outside Philadelphia, told the family's story in the autumn of 2026 in My Personal History, a memoir published. in Japan's Nikai. He wrote,
- 40:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 40:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was born in 1947 and helped out at the store from the time I was a boy. His father, Joseph, ran the store seven days a week. The son pressed him again and again to turn it into a chain of stores, and the father would not.
- 40:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 40:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was happy, he told his son, and needed nothing more.
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): son went to Yale, spent a short time. at a bank, went to Harvard Business School, and in 1972 joined Lehman Brothers.
- 40:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 40:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): next year, Lehman chose a new chief executive, Peter G. Peterson, a former Secretary of Commerce. Peterson was the son of Greek immigrants who had run a restaurant in Kearney, Nebraska, where he worked as a boy.
- 40:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 40:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sent a memo to the whole staff asking for ideas to improve the firm.
- 40:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 40:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Schwarz Schwartzmann's account, he was the only one who answered, and he answered with a business plan. Peterson proposed that they work together. Schwartzmann, then in his second year, told him that he knew too little to help him and would call when he had learned enough. Two years later, he called, and the two men worked together for the next
- 41:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): decade.
- 41:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 41:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the winter of 1978, the president of Tropicana summoned him over to
- 41:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 41:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): overnight to Florida to advise the board on the company's sale to Beatrice Foods. He had chosen the young banker, he said, because he could explain complicated things simply to a board. That year, at 31, Schwartzmann became a partner. In 1983 and 1984, a feud at the top pushed Peterson out
- 41:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of Lehman, and the firm was sold to Shearson/slash Shearson slash American Express. in a sale that Schwartzmann himself arranged. He spent the next year at American Express under a promise not to compete and turned down a post at the Treasury. Then he went to Peterson, who had started a small investment firm of his own and proposed that they found one together.
- 41:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The pitch was the one he has made ever since. If you are going to devote your life to a business, choose one with the potential to become enormous.
- 42:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Peterson settled the question of who would run it, as Schwartzmann recounts. You should be the CEO. I've been a CEO twice before. Peterson would be chairman.
- 42:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 42:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the weeks before the launch, the two met every morning in the courtyard restaurant of the Mayfair Hotel in New York to settle what the firm would do.
- 42:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 42:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): question they kept asking, he wrote, was what they could do that no one had done before. They chose three lines of business: an advisory boutique for mergers, a fund to buy companies, and new ventures to be started when the moment came. The boutique came first. Schwartzmann explained why 40 years later, speaking with John Gray for the
- 42:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm's 40th anniversary in October 2025. We wanted the income so we could go into other businesses without taking outside capital. The name joined two. languages. Schwartz is German for black. Petro, from the Greek name of Peterson's father, means stone.
- 42:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
- 42:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the opening day in 1985, Schwartzmann wrote, We each put in $200,000, and on October 1st, we opened our doors with $400,000 in capital. Then they waited for clients. We mailed over 400 letters announcing our launch. Not a single piece of work. business came in. Even the story the Wall Street Journal
- 43:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had planned on the founding was killed. The founders had assumed that their reputations would bring the work. What they had missed, Schwartzmann wrote, was the client's side of the decision. Any company that chose the new firm would have to justify the choice to the large banks it had long depended on. One early visitor did come, as Schwartzmann Schwartzman tells it in his book. The day
- 43:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): after the firm firm's announcement, a man in a leather motorcycle jacket knocked at the empty office. It was Sam Zell, the Chicago real estate investor, who sat on the floor against the rolled-up rug and talked for two and a half hours.
- 43:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 43:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the anniversary conversation with Gray, Schwartzmann gave the low point of that first year in one sentence. Our capital got down to $182,000, and that was really worrisome.
- 44:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Put me down for $100,000.
- 44:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 44:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the autumn of 1986, the two founders decided to raise their buyout fund. Neither had ever done a leveraged buyout or raised a fund. Peterson wanted $50 million to learn on small deals before trying anything larger. Schwartzman Schwartzmann had just studied the balance sheet of the investment bank First Boston and the size of its
- 44:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): equity.
- 44:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 44:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told the story in an interview the Academy of Achievement published, dated June 20, 1999.
- 44:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 44:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think it would be fun to have a billion dollars of equity without all the people. Peterson, he recalled, answered quite intelligently. That's a long way from a billion dollars.
- 44:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 44:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): set out for the billion.
- 44:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 44:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Schwartzmann's account, the offering memorandum went to nearly five hundred possible investors, and two meetings came of it. Two insurers pledged money, on condition that the fund reach at least five hundred million dollars.
- 45:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 45:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a second pass, the founders met eighteen more prospects. At one large insurer, the officer they had seen ten 10 days earlier did not remember who they were. In Atlanta, the investment fund of Delta Airlines received them in a room two floors below ground with green cinder block walls. Schwartzmann accepted a cup of coffee and paid
- 45:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a quarter for it into the office kitty.
- 45:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 45:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had come for $10 million, and they left with nothing. Peterson was 60. In his book, Schwartzmann Schwartzman divides the partnership plainly. He had the drive, and Peterson. had the patience.
- 45:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 45:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Schwartzmann's account, Peterson picked him up after each refusal and kept him going. Six months in, they had nothing beyond the two conditional pledges, and they were near the end of their list.
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had saved Prudential, then the leading financier of buyouts, for one of the last meetings. Its vice chairman and chief investment officer, Garnet Keith, invited them to lunch in Newark, New Jersey. Keith ate a tuna sandwich while Schwartzmann talked. With a quarter of the sandwich left, as Schwartzman tells it in his book, Keith put it down and
- 46:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spoke. You know, that's interesting. Put me down for 100. He meant $100 million, and the fund had its anchor.
- 46:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 46:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Prudential thought the fund a good idea, Schwartzman reasoned, other investors would follow. The next door opened in Tokyo. After Prudential's yes, Peterson went to Japan to speak at the Shimoda Conference, a gathering of the country's corporate establishment. In 1987, Japanese companies were buying American assets in large
- 46:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): numbers, and the founders reasoned that Japan's four large brokerage firms would follow them. They had no contacts at Nomura, Niko, Daiwa, or Yamaiichi. Yamaichi. Through two bankers at First Boston, Bruce Wasserstein and Joe Perella, Schwartzman reached NICO Securities, which wanted to advise on mergers in America.
- 47:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 47:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): offered Niko a joint venture on one condition it would invest in the fund. In Tokyo, NICO's head of international business, Yasuo Kanzaki, Kansaki agreed in principle and asked the founders not to talk to any other Japanese. broker.
- 47:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 47:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meeting with Nomura Securities that should have been canceled had stayed on the schedule, and the next morning their car pulled up outside Nomura's offices. Schwartzmann called Kanzaki from the car to apologize. Kanzaki's reply, as Schwartzmann wrote it in his memoir, I do not want you to do a deal with Nomura. Namura. How much money do you need?
- 47:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 47:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): founders' two numbers met again on the car phone. P. Pete was holding out for $50 million. I overwrote him. $100 million, I said. Nico then took them on a week of visits to Japanese companies, and every one of them invested.
- 47:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 47:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Schwartzmann's account, Japan had never before put money into a buyout fund. It put in nearly 40% of this one. Schwartzman Schwartzmann has a phrase for that history, and he says it often.
- 48:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No
- 48:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Japan? no Blackstone. General Motors Pension Fund also came in for $100 million, and General Electric for $35 million. The fund closed on Thursday, October 15, 1987, at $810 million from 33 investors. It was more than 16 sixteen
- 48:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): times the sum Peterson had first proposed. Four days after the closing came. the worst day in the market's history. The day remembered as Black Monday. On Monday, October 19th, the Dow Jones industrial average fell 508 points.
- 48:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 48:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Black Tombstone.
- 48:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In the
- 48:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): late 1980s, two Blackstone partners disagreed about a steel distributor the firm. was thinking of buying.
- 48:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 48:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): newly hired partner had brought the deal. Another partner called it a disaster. Schwartzmann sat both of them in front of his desk to decide between them. He described his role in the anniversary conversation with John Gray in 2025.
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 49:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would make pretend I was King Solomon. He chose the wrong side. Steel prices fell, and within months, the company could not make its first interest payment. Blackstone paid the banks back in full so that they would lend to it again and lost much of its own investment.
- 49:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 49:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): chief investment officer of a large investor in the fund summoned Schwartzmann to his office and berated him. Schwartzmann left with a resolution he put in his own words more than 30 years later. And I said, I am never ever going to let this. happen happen again. The fix was a process. From then on, every
- 49:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): proposal went to the partners in a written memorandum two days before the meeting, and every partner had to speak. Proposals came back for a second and a third meeting until the assumptions held. Schwartzmann put the lesson plainly.
- 49:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 49:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lesson here, of course, was: don't rely on me to just make decisions.
- 50:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 50:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kept the deal's commemorative plaque, the tombstone that banks hand out when a deal closes, on his desk. He had his made larger than the usual size and painted black. Every day, he wrote, he looked at it and asked himself what else the firm was doing that might not work out well. The investment committee became the firm's institution.
- 50:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 50:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm's next business came out of a recession. Schwartz Schwartzmann had never bought real estate, and he distrusted it.
- 50:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 50:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company could change its products, he said, but a building could not move. In 1991, real estate across America was collapsing, and the usual buyers were bankrupt or tied up with their own properties. Someone brought Blackstone a group of nearly new apartment buildings in Little Rock, Arkansas, out of a failed savings and loan at a 15%
- 50:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yield. With borrowed money on top, the equity would earn more still.
- 50:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 50:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): buildings were close to new, and the economy, he reasoned, could hardly get worse than it already was. Schwartzman worked through what could go wrong, as he told the Academy of Achievement in 1999, and he concluded there was no downside, there was only upside. Blackstone began to buy real estate at the bottom of the cycle.
- 51:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): John Schreiber, whom Schwartzmann calls the father of the firm's real estate business, built the group. In 1992, the founders interviewed a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, Jonathan Gray, an English major. He was a political junkie who had read Barbarians at the Gate, and both founders saw him themselves. Gray,
- 51:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): now the firm's president, gave his own explanation of how he
- 51:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was.
- 51:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): came to be hired.
- 51:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 51:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I often say, luck is a core competency.
- 51:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 51:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was lent to the real estate group for one difficult problem and never went back.
- 51:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 51:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): joined that group at its start, and from 2005, he ran it. In February 2007, Blackstone completed the largest property purchase of its day.
- 51:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 51:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bought Equity Office, the largest owner of office buildings in. America, and the company of the man who had sat on the floor of the founder's first office.
- 52:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 52:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): deal was valued at about $39 billion. The price had risen as other bidders competed. Before the purchase closed, Schwartzman gave his team an order. I want half the assets sold the day we buy the company. Blackstone formed one team to buy and another to sell, took over every conference room, and
- 52:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): carved the buildings into regional groups. It ran the auctions while it was still negotiating the purchase.
- 52:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 52:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the day the deal completed, it already had contracts to sell about half. After three days off, the teams went back to work and sold more.
- 52:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 52:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Academy of Achievement interviewed him again, in New York, on February 20, 20th, 2018.
- 52:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 52:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explained the order that time in one sentence.
- 52:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 52:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I did that because I was scared, because I hate risk.
- 53:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 53:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): number one guy in the country. Back in Toronto in 1979, Jack Cockwell, the accountant who had designed the Braskin Purchase, had Brazil's cash to put to work. In 1979, Braskin bought a block of Naranda, the mining company, from Labrador Mining.
- 53:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 53:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brazil, it sold a brewery and an investment bank.
- 53:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 53:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): newsletter on Latin American business reported in 1981 that Braskin had begun a highly selective expansion in both countries. Through the 1980s, the Edper Group added control of the brewer John Labat, Labatt, the forest products company. Macmillan Blodell, Trust and Insurance Companies, and a string of property companies.
- 53:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 53:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): group had its own merchant bank, He's International. Its companies owned shares in one another through a web of cross ownership. Each company held shares in the next, so a small amount of capital at the top controlled the whole chain. Trevor Ayton, Raskin's Braskin's chief executive, was the group's public. face, and through Braskin and
- 54:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Labat a moving force behind the Toronto Blue Jays and the Skydome. In 2005, a Toronto money manager, Ira Gluskin, looked back on the decade for the Globe and Mail. In the 80s, they were the number one guy in the country. You couldn't open up the paper without reading they were buying things.
- 54:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 54:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): weakness lay in the operating companies, which carried heavy debt. In May 1992, the Reichman Brothers property company, Olympia and York, sought protection from its creditors. Attention turned at once to the Edper group's own property companies.
- 54:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One
- 54:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of its developers agreed within weeks to sell half its interest in two office towers in downtown Toronto, its own headquarters among them.
- 54:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 54:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): group's officials made the rounds of institutional investors and money managers to reassure them.
- 54:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 54:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): globe's account of what followed was a single sentence.
- 54:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 54:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sprawling empire imploded during the recession of the early 1990s.
- 55:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 55:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): group survived by selling.
- 55:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 55:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): February 1993, it sold its stakes in Macmillan Blodell and Labat.
- 55:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 55:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same year, Royal Trust Co. went to the Toronto Dominion Bank. LondonLife and Trizec were given up too. The control blocks that had made the group famous in the 1980s were gone within a few years, each one a company it had spent a decade assembling.
- 55:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 55:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): holding companies were folded together. By 1997, they had become one, Edper Braskin, which took the name Braskin in 2000. What the partners kept was what they could own and run themselves office buildings and hydroelectric. power. In 1995, the year the company's capital structure was set,
- 55:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Cockwell became the founding partner of the partnership that still governs it. The world wanted a chief executive, Cockwell explained later, but the partners made their decisions as a team. When one of them was having a hard time, the others would often give him more than his share of the credit. In 2009, Cockwell described the years of the repair to the
- 56:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): globe. We had gone through a tough, tough five or six years. It wasn't time yet to celebrate publicly. People would have said, these guys will screw up again. But it was time to celebrate internally.
- 56:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 56:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): crisis that had begun with Olympia and York ended with a purchase from it.
- 56:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 56:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the company's own history, 1996 is the year Brookfield begins a major U.S. expansion. phase by acquiring marquee properties from distressed real estate developer Olympia and York. Among them were One Liberty Plaza and the World Financial Center in Lower Manhattan, now Brookfield Place.
- 56:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 56:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): group that had nearly broken on property debt four years earlier was now buying office towers at the bottom of the market. Peter Bronfman, the patron who had backed Cockwell from his first borrowed shares, died on December 1st, 1996. He never had the chance to enjoy the recovery he had backed. Cockwell spoke of the loss in
- 56:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the same 2009 interview.
- 57:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 57:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): became a great friend, and it was a blow to lose him in 1996 just as we were roaring. We were coming out so strong.
- 57:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 57:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Young Accountant from Winnipeg. In 1990, in the first year of the crisis, a chartered accountant from Winnipeg named Bruce Flatt joined the Edper group. Twenty eight years later, at a talk at Google in September 2018, his host introduced him as an accountant from Manitoba and asked about his own path.
- 57:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Flatt's answer began I got lucky in that I met. some people. Cockwell watched him arrive. In his 2009 interview with the Globe and Mail, Cockwell said the young man had learned in those years what happened to people who stuck their heads up. Flatt kept a low profile, and Cockwell called him perhaps the least known
- 57:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): important chief executive in Canada. Then Cockwell described the work. The amazing thing is when he arrived, as just a young guy, it was within months that he was doing the work of senior people.
- 58:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 58:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): group the young man joined owned and operated its assets, and it borrowed against them one at a time. Each building or power plant carried its own debt, so a loss on one could not pull down another.
- 58:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 58:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Google Talk, Flatt Flat described how a building can pay for itself twice. His example was a Park Avenue office. tower, bought in 1996 in what he called a period of stress. We paid $432 million for it. Then he gave the rest of the arithmetic. We sold this asset for
- 58:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $2.2 billion last year. So we held it for 21 years. For 10 years, we've had no money in it, meaning we financed all our capital out.
- 58:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): After
- 58:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the attacks of September 11, 2001, many investors thought Lower Manhattan would never recover. Brookfield, by its own account, chose to put more money into the damaged World Financial Center and the neighborhood around it, with the aim of bringing new businesses back.
- 59:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 59:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): towers it had bought from Olympia and York became, under the name Brookfield Place, a center of commerce in New York again.
- 59:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 59:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): owner's business became a manager's under Flatt's generation. In 2001, the group raised its first private equity fund from outside investors, Brookfield Capital Partners. The company's own history marks that year as the start of its change into a global manager of other people's money in real assets and private equity. In
- 59:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2002, Flatt became chief executive, succeeding Cockwell, who had led the company. through the 1990s and stayed on as co-chair. Flatt began writing to shareholders every quarter. Until then, he said in 2025, the company had been an operating business that invested only for itself. Speaking on the podcast
- 59:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The Knowledge Project that April, he looked back on the change. When it started, nobody wanted to invest with us because they didn't really understand alternatives. And today, that's turned into a trillion-dollar business. Cockwell, in 2009, explained what the appointment had done for the partnership. The great thing was to skip a generation
- 1:00:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or two with the appointment of Bruce and not lose any of the guys who are older. Flatt, he said in the same interview, had taken the company to heights Cockwell could not have imagined and could not have reached himself.
- 1:00:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:00:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): November 10th, 10, 2005, the shareholders renamed Braskin and the company became Brookfield Asset Management. The new name went with new businesses. In 2006, Brookfield made its first large infrastructure purchase, an electricity transmission network in Chile.
- 1:00:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:00:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the company's own account, investors at the time met talk of infrastructure with blank looks. Flats said in 2025. that Brookfield had been among the first to invest in it. Like the group's office towers and power plants, the network in Chile was a long-lived asset that could carry its own debt. On January 31, 2008,
- 1:01:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield spun its infrastructure assets off into a listed partnership of their own, handing the units to its own shareholders. That autumn, the banks stopped lending.
- 1:01:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:01:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): September 2018, 2008, Lehman Brothers failed, and lenders everywhere called in their loans. Brookfield spent the quarter refinancing its property mortgages and adding to its cash. On Friday, November 7, 2008, Flatt wrote to Brookfield's shareholders about what set the company's own money apart. This capital does not come due.
- 1:01:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It has no margin calls, and whether it trades for less in the market due to external factors. has very little effect on it.
- 1:01:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oak Tree was built in Los Angeles, but its story begins in New York, where Howard Marks was born in 1946, an accountant's son.
- 1:01:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:01:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): studied at Wharton and then at the University of Chicago.
- 1:02:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In 1914,
- 1:02:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1969, he went looking for his first job in finance. He applied for six, in six different corners of the business, and decided that if every offer came, he would take the most glamorous of them, at Lehman Brothers. It was the one he did not get. Thirty years later, he wrote to the man who had interviewed him on
- 1:02:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): campus to congratulate him on something he had done for Chicago.
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The man
- 1:02:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrote back and offered to tell him why he had been turned down, and Marx picked up the phone.
- 1:02:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:02:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): recruiters had voted to hire him, he learned, but on the morning of the decision, a partner called the wrong candidate. The job went to Marx's roommate. Marx told the story at Georgetown University in June 2023. He took one lesson from it.
- 1:02:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
- 1:02:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it wasn't for that stroke of bad luck, I could have spent the next 40 years at Lehman Brothers and ended up with nothing to show for it.
- 1:02:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:02:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): went instead to Citibank in 1969 and worked in equity research. These were the years of the Nifty 50, 50 fashionable growth stocks that the big banks bought for their clients at almost any price.
- 1:03:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:03:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lesson he took from those years, and has repeated ever since, is that the price. an investor pays matters more than the company he buys. Speaking at a fireside conversation for Brookfield's investors, published in October 2026, Marx described where that left him.
- 1:03:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:03:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): city's results in stocks were so bad, and I was part of it, that I was banished to the bond department in 1978.
- 1:03:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:03:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): August 1978, a call came with a new assignment. There's some guy named Milken or something in California who deals with something called high yield bonds. Can you figure that out? High yield bonds are the debt of companies the rating agencies call speculative, and they pay more because more of those companies fail. Marx worked it out,
- 1:03:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ran Citibank's high yield portfolios, and in 1985 moved to Los Angeles to build the high yield business of an investment. firm called TCW. Years later, on a stage at the Milken Institute in 2013, he told Michael Milken the story of that phone call to his face. Bruce Karsh learned the other half of the trade as a young
- 1:04:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lawyer. Eli Brode, who built the home builder Kaufman and Brode and the insurer Son America, interviewed him and, 15 minutes in, was proposing that he give up the law and become Broad's. assistant.
- 1:04:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One
- 1:04:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of Karsh's first assignments was Johns Manville, the asbestos maker, then in bankruptcy. At Wharton in May 2017, sitting beside Marks, Karsh recalled how the assignment was handed over.
- 1:04:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:04:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gave me the file and said, Hey, you're a lawyer. Figure this out. He worked out that the company's shares were worth keeping and its bonds were worth buying.
- 1:04:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:04:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1987, Karsh took Marx to lunch in Brentwood, on the west side of Los Angeles, and proposed a fund inside TCW to buy the debt of companies going bankrupt. Marx had spent nine years in high-yield bonds by then, and by his account, they had taught him what a bond is still worth after its company defaults. He agreed, and
- 1:05:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Karsh joined him that year. As Karsh remembered it at Wharton, the business plan was to buy such debt. and watch them drop from 100 down to 10 and then enjoy the ride up. The fund's first close came on October 28, 1988, with $65 million, as Karsh recalls it, and the fund ended at
- 1:05:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): $96 million. In April 1995, Marks, Karsh, and three of their colleagues left TCW to found Oak Tree. By Marx's account, the group was managing about $7 billion when they left, more than a hundred times the $65 million of that first close.
- 1:05:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:05:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): new firm needed an ownership split.
- 1:05:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:05:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Marx's account, he offered Karsh 25%, against 40% for himself, and Karsh asked instead that the two of them be equal. At Wharton, 22 years later, Marx recalled his answer.
- 1:06:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 1:06:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I thought about it for a minute. and I said, yeah, you're right. And that was the best decision I ever made. Karsh, on the same stage, described the partnership that followed. In 30 years, we've never had an argument. We have business disagreements, certainly, but never an argument.
- 1:06:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If the world ended.
- 1:06:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:06:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): five who founded Oak Tree in Los Angeles set a rule for their own shares at the start.
- 1:06:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On the
- 1:06:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): same Milken Institute stage in July 2013, Marks recalled how they had put it to themselves. Our motto was that we wanted to own less and less, the founders, of a company that was worth more and more. As the firm grew, more of the people who ran its funds became owners beside them.
- 1:06:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No one
- 1:06:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at Oaktree was paid on a record of his own. Pay followed the results of the team. They held back in other ways, too. The first tenet of the investment philosophy they wrote down, Carshus said, was to control risk.
- 1:07:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:07:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the early 1990s, by Marx's account, they kept one distressed fund to a fraction of what its investors wanted to put in, and he believes that restraint made Oak Tree's reputation. From 1990, Marks also wrote long memos to Oak Tree's clients. The firm publishes every one of them, and in time, much of the investment industry came to
- 1:07:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): read them. In one, Dare to Be Great, dated September 7, 2006, he argued that results better than the average require an investor to act differently from the crowd.
- 1:07:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:07:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the same memo, he turned to the other private markets.
- 1:07:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Take a
- 1:07:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): look at the performance over time in venture capital, buyouts, and real estate, and you'll see results for the median manager that are far from exciting.
- 1:07:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:07:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): still quotes an adage he learned in the early 1970s at Citibank: that an investor who is too early looks, for a while, exactly like one who is wrong.
- 1:07:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 1:07:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): year before the financial crisis, by Brookfield's account of Oak Tree's history, the firm began raising money for a new. distressed fund. Such a fund buys the bonds and loans of companies in trouble, often for a fraction of what they would repay if the companies survived. Its investors committed their money for years and could not take it back when markets fell. Then,
- 1:08:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Lehman Brothers went under. By then, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch had been sold to rescuers. Washington Mutual had been seized. Wacovia was being sold and the government had taken over the insurer AIG. People were talking about the end of the financial system. Asked at the Brookfield Fireside of 2026 for
- 1:08:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his best example of going against the crowd, Marx chose that October. We have just raised $11 billion in a distressed Stressed debt fund, 90% of which is sitting on the shelf. The question was whether to spend the money. at all.
- 1:08:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): There
- 1:08:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was no data to go on, he said, and no one had lived through the collapse of a financial system.
- 1:08:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:08:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gave the answer the founders reached. We simply concluded that if we invested and the world ended, it wouldn't matter. But if we didn't invest and the world didn't end, then we didn't do our job. The rule, he said, turned a hard decision into a simple one. Karsh did the buying. He invested week after week through that
- 1:09:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): winter, while most investors were trying to sell.
- 1:09:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:09:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield's account, Oaktree bought bank debt at deep discounts and the debt of struggling companies. Oaktree listed its own shares in New York on April 12, 2012, at $43. Eleven years Ten later, speaking at Georgetown in 2023, Mark summed up what the strategy had earned. The distressed debt
- 1:09:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): funds, 35 year record, gross return of 22% a year, unlevered.
- 1:09:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 1:09:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's on Joe and Scott.
- 1:09:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:09:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two men who would succeed the founders started at KKR at the bottom.
- 1:09:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): One
- 1:09:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of them, Scott Nuttle, described their arrival on Bloomberg's. front row in April 2022 when the two were running the firm. Well, we were the two analysts hired in a New York office in 1996, so we were the extent of the analyst class. The other, Joseph Bay, was six weeks senior. Both were
- 1:10:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 24 and both were married. Bay Bey remembered how the evenings went. The second thing I remember is there used to be a McDonald's on 57. 57th Street that we would go to every night for dinner. They sat side by side and took whichever deal the other was too busy for.
- 1:10:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:10:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm they joined belonged to Henry Kravis and George Roberts, the cousins who had started KKR with $120,000 20 years before. Its business was buying companies.
- 1:10:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:10:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the early 2000s, the companies KKR owned kept asking it for loans and other financing beside its equity. KKR said no, time and again, and other lenders made the loans.
- 1:10:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:10:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm kept a spreadsheet of who had made them and what they had earned, and Nuttle gave his verdict on it. It was a very upsetting spreadsheet. KKR stopped saying no, and in 2004 Before it started a credit business. Two years later, it went after capital of its own. In May 2006, KKR listed a fund on the
- 1:11:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Amsterdam Exchange that let the public own a share of its funds and filled it within weeks. Until then, KKR had no balance sheet of its own. Kravis explained at the Milken Institute in May 2025 what the Amsterdam fund gave the firm. That was key for us because then we had permanent capital, the first permanent
- 1:11:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): capital we had.
- 1:11:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:11:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the crisis, the funds units fell far below the value of what it owned. Kravis later wrote that the venture had been one of KKR's most transforming steps, and, at the same time, close to a failure. KKR merged with it in 2009, on terms that gave the funds holders a share of KKR AR itself. On Thursday,
- 1:11:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): July 15, 2010, the firm listed in New York. Later, it bought an insurer, Global Atlantic, taking a majority in 2021 and the whole of it in 2024.
- 1:12:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:12:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): firm's investors had been asking about succession since the founders turned 60. In July 2017, the Cousins made Bay and Nudall co-presidents and co-chief operating officers. They chose two, Kravis wrote later, because they feared that if they picked one, they would lose the other.
- 1:12:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:12:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kravis' account, the two asked to be paid as equals.
- 1:12:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): At
- 1:12:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Milken Institute, Kravis said the request matched the founder's own arrangement. And that's where George and I have always been made exactly the same. Ownership, the same, you know, amount of carry, and everything else. Roberts, beside him, gave his view of partnerships. Well, look, I think there are three things that mess up any requests.
- 1:12:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): relationship. It's sex, money, and ego. On Monday, October 11th, 2021, Bay and Nuttall became co-chief executives, and the cousins, in their late 70s, became co-executive chairmen. Robert summed up the handover in one saying: If something doesn't work out, it's on Henry and me. Now it's
- 1:13:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): on Joe and Scott. And if something works out, you get all the credit. The cousins' years as chief executives of a listed company left a record. $1,000 invested in KKR on its first day on the New York Stock Exchange in July 2010 had grown to about $10,700 by the day of the handover, with dividends
- 1:13:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reinvested.
- 1:13:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:13:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the SP $500, $1,000 over the same years grew to about $5,000. That is $2,000. 23.5% a year against 15.4%. On May 1, 2026, KKR turned 50, and by the end of June, it managed about $796 billion on its own
- 1:13:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): count. The handover had a second half, written into the agreement KKR announced the same day. The founders control KKR through a single special share, and the agreement set a date for that share to go. On the last day of 2026, unless an earlier event brings the date forward, the special share is canceled. Every share of
- 1:14:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): KKR votes once, and the founder's control ends.
- 1:14:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Amazing Hands.
- 1:14:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:14:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a Saturday morning in May 2006, the telephone rang. for Steve Schwartzmann. Michael Klein, who ran Citigroup's corporate and investment bank, asked to see him right away and was at his door within half an hour. His case was for selling shares in Blackstone to the public. It would bring capital that never had to be returned,
- 1:14:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stock to pay the firm's teams, and a way to pay Pete Peterson for his share as he neared retirement. Schwartzmann's worry was. control.
- 1:14:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:14:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Monday, he took the idea to Tony James, the firm's president, and the two began preparing to list the next year.
- 1:14:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:14:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told how he settled it in his memoir. We decided that the public could buy into Blackstone's economics, but not its governance.
- 1:15:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:15:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Friday, June 22nd, 22, 2007, Blackstone's units began trading in New York, sold to the public at $31 each.
- 1:15:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:15:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Schwartzmann's account, the offering drew more attention than any since Google's in 2004. Three foreign governments had asked for a stake, he wrote, and he chose China. Its new state investment fund bought a separate stake, without votes, for $3 billion. More than half of what the listing raised went to buy interests
- 1:15:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from the firm's existing owners. Eleven days later, Blackstone agreed to buy Hilton Hotels, a purchase the trade journal Private Equity International later counted among the most profitable private equity deals ever made. The offer had come near the top. By February 2009, a buyer at the offer had lost about
- 1:15:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 86%.
- 1:15:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Blackstone's management and advisory fees fell only about 6% from 2007 to 2007. 2008. The firm then turned toward the savings of individuals. In January 2017, it opened a property trust for individual savers, sold through their wealth advisors, and the trust began with about $279 million.
- 1:16:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It went on selling shares to savers month after month. About the same time, James, who had been president since 2006, came to Schwartzmann with the name of his own successor. Schwartzman told the story to John Gray himself in their anniversary conversation of October 2025. He said, He said it's John
- 1:16:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Gray. I said, Well, I agree with you. That's the only answer. Gray, the English major of 1992, had built Blackstone's property business, which by 2018 had accounted for half of Blackstone's earnings for several years. Over the next 18 months, he was trained across every part of the firm, and
- 1:16:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Schwartzman reminded him how. And so you were sort of smuggled into meetings, more or less. Gray recalled how the decision was received.
- 1:17:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 1:17:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the announcement happened, nobody was surprised. There was no, this is big news. The investors were like, we expect this. On Tuesday, February 13, 2018, Gray became president and chief operating officer, the role that marks him as the successor. Schwartzman remains chairman and chief
- 1:17:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): executive. On Thursday, July 20, 2023, Blackstone became the first alternative manager to pass a trillion dollars of client money.
- 1:17:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:17:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the end of September 2026, it managed about $1.37 trillion. For its public shareholders, the record starts at the top. $1,000 that bought Blackstone's units at the offer price in June 2007 had become about $10,300 by October 22nd, 2026,
- 1:17:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): with dividends reinvested. Over those years, the SP 500 turned $1,000 into about $7,000. $7,400. That is 12.8% a year against 10.9%. At 79, Schwartzman was publishing his history in Nikai, one chapter a day. It begins with the
- 1:18:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two men who started the firm and the 5,000 people it employed 40 years on.
- 1:18:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:18:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the anniversary conversation, he had told Gray what he expected. Having you at the helm of what we're doing. ensures that the firm is going to be in amazing hands.
- 1:18:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This company looks very undervalued.
- 1:18:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:18:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2018, Connor Teske was one of Brookfield's younger executives. Today, he is the chief executive of its asset manager. Brookfield had begun to track the other large alternatives. alternative managers, how they grew and how their shares traded. One of them was Oak Tree. Teske's group noticed that its business ran against the
- 1:18:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cycle. It did best when markets fell, and its growth flattened when markets were strong.
- 1:19:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:19:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the podcast The Knowledge Project in March 2026, Tesky Teske told how Brookfield's pursuit of the firm began.
- 1:19:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:19:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): remember at the beginning of 2018. going to Bruce and saying, This company looks very undervalued. And he gave me one very simple piece of feedback, which was, you're right, it looks undervalued. But what would be amazing is, could we do something strategic with them? Bruce Flatt, Brookfield's chief executive, had a reason
- 1:19:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to want more than a trade.
- 1:19:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 1:19:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Teske's Teskey's account, Flatt Flats saw that Oak Oaktree Tree led the market in credit. a business in which Brookfield then had little exposure. Teskey's team took the question away and came back with a structure. Brookfield would buy out Oak Tree's public shareholders and go into partnership with the founders and senior managers who ran the firm.
- 1:19:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:19:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): late 2018, Brookfield approached Howard Marks and Bruce Karsh, Oak Tree's founders, with the idea. The founders accepted.
- 1:20:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:20:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Wednesday, March 13, 2019, the two firms announced the agreement.
- 1:20:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:20:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): five who had left TCW with about $7 billion to manage, by Marx's count, agreed to sell about 62% of what they had built. The price was about $4.8 billion, as Flatt's letter to shareholders put it, and Oak Tree's public holders could take cash or Brookfield shares. The founders kept the rest of the firm
- 1:20:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and the running of it, and Marks and Karsh stayed on as its co chairmen. The agreement also set a schedule under which Brookfield could own all of Oak Tree, but no earlier than 2029. Marx's statement that day gave his view of the match. The opportunity to join forces with Brookfield is ideal. Our firms share a
- 1:20:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): culture that emphasizes both investing excellence and integrity. and our businesses mesh without overlapping or conflicting. In his letter for that quarter, Flat compared the pairing to Volkswagen's ownership of Porsche and Lamborghini, two brands under one owner, each with its own customers. The purchase was completed on Monday,
- 1:21:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): September 30, 2019. Marks joined the board of Brookfield's Parent Company, where he still sits as a director.
- 1:21:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:21:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a stage together at Brookfield's Affiliates Investor Day, in a session put online in October 2026, he and Flatt spoke about what each had found in the other. Marx described what he had seen at Brookfield. This ownership mentality of not being a hired hand who runs pieces of paper for somebody else, but somebody who owns
- 1:21:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): assets and tries to optimize their value. Flatt remembered what Marx. had said to him after his first few board meetings.
- 1:21:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:21:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): didn't realize your private equity business was actually what you do. This is a real business. The pandemic came within a year of the closing.
- 1:21:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:21:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Knowledge Project, Tesky described Oak Tree's response. They were incredibly active during COVID. The business took an incredible step change. The downturn was short, he said, and Oak Tree used it to grow.
- 1:22:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Brookfield's own history says that in 2020, more than $16 billion was raised for a new Oak Tree fund, and that Brookfield introduced Oak Tree to some of its own clients. On Monday, October 13, 2025, Brookfield agreed to buy the rest of Oak Tree, about a quarter of it, for about $3 billion,
- 1:22:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): paid in cash and in shares of Brookfield's companies. The purchase was completed on Friday, July 31, 2026, about three years ahead of the 2019 schedule. When the second agreement was announced, Marks gave his own account of it. Becoming part of Brookfield in full is a natural evolution that will allow Oak Tree to
- 1:22:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): continue thriving as part of one of the world's leading investment organizations.
- 1:22:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We toll the road.
- 1:22:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 1:22:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): his letter to shareholders dated Friday, February 17, 2012, Bruce Flatt made a forecast about the business of managing other people's money that Brookfield had built beside its own.
- 1:23:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 1:23:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrote, In five to ten years, we believe that our asset management operations will mature to a point that if it's intrinsic value is not reflected in the share price, we will be able to separate this business from our real assets to ensure the values are surfaced.
- 1:23:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 1:23:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): took 10 years and 10 months.
- 1:23:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:23:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Friday, December 9, 2022, Brookfield handed a quarter of its asset manager to its own shareholders, one new share for every four they held, and kept the rest.
- 1:23:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:23:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): parent was renamed. Brookfield Corporation.
- 1:23:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 1:23:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): whole group of investors, largely in the United States, buy shares in asset managers, Flat explained later, and the separation offered them exactly that.
- 1:23:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:23:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Knowledge Project in April 2025, he told both sets of shareholders what the split meant. You need to trust us when we're changing. Brookfield Asset Management is a pure play. as a management business that's asset light, that will probably never be anything different. The parent kept the capital, and in 2020,
- 1:24:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it started an insurer of annuities, now called Brookfield Wealth Solutions. An annuity is savings that pay out over decades, so the insurer holds its customers' money for just as long. Flat has described the insurer as a permanent client. for the asset manager's funds.
- 1:24:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:24:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): insurer is run by Sachin Shah, who joined Brookfield in 2002 and belongs to Flat's generation. Speaking on In the Money with Amber Canwar in January 2026, Shaw described how it was built. We didn't come into the space with third-party Third party capital. We used all of our own balance sheet capital at Brookfield
- 1:24:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to build a business.
- 1:24:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 1:24:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bought the American insurers, American National, and American Equity along the way. At Brookfield's Investor Day in September 2026, the parents' president, Nick Goodman, gave its size. In our wealth solutions business, effectively a business that did not exist five years ago, we've scaled it to almost $200 billion in
- 1:25:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): assets. On Wednesday, April 1, 2026, in London,
- 1:25:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the insurer had completed its purchase of Just Group, a British provider of pensions and annuities for £2.4 billion. Connor Teskey had moved to London in 2016 when Flat and Cyrus Madden asked him to join the renewable power team. By his own account, he said yes, as he does to whatever the firm asks of him.
- 1:25:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): On Wednesday, February 4, 4th, 2026, he became chief executive of the asset manager. Flatt remains chief executive of the parent. Speaking to the podcast host Shane Parrish that March, Teske described how Brookfield chooses its people. It is a complete meritocracy. We really don't care what your background is, where
- 1:25:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you were born, how you were raised, who you pray to, who you love. The partnership at the top of Brookfield renews itself by just generation. When a partner leaves, Flat explained in 2025, his shares pass to the partners who follow, never to his heirs. Brookfield still prints the principles of Peter Bronfman, whom it calls its
- 1:26:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): founder, and the ninth of them reads: Conduct orderly ownership and management succession. Jack Cockwell, the partnership's founding partner in 1995, is a director of the company at 85, as he has been since 1979. The partners, the generation he hired and the ones they hired, own about a fifth of
- 1:26:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the company, worth about $18 billion at the close of October 22nd, 2026. Brookfield Corporation and its insurer have agreed to combine, and the combination is pending. Under the plan in the company's 2026 circular, the trust that would control the combined company would be held by Flat, with 41%
- 1:26:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and seven younger partners, Tesky among them. Cockwell is not one of them. A thousand dollars put into Brookfield in early 2002, when Flat became chief executive, had become about $50,000 by October 22nd, 2026, with dividends reinvested. The same sum in the S SP P 500 had become
- 1:27:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about $11,000. That is 17.2% a year against 10.1. Brookfield's own estimate, which starts in 1993, is 19% a year against 11 for the SP 500.
- 1:27:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:27:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): year 2026 tested the whole industry. To October 22nd, every listed manager of the primer tracks fell by 6 to 36%. 35% with dividends, while the SP 500 rose. Some of the credit funds sold to individual savers received requests to withdraw up to eight times the 5%
- 1:27:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they allow each quarter.
- 1:27:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 1:27:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Knowledge Project in April 2025, Flatt was asked how investing had changed in his years as chief executive. In 1979, the company had sold a city. city's trams and power for cash. His answer described what it does now. We invest in the backbone of the global economy. These are simple
- 1:28:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): things. We deliver your water in the morning. We toll the road you drive on in the afternoon. We deliver your power to your house.
- 1:28:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That concludes part one of our industry primer on alternative asset managers. Part two: a deep dive for professional investors, is available to members of Latticework. To read the full written primer and its companion slide deck, subscribe at LatticeWork.com.