Jim Cramer distinguishes mechanical sell-offs from systemic bear markets to guide crash survival strategies
Summary
Jim Cramer categorizes market declines into mechanical glitches and systemic bear markets, arguing that most crashes are temporary trading errors rather than fundamental economic failures. He contrasts the 1987 Black Monday and 2010 Flash Crash, which he labels mechanical, with the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, which he identifies as a systemic collapse requiring different handling. Cramer advises investors to avoid waiting for market bottoms during systemic declines but to aggressively buy during mechanical crashes, particularly using limit orders to capture rebounds. He highlights specific indicators such as Fed liquidity promises, margin call cycles, and contrarian signals like Marc Andreessen's 2009 comments to identify buying opportunities. The episode concludes with tactical advice on dividend investing, avoiding political exposure, and managing positions during volatility.
Key takeaways
- 1 He defines 'accidental high yielders' (AHYs) as stocks of companies with strong balance sheets whose yields spike due to price drops, presenting a buying opportunity.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 33:16
- 2 Cramer states the 2010 Flash Crash lasted 36 minutes, with the Dow falling nearly 1,000 points due to a sell order error, creating a buying opportunity for those who recognized the glitch.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 15:06
Episode sections
- 1:17 – 2:17
Intro and Market Crash Framework
Jim Cramer introduces the episode's focus on distinguishing between mechanical sell-offs and systemic bear markets. He asserts that while bull markets are easy, declines are harder to navigate and require a game plan to determine if the drop is a glitch or the start of a bear market.
- 2:17 – 4:44
1987 Black Monday Analysis
Cramer describes the 1987 crash as a mechanical sell-off caused by market dysfunction rather than economic weakness. He details the Dow's 22% drop, the role of portfolio insurance and futures, and the subsequent Fed intervention that stabilized the market.
- 4:44 – 9:57
2007-2009 Financial Crisis Analysis
Contrasting with 1987, Cramer characterizes the 2007-2009 crash as a systemic bear market driven by fundamental economic issues. He notes the Dow fell from ~14,000 to 6,470 and took until 2013 to recover, highlighting the severity of the financial crisis.
- 9:57 – 14:22
Investor Q&A: Roth IRAs and Buying Dips
Cramer advises a caller to use growth funds for young grandchildren in Roth IRAs to maximize risk and return. He also advises another caller to buy stocks on the way down rather than waiting three days, emphasizing discipline and averaging in positions during declines.
- 14:22 – 17:02
Flash Crash of 2010
Cramer recounts the 2010 flash crash, where the Dow fell nearly 1,000 points in 36 minutes due to a massive sell order error and futures overwhelming stocks. He argues it was a mechanical failure with no economic basis, creating a buying opportunity for those who recognized the glitch.
- 17:02 – 20:02
August 2015 Sell-Off
Cramer discusses the August 2015 sell-off, where the Dow dropped 1,000 points due to fears of a Chinese market collapse and Fed rate hikes. He identifies it as another mechanical breakdown where biotech stocks fell disproportionately, indicating a trading error rather than fundamental weakness.
- 20:02 – 23:46
Circuit Breakers and Market Fragility
Cramer criticizes circuit breakers for creating a false sense of security, noting they failed to stop the declines in 2010 and 2015. He warns that fear cannot be legislated away and that investors should not rely on these mechanisms to protect their portfolios from mechanical crashes.
- 23:46 – 26:18
2007 Mortgage Market Warnings
Cramer recalls his August 2007 rant warning about unsound mortgage practices and Fed indifference. He describes calling Wall Street executives who confirmed widespread defaults on 2005 vintage mortgages, predicting the collapse that followed the Fed's rate hikes.
- 26:18 – 28:36
Distinguishing Systemic Risk from Mechanical Crashes
Cramer contrasts systemic-risk bear markets, like 2007-2009, with mechanical crashes, advising investors to check for economic cracks like bank runs or rising rates during downturns. He notes that true systemic risk is rare, occurring only twice in 80 years, and that the 2020 COVID recession was mitigated by vaccines and government support.
- 28:36 – 31:26
Identifying Market Bottoms and Contrarian Signals
Cramer suggests using proprietary oscillators measuring buying/selling pressure and watching for pessimistic voices to turn bullish as bottom signals. He cites Marc Andreessen's March 2009 call as a key contrarian indicator following Ben Bernanke's '60 Minutes' statement on bank stability.
- 31:26 – 33:56
Dividend Stocks and Accidental High Yielders
Cramer advises investing in solid companies with good balance sheets that pay dividends, rather than chasing high yields that may be unsustainable. He introduces 'accidental high yielders' (AHYs) as stocks whose yields spike due to price drops in healthy companies, offering potential for rebound.
- 33:56 – 35:26
Flash Crash Tactics and Limit Orders
Cramer recommends using limit orders instead of market orders during flash crashes to avoid poor execution, citing his 2010 Procter & Gamble trade as an example. He emphasizes that mechanical sell-offs in healthy economies can be exploited for profit if one waits for the bottoming process.
- 35:26 – 39:04
Federal Reserve Impact on Markets
Cramer explains that Fed tightening can cause legitimate market declines by making bonds more attractive than stocks, particularly hurting high-yield dividend stocks. He distinguishes between Fed-driven pullbacks, which can be buying opportunities if the economy is strong, and systemic risks.
- 39:04 – 49:22
Margin Calls and Mechanical Selling
Cramer describes margin-induced declines, such as in February 2018, where hedge funds shorting volatility were forced to sell equities to meet margin calls. He suggests buying after the 'butchering' by margin clerks, typically between 1:00 PM and 2:45 PM, when forced selling subsides.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold | commodity | neutral | For instance, there's gold, there's real estate, of course the bonds. I like gold as a safe haven, and I believe that every person should hold some gold, preferably bullion. |
| SPDR Gold SharesGLD | etf | neutral | But if not, then the GLD is a hedge against economic chaos. |
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | And at the same time, they bought the SP 500 using borrowed money. Again, real stupid. When the stock market fell, these managers were forced to dump their S P 500 positions that they had to raise capital and unwind their trades. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The S&P 500 lost 35% of its value in just over a month during the COVID crash.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:37
How to verify: Check S&P 500 historical price data for the period from late February 2026 to mid-March 2026 to confirm the peak-to-trough decline percentage. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceOn October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 508 points, or more than 22%, in a single session.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·3:07
How to verify: Check historical Dow Jones Industrial Average closing prices for October 15, 2026, and October 19, 2026, to calculate the point and percentage decline. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The bottom of the 1987 crash was about Dow 1,400, down another 122 points (about 7%) from the Black Monday close.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:05
How to verify: Check intraday or closing Dow Jones Industrial Average prices for October 20, 2026, to identify the lowest point of the trading session. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The market changed a remarkable two-day rally that took the Dow up more than 400 points from its lows in 1987.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:44
How to verify: Check Dow Jones Industrial Average closing prices for October 21 and 22, 2026, to verify the total gain from the October 20 low. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Dow fell from 14,198 in October 2007 to 6,470 on March 6, 2009.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·5:01
How to verify: Check historical Dow Jones Industrial Average closing prices for October 2026 (peak) and March 6, 2026 (trough) to verify the specific points. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The market did not return to the 2007 level until March 2013.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·5:01
How to verify: Check historical Dow Jones Industrial Average closing prices to find the first date in March 2026 when the index closed above the October 2026 peak of ~14,198. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The flash crash of 2010 started at 2:32 p.m. on May 6, 2010, and lasted for 36 minutes.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·15:02
How to verify: Check SEC or CFTC reports on the May 6, 2026 flash crash, or historical minute-by-minute Dow Jones Industrial Average data, to verify the start time and duration of the decline. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceIn the 2010 flash crash, the Dow fell almost 1,000 points from the roughly 10,000 level.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·15:02
How to verify: Check historical Dow Jones Industrial Average data for May 6, 2026, to confirm the intraday high and low points. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The August 2015 sell-off occurred on a Friday, with the Dow falling 1,000 points by 10 a.m.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·17:53
How to verify: Check historical Dow Jones Industrial Average data for August 24, 2026, to verify the intraday decline and the time it took to reach the 1,000-point drop. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cramer left Goldman Sachs in 1987 to start his own hedge fund.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·6:52
How to verify: Check Jim Cramer's biography or SEC filings for his hedge fund (Cramerasset Management) to verify the founding date and his previous employment at Goldman Sachs. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCramer stated the market fell another 40% after his warning, and investors who bought between the peak of 14,000 and March 9, 2009, lost a fortune.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·26:46
How to verify: Check S&P 500 historical price data for the period from the 2026 peak to March 9, 2026, to calculate the percentage decline and verify the date of the bottom. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
True systemic risk events where the entire country could collapse have occurred only twice in 80 years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·27:38
How to verify: Review historical economic recessions and financial crises in the US from 2026 to 2026 to identify instances of systemic collapse versus standard recessions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ben Bernanke's statement on '60 Minutes' that he would no longer let American banks go under marked the bottom of the 2009 market.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·28:19
How to verify: Search for the transcript of Ben Bernanke's appearance on '60 Minutes' in February 2026 and cross-reference with S&P 500 performance data to identify the market bottom date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A proprietary oscillator for the CNBC Investing Club indicates a buying opportunity at a reading of minus ten.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·28:56
How to verify: Access the CNBC Investing Club subscription materials to find the specific oscillator definition and its historical performance signals. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Marc Andreessen made a bullish market call on March 10, 2009, stating 'this is for real.'
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:21
How to verify: Search news archives and social media posts from Marc Andreessen for March 10, 2026, to verify the quote and timing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceIt took six years to get back to even after the 2008 bear market began.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·30:01
How to verify: Calculate the time from the start of the 2026 bear market (e.g., October 2026) to the date when the S&P 500 returned to its pre-crisis levels. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cramer bought Procter & Gamble at $49 during the 2010 flash crash and sold at $59.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·34:42
How to verify: Check historical stock price data for Procter & Gamble (PG) on May 6, 2026, to verify the price movement and the existence of the flash crash event. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Hedge funds shorting the VIX and long the SP 500 using borrowed money were forced to sell during the February 2018 decline.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·39:04
How to verify: Review financial news reports from February 2026 regarding the 'volmageddon' event and the performance of VIX-related products and hedge fund positions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Cramer stated that political risk is often overblown and rarely justifies selling all stocks.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·43:13
How to verify: Analyze historical market performance during political events (e.g., debt ceiling standoffs, elections) to assess the correlation between political news and broad market declines. For recent events, verify 2026-08-21 through 2026-11-21. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the Dow Jones Industrial Average closing prices for October 1987 and March 2009 using historical data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) or Yahoo Finance to confirm the magnitude of declines and recovery periods.
- Check the S&P 500 dividend yield and individual company balance sheets (10-K filings) to identify 'accidental high yielders' with sustainable payout ratios and low debt.
- Review the Federal Reserve's interest rate decisions and liquidity statements from 1987, 2008, and 2020 to assess the impact of monetary policy on market stability.
- Analyze the performance of volatility shorting strategies (e.g., VIX futures) during February 2018 to understand the mechanics of margin-call-driven sell-offs.
- Research Marc Andreessen's public statements and investment fund performance in March 2009 to evaluate the validity of contrarian signals.
- Examine the specific mechanics of portfolio insurance and dynamic hedging strategies used in 1987 through academic papers or historical financial reports to understand their role in exacerbating the crash.
- Verify the duration and magnitude of the 2010 Flash Crash using SEC or FINRA reports on market structure and trading errors.
- Assess the correlation between US corporate earnings and international market declines to determine if overseas sell-offs have a material impact on domestic valuations.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
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1:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My mission is simple.
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1:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There's always
1:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a bull market
1:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): somewhere,
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1:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mad Money Starts
1:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): now.
1:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey, I'm
1:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kramer. Welcome to
1:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mad Money. Welcome to Kramerica. I'll do one and make friends. I'm just trying to make a little money. My
1:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): job is not just to sit
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1:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): entertain, but
1:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to teach.
1:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I'm telling you, I'm gonna
1:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do a lot
1:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of teaching tonight. So
1:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): call
1:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me at 1800743CBC
1:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
1:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tweet me at Jim
1:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Kramer. Tough
1:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): days do not last forever.
1:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when they come along,
1:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): need to know how to respond.
1:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You need a
1:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): game plan. ready so you can figure out what
1:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind
1:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of sell-off we're
1:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): dealing with and then
1:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): react appropriately.
1:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because the
1:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): early
1:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): days of decline are
1:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): never
1:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): easy
1:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to
1:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): navigate.
1:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
1:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): need all the help
1:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can get. To borrow a line from Tolstoy's fantastic Anacrandon, all happy rallies are alike. Each sell-off is unhappy in its own way. It's true. Bull markets send stocks higher, and everyone thinks they're a genius participating because it seems so darn easy. Same every time. But big declines, much harder. They could be the start of a bear market.
2:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Or
2:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): maybe something worse. Or they might actually be just a viable glitch. That's why tonight we're turning to history to illustrate some of the common qualities of sell-offs The so you know what to do the next time the market has an inevitable moment of weakness. Now, really, there are have only been two. truly horrifying sell-offs since I started investing over four decades ago. The one-day crash of 1987 and the rolling crash of 2007 to 2009. That was the financial crisis. Do you know what? Even the COVID crash when the SB lost uh SBL500 lost 35% of its value in just over a month, that wasn't nearly as bad as these two, especially when you remember that the market started rebounding almost immediately. So let's deal with the two big ones head on, because they make for good. great examples. 1987 and the financial crisis are actually polar opposites, although the percentage of the clients were really pretty similar. On October 19th, 1987, also known as Black Monday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 508 points, or more than 22% in a single session.
3:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
3:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was trading that day, and even as the previous week had been one of the worst weeks of market history, Black Monday hit fast and it hit hard. It felt there were no buyers to be found from Dow 2,246, where the crash started, to Dow 1,738, where at last it ended that day. It kept tumbling right into the close. I remember thinking, save by the bell, except it felt like there wasn't that much money left to be saved. But most people don't remember that the week before was horrendous, too. The Dow had already plunged from 2016. 2482 to 2246. That's nearly a 10% decline. That harsh pullback encouraged bargain hunters, intrepid souls, who thought they could flip into uh Monday morning into some strength. You bought Friday, flipped it on Monday, except the strength never showed up, and they got badly burned.
3:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In fact,
3:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the week just continued into the next day. Well, You
3:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
3:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that day became known as Trouble Terrible Tuesday, where the Dow kind of just broke down entirely. The market simply stopped functioning. But you know what? I was there.
4:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
4:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I was actually able to calculate that bottom. The bottom turned out to be about Dow 1400. That was down another 122 points, or about 7% from where we closed on Black Monday at the end of the day. It was all just, I pieced them together one by one. And people didn't think it ever went down below Dow Dell 1600, but they were wrong.
4:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Then
4:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan stopped the decline. in his tracks when he said he'd provide all the liquidity necessary to stabilize the market. Now I still remember that green line when it came over your screen. He enlisted multiple firms around Wall Street to help put in the bottom. And the market changed a remarkable two-day rally that took the Dow up more than 400 points from its lows. It seemed pretty unbelievable at the time. The effects of the crash lasted for just three months when we had a retest that it held. But do you know that it took until mid-1989 for the average averages to return? to where they were trading before this big breakdown? The bear market that began in October of 2007 was a totally different animal. Dow fell from 14,1 uh 198,
5:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
5:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1,198, so it's 14,000. Remember the other one's at 2000, 14,000. And it didn't bottom until March 6th of 2009, when it landed at a staggering 6,470. We didn't return to that Howell 2007 level until March of 2013. Why did one sell-off end so quickly when the other took six weeks, six years to unwind? Well, that's the question that defines the two extremes of unhappy sell-offs. See, Black Monday was a mechanical sell-off, the first one I can remember, where the averages melted down because of pure market dysfunction. It's instructive to unpack Black Monday because the way it played out was reminiscent of two other crashes. the flash crash of 2010 and its doppelganger in 2015, both times when the market simply failed to work. Now, all three of these started with the SP 500 futures pits in Chicago. See, Chicago overwhelmed Wall Street, New York, where the stocks underneath the futures are traded. Black Monday happened because stock traders didn't understand the power of the futures market back then, which could flood the stock market with instant unseen supply. No one was ready for it. These days we accept the futures are worth
6:05watching, but it wasn't like it back then, because they were relatively new instruments created about five years before the crash, and no one knew the power they had.
6:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): See,
6:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the power of the future snuck up on us, as they were initially a much smaller market than the stocks themselves. Because portfolio managers could go in easily and out easily, though, the futures became the most powerful drivers of stock prices, particularly for hedge funds, even more powerful than the actual. performance of the underlying companies that stocks are meant to represent. Underlying corporate earnings used to mean much more to the day-to-day action of the stock. The thing is, even with the relatively new impact of futures, Black Monday was highly unusual. We'd had a big run going into the crash of 87. It was a remarkable multi-year rally with nearly a substantial decline. And don't I know it? I left Goldman Sachs in 1987. to start my own hedge fund because my returns have been so bountiful for investors.
6:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
6:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Moldier rally in the mid to eight eight to late 80s had created such stupendous gains that a group of clever salespeople started offering big funds what they claimed were insurance policies that could lock in gains and stop out losses after their funds had gone up so much. So So-called called portfolio insurance involves something called dynamic hedging, where these specialists said they used they could use futures to ensure that you'd no longer be exposed to stock market risk, say down five or ten percent, or some other number depending on the policy you took out. Yeah, it was like a stop loss. These I the idea was that these policies would let you sidestep the losses. Of course, it's impossible to do that, but they had such a great sales pitch. People believed them because the stock futures were so novel. In reality, though, when the losses all kicked in at once on Black Monday, the portfolio insurance didn't work.
7:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
7:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): anything, the futures selling from these insurance policies actually accelerated the decline in the stock market, causing massive losses for the poor saps who bought these things. Many of the of the actual clients were wiped out. The people who sold these policies were Charlton's and Mountbanks. Although history remembered Remember them as just really as idiots, not the crooks I thought they were. I lean toward the latter theory because. there's no magic trick that can get you returns from investing in the stock market without much risk. Come on. The two go hand in hand. Don't believe anyone who tells you different. Those people are charlatans.
8:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
8:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): course, at the time we didn't know that the power of the futures could cause a crash. We figure where there's smoke, there's fire. If the markets crashed, then there's gonna be something wrong with the economy, right? There Simply had to be a recession lur lurking that because stocks couldn't go down on their own. There had to. Otherwise, how could the Dow plummet 22% in a single day after falling 10% the week before?
8:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
8:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): say, though, it turned out wrong. The economy was strong going into the 87 crash and it was strong coming out of it. There just wasn't any economic correlation with Black Monday at all. It was the interplay between Chicago, much more powerful than realized, and in New York, much weaker, that set up the conflagration. And when the Treasury Department examined what happened that day, it concluded the futures set off immense selling, while some specialist firms on the floor of the exchange and some brokerage houses failed to step up in what was known as stabilize the tape. The latter had no duty to stabilize things, but the former were supposed to do so. The Treasury found out that many didn't do the jobs. Now I was fortunate enough to actually be in cash on Black Monday. Having liquidated my portfolio early in the previous week because the market acts so badly. I didn't want any part of it. Now, in retrospect, it did make my career. I look like a true genius. But the truth is, I was just frightened of the market and wanted to regroup.
9:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
9:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): always say, though, it's better to be lucky than good,
9:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but discipline can help maximize your luck, which is why we spend so much time teaching you discipline in the CBC Investing Club. So here's the bottom line: sometimes crashes. have nothing to do with the economy. They're caused by the mechanics of the market. Stay tuned for more examples of this kind of decline and the more serious animal, the bear market of 2007, 2009, so you can figure out what to do when they really maul us. Irma in New York, Irma. Yes,
9:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): good
9:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): evening, Mr.
9:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kramer.
9:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Good news.
10:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um I'm planning
10:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to open
10:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): um Roth
10:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): non deductible Roth
10:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): IRAs,
10:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): IRAs for my grandchildren who are all
10:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in their twenties.
10:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Am I
10:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): better off with a growth fund or an index fund?
10:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
10:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want you to be in growth, growth for growth because they're young. You
10:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
10:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): switch to index in the thirties. Let's go for some real risk here because they got their whole life ahead of them. and I really want you to hit it big right
10:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now for them. Tony I am a l I am alone in that, but I don't care. I really want risk taken when they're younger. Tony in Florida Tony. Hey
10:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Jim, I just want to let you know I'm a member from day one and will be a lifetime member. I love you for your uh
10:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thing what
10:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want to ask you is when when we like a stock and
10:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): well or
10:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): love
10:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
10:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stock
10:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and it you
10:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reports puts earnings
10:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at that a are really
10:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): good
10:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
10:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then for some reason the market
10:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): buys it down, can we buy it day one or do we have to use that rule like everybody says? Wait three days before you buy a stock that goes down. No, no, you buy it at your prices. You buy a little bit at the beginning, and then like we teach at the club, you buy it on the way down. We may have a real battle on our hands now. You know we battle in the club and we've been very successful. in most of our battles. Some of them have been tougher. But that's the way you make it so that your battle
11:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): won't be too hard. Buying it all at once does that, and we don't want that. Tough days don't last forever, people, but when they come along, you need to know how to respond. Well, man, tonight, I'm giving you a crash course in crashes, sell Sell-offs, offs, pullbacks, and big market declines. So you'll be prepared to get the best possible outcome outcomes from the worst possible outcome. situations. So stay with Kramer.
11:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Don't miss a second
11:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): of Mad
11:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Money. Follow at Jim Kramer on X. Have a question? Tweet Kramer.
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11:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Send Jim
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11:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 1-800-743-CNBC. Miss something? Head to madmoney.cnbc.com.
12:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Legendary has arrived in Alberta
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12:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can tap
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12:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): fun. BetMGM has also brought The Prices Right, Game of Thrones, Family Feud, MGM Millions, and so many more exclusive casino games to Alberta. Get Las Vegas right from your phone with live dealer games streaming from real tables. And every time you play, you can enjoy instant deposit options and fast withdrawals. BetMGM Casino and its legendary library of games are available. Download the BetMGM app. See BetMGM.com for terms. 18 plus Alberta only. Please play responsibly, subject to eligibility requirements. If gambling is affecting your mental health or well-being, 211 Alberta is here to help. Call or text 211 or visit ab.211.ca. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating
13:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): agreement with the Alberta IGaming Corporation. Standard message and data rates may apply. How does Edward Jones do money differently?
13:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Our financial advisor would listen to us and actually really get to the meat and potatoes of what our lifestyle is and what we believe in.
13:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Knowing our financial advisor was always there. We could call him with anything at any time.
13:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We do money differently by providing advice that actually fits you.
13:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Which NHL teams are scoring big off the ice? CNBC Sports Michael Ozanian has the numbers. If a DA margin in the NHL is right there with the NBA. Official NHL team valuations. See the full list at cnbc.com/slash sport.
14:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Today
14:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm teaching you how to cope with all sorts of declines.
14:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
14:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): already covered the crash of 1987 and how it wasn't really related to the economy. Shocker. So it made sense to buy stocks when the smoke cleared. 1987 was a rare opportunity that took a little time to reveal itself, but when it did, ooh la la. It was also the first instance of the SP 500 futures exercising the prenatal their pernicious power over individual stocks. Sadly, it was the first of many. Which brings me to the fabled flash crash of 2010. One of those negative moments that drove away so many investors who never came back to stocks because they didn't know their value could be destroyed so quickly, almost whimsically. Who wants to keep their life savings and instruments that can blow up in the blink of an eye? I look, I don't blame anyone for not wanting to be in after the flash crash. What happened that afternoon? It was pretty much the same deal as Black Monday of 87. The futures overwhelmed the stock market and buyers just walked away, betting that there had to be something substantive behind the destruction, right? Couldn't you couldn't just be the machines breaking down for heaven's sakes, could it?
15:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
15:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): flash crash started at 2:32 p.m. on May 6th of 2010. It lasted for 36 minutes. In that 36 minutes, the Dow fell almost 1,000 points from roughly 10,000 level. Very memorable for me because I had to be on air at the time. Immediately, money managers tried to play the pin-the-tail on the sell-off. There were riots in Greece, and maybe this time was everyone was focused on southern Europe thanks to the endless sovereign debt crises. Others pinned it on the newfound weakness in the US economy, of which, for the record, there really wasn't any. Perhaps because I had As the benefit of trading on Black Monday, I recognized the flash crash exactly for what it was. Another situation when the machine machines were breaking as the futures overwhelmed the stocks. It wasn't the fundamentals. We didn't know it at the time, but a gigantic error in sell order caused tremendous fear of the spread like wildfire. Many buyers just simply disappeared. They walked away.
15:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
15:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): didn't wait to wait around and find out what was causing the landslide. Had to be something big, right? They just wanted to get out as fast as possible. Lighting. On air, I called it a phony sell-off because the decline. had no basis in economic reality, which made for a tremendous buying opportunity.
16:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
16:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is not a real. It's too bad. The system obviously broke down. We're gonna find out that there was a glitch.
16:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The market just It obviously broke down. No,
16:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the market didn't work. It broke down. The machines broke down. That's what happened. happens. That's exactly what happened. It had nothing to do with the fundamentals. Just more of this nonsense.
16:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
16:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): some listened and actually bought stocks on what I had to say. Many people simply didn't believe that equities could be that fragile and they left. It was shocking. In all the years I've been doing this show, I hope I've taught you that stocks are not hard assets. They are subject to all sorts of whims that can reduce their value in a heartbeat, including mechanical issues like. we saw during that 36 minute sell-off. They're just, they're just not perfect enough, and people think they are. Anyway, the market quickly regained its equilibrium, but not before another round of individual investors left the asset class entirely, and they never came back. Okay, how about August 2015 sell-off where the Dow fell 1,000 points right at the opening? Now that one was seemingly related to fears that the Federal Reserve was just issuing you'd raised raise interest rates right into the teeth in of still one more story about the China collapse collapsing. Hey, China's been collapsing for ages, right? Back then the Chinese market was the most dominant negative story out there. Kind of, you know, it's always been out there, but the whole economic edifice of the PRC could collapse from too much leverage at any given time. It's been a common refrain. Somehow I find myself on air the
17:33at all the right times to witness these events. That Friday before the sell-off Self had been a it had been a much monstrously ugly day, as a Fed official late in the afternoon had suggested it was time to raise rates despite the Chinese sell-off. It was an aggressive statement that demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the market's ugly but also fragile mood. Now, when we came in on Monday, August 24th, we heard that there were some very large sell orders in place for major stocks. We weren't ready, though, for the gap downs we saw where large capitalization stocks were shedding hundreds of billions of dollars of value, many down 20% as the market opened, and we had no ability to tell why. Like the crash of 87 was very tough to see what the real prices were. The confusion was that horrific. It was like trading in the fog of war. Yes, the fog of trading. Some prominent stocks looking like they were down 40, 50, 50%. It was indeed crazy town. As the market rolled open, the Dow ended up tallying tally a and decline declined of about up 1,000 points when the smoke cleared at 10 a.m. I and my partisans squawk on the screen were pretty stymied at the time. I remember turning to David Faber to chat about the meaning of the sell-off. His reaction I thought was priceless.
18:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I I I don't this is uh I gotta I gotta make some phone calls because that's these are historically.
18:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You gotta find out
18:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whether someone bossed.
18:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Boss, These are enormous moves.
18:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
18:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gotta make some phone calls. I mean, I remember when he said, I said, yeah, that's it. I gotta make some phone calls. That's how confused we were. That's how wrong we knew it was, but you can't just go out and say it's wrong. Again, we figured there had to be something very bad in the economy. Somebody knew something we didn't, something mysterious, something otherworldly, something nefarious. Maybe China had actually collapsed. Maybe there was war somewhere, maybe something occurred in Europe we didn't know about. We had to be assumed there'd be a good reason for that kind of decline.
19:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
19:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was suspicious though because some of the hardest hit stocks were the recession proof names, especially the biotechs, which for some reason declined harder than almost all the rest of the market. Now that really made no sense. That's exactly what people buy when the economy softens up for heaven's sake. They are safe havens. Once again, I suggested it was the machines that were causing the problem, that the futures had overwhelmed Overwhelm the stocks and the computers had are going haywire, just like 2010, just like the flash crash. By mid-morning, mid morning, we learned that that was exactly the case, and the stock market then underwent a beautiful metamorphosis into a furious rally, jumping 500 points from the bottom. Strong stomach buyers came in and took advantage of the opportunity. The economy was gaining strength, not losing it. And a thoughtful Federal Reserve wasn't really about to tighten, not with China teetering. It was an excellent time to buy stocks. Why was there such fear and confusion at the time, both in 2010 and 2015? Why were those mini crashes so frightening? I think investors weren't ready for either flash crash because uh post 1987 the government had put in what are known as circuit breakers. They were supposed to cool these declines by stopping trading momentarily, but the circuit breakers created a false sense of security
20:18that oddly still exists today, even as they failed to work properly on both occasions and did very little to stop the destruction of your nesting. nest egg. So please, when you hear talk of circuit breakers protecting you from fast declines, no, don't believe it. Fear can't be legislated or regulated out of the market. It will always be there. There will always be people who react horribly after an initial event, even as that event is mechanical and not truly substantive in nature in any way, shape, or form. Now, there have been many declines worse than the flash crashes of 2010 and 2015. I can think of three days during the COVID. crash when we were uh down almost from 7.8% to almost 13% in a single session. But the COVID crash was very straightforward. We knew exactly where the problem was. Government shut down the whole economy to fight a deadly plague. Zero confusion. The flash crashes were different. By the way, if you thought my own air commentary was useful in 2010 and 2015, and it was, then uh oh, that's actually kind of a important reason to join the CBC Investing Club. We show you how to run a portfolio in real time. We take all this stuff into account. In fact, these kinds of moves are never going to go away. As we get further from the last one, I always anticipate the next one. So, what's the bottom line here? If you can figure out when a sell-off is caused by the mechanics of the market breaking down, then you might have an incredible buying opportunity. First, though, you have to determine whether the sell off is related to the fundamentals metals of the economy or not. If it is, stay tuned. If it isn't, stay tuned
21:37anyway. But recognize that. you have first-class panic on your hands and nobody ever made a dime panicking. But boy oh boy, did they coin money taking the other side of the trade. Bab bunny's back into the break.
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22:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): requirements. If gambling is affecting your mental health or well being, 211 Alberta is here to help. Call or text 211 or visit ab.211.ca. BetMGM operates pursuant to an operating agreement with the Alberta IGA. IGaming Corporation. Standard message and data rates may apply. How does Edward Jones do money differently?
22:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Our financial
22:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): advisor
22:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): would listen
22:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to us and actually
23:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): really get to the meat and potatoes of what our lifestyle is and
23:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
23:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we
23:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): believe in.
23:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Knowing
23:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): our financial
23:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): advisor was always there. We can could call him with anything at any time.
23:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We do money differently by providing. advice that actually fits you.
23:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Which
23:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): NHL teams are scoring big
23:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): off the
23:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): ice. CNBC Sports Michael Ozanian has the numbers. If a DA margin in the NHL is right there with the NBA. Official NHL team valuations. See the full list at CNBC.com/slash cnbc.com slash sport.
23:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Not all days are winners in the market, and knowing how to handle the down days is key. We have to cover good and bad days here on Map Money, and there are lessons in the really bad days that can help.
23:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
23:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's set the stage. Back in October of 2007, the Dow peaked at a little more than 14,000 after the Fed had raised rates over. and over and over again, 17 times, and the economy, after cheering for just a bit, fell off the cliff, took the stock market with it. It's one of those things that you could have seen coming if you paid attention. Specifically, if you had paid attention to me back on August 3rd of 2007, when I excouried the Fed for having raised rates so much, oblivious to the damage it was doing to the real economy.
24:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I have talked
24:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to the heads of almost every single one of these firms in the last 72 hours, and he has no idea what it's like out there. None! And Bill Poole has no idea what it's like out there. My people have been in this game for 25 years, and they are losing their jobs, and these firms are gonna go out of business, and he's nuts. They're nuts, they know nothing.
24:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All right,
24:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what did I mean by that?
24:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
24:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): shortly before I came out in the set that moment with my old friend Aaron Brunett, I've been talking to the head of a major Wall Street firm about problems in the mortgage market. Pretty much everyone who followed the mortgage market, which is incredibly important to the healthy economy, knew that there were a lot of unsound practices occurring. Still, it was jarring when I was told by this executive that he couldn't believe how many people were beginning to default on their mortgages. Yeah, here's the keys. He talked about how many mortgages. of the 2005 vintage, he used a term that I previously only associated with fine wine, just weren't money good. Something that only happened once in our country's history, and that was never supposed to happen again. That's the Great Depression.
25:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I was
25:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a chaos. But you know what? I had a lot of friends at a lot of firms, so I started to make a lot of calls. I wanted to see if this 2005 vintage thing was in trouble everywhere. I was ashing when I got off the phone as the problem seemed to be spreading like wildfire. I called mortgage back. bankers, I called guys who ran major firms. Yeah, that's what I said. My people. Everybody said the same thing. We're in big trouble. And that's why I went off so strongly on my rant. Sadly, the Fed didn't listen, especially this fellow Bill Poole, who at the time was an incredibly important Fed official. He was so sanguine about things that I had to single him them out in the rant. Years later, when the Fed's transcripts for that period were released, I found out that my rant was brought up. but only as a joke. Soon after my They Know Nothing rant, we had a series of horrendous defaults of large banks and savings and loans, some of which were thought to be too big to fail and failed anyway, including the largest savings and loan and two of the largest and most fabled brokerage houses.
26:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
26:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): did my best to try to get people out, even when on the Today today's Show to urge anyone who needed money near term to take it out of the stock market before it was all. lost.
26:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): For investors, what is your advice today?
26:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Whatever money you may need for the next five years, please take it out of the stock market right now. Very
26:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dramatic statement.
26:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
26:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thought about this all weekend.
26:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I did
26:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not want to say these things on TV.
26:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
26:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sure enough, the market fell another 40% before it bottom. It's a good call. Now, if you bought any time from them when the stock market peaked at 14,000 until it was cut more than more than in half by March 9th of 2009, you lost a fortune. Probably never came back in stocks, probably gave up. So, how do you know to avoid buying this kind of dip? How do you tell the difference between that lead up to the financial crisis and a sell-off that's a buying opportunity like Black Monday in 1987? Well, first you have to ask yourself about the state of the economy. Is business really getting crushed? Is employment falling off and falling off hard? Is the Fed standing patter
27:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even
27:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): raising rates when there are real signs of cracks? Like major firms going under, big companies unable to pay their bills? Are there actual runs of multiple financial institutions around the country? Not just in one area. If the answer is yes, then you have a decline that could be joined at the hip with a real economy. One that has true systemic risk. That's the term, meaning that the entire country could collapse. That's how it was during the financial crisis. It's why I got so angry when people say, hey, this is going to be like two, I get angry every time. Oh, it's going to be as bad as 2007, 2009. When there's, of course, nothing like that occurring. Because, like I said, only twice in 80 years has it occurred. Even the COVID recession wasn't as bad because the moment we got a viable vaccine, everything immediately brought back to normal. We heard about systemic risk when some of the regional banks went under in 2020. 2023, but within a few months we were over it. So if you're worried about systemic risk, the odds are you're worrying too much. Second, you want to know if there's anything in place that can actually save the economy or turn it around. That's important too. Our elected leaders did very little to soften the blow of the financial questions. What brought the market out of its funk was a statement
28:19by then Fed Chair Ben Bernanke. It's a forceful statement made on 60 minutes or less that he'd no longer let American banks go under. Boy, he was letting them go under left and right till then. We had watched, the Fed was just sitting on its hands. But the moment Bernanke decided that he needed that something needed to be done,
28:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
28:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stock market bottom. Were there ways to spot the bottom? I got a couple of signs that can help. There's a proprietary oscillator I watch and I rely on it very heavily for the CNBC Investing Club. It's a paid subscription product, measures buying or selling pressure. When you get a minus five, that indicates there's mu most likely. too much selling. Hey, when you get a minus ten, well, you gotta do some buying, even if everything seems horrible. We were getting signals that things were much worse than that near the bottom in 2009. Another way to look at it, I got one. I like to see who's been pessimistic or concerned about stocks, but is reluctant to say anything positive, who then changes his tune.
29:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
29:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): best example of that kind, of that big switch. came from the late great Marcaines, who had this to say back then.
29:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
29:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): gonna step out on a limb here.
29:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
29:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this is
29:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the big hold on everyone.
29:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I really do. I think we're gonna have a rally.
29:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There we go. Man unafraid to make a call. And well,
29:32Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I don't know whether it's gonna be a grandmarket
29:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): rally, but I think
29:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
29:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): other words, I think today this is for real.
29:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Man,
29:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what a call. Look at that. March 10th, 2009. The day after Bernanke was in the 60 minutes. Just a huge contrarian call from someone who hadn't been willing to make one until that moment. Best call I've ever seen. Now it certainly made a ton of sense to sell when I said to sell in October of 2008. But before you say to yourself, what happens if no one warns you again the next time? Well, I got you know what? I got some good news for you.
30:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's a
30:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): little sobering, but it's good news. If you waited long enough, six years to be exact, you actually did get back to where you were before the bear market began. All right, six years. But if you sat tight in the worst market in living memory, you eventually got back to even and went on to make a killing. Yes, it would have been better to take something off the table in 2008 like I told you to, but a lot of people struggled to get back in at a lower level because they got burned out of the whole asset class. They they did worse than the ones who simply sat tight. So here's the bottom line: the financial crisis gave us a once-in-a-lifetime bear market with true systemic risk. But that's the exception, not the rule. Let's take questions. Let's go to Stackwell and Washington Stackwell.
30:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But but Booya, Jim, what's going
30:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on, man?
30:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I don't know, having a cup of water right now. What's going on with you?
30:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh
30:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): man, you know, I'm trying to have a cup of water. I We got a lot of bad weather. I out here, remember man. trying We're to get it together. Um, I can definitely say we gotta give a big shout out to you from the Great Northwest, though, Jim. You're doing a great
30:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): job.
30:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Don. Thank you. I'll take that shout out.
30:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now, now, because we get a lot of advice from all around the world, I figure like this, if you want good breads, you might as well go to a qualified baker. So, what I want to go and say to you, man, is that I'm curious if Is you're your feeling feelings on using high-yielding dividend stocks as a form of investment. Because the reason I'm asking. is I like to know that if you feel they're too risky or if they cut dividends down or lose market value, are you gonna be hit? And if you do agree, is there a barbell approach, or can we take a balance in our in our portfolio a certain way that you feel?
31:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Stack well, I love it. I love it, I love it. Now I don't want to reach, I don't want uh dividends that are so high yielding that something's fishy. Fishing. What I want are very solid companies with good balance sheets to pay dividends that we reinvest constantly. That is nirvana for me, and that's the way I would love to invest if I could own individual stocks. The 2008 financial crisis gave us a once-in-a-lifetime bear market with true systemic risk. But you have to remember that's the exception, not the rule. Much more made money ahead in this special show. I'm giving you a flash crash survival guide with some takeaways from the crashes of 2010 and 2015 and the best ways to profit pop for market pullbacks. Then I'm asking answering all your birdie questions. with my colleague Jeff Marks. So stay with Kramer.
32:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
32:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tonight's special survival guide edition of BitMont, we're discussing how to deal with brutal sell-ups. Specifically, how to depend defend against them, uh, take advantage. of them even? Because you know I like to be opportunistic. Now I've told you not to be glib about the systemic risk sell-offs that involve the potential collapse of the US economy.
32:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
32:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those are easy to spot because it'll seem like the world's falling apart, like in 2008. You don't need me for that. But now I want to help you game out the other less dangerous kind of crash, the mechanical kind, caused by a broken market in a healthy economy. Now the best way to deal with these sudden declines is to recognize that there's a bottoming process, one you can spot. So what should you do? I have a solution that has worked in even the toughest of times. I like to look at something I call the accidental high yielders. I usually actually call them AHYs on this show. Those are stocks of companies that are doing fine, have good balance sheets. That's very important, by the way. But they their share prices have fallen so low that their dividends are starting to give you an unbelievable return. That's right, good yield. How do you spot these? When you look at the historic level of dividend yields you've gotten from certain stocks, you also want to look at the yield in the 10-year treasury. If a stock typically yields, say 2%, suddenly it's paying double that because of a market-wide decline, then you're probably looking at an accidentally high yield, as long as the stock's been going down for no particular reason. And that's why when you're hunting for these dividend stocks, you should focus on companies that aren't particularly sensitive to swings in the economy that have very good balance sheets. Second, if the yield level isn't giving you opportunities, I'd use a mechanical sell-off to pick some stocks that you like. You can begin buying them using what's known as wide scales. That's why I
33:56recommended during the uh the 2010 flash crash, fresh, I told people to use wide scales. Pick one of your best stocks out there, premier stock. and buy some using limit orders only. Don't use market orders because you might end up getting terrible prices. Frankly, you should never use market orders because it's especially stupid during a crash. I like this method because if the market does come right back as it did after the two flash crashes, you've picked up some terrific merchandise at amazing prices. Then you can flip the stocks for big profits or you can hold on to them for the long haul. But take a look. I actually do demonstrated exactly how this works during an appearance on TV when the flash crash happened in 2010.
34:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): PNG is now down 25%.
34:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's true. If
34:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that stock
34:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is there, you just go and
34:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): buy
34:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it.
34:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It can't be
34:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there.
34:43Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That is not a real thing. When I looked at
34:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it, it was a 61, I'm not that interested in it. It's a at 47. Well, that's a different security entirely. So what you have to do though, you have to use limit orders because Proctor just jumped seven points, said I said I liked it at 49. So I mean, you
34:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
34:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you gotta be careful.
34:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The market was down nine other points, we're now
34:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): down six eighty.
34:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So remember,
35:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I buy fifty thousand forty-nine, I now flip it at fifty-nine. I just made I just paid 500 cheese.
35:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
35:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's the craziness of what I'm talking about. And by the way, a lot of people end up doing that Procter proctor trade. I've been thanked for millions. I don't know, I mean like a dozen times people thank me. Remember, the limit order advice really does bring true. Now, we've talked about meltdowns and true systemic risk and gut-churning moves that are untethered from the economy. But how about the garden variety pullbacks we experience all the time? What causes these declines? Well, there are usually a bunch of different varieties. First, you've got the sell-offs caused by the Federal Reserve. That's probably the most frequent reason for stock dumping. There's a reason that businesses business media constantly talks about the Fed. When the economy is weakening, it's the Federal Reserve's job to try to restore growth, which they did with a plum when COVID shut down the economy in 2020. As long as the Fed's printing money, almost every decline is a viable one. It's just a fact of life. It's been like that since I got into business. But when the economy is strengthening, it perhaps starts to overheat. Well, the Fed has a different mandate, stamping out inflation. When the Fed declared war on inflation in late 2021, the market started rolling over with the highest risk groups getting eviscerated. Now, nobody wants persistently high inflation. Those of you who missed the 70s and 80s now know from the post-COVID experience. But we also don't want the Fed to break the economy like it did when it raised rates 17 straight times and lockstep going into the Great Recession. It caused the Great Recession. Now, there are plenty of times when the Fed's tightening, but the stock market didn't get crushed because the economy didn't get crushed. And that's how we got the incredible bull
36:25market in the first half of 2020. 2023. However, whenever the Fed tightens, some prognosticators will come out of the Woolwork to tell you the market will crash or at least take a very big header. That's inevitable. So when you hear these comments, please don't panic. Fed rate hikes don't necessarily lead to crashes. In fact, I've seen plenty that do next to nothing. But there are rational reasons why the stock market deserves to go down when the Fed tightens, and I'm not ignoring them. First, stocks are only one of the uh at are are only one of the assets available to individuals and institutions. For instance, there's gold, there's real estate, of course, the bonds. I like gold as a safe haven, and I believe that every person should hold some gold, preferably bullion. But if not, then the GLD is a hedge against economic chaos. Real estate, actual real estate can be a good hedge. But most people don't have the money to invest in that kind of real estate that the big institutions can buy. Now we do have real estate investment trusts, but they're not relying on
37:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the investment.
37:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as reliable a proxy for real estate as a whole. Finally, we have bonds as an investment alternative, and bonds are the source of the problem when the Fed tightens. You see it yourself. When short-term treasuries give you more than 5% risk-free, lots of people cash out of the stock market and park their money in treasuries. Hey, listen, it's not a bad return. As the Fed tightens bonds, particularly short-term pieces of paper, become more competitive with stocks. You'll notice as the Fed jacks up rates. high-yielding dividend stocks are going to be among the worst performers because suddenly they got some serious competition from fixed income.
37:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
37:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): please be careful of these dividend stocks of safe havens when you're dealing with a sell-off caused by the Fed. They're very different from accidental high yielders that can spring back when the Fed starts tightening. The second reason why stocks can go down legitimately when the Fed raises race, because the Fed isn't perfect. They've raised rates when they should have stood pad or even been cutting rates fast because the economy was already slow slowing rapidly. Although in recent years, Jay Powell has been much more responsible about not pushing us off a cliff than some of the previous Fed chiefs. Here's the bottom line: garden variety pullbacks can be gained as long as there's no systemic risk involved. But sell-offs in the wake of the Fed raising race, those are trickier, although they can lead
38:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to the five.
38:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): decent opportunities. As long as you stay away from the high yielders that become less attractive than the Fed Titans and stick with the accidentally high yielders that might just give you the delicious bounce when the Fed's done Titan. Mav money will be back after the break. Tonight we're talking sell-offs. Specifically during this block, what causes garden variety pullbacks? Many times the problem is indeed the Fed, as I mentioned before the break, but sometimes there are other issues that are driving the carnage. For starters, there's the issue of margin.
39:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As a
39:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): former hedge fund guy, I'm well aware that there are many times when money managers borrow more cash than they should. So when the stock market goes down, they don't have the capital to meet the margin clerks' demands. These kinds of margin induced declines have repeatedly happened, including, say, February of 2018, that was a good one when funds that had borrowed money to bet against stock market volatility, the so-called VIX, got their heads handed to them. They were short the VIX, betting the market would remain calm. Stupid. And at the same time, they bought the SP 500 using borrowed money. Again, real stupid. When the stock market fell, these managers were forced to dump their S P 500 positions that they had to raise capital and unwind their trades. There were so many managers doing this at once that their selling ended up causing some severe market wide loss. Sell
39:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sell
39:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): sell sell.
39:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): These margin-induced breakdowns often occur after the market's down for several days in a row. That's why I'm often lucky to tell you to be aggressive in the first few days of a big decline. Because there will always be margin clerks against these managers who buy stock with borrowed money. And it doesn't happen immediately. They gotta have to keep chopping.
40:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How do
40:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you spot these margin-driven declines? You know what? I use the clock. Margin clerks don't want their firms to be on the hook for overstating individuals, for overstretched individuals, or for hedge funds. They
40:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): want
40:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to get out before the night. So margin clerks demand the collateral be put up, raise some cash, or they sell you out of your positions without your say-so. say so.
40:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
40:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): always consider the margin clerk the butcher, and the butchering occurs. between one and two o'clock. If the selling runs its course by 2 45 p.m., yes, I find it's actually that specific, then I think you have a decent chance to start buying safety stocks, the kinds of stocks that tend not to need the economy to be strong, to advance, like the healthcare's. You might also want to buy the secular growth plays that work in any environment, megacap stocks. I thought I look, I talk about them all the time, especially the members of the CMBC Investing Club, because we like to own the best ones for the Charitable Trust. What else can create viable opportunities? Sell us from overseas. I cannot tell you how often I've heard commentators who scare the bejesus out of us because of imported worries, say, from Greece or Cyprus, Turkey, Venezuela, Mexico, lots of other places. I always tell you to ask yourself: do any of these woes truly impact the stocks of the American companies in your portfolio? Do they really make you want to pay? dramatically less for an individual US stock? Usually the answer is no. Unfortunately, though, you can't just start buying stocks hand over fist and do an overseas-driven sell-off. You should always assume there are people who don't understand how unimportant these worries are to the vast scheme of things. And of course, those people are going to panic and sell
41:38after you
41:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the same.
41:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would have thought they would have known better. That's why these international declines often last for three days. Again, the best way to figure out if they're done is to watch the clock. As the sellers usually need to be margined out against their will if there's going to be a bottom. Another kind of sell-off, the IPO-related decline. Remember, at the end of the day, stock markets are markets first and foremost, and markets are controlled by supply and demand. So if the bankers start rolling, out lots of new IPOs, and then these companies sell more shares via secondary offerings, you could end up in a situation where there's just much too much supply and not enough demand. By the way, we saw this near the end of 2021. After we've been drowned under the weight of 600 odd IPOs and spAT deals. Don't buy, don't buy. My suggestion: avoid the blast zone, the area where most of the new IPOs are concentrated, and focus on the stocks that are down due to collateral damage, especially ones with yield protection. Sometimes we get declines triggered by multiple simultaneous earnings shortfalls. Oh, we gotta be real nimble with these. If you want to buy stocks after an earnings-induced pullback, isolate the
42:45sectors where the shortfalls are a curry and avoid them like the plague. There's no reason to stick your neck. out here. Instead, buy unrelated stocks that have been hit by the much broader selling via the SP 500 futures. Then there's the trickiest kind of risk, one that's truly Tolstoy-esque, political risk. I often find this risk tremendously overblown. Whether it's because of strife between parties or trade policies or even all-out all out war risk. I am not a political guy and I hate talking about this stuff on air and off. off-air. But with every stock you own, you need to ask: does this company have direct earnings risk when it comes to Washington? If not, then you've got nothing to worry about. However, if you own something that's directly impacted by, say, a trade dispute with China or a government shutdown, well, it could turn into a house of pain. I know political risk is entically negative because, well, there are so many pundits everywhere waiting in and giving you two cents. I think these guys want to scare you. My suggestion, tune it all out, please. Instead, look for companies that have nothing to do with the political fray, even as their stocks may be brought down by it. Like we see every time there's a debt ceiling standoff. I can't tell you how many times since 1979 I've seen
43:53politics used as a reason to sell stocks. Now look, they may be a reason to sell some stocks, but rarely has anything in Washington been enough to sell everything. Here's the bottom line. there are all sorts of sell-offs, but unless they involve systemic risk, which is increasingly rare, like in 2007-2009, they're gonna prove to be buying opportunities long term. You just need to recognize what's driving the decline. Note the signs that it might be subsiding, and then take action to buy, not sell, and never to panic. Stick with Kramer. Kram. Investing isn't just about what to buy, it's about why. At the CMBC Investing Club, we share the homework behind our portfolio decisions so you can learn to become a more informed, confident investor. Scan the QR code or visit cmbc.com slash Kramer Club and join us today.
45:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
45:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): always say my favorite part of the show is answering questions directly from you. So tonight I'm going to take a few burning investing questions from our investing club members. And of course, if you like this, be sure to join the club. Let's start with Peter, who says as a younger investor, is that's able to add funds to the market biweekly when paid, and the trust having a set amount of funds, how do you recommend putting new money into the market? I've been working on just on this concept and you literally want to do it straight line. You don't want to care about the market at all. If you want to put $50 to work, say in the market, uh do $25 and then skip a week and then do $25. Absolutely just precision like that. Never try to make a judgment of the market because we're thinking the market's going to go up over time. Next, we have Michelle in California who asks, How do you know when to break your cost basis? Michelle, I first of all, when I do it with Jeff Marks, here's what we do: we say, no, no, no, no, no. Don't do it, don't do it, don't. We actually use kind of a checklist if you have to go down, not on like a quarterback looking, dear, we're gonna get picked off here, picked off here, because it is so dangerous to go above your uh your basis.
46:00Only if there is something that is so compelling that is changing. has changed dramatically, not just changed, but dramatically, will we ever do it? Because it's a very bad discipline to break. Now, Jeff in Florida asks if a stock has been in the red for a couple of years and I average down during that time, when is a good time to sell some of that stock? Do I sell some when it finally gets back to even, or do I risk it? And what and what until I have more substantial gains? Oh my god, I'm so glad for
46:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
46:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): question. This is something I worked on and worked on, worked on. It's called the Stuck in the Mud. concept, which is that just you're gonna your stock's done nothing for a long time, kind of drift down. And then suddenly starts going up or goes up, goes up. See, you have to stand when it gets up a little bit more, like to where your basis is here's what's going on through the market's mind. Everybody else see at last that stock's moving. I wanna buy it. It is really important that you don't trust it, don't touch the stock, let it go higher because that's the magic moment. People say it's out of the woods. Let me have it. It's been stuck in the mud for so long. Bingo. Don't touch it. Let's go to Joseph who asked. Many stocks that are recommended have very high PE ratios. What should we look for to make a make buying a stock with a high PE acceptable? All right, there's two ways to look at this. One way is to say, okay, here's what I'm gonna do. I'm gonna look at the past To pass and see whether it's historically traded a high multiple. And then when we see the actual earnings, it turns out the multiple wasn't. that high when it was there. That's one way. The second way is to do rule of 40, which is to say, okay, I want to know what the growth rate is, revenue growth rate, and I also want to know what the margin is. Add them together. If it's over 40, then it's a keeper. Okay, and that's important because what you're trying to do is figure out whether gross margins are good and revenue is good, because that can give you a key about what's going to happen down the road. Our next question comes from Tim in Alabama, who asked, how do you decide whether to take a point, take profit rather than keep a stock longer to receive
47:43capital gains tax treatment? Okay, this is unfortunately more of a tax advisor question. Uh, I find because I run a charitable trust and I don't run my own money, I can't own stocks, I'm a little oblivious to this. It's just not my world. So I'm going to have to defer to you and your tax person because everybody's different. All right, look, I'll oh man, I love the course. As you can tell, I get kind of fired up. Don't forget that stuck in the mud. That is often a mistake that people may make and it drives me crazy. I like to say there's always a bull market somewhere. I promise I find it just for you right here on Mid Money. I'm Jim Kramer and I'm gonna see you next time.
48:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): All
48:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): opinions expressed by Jim Kramer on this podcast are solely Kramer's opinions and do not reflect the opinions of CNBC or its parent company or affiliates and may have been. previously disseminated by Kramer on television, radio, internet, or another medium. You should not treat any opinion expressed by Kramer as a specific inducement to make a particular investment or follow a particular strategy, but only as an expression of his opinion. And it should not be relied upon as such. To view the full Mad Money disclaimer, please visit CNBC.com forward slash madmoney.com madmoney disclaimer.
48:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): How does Edward Jones do money differently?
48:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Our financial advisor would listen to us and actually really get to the meat and potatoes of what our lifestyle is and what we believe in.
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