The Variant Perception Podcast

Late-cycle macro pressures and post-midterm policy confusion dominate market outlook

25 min Listen to the original Episode page
Late-cycle macroUS PoliticsAI FinancingChina EconomyEurozone ECBMonetary Policy

Summary

Speaker_1 describes a 'late-cycle gravity' environment where growth is insufficient to trigger reflation but too high for central bank rate cuts, leading to monetary tightening and liquidity drainage. The speakers note that post-midterm political fragmentation in the US limits proactive fiscal stimulus, creating policy confusion. While the AI sector is seen as a secular offset, its financing model is described as fragile and dependent on continuous confidence. China is no longer exporting disinflation due to energy shocks, and the Eurozone faces peak growth with sticky inflation, increasing the risk of ECB policy mistakes.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 3:51

    Late-Cycle Macro Setup and Liquidity Drain

    Speaker_1 describes a typical late-cycle macro environment where growth is insufficient to drive reflation but inflation remains high, forcing central banks to tighten monetary policy. This tightening drains excess liquidity, leading to higher yields and a slowing credit cycle, with downside risks outweighing upside potential for the consensus.

  2. 3:51 – 6:05

    Political Fragmentation and Policy Confusion

    Post-midterm elections, the US administration is described as splintering, with officials like JD Vance, Mark Rubio, and Scott Bessent pursuing divergent agendas. This political fragmentation limits proactive fiscal stimulus and creates policy confusion, making the government reactive rather than proactive.

  3. 6:05 – 12:31

    US Growth, Fiscal Support, and Consumer Vulnerability

    US growth is currently too strong for Fed cuts, but fiscal support from the OBBBA and tariffs is expected to flatten next year. Consumer disposable incomes have low margins of safety, and while the labor market is a lagging indicator, credit tightening poses a risk to growth.

  4. 12:31 – 17:22

    AI Financing Confidence and Credit Headwinds

    The AI sector is viewed as a secular force offsetting the traditional macro cycle, but confidence is fragile due to financing risks and recent personnel changes like Jensen's resignation. Investment grade yields are above nominal growth, and curve flattening is seen as a classic late-cycle recession indicator.

  5. 17:22 – 20:55

    China's Export Dynamics and Policy Constraints

    China is no longer exporting disinflation due to energy shocks and surging PPI/export prices. The nominal effective exchange rate has risen, possibly to repatriate assets, but political stability under Xi Jinping constrains major policy pivots despite economic deceleration.

  6. 20:55 – 24:55

    Eurozone Late-Cycle Risks and ECB Policy

    The Eurozone faces exaggerated late-cycle dynamics with growth peaking and inflation remaining high, lacking the offset of secular AI activity. Credit conditions are poor, and the ECB risks a policy mistake by hiking further if inflation remains sticky due to energy factors.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
NVIDIANVDAequityneutralUm obviously NVIDIA that news.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Growth is not high enough to drive reflation but not low enough for the Fed to cut, while inflation is high enough to require tightening.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·0:47

How to verify: Check US GDP growth forecasts and Fed Funds rate decisions from Federal Reserve meeting minutes (FOMC) and Bureau of Economic Analysis data for the period 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

A potential upside scenario requires a declarative resolution in Iran leading to a rapid drop in oil prices to deflate risk premiums.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:58

How to verify: Monitor news reports on Iran-US negotiations and Brent Crude oil price movements from Bloomberg or Reuters during the verification window. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Historical analogs for current macro deterioration include 2010, 2015, and 2018, which saw V-shaped recoveries due to low inflation tail risks.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:13

How to verify: Review historical US GDP and inflation data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve for the years 2010, 2015, and 2018 to confirm recovery patterns and inflation levels. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US administration is splintering with officials like JD Vance, Mark Rubio, and Scott Bessent pursuing divergent agendas post-midterms.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·4:00

How to verify: Verify public statements, tweets, and policy positions of JD Vance, Mark Rubio, and Scott Bessent from their official social media accounts or press releases during the verification window. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Consumer real disposable incomes have low margins of safety, making them vulnerable to shocks as credit tightens.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·6:51

How to verify: Check US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on Personal Income and Outlays, specifically real disposable personal income, for the verification period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Jensen Huang resigned from NVIDIA, causing a market reaction that suggests heightened sensitivity in AI financing confidence.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·13:12

How to verify: Search for news articles and press releases from NVIDIA Corporation regarding Jensen Huang's resignation and subsequent stock price movements during the verification window. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

China's PPI has surged above 5% and export prices are rising, indicating China is no longer exporting disinflation.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·18:21

How to verify: Check China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data for Producer Price Index (PPI) and export price indices for the verification period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Eurozone growth LEI dropped from 1.1% to 0.7%, and credit lending services are poor.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·20:55

How to verify: Verify Eurozone Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) and credit growth data from the European Central Bank (ECB) Statistical Data Warehouse for the verification period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

AI financing commitments total over a trillion dollars to 2030, relying on continuous funding confidence.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·13:39

How to verify: Review earnings reports and capital expenditure disclosures from major AI infrastructure companies (e.g., NVIDIA, Microsoft, Google) and industry reports on AI CapEx trends for the verification period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US macro risk indicator dropped to 50 from near 90 at the beginning of the year.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·7:22

How to verify: Check Variant Perception's published macro risk indicator data or related research reports for the period 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. For recent events, verify 2026-08-20 through 2026-11-20. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify current US GDP growth vs. core PCE inflation data to assess 'late-cycle gravity' claims.
  • Review US Treasury yield curve dynamics, specifically curve flattening, as a recession indicator.
  • Check AI sector CapEx commitments and financing structures for potential refinancing risks.
  • Analyze China's PPI and export price data to confirm the end of disinflationary exports.
  • Assess ECB policy statements and energy price forecasts for Eurozone inflation risks.
  • Examine US fiscal impulse data post-OBBBA and tariff implementations.
  • Monitor US labor market lagging indicators for signs of credit tightening impact.
Full transcriptexpand

0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um so Ten, you've just released our G3 LIW.

0:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

0:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you've given us a formula here. So late cycle gravity plus post-midterm policy confusion.

0:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

0:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's try and understand this. What's the upside and downside here?

0:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

0:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would say there's a lot more downside risks versus consensus than upside. That's probably how I uh that's that would be the the the ten second summary.

0:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.

0:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): From what I can see on our models and this is obviously not new, we've been writing about this the past month

0:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or

0:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two, right, since the Fed started hiking. You're seeing kind of a typical late cycle macro setup where growth is

0:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you

0:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know not high enough to really drive reflation, but not low enough that the Fed can start cutting. Yet the level of inflation is high enough that central banks have to worry about that. But because of that, you just have monetary policy being tightened, yields are going higher, which is then feeding through into a slowing credit cycle, is draining excess liquidity.

1:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,

1:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): typical late cycle, right? Where the impulse of growth and inflation are slowing, but the level of both is not low enough yet. But you just have liquidity being drained from the system, which is necessary to support asset prices. So that's kind of one piece that I think is is ongoing and is set to play out over the next few months, especially if the Fed follows through and hikes in December, especially if they do the 50 fifty bit, right? That that

1:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um

1:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and then maybe they even hike again January, and then you potentially start inverting the yield curve in a typical lay cycle sign. So I I think that's the one piece where I'm talking about the lay cycle gravity. It's very hard to see how we push back against that. We would we would probably need something miraculous where we get something declarative in Iran,

1:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,

1:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): suddenly oil prices fall and all the risk premiums link linked to, you know insurance and price gouging, all the all that has to then come out really quickly.

2:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Which

2:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is that the kind of situation that might delay the the late cycle

2:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that

2:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you claim we're in.

2:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. If you get that yeah if you get a you know a quick drop in oil prices and clearly that that will reflate the cycle for a bit, right? But it's just it's important to acknowledge how um the marginal data updates is just very consistent with our reading of what lay cycle environment looks like. So you we just have to acknowledge it's genuinely lay cycle and it's accelerating and it's going faster than

2:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

2:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would have anticipated when the Fed first chose the hike.

2:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

2:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the second teeth yes.

2:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

2:46Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would have thought we were way more resilient to w just one first the the the one hike, right? But the data's pretty unambiguously turning.

2:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You

2:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, y obviously you know we we wrote about it with our macro risk risk indicator, right? Also just dropping a lot. Like I say, um we've looked at comparable historical episodes and you have two thousand, two thousand seven, all right, let's park those, right? Those are kind of d you you don't you don't always want those analogs. And then you have twenty 2010, ten, twenty 2015, fifteen. and 2018. Right? So those are the five comparable examples when we've seen a similar kind of deterioration in the macro on our on our macro risk indicator. And the mid-2010s were, you know, there was obviously asset vol drawdowns, but it was pretty quick V-shaped recovery. But it was because the level of inflation wasn't that high. The tail risks for from inflation were unambiguously to the downside at the time. which meant you got a much quicker policy pivot, right? And reflation.

3:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The

3:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): problem today is it feels more like a 2000-2007 setup, right? Where the ability for policy to act preemptively is low.

3:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

3:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then you throw into that the midterm election where, again, I'm pretty concerned since the midterms how

3:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how

3:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): How there's does it there's do a feeling of

4:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it

4:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): again, if you assume pre-midterms that Trump was fully in control, I would say now clearly there's less control. Right? Like the

4:09Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): his

4:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the administration officials are splintering from JD Vance tweeting about the Iran war on the day, right? Mark Ruby doing his own thing, uh how a lotnik uh and uh and Scott Besson, right, you know, fighting find each other. So you have a splintering in the cab in in in the cabinet in the administration.

4:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

4:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you also have a splintering s now with the the Fed governance, right? With a big range of, you know, are

4:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we

4:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): gonna hike 50 bits? Are we you know, i is is policy accommodative or not. So I just think it's kind of um I I guess i in my mind it's almost the analogue was you have like a dam that was sort of like Trump and the midterm holding these things back and we have this splintering. which means again that's the kind of environment where you're gonna struggle to have coherent policy that's proactive, right? It's like everyone looking out for their own agenda.

4:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,

4:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which as I put in the report, I think that limits your potential for more fiscal stimulus, right? You just it's gonna just delay things. That means that policy is ultimately forced to be reactive once something bad happens rather than proactive.

5:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

5:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.

5:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And you

5:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so what you're suggesting is once you start losing, I guess, more uniformed, let's say, fiscal spending, which is what what we had really this year, plus the AI boom, you take that away and a lot of growth is just collapsing in the US.

5:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,

5:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): c collapsing is a strong word. Again, I think it's just the worst kind of late cycle setup where you don't get a recession quickly, right? It's just like the tail risk of these things. means growth will slow down, but it won't go negative. So it limits how quickly the Fed can act. It's almost like the typical late cycle, right? Because things don't turn that quickly, but it's just this awkward growth isn't quite rolling over, but then eventually it just breaks you get a credit event of some kind.

5:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

5:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. Let's turn to the US uh growth slide. slide. 'Cause what what you're suggesting

6:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): here

6:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is well

6:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,

6:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): growth is is still too strong for Fed cuts. And then also you're laying doubt about fiscal support, which is what you mentioned with that image of of dams.

6:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well it's just more if you look at this year, the OBBBA was clearly, you know uh

6:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

6:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh it's gonna be hard to repeat, right? So from an impulse point of view, these things are known. It's happening. It's a question of whether some some things get rolled back next year.

6:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

6:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and obviously tariff refunds, right? Which again is a one off. So you kinda have mechanical reasons why we've ha we've had a positive policy impulse this year. Um, which again realistically it's not gonna be the same next year, right? It'll just be flat, best case. Next year. You have relatively low margin of safety on uh real disposable incomes amongst consumers. So again, vulnerable to a shock, especially because credit is tightening, rates are going up. But labor markets tend to be lagging indicators, right? So but you also have the

7:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

7:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lagged effects of the previous growth. So the labor market is like recovering mildly. But again, that just means you're not gonna get bad labor market data to to force a quick Fed fat pivot. So you you have this condition where if policies restrain and then you get a negative shock,

7:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it

7:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it it risks having a more embedded um effect. Um and again, and overall if you look at macro syndicator, right? So it's dropping all the way down to fifty, right? From like, you know, near ninety at the beginning of the year. So that also gives you a sense that the it's just the balance of risk is way more like two sided now. So it's important to be for portfolios to be uh defensive or have balance, right? Or de-risk. Um

7:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

7:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that'll be kinda the the overall

7:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

7:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sense sense I get

7:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): here. So

7:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're

7:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): still

7:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kinda preferring you know, bonds or or duration? At

7:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

7:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): margin. Yeah.

8:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And trimming and trimming

8:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): equities.

8:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.

8:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I would say at the margin. Like again, it's tricky. The reason you build models is to stop yourself overreacting emotionally. Yes. Right. That's why we need all our models as anchors.

8:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But

8:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then we it's obviously our job to also then try to interpret what's going on. Um that the models might not be able to capture. And I I would say right now

8:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what the

8:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): model can't capture is clearly a marginal negative in my mind for risk assets versus one and two months ago.

8:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right?

8:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The the political dynamics, you know, the the the set the sense around uh you know AI obviously with Jackson, AI CapEx financing at the margin, that's clearly worse, right? You know, the fiscal impost and the margin clearly worse. How quickly can can central bank banks start cutting again? Are the margin worse? Um

8:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.

8:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But how

8:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do we then

8:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): compare, like how do we compare then perception with the models here? Let's let's actually dive into it.

9:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What

9:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are the specific models that are telling you, okay, it's it's still okay or it's not so bad? Then how do you compare with maybe the the softer stuff? Because obviously we had the midterms, you've you got the politics, you you've got the Iran war still going on. Um obviously NVIDIA that news. How what in the models is is keeping you grounded here.

9:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well, so

9:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the model is obviously the growth and inflation and policy and liquidity leading the cases, right? And I would say they pretty much confirm intuition, which is growth outside the US deteriorating, US growth holding up for now, not great, but not terrible. Inflation level high across the board, even though the impulse should be rolling over.

9:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.

9:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Liquid excess liquidity, liquidity rolling over, clearly, right? There's a lack of marginal buyer for assets. Um

9:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

9:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): policy, yeah, most policy stuck.

9:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

9:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would say that's confirming. What the model, but because the model inputs uh uh macro data that's that released weekly. monthly with a lag, right, it's gonna you know, in real time we kinda have the have a judgment on on some of the the the shocks and events going on and g and and at least get a sense of is it meaningful, right? Because you can't just wait for the data to update. So for example something like Iran, I would say we've had a reasonably good um read of the situation early in the year, right? Drawing analogy to like US US-China China trade war. as good as it gets, dragging on. But again, it even that went longer than we thought. Whereas today, my reading would be: given the midterms, it seems the odds of a resolution has gone up a lot

10:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): more

10:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): after the midterms. That yeah. I would say it's just more oil prices somewhat stuck because of the ancillary costs, right? Insurance, transportation, you know, the risk premiums. That that's kind of what's holding things up

10:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now.

10:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um, I do think

10:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you

10:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you probably have to give credit to the Trump administration with some of the sanctions, embargo, that at some point that becomes like a social issue for Iran as well, right? Even if your population can tolerate a lot more pain at some point, you know, if you start stop running out of basic uh goods, it it also motivates you to do a deal. So

11:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mm-hmm I

11:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actually think the odds of that's gone up, depends why oil prices fell after the

11:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

11:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): election. So I would say that's kinda okay. But there's other things we can't predict, like you

11:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,

11:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I mentioned multiple times El Nino, right? Food price inflation that drags on into twenty twenty seven. That that's kind of stuck, right? That's something again it isn't gonna be fully captured in the model. And then the political dynamics, right? We clearly you know, going back to the primacy of sovereignty, sovereignty sovereign possible. trinity, politics, trumping economics, right? Like it's important to be aware of these political movement because governments are very involved in markets. And the model isn't gonna understand that since the midterms, we we've had a pretty big uh what's like fracturing, I guess,

11:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of

11:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a lot of like the

11:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the

12:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uneasy equilibrium that that that existed. before before the midterms, right? Because of Trump's personal brand of power, I would have said. That's why the I think his administration is sprintering. Right. That's why amongst Republicans sprintering. Um

12:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. You've also cited some other like late cycle indications. The first one is being credit headwinds. Um already got those. Uh and we also have housing. Uh which of those do you think is actually more significant?

12:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well

12:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): th they're all significant, right? It's essentially I I think of it as like you just basically have the secular AI thing and then you have like the non AI, which is like a much more typical macro cycle. So housing

12:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): oh

12:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they thought this is like typical macro cycle right you Yields always why went now now activity's activities terrible terrible. You know, it's fairly

12:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

12:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would say, standard traditional macro cycle. Offset against the secular sovereignty backed AI. But clearly at the margin, what connects all of them is financing. And initially, if it was AI financing crowding out the rest of the economy, then these things are fine. But clearly, with doubts around Jensen

13:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

13:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you just know the reaction since he resigned, it it does suggest like a heightened sensitivity and risks around the AI financing, right? And the whole game is a confidence game because it's super reflexive. If the financing works, then the Frontier Labs can meet their commitments and the game carries on. Right? And if the confidence goes and they can't raise the financing,

13:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right?

13:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We've got a trillion dollar plus of all these commitments, right, to 2030. If they can't raise the financing, then it's reflexive on the way down too. And I think that that's the

13:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

13:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's why the confidence matters. And the confidence obviously comes from the personnel, the narratives, from asset prices, but also from macro and policy, from liquidity, from the Fed policy, from fiscal policy. right? And and at the margin, all these things have worsened since the midterm.

14:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. Um, what are we then seeing with credit headwinds? Because obviously,

14:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

14:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, investment grade yields above our nominal growth outlook is is one of those bad signs. But that's not particularly new. What you are suggesting, though, is you're going to get a curve flattening. And I'm just interested, what are the investment implications there?

14:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I th I think it's just really hard in environment, right? Like the the curve flattening is because the Fed likely follows through on the hikes. Markets pricing it,

14:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right?

14:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We're discounting like um, you know, either twenty five or fifty in December, but you have like almost eighty bits BIPs worth to the middle of next year, middle of twenty 2027. twenty seven. So there's a lot priced in.

14:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On

14:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): current trends, it looks like they get realized, but then they're going to be realizing those cuts into a growth slowdown. So I think that's what drives the curve flattening.

14:58Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

14:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and again, curving and curving version is obviously one of those classic historical, you know, recession, very long leading recession lead indicators. Right? Uh so so I I would say that's the way I would think about it, that.

15:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah

15:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it again it's just that awkward thing that we don't have a like a red panic button now but you can kind of see the things falling into place. So at the margin you need to probably do something to de-risk. But at the same time, because of just how volatile and catalyst driven the market is, you kinda have to be open to

15:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know

15:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what are the uh upside risks as well, right?

15:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think

15:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's all. But it's just more on current trends, assuming no more shocks, you you're seeing just more deterioration. That kind of puts us into these headwinds building as we go into Q one twenty twenty seven. Um

15:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah

15:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and potentially if open eye wants the IPO then that's another you know slug of supply the market will need to absorb. It just yeah.

16:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I

16:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think you can see it's it's tough, right? But again, given the price action instead means like clearly the market is is price some of those risks, but maybe what's underappreciated here is like the macro cycles turning at the same time. So you have the secular AI force at the margin weakening and you have the macro turning together. What connects them is credit. Credit is a function of interest rates and credit spreads, spread, right? That itself depends on the Fed, and the Fed just telling you inflation is too high and growth is too high that we can't ease. But those data points are not the most forward looking, right?

16:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I mean you you mentioned here the importance of inflation too, because the risk here is that the Fed hikes because of short term inflation that's above target.

16:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um but

16:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then you now have risks as well in the medium term that both growth and inflation might be falling. So what's this indication then in the medium term you might get disinflation?

17:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh

17:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's just all our impulse indicators, right? Well global diffusion of growth and inflation impulses. We put in the snapshot, we

17:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): put

17:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the EMTM last month. So yeah, that's all that's all negative.

17:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh

17:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right now. Yeah.

17:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. Even even despite say China not really being an exporter of disinflation.

17:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well well, like I say, if China goes back to exporting, it'll be good, right? Um but right now that's not what's happening, right? China is no longer Don't go exporting disinflation.

17:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.

17:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So again, because of the energy shock, China isn't doing that anymore. So you're gonna have to wait till that turns.

17:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right.

17:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So

17:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if China goes

17:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): back to exporting disinflation, then clearly that that will help global central banks. But again, we we're not on the timeline when that's gonna happen. Chinese and and that's why I put on the page, right? Ultimately,

17:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,

17:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Chinese export prices have surged higher. Um Huh, why is this?

18:17Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,

18:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that was

18:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a good idea. Yeah, with China inflation. PPI surging above

18:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): five percent. Yeah. Export

18:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prices are higher, right? Obviously these are mechanical. We probably peak, but that's gonna follow through.

18:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How how has China let the nominal effective exchange rate rise so much this year?

18:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I guess you know obviously clearly it's I think it's probably a a part of um policy stability, a part of repatriating um repatriating foreign assets to China. to plug some balance sheet holes would be my interpretation.

18:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Because it seems to be harmful to the export growth that they depend on.

19:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean,

19:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is it maybe

19:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): good for

19:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): consumers?

19:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I would I would say Chinese exports are so competitive in terms of quality to price. Like you can weather quite a big appreciation and probably not have it be sat that sensitive, right?

19:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That

19:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would be the other thing. Like I don't think it's that sensitive to uh currency anymore.

19:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like

19:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Chinese

19:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): actually

19:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a good example, right? Yeah. Like you would need a s

19:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): really

19:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): significant move.

19:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay.

19:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

19:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): obviously you're still talking about the potential of a policy pivot.

19:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh Um

19:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think the

19:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): LEI last time

19:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): went to like negative five.

19:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

19:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but this time it's kind of bumped bumped back up. So if there is going to be a pivot, is this something we'd be looking at more next year then?

19:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I don't know. I guess we'll just see when the LEI deteriorates a Along lot even further. We might be close, but um

20:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know

20:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's important to acknowledge the number one priority. is clearly political stability, right? Going into President Xi seeking the fourth term. There's obviously been a lot of focus on party discipline, loyalty, right?

20:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

20:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I would say that's clearly like an overarching constraint. Um

20:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that

20:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): again makes it unlikely there's any big policy shifts. But

20:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if

20:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): obviously obvious but if the economy of society, KPI. KPIs get so bad and they will do something like they did in uh twenty twenty four. But yeah, at the margin, last month I saw we were getting there given the the the pace of deceleration. Um but but this arrested again this month, so it feels like we're not quite there yet.

20:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. Um we can turn to to Europe too. I mean you've You made the point here. Uh it's it's in a late cycle stage too, so what was once the kind of economic growth surprise has now kind of fallen down.

20:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

20:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): going from growth LEI going from one point one percent to zero point seven. Uh that's a a big drop.

21:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

21:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your your maybe hope is that a mild winter might be able to help them out here.

21:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh

21:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): well the mild Ma winter is more gives you a chance the ECB won't exacerbate. the problem by continuing to hike. I think the you can see here it's pretty unambiguous the headwinds that's coming, right? The credit lending service are really bad. The lag defects of yields about to stop uh of the yield rises are gonna start feeding through, real money growth is still bad again.

21:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,

21:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I just think it's yeah, y again, it's like the US, you see late cycle dynamics, but you just don't have the secular AI activity. So it's just gonna be even more exposed. Right? It's yeah. You just have m a a tip more even more exaggerated of a late cycle dynamic of growth is starting to peak and rolling over, but inflation is high. But you don't have any kind of secular thing offsetting it. I mean at the margin, German fiscal would help, but obviously France is not offering you anything right now. So overall it feels um

22:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,

22:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it it's another example of potentially the ECB being forced to hike and that becomes a policy mistake.

22:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mm-hmm.

22:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Really

22:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think yeah, this is that really awkward transition period we're in.

22:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So

22:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this is really it's really difficult to to invest in this. I mean we're still underweight Europe.

22:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

22:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and then selling the America the sell America reversal trade.

22:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I think I I would say I wouldn't want too much activists, but I would say yeah at the margin having more of a quality bias matters, having a more resilient bias matters at this

22:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): point.

22:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mm-hmm. Okay.

22:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um

22:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and then with inflation, would you add anything more?

22:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Globally. Um I think that yeah, we didn't cover this, but I think this page basically lays it out, right? This is kind of why I think is the is the the headline takeaway here. Growth momentum is weakening,

23:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but

23:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): excess liquidity is rolling over. That typically leads to flattening curves, and your yoke curves flattening and then inverting as central. bank's hike is a typical late cycle environment. Outside of AI, I would say this is a very classic late cycle macro. But again on AI, because of the political sovereign aspect and all the current

23:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh

23:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of factions fighting each other playing out, right? Like that's what the huge uncertainty is. And I don't don't know, right? The late, you know, now it's like maybe Alex Alice Hond One is not a spy, you know, this is to support anthropics, IPO, who knows, right? That's the problem here. But you can bet that at the margin that that reduces your support for AI financing for a while. Even if Jansen's gonna come back, I think it's pretty unprecedented to immediately come back, right? It's gonna take take a while. Maybe it needs to be like, sure, maybe in a year he can come he can come back.

23:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Right?

23:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It yeah. I just think this is there's such extreme uncertainty, which is not helpful when the macro cycle cycle's is already turning because the Fed already um set things in motion with the hike in September.

24:08Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,

24:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so it's really an environment where yeah, you're not you're not risk-off, but you're certainly going to wait and see

24:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): into just being a

24:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more defensive position.

24:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,

24:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we're certainly going that way. It's very hard to see how macro is macro resindicator suddenly V V-shapes shapes back up. Put it that way, right? It's probably rather stuck here with this kind of fifty 50-50 fifty outlook, or things might deteriorate.

24:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): To

24:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): get like the V-shape up, yeah, we V-shape recovery back up. Yeah, it probably has to be like oil prices collapse, it ran completely over, suddenly the price cuts back in. Yeah.

24:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You

24:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, big stimulus, right?

24:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No. Those will be interesting times. Okay, Tian, is there anything else you want to add? Or should we finish up? I

24:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean that's good, yeah.

24:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,

24:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): perfect. Thanks Chen.

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