Variant Perception reviews 2026 surprises: AI CapEx crowding, jobless growth, and geopolitical inflation shocks
Summary
Variant Perception hosts review their top 10 surprises for 2026, defining a surprise as an event where the average investor assigned less than a one-third probability but the firm believed it was greater than one-half. They discuss how AI CapEx has surged so massively it crowds out non-AI investment, validating a 'sovereignty' framework where national balance sheets drive capital allocation. The firm correctly predicted a 'jobless growth' template similar to 2003, where tech-led productivity gains shift spending from labor to CapEx, rendering traditional leading indicators like the Conference Board index ineffective. They also analyze geopolitical shocks, including the Iran war, which drove yields to 2007 levels and broke the housing disinflation narrative, while highlighting structural shifts in global FX dynamics and the end of consumer depreciation.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 2:27
Introduction and Definition of Surprise
Hosts introduce the review of top 10 surprises for 2026, defining a surprise as an event where the average investor assigns less than a one-third probability, but the firm believes it is greater than one-half.
- 2:27 – 6:20
Surprise 1: CapEx Boom and Sovereignty
The firm predicted a broad CapEx boom driven by fiscal stimulus and AI, but notes AI surged so massively it crowded out non-AI investment. They argue that 'sovereignty' and national balance sheet mobilization will sustain high CapEx levels despite financing difficulties and geopolitical shocks like the Iran war.
- 6:20 – 9:16
Surprise 2: Jobless Growth Template
The firm correctly predicted a 'jobless growth' scenario similar to the 2003 template, where tech-led growth and productivity gains shift spending from labor to CapEx. They argue traditional leading indicators like the Conference Board index are broken in this environment, while labor market weakness coexists with economic growth.
- 9:16 – 10:18
Surprise 3: Housing Disinflation and Inflation
The prediction that housing disinflation would break the sticky inflation narrative was wrong due to the unforeseen Iran war, which drove yields to 2007 levels. However, the firm notes housing remains a disinflationary or neutral factor, with weak listings and price drops, but was overwhelmed by geopolitical inflation shocks.
- 10:18 – 21:38
Surprise 4: Yields, Japan, and Curve Dynamics
The firm underestimated the impact of Japan's 'impossible trinity' on global long-end yields. They analyze historical Fed hiking cycles, noting that the yield curve typically flattens after the first hike as the market gains credibility in inflation control. They warn of potential systemic deleveraging and predict 10-year yields around 4.5-8% structurally.
- 21:38 – 24:00
Surprise 5: Value vs. Growth and Political Economy
The firm's top-down macro and bottom-up fundamental approach favored value over growth, driven by sector rotations and capital cycle quality. They discuss a structural divergence where political power (held by older, less productive sectors) conflicts with future productivity sources (AI, high-tech), leading to persistent fiscal deficits and inflation.
- 24:00 – 26:05
Surprise 6: Dollar and Global Imbalances
The firm predicted complex dollar dynamics with divergence between Asian and European currencies, correctly highlighting the Australian dollar. They argue global imbalances (US surplus, China deficit) are politically unsustainable, leading to a steady US dollar weakening to incentivize reshoring, while China focuses on exporting deflation.
- 26:05 – 29:53
Europe-China-US Geopolitical Realignment
The speaker argues that Europe is distancing itself from the US sphere of influence, potentially aligning more with China to rebuild its manufacturing and energy independence. This dynamic could lead to China buying European debt, creating a structural bid for the euro and isolating the US, while Japan and other nations adjust their currencies to resolve global imbalances.
- 29:53 – 31:09
Emerging Markets Liquidity Regime Performance
The speaker reviews their 'EMDM liquidity regime' model, noting it correctly identified a long Emerging Markets (EM) opportunity. However, they acknowledge the outperformance was narrow, driven heavily by Korea and Taiwan semiconductors rather than a broad-based rally, with Brazil underperforming relative to expectations.
- 31:09 – 34:45
Oil Volatility and Geopolitical Shock Persistence
The speaker predicted oil volatility due to geopolitical tensions and resource nationalism, which materialized through a prolonged Iran war. They argue that energy shocks rarely reverse quickly, breaking refined product markets and creating generational knock-on effects similar to the Korea or Vietnam wars, forcing a break in historical monetary-fiscal regimes.
- 34:45 – 37:16
China Tech Stock Misjudgment
The speaker admits their prediction that China tech stocks would broadly outperform was wrong. They failed to connect depressed domestic household demand with consumer-exposed offshore internet names (like Pinduoduo, Meituan, Alibaba), which underperformed, while pure-play AI and hardware stocks (like Star 50) succeeded.
- 37:16 – 41:13
Capital Cycle Predictions: US Regional Banks and Energy
The speaker reviews their 'Surprise 9' capital cycle prediction, which flagged US regional banks and energy services as capital-scarce sectors. They note these predictions broadly worked out, driven by catalysts such as the Iran war boosting energy and anticipation of Basel III reform/deregulation for banks.
- 41:13 – 43:04
Underallocated Sectors and Geographies
In response to a listener question, the speaker identifies Emerging Asia as having a strong capital cycle and extremely low crowding, presenting value opportunities. They dismiss consumer staples as unattractive due to real income headwinds and cost-push inflation, noting few sectors sit in the desirable low-crowding/high-capital-cycle quadrant.
- 43:04 – 48:50
Retail Investor Cash Exposure and Passive Investing Risks
The speaker suggests retail investors are generally overexposed to cash, as staying invested historically outperforms timing the market. However, they warn that passive market-cap weighted indices like the S&P 500 may not replicate past performance due to increased market rotation and structural shifts, advocating for multi-asset and rotational strategies.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| MicrosoftMSFT | equity | neutral | Yeah, the Russell Value Index started having like Microsoft and Apple start entering. |
| AppleAAPL | equity | neutral | Yeah, the Russell Value Index started having like Microsoft and Apple start entering. |
| AmazonAMZN | equity | neutral | Yeah, I think in a percentage you had like Amazon or something. |
| US dollarUSD | currency | bullish | The US basically wants a weaker dollar. |
| Crude oil | commodity | neutral | Uh yeah, obviously we we basically said oil is gonna have a very volatile year, right? |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The definition of a surprise used by the firm is an event where the average investor assigns less than a one-third probability, but the firm believes it is greater than one-half.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check the transcript at [1:04] for the explicit definition provided by Tien.
AI CapEx surged so massively in 2026 that it crowded out non-AI exposed investment, preventing the broad-based CapEx boom predicted for early 2025.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [3:12-3:27] and verify with 2026 corporate CapEx data from SEC filings or industry reports (e.g., Gartner, IDC) showing AI vs. non-AI investment splits.
Tech investment as a share of non-residential investment is extremely high, while XAI SP CapEx was muted.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [3:37-3:49]. Verify 'XAI SP CapEx' (likely ASR error for a specific index or sector) against relevant financial data sources for 2026.
The 'jobless growth' template of 2003 is repeating, where tech adoption shifts spending from labor to CapEx.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [6:53-7:10]. Verify with 2026 labor market data (BLS) showing low hiring rates alongside GDP growth, and productivity data.
The Conference Board Lead Indicator has been 'super negative' and is 'broken' in the current economic environment.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [7:21-7:24]. Verify the actual value of the Conference Board Leading Economic Index (LEI) for 2026.
Yields were back at 2007 levels due to the Iran war, with bond markets 'blowing up'.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [9:33-9:40]. Verify US Treasury yield levels in 2026 against historical data from 2007.
Japanese long-end yields dragged up global long-end yields due to Japan's 'impossible trinity' and large net international investment position.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [10:59-11:46]. Verify with Bank of Japan policy data and global yield correlation studies.
In almost all Fed hiking cycles since 1970, the yield curve flattens after the first hike.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [12:26-12:34]. Verify with historical Federal Reserve rate hike data and yield curve spreads (10y-2y) from 1970 to present.
The firm predicts 10-year yields will be between 4.5% and 8% on a one-year horizon.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [21:25-21:33]. Verify against actual 10-year Treasury yields in 2027.
The US wants a weaker dollar to address current account imbalances and incentivize reshoring.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Check transcript at [25:35-25:42]. Verify with US Treasury statements or policy documents from 2026 regarding currency policy.
Europe is not firmly within the US sphere of influence and is trying to find its own way, potentially aligning more with China.
Speaker 1 ·26:13
How to verify: Check EU foreign policy statements, trade agreements with China, and voting records in international bodies like the UN regarding US-aligned resolutions.
China is the biggest surplus country and a potential buyer of European debt if Europe issues debt to rebuild its manufacturing and energy independence.
Speaker 1 ·27:09
How to verify: Review IMF Balance of Payments data for China's current account surplus and European sovereign debt issuance records to identify Chinese holdings.
China has allowed the RMB to slowly appreciate this year.
Speaker 1 ·28:39
How to verify: Check PBOC daily fixing rates and exchange rate data against the USD for the relevant year.
The EM outperformance this year was heavily driven by Korea and Taiwan semiconductors.
Speaker 1 ·30:15
How to verify: Compare performance of MSCI Korea/Taiwan indices or semiconductor ETFs against broader EM indices like MSCI EM.
China's onshore tech stocks (Star 50) made new highs, breaking 2021 highs, while offshore consumer-exposed names (K Web) did nothing.
Speaker 1 ·35:37
How to verify: Check price charts for the CSI 500 (Star 50) and KWEB ETF against their 2021 peak prices.
The Iran war has broken refined product markets and crack spreads will take time to normalize.
Speaker 1 ·32:13
How to verify: Analyze Platts or Argus data for refined product crack spreads (e.g., gasoline, diesel) and inventory levels in the Middle East and globally.
The Korea War led to the Fed Treasury Accord, breaking the post-WWII yield-capping regime.
Speaker 1 ·32:57
How to verify: Review historical Federal Reserve documents and Treasury records regarding the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord.
The Vietnam War and Great Society spending foreshadowed the break of the Bretton Woods system and the dollar's depegging from gold.
Speaker 1 ·33:23
How to verify: Review historical economic records of the US balance of payments, gold reserves, and the 1971 Nixon Shock announcement.
US Regional Banks and Energy Services were flagged by the capital cycle model as capital-scarce sectors.
Speaker 1 ·37:22
How to verify: Review Variant Perception's published 'Surprise 9' or capital cycle reports from the previous year.
Consumer staples are unattractive due to real income headwinds and cost-push inflation.
Unidentified speaker ·
How to verify: Analyze consumer spending data, real wage growth statistics, and CPI components for food and household goods.
Do your own research
- Verify Conference Board Leading Economic Index trends against current GDP and labor data to assess the 'broken indicator' claim.
- Check US Treasury yield curves and Japan's BOJ policy statements to analyze the 'impossible trinity' impact on long-end yields.
- Review housing inventory levels and price indices (e.g., Case-Shiller) to assess the persistence of housing disinflation versus geopolitical inflation shocks.
- Analyze China's household consumption data and earnings reports for major internet names (Pinduoduo, Meituan, Alibaba) versus AI hardware stocks.
- Examine US regional bank capital ratios and energy services capex plans to validate the 'capital scarcity' thesis.
- Assess retail investor cash levels via SIFMA or fund flow data to evaluate the 'overexposed to cash' claim.
- Review passive fund flows into S&P 500 ETFs versus active fund flows to test the claim of passive underperformance in high-rotation environments.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Unidentified speaker: Welcome to our presentation, our webinar revisiting our top 10 surprises for 2026.
- 0:08
- Unidentified speaker: We wrote those originally uh in December last year.
- 0:13
- Unidentified speaker: Um and Tien uh CIO and fund manager for VPX, ETF, has joined us to kind of show us uh and walk us through each of those surprises.
- 0:25
- Unidentified speaker: I'll let you probably define it.
- 0:27
- Unidentified speaker: And um yeah, after we'll present for 30 minutes, we'll probably keep it more informal uh and just discuss.
- 0:34
- Unidentified speaker: Um but I do invite uh attendees, just send your questions through as you go.
- 0:39
- Unidentified speaker: If there's a particular topic that interests you, a chart you notice, I recommend just ask questions and we'll try and address them even as we go, maybe.
- 0:47
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 0:48
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, we'll know let's see.
- 0:49
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, awesome.
- 0:50
- Unidentified speaker: Tim, do you want to kick it off?
- 0:52
- Unidentified speaker: Uh yeah.
- 0:52
- Unidentified speaker: So I I would say like like we put on the first slide here, the definition of a surprise is important because there's a tendency for people for um, you know, different like very hyperbolic predictions each year, right?
- 1:04
- Unidentified speaker: And so I think I always really value the Byron Wing annual predictions that he put out where he defined it as this, you know, an event that the average investor would assign less than a third probability to, but we think it's greater than half.
- 1:18
- Unidentified speaker: And that puts you in the realm of things that are more likely to happen, but that's also a bit more relevant for you know most investors, right, compared to the the typical crazy tail risk predictions that you know, obviously if they hit it's great, but it's not particularly actionable on a practical day today.
- 1:32
- Unidentified speaker: So that this was kind of roughly the criteria, and this is the criteria in which we've written our um annual themes, right, for the last few years as well, and how we'll write our uh theme for next year uh as well.
- 1:41
- Unidentified speaker: Uh so yeah, so you know, obviously it's uh when you mark your own homework, there's obviously some leeway on whether people you're a generous marker or you're a harsh marker.
- 1:52
- Unidentified speaker: I I would say I think we've been fair in how we mark this actually.
- 1:55
- Unidentified speaker: I think we could have chosen to be more generous or harsher, but on balance, I think it's actually being a pretty high hit rate.
- 2:02
- Unidentified speaker: Um, yeah, considering the amount of random things right from the Iran war and you know all the all the random geopolitical things that have happened.
- 2:10
- Unidentified speaker: Um so yeah, we'll go through each of each of these in turn.
- 2:12
- Unidentified speaker: As I say, I think I've put them into the category of right, wrong, mostly right, mostly wrong, very right or very wrong.
- 2:18
- Unidentified speaker: But broadly I will say this is I think this is fair overall.
- 2:22
- Unidentified speaker: And I think on balance they they broadly fit that one third, one-half probability that we are thought about.
- 2:27
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, the surprise number one we led off was this idea of uh the CapEx boom that people were holding their breath for the beginning of 2025 didn't quite come about, but we thought it would come about this year.
- 2:38
- Unidentified speaker: Um, now at the time, I think there was a lot more of our framework centered around the uh the fiscal stimulus, the one big beautiful bill act, and the the kind of investment incentives.
- 2:50
- Unidentified speaker: You know, we thought that would be AI, but we thought broadly the very good fiscal incentives, the fact that the the macro risk syndicator was risk-gone, right?
- 2:59
- Unidentified speaker: There wasn't that much signs of inflation at the time.
- 3:02
- Unidentified speaker: On our models at least, we thought it would be like a broadly very benign macro environment that you got AI, but everybody else would take advantage of the policy and front load uh investment.
- 3:12
- Unidentified speaker: But as it turned out, AI was so massive that it did obviously surge.
- 3:17
- Unidentified speaker: It had a lot of spillover into the kind of the related sectors, but it also ended up crowding out um uh the kind of the non-AI exposed investment.
- 3:27
- Unidentified speaker: So that's why this wasn't completely right.
- 3:29
- Unidentified speaker: But I think the the spirit of this, this idea of expecting a pretty secular capex boom um was important.
- 3:37
- Unidentified speaker: Um, you know, I cited some numbers here just so clearly tech investment as a share of non-RESI investment is extremely high right now, and XAI SP CapEx did um was pretty muted.
- 3:49
- Unidentified speaker: But I would say that wasn't necessarily a function of um that's the outlook is actually bad.
- 3:55
- Unidentified speaker: I think that was really a reflection of you know the difficulty in getting financing and the crowding out as the financing mechanism shifted.
- 4:02
- Unidentified speaker: And obviously with Iran and tariff uncertainty, that probably did cloud, uh cloud things a bit.
- 4:07
- Unidentified speaker: But overall, yeah, I would say this is a continuing theme.
- 4:10
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, there's some skepticism around the sustainability of AI CapEx, which I completely understand.
- 4:16
- Unidentified speaker: You know, we've seen all the railway.
- 4:17
- Unidentified speaker: I feel like last year we were already talking about it, right?
- 4:19
- Unidentified speaker: The railway boom, um, which is fair.
- 4:22
- Unidentified speaker: But the the angle we've always said is that there's a primacy of sovereignty uh framing on everything going on, right?
- 4:28
- Unidentified speaker: When you have existential competition between US and China, the the state, the sovereign will be involved and they will be powering this.
- 4:36
- Unidentified speaker: And there'll be a lot more resources available to fuel these things for a lot longer.
- 4:40
- Unidentified speaker: Did you think it would be the capex would be as big as it as it's been this year?
- 4:46
- Unidentified speaker: Um yeah, I would say I'm not that like I I think the concept we lay down the primary sovereignty was this idea of a national balance sheet, right?
- 4:55
- Unidentified speaker: This isn't just one company, this is your national balance sheet, it's your public sector and private sector.
- 4:59
- Unidentified speaker: In a way, that's how China operates, right?
- 5:01
- Unidentified speaker: The party and the companies all work together.
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker: And I was like, in the US, yeah, Max 7 is a part of the national balance sheet along with the government.
- 5:09
- Unidentified speaker: And when it's an existential um national competition, like you have to deploy all resources available.
- 5:16
- Unidentified speaker: Um, and that that's obviously been very correct that we laid out.
- 5:19
- Unidentified speaker: So in that in that sense, I don't think it's a surprise, right?
- 5:22
- Unidentified speaker: We laid out the Eisenhower deal use technology analog, right?
- 5:26
- Unidentified speaker: The the the the kind of mobilization analog from World War II, right?
- 5:30
- Unidentified speaker: I think we really dialed out that sovereignty report last year, just be like, hey, this is big.
- 5:36
- Unidentified speaker: So in that sense, it's fine.
- 5:37
- Unidentified speaker: I think what I'm surprised is actually the right-hand chart which I showed.
- 5:40
- Unidentified speaker: Um, I'm more surprised, despite all the headwinds to small business and shocks, that the CapEx intentions have broadly actually been quite resilient, right?
- 5:49
- Unidentified speaker: When the CAPEX intentions compared to obviously there's some geopolitical aspect, right?
- 5:53
- Unidentified speaker: You can see the Biden, the Biden year is a Republican, and you know, when there's a Republican or Democrat in office, that there's a clear seasonality.
- 6:01
- Unidentified speaker: Uh but nevertheless, like you know, I would have thought this this macro environment wasn't that great for small business CapEx, and it's actually been quite resilient, actually.
- 6:10
- Unidentified speaker: Um so yeah, but but overall, I would I would say, you know, in in hindsight, was probably that people were skeptical, but it kind of played out.
- 6:19
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 6:20
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, so surprise too.
- 6:22
- Unidentified speaker: I would say this is a really good win for us, right?
- 6:24
- Unidentified speaker: I think this is the one we I think we were a bit more unique in doing the time, this idea of a jobless growth template.
- 6:30
- Unidentified speaker: I think that was what's controversial at the time.
- 6:33
- Unidentified speaker: And I think this is definitely one I I would give ourselves very good marks for.
- 6:36
- Unidentified speaker: This idea that the labor market would be muted, right?
- 6:40
- Unidentified speaker: It'd be a very tech-led um growth.
- 6:44
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but a lot of the traditional leader cases, and those things just continue to look bad.
- 6:48
- Unidentified speaker: And that's and that's pretty much what's played out.
- 6:50
- Unidentified speaker: And we and we cited precisely the mechanism, right?
- 6:53
- Unidentified speaker: The 2003 jobless growth template, right?
- 6:56
- Unidentified speaker: The last time you had a revolutionary kind of technology, corporates going to mass adoption, shifting spending away from labor towards um uh yeah, towards these tech investments.
- 7:09
- Unidentified speaker: So I think that's been banned on.
- 7:10
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, I think that this is obviously playing out and it's set to continue.
- 7:14
- Unidentified speaker: And the right-hand chart here just shows you the difference between building adaptive leading indicators versus traditional leading indicators.
- 7:21
- Unidentified speaker: You know, you know, for example, the conference board lead indicator, right?
- 7:24
- Unidentified speaker: It's just been super negative for so long that at this point it's just broken uh versus taking a more adaptive method to understand the shifts in the uh in the economy as well.
- 7:34
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 7:35
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, again, I think this is because what was the consensus back in December?
- 7:40
- Unidentified speaker: Oh, the yeah, people were worried, you know, there was a classic, oh, we're maybe in recession because the labor market there is bad, or there's all these headwinds to the labor market, right?
- 7:48
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, all throughout 2025 was basically people worrying about US labor market.
- 7:52
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 7:53
- Unidentified speaker: To the extent you were, right?
- 7:54
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, you were worried.
- 7:56
- Unidentified speaker: So I think people are skeptical.
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker: You can have, you know, the the narrative was oh, you know, consumer is like 60, 70% of the economy, right?
- 8:02
- Unidentified speaker: If household and workers aren't doing well, the economy can't grow.
- 8:05
- Unidentified speaker: I would say that was the and then you also have the 2003 analogy.
- 8:10
- Unidentified speaker: Is that still solid in relation to that?
- 8:13
- Unidentified speaker: I would say that the the implications are, right?
- 8:15
- Unidentified speaker: The basic idea is you is that productivity will go up.
- 8:19
- Unidentified speaker: It's very hard to measure labor productivity and total factor productivity in real time.
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker: So anyone saying you can measure it now, you don't you can't really, right?
- 8:26
- Unidentified speaker: So the marginal error is massive.
- 8:28
- Unidentified speaker: But the basic idea is productivity does go up from the tech adoption.
- 8:31
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, businesses don't need workers as much, hence why hiring rates stay low.
- 8:36
- Unidentified speaker: But because but the hiring is low, not because people are worried about the future, it's because they're shifting all the spend towards capex and capital and tech instead of people.
- 8:47
- Unidentified speaker: But that basically means that from a collective level point of view, the money still flows through the economy, profits stay up, it's just labor keeps getting depressed down.
- 8:55
- Unidentified speaker: And I think that's still the phenomena we're in.
- 8:57
- Unidentified speaker: And and I think we're gonna be in for a while, and it's gonna keep going until you know the and this is a big thematical problem working on, right?
- 9:04
- Unidentified speaker: It's gonna keep going until like all the white-collar populism starts coming.
- 9:08
- Unidentified speaker: Right?
- 9:09
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, it's aligned to the midterms and what happens afterwards.
- 9:11
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, so I think that's that's pretty clean.
- 9:16
- Unidentified speaker: Uh surprise three, housing disinflation breaks the sticky inflation narrative.
- 9:21
- Unidentified speaker: So clearly that was wrong, but I think the underlying message here was correct.
- 9:26
- Unidentified speaker: Um, obviously, because of Iran war, clearly inflation has gotten a lot higher, right?
- 9:30
- Unidentified speaker: We've gone from pricing multiple cuts to obviously pricing a lot of hikes.
- 9:33
- Unidentified speaker: We're recording this on the day that the bond market just is just blowing up, and yields are back at 2007 levels, right?
- 9:40
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but I I I think, yeah, this is just who could have foreseen the Iran war would last so long.
- 9:46
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 9:46
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but the housing market did actually stay pretty weak.
- 9:49
- Unidentified speaker: And if you break out the the components of inflation, the the core housing pieces is still pretty weak, right?
- 9:54
- Unidentified speaker: If you look at and again, this this this left-hand chart shows that you know there's still a lot of listings where they have to drop prices.
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker: So I think housing remains a disinflationary factor, or at least a neutral factor.
- 10:05
- Unidentified speaker: I know that was a small tick up in in uh rent recently, but overall I would say um I think the sphere was right, but it just got overwhelmed.
- 10:13
- Unidentified speaker: Not much really to say on Iran, right?
- 10:15
- Unidentified speaker: It is what it is.
- 10:18
- Unidentified speaker: Surprise 4 is kind of related, so we don't need to belabor the point.
- 10:22
- Unidentified speaker: I think our original idea was that because of this jobless growth idea, there'll be too many conflicting forces acting on yields, and therefore yields will just get stuck in the range.
- 10:32
- Unidentified speaker: And the day before the war started, like it was still trading around our kind of you know, central four percent, right?
- 10:38
- Unidentified speaker: Plus or minus 25 to 50 bibs.
- 10:39
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 10:40
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but obviously, again, Iran war, uh, we know that's the thing.
- 10:44
- Unidentified speaker: Um the thing I would highlight here is I think looking back to the end of 2025, we under, I think we underestimated the the impact that the Japan impossible impossible trinity would have on dragging up global long-end yields.
- 10:59
- Unidentified speaker: So I think we were already aware at the time that impossible Trinity was becoming unsustainable, they would probably do policy intervention, you know, Takeachi being elected, she was going to do fiscal, was really gonna blow the situation up, and then that would force some kind of intervention and possibly lead us into a plaza accord, right?
- 11:14
- Unidentified speaker: And obviously, we started writing about that more through this year.
- 11:18
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but yeah, I think at the time it wasn't obvious how I think how important that would be that Japanese long-end yields went high, it would drag up global yields.
- 11:26
- Unidentified speaker: And yeah.
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker: Have Japanese long-end yields always had such influence across global markets, or is this quite unique, or is it just a story in one place the economy just slowly spreading out?
- 11:37
- Unidentified speaker: Well, they have an extremely large net international investment position, right?
- 11:40
- Unidentified speaker: Japanese pensions and real money has a lot of assets abroad, so that that I think they do have outsize impact.
- 11:46
- Unidentified speaker: Um and also it's it's kind of a lead in the case in the sense that it's kind of where the macro imbalances are so extreme that everyone's looking to Japan to see how it resolves, right?
- 11:58
- Unidentified speaker: So the the Japan, the Japanese widowmaker shorting Japanese bond trade has been my entire career.
- 12:03
- Unidentified speaker: In fact, since I started even being aware of what like a bond is, right?
- 12:06
- Unidentified speaker: It's been like a it's been like the widowmaker kind of thing, but it's where the imbalance is supposed to resolve.
- 12:12
- Unidentified speaker: So I think in that sense, it also feeds the narrative.
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but yeah.
- 12:16
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but I don't think that's the interesting point.
- 12:18
- Unidentified speaker: The interesting point I wanted to make on this slide was if you're now that we've had the first Fed hike, we went back and looked at every single Fed hike going back to the since 1970.
- 12:26
- Unidentified speaker: And the right-hand chart here shows that there's a very clear pattern that in almost all situations the yoke curve actually flattens after the first hike.
- 12:34
- Unidentified speaker: And it's because typically after the first hike, um, the market starts giving the Fed credibility that they are taking the inflation problem seriously and they've got a handle on it and they're gonna slow growth.
- 12:45
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 12:46
- Unidentified speaker: So even in the one and done, which was the only example of the Fed hiking once and stopping, was the the March 1997 one and done that Greenspan did.
- 12:54
- Unidentified speaker: And even then you can see eventually the curve flattened.
- 12:57
- Unidentified speaker: So I think this is like something that will probably act against like the the current kind of term premium fiscal excess.
- 13:05
- Unidentified speaker: You know, your curve is going to steepen, right?
- 13:07
- Unidentified speaker: Like this is very interesting because the base case is very much against what the market is pricing uh right now.
- 13:12
- Unidentified speaker: And you think this is a possibility?
- 13:14
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I'm just saying the base case is much more likely the curve actually flattens from here.
- 13:18
- Unidentified speaker: But clearly we're in the middle of some epic, um, some epic stop loss, or it potentially even some kind of systemic deleveraging, right?
- 13:26
- Unidentified speaker: Like today's price action, the way the the way the 10 years of the US 10 years are blown through 5%, that is not a normal, right?
- 13:33
- Unidentified speaker: Like it's there's no obvious catalyst.
- 13:35
- Unidentified speaker: You know, it wasn't like there was some obvious thing you can pinpoint, like, oh, it was that was a liberation day, or there was some uh, you know, or inflation is a 10% during Russia-Ukraine, right?
- 13:45
- Unidentified speaker: Like when there's no news and it has this kind of extreme capitulation action, you know, within a few weeks twice, it could be systemic, right?
- 13:54
- Unidentified speaker: Like I feel like maybe we'll wake up in a month or two, three months, and you hear about oh, so and so got liquidated or something significant.
- 14:00
- Unidentified speaker: Um, you know, it could be, right?
- 14:03
- Unidentified speaker: Like, I I I mean things I remember was when Third Avenue got into trouble and it all came out later.
- 14:08
- Unidentified speaker: I think I can't remember, is it I can't remember what year it was, but I remember like it came out later on.
- 14:12
- Unidentified speaker: And at the time it was like really confusing price action.
- 14:15
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, and doesn't it also worsen the sell-off?
- 14:19
- Unidentified speaker: Because they try to liquidate all those positions.
- 14:21
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, well, obviously by seeing the price action, we must be somewhere somewhere from the middle, we must be mid somewhere between halfway to the end of the liquidation, right?
- 14:30
- Unidentified speaker: Like the LPPLs are going off across the board, yeah, right?
- 14:33
- Unidentified speaker: And so now and then when you see this, these are typically again towards the final leg.
- 14:36
- Unidentified speaker: But obviously it's very dangerous to step into it.
- 14:38
- Unidentified speaker: But like this is genuine, I think this is move beyond just pod sharp leverage blowing up, right?
- 14:43
- Unidentified speaker: That feels like something else.
- 14:45
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but assuming that somehow exhausts, the the base case would actually be for the curve to flatten, which would keep a lid on keep a lid on yields.
- 14:54
- Unidentified speaker: We did actually get a question um on one of the ask me anything on Twitter.
- 14:59
- Unidentified speaker: And someone asks, where will tenure rates be in one year?
- 15:06
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, obviously there's an a number of factors here.
- 15:09
- Unidentified speaker: So I think you have on a one-year horizon, we're gonna have to look more at the structural and cyclical, right, rather than the immediate tactical.
- 15:17
- Unidentified speaker: So I think the challenge is on a structural time horizon, this remains a uh avoid environment, right?
- 15:25
- Unidentified speaker: This is a real asset overnominal bond environment.
- 15:28
- Unidentified speaker: The fundamental structural issue we have, you know, not just from a market point of view, but from economic and society's point of view is um the the kind of the political power and the economic productive base is is has diverged.
- 15:44
- Unidentified speaker: And that's what's driving all the tensions around fiscal deficits and everything you're seeing in terms of Western society and and and you know the fragmentation of the two-party systems, right?
- 15:52
- Unidentified speaker: Like fundamentally, today's political power belongs to people who were productive yesterday, right?
- 15:58
- Unidentified speaker: But in the environment where things are stable, people who were productive yesterday is also productive today, right?
- 16:02
- Unidentified speaker: So they hold on to political power.
- 16:04
- Unidentified speaker: And obviously, historically, it was like the manufacturing worker, right?
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker: And they became the office worker.
- 16:08
- Unidentified speaker: But the problem is like we're in such uh such a rapid shift that the people who were productive yesterday are no longer the people who will be as productive in the future.
- 16:16
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, right?
- 16:17
- Unidentified speaker: High tech energy, like a few sectors will account for most of the value creation and growth in the future.
- 16:23
- Unidentified speaker: It's gonna be really display a lot of traditional industries.
- 16:26
- Unidentified speaker: But the traditional industries are where the bulk of the median workers is, and the median worker in the West is currently the median voter, and the median voter drives politician preferences and political power.
- 16:38
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 16:38
- Unidentified speaker: And so because we're in that tension, that's why um, you know, resources are having to be taken, right?
- 16:45
- Unidentified speaker: Why we're starting to run up deficits, right?
- 16:46
- Unidentified speaker: Why there's fears about taxes and like disruption, because at some point, because the people with the political power no longer as productive, they have to like, but they want to maintain their economic share, so they have to start extracting.
- 16:57
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 16:57
- Unidentified speaker: Like fund like again, extreme example would be in saying Latin America, right, with Peronist movements, right?
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker: Latin America, why is this structurally sorry has such a big problem?
- 17:05
- Unidentified speaker: Why what Midlay is trying to do is potentially a generational thing in the same way Thatcher's was in the U in the UK, is that Peronist is basically you have a populist whose basic thing is to extract uh extract economic rent from the productive capital base, right?
- 17:23
- Unidentified speaker: Or the productive parts of the economy.
- 17:24
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 17:25
- Unidentified speaker: And we're kind of going for that tension, right?
- 17:27
- Unidentified speaker: That's why you have all the transfer payments, right?
- 17:29
- Unidentified speaker: Like it seems as if though the young versus old is all the same.
- 17:33
- Unidentified speaker: The sources of productivity are no longer in the same interests of political power.
- 17:38
- Unidentified speaker: And there's a divergence.
- 17:40
- Unidentified speaker: And the thing is, and I mean you said in the last report, it's politics will trump economics.
- 17:44
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 17:45
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, that's fundamentally why deficits cannot close, uh right, because you we're in the process trying to resolve it.
- 17:50
- Unidentified speaker: But running a deficit is a way to smooth that process over.
- 17:53
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 17:53
- Unidentified speaker: Right?
- 17:53
- Unidentified speaker: Because you can run a big deficit so that the you know, the old coalition, the voters can still keep that share, right?
- 18:00
- Unidentified speaker: You know, the retirees get their payment, right?
- 18:02
- Unidentified speaker: Pensions are met, the obligations are met, right?
- 18:05
- Unidentified speaker: All just all the transfer payments, all the kind of entitlements are met, right?
- 18:08
- Unidentified speaker: But fundamentally is, you know, fundamentally this has to resolve some eventually.
- 18:14
- Unidentified speaker: And the default, which is what the market is pricing, and this is what we wrote about in our structural limits of fiscal policy thematic in 2024.
- 18:22
- Unidentified speaker: The default is nobody wants to fix this.
- 18:24
- Unidentified speaker: If nobody wants to fix it, you eventually get slow burn to inflation and you inflate it away.
- 18:29
- Unidentified speaker: The good way would be the Rosal Napier style of financial repression, right?
- 18:33
- Unidentified speaker: The extreme way would be things like a site like, you know, like Vichy France after World War II, right?
- 18:37
- Unidentified speaker: Where you just you know go massive inflation one-off and and you know remove the wealth from the people that uh society doesn't like.
- 18:45
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but like there's other extreme movements, like the Argent, the Argentinian example, right?
- 18:49
- Unidentified speaker: The Peronis type movement where that never gets resolved.
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker: And then the country basically eventually you pay for it in institutional credibility and you break all the institutions.
- 18:58
- Unidentified speaker: There's no institutions like that.
- 18:59
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 19:00
- Unidentified speaker: A good example, not good, but the the the cycle of history would be something like the UK, where things get so bad because the unions, the miners were super strong, right?
- 19:09
- Unidentified speaker: But eventually you led to a three-day work week, winter of discontent, IMF bailout, and all that eventually results in a Thatcher, who basically obviously destroys the political power of the old unions.
- 19:21
- Unidentified speaker: And then obviously you get the big ban and the deregulation and the shift.
- 19:24
- Unidentified speaker: But that's obviously a generational scar in this country, right?
- 19:28
- Unidentified speaker: And you Thatcher remains an extremely polarizing figure, right?
- 19:31
- Unidentified speaker: Hated by many here.
- 19:33
- Unidentified speaker: I want to ask one question before we move on, then it's like where are the sources of productivity then in broad terms over the next five to ten years?
- 19:42
- Unidentified speaker: I would I would say this well, the obvious answer would be AI adoption and the and the like, right?
- 19:47
- Unidentified speaker: But I think where the money is gonna go is gonna be all the things aligned to sovereignty, right?
- 19:54
- Unidentified speaker: It might not be productive on a global basis, because clearly we're we're gonna be moving towards more competition, but for individual countries, I think it can be.
- 20:01
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, high-tech manufacturing, right?
- 20:05
- Unidentified speaker: You know, resources, right, energy, anything to do with energy uh in terms of breakthroughs, right?
- 20:10
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously AI adoption generally.
- 20:12
- Unidentified speaker: Um yeah, I would say those are the problems.
- 20:16
- Unidentified speaker: But anyway, that's a very long way to say.
- 20:17
- Unidentified speaker: Given that structural environment, yields are generally good, nominal yields for government bonds are generally going higher.
- 20:22
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, right.
- 20:23
- Unidentified speaker: That's a very long way to say.
- 20:24
- Unidentified speaker: So if you give me a one-year view, the problem is you have to anchor on that structural environment where it's very hard for yields to come down, stay down, unless the politics gets fixed.
- 20:31
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 20:31
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 20:31
- Unidentified speaker: I think the the thing we cited was the Thomas Sall, um, the first rule of economics is scarcity, and the first rule of politics is to ignore scarcity or something, something else.
- 20:39
- Unidentified speaker: You know, I butchered it, but yeah.
- 20:41
- Unidentified speaker: So I think that's the problem.
- 20:42
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 20:43
- Unidentified speaker: So structurally, we're in a yield higher environment.
- 20:47
- Unidentified speaker: So, but you can you can have cyclical, like relatively benign cyclical environment into that structural.
- 20:54
- Unidentified speaker: So I think the thing is looking at year forward, I don't think uh, you know, realistically I don't think cyclical inflation is gonna be as much of a problem, right?
- 21:01
- Unidentified speaker: This is heavily an oil story.
- 21:02
- Unidentified speaker: And at that point, like the real income headwinds would really be hurting the household, right?
- 21:06
- Unidentified speaker: At that point, your marginal rate of increase for AI capex just can't be sustained at the current rate.
- 21:11
- Unidentified speaker: Um, assuming the Fed has hike, right?
- 21:16
- Unidentified speaker: Even on base historical base patterns, the reason the curve flattens because like growth does start to slow, you move into a late cycle environment.
- 21:22
- Unidentified speaker: So I think that's what makes it tricky.
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, but if you put that together, I'm like I'm gonna say like four and a half, eight percent per 10 year.
- 21:33
- Unidentified speaker: Fair enough.
- 21:34
- Unidentified speaker: Should we go to the next slide?
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, that was a very long answer.
- 21:38
- Unidentified speaker: Uh surprise five.
- 21:40
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I think this was just have having a a top-down macro with a bottom-up fundamental approach basically worked really well, right?
- 21:49
- Unidentified speaker: Like given how how secular value underperformance has been, I think we timed it pretty good.
- 21:56
- Unidentified speaker: That and we you know we we put the report out right in October last year, and then we emphasized it as a theme, and obviously all the inputs kept improving.
- 22:04
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, I think value overgrowth makes sense.
- 22:06
- Unidentified speaker: But this was really driven off the fact that we had good sector models, right?
- 22:10
- Unidentified speaker: And and the sector rotations really drove most of the performance this year, right?
- 22:14
- Unidentified speaker: Um, so yeah, this is still pretty much value overgrowth in in the current environment.
- 22:18
- Unidentified speaker: None of the models have really changed yet.
- 22:20
- Unidentified speaker: Because I remember I think in June you suggested that value tailwind was coming off.
- 22:26
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, that was more for small cap.
- 22:28
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, there's a yeah, there's a subtle difference between small cap, large cap versus value and growth.
- 22:32
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's easy to conflate the two.
- 22:34
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, I think we previously had uh uh been turned a bit more neutral on small caps, right?
- 22:39
- Unidentified speaker: For most of the ride, and in June we basically went underway small caps again.
- 22:42
- Unidentified speaker: So small cap, large cap is I think a cleaner expression of interest rates and um and growth, but really interest rates, right?
- 22:52
- Unidentified speaker: So basically it's more in June, like at that point yields are probably sustainably higher that it hurts small cap, large cap.
- 23:00
- Unidentified speaker: It doesn't hurt the overall economy enough, but it hurts small capital cap, and that's the expression.
- 23:04
- Unidentified speaker: But value growth is a bit more complicated because again, it it's heavily dependent on the sector.
- 23:09
- Unidentified speaker: Um and it's just more within the environment where a lot of the things that were capital scarce previously became value, but then the catalyst happened to kind of unlock these sectors.
- 23:20
- Unidentified speaker: Didn't also some major US tech companies start entering the value fold.
- 23:25
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, this this re I think it was June.
- 23:27
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, the Russell Value Index started having like Microsoft and Apple start entering.
- 23:32
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I think in a percentage you had like Amazon or something.
- 23:34
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, there's some Amazon, yeah.
- 23:35
- Unidentified speaker: So they started becoming blended.
- 23:36
- Unidentified speaker: But obviously, this is a function of SaaSpocalypse and then you know fears about Max 7, free cash flow.
- 23:42
- Unidentified speaker: But again, the the industry is doing what they're supposed to be doing, right?
- 23:45
- Unidentified speaker: If it was like relatively cheap, then yeah, they're supposed to own some.
- 23:49
- Unidentified speaker: Um but I think this was more about capital cycle quality with macro and combining it is like a good way to do sector rotation essentially.
- 23:57
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, that obviously worked out pretty well.
- 24:00
- Unidentified speaker: Um yeah, this we can probably spend a bit given we already started talking about the politics.
- 24:04
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, we thought this year would be a lot more complex on the dollar, but uh so we didn't really want to make a big core on the dollar this year, but we thought there'd be a lot of cross-region divergences, and this has been mostly correct, right?
- 24:15
- Unidentified speaker: To be long Asian currencies and to be short European currencies.
- 24:19
- Unidentified speaker: And you know, we we highlighted the Aussie dollar multiple times, and that obviously worked out well, right?
- 24:24
- Unidentified speaker: Uh in terms of within Asia.
- 24:27
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but these tensions are not done resolving.
- 24:31
- Unidentified speaker: So the left and the right charts here shows you what um the real effective exchange rate and the relative export prices look like at you know in December last year and today.
- 24:41
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 24:41
- Unidentified speaker: So you can see like you know, Europe coming in a little bit, right?
- 24:44
- Unidentified speaker: You can kind of see China going up a bit uh in the bottom left and top top right corners.
- 24:49
- Unidentified speaker: But broadly, I think there's still uh more to go to try and resolve these global imbalances, right?
- 24:54
- Unidentified speaker: Like uh as I point here, no, I think global imbalances basically big US current account surplus, big China deficit is no longer politically viable.
- 25:04
- Unidentified speaker: So we are again in that process of trying to work through how to reduce it, right?
- 25:11
- Unidentified speaker: And this is echoes to the plaza code error, which is why we had on things like the short Swiss EN trade, right, into the BOJ intervention.
- 25:17
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, there's many echoes.
- 25:19
- Unidentified speaker: And the basic point here is that US, Japan, China, Europe have different sovereign priorities.
- 25:23
- Unidentified speaker: So they want different things out of trade and different things out of the FX market.
- 25:27
- Unidentified speaker: So as a result, that's basically where the clash is, right?
- 25:30
- Unidentified speaker: Like fun, but fundamentally, who's the most dominant is still gonna be US and China, right?
- 25:35
- Unidentified speaker: The US basically wants a weaker dollar.
- 25:37
- Unidentified speaker: That's the only way they're gonna address imbalance and uh incentivize reshoring in a profitable way.
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker: So I think ultimately the US policies will try to keep trying to engineer essentially a steadily weaker dollar.
- 25:49
- Unidentified speaker: Again, not a crash, but just a steadily weaker one.
- 25:52
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but from China's point of view, because of that big expo engine, they're still focused on exporting their C.
- 25:57
- Unidentified speaker: And that's where the knock-on effects are going to go through to Europe and Japan.
- 26:02
- Unidentified speaker: That was basically what we thought at the beginning of the year.
- 26:05
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 26:05
- Unidentified speaker: But what's been very interesting is if you look how the years developed, I would say the tension between Europe and China has been way less than I would have thought.
- 26:13
- Unidentified speaker: I would have thought Europe would dilate up to 10 immediately because they're in the US camp.
- 26:17
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 26:18
- Unidentified speaker: They should be firmly within the US sphere of influence and aligned to the US.
- 26:21
- Unidentified speaker: Instead, whether it's due to President Trump and you know, all the kind of Greenland or whatever else, or like, you know, the shifting politics, shifting demographics, or whatever it is, Europe is clearly not really that in the US camp, right?
- 26:35
- Unidentified speaker: As it as it as it probably should be.
- 26:37
- Unidentified speaker: So therefore, you know, you have this concept of the middle powers, right, the Canada, the Europeans, trying to find their own way.
- 26:43
- Unidentified speaker: But as a result, that opens up for more cooperation with the Chinese.
- 26:47
- Unidentified speaker: So one idea that I've been starting pushing is Europe, what's the Europe's sovereign priority?
- 26:52
- Unidentified speaker: They have to basically rebuild the pillars of a functioning society, right?
- 26:57
- Unidentified speaker: So you need your own manufacturing, you need your own energy independence.
- 27:00
- Unidentified speaker: There's a lot of things to invest in, right?
- 27:01
- Unidentified speaker: You need to rebuild your technique, you need to rebuild a lot.
- 27:04
- Unidentified speaker: That's gonna need a lot of money that you've got to borrow.
- 27:06
- Unidentified speaker: You gotta issue a lot of debt.
- 27:08
- Unidentified speaker: Generally, who's the buyer of the debt?
- 27:09
- Unidentified speaker: It's the surplus countries, and China's the biggest surplus.
- 27:12
- Unidentified speaker: But is that a win-win potentially, right?
- 27:14
- Unidentified speaker: How's that different to like the early 2000 kind of uh savings club with the petrol dollar, right?
- 27:21
- Unidentified speaker: Where the money just flows around from the US and back.
- 27:23
- Unidentified speaker: Why can't it happen with Europe and China, where China exports to Europe, Europe buys all the cheap goods, but then Europe starts borrowing, uh, but then Europe issues a lot more debt that China buys, and then you know that helps Europe finance on the rebuild.
- 27:37
- Unidentified speaker: China gets more political leverage, and China obviously cares about Europe ultimately because of like um lithography technology, right?
- 27:45
- Unidentified speaker: Like I can see how that we end up in that path.
- 27:47
- Unidentified speaker: But then in that scenario, there's a structural bid on the euro.
- 27:51
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, right.
- 27:51
- Unidentified speaker: So my and would also would isolate the United States too.
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I well again, it's very I think it's very unrealistic for the Europeans to be not in the US sphere of influence, but the margin they seem to be trying to go in the middle.
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker: So this dynamic we laid out at the beginning of the year, it played out quickly, but now you can kind of see it's starting to shift, right?
- 28:09
- Unidentified speaker: Like there's just this is like it is quite messy, but fundamentally it's because global imbalances need to resolve somewhere.
- 28:16
- Unidentified speaker: And it will only be fully resolved if China's surplus goes down and US deficit goes down.
- 28:21
- Unidentified speaker: But don't but like the FX is playing one part, but then the politics is also really messing it up, right?
- 28:27
- Unidentified speaker: But but for example, on the US-Japan side, where Japan has a lot less leverage over the US, yeah.
- 28:32
- Unidentified speaker: I think they're gonna find a way to appreciate the yen one way or another, right?
- 28:36
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 28:37
- Unidentified speaker: But that that's easier said, right?
- 28:38
- Unidentified speaker: That's gonna be easier.
- 28:39
- Unidentified speaker: China, you can see, has already allowed the R and B to slowly appreciate this year.
- 28:42
- Unidentified speaker: Again, not a huge amount, but a little bit.
- 28:45
- Unidentified speaker: But but that that's kind of the marginal direction, otherwise you you can't solve this.
- 28:49
- Unidentified speaker: Well, the plots are accord include Europe because when we're looking at those examples from the 80s, you know, you had France, you had the United Kingdom, you had Germany.
- 29:00
- Unidentified speaker: Uh would that apply again in this case, or is that impossible with the um the European monetary system?
- 29:09
- Unidentified speaker: Well, fundamentally, this is about the surplus country with the deficit country.
- 29:13
- Unidentified speaker: So I think the the thing is like China is the major surplus country.
- 29:16
- Unidentified speaker: US is a major deficit country.
- 29:18
- Unidentified speaker: So it's gonna have it's gonna be a US China, but the US-China obviously don't they cannot agree on this.
- 29:23
- Unidentified speaker: So like it's more Europe will be just like uh Europe, Japan, every other country will be a residual, essentially, right?
- 29:31
- Unidentified speaker: Like a very comparing chart, like keep proudly is like the difference between Chinese current account change and US current account change.
- 29:37
- Unidentified speaker: And the difference between that net change is what's being forced onto the rest of the rest of the world, right?
- 29:42
- Unidentified speaker: And that that that just keeps happening.
- 29:43
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, so everyone else is almost a bystander and just like gonna be collateral damage or benefit, depending on the way it goes.
- 29:49
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 29:53
- Unidentified speaker: Surprise 7.
- 29:54
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, this broadly I think worked out.
- 29:55
- Unidentified speaker: I think we labeled it mostly right.
- 29:57
- Unidentified speaker: Our EMDM liquidity regime basically worked.
- 30:00
- Unidentified speaker: So it went long EM, stayed long EM.
- 30:03
- Unidentified speaker: You know, the model for first for such a slow-moving long-term model, I think it's done a really good job with the timing, right?
- 30:09
- Unidentified speaker: Especially out of sample as well.
- 30:11
- Unidentified speaker: So it pretty much nailed the turn and stayed in EM, as you can see in the left-hand chart.
- 30:15
- Unidentified speaker: I think we do have to acknowledge clearly the EM outperformance is heavily Korea Taiwan semis this year.
- 30:21
- Unidentified speaker: I mean, I'll pick Brazil did actually do pretty good overall, but there was obviously a very extreme divergence under the hood.
- 30:28
- Unidentified speaker: But again, there's a lot of this linked to energy, Iran, and not just AI as well.
- 30:33
- Unidentified speaker: So because also when you look at the inputs of the EM regime indicator, I mean global access liquidity is falling.
- 30:40
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, the absolute level is starting to come off, but yeah, but not enough to flip the model, yeah.
- 30:45
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 30:46
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, it is, but yeah, it's been a much a much more narrow market in EM than the sense of it's a broad-based thing.
- 30:52
- Unidentified speaker: But broadly, I think it was still right in that.
- 30:54
- Unidentified speaker: Um yeah, but you you'd thought, yeah, Brazil would have performed better, but it seemed like it appeared more out of career and um yeah, obviously.
- 31:03
- Unidentified speaker: I think Brazil still did do good, so that's why I labeled it mostly, right?
- 31:06
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, yeah.
- 31:09
- Unidentified speaker: Uh yeah, obviously we we basically said oil is gonna have a very volatile year, right?
- 31:14
- Unidentified speaker: Coming into the year, there was a a a broad consensus, it was a supply glut.
- 31:19
- Unidentified speaker: And I think we and because we had done all our stuff around the primacy of sovereignty, right?
- 31:23
- Unidentified speaker: We thought, hey, there's just a lot of geopolitical tensions, resource nationalism, US-China competition, the Saudi fiscal looks terrible.
- 31:30
- Unidentified speaker: We thought those would be the factors to drive volatility.
- 31:33
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, in the end, it's like you know, this Iran war that I I mean, I really doubt that they intended it to be this long and this prolonged, right?
- 31:42
- Unidentified speaker: But you knew something was going to happen.
- 31:44
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, we thought something's gonna happen.
- 31:46
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 31:46
- Unidentified speaker: It's a yeah, it's a great, it's a great power of competition that there's gonna be a lot of collateral damage.
- 31:52
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but at this point, what what I think is interesting to highlight, again, even going back to March, right?
- 31:58
- Unidentified speaker: The the this was a chart we used back in March, the right-hand one, which was saying as a base case, when the energy shocks occur, they very rarely reverse quickly, right?
- 32:07
- Unidentified speaker: Generally from the pre-shock levels, all prices generally stay up.
- 32:10
- Unidentified speaker: And mostly that's been proven true.
- 32:13
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, now that the war's gone on long enough, it's completely broken all the refined product markets.
- 32:18
- Unidentified speaker: So you can see all the crack spreads and these things uh it's gonna take a while for that to normalize, right?
- 32:23
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, we're over we've been for for a while, um in our strategy, but uh which is which is benefiting from this.
- 32:31
- Unidentified speaker: Um but yeah, the the main point I wanted to make here was I I think you're getting to the point where the war's gone long enough with the consequences that there's a real danger.
- 32:42
- Unidentified speaker: This has a generational knock-on effect in the same way the Korea War or Vietnam did.
- 32:47
- Unidentified speaker: This this this will sound a bit hyperbolic today.
- 32:50
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but if you look in hindsight, the Korea War essentially ultimately um led to the Fed Treasury Accord, right?
- 32:57
- Unidentified speaker: The Korea War basically broke the the existing fiscal monetary uh consensus of the time.
- 33:03
- Unidentified speaker: So you had basically World War II was the driver of the Fed capping yields at the time, and then that basically persisted after the war was over.
- 33:10
- Unidentified speaker: But the Korea War ultimately led to a lot of the the kind of shortages and shocks that that drove that eventually broke, uh broke the Fed the Fed Treasury Accord, right, and led to the independent Fed mandate and all that.
- 33:23
- Unidentified speaker: Uh similarly Vietnam War um with LBJ on top of the Great Society, that was the classic guns and butter that ultimately led to um you know that that foreshadowed essentially the break the the Brandon words, right?
- 33:36
- Unidentified speaker: And the brown words, like ultimately, right?
- 33:39
- Unidentified speaker: Uh you know, having to depeg from the dollar, uh depegging the dollar from gold.
- 33:44
- Unidentified speaker: So like the problem is that when you start wars that can't end quickly, you stop that that basically creates like a forcing mechanism because real-world physical constraints suddenly become very acute and they all happen at the same time.
- 33:56
- Unidentified speaker: So as a result, you can't print your way out of it because you can't move stuff around quickly enough to resolve it.
- 34:01
- Unidentified speaker: In most most of the time, when you have physical constraints, it's as less of an issue because you can print lots of stuff to to like to essentially paper over it for a bit, and then you just move resources from one from where it's not immediately needed to resolve the constraint.
- 34:17
- Unidentified speaker: But basically, walls force like a lot of physical constraints to occur simultaneously, yeah.
- 34:22
- Unidentified speaker: Which then runs into like an environment where we're doing printing lots of fiscal access.
- 34:26
- Unidentified speaker: And that's why it generally breaks these historical monetary fiscal regimes.
- 34:30
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, yeah.
- 34:31
- Unidentified speaker: So there's a real danger we were going down that path.
- 34:34
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, President uh Trump and Shi are meet are meeting, you know, maybe there's some module science as a path forward, we'll see.
- 34:40
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, but it wouldn't be the first.
- 34:42
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 34:45
- Unidentified speaker: Uh surprise nine.
- 34:46
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, this is just wrong.
- 34:48
- Unidentified speaker: Um we thought China tech stocks would outperform, but you know, essentially what happened was we had a view that China's Chinese AI could catch up and it was way underpriced.
- 34:59
- Unidentified speaker: But we also did lots of stuff on China's uh economic models and it was and how basically depressed Chinese household demand and domestic demand would be and no one wouldn't recover.
- 35:10
- Unidentified speaker: I think what we failed to do was connect the dots between the two.
- 35:14
- Unidentified speaker: That it just meant if you have consumer exposed offshore internet names, they were way caught up by the um yeah, by the domestic macro than the AI.
- 35:24
- Unidentified speaker: And it's only the pure play AI that that perform.
- 35:27
- Unidentified speaker: So if you look at the left hand chart, it's super interesting, right?
- 35:29
- Unidentified speaker: If you look at onshore tech, the more AI exposed names, the hardware exposed name, you know, Star 50, those things like made new highs, right?
- 35:37
- Unidentified speaker: They broke even the 2021 highs.
- 35:39
- Unidentified speaker: And then like we're sat here going, oh yeah, K Web, you know, Hansen tech has done absolutely nothing.
- 35:44
- Unidentified speaker: Um and if you look at the right-hand chart, that that that gives you the summary, right?
- 35:48
- Unidentified speaker: Again, Chinese because it doesn't have that.
- 35:50
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it's heavily weighted.
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker: No, it's just heavily weighted towards the consumer exposed names.
- 35:55
- Unidentified speaker: So it's it's got exposure, you know, like Ping Dodu or Maitwan, Alibaba, right?
- 35:59
- Unidentified speaker: There's just a lot of domestic exposure.
- 36:02
- Unidentified speaker: It just didn't think hard enough at the time.
- 36:04
- Unidentified speaker: Um that the thesis was right, but yeah.
- 36:06
- Unidentified speaker: It was just more like, oh yeah, we're we're so offshore.
- 36:08
- Unidentified speaker: We need some easy offshore vehicles.
- 36:10
- Unidentified speaker: Um but the right-hand chart shows you the underlying domestic economic reality in China, right?
- 36:17
- Unidentified speaker: Like again, the official numbers is questionable how accurate they are.
- 36:20
- Unidentified speaker: But if you look at some of these PMI surveys, equivalent surveys, the labor market in China is still like pretty bad, right?
- 36:27
- Unidentified speaker: Very, very bad.
- 36:29
- Unidentified speaker: So the domestic economy is just gonna be stuck in this new normal.
- 36:33
- Unidentified speaker: And it's gonna be very hard to jolt, jolt, jolt it out of it.
- 36:36
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, but they're not at the stage where they want to take out a bazooka.
- 36:40
- Unidentified speaker: I don't think they can do a bazooka on the on the consumer household.
- 36:43
- Unidentified speaker: That's the point.
- 36:44
- Unidentified speaker: China Tech, I think, was on the 2025 surprises.
- 36:48
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, it worked that year.
- 36:49
- Unidentified speaker: That was a that was big, that's what that's that's will be the that's the capital cycle call.
- 36:53
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 36:53
- Unidentified speaker: So we'll get to it in the next slide.
- 36:55
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, back then that was a pure, that was like the outlier on our capital cycle model.
- 36:58
- Unidentified speaker: And and the good thing about capital cycle to make forecasts is you just need a catalyst.
- 37:03
- Unidentified speaker: Like the under it it's basically assigned the fundamentals in place in a way.
- 37:06
- Unidentified speaker: And if you get a catalyst that year, boom, it'll just work.
- 37:09
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I yeah, I get that.
- 37:13
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, um, but just like oil, you know.
- 37:15
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, exactly.
- 37:16
- Unidentified speaker: But the segue nice is a segment, yeah.
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker: The segue is 19 to 10, which is our capital cycle prediction that we put in every year.
- 37:22
- Unidentified speaker: And this was just, hey, based on our models at the time, which are the most capital scarce sectors are least crowded, that we think has a realistic path and a catalyst.
- 37:31
- Unidentified speaker: And we and we flag US regional banks and energy essentially, energy services we picked out at the time.
- 37:37
- Unidentified speaker: But obviously, Iran war was a catalyst to drive all energy higher, uh, and banking regulation, you know, at the time there was a lot of anticipation about uh you know, Basel III reform, right?
- 37:48
- Unidentified speaker: And and and deregulation.
- 37:50
- Unidentified speaker: And so I would say both broadly they worked um out.
- 37:57
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 37:58
- Unidentified speaker: We'll see where our capital cycle models are at the end of the year.
- 38:02
- Unidentified speaker: And any hints at maybe the next surprises.
- 38:10
- Unidentified speaker: Well we'll need to re there's obviously a lot of moving parts.
- 38:13
- Unidentified speaker: We'll need to see.
- 38:14
- Unidentified speaker: Uh again, I haven't I haven't done all the work for for next year as yet.
- 38:18
- Unidentified speaker: But if we go back to the definition, it has to be something people think it's probably less than a third, that's more than half.
- 38:24
- Unidentified speaker: What actually surprised you this year?
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker: How long they around war has gone on for?
- 38:32
- Unidentified speaker: Again, what uh so it's funny, like the the the day after war, I had to do this Monetary Matters podcast, right?
- 38:38
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, so I'm gonna have to do it afterwards.
- 38:39
- Unidentified speaker: I had to like I got asked.
- 38:41
- Unidentified speaker: I thought at the time it'd be like a 45-day war.
- 38:43
- Unidentified speaker: I said this is not over, this is not gonna be Venezuela for like a few weeks.
- 38:47
- Unidentified speaker: Right?
- 38:47
- Unidentified speaker: You mobilize too much stuff, like you're you're gonna you're gonna do something serious here.
- 38:50
- Unidentified speaker: You want regime change.
- 38:51
- Unidentified speaker: But I thought it'd be like they plan for a 45-day war and be over.
- 38:55
- Unidentified speaker: And then when we got the MOU, yeah, I just thought like you wouldn't, it would just there'll be a way to just move on, right?
- 39:02
- Unidentified speaker: And it just uh it's it's just become this quagma.
- 39:07
- Unidentified speaker: Uh yeah, I I'm very surprised how President Trump has not been willing to walk away and pick from this.
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 39:16
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 39:16
- Unidentified speaker: If you look, yeah.
- 39:18
- Unidentified speaker: So I guess that that's how how long that's dragged on and and the long-term consequence of that is I think that's very surprising and concerning uh to me.
- 39:30
- Unidentified speaker: That's probably the main one there.
- 39:32
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, well, I mean, once the once the Iran war happens and oil prices goes up, it's probably understandable why yields are higher.
- 39:38
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, I think my framing was probably emphasizing too much how poor domestic households and real income headwinds were.
- 39:45
- Unidentified speaker: And the market is still very much trying to trade the 2022 uh scenario.
- 39:51
- Unidentified speaker: Um which is implicitly, again, a comment on the existing institutions and credibility, right?
- 39:58
- Unidentified speaker: So if we were in a in like a good kind of normal environment where institutions were credible, it would be very easy for central banks to say, hey, we're gonna look through these energy shocks because theoretically we should, but you can trust us because we have a good long-term track record of managing inflation.
- 40:13
- Unidentified speaker: And you know, we don't need to take unnecessary growth downside to manage our inflation risk.
- 40:18
- Unidentified speaker: The problem is after 2022, and you know, various whatever else is gone on, like central banks are low on credibility.
- 40:25
- Unidentified speaker: So as a result, I think this forcing them to err on the side of overweighting inflation relative to growth risks.
- 40:33
- Unidentified speaker: Um and and I think that's probably why we're we're a bit stuck here uh right now.
- 40:40
- Unidentified speaker: Um the biggest surprise remains the Iran and how long it's lasted.
- 40:44
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, because I would say, like, again, going back to that structural angle, we've had the structural framework yields are going high, right?
- 40:49
- Unidentified speaker: That's not news, but that's kind of like a three, five year ongoing.
- 40:52
- Unidentified speaker: I just thought the cyclical factors would be quite strong that we would get housing, housing disinflation, right?
- 40:56
- Unidentified speaker: We have lots of these cyclical factors that will keep a hold on it.
- 40:59
- Unidentified speaker: But then Iran really, I think, blew it out basically.
- 41:01
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, like it's just it's just you know, it's mostly oil has been driving yields, right?
- 41:06
- Unidentified speaker: For most for most of the uh most of the last most of the past few months, it feels like the way it's trading.
- 41:11
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 41:12
- Unidentified speaker: Okay.
- 41:13
- Unidentified speaker: Um there's two questions we've received.
- 41:16
- Unidentified speaker: Okay.
- 41:16
- Unidentified speaker: Um we can go over them.
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker: Uh so the first is by Mike Fritzel, uh Asian century stocks.
- 41:27
- Unidentified speaker: It seems like everyone's chasing after uh semiconductor stocks.
- 41:32
- Unidentified speaker: But what sectors or geographies are at the other end of the spectrum?
- 41:39
- Unidentified speaker: Underallocation and a lack of attention from investors.
- 41:46
- Unidentified speaker: Uh well, I mean, on the sector geography, I need to look up.
- 41:50
- Unidentified speaker: The sector we kind of have the chart here, right?
- 41:52
- Unidentified speaker: So um yeah, obviously, if you look, there's not a lot in that bottom right quadrant, right?
- 42:00
- Unidentified speaker: Which is where you want to be.
- 42:01
- Unidentified speaker: You want things to be good on capital cycle, but low on crowding.
- 42:04
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, consumer staples, you love consumer staples.
- 42:07
- Unidentified speaker: Very slim pickings there, right?
- 42:09
- Unidentified speaker: We don't like consumer staples for other reasons.
- 42:11
- Unidentified speaker: Eventually, I think the consumer staple value will come through, but I think given how bad real income headwinds are, yeah, and uh the cost-push inflation, I don't think staples are that safe either.
- 42:20
- Unidentified speaker: So this is pretty slim pickings.
- 42:23
- Unidentified speaker: I could just look up the sector stuff.
- 42:26
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, so if you look at like broader regional stuff, I should say that's probably the reason he asked.
- 42:30
- Unidentified speaker: Asia EM.
- 42:32
- Unidentified speaker: Asia, Asia EM is where the capital cycle is pretty good and the crowding score is uh extremely, extremely low.
- 42:40
- Unidentified speaker: So yeah, so you know, to extend that there's uh value opportunities in emerging Asia, that'll be that'll be a bigger that that's what this model is saying.
- 42:50
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, in that corner.
- 42:51
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, right in the corner.
- 42:53
- Unidentified speaker: Okay.
- 42:54
- Unidentified speaker: Maybe maybe when we cut it out, we can put the chart in afterwards, yeah.
- 42:57
- Unidentified speaker: Um and then the last question um from Dan Blum.
- 43:04
- Unidentified speaker: Uh depending on which perspective you use, are retail investors overexposed to cash equities or both?
- 43:13
- Unidentified speaker: Are retail investors overexposed to cash equities or both?
- 43:17
- Unidentified speaker: So I would say, yeah, in general, retail investors probably are overexposed to cash, right?
- 43:21
- Unidentified speaker: Because it's like the classic saying more money is being lost trying to like, you know, avoid recessions or fears than just staying invested.
- 43:27
- Unidentified speaker: So as a base case, I think just staying invested over time has worked out better.
- 43:32
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 43:32
- Unidentified speaker: There's a reason things like dollar cost averaging generally for retailers work better over time.
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 43:36
- Unidentified speaker: So I would say in that sense, Britain probably is overexposed to cash over time.
- 43:42
- Unidentified speaker: Um, you know, the popularity of things like Vanguard and all these things clearly means that from a marketing point of view, I think there's been a lot of converts where people understand you just, you know, be o and chill, and there's a lot of these things.
- 43:54
- Unidentified speaker: But I think that that has worked for the last 10, 15 years.
- 43:57
- Unidentified speaker: But obviously, even the reason we launched our own product is I'm not sure that's gonna work for the next 15 years, right?
- 44:02
- Unidentified speaker: Like I had to go um yeah, I I was thinking about this for my kids like long-term accounts that they're gonna not gonna touch for the next decade.
- 44:08
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 44:09
- Unidentified speaker: And my first thought is we need US equities in the long run, US most productive, you know, this blessed piece of land with like just surplus for everything, right?
- 44:19
- Unidentified speaker: Energy, food surplus, you know, great finance environment.
- 44:22
- Unidentified speaker: But I was very nervous about yeah, just SP or these things.
- 44:25
- Unidentified speaker: Like we're in an environment where there's gonna be a lot more rotation.
- 44:27
- Unidentified speaker: The carbon cycle probably will drive a lot more extreme winners and losers.
- 44:31
- Unidentified speaker: So in that sense, I think if people just passively sat on just yeah, market cap weight indices and expect that to just do the same thing as it did over the next 10 years, that's probably a bit more.
- 44:42
- Unidentified speaker: So the SP can't promise into the next 10 years what it has promised for the last 20?
- 44:48
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I think this I think this is an environment that suits a lot more multi-asset allocation and more rotational, more kind of rotational strategies.
- 44:57
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 44:58
- Unidentified speaker: You know, there's a reason if you look all the big thematic like privacy or sovereignty, structural limits of fiscal policy, you know, stuff we wrote about, global imbalances, stuff we wrote even going back to age of scarcity, right?
- 45:07
- Unidentified speaker: Like we are in an environment where the fundamental assumptions that has underpinned how we do financial analysis has been shifting.
- 45:15
- Unidentified speaker: Right.
- 45:15
- Unidentified speaker: Like for 30 years, pre- what is that 30 years fair?
- 45:19
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, let's call it 1990 to 2020, right?
- 45:23
- Unidentified speaker: Like that's probably generous.
- 45:24
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, for 30 years, you didn't have to worry about, you know, is the broader regulatory environment going to shift to such an extreme extent, right?
- 45:32
- Unidentified speaker: People didn't have to worry so much about return off capital, you just have to worry about return on capital, right?
- 45:36
- Unidentified speaker: Like, you know, the cost of transacting everything was coming down, right?
- 45:40
- Unidentified speaker: Like it's because it was a very stable political environment.
- 45:44
- Unidentified speaker: But under the hood, that tension between who's productive and who has political power has been shifting.
- 45:48
- Unidentified speaker: Shifting, yeah.
- 45:49
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 45:49
- Unidentified speaker: And so we're in an environment where the fiscal, pressure, fiscal pressures, right?
- 45:53
- Unidentified speaker: Like the political pressures, the sovereignty pressures, the the changes to you know, reverse globalization.
- 45:58
- Unidentified speaker: Like all these factors mean your your environment is so unstable that, yeah.
- 46:04
- Unidentified speaker: And it's gonna need like different assets.
- 46:07
- Unidentified speaker: It seems like we're at the end of that consumer depreciation over really over the last 15-20 years.
- 46:13
- Unidentified speaker: What do you mean by the end of consumer depreciation?
- 46:16
- Unidentified speaker: Well, one of the big sources that has maybe capped inflation, it it's it's one the from um the book with Goodhart, uh the unancared uh central banker, showing that what's actually mean capping inflation isn't just the credibility of central banks, but it's this flood of consumer goods being cheaply uh produced thanks to essentially all this labor and capital now coming online.
- 46:41
- Unidentified speaker: Right, actually, okay.
- 46:43
- Unidentified speaker: And but now that's been that's now shifted as kind of the political consequences that consequences of that have come into play.
- 46:50
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, I think we've seen a very dramatic reverse.
- 46:52
- Unidentified speaker: Obviously, Tigris being like the most obvious example.
- 46:55
- Unidentified speaker: Um, but I think if even a general sense, you can think about what what is more important, safety or efficiency, right?
- 47:02
- Unidentified speaker: That's basically the tension for everything.
- 47:03
- Unidentified speaker: And this is not just an economic phenomenon, you see in biology and everything, right?
- 47:07
- Unidentified speaker: Like, why do certain animals have you know organs or things that are useless, but it gives them some safety, right?
- 47:12
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, like the saber tooth, like that.
- 47:13
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah, all these things, right?
- 47:14
- Unidentified speaker: Um, so clearly in the extreme globalization star, we were prioritizing just in time delivery, all these things to go fully for efficiency, which kept costs down.
- 47:23
- Unidentified speaker: But you create lack of safety because very vulnerable to a single break.
- 47:27
- Unidentified speaker: And uh COVID was uh such an extreme wake-up call that it's accelerated everybody's attempts to um build up safety, which means necessarily you are becoming less efficient, but you get more uh resilience, right?
- 47:42
- Unidentified speaker: And that that's clearly a trend that's ongoing and it's only going to get exacerbated because we're in an environment where US-China competition is escalating.
- 47:51
- Unidentified speaker: So you're trying to do a lot of these things that will create winners and losers and cost in an environment that's also creating physical constraints, right?
- 48:02
- Unidentified speaker: Like if you think back to like a good time to reform was like when there's a peace dividend, right?
- 48:07
- Unidentified speaker: So like after the Soviet Union fell in 1991, that was a great time to do loss of reform.
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker: Right?
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker: You got a peace dividend.
- 48:12
- Unidentified speaker: Like we we have the opposite.
- 48:14
- Unidentified speaker: Yeah.
- 48:15
- Unidentified speaker: And you have to reform.
- 48:16
- Unidentified speaker: And you try, yeah.
- 48:17
- Unidentified speaker: So makes it tricky.
- 48:18
- Unidentified speaker: But yeah, that's why I think, yeah, in that sense, people, you know, retail property you need some, you need different real assets, right?
- 48:23
- Unidentified speaker: You need like some to diversify away from your nominal equity.
- 48:27
- Unidentified speaker: This pretty much brings us to the end, Jen.
- 48:28
- Unidentified speaker: Do you want to do you wanna add anything uh at the end as a final statement?
- 48:32
- Unidentified speaker: No, that's thanks to everyone for joining.
- 48:34
- Unidentified speaker: Uh if you like this, we'll try and do more of this kind of style.
- 48:38
- Unidentified speaker: Like and subscribe.
- 48:42
- Unidentified speaker: Okay, perfect.
- 48:43
- Unidentified speaker: Well, thank you everyone for for joining.
- 48:45
- Unidentified speaker: Um and we'll we'll try and make sure there's there's a recording available.
- 48:49
- Unidentified speaker: Okay.