Thomas Jasper on Risk Management, Lehman Brothers Collapse, and Investment Thesis
Summary
Thomas Jasper, author of 'Wall Street Maverick,' discusses lessons from his 50+ year career, emphasizing the difficulty of timing markets and the importance of defining risk tolerance. He recounts his experience at Salomon Brothers during the 1987 crash and explains how interest rate swaps helped the thrift industry manage risk. Jasper details his personal loss with Lehman Brothers, attributing it to flawed risk models and poor relationships with regulators. He also shares a venture capital success story involving a 'Plan B' and criticizes Bitcoin for lacking a clear investment thesis.
Key takeaways
- 1 Markets cycle rapidly; 2008 was terrible while 2009 was very good in credit markets, illustrating that downturns can reverse quickly.
Thomas Jasper · 1:32
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 2:03
Introduction and Market History
Bob Brooks introduces guest Thomas Jasper, author of 'Wall Street Maverick,' to discuss lessons from his 50+ year career. Jasper notes that while markets cycle (citing 2008 vs 2009), timing them is extremely difficult.
- 2:03 – 3:22
Understanding Risk and Tolerance
Jasper emphasizes that investors must first define their risk tolerance, then assess if an investment fits that tolerance, and finally monitor how the risk changes over time due to market and interest rate environments.
- 3:22 – 5:28
Salomon Brothers and 1987 Market Crash
Brooks recalls the 1987 crash and asks Jasper about his experience. Jasper, then between jobs at Salomon Brothers, recalls the firm did well during the crash because it was attuned to risk-taking rather than reckless gambling.
- 5:28 – 7:33
Interest Rate Swaps Explained
Jasper explains interest rate swaps as a tool used by the thrift industry to convert floating-rate liabilities into fixed-rate liabilities, matching their long-term fixed-rate mortgage assets. He notes the derivatives market is now hundreds of trillions of dollars.
- 7:33 – 10:19
Bitcoin and Investment Thesis
Jasper distinguishes calculated risk from gambling, stating he does not understand the investment basis for Bitcoin. He argues that while speculation is possible, an investment thesis requires understanding risk parameters and potential returns.
- 10:19 – 15:33
Lehman Brothers Collapse and Personal Bias
Jasper recounts his negative view of the 2008 mortgage security market, except for Lehman Brothers, where personal relationships and a golf outing clouded his judgment. He lost tens of millions when Lehman filed for bankruptcy.
- 15:33 – 17:17
Lehman's Risk Models and Bailout Politics
Jasper reveals that while other firms reduced risk in 2008, Lehman doubled down. He criticizes Lehman's risk models for 'garbage in, garbage out' and attributes the lack of a bailout to poor personal relationships between Lehman's CEO and Treasury officials.
- 17:17 – 24:32
Venture Capital and Plan B
Jasper shares a story of raising over $1 billion in VC capital after an investment bank said it was impossible, thanks to a 'Plan B' devised by Jay Scheidler. He advises investors to always have a Plan B.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| BitcoinBTC | crypto | neutral | Well uh I mean the real life example today, and I I don't mean to uh I'm not sure where you stand on the uh on the uh the the Bitcoin and and sort of the that that whole question as to when when people talk to me about is Bitcoin an investment or not and and espouse its |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Two thousand nine was a very good year for credit markets after the terrible year of two thousand eight.
Thomas Jasper ·1:12
How to verify: Check S&P High Yield Index or Bloomberg Barclays High Yield Index performance data for 2026 vs 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The derivatives market is measured in the hundreds of trillions of dollars and is many times bigger than the U.S. Treasury market.
Thomas Jasper ·7:16
How to verify: Review International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) or Bank for International Settlements (BIS) quarterly derivatives statistics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Lehman Brothers raised close to a billion dollars in capital for Thomas Jasper's business.
Thomas Jasper ·12:04
How to verify: Search Lehman Brothers SEC filings or press releases from the relevant period for capital raises. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBear Stearns went under in early 2008 and was taken over by JP Morgan.
Thomas Jasper ·12:24
How to verify: Check historical news archives or SEC filings regarding the Bear Stearns/JPMorgan acquisition in March 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceLehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September of 2008.
Thomas Jasper ·12:44
How to verify: Check Lehman Brothers bankruptcy court records or major news archives for September 2008. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Lehman Brothers was in the top five investment companies in the world.
Thomas Jasper ·14:54
How to verify: Review historical rankings of investment banks by revenue or assets under management for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Lehman Brothers doubled down on risk in early to mid 2008 while other Wall Street firms reduced risk.
Thomas Jasper ·15:33
How to verify: Analyze Lehman Brothers quarterly financial reports and risk disclosures from 2008 compared to peers like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Lehman Brothers' internal risk models did not include some of their worst-case scenarios.
Thomas Jasper ·16:09
How to verify: Review the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) report or Lehman Brothers bankruptcy estate documents detailing risk model failures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The lack of a Lehman bailout was due to poor personal relationships between Treasury officials and Lehman CEO Dick Fuld.
Thomas Jasper ·16:42
How to verify: Review memoirs of Treasury officials (e.g., Timothy Geithner, Hank Paulson) or historical accounts of the 2026 bailout decisions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Thomas Jasper raised over a billion dollars in venture capital for a company after an investment bank said it was impossible.
Thomas Jasper ·18:31
How to verify: Search for press releases or SEC filings related to Thomas Jasper's venture capital ventures and funding rounds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify the size of the global derivatives market against Federal Reserve data on OTC derivatives.
- Review Lehman Brothers' 2008 10-K and 8-K filings for risk disclosures and subsequent bankruptcy court documents.
- Check the current market capitalization and trading volume of Bitcoin to assess its liquidity and speculation levels.
- Research the historical performance of interest rate swaps and their regulatory status post-2008.
- Investigate the specific risk models used by Lehman Brothers as described in post-crisis financial analyses.
- Look for counter-arguments to Jasper's view on Bitcoin from proponents who cite store-of-value or monetary policy critiques.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:00
- Bob Brooks: Well, what a fifty plus year on Wall Street and history can teach us about investing in life. Stay tuned for Prudent Money.
- 0:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Good
- 0:23
- Bob Brooks: afternoon. This is Bob Brooks, and you are listening to the Prudent Money Radio Show. Thanks so much for joining me today. You know I do appreciate it. Well, history can tell us a lot about today and what to expect ahead. Thomas Jasper has had a front row seat to the good and the bad of history and is here to talk about his memoir,
- 0:42
- Bob Brooks: Wall Street Maverick: Musings on a career of innovation, derivatives, credit, and risk. Tom, it's such a pleasure to have you on the program. today.
- 0:52
- Thomas Jasper: Thank you, Bob. Thank you for having me.
- 0:53
- Bob Brooks: You know, Mark Twain had a uh famous saying about history. History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes. With all the wealth of information from your book that is uh you know a history lesson in itself, talk a little bit about the importance of history and the invaluable lessons that it does have for us today as investors.
- 1:12
- Thomas Jasper: Well, uh, there's no question, certainly in my experience. uh and my career on Wall Street, there's no question that W Wall Street goes through cycles. And uh, you know, uh so uh I mean we can take two thousand eight for example. Uh clearly two thousand eight was a terrible year in the financial markets. And whereas
- 1:32
- Thomas Jasper: two thousand nine it turned around very quickly and it was a very good year, at least from the standpoint of the the markets that I was in, which was credit. So I mean that's just that's just one of many, many examples over many, many years.
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
- 1:46
- Thomas Jasper: that being said, I think it's uh it's very hard to time markets. And I think it's uh you know, in my career I was a tr I was uh ran a trading desk, so we were by definition trying to time when we went in and when we got out, but that's really hard to do.
- 2:03
- Bob Brooks: Sure, sure, absolutely. You know, we talk a lot about risk on the program and and uh you know when it comes to Wall Street, it seems like it's a a situation where there's the growth story, but never there there's nothing there's there's never a risk story. Talk about the importance of making sure you understand the risk part of it
- 2:23
- Bob Brooks: along with the growth part of it.
- 2:25
- Thomas Jasper: Oh Well I think that's uh that's that that goes without saying that you have to understand the risk you have number one you have to understand what your risk tolerant tolerance is and really uh really come to grips with that. That's that's sort of the first question. Then the second question is okay what is the risk that I'm taking in this investment that
- 2:45
- Thomas Jasper: I'm making and does it fit within my risk tolerances? And then the third is to be watch it very closely over time in terms of how that risk changes, because that risk will change over time as you know a bond matures or as uh you know whatever whatever it is that
- 3:05
- Thomas Jasper: you're investing in that you're looking at. So that risk will change over time, and you have to kind of constantly update your view on the risk. And part of it is what's the market. environment, part of it is what's the interest rate environment. Um, and there's many different factors that go into it.
- 3:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Of
- 3:22
- Bob Brooks: course, you you have a long history with a company by the name of Solomon Brothers. I haven't heard that in in a long time. Uh, but I do remember being in a college class and it was uh believe it was October nineteenth, very infamous day in in the history of our of our markets. And uh the the broker who taught the class w
- 3:42
- Bob Brooks: worked at as a broker, Solomon, so he came it it was a six o'clock class. He came w uh struggling into g late, of course, to the uh class and looked like he'd been through a war.
- 3:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh and
- 3:54
- Bob Brooks: I I got into the business ninety two so I didn't I didn't experience that. What was it eighty 87 seven like for you? I mean that was that was a big deal.
- 4:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 4:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it it was. Uh
- 4:05
- Thomas Jasper: and uh I uh uh I was sort of between uh jobs at Solomon Brothers at that point in time, which is never a place you want to find yourself
- 4:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 4:16
- Thomas Jasper: uh at a firm like Solomon. Uh you you always want to identify what your uh what your PL is uh because ultimately that's what you're getting paid to to do.
- 4:27
- Thomas Jasper: And uh yeah no it was it was a very difficult time uh to make money uh long or short uh in the market. And um you know Solomon uh was uh a wonderful place to work uh at uh it had its
- 4:47
- Thomas Jasper: uh
- 4:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 4:48
- Thomas Jasper: had its issues but uh ultimately it was uh a lot of very good people, very smart people, very aggressive people. And you know, Solomon uh uh did quite well actually during nineteen eighty seven as I recall. That's a long time ago.
- 5:04
- Thomas Jasper: But uh as I recall they did quite well during that that period. And uh a little a lot of what Solomon was known for is uh being very attuned to risk and uh being a risk taker. But risk taking doesn't mean that you just jump in willy-nilly. Uh risk taking means that you're really
- 5:24
- Thomas Jasper: understand what is the risk you're taking and then you place your bet accordingly.
- 5:28
- Bob Brooks: Tom, you helped uh of course build the interest rate swaps business. Now for someone listening, they may they may think, uh what is a swap? I've never heard of a swap. How does that work? In your best layman's term, and it's I know it's a technical, very, very technical uh uh term. Talk a little bit about
- 5:48
- Bob Brooks: what that is and uh what uh what real-world problem that it solves.
- 5:54
- Thomas Jasper: Well, what what I be what what talks about is I was the one of the people at the early stages of what was called the interest rate swap. market. And the interest rate swap market was uh a uh uh uh very simplistic in terms it was basically just you had one party uh to the swap that was
- 6:14
- Thomas Jasper: paying a fixed rate you had one party to the swap paying a floating rate and let's let's talk about how it was used uh by by the uh by the thrift industry as a as an example at the time The thrift industry at the time had gone through any number of cycles where they were basically
- 6:33
- Thomas Jasper: borrowing money short term, so floating rate, and they were lending money
- 6:40
- Thomas Jasper: in terms of mortgages long term at a fixed rate. And there were periods in time when the cycle meant that uh the floating rates would be higher uh than. the fixed rates and they would lose money, lots of money, the industry under. And so the thrift industry used the interest rate swap essentially to convert
- 6:59
- Thomas Jasper: their floating rate liabilities into fixed rate liabilities so they had a better match between their assets and their liabilities and their balance sheet. So that's just that's just one simple example in terms of how it was used. Uh and uh it's now
- 7:16
- Thomas Jasper: part of the overall what they call the derivatives market, which is a market that is many, many, many times bigger than the U.S. Treasury market.
- 7:27
- Thomas Jasper: It's measured in the hundreds of trillions of dollars in terms of its size. So it's a huge market out there.
- 7:33
- Bob Brooks: Your career involved uh taking risks and challenging conventional thinking. You know, How did you do distinguish a calculated risk from something like a you know that's a real gamble? I mean, you're seeing a lot of products come out right now that you look at it and you go, boy, that's that's uh is that investing or is that gambling?
- 7:51
- Thomas Jasper: Well uh I mean the real life example today, and I I don't mean to uh I'm not sure where you stand on the uh on the uh the the Bitcoin and and sort of the that that whole question as to when when people talk to me about is Bitcoin an investment or not and and espouse its
- 8:11
- Thomas Jasper: investment, I I sit there and say no one has ever explained to me what the investment basis is for Bitcoin.
- 8:18
- Bob Brooks: Agreed.
- 8:19
- Thomas Jasper: But uh so uh that's not to say if you want to speculate on something, it's not to say you shouldn't you know buy or sell Bitcoin. but uh it I've never understood the investment thesis. So uh and it's maybe it's just that, you know, I'm in my seventies and and maybe it's just you know way beyond me, but uh in terms of what cr the the importance of
- 8:39
- Thomas Jasper: cryptocurrency and how what what role it will play in the future of the global economy. But uh getting back to your question, uh what w it it really boils down to do you understand what the risk parameters are around the transaction in terms of what you can make versus what you can lose? So it's it's a cost-benefit
- 8:59
- Thomas Jasper: analysis and uh around okay, if I make this investment, uh what can I make uh and what needs to happen for me to make uh that return on the investment? And uh in turn
- 9:15
- Thomas Jasper: am I is there any way I can manage that uh return over time so that I effectively can take the the the uh the the bands under which that transaction can uh trade, uh, you know, uh good or bad, uh, and turn
- 9:35
- Thomas Jasper: it into something that's manageable. It's You can say that I'm to a ninety eight percent degree of confidence, I'm I'm confident that I will make a return of, you know, twelve percent,
- 9:46
- Bob Brooks: uh
- 9:46
- Thomas Jasper: whatever the whatever the return might be. So it's it's you know, a calculator risk to me is really understanding what the risk parameters are and then managing the the investment within those risk parameters.
- 9:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 9:59
- Bob Brooks: is Bob Brooks and you are listening to the Prudent Money Radio Show. Thank you so much for joining me today. You know I do appreciate it. Talking to Thomas Jasper about a great book, Wall Street Maverick Musings on a Career of Innovation, Derivatives, Credit, and Risk. Tom, can you share a time when everyone around
- 10:19
- Bob Brooks: you felt comfortable with risk? And I'm thinking of today. Of course, there's lots of times in the past, but uh but you thought something
- 10:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's a good thing.
- 10:27
- Bob Brooks: was wrong.
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 10:28
- Bob Brooks: especially I I think it it really speaks to your experience and your uh and what you've been through on the credit side as we look at what's going on today. But talk talk a little bit about that.
- 10:40
- Thomas Jasper: Yeah, I mean uh certainly two thousand eight is a classic example of that. There was a tremendous amount of noise in the marketplace in terms of what was
- 10:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh what
- 10:50
- Thomas Jasper: was going to happen. And just going back to uh sort of refresh everybody's memory, it it it all for the most part, it was around what was the uh risk in the marketplace, was there systemic risk associated with all of the big investments that have been made in mortgage securities? And so by a mortgage
- 11:10
- Thomas Jasper: security, I'm talking about where uh dealers uh had uh essentially taken home mortgages and then packaged them into securities, uh, you know, uh whether you might have uh a thousand mortgages in a security and uh and then sell that security to the marketplace. And the question was how good
- 11:30
- Thomas Jasper: was the disclosure around those securities and was there a systemic risk associated with them? You know, at the point in time, uh the business I was in involved taking credit, not not to the that particular mortgage security, but certainly to the uh to the participants in that marketplace. And uh I took a very uh
- 11:50
- Thomas Jasper: negative view towards the marketplace with one exception, and that exception actually came back to bite me, which was on Lehman Brothers. And uh I had a sweet spot to my heart that that clouded my thoughts. thinking.
- 12:04
- Thomas Jasper: And I talk about it in the book. That Lehman had raised close to a billion dollars in capital for my business. They were very close to me. And I talk about in so in early 2008, Bear Stearns went under and was uh
- 12:24
- Thomas Jasper: essentially taken over by JP Morgan. for pennies on the you know on the dollar in terms of their stock price. And you the the market then shifted its focus to Lehman, and I watched that very closely like a hawk because I had a fairly substantial risk position on uh for on Lehman credit. And
- 12:44
- Thomas Jasper: in uh so Lehman went under in September of 2008, and it was the largest bankruptcy at the time. I lost a fair amount of money as a result of it. But in uh in May of that year, so we're you know a few months before the bankruptcy, Lehman and uh sent me an invitation to
- 13:04
- Thomas Jasper: come join them for a golf outing in Scotland. And I talk about it in the book, and I won't bore your readers, but I went to this outing and which was phenomenal. and uh uh you know really spent a lot of time with the senior management of Lehman and I kept hearing the story that they were going to make it
- 13:24
- Thomas Jasper: and everything was going to be okay and I bought that story. And it was uh I you know I my thinking was clearly colored by the golf and by my relationship with those people. And uh Lehman went under
- 13:39
- Thomas Jasper: Flash forward about three, four years, I was asked to by a friend of mine to do some work for the Lehman Bankruptcy Estate. And
- 13:51
- Thomas Jasper: by doing so, I was became an insider into what was really going on and the d at Lehman during that period in time that I had an investment. And the difference between what was really going on and what they were were reporting was shockingly different. It just goes to show you that uh you know when you make an investment,
- 14:11
- Thomas Jasper: don't fall in love with it uh, because things can uh things can change and you need to change your thinking and you have to be very uh constructive in your thinking and uh very critical in your thinking. And and I would I would be the first to admit. and I admit this in the book that I was not as it as it came to Lehman and and
- 14:31
- Thomas Jasper: my company lost uh you know tens of millions of dollars in as a result of it.
- 14:37
- Bob Brooks: Yeah I I guess the you know the the the question c comes to mind how could a company look like everything is great and your your Lehman brothers were they're they the number two or number one investment company in the in the world, right?
- 14:49
- Thomas Jasper: Yes, they were very big. Yeah.
- 14:51
- Bob Brooks: Yeah, number number one.
- 14:53
- Bob Brooks: Were they the biggest?
- 14:54
- Thomas Jasper: No, they were not the biggest, but they were certainly in the top top five.
- 14:58
- Bob Brooks: Top five. So you you the question comes though, you wonder how everything can look great one day. I'll never forget this. The next day, Lehman's bankrupt, they're into default, you know, the as bad as it gets. And I I guess the moral to the story is it really the the under the understanding. underpinning of that company was bad for a long time, had to been
- 15:18
- Bob Brooks: bad for a long time, and just it comes to a point where it's just not sustainable. Is that a good good way to put it?
- 15:24
- Thomas Jasper: Yes, absolutely.
- 15:33
- Thomas Jasper: the estate. Uh Things have been bad. And what was most shocking was that whereas most people in early to mid 2008 were on Wall Street were reducing their risk, Lehman was doubling down.
- 15:47
- Bob Brooks: Just banking on if we could just hit this one last deal. Is that I mean is that kind of the the thinking?
- 15:53
- Thomas Jasper: Yeah, that was absolutely that that seemed to be the thinking. And relative to their risk models, because they had internal risk models which told
- 16:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them
- 16:01
- Thomas Jasper: uh you know what kind of uh uh capital they needed to support their business. And uh,
- 16:09
- Thomas Jasper: you know, they were the risk models were well designed, but it's it's all the it's always the storage of garbage in, garbage out. And uh essentially uh they weren't including in their models some of their worst case scenarios.
- 16:24
- Bob Brooks: So the question is, you why didn't uh just out of curiosity, your opinion on this, why didn't the ministr the administration bail them out? I mean they bailed out just about every everybody else, it seems like, or they connected companies or did whatever they did. But this it seems like they kind of left Lehman uh to weather and be on its own.
- 16:42
- Thomas Jasper: I think it was the personal relationships that uh uh the those running the folks running the Treasury had with uh
- 16:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): with
- 16:49
- Thomas Jasper: Dick Fold, the uh ceo of Lehman and it wasn't a good one.
- 16:54
- Bob Brooks: Apparently not that
- 16:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 16:56
- Bob Brooks: that was
- 16:57
- Thomas Jasper: I I I was I was in your camp Bob I I thought that they would ultimately and again this was bad judgment on my part. Uh I thought that they were uh they would be uh worst case is they would be bailed out and the shareholders would really get hit hard but the credit holders like I was would be fine.
- 17:17
- Bob Brooks: Yeah, that was uh and I'm I'm sure you could probab I would imagine that you label that as the most dramatic situation you've ever that you've gone through in the business. Is that would that be pretty
- 17:28
- Thomas Jasper: much uh it was certainly one of the uh one of the most dramatic uh and uh uh uh uh one of the others uh and uh and this was uh the good news uh I when I left Solomon, I was a venture capitalist, and again I talk about this in the book, set up a company, uh very highly innovative company,
- 17:48
- Thomas Jasper: and we went out to raise capital uh using a very high-powered investment bank. And the investment bank came back uh after working with us for a few months and basically said, you've run out of run. runway. There's no way you can raise this capital. And I went to the VC guy, Jay
- 18:07
- Thomas Jasper: Scheidler, who again I'm hugely fond of,
- 18:12
- Thomas Jasper: and I said, Jay, this is what they're saying. And he said, Let me let me think about it over the weekend and I'll come back to you. And by 48 hours later, he came back with a uh plan B, which uh ultimately was highly successful. in which we were able to ultimately raise over a billion dollars in capital for. So
- 18:31
- Thomas Jasper: again, it's it's it's a it's an example of of uh uh you know uh a a number of different things but it's it's an ex number one of which is always have a plan B.
- 18:44
- Bob Brooks: Yes definitely Def yes, definitely. we in fact it's funny you say that we we always talk about uh as an investor to have a plan A and a plan B because plan A doesn't always work. And uh
- 18:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's right.
- 18:55
- Bob Brooks: It what's what's interesting is you know markets booming much like they have been in in today's uh in today's environment. Um you know, people often conveniently explain away warning signs. What uh you know what tells you that healthy optimism is turning
- 19:15
- Bob Brooks: into dangerous overconfidence? I mean I that I don't know if your opinion of this, that's to me what we're seeing right now.
- 19:22
- Thomas Jasper: Uh that's a that's a tough question because it's uh there's been lots of books written on that very question in terms of uh how do you uh you know the the exuberance that the markets
- 19:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right
- 19:34
- Thomas Jasper: number one it's hard to bet against the markets as we all know uh it's
- 19:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): hard to
- 19:39
- Thomas Jasper: take a contrarian position. Uh those people that make and what you read about after the fact when markets blow up, and you read about after the fact that they made all this money because they were uh they were short the market, and uh and so they, you know, were able to cover their shorts uh at huge profits, etc. et
- 19:59
- Thomas Jasper: cetera. Let me tell you, it's really hard to do that. And uh uh what you don't hear about is the people that lost their shirt trying to do that uh before the the the worst case happened. I think that uh I mean I would agree with you. I'm I'm worried about the market now because of the level of interest
- 20:19
- Thomas Jasper: rates and they in in my view they can only go higher. Um I worry uh a bit about uh you know, I th I thought that there was significant political risk in the United States, which uh I think it's tempered a little bit b by the election, so I think that's good news. Um I think that
- 20:39
- Thomas Jasper: the uh uh uh you know the all the issues around AI I don't understand. I'm not the s uh but in turn with all of the money that's going into AI and the way AI seems to be capturing the market, you just think that's the bubble that's a bubble like like the dot com market,
- 20:59
- Thomas Jasper: like any number of markets, it's gonna burst sooner or later. And I'm very worried about that. So I'm in your camp, Bob.
- 21:05
- Bob Brooks: So, you know, Tom, you look at the you look at the situation where and and I I'm with you. I I uh you know AI is a search engine to me. I I know it that there's tons more to it, but I I don't really fully understand it either, which I don't think the vast majority of the of of the uh the world understands AI. But you you've got
- 21:25
- Bob Brooks: all these companies who are strapped for cash and they're like clear uh clear weave, I guess I think I'm saying that right. They uh I was reading today that they're they're getting sixteen percent on their debt. And I mean there's no there's no good way to get cash. I mean t to me this has
- 21:45
- Bob Brooks: there's no unless the the government, which I think the way things have changed g uh prevents this from happening, but unless the government steps in, were these these companies just gonna go under? Because this is a big infrastructure bill. They've They s and in the a lot of money they gotta spend.
- 22:01
- Thomas Jasper: Yeah, I mean I think uh well i you know, it's the natural cycle, and I think it's a good cycle that uh you know, you have winners and you have losers. And uh fortunately there are many more winners than there are losers. But uh I I think that the you know, the markets have been built around uh I I mean,
- 22:21
- Thomas Jasper: I I'm I'm on a number of blackstone boards and we see any number of companies that go through bankruptcy and come out the other side of bankruptcy and do very well. But in order to do that, essentially they have to disavow the debt that they put on in the first place and uh which uh you know is a problem. But ultimately uh
- 22:41
- Thomas Jasper: in terms of the markets don't have have very short memories, uh, you know, people are willing willing to bet on the new new company uh that is uh uh coming out of bankruptcy and uh with you know with a much different capital structure and say that's a good thing. And it is a good thing, but
- 23:01
- Thomas Jasper: uh because it employs people and and it allows hopefully companies that know what they're doing to to survive perhaps a bad patch. But uh yeah, I I um I you know I'm I'm worried about the markets uh today and uh you know I'm uh I'm I'm an old guy, so uh, you know, I
- 23:21
- Thomas Jasper: uh my risk tolerance isn't what it used to be.
- 23:24
- Bob Brooks: Yes.
- 23:25
- Thomas Jasper: And I think that's the way you have to you have to f you come back to what I was talking about earlier. You really have to understand what your risk tolerance is. And uh uh we all like to make a lot of money in the markets, uh, but we hate losing money and
- 23:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 23:39
- Thomas Jasper: and it's very hard to time when the you know when those bubbles are gonna burst.
- 23:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 23:45
- Bob Brooks: Tom, uh great talking to you today. I wish we had a lot more time because there was a whole lot more I wanted to ask you about. The name of the book is Wall Street Maverick Musings on a Career of Innovation, Derivatives, Credit, and Risk. Great book, and uh Tom, thanks for your time and uh good good luck to you going forward.
- 24:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well, Oh thank
- 24:02
- Thomas Jasper: you, Bob. Uh, you too and uh to all of your uh listeners.
- 24:06
- Bob Brooks: Thank you. This is Bob Brooks, and you are listening to the Prudent Money Radio Show. We are all out of time. Until we do meet again next time. Keep the faith and have a great rest of the day.
- 24:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's all the time we have for today. Questions or comments for Bob or to find out more great information like what you've just heard, visit www.prudent. www.prudentmoney.com. Be sure to join Bob Brooks again for the next edition of Prudent Money.
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