Allocating to India

Anand Vasagiri on India investment thesis, governance risks, and indirect exposure via Kansai Paints

52 min Listen to the original Episode page
Emerging MarketsIndiaValue InvestingArtisan PartnersCorporate GovernanceCurrency RiskPassive InvestingDue Diligence

Summary

Anand Vasagiri of Artisan Partners explains that global allocators should seek value through attractive economies and good governance rather than targeting specific countries. He outlines a long-only, concentrated strategy focusing on undervalued businesses with strong governance, noting that India's regulatory friction and currency risks require a larger margin of safety. Vasagiri highlights the importance of ground-level due diligence and criticizes traditional accounting metrics for failing to capture intangible assets in knowledge-based economies. He discusses using indirect exposure, such as investing in Kansai Paints to access Indian growth, while managing risks related to founder behavior and regulatory changes.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Global allocators seek value through attractive economies, streamlined regulations, and good governance rather than targeting specific countries.

    Anand Vasagiri · 0:00

  2. 2
    And uh we are long-only investors, we are long-term investors, we look for good businesses run by good people with clean balance sheets and attractive evaluations. valuations. Those are the four key characteristics that we uh were first trained by David and I can talk more about why these are important and how these are important later on in the conversation. But that's what we effectively

    Anand Vasagiri · 3:03

  3. 3
    Passive flows do not ensure broad market coverage; for example, an iShares ETF in India covers only 450 out of 6,700 potential names.

    Anand Vasagiri · 13:38

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 5:15

    Investment Philosophy and Strategy Overview

    Anand Vasagiri explains that global allocators seek value through attractive economies, streamlined regulations, and good governance rather than targeting specific countries. He outlines Artisan Partners' International Explorer strategy, which focuses on long-only, long-term investments in undervalued businesses with strong governance and clean balance sheets, aiming for asymmetric risk-reward outcomes in inefficient small-cap markets.

  2. 5:15 – 8:44

    Background and Due Diligence Approach

    Vasagiri discusses his background in emerging markets and how it informs a skeptical, ground-level due diligence approach. He emphasizes verifying physical assets and management behavior over financial models, citing experience with past crises to identify structural versus cyclical risks in companies like CARE Ratings.

  3. 8:44 – 16:00

    Market Inefficiencies and Portfolio Construction

    The speaker highlights the vast, undercovered universe of non-US small caps, noting that even passive flows do not cover all names. He illustrates how misunderstood companies like PVR INOX and CARE Ratings offered attractive entry points despite being well-known, allowing for concentrated bets in a portfolio of 30-40 names with a five-year average holding period.

  4. 16:00 – 18:52

    Valuation Discipline and Kansai Paints Example

    Vasagiri asserts that value investing works in India by maintaining strict discipline on discount rates and criteria. He uses Kansai Paints as an example of acquiring exposure to Indian growth (via Kansai Nerolac) at a reasonable multiple (11-12x earnings) by investing in a Japanese-listed parent company, thereby avoiding overpaying for direct Indian exposure.

  5. 18:52 – 26:54

    Portfolio Evolution and Governance Risks

    India exposure in the portfolio has decreased to ~2% due to regulatory changes and position trimming, with significant indirect exposure via Kansai Paints. Vasagiri discusses the importance of founder involvement, noting that while active promoters can create value, governance risks exist where they may shunt value to themselves rather than growing the enterprise.

  6. 26:54 – 30:43

    Liquidity and Value Creation Levers

    Illiquidity is framed as a source of opportunity for patient investors. Vasagiri explains that value is extracted through business compounding, strategic buyouts, or share buybacks. He notes that while India is early in adopting buybacks, US companies have long used them to create value at depressed multiples.

  7. 30:43 – 34:52

    Regulatory Friction and FPI Challenges

    The speaker criticizes India's regulatory framework for creating unnecessary friction for long-term foreign investors, citing onerous disclosure requirements and complex account opening processes. He contrasts this with easier access to other emerging markets, suggesting these hurdles deter patient capital.

  8. 34:52 – 37:15

    Currency Risk Management

    Vasagiri states that returns are measured in USD, requiring an adjustment for expected currency depreciation in emerging markets (assumed at 2-5% annually). This creates a 10-20% headwind over a five-year holding period, necessitating a larger margin of safety compared to developed market investments.

  9. 37:15 – 41:38

    Quality, Accounting Metrics, and Passive Investing

    Anand Vasagiri explains that buying quality franchises at a discount provides a margin of safety that increases if the business compounds value, unlike shrinking businesses. He argues traditional accounting metrics like P/B and P/E fail in knowledge-based economies because they miss intangible assets like IP from R&D. He also notes that passive investing creates momentum effects, as capital flows automatically into existing index constituents.

  10. 41:38 – 46:40

    Investment Discipline and Historical Cycles

    Vasagiri emphasizes creating genuine value over chasing index performance, citing his personal wealth investment as a discipline anchor. He reflects on past market cycles, including the Harshad Mehta bull market and the 2005-07 emerging market run, noting that while markets change, fundamental principles remain. He dismisses listing location changes (e.g., Europe to US) as value-neutral without underlying governance and capital allocation improvements.

  11. 46:40 – 49:11

    Management, Capital Allocation, and Mistakes

    Vasagiri identifies management and capital allocation as the primary sources of investment mistakes, distinguishing between flawed processes and unfavorable outcomes. He highlights that DCF valuations rely heavily on terminal value, which is vulnerable to value-destructive capital allocation by management. He stresses the difficulty of judging people and the importance of ground-level due diligence.

  12. 49:11 – 51:32

    Unexpected Upsides and India Investment Thesis

    He shares an example of a German defense contractor where a non-thesis defense contract provided unexpected upside, likening it to a lottery win. Regarding India, he argues that global allocators should not seek exposure for its own sake but focus on local economic attractiveness, regulatory streamlining, and good corporate governance, which naturally attract capital.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
S&P 500indexneutralSo SP 500, for example, as more and more money floods into that index or goes passive, you automatically get the momentum benefit just because of increased allocation of passive capital, right?
US dollarUSDcurrencyneutralabout some model refusing to take payments in US dollars because that person thought US dollar would be worthless. This was in 2005 7 time frame.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Artisan Partners manages close to USD 170 billion.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:01

How to verify: Artisan Partners annual reports or SEC Form ADV Part 2A. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

India is about 6% of the International Explorer benchmark and about 2% of the portfolio.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·1:35

How to verify: Artisan Partners International Explorer strategy fact sheet or quarterly portfolio disclosure. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The global small-cap universe (ex-US) has about 56,000 companies under $5 billion; India has ~6,700 such companies.

Anand Vasagiri ·9:04

How to verify: Bloomberg terminal screen or FactSet query for market capitalization filters. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The average holding period for the strategy is about five years.

Anand Vasagiri ·4:33

How to verify: Artisan Partners strategy documentation or investor presentations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

CARE Ratings was a shareholder position initiated during the COVID period.

Anand Vasagiri ·13:58

How to verify: Artisan Partners portfolio holdings disclosure or 13F filings (if applicable) or company press releases from that period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Kansai Paints was trading at around 11-12 times earnings when the position was initiated.

Anand Vasagiri ·17:20

How to verify: Historical stock price data for Kansai Paints (4764.T) and earnings reports from the initiation date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Kansai Paints owns close to just under 75% of Kansai Nerolac (KNPL).

Anand Vasagiri ·17:55

How to verify: Kansai Paints annual report or KNPL corporate governance report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

The portfolio has experienced roughly two to three buyouts per year since launch.

Anand Vasagiri ·28:41

How to verify: Artisan Partners performance attribution reports or portfolio activity logs. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The speaker assumes emerging market currencies depreciate 2-5% annually.

Anand Vasagiri ·35:11

How to verify: Internal investment policy statement or methodology document of Artisan Partners (if public) or historical currency data comparison. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

It is more onerous to open accounts in India compared to other emerging markets like South Africa and Indonesia.

Anand Vasagiri ·34:04

How to verify: FPI registration guidelines from SEBI/RBI and comparative onboarding timelines reported by custodians. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Anand Vasagiri joined David as an intern in 2004.

Anand Vasagiri ·37:35

How to verify: Anand Vasagiri's LinkedIn profile or Artisan Partners biographies. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Fama-French three-factor models added 'quality' as a parameter.

Anand Vasagiri ·38:35

How to verify: Kenneth French Data Library or academic publications on Fama-French factor models. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In a DCF, almost two-thirds of value comes from terminal value.

Anand Vasagiri ·48:03

How to verify: Standard financial valuation textbooks or DCF calculation examples. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Vasagiri invested his tuition money during the Harshad Mehta bull market.

Anand Vasagiri ·42:56

How to verify: Vasagiri's personal biography or interviews from that period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 2005-07, some investors refused US dollar payments.

Anand Vasagiri ·44:03

How to verify: News archives from 2005-2026 regarding currency sentiment or specific investor anecdotes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Companies were rushing to list in Hong Kong for better multiples, and some are now delisting.

Anand Vasagiri ·44:23

How to verify: Hong Kong Stock Exchange listing data and delisting announcements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Vasagiri holds a substantial portion of his personal wealth in his fund.

Anand Vasagiri ·41:55

How to verify: Artisan Partners' 'Skin in the Game' disclosures or SEC Form ADV. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

A German company in his portfolio received a large defense contract not part of the thesis.

Anand Vasagiri ·49:50

How to verify: Artisan Partners quarterly portfolio disclosures or news about the specific German company. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Artisan Partners' International Explorer strategy holdings and India allocation percentage via their latest quarterly portfolio disclosure.
  • Check the regulatory disclosure requirements for Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPIs) in India through the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) website.
  • Review Kansai Paints' (KPSI) financial filings to confirm the ownership stake and earnings contribution of Kansai Nerolac Paints India.
  • Analyze the historical performance of the iShares MSCI India ETF (INDA) versus the broader Indian small-cap market to assess passive coverage gaps.
  • Examine CARE Ratings' balance sheet and credit ratings post-IL&FS default to verify the speaker's claim of no structural impairment.
  • Calculate the USD-denominated return impact of a 2-5% annual currency depreciation assumption on Indian equity investments.
  • Review the governance structure and promoter shareholding of key Indian portfolio companies to assess founder-related risks.
  • Compare the P/E and P/B ratios of Indian knowledge-based companies against their R&D expensing to validate the claim that traditional metrics miss intangible assets.
Full transcriptexpand

0:00Anand Vasagiri: When you talk of global allocators, Sarah, and again I can only speak from my perspective, the goal is always and we are paid to create value. We're not paid to allocate to India or to any country for that matter, or to any sector for that matter. Right? So to the extent that you have a an attractive local economy, to the extent you have a streamlined regulatory framework that works well, with not of with not a lot of unnecessary friction in the process, and you have good companies with good governance, then automatically it becomes their favorite destination. And so you don't necessarily have to go out and seek capital, capital will find its way.

0:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This is allocating to India. Conversation for foreign investors thinking about the world's fastest growing large economy. with the allocators and fund managers actually putting capital to work. Views expressed are the speakers' own

1:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

1:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): informational only, not investment advice. Full disclaimer in the show notes. Our guest today is Anand Vasagiri, co-portfolio manager of the International Explorer Strategy at Artisan Partners, which manages close to 170 billion dollars.

1:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Anand has spent most of his career hunting for small and mid-cap companies the market has missed, including nearly a decade co-running the global small cap strategy at Paradise. India is about 6% of its his benchmark. and about 2% of his portfolio. We get into why, whether Indian small and mid-cap companies ever stay overlooked long enough to get cheap, how a dollar investor should think about the rupee. Here is a conversation with Anand. Anand, welcome. Uh can you talk to us about your background and and your journey so far?

2:02Anand Vasagiri: Sure. Uh Sarah Vinitin, thank you for the opportunity. It's my pleasure to be here and uh to have this conversation. First, to set the stage, uh, because some of your audience may not be very familiar with Artisan Partners or what we do and how we do it. A little bit of that. My partner Baini and I, we co-manage the International Explorer strategy under Artisan Partners. Artisan, as you uh mentioned, is a listed investment management firm based in the US. And the firm uh manages about 170 billion through several different strategies, but under the umbrella, each strategy is operated quite independently. And we are part of the international value group that's headed by David Samra. David happens to be the person who gave both Bainey and I a foot in the door on the buy side. We first started off as analysts working for David many, many years ago. He was the one who trained us in his methodology, and we continue to follow that very diligently even today.

3:03And uh we are long-only investors, we are long-term investors, we look for good businesses run by good people with clean balance sheets and attractive evaluations. valuations. Those are the four key characteristics that we uh were first trained by David and I can talk more about why these are important and how these are important later on in the conversation. But that's what we effectively follow. We are largely benchmark agnostic. When we started off as analysts we worked at Artisan for a while and then we both, Benny and I, we both left to join other firms as you mentioned and uh we came back in 2020 twenty twenty to help launch this international explorer strategy. and our objective then and continues to even today has always been to create a vehicle that is focused on wealth creation. Uh so we are not interested in giving or we're not trying to give exposure to a market or a market cap spectrum or to a factor, a value factor, or something like that, to our audience. What we are interested in doing is genuinely to focus on the most asymmetric risk award opportunities. And we

4:13wanted to focus on the most inefficient part of the universe, which happened to be at that time and even till today, the international small caps. And we can get into why that's the case later on. But effectively, fish in the most inefficient. part of the market to help deliver asymmetric risk reward outcomes, running a fairly concentrated portfolio with a longer term holding. Our average holding period is about five years. So we blend all of that in to create this uh vehicle. And so we are reasonably benchmark agnostic. We don't care if a country is X percent of the benchmark, you know, 1% or 5%, if we find a lot of names that meet our criteria. we're happy to be invested in that country or in that sector. There are sectors where we have very little exposure or zero exposure. Energy is a very good example. We're not paid to give exposure to our clients, we are paid to deliver value for our clients. That's how we think about it.

5:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Growing up in India, what has been your biggest strength that you brought? to this business?

5:15Anand Vasagiri: Nitin, interesting question. Growing up in India in an emerging market, right? You kind of see all the policies that were getting implemented at that point in an emerging market, you see firsthand the pros and cons of it. In addition to India, I've worked in other parts of you know a few other emerging markets. I've looked at in emerging markets, invested in emerging markets, also spent a little bit of time in Russia. So, with all of that background, you kind of see which systems work, why they work. And uh it was, you know, I was fortunate enough to go later on in my life to do MBA at uh Chicago booth and again interact with a lot of people that's you know, people who follow military. Milton Friedman's uh school of thought on on you know the role of government and the role of each sector within the ecosystem and see how one interfering in the other causes distortions potentially, right? It is interesting that the movies we've seen growing up in emerging markets. are being played in developed markets today, right? Government interfering in the industries,

6:33policies, the lack of fiscal discipline, all of which cause these issues are being replicated. Even in you know parts of the US, I mean, or in other parts of the world, people are pushing for government to get more involved. in the private sector. And we've seen how that pans out growing up. We've seen those movies before, right? So to a certain extent, you do get that benefit. It's almost like re-watching a movie, and you kind of know how it ends. You don't know how long the movie is going to be, but you kind of roughly know uh the direction of travel, right? So those are the benefits. But at the same time, this the other interesting. thing is a lot of times people get so enamored by the growth in these emerging markets and don't really understand the risks and challenges in these emerging markets. Both Bainey and I, we've grown up in emerging markets. Bainey grew up in China, I grew up in India. And so when we're looking at emerging markets, not just India or China, but across the world, we are a bit more skeptical in terms of looking under the hood, right? In a lot of times, when somebody says, Oh, this company has

7:41a factory in XYZ that produces this much of revenue. People start with, you know, looking at the margins and the revenue growth trajectory. We start with does the town exist? Does the factory exist? Right? Call it because of scar tissues, call it whatever, but that's where we start off. So our due diligence, uh, we spend a lot more time. uh doing our due diligence on the ground, not just on the companies, but on the people as well. Right? Looking at how these people have allocated capital or interacted with their other partners in the past, because that also gives you a good idea of how they are likely to behave in the future.

8:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Most foreign money sits in India in a handful of big companies. Your portfolio looks at companies that are below five billion usually. When you're fishing in these waters, what are the things that really concern you and what makes you feel that that's the segment of the market that will grow faster than the others?

8:44Anand Vasagiri: Okay. Uh it's a good question, Nitin. The reason why. as I mentioned early on, why we narrowed down on this part of the universe globally is that A, it is a very large universe. If you look at uh just do a Bloomberg screen, if you look at the number of companies under 5 billion outside of the US, they are about 56,000 companies. You do the same in India, uh, you get 6700 odd companies. right? That are under 5 billion. And above 5 billion, they are in India probably about 200 odd companies. Globally, they're just under 3,000 companies. So the universe compared to the large cap space is much larger, number one. And it's very, very undercovered. In many cases, when we enter into a market, typically find that. the stocks are not as well covered. In a large cap universe, you'll have companies that are typically covered by six to seven analysts or more. In our small cap universe, oftentimes we do get this question that when we go meet with the management teams and ask them how many investors or analysts they've met with recently, they'll say, Oh, we met the last one we met with uh was about uh six

10:02years ago. The last meeting they've had was about six years ago. So we do get that. Less common in India for us to get that question because India seems to have in that universe is slightly more coverage. But the one thing I want to emphasize is coverage does not necessarily mean the same as knowing a business or understanding a business. And many times these companies are covered by people who are relatively fresh out of college, relatively young, and have just focused on one sector. So oftentimes, while they may be great at modeling out the financials or doing a DCF, many times we do find that they lack the perspective and often miss the forest for the trees. Bainey and I, we've been doing this for about 20 plus years each. We have invested in domestic markets, international foreign markets. We've invested in small caps and large caps. We've invested in developed markets and emerging markets. So across the market cap spectrum, and we've done it through the cycles, right? So we

11:14have at the the benefit of some experience and perspective that helps us immensely when we are looking at companies in a country or in a sector. And going back to our earlier discussion, that kind of sometimes we feel like we are time travelers. To give you some concrete examples, during the financial crisis, GFC, we did a lot of work on creative trade rating companies in the US, SPE and Moody's. Right? And there was a lot of concern about those business models getting fundamentally disrupted or eliminated either by the regulator or because of market parts. But and so we did that analysis and we came out with certain understanding of how things evolve post-crisis. Post the crisis. And fast forward to 2018, there was a similar situation, not exactly the same, but similar situation in India when the infrastructure leasing in financial services, ILNFS, declared bankruptcy, right? Defaulted. And there was again a lot of concern, and rightfully so, there was a lot of queries from the regulator on the three great rating companies Crystal, uh, Moody's and uh Care Kerr in India. Uh the three listed companies, and we started doing a deep dive on it with the benefit of having done similar work and

12:32having seen that cycle play out or something similar play out in a different part of the world in the past, earlier. And so we had that benefit and we after doing a lot of analysis, we realized that the franchise value is not as impacted as people are worried about. And so we became a shareholder in care. It met our four key criteria and it was trading at a value that we thought was very attractive, and we didn't think the franchise was structurally impaired because of the situation. So we became shareholders. So that's one example. The other thing is in India, yeah, there's now a lot of talk about SIP. and all these passive flows, capital that is coming into the market, and people assume naturally that that flows to every name in the universe. However, if you look at the flows, in many cases, even the passive flows have to come through either a fund or an ETF or an index, right? An ETF tied to an index.

13:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If

13:38Anand Vasagiri: I look at iShare's ETF in India, the Smin ETF, that's one ETF I'm just using as an example, that only has 450 names out of 6,700 potential names in the Indian universe, too. So the coverage, even for passive flows, is not as broad. And for that reason, their names that continue to be overlooked or misunderstood. And CARE, I gave you an example of CARE before, and that was a little while ago during COVID, is when we became shareholders of care. But I'll give you another name that's more common, right? PDRI Knox. That's practically a household name in India. And still, that company last year was training at roughly at the same level that it was trading at during the peak of COVID when theaters were shut down, despite having a much better balance sheet and despite improving the business model quite considerably over the last four or five years. So, with a better business model, with a cleaner balance sheet, it was trading at a valuation that kind of assumed that the business was structurally impaired, whereas we thought it was cyclically going through a phase. And so again, this is a well-known

14:51name in India that still was attractively priced. And so in any country or you know, in any geography or a sector, we're not looking for tens of names or hundreds of names. Our total portfolio has about 30, somewhere between 30 to 40 names at any given point. And our average holding period is about five years. So we are only looking for a handful of names. new names each year, and we can afford to be very, very picky. And we do find that there are pockets in the market, even in even when markets

15:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in

15:26Anand Vasagiri: or if some country is in favor, there'll still be pockets within that country that are out of favor. Right? And so we do fish there and try to find this asymmetric risk-reward risk reward outcome. That is largely misunderstood.

15:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Anand, India is a high-priced market. It continues to have good companies, but peas rarely shrink. What's your take on that, given that you come from a value background? Is value investing working in India or is it growth at a reasonable price?

16:00Anand Vasagiri: Great question, Nitin. Nathan. Again, as I mentioned earlier. we are benchmark agnostic investors, very disciplined investors. And if we go to a market and if we don't find companies that meet our criteria, we don't move the lines. We don't adjust our criteria. We stay disciplined. We don't adjust our discount rates when the valuations are not justifiable and say, oh. central banks are going to drop interest rates, so you can justify a higher price with a lower discount rate, etc. We don't do stuff like that. We stay very disciplined. Our process has not changed in 20 years. Now, if we look past the characterizations, right? In India, one companies like uh I mentioned CARE and PVR. they were they were disruptions, they were missing uh you know the market misunderstood these names, that we were still able without we were able to invest in them, we were able to

17:00identify the stocks, and we did not pay up for those businesses, even though those are great franchises in our perspective. That's number one. Number two, uh, if you look beyond the superficial characterization, I'll give you another example. We have a company in our portfolio called Kansai Painz. Paints, and that's a core holding for us in one of our top 10 positions. Kansai Paints is a company that's domiciled in Japan and listed in Japan. The company, when we initiated our position, was trading at around 11-12 times earnings, right? Reasonable, quite attractive.

17:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): For

17:33Anand Vasagiri: a Japanese paint company, immediately people will say, Yeah, for a Japanese paint company, that probably is a fair multiple, right? That company is run by a very good, sensible management team with a clean balance sheet and you know at a reasonably attractive valuation. Now, if you look under the hood, Kansai gets only less than 30% of its revenue from Japan. The rest of it comes from outside the country. And they own close to just under 75% of the listed Indian. paint subsidiary, Kansai Merlak, KNPL. Right? And that has good exposure to both the decorative side and even more attractive industrial coating side that is benefiting structurally from all the tailwinds of you know of growth in investments in infrastructure in India. And we're able to get all of that business along with business. businesses in other parts of the world in other emerging markets all paying you know 11, 12 times under under that.

18:35Right? So sometimes we do get to invest or benefit from the growth in India without necessarily having to pay up for that growth.

18:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Anand how has your India portfolio changed over a period of time since you joined back at artisan partners?

18:52Anand Vasagiri: So when we launched the portfolio originally, care was a big position for us. And as it came closer to our estimate of fair value or the discount to fair value narrowed, we trimmed our position. There was another reason why we trimmed our position because there was this for some of the pools of capital that we manage, we have different pools of capital under our her strategy. and some for some of the pools, the regulator changed or increased the compliance burden, or there were additional requirements. Disclosure uh requirements. There was a additional disclosure framework that was introduced in India that put additional burden on just some pools of capital, which made it harder for us and a lot more onerous for us to manage that. India exposure. So today it's at about two percent, just over two percent of our total uh or strategy portfolio position. We don't necessarily think

19:52of that as India exposure. As I said, Kansai Painz is a uh much bigger uh weight in our portfolio and maybe a third of that value is actually coming from India. That doesn't count towards India exposure, but in our minds that is exposure for India, right?

20:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Sure. Have you exited any positions, Anil, in the last uh four or five years in India?

20:15Anand Vasagiri: No. We these were the only two positions that were initiated. Uh we've trimmed our position in care ratings, but we've not exited it. It still continues to be uh a position for us. And the other position we initiated is PDF.

20:31Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And then your view on India being one of the uh places where founders are still holding majority or a substantial stake. So, how does that dynamic play out for you in India versus other geographies?

20:44Anand Vasagiri: Good question, Sarab. Uh, one thing I would say is that this feature is not unique to India. There are a lot of other companies, listed companies in Asia where the founders are still actively involved. Netnet, if the promoter, as they're called in India, or founders or owner operators, as they're called elsewhere, if they are actively involved in the business and are focused on value creation, we are positively biased towards our. such situations. And we do have names in our portfolio where the owner operators have created substantial value and continue to be actively involved and drive a lot of decisions on capital allocation and even business strategy. Right? The challenge is in finding those people. because there are also a lot of scenarios where the owner operators are focused more on shuffling value instead of growing the whole pie and increasing the size of the pie for everybody and creating value, they're more focused on shuffling value and moving value from minority investors.

22:03over to the majority or to their controlling shareholders. In the long run, unfortunately, most of those attempts end up destroying value, including the value that they own. But it's unfortunate that many of those people don't realize

22:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that. So

22:19Anand Vasagiri: that's one scenario. You do have these governance issues in other parts of the world as well, where you have, you know, in parts of Europe, you have some really entrenched boards, or boards who don't really think of value, who are not focused on value creation. Or you have boards who are extremely conservative and don't have a sense of urgency in other parts of the world. Right? So all these all tied to governance issues, right? Ultimately. So we do spend a lot of time meeting with people, and that's the reason good management teams are or good people, is one of our key criteria, one of our focus. four key criteria. And so we do spend a lot of time trying to figure out how these people have acted in the past, what actions are they doing right now, or what actions are they taking right now, and how they are likely to behave in the future, and if that's going to be value accretive to the enterprise as a whole, as opposed to just their own pocket, right? So we do spend a lot of time thinking about that, we do spend a lot of time asking. people about that. We spend a lot of time trying to figure out if these people think of minority investors as partners, or do they think of them as a pain that needs to be dealt with, right?

23:28And there are many times where you do go and ask, start asking questions, and sometimes you have to ask tough questions. When you go meet with the management teams, sometimes the promoters are not even willing to meet, and that does send a signal as well, right? If you're not even willing to meet with the minority investors, that tells you how important you think those that constituency is for your business. And so we do ask, and because this is an Indian podcast, I'll give you, I'm trying to give as many India-specific examples. And in at least a couple of my meetings, there was one meeting where the management team said, My understanding of finance was quite antiquated, right? In a lot less colorful language, of course. And uh there was another promoter who was really agitated with my questions, and he said, I don't have the creativity to understand their accounting and financial statements. Right? Those were great meetings too, from my perspective, because they're very productive. They stopped me from investing any more time. in those companies, right? Better to find it at that time rather than after you've allocated capital to a name like

24:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.

24:34Anand Vasagiri: So we do look at these things. We actually

24:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are

24:39Anand Vasagiri: less impressed by what they say in a boardroom or in a meeting, and we are more impressed by their actions. Right? We put a higher weight on their actions as opposed to what they tell us.

24:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Has that changed with the change in generations of the family over your 20 years career in this space? Type meeting these kind of families. Has there been a shift as generations have changed?

25:04Anand Vasagiri: Sometimes there is, Nitir. That's actually a very good point. I won't name the name of a company, but there was one instance where the founder or the promoter. fell sick, and his son, who was actually doing uh an advanced you know, master's program in computer science in the US, left that and came back to India to sorry, came back. This is not an Indian company, so okay, went back to take over the business and he ran the business. And he immediately he found out using his background how to cut costs, how to streamline the operations much more efficiently, and do stuff like that. So initially, you know, that those are all positive signs. So I was very impressed and we became shareholders. This was earlier, way, way earlier. And then that was the first meeting. Two years, three years later, the business had started to perform nicely. I went back to meet with this person, and this person had a very fancy racing car. uh parked outside the

26:05office and was more interested in talking about his vacation in his car than about the business this time. So then we realized okay, it's time to move on, right? Because his his priorities have changed. Looks like they have changed, right? And so we we moved on. So those are instances, but in general you we do look for scenarios in many parts of the world where you have if you have a younger generation who comes with a slightly different mindset, then there is a better chance of value creation, there's better chance of good capital allocation. And uh we factor that into our analysis.

26:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): There's another challenge in the space which you look at Anand in India, which is liquidity. So, how do you how do you handle that liquidity uh challenge?

26:54Anand Vasagiri: It's a brilliant question, Sarah. But the thing is, that is the other side of the opportunity set coin, right? If you are getting all of these opportunities only because these stocks are not as liquid for large firm funds to go in and exploit those inefficiencies. So it requires one patience, it requires conviction. The ideal scenario is you enter a company when it's an illiquid small cap and you exit when it is a liquid large cap, right? That's the ideal scenario. But you know, there are instances where that does not happen. And if you look at the reasons why it does not happen, usually we realize that usually if the franchise is impacted, right? If the quality of the business deteriorates, or if it is a commoditized business, then you're actually racing against time to extract value. It's more like a shrinking ice cube. You have to extract value before the ice cube completely melts. But if you've invested in a franchise where the value is getting compounded,

28:01then even if the price comes down, your margin of safety would have only grown, right? And as long as you're a patient investor and you're not a forced seller, then that is a very attractive setup. And the reason why I say attractive is over time we've realized that we had names like that in our portfolio. But immediately that value it may not be apparent to the market today. but it starts attracting other capital, sometimes strategic capital, sometimes portfolio capital, or like something like a PE. And we have benefited. If you look at our portfolio, we've had benefit, you know, we've had the benefit of uh buyouts. We have had several buyouts over the last since the time we launched, and you know, on average, maybe two, three buyouts per year, roughly. Uh, it's never linear. and you can never time it. But if you're buying good businesses, trading at attractive valuations with clean balance sheets, they do attract both, as I said, strategic as well as you know, financial investors. So that's another way. So focusing on the quality of the business does reduce the risk of that happening. And the last thing is you also need companies to have some kind of self help strategies. Right? What if the market does not realize?

29:21Do you sit waiting for a buyout? Or if you have if you're cash generative and your business continues to do well, you can deploy that to buy back your own shares. So share buybacks can be another lever through which you can start creating value. You become the market marginal buyer of your own shares. And we keep pushing companies in our portfolios to do that. India, again, is very early in that journey, but some companies in other parts of the world are much further along. US companies have always done that, but you can create a lot of value by buying back your own shares at very attractive multiple or depressed multiples. Right. So that's another lever that can be used by the companies. So we look for companies that have all of these. So even if we are wrong on the timing, or even even if we are, you know, as patient investors, we have we give them a lot of real runway. But we do want the companies to think about all of these levers of value creation.

30:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): India has seen a lot of regulatory changes over these years, some good and have resulted in better governance in the space that you are essentially. fishing in. But overall it has improved the quality of information that is shared with the investor per se. What's your take on that? Has that increased the universe in which you would like to pick your uh choices from?

30:43Anand Vasagiri: Yes, Nitin. Many times you see the companies that we interact with, these are small cap, mid-cap mid cap companies. right? They don't have the benefit of a lot of A interactions with foreign investors, and many times even interactions with sell side analysts or local bankers or consultants. So they're not as polished in their answers or in what in the material that they present. Many times we tell the companies how they should tweak their tech to make a better pitch. Right. So while the disclosure rules may have improved, we've always believed in doing a lot of on-the-ground due diligence, first-hand research. So we do see through that information or we do look past, you know, if somebody is not polished enough to present a promoter, some, you know, some promoters are very slick. when it comes to presenting their uh pitches or their investment cases, others are not. We try to look past that uh to really see how they're acting in their businesses. That's number one. Number two, in terms of being open and transparent, we we treasure that a lot

31:56more than how well they're presenting their case, right? Most of the times the due diligence we do, we come up, you know, come. we have questions that may not be the most pleasant ones for the management to explain or understand. We're not there to win beauty contests or popularity contests. And so we go in with tough questions. And if some management team takes offense at Of that, then you know that tells us something. But coming back to your question on the regulatory side, more disclosure definitely helps. But at the same time, if it's confusing disclosure, and you're the only one who's doing the due diligence, then that's an itch too.

32:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): How is regulatory framework in India compared to other geographies? And then what's your view over a period of time?

32:46Anand Vasagiri: While the regulatory burden seem to ease, seems to seem to have eased. over time, I we still do believe many of them do face friction. And these are legitimate long-term foreign investors who with a long-term horizon, right? They're not trying to go in and out very quickly, and they do face this friction. Um, and again, I gave the example of the additional disclosure framework for FPIs. We understand its purpose and intent, but if the regulation makes it too hard or too onerous for legitimate market participants, then you know it's something that needs to be looked at. The broader issue is India, like many other countries, is competing globally for patient capital. Right? And to the extent that foreign investors are attracted by the businesses, if they face too much of friction or if the the costs are too onerous, then it deters

33:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this

33:45Anand Vasagiri: capital from coming into India just because of the operational complexity. Right. It still takes much longer to open accounts in India. It still it's R my understanding that it's still more onerous than if you know compared to even uh other emerging markets. India is one of the last markets that many of these investors end up opening. So that's one challenge. The other thing more on a personal front is yeah, I can open uh an account in Charles Schwab or Interactive Brokers from the US and invest in many emerging markets, including South Africa and Indonesia. Um but I can't invest in India as a former foreign investor with an account here, right? So there are these hurdles and I'm sure the regulators and the government are working on it. At some point, hopefully they'll bring the friction down.

34:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Anand, given that most of your money would be uh would be US dollar denominated, what's your view on the currency depreciation and how do you handle the currency risk uh in your portfolio?

34:52Anand Vasagiri: Right. Sarab, our returns are measured in dollars, right, for reporting purposes. So what I earn or what a stock does in Indian rupee or Indonesian rupiah or Turkish lira has very little bearing uh to our investors or to our performance. If I say we did this in Turkish lira, but most of it got eaten up. by currency depreciation, yeah, it doesn't help, right? So historically, when we've invested in emerging markets, we assume that the currencies would depreciate somewhere between two to five percent, depending on the state of the emerging market, annually. And because our average holding period is about five years, we assume then that we would face a somewhere between 10 to 20 percent headwind. from currency alone. So if we need a 30% discount to fair value for a company in Switzerland, right? For a portfolio potential portfolio investment in Switzerland, we want a 30% discount to our estimate of fair value. Then if we're looking at the looking at a company in an emerging market, then we need an additional 10 to 20% percent of upside to compare it on a like like-for-like for like basis, right? So we we did look for that additional upside when we were investing in emerging markets. Now, as we discussed earlier, some of the emerging market

36:11countries have better balance sheets and are being fiscally more prudent than many developed markets, right? So these things do are changing and do change, and that may change how we have to factor in currency depreciation in the future and not. just blindly use the two to five percent uh that we've per annum depreciation headwind that we have assumed in the past.

36:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And what's your take on value investing versus momentum investing, etc., which is happening a lot, right? So you're gravitating towards the value investing, but

36:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): most

36:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of the investors are either going uh for passive investing or uh for kind of momentum investing. What's your view of value investing? And it has kind of underperformed over over the last five, six years in India and and globally. Uh what so what's your what's your view?

37:01Anand Vasagiri: So two things, uh Sarah. If you take the traditional value investing as a you know, if you analyze traditional value investing, that typically means buying optically cheap companies. whether it's companies at a deep discount to book or low PE. That's how I came into this business as well, with that mindset. That if you buy a company at a discount to book, then you have some margin of safety. If it is at a greater discount to book, it has a greater margin of safety. And one of the first things David did when I joined as an intern, uh for him in 2004 was take me to this conference room and he explained how time and the business quality change that equation.

37:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And

37:49Anand Vasagiri: I kind of touched on it earlier, where if you are buying a good business that compounds value, you could have paid maybe one times price to book. But if the value has grown

38:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and

38:01Anand Vasagiri: the price has not moved, your margin of safety has actually increased. But if you've actually bought a business at a discount to book, let's say 70% of book, price to book of 0.7. But if it's a shrinking ice cube, value continues to leak, and three years' time, if you not realize the value, then it's probably at one times book, right? And so if the multi so you're actually losing value in one case, and in another case, you're actually getting bigger margin of safety on your investment. And so that to be very honestly, that was an aha moment, right? On focusing on quality of franchises and willing to pay up for a higher quality franchise. That's point number one. Point number two is so quality of franchise does make an impact. And if you look go back and look at Pharma French three factor model, even they have increased the number of factors to add quality as a parameter. Right? So even the empirical research now supports this view. That's number one. Number two, if you look at

39:08companies and if you look at the traditional way of classification from value investment. investing perspective, as the economy became more and more knowledge-based, traditional accounting metrics or methods did not capture that, right? RD is expensed,

39:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): right?

39:27Anand Vasagiri: So all of the IP that is getting created through RD is not captured in a traditional metric. Those metrics worked well when you have a manufacturing company, you have a commodity company, or you have you had a bank, and again, largely commoditized capital. So for those, those metrics worked very well. But if you had a knowledge based economy where net we you know you have the benefits of network effects, etc., traditional accounting metrics did not capture that very well. So when you talk of value not working well, it is usually the case

40:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of the

40:01Anand Vasagiri: traditional value metric. metrics like price to book or PE not working very well. Because now you're comparing an old school industry with new business models that are much better business models because they're the they're more capital efficient and have better returns on capital. But don't necessarily follow the old traditional metrics or value, right? So that's the second uh part I would say. The third and the final part of explanation that I would offer is as passive investing became more prevalent, they that automatically led to momentum investing. And the reason why I say that is if you have passive capital, as more money flows into it, the names that do well are the same names that are included. in the index or that are bought by passive capital to begin with. So SP 500, for example, as more and more money floods into that index or goes passive, you automatically get the momentum benefit just because of increased allocation of passive capital, right? So that's another tailwind momentum investing seems to have had in recent years, but again.

41:15as I said, our goal is not exposures, our goal is to genuinely create value. So we believe that if we find 30 to 35 or 40 very attractively priced asymmetric risk reward outcomes, we should be able to compete irrespective of the factor with any index or any style of investing on a through through-the-cycle the cycle basis. basis.

41:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): What happens when the index narrows down to only a few handful of stocks as it is happening today?

41:45Anand Vasagiri: It does. And that that's a fascinating observation, Nithan. But at the same time, if somebody wants exposure to that, you know, that's fine. We are genuinely focused on creating value. And part of the reason could also be that this is all Baini and I do. and we both have a substantial portion of our personal wealth invested. So when we when you have your personal wealth invested in something, you don't really care whether that index has gone up X percent or Y percent. You genuinely want to create value and you want to protect the downside.

42:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Anand you have had a long investing journey, and over this period of time, I think a lot of hypothesis. hypotheses would have been created, and a lot of things, lot of those I would not have stood the test of time. So, can you uh talk us through one of them?

42:35Anand Vasagiri: You have different explanations that come through at different times. But the more things change, somebody else said it's not my statement, the more things change, the more they remain the same. So when you go through cycles, sometimes you feel that you know you don't understand it. you're missing out on something, but at the same time, sticking to the basics and staying disciplined has helped. I've seen investors immensely on a through the cycle basis. Right? The very first time I got caught in a euphoria was when I started investing during my undergrad days, and maybe it's well before your time, but sure, but during the Harshad. Meta bull market run, and I was investing my tuition money in that time, very small. And every stock I bought was going up, and I thought I was genius. And then everything, the whole market crashed, and then that's when you realize, or at least I realized, that um there's a lot more to investing than just buying stocks that go up. Right? So I started learning more about investing. And you do see these cycles over time.

43:43There are different waves that happen. And there are times when you know dollar is very strong now, and people are talking about US exceptionalism. But I've seen this movie before. I mean, there were times in uh 20 in 2005 7 timeframe, Time frame, emerging markets had such a great run. I I do know of, or at least I've have read one article. about some model refusing to take payments in US dollars because that person thought US dollar would be worthless. This was in 2005 7 time frame. If you search on the internet, you'll know who I'm talking about. And that's one scenario. And there were also scenarios where at one point there was a rush to enlist companies in a particular exchange. because companies thought they would get better multiples there. Hong Kong attracted a lot of uh listings, or at least a lot of companies thought that they would get better valuations if they went to Hong Kong and list there. Right? Some of these companies now are

44:43trying hard to delist there and come to list elsewhere. But these are all things you do see. I mean, they don't create value, they create a lot of activity. and a lot of, you know, they cost a lot for companies and their distractions. And even now, now suddenly a lot of companies in Europe, if you go and talk to them, they say, Oh, we're thinking of relisting in the US. Right? It's like me saying, or somebody saying that I don't go to a gym, but I have a gym membership. Maybe if I change my gym membership and go to don't go to the next gym, I'll get a better result. If you're not going to the gym, you're not going to get a better result no matter where you have the membership. Right? Just by changing your membership, you don't get the benefit. You have to take action. It's the same thing just by changing where you list, you don't necessarily get the same benefit. You have to take actions that that particular universe or that set of investors demand. Right? Being more disciplined on governance. being more disciplined on capital allocation. So those are the things that are necessary. So without doing all of those, if you just switch, then you don't necessarily get the same benefit. And you see the same things, you know, you have the dot-com crisis, and you know, you had massive investments in Fiverr's investment at one point, right? There were these constant interviews on TV that talked.

46:03about how internet capacity or bandwidth was had to double every hundred days or so, right? Uh and companies invested a lot. And I think to this day we enjoy the benefit of the massive investment. But there was a also material destruction of value in that process. Right? So we're seeing some of those again.

46:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Anand can you talk us through uh some of the mistakes or some of the uh things which which you would have done over a period of time, right? Uh some of the investments which may have not gone as per as per your thesis or as per what you envisaged.

46:40Anand Vasagiri: So the underlying mis uh lesson from our mistakes is often about people and capital allocation. Uh we can model earnings. reasonably well, especially if you're focused on uh looking at durable franchises. Um and if we still get the investment wrong, it's usually because management and ended up deploying capital in ways that did not create a lot of value. Right? Investing is, as you know, a probabilistic exercise, right? Even if you are investing in something that has a 70-30 odds of uh success, it still can fail in those 30% of the cases. So the critical distinction that we need to make is between an unfavorable outcome versus a flawed process. Right? If it's an unfavorable outcome, but if you underwrote it with a 70-30 uh odd scenario, there are still 30% of the cases where a good underwriting

47:43process will still have a bad outcome, right? Or not necessarily a good outcome. So segregating that, if you if we just look at uh our history, uh most of the cases where you know we were disappointed with the outcome were scenarios where the capital allocation ended up being value destructive. And if you look at the traditional valuation methods, most of the times you have in a DCF almost two-thirds of the value coming from terminal value. Right? And that implies that a the duration or durability of the franchise is valid for that period that you underwrote, and the price you paid for that franchise. justified or matches with that duration. And lastly, the people who are involved in capital allocation actually took that capital during that period and allocated in a value accretive process. And many times the mistakes happen because people or management teams or promoters end up taking actions that destroy that value, and that has a huge impact on. the terminal value. Again, judging people is hard. That's the reason why we spend a lot of time on the ground meeting with people, but we still make mistakes.

48:58Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Let me be more cheery. When was the case where your thesis was more gloomy than the outcome? You didn't expect it to be so successful.

49:11Anand Vasagiri: If the outcome uh is great or better than what you expected, and you get better returns, you always take the grade. But no, on a serious note, there are a lot of times, as value investors, you're looking for a margin of safety. So you're saying, okay, if half of my assumptions go wrong, will my capital still be protected? That is the asymmetric risk reward outcome you're talking about. But at the same time, you do understand, if you're a disciplined investor, you do understand that there could be real option, there could be a real option value. for some of the upsides, right? So sometimes, for example, we had this one company in Germany that when we got in, it had a very small exposure to defense, not even directly to defense, but you know, on the side, making one small product that could potentially be used. Uh That was never part of a our thesis, but suddenly they got a huge defense contract. That's icing all on the cake for us, but that was not our thesis. We you know, we openly admit it. Uh it continued to execute on other fronts that did deliver and create a lot of value, and that was on a in our thesis. But this additional icing on the cake, we're happy to take it when it comes, but at the same time, you know it's like winning a lottery.

50:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): What are one or two conversations which maybe global allocators or investors need to have about India? which they are not having about India?

50:28Anand Vasagiri: When you talk of global allocators, Sarah, and again, I can only speak from my perspective, the goal is always and we are paid to create value. We're not paid to allocate to India, or to any country for that matter, or to any sector for that matter, right? So to the extent that you have A an attractive local economy, to the extent you have a streamlined regulation. regulatory framework that works well with not of uh with not a lot of unnecessary friction in the process, and you have good companies with good governance, then automatically it becomes a favorite destination. And so you don't necessarily have to go out and seek capital, capital will find its way to those markets that have these uh criteria.

51:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So great uh great speaking with you, Anand. Uh it's been lovely uh chatting with you. Uh it's been a great conversation. Thank you so much for your

51:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): time. Thank

51:21Anand Vasagiri: you, Sarat. Thank you, Nitin. Really enjoyed the conversation. Cheers.

51:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thank

51:27Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.

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