Chris Acito argues ROE justifies BDC premiums and discounts, identifying six premium-trading funds as value opportunities.
Summary
Chris Acito of Gapstow Capital Partners advocates using Return on Equity (ROE) as the primary metric for evaluating business development companies (BDCs), arguing it reflects the cash-on-cash return of the underlying loan portfolio. He posits that funds should earn 9-10% ROE to trade at net asset value (NAV), with lower returns warranting discounts and higher returns justifying premiums. Acito identifies six BDCs trading at premiums as exemplars of this strategy, contrasting them with the typical market narrative focused on discounted valuations. He provides specific buy, pass, and watchlist recommendations for several BDCs based on their ROE relative to their trading price. The discussion distinguishes alternative credit from traditional fixed income by highlighting the illiquidity and origination premiums inherent in BDC loans.
Key takeaways
- 1 BDCs trading at 80% of book value are not automatically attractive; if their ROE is low (e.g., 5%), the discount is rational and necessary to bring the investor's return on invested capital back to the 9-10% target.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 7:05
- 2 BDCs trading at a premium (e.g., 30% above book) are justified if they generate mid-teens ROE (e.g., 15%), as investors pay more for higher underlying portfolio performance.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 8:03
- 3 BDC loans confer an additional yield pickup beyond high-yield premiums due to illiquidity and origination premiums, as they are often privately negotiated and narrowly distributed.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 12:15
- 4 Main Street, Capital Southwest, Trinity Capital, Hercules, Sixth Street, and Aries are identified as poster children for the strategy because they generate above-average ROE relative to peers, justifying their premium valuations.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 13:20
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 0:26
Sponsor Read
CEFdata.com promotes its data tracking services for closed-end funds and non-listed funds.
- 0:26 – 3:01
Introduction and Methodology
Chuck Jaffe introduces Chris Acito of Gapstow Capital Partners, who explains his credit-centric, fund-focused approach. Acito identifies Return on Equity (ROE) as his primary metric for evaluating whether a fund is a value trap or a justified premium.
- 3:01 – 5:18
ROE as a Valuation Tool
Acito defines ROE as the cash-on-cash return generated by the underlying loan portfolio, distinct from share price volatility. He argues that funds should earn 9-10% ROE to trade at NAV; lower ROE warrants discounts, while higher ROE justifies premiums.
- 5:18 – 11:22
Market Context and Asset Class Definition
Acito discusses the impact of rising rates on fixed income versus floating rate obligations. He defines alternative credit as requiring high single-digit to low double-digit returns, distinguishing it from municipal bonds or traditional fixed income.
- 11:22 – 12:40
Credit Quality and Liquidity Premiums
Acito characterizes BDC loans as below investment grade but notes they offer illiquidity and origination premiums because they are privately negotiated and less liquid than broadly syndicated high yield bonds.
- 12:40 – 16:28
Premium Trading BDCs
Acito identifies six BDCs trading at premiums (Main Street, Capital Southwest, Trinity Capital, Hercules, Sixth Street, Aries) as exemplars due to mid-teens ROE, contrasting them with the typical discount-focused narrative.
- 16:28 – 18:56
Lightning Round: OBDC and SLRC
Acito analyzes OBDC (Blue Owl) and SLRC (SLR Investment). He views OBDC's deep discount as potentially irrational given its ~10% ROE, suggesting a buy. He views SLRC's deep discount as possibly excessive given its 7-8% ROE, but leans toward a buy due to misunderstanding of its asset-backed model.
- 18:56 – 23:51
Lightning Round: OCSL, EIC, ECC
Acito advises against OCSL (Oak Tree) due to low 5-6% ROE justifying its discount. He gives a hard pass on ECC (Eagle Point Credit) due to negative ROE despite high yield. He suggests a qualified watchlist position for EIC (Eagle Point Income), noting its 6.6% ROE is slightly low but directionally appropriate for its discount.
Claims worth verifying
Acito identifies Return on Equity (ROE) as the primary metric for evaluating fund valuation and avoiding value traps.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·3:01
How to verify: Check Gapstow Capital Partners' public materials or investor presentations for their stated investment methodology and definition of ROE. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
BDCs and closed-end funds are portfolios of loans that can trade at premiums or discounts to net asset value (NAV).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·3:41
How to verify: Review SEC filings (N-14 or N-CEN) for BDCs and CEFs to confirm asset composition and market price vs. NAV data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceFunds should earn a 9-10% return on equity to justify trading at NAV.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·6:05
How to verify: Calculate historical ROE for a sample of BDCs/CEFs using SEC filings (10-K/10-Q) to see if the 9-10% threshold aligns with market pricing. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBDCs trading at 80% of book value are not automatically attractive if their ROE is low (e.g., 5%).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·6:45
How to verify: Compare the market price of BDCs trading at ~80% NAV against their reported five-year ROE in financial databases (e.g., Bloomberg, FactSet). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Six listed BDCs trade above par with an average 30% premium and mid-teens five-year ROE.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·8:03
How to verify: Screen for BDCs trading above 100% of NAV and calculate their five-year average ROE using historical financial data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Ten BDCs trade at 60% of book or less with an average six percent five-year ROE.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·8:36
How to verify: Screen for BDCs trading below 60% of NAV and calculate their five-year average ROE using historical financial data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Blue Owl Capital Corp (OBDC) trades at a more than 20% discount to NAV with NAV returns close to 10%.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·16:40
How to verify: Check OBDC's current market price and NAV per share from financial data providers; review OBDC's 10-K for historical ROE. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSLR Investment Corp (SLRC) has a five-year ROE in the seven to eight percent range and trades at a >30% discount.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·18:15
How to verify: Calculate SLRC's five-year ROE from SEC filings and compare its market price to its NAV. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceOak Tree Specialty Lending (OCSL) has a five-year ROE of 5-6% and trades at a 20% discount.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·19:16
How to verify: Calculate OCSL's five-year ROE from SEC filings and compare its market price to its NAV. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEagle Point Credit (ECC) has a slightly negative internal core ROE and trades at ~50% of NAV with a >40% yield.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·21:07
How to verify: Check ECC's reported NAV trend and yield from financial data providers; review ECC's filings for portfolio performance data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify the five-year ROE calculations for the six premium-trading BDCs (Main Street, Capital Southwest, Trinity Capital, Hercules, Sixth Street, Aries) using their SEC filings (N-1A or N-CSR) to confirm the 'mid-teens' claim.
- Check the current share price and NAV of OBDC and SLRC to assess if their discounts remain 'irrational' or 'excessive' relative to their latest reported ROE figures.
- Review ECC's (Eagle Point Credit) dividend history and portfolio composition to understand the cause of its negative ROE and high yield, verifying Acito's 'hard pass' rationale.
- Analyze OCSL's (Oak Tree) dividend sustainability and ROE trends to determine if its 5-6% ROE justifies its discount or if management can improve returns.
- Compare BDC loan yields to broadly syndicated high-yield bond yields to validate the claim of 'illiquidity and origination premiums' in the alternative credit space.
- Read Gapstow Capital Partners' investment policy statement or public disclosures to identify any potential conflicts of interest in recommending specific BDCs.
- Check the latest quarterly reports of EIC (Eagle Point Income) to confirm its 6.6% ROE and assess if it remains 'directionally appropriate' for its discount.
- Investigate the dividend cut history of low-ROE BDCs to verify the 'vicious circle' narrative linking low returns to share price depreciation.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you putting non-traded BDCs or interval funds on your platform? How have their repurchase windows really played out? And how do they compare to listed BDCs and credit ETFs? CEF Data Tracks It, Human Checked, across the full non-listed universe. Built by CEF advisors, closed-end fund specialists for over 35 years. For platforms, service providers, sponsors, and boards, CEFdata.com.
0:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey,
0:26Chuck Jaffe: it's Chuck. Jaffe, host of the Navigator Podcast from the Active Investment Company Alliance. Every weekday, I also host an hour-long financial interview program called Money Life. And our show on November the 19th included Chris Acido, Chief Executive Officer at Gapstow Capital Partners. He was there for a feature called the Money Life Market Call, and since the focus of the conversation was closed closed-end end funds and business development companies, we wanted to make sure you had a chance to listen in. So here it is as a bonus episode of The Navigator. Enjoy. Chris Acedo, Chief Executive Officer at Gapstow Capital Partners, is here. We're talking credit markets, closed-end funds, and business development companies now on the Money Life Market Call. Welcome to the Market Call, the part of the show where we talk with experienced money managers about how they do their job, what they look for that determines their buys and sells, what they see happening broadly on the market, and how they put it all together. And making his debut today on the show, Chris Acido, Chief Executive Officer at
1:36Gapstow Capital Partners, online. at Gapstow, Gap S T O W Gapstow.com. He is a credit-centric manager, meaning we're looking at credit markets. He does it with closed-end funds, but not all closed-end funds. There are parts of the credit market that are not really his focus. And he does it with business development companies. So And we're going to discuss all of that now. Chris Acido, Aceto, great to have you here on Money Life.
2:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Chuck, it is great to be here. Thanks for having me.
2:05Chuck Jaffe: We always start with methodology. You've got an approach that drills you into certain parts of the credit market, kind of keeps you away from the others, but also the things that you are looking for, you're pretty specific in what you want to see. So help us understand how it works.
2:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Happy to, Chuck. Um, I think you introduced Gap GapSale Sale very well. Just to say it again, we are a credit. credit-centric fund investor. And that's an important part to talking about the methodology for our audience. We're investing in funds, not individual stocks. And to me, it's it's an interesting question. You you always like to think of a money manager as you want to evaluate their process and their people. And all of the things are very important. But I think for the audience today, I want to tell you there's one metric. that I really hone in on as sort of a good first step for whether or not a fund is something we want to be taking a look at from a valuation standpoint. And as you know, this this is an interesting time to be talking about this because people were familiar with the fact that BDCs and closed end funds are trading at discounts, some very, very significant. How do you make sure that you're not in a value trap? Um, how do you make sure that you're not just drawn to a very high yield? So, my first and foremost uh metric to look at is return on equity. Um, and I can dive into that, Chuck, if you want. One, What is return on equity? Coming back to funds, the funds that we look at and BDC. BDCs included within that, are
3:41portfolios of loans. That's what they own. And so you would think that uh the portfolios would more or less be valued at what their net asset value is. But as we know in the listed fund world, sometimes those funds can trade away from net asset value, premium or discount. But if you focus on how well that actual portfolio of loans is performing, um, that is what ROE is. That's what return on equity is. Did the portfolio of loans maintain its value, add some interest to that, uh, the dividend to it, and that's what the return on equity is. Different than what the share price return is, and uh different than what a dividend rate is. It's the total return associated with owning that portfolio. To summarize slightly differently, I've given this manager a dollar. Are they doing a good job with it? From a cash on cash return to the
4:43underlying portfolio. And maybe that share price goes through volatility swings, maybe premium, maybe discount. That's somewhat out of a manager's control. Are they doing a good job with investing the capital within that fund structure?
4:58Chuck Jaffe: When you look at current markets, you're credit-centric. We have seen interest rates rise, but for a long time now, whenever rates have gone up and people have said, well, you know, rates go up, we're going to see more defaults and things along those lines. We haven't had waves of defaults. But for you as an investor, do rising rates change the game significantly?
5:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um, rising rates will change the game over time, particularly on valuation. If you're holding fixed income-oriented underlying investments, rising rates will pinch the valuation of those holdings. Sometimes, though, some of these funds are holding floating rate obligations. that will actually increase in value with a rising rate environment, or at least um directionally so, and certainly pick up on the dividend yield standpoint. So depending on the underlying collateral, rates will really have environment. And I think you you've you've transitioned to a really interesting point, Chuck, which is, you know, what what's That's a good return for that ROE I was talking to you about? Um, and I'll give you my metro. metric if if you're so interested. I I think
6:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): these
6:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): funds I think these funds should be earning a nine to ten percent return on equity. Listed funds, they apply some leverage, they take risk with their underlying collateral. That strategy should be able to over time produce Reduce eight, 8, nine, 9, ten 10% percent return on equity. And if they are not doing that, then I think there is some concern with is the manager doing a good job portfolio and potentially they can do a little bit higher. And I think if if you want to assess where we are in the marketplace, everyone is asking right now: uh, BDCs are trading at 80% of book value. Should I jump in? That seems like uh a terrific opportunity. Question is, um, how do I know it's not a value trap? Think about Roe. And um, I'm gonna beat this, I'm gonna beat this drum throughout this podcast, Chuck. ROE, ROE, ROE. To give you an example, you know, if if something is trading at a nine to ten percent roe, I think it should trade more or less at nav. These are obviously directional rules, but uh a good starting point. If you are looking at a BDC or a closed in fund that's generating a 5% return on equity, I don't think it should be a surprise to people
7:25that that probably needs to trade at a discount. That's not an irrational discount. That's saying I will pay less than a dollar for this net asset value in order for my return on my own invested capital to create. creep back up to that 9, 10%. Similarly, there are some BDCs right now who trade at a premium. Why would a premium make sense? Why would I pay more than net asset value? Well, those are BDCs and closed in funds that generate a return on equity that's measured kind of in the mid-teens. Let's let's be really specific. There are 38 more or less listed BDCs right now. The six BDCs that trade above par, and they on average have a are trading at a 30% premium to book, have a five-year return on equity measured in the mid-teens.
8:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
8:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Chris's back of the envelope says a nav-oriented price should be uh 9 nine to 10 ten percent. Um, no surprise that uh a fund that is traded. trading at a premium has a much higher ROE. The other end of the spectrum, though, the 10 or so BDCs that trade at a 60% of book value or less have a five year ROE of six percent on average. So well below Chris's back of the envelope for what a good position should be. I know we're gonna going to talk some specific names later on, but I'm I'm gonna going to use this directional rule on an ongoing basis to establish whether or not there is a value trap. So we can uh we can get into it.
9:01Chuck Jaffe: One of the other things is you're looking for that ROE. There are parts of the fixed income and credit markets that you really don't get into, like you're not into Muni bonds and things along those lines, which I
9:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know
9:14Chuck Jaffe: because we're we've talked in the past, not for the show, but for the Active Investment Company Alliance roundtables that we've we've appeared at together. Is that a market call, or is that an investment share class? In other words, is is this an asset class that you don't want to be in, even though you're looking for credit, or is it a call on I'd be there, but this is not the time to be there?
9:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, it's an asset class. almost an asset class definition, Chuck, which is for alternative credit investing, which is Gapsdow's specialization, we need to look for return profiles that are in the high single digits, if not low double digits, um, for credit instruments. That is what we focus on definitionally, because that's what credit investors demand as having a role of credit in a portfolio. That is to say, they need that return profile to make it relevant. That's very different than MUNI's or traditional fixed income, which have a very different return profile. They play a different role within the portfolio. They diversify from equity as credit does, but they do it in a way that uh produces a lower return profile. It's one of the reasons. people are so interested in credit over the last decade or so, which is how do how do we reintro how do we introduce into our portfolios equity diversifying asset classes that don't have a low return profile?
10:40Chuck Jaffe: Well, looking for the higher return profile, you know, historically high yield has been considered junk bonds, and yet they haven't been junky for a long time. And so there seems to be this sliding scale. While the public still thinks of them as junk bonds, now it might be private credit or something else that like that maybe should earn the level. So I'm curious because you are looking at alternative credits and you're looking at things like BDCs. Are you basically what would now be considered sort of the junk investor, or is the credit quality still good enough that no, there's there's something a little further out there that fall qualifies as junk net?
11:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Well,
11:23Chuck Jaffe: it it is all all junk. I
11:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I like
11:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): not
11:27Chuck Jaffe: to use that. I like
11:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): to it is
11:29Chuck Jaffe: below
11:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): investment
11:30Chuck Jaffe: grade,
11:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): all of these instruments. The BDCs These are different in that the
11:35Chuck Jaffe: below
11:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): investment grade loans um that they own. are typically private, that is to say, not broadly syndicated. They are narrowly distributed, sometimes even bilaterally negotiated with a client. As a result, these are less liquid instruments. And so, in addition to getting paid the high-yield premium, uh which is available, there's also an illiquidity and an origination premium. that come along um with these loans as well. So they uh they are like high yield rated uh below triple B, uh you know, so double B, single B, triple C, but but the less liquid nature of the BDC-oriented loans um confer an additional uh yield pickup as well.
12:23Chuck Jaffe: So while we're going gonna to talk some specific names when we get to my audience's picks in the lightning round, what is a name or two that's kind of the poster child for you right now? Like this is the space that I like to be in. This is the kind of fund or BDC that really is an exemplar of what we want to do.
12:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, well I I think we need to turn to those using my my metric here. Um, you know, who who are those BDCs to stick here that are trading well above book value, who are generating those above average returns on equities. Um, you know, the six firms I referenced earlier um include Main Street, Capital Southwest, Trinity Capital, Hercules, Sixth Street, you know, Aries is pretty close to uh a nav Have or a premium as well. Um those are it that's a heterogeneous group. It is interesting that between the smaller end of the market and the larger end of the private credit market, these firms have been able to uh generate those higher returns on equity relative to uh the peer group right now.
13:28Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
13:29Chuck Jaffe: a lot of people will hear this and go, wait, did he just say that the poster child for the methodology are the things that are trading at premiums? Because almost every time we talk to a closed end fund investor. it's all about the discount. This is distinctly not discount capture, but that is what you said, right? Like the poster children are all the ones that are at premiums.
13:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Well, I got I think there's a good argument for why the higher quality um return on equity metrics. So no value judgment here, just are you returning Earning a higher rate of return? Are the ones that are being rewarded with that premium. And again, we we can now get into is the premium too much or not enough? Uh, but in terms of the the not being a value trap, those are ones. And good pickup, Chuck. That uh uh, you know, there's some in the middle that we I think we're gonna talk to in a in a few minutes that uh maybe are trading below where they should be. But uh don't don't ignore the ones with a premium.
14:25Chuck Jaffe: And is that ultimately what winds up making you sell is that fundamentally it's just if the roe is not good enough, that's gonna be the sell discipline?
14:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): That is a very large component. And it's it's not the the roE is important because not only is it going to be difficult to push the discount back to par, there are other components to it. which are if you're not earning a big enough ROE, are you generating enough income in order to keep a dividend level stable? Do you begin to get into a bit of a vicious circle, which is having to cut dividends, which then uh doesn't attract more investors, which pushes share price down even a little bit more? You know, that's that's where, you know, ROE is important as well. Not you're doing a good stewardship, but we also know this is a very dividend-oriented investing universe. And so, you know, cutting dividends is a is another downside to uh not being able to continue to produce a good ROE.
15:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
15:31Chuck Jaffe: now we're going to get your quick and dirty take on some BDCs and closed end funds my audience is particularly interested in.
15:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Quick and dirty.
15:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Why
15:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): doesn't somebody tell me what they think is
15:46Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): going on here? Yes,
15:48Chuck Jaffe: it's quick and dirty. That's what we call our lightning round here in the market call. We're doing it today with Chris Acido, Chief Executive Officer at Gapstow Capital Partners. Gapstow, G-A-P-S-T-O-W, Gapstow.com. If you want to learn more about Chris and the firm and what they do. You know how quick and dirty works, but if you want to get in on closed-end funds and BDCs, make sure you send your requests for those two to Chuck at moneylifeshow.com. Include the tickers and your hometown. We're going to start today with a request from Al in Orchard Park, New York. It's one of three BDCs we're going to discuss. He wants to know about OBDC. That's Blue Owl Capital
16:28Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Corp. OBDC. NAV returns close to 10%, 9 to 10% historically. Yield 12%. Okay, Chris's metric should mean that should trade closer to par.
16:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
16:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): fact, Blue Owl, and these are all as of uh last week, is trading at a more than 20% discount to nav. Um, I find that interesting. What could potentially potentially uh arrive at that that conclusion, you know, Blue Owl has been associated with a greater degree of technology investment and and software investment. That's not necessarily true of this BDC, but maybe there is an overall concern with the name in that regard. But you would think that uh um at least the uh the Gap Stow style simple back of the envelope, it's interesting that they're trading at uh you know more of a discount than the ROE would would lead one to the lead.
17:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When you hear the word go, you just try to grab it.
17:23Chuck Jaffe: So given that situation, that's a buy on OBDC Blue Owl Capital Corp. Javier in Wilmington, North Carolina wants to know about SLR Investment Corp. That's SLRC.
17:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So SLR SLRC, uh SLRC. Um a little bit of a different BDC, unlike Blue Owl, which focuses on senior loans to corporations or private equity companies, SLRC has a unique business model in which the bigger part of their portfolio is oriented towards asset back lending. For example, um equipment finance. So a little off the beaten path for a typical BDC investor, if in fact they're focusing on the business model. Gap sale back of the envelope, nav returns in the seven to eight range, so maybe a little bit below where we thought, strong yield at 11%. Trading at a big discount, more than 30% of a discount as of as of last week. So, you know, is this a you would warrant uh a little bit of an? a nav return discount, but 35, 30% discount for an interesting firm, maybe a little bit much, maybe it's being hurt by the fact that people don't understand the business model as well as they should.
18:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Could we please buy now?
18:41Chuck Jaffe: So back of the envelope says yes, that would be a You buy on SLR Investment Corp. SLRC. And Peter in Wesley Chapel. North Carolina, wants to know about Oak Tree specialty lending. That's OCSL.
18:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Good three choices. They're very, very different, at least in terms of situation. Oak Tree is similar to Blue Owl in that they make primarily senior loans. But of the group, lowest nav returns over the last few years, more than in the five 5 to 6%. six percent. And they're trading at a 20%. discount. That's interesting. That one seems to indicate that this is not an irrational discount for ROE type measures relative to its its peer group. If it's well below that 9 to 10% heuristic, that uh perhaps a a a discount is appropriate here.
19:34Chuck Jaffe: Yeah, so the discount being appropriate means the back of the envelope saying not so fast. on OCSL, Oak Tree Specialty Lending. We're going to finish with two closed end funds. They are sister funds, so we'll lump them together. They also came from the same audience member. Dave in Jacksonville, Florida, wants to know about Eagle Point Income, that's E I C, and then Eagle Point Credit, that's ECC.
19:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. So both funds focus on. CLO investing, collateralized loan obligations. CLOs are themselves funds that own broadly syndicated loans for the most part. There are two ways to invest in a CLO: to either provide debt financing to the CLO or own the lowest tranche in the securitization. which gives you the broadest and deepest and riskiest exposure to that underlying portfolio. EIC focuses on the debt. ECC focuses on the equity of CLOs. Let's start with the equity. That's a really difficult situation. Um CLO equity over the last 12 to 30 months has had a very rough go of things. Um that for the most part CLOs have been underperforming with with yields coming in. Perhaps no surprise then that ECC has had an internal core return on its portfolio ROE
21:07that's actually slightly negative. And even though its yield is hold on to your horses, over 40%. uh, that might attract a few people. The price to nav is around 50% right now. So again, what might seem very, very attractive right now, price to nav a 50 cents a book, a yield that's very, very high, and yields are measured relative to uh the current market price. So, you know, 42 at a book value. of 50 is maybe not crazy, but it's it's an eye-catching number. But one needs to understand that right now, um, and has been for the last five years or so, ECC has been a portfolio that has been shrinking in value over time. So a really interesting situation based on the heart of the market that it it focuses on. Eagle Point International. income, that's I think in the uh uh we can go back to our our usual metric. Uh you should know it by now, Chuck. 15% yield nav at 6.6, which is a little bit below. I bet you're gonna guess a PE discount of 20% makes sense in this case. And lo and behold, directionally, that's that's about right. Um, probably uh the CLO mezzanine in
22:26investing, the CLO debt has been actually a pretty attractive space over the last few years. And as a result, mezzanine-oriented funds like EIC have done reasonably well. I might argue the NAV return is a little bit low relative to what your expectations for such a fund would be, and we've made throughout this discussion. Um, So maybe, maybe in a situation where a NAB discount is is warranted.
22:54Chuck Jaffe: Yeah, so we we finish Eagle Point Credit. That's that's a hard pass on that one on Ticker Symbol ECC. Eagle Point Income EIC. Well, maybe a qualified buy, certainly one that's going to be on the watch list, not necessarily a good goodbye, buy, just one that could that people can look for to see if it's gonna. going to pass their back of the envelope test. And speaking of goodbyes, well, we've gotten to the point where we have to say ours, Chris, but this has been great. I really appreciate you coming on the show. Hope we'll do this again down the line.
23:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Chuck, thank you for having me. Enjoy the discussion. That's
23:29Chuck Jaffe: Chris Acido. He's Chief Executive Officer at Gapstow Capital Partners, PartnersGapStow.com Gapstow.com to learn more about the firm. We'll be back to wrap up this show. but don't give up now or you won't cross the finish line, and then you might just feel like a loser. This is Money Life.