Dan Peris argues dividends provide tangible ownership and superior risk-adjusted returns versus buybacks and total return metrics
Summary
Host and guest Dan Peris critique total return as a flawed metric that conflates cash dividends with unrealized price changes, arguing dividends offer tangible ownership benefits that mitigate agency costs. Peris contrasts dividends with buybacks, characterizing the latter as liquidity measures for sellers rather than business outcomes for shareholders. The discussion highlights how passive index dominance distorts market benchmarks and questions the sustainability of high-yield contingent returns in a low-trust environment.
Key takeaways
Episode sections
- 0:01 – 2:15
Introduction and Guest Background
Host introduces Dan Peris, noting his outperformance on Nov 5, 2026, and background as a historian.
- 2:15 – 4:14
Dividend Philosophy and Agency Costs
Peris explains dividends as a tangible manifestation of ownership that mitigates agency costs for minority shareholders.
- 4:14 – 6:24
Historical Context of Dividends vs. Speculation
Peris argues pre-1980s markets viewed non-dividend stocks as speculative, contrasting with modern norms.
- 6:24 – 11:47
Dividends vs. Buybacks: Trust and Accountability
Peris contrasts dividends as business outcomes with buybacks as liquidity measures, referencing Buffett.
- 11:47 – 14:17
Taxation and Investment Policy
Peris prioritizes investment policy over tax minimization, noting equalized tax rates for dividends and gains.
- 14:17 – 22:05
Critique of Total Return Measurement
Peris critiques total return for conflating cash returns with contingent, unrealized price changes.
- 22:05 – 24:13
Brokerage Statements and Realized Gains
Peris cites research showing brokerage statements fail to distinguish between cash and contingent returns.
- 24:13 – 31:28
Jeremy Siegel and Dividend Reinvestment Friction
Peris argues historical return assumptions ignored the friction and cost of dividend reinvestment.
- 31:28 – 35:08
Duration and Contingent Returns
Speaker_1 uses Macaulay duration to compare cash flow profiles, favoring high-yield dividends over low-yield buybacks.
- 35:08 – 41:15
Trust, Sovereign Debt, and AI Financing
Discussion on societal trust levels, long-duration bonds, and tax subsidies for AI infrastructure debt.
- 41:15 – 46:53
The S&P 500 as a Driver, Not a Benchmark
Speaker_1 argues passive flows make the S&P 500 a participant-driven momentum vehicle rather than a neutral benchmark.
- 46:53 – 51:37
Russell 1000 Style Box Flaws
Critique of Russell 1000 indices for forcing value and growth to sum to the parent index, causing chaotic rebalancing.
- 51:37 – 55:57
Market Structure and Passive Dominance
Discussion on how passive investing and quant funds have replaced fundamental decision-making in markets.
- 55:57 – 1:04:26
Russia's Hegemonic Decline
Speaker_1 applies hegemonic cycle theory to Russia, viewing the 2022 invasion as a failed attempt to manage decline.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Callaway Golf CoCALY | equity | neutral | honestly i personally like for my i i when i was at fidelity i owned 15 of callaway golf you guys remember that and like they would just basically do enough buybacks to offset the stock dilution |
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | And again, it's detailed specifically in the history of the SP 500, which was a technological marvel when it was introduced as a daily index price in the 1950s. |
| TeslaTSLA | equity | neutral | And if that means missing SpaceX or Tesla or Broadcom or AMD, or name good, you know, not even politically |
| Meta PlatformsMETA | equity | neutral | The tax deductibility of interest means you and I, maybe not the squirrel, but Benny, you and I are subsidizing Google and uh Meta and Oracle's uh build out of AI. |
| AmazonAMZN | equity | neutral | And like basically that's how what we have now. And you see 10% down Amazon and Google last week, right? |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
Peris outperformed the index by about 500 basis points on Nov 5, 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:21
How to verify: Check the performance records of Federated Hermes' dividend portfolios for the period around Nov 5, 2026, and compare against the S&P 500 or Nasdaq index performance for that day. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Peris transitioned from Sovietology to financial research in the early 1990s after taking the CFA exam.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:35
How to verify: Verify Peris's biography on the Federated Hermes website or his LinkedIn profile for career timeline and CFA designation date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Until the 1980s, stocks without dividends were considered speculative or defective.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:38
How to verify: Review historical financial literature or academic papers on dividend policy prior to the 1980s, such as studies on the 'dividend puzzle' or historical market data from NYSE. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Kenneth French originally stated that buybacks are divisive.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:48
How to verify: Search for Kenneth French's published writings, speeches, or interviews where he discusses share repurchases and their divisiveness among investors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The SEC blessed total return measurement in 1988.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·16:37
How to verify: Search SEC EDGAR for regulatory filings or guidance documents from 2026 regarding the use of total return in investment disclosures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDavid Solomon and Samuel Hartzmark published 'Reconsidering Returns' in 2020/2022.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·22:50
How to verify: Locate the academic paper 'Reconsidering Returns' by David Solomon (Boston College) and Samuel Hartzmark (University of Chicago) in academic journals or SSRN. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Jeremy Siegel's 'Stocks for the Long Run' assumes easy and inexpensive dividend reinvestment.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:09
How to verify: Review Jeremy Siegel's book 'Stocks for the Long Run' to check assumptions about dividend reinvestment mechanisms and costs. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Peris avoids investing in companies with non-voting shares due to agency costs.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:43
How to verify: Review the investment policy statement or portfolio holdings of Federated Hermes' dividend portfolios to confirm exclusion of non-voting stock classes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The S&P 500 was introduced as a daily index price in the 1950s.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·17:57
How to verify: Check historical records from S&P Dow Jones Indices regarding the launch date and methodology of the S&P 500 index. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 claims that until the 1980s, stocks without dividends were considered speculative or defective, and serious issuers came to market with cash flow attached.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:28
How to verify: Check historical dividend payout ratios and issuance practices in SEC filings or financial history texts (e.g., 'The Rise and Fall of the Dividend' literature) for the period prior to 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpeaker_1 states the S&P 500 was created in 1957 as a price index, and the S&P 500 Total Return Index was created in 1988.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·42:19
How to verify: Verify the inception dates of the S&P 500 and S&P 500 Total Return Index on the S&P Dow Jones Indices website or SEC filings of index providers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEngelsberg Ideas is a UK website that has emerged as a prime position to write on international geopolitics.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:03:29
How to verify: Search for 'Engelsberg Ideas' to confirm its country of origin and content focus on geopolitics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Engelsberg Ideas covers topics including the shrinking Russian landmass and soft power losses such as tennis players being banned from the US Open.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:03:43
How to verify: Visit the Engelsberg Ideas website and search for articles on 'Russia' and 'US Open tennis bans'. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Dan Peris's performance claims against the relevant index for the date November 5, 2026.
- Review David Solomon and Samuel Hartzmark's research on brokerage statement disclosures regarding cash vs. contingent returns.
- Check the current dividend yield and buyback activity of the S&P 500 index components.
- Assess the tax treatment of dividends versus capital gains in your specific jurisdiction.
- Examine the holdings and rebalancing methodology of the Russell 1000 Value and Growth indices.
- Investigate the percentage of S&P 500 market capitalization currently held by passive index funds and ETFs.
- Review Federated Hermes' public filings for Dan Peris's current role and any potential conflicts of interest.
- Read Engelsberg Ideas for independent geopolitical analysis referenced in the episode.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. Good evening, everyone. It's 5 30 Eastern on November the 5th. Now that's a big day for the Brits. That's what that's when Parliament got blown up. Um, but um November the 5th, 2026 is when the Nasdaq got blown up. Someone who wouldn't have been hurt very much is is is our guest today, Dan Perris, Paris because
- 0:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he's a dividend investor and he probably outperformed the um the index by about five 500 hundred basis points today. Dan, welcome to Benny and the Squirrel.
- 0:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh thank you, uh Cartoon Rodent and thank you, Benny, for having me. And while your numbers are a little bit off, uh yes, I had popcorn today and watched the show.
- 0:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it
- 0:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): w it was it was a
- 0:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): fun it was a fun day. It was a fun day. Okay, Like
- 0:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we we we
- 0:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): as guys who've kind of like warned people about it like what was coming, we were we were happy campers. Let's put it that way.
- 0:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well put put put it this way, um I'm pretty it was almost a perfect day to have you booked because there are a lot of people that would be potential guests that might be a bit traumatized after today's market. Um but we got we got you. So Dan, a bit of background for for for for viewers on you. Um you're originally an academic, uh and and a and a
- 1:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sovietologist, a Russian specialist. And we're going to talk about that in a bit. But really, since your investing career started in the early 90s, you've been a value and income guy. And you've written several books, two of them specifically devoted towards the topic of dividend investing, both of which I've read and
- 1:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): which I highly recommend. And you're a prodigious publisher of long form articles on subject. Substack and elsewhere, which we'll talk about later. But I wanted to um to start really, um, actually, before um, before we do that, we have to do um everything here is not investment advice.
- 1:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We are gonna talk about markets, but we're really not making any trade recommendations here. But what I wanted to do is start with um the concept of.
- 2:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the concept of
- 2:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 2:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): your dividend philosophy behind investing and then move into how you think we need to think about measuring total returns.
- 2:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 2:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and they are related, uh, but uh I did come to dividend investing, and in effect to my critique of of total return is as the current uh statutory de jure measurement system. both the same way, which is as a historian. When I did make the transition from what we used to call Sovietology to then by the end, I had to refer to it as modern Russian
- 2:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): history, uh, and settled into financial research after I had gotten into the industry by memorizing the rules. Took the CFA three years of utter misery and passed past that and set to work. Uh, my training as a historian at Inklin. and inclination as a historian could not be kept down. And
- 2:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as I operated in the stock market, I kept thinking about it from a historical perspective. And of course, more and more leaned in the direction: well, you know, history doesn't provide all of the answers, but it provides kind of a range, a framework of understanding, options for problems. And they recur over and over and over again. The same human.
- 3:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): behavioral issues and choices that we're faced with. And in that context applied to the stock market and investing, to me, just focusing on cash flows as a minority shareholder of companies, of large companies that I do not control, was sort of an obvious thing to deal with. And I'll use the one 1960s or 70s
- 3:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): social science term, probably the only one you'll hear from me that I'm positive about. Dealing with the agency costs, dealing with the fact that, you know, the CEO, the board, there are other people, there's a cost in using them. They run the company. And so the dividend is the tangible manifestation for a minority shareholder of business ownership.
- 3:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that was just so natural for me that in my firm, I migrated very quickly to uh the person uh in the firm. older person who was running a dividend-oriented portfolio. And uh I've been there uh really ever since uh uh 20 years uh running
- 4:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our dividend
- 4:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): portfolios.
- 4:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 4:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's let's take it back a lot further than that. Let's take it back to the sort of 18th, 19th century and um you know the concept of the transition from fixed income investing to stock investing.
- 4:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): really was via a dividend path. And you've you've cited the examples of the railroad, the railroad stock issues. And perhaps perhaps take it back to first principles there.
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, exactly. If you if you consider uh the really the stock market up until the 1980s, all serious issues, issuers, stocks came with a the cash flow. Otherwise they weren't taken to they were considered speculative issues or something was very, very wrong. And there were different gradations. There were bonds that paid a fixed coupon, preferred
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that had a kind of a fixed coupon but priority. And then common equity, which was considered the riskiest, but had the ability for the dividend to grow. Those were your three options. It was high, high dividend, middle dividend, or low dividend. The no dividend option wasn't an option, uh, unless unless the company was a mining enterprise or clearly a
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): speculative issue. It was a sign of seriousness that uh companies uh would be able to uh pay a dividend. Their capitalization structure when they raised money was all linked around payment. It looked a lot like frankly bond uh investing today, just uh uh with greater degree of variance. And I I I understand we've moved
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): away from that. There were all sorts of reasons in the 20th century why that's happened. And I cover them in a lot of the writings that you referenced. Thank you. Uh, but for me as an investor now, and for our clients and a reasonable subset of the population that not necessarily older, but but more conservative perhaps, and run their own businesses,
- 5:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): still uh want to have that type of business ownership relationship uh that. is I I think you know 5,000 years old, but uh you know, in the stock market, 200, 300 years old, 400 years old, uh, but has fallen out of fashion in the US market over the last 40 years. And there are reasons for it. They're they're they're okay reasons, but uh for
- 6:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me, for our investors, uh we're we're sticking with that uh plain vanilla business ownership approach.
- 6:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And and but you think about dividends, right? Like you're there's always this Warren Buffett conversation of buybacks versus dividends. And like I hold personally, this is just my own personal view, is like that there's a level of trust with dividends. Like, hey, I'm paying you a piece of what we make and it holds people
- 6:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): accountable, right? Like there's an accountability to a dividend. And like yes, you don't have the legal rights that you do with interest, like with debt, but it's like I'm your investor, you give me the cash, and then I trust you. And it's just something of like basically, whereas in a stock buyback,
- 7:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'll do it when I want to do it, and usually they do it at the wrong time. They they usually do it. It's like, hey, we were AI guys and tech guys buying it, you know, the first half of this year, and they're not gonna. do it for the next, you know, however many like months, right? Like so talk about like that concept of stock buybacks versus dividends and why
- 7:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): dividends do like in in invoke trust in people.
- 7:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 7:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean largely for the reasons you've said and kind of the agency concept that other people are involved in. And So to hold their feet to the fire, we're expecting a cash payment. You know, Kenneth French, though, a many are quoted with this, but I believe the original quote comes from Kenneth French, says that, you know, buybacks are very divisive. They divide people who understand finance from people who don't understand finance. And
- 7:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): apparently I don't understand finance. And that's fine. I I would edit that and say that buybacks are very divisive. They divide people who understand finance from people who understand business ownership through the stock market. And if you take the business ownership through the stock market perspective, not just the pieces of paper, not the stocks, but business ownership, then yeah, they're very
- 8:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): divisive. A buyback is a liquidity measure for share sellers.
- 8:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 8:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dividend is a business outcome for shareholders.
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yes.
- 8:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fundamentally different. Now, there are times when a buyback, if executed well, and there are lots of people. one of my followers on social media, I can't really pronounce his last name correctly, so I'm gonna uh um uh butcher it, but it's S-E-I-G-N-E, is provides Michael, uh,
- 8:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): provides an analysis of the efficiency of buybacks. And you know, when a company announces a $10 billion buyback and they end up kind of spending it very poorly, it's the equivalent of $8 billion or something like that. A lot of it just goes to the investment bank. banks, or there are lots of frictions involved. They don't reduce the share count anywhere near as much as they say. If a
- 8:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): buyback does reduce share count very significantly over time, that does benefit shareholders. No problem with that. And we see that in some very large corporations that we invest in that have large aggregate dividends, big energy companies, phone companies, and suggest: hey, if you lower the share count, you can raise the per share dividend
- 9:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): without having the aggregate dividend get out of control. But that actually doesn't happen that often. Most of the buybacks, Benny, as you mentioned, are first of all, non-dividend paying companies and they are splashy affairs that are nowhere near as effective as claimed. And so again, I as a historian I say, hmm, one's a market outcome, the buyback,
- 9:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one's a business outcome, the dividend one has a long record of making sense the other is a newfangled object
- 9:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): yeah and
- 9:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 9:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): honestly i personally like for my i i when i was at fidelity i owned 15 of callaway golf you guys remember that and like they would just basically do enough buybacks to offset the stock dilution and then that obviously became a big thing in tech world right like with all the the Silicon Valley and like that is an actual thing whereas you look if at a Dillard's, like
- 10:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's not like uh malls or or you know department stores have been a good business, but that's been a great stock because it was so cheap and they bought it back. So I totally agree with you that like it matters the valuation of your company. And if no one else wants it, like eh fine. That is the actual best use of capital. But like it comes back to like what the scroll would love is
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what's the best capital allocation decision with your capital.
- 10:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Let
- 10:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me let's just finish with the with the one that you mentioned where they use it to offset dilution. Uh that's perfectly reasonable. Uh it's just not a return of cash to shareholders. It's a compensation program. Shareholders derive no benefit because the uh the shares are being issued out the front or the back while the buyback is occurring in the front. There's nothing wrong with that,
- 10:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's just compensation. But let's not semantically conflate. two things: a benefit to share sellers and possible offset of issuance by the corporation, and a business outcome, which is the dividend. They're just fundamentally, and this we're going to get to in the total return conversation between contingent returns and cash returns. They're just philosophically different.
- 11:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And for convenience sake, they've been smushed together. There's nothing wrong with that. But I I do object to the phrase when a corporation particularly ours, says, hey, the combination of dividend and buybacks is certain amount of cash return to shareholders. I do raise my hand at that point and say
- 11:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the buyback
- 11:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield.
- 11:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): The all in
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yield or whatever
- 11:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): that bullshit
- 11:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is. There is a
- 11:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very prominent, there are several very prominent uh podcasters and and uh uh writers who talk about shareholder yield God bless them it's a free country and so forth. but that's not how we see the world. Can I just
- 11:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what you're trying to say is
- 11:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not a real thing.
- 11:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Can I just address one sort of elephant in the room up front, which is obviously the tax code, right? Um and ultimately, you know, there is leakage in compensation via dividends versus compensation, sorry, cash.
- 12:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's not call it compensation on the other side. But the but the difference with treatment between a buyback and a dividend clearly creates fit frictions for a shareholder. I mean, and they they pay more tax on a dividend.
- 12:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Guilty as charged.
- 12:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
- 12:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And my answer is a simple one. In addition to acknowledging guilt, it is that
- 12:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 12:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I choose not to, and our customers choose not to, our investors to subordinate investment policy to tax minimization. There's absolutely nothing wrong with tax minimization. It's just how far do you go?
- 12:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Or
- 12:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): today is a good day of pointing out that capital gains only stocks. Uh you don't involve too much taxation, but then you get sometimes you get smacked in the face. Uh, but more broadly, over longer periods of time, yeah, a dividend's a taxable event, unless it's in a
- 12:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tax-deferred account.
- 12:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And capital gains realization or selling is it can be a choice of the shareholder, the share seller, and they can control the tax as a result. Guilty is charged. But in the end, uh I do choose to give priority to the investment strategy. And while we are as sensitive as we can be on behalf of our
- 13:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): clients. to tax minimization, it's secondary. It is not primary. Now there are folks out there in the investment landscape who flip those two and make a business of flipping them. And that's that's fine. And there are you you and I have met on the street corners and the bars and the restaurants and the grocery stores people who will not only uh
- 13:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prioritize tax minimization, but will build their whole life around it uh just out of anger. And you you see that particularly, you
- 13:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 13:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I suppose during election season. But uh that's just not the way we approach it. Yes, uh taxes are a sign of success. Now the tax code could always be better. We we are actually in a fairly benign environment in terms of taxes where the tax rate of dividends versus capital gains has been equalized for the last two decades. That's huge. There have been times in the 20th century in the
- 14:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): US where the tax rate on dividends was much higher than capital gains. That made it an unfair competition. Right now it's roughly equal for long term capital gains and qualified dividends. And so yes, uh guilty is charged. Thank you. Moving on.
- 14:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. Well, listen, let's talk about you know, your views on the flaws in total return measurements. And why don't you start with the classic? total return measure measurement that's been total shareholder return measurement that's been around since, you know, well, 30 years, right? And then and then pick that and then pick that apart.
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. And so as a historian, I asked the following question: Where did the rules come from? They can be any of our rules. A book from 2018 was about modern portfolio theory. Uh, where did the dividends go? Because because right now we live in a dividend-free world that's peculiar. Where did the dividends go? What was the reason? And ask where the
- 14:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): current rules came from or practices came from. What was the reason at the time that they came into existence? And are they still fit for purpose? And through a variety of uh investigations, writings, books, articles, and so forth. If you look, a great deal of what we
- 15:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): do and use in the modern investment industry is a product of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. A lot of the theories, a lot of the tools. And it's a fair question to ask almost 100 years later are they still fit for purpose? If the answer is yes, then the answer is yes, that's great. Wow, that's a good tool. If the answer is no, well, it's worth asking that question.
- 15:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I looked at modern book. portfolio theory, I think it's it's highly flawed at this point. I look at uh uh many of the statistics associated with that and think they're kind of meaningless in the current environment. We're gonna talk a little bit about the S P 500 uh later in the show because I I wrote a piece about that and its history. But the most recent piece that I just put on Substack is looking at the history of total return as a
- 15:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): calculation, as a concept, and what it achieved, what it achieved in the uh becoming popular. popular in investment uh literature and measurement in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. It was developed before that. It was slowly came into existence late 19th, very early 20th century, among researchers, academic researchers in 1924, and
- 16:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and uh uh Ben Graham references it in 1934, but anecdotally, and and uh T. Row Price uh references and the Babsons reference it and so forth. It's uh it's all fine. Lorian Fisher, nineteen sixty-four. Those are all academics, quasi academics, high-end practitioners. But in terms of becoming the measurement that's on your, you know, we'll call it website or
- 16:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): brokerage practice, it's really more in the sixties, seventies and eighties. The SEC really only blessed it, I believe, in nineteen eighty eight. And it's not even a for as much of a formal blessing. It's allowed to be put on uh documents. Uh there were hearings about it. So it's a it's a new it's a new measurement. Uh, it's but it's been around 50 years. And so it was not enshrined in the Ten Commandments. It is not
- 16:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in Adam Smith. Uh, it was a result of
- 17:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): daily, in my mind, daily pricing of assets and the technology around daily pricing of assets. You would not create the concept of total return if you did not have daily pricing of assets. As you mentioned, opened the hour
- 17:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Rupert in terms of income streams in the 19th century. That was all that was all the information you realistically had was what the coupon was the bond coupon, the preferred coupon or the equity coupon for the railroads in the 19th century. But in the middle of the 20th century, as the technology improved after the war, you get daily share prices. And it
- 17:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): became useful It was a very clever development. And again, it's detailed specifically in the history of the SP 500, which was a technological marvel when it was introduced as a daily index price in the 1950s. It was presented by SP as a technology advancement. And it was daily prices plus the dividend. And Wow,
- 17:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we can now show you two things at once: your income stream. and the daily price change. That was innovative, that was helpful, that was great, and it was infinitely better than what went before, which was essentially helter-skelter uh measurement systems that were of little use. So let's go credit
- 18:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where credit is due, both the modern portfolio theory, 1952, 1959, SP 500, 1957, emergence really later late or 60s, 70s, and 80s. of total return and helping people to understand what's going in the marketplace. However, go on, Betty.
- 18:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 18:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): no, no, you go
- 18:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on.
- 18:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): However, that uh um shorthand, helpful shorthand, is nevertheless helpful shorthand between two completely unrelated phenomena. One is a market.
- 18:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): phenomenon that the daily price change, and the other is a business phenomenon, a company pushing out a share of its profits to company owners. And one of those in the article I make, the argument I make is real, cash returns, and the other is contingent returns. That is, until realized with
- 19:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a sale,
- 19:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): your
- 19:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the amount of money everyone lost today in the market. I apologize, technology investors, or the amount of money you make on a good day,
- 19:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 19:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can't consume that. You can't pay the rent with it. You can borrow money against it, but only a little bit. You can't use it for, you know, economists refer to uh investment gains to fund consumption. That's sort of the ultimate purpose of investing, is to fund consumption, is to create growth. But then economically, it's got to come out at the other end, which is to fund consumption.
- 19:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can't fund consumption with a contingent gain you can only fund consumption or make other investments with a realized gain which is either a dividend or a realized return Benny
- 19:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 100% agree with you and like have you know John uh the Ken Gabriel Gabreth the concept of the bezel you you're are are familiar with this like concept of like like hey like we all think we're like having more wealth and we're like collaterizing it basically uh uh in a bubble, right? And I
- 20:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): think that's
- 20:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what happens, right? And and in essentially you're saying that like maybe you can borrow a little bit against it, but but in reality, when you get the dividend, you get the interest, you get that's an actual here, I'm getting the money from you, not like some psychological thing of like I think my money's worth more. And then when my money's worth more, there's
- 20:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like this feedback loop of like leveraging it to like, oh, my buying decisions and my like what I'm doing. And then so it's really a situation where like people don't realize that it's nonlinear in the sense of it goes up and then it comes down. Just like today, it's like, was it really that much different than the
- 20:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): beginning of the year? But yeah,
- 20:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): feed
- 20:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I do have to say that
- 20:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, today none of the companies, at least in our portfolio, cut their dividend. Also, none of the companies today in our portfolio raised their dividend. You know what happened today in our companies? Nothing, uh other than they continued to provide their goods and services and operated another day. Yet in the stock market, you know, huge swoons up and down. Uh yeah, the dopamine on the way up and the the, uh the the I
- 21:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't know what the opposite of dopamine is on the way down. Uh, but I think those are worthy of separating out and letting investors have a better sense of what's real. And by the way, real can include harvested capital gains or losses, just a sale that generates cash, because that is real. But separate cash
- 21:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): returns,
- 21:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 21:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): income stream, the dividend stream, the realized gains or losses from the contingent gains and losses. Psychologically, I think it would be helpful for people and
- 21:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): anchor them a little bit more in understanding. Okay, there are two separate phenomena going on here. We should understand both. Mixing them together in one number was very helpful at a time. And there are reasons why in the 1960s and 70s was particularly helpful because most stocks had dividends and therefore things weren't quite so crazy. But it's become less helpful. over time.
- 22:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, Daniel, in an ideal world, what would a brokerage statement look like?
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I went back back and forth with one of my uh readers uh on this who was sending me uh you know snippets of his his brokerage statement. And you can think about your brokerage statement. Brokerage Broker statements for tax reasons do show unrealized at the individual security level and the portfolio level, it's easy to aggregate. unrealized uh capital gains and losses, unrealized, yes,
- 22:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unrealized uh gains and losses. They actually rarely show, you have to kind of toggle and find it and go to a few buttons to get the aggregate income. They can sometimes show yield. It depends on the company. David Solomon at Boston College and Samuel Hotzmark Hartzmark at the University of Chicago recently put out an article called Reconsidering Returns in 2020.
- 22:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2022 that looked at some brokerage statements and how frankly badly they handle this. But none of them, none of them currently, this is a kind of a radical idea. And you know, maybe it gets accepted in the next 10 years, or maybe it doesn't, but none of them make the effort to distinguish between what I'll call cash returns and
- 23:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): contingent returns. And very few of them, Hartzmark Hartsmark and Solomon. only found one that actually makes a minimal effort to show total return. Now it's really, really hard to show total return in a portfolio. The reason is you have cash flows in and out unrelated to the dividend. You're putting money in from your 401k, or you're taking money out to
- 23:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): buy a car or finance and education. Uh, There are fees, there are taxes, et cetera. And in it, particularly in a taxable account, it can be hard to show total return. You can do it over short periods of time and then geometrically link them. I don't want to get down the rabbit hole of arithmetic versus geometric. I was told to stay away from that. It audiences will
- 23:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): disappear once you mention the word geometric. But um, it can be done, but it's hard. But it it is indeed the case that currently I think brokerage statements could do a lot better in helping investors understand what's really real and what's contingent, both in terms of their uh the current period that they're looking at and over time.
- 24:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 24:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that's right. Um
- 24:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): real quick, real quick, like when we talk about uh Jeremy Siegel, like the stocks to the long run, like do you have any like views on that versus like what your research has done? Since like
- 24:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 24:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): seems like like the seminal book on like what you're talking about.
- 24:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, there is a uh uh cottage industry of debunking that or adding additional information. And Jeremy Siegel to his credit has responded responsibly. Um, and the data sources the the issue, the cottage industry, of which some really, really high high-end end uh
- 24:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): academics and uh a former marketing professor, Edward McCormick. Macquarie at uh Santa Cruz, um, who now uh has taken a deep interest in this, but a bunch of other uh high-end finance and academic uh financial historians really are working back into the 19th century and figuring out what the returns were. The data's just really hard. One of
- 25:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the key issues that they talk about
- 25:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 25:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dividend reinvestment. One of the challenges with the original numbers that Siegel came up with is that you kind of assume dividend reinvestment is easy and inexpensive. And it turns out until recently, until the last couple of decades, dividend reinvestment, which ends up being like 90% of the returns of
- 25:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an actual account, not individual securities, but an actual account, is was hard and expensive. And so assuming dividend reinvestment means that the returns are probably
- 25:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lower than whatever the accepted wisdom is, about 10%,
- 25:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because it would have been really hard to realize the full 10% because of the way the market was structured until a couple uh uh couple decades ago.
- 25:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Is this with the introduction of fractional shares? Is that is that is that really what's made the difference to ease of full frictionless reinvestment?
- 26:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It is the brokers no longer charging and the ability to reinvest uh very quickly, that is within a day or two, or if not instantly, that makes the difference. Because if you do delay, if you if you reinvest on a monthly basis, there's a bit of a drag. That's where you get. Again, we're gonna, this is podcast killing material. We're gonna get into arithmetic versus geometric. We don't want to go there. But if
- 26:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you do, if you the longer
- 26:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 26:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): take to reinvest. the more the drag. So more frequent reinvestment is good and uh uh costless reinvestment is good. Uh charging, brokers used to charge for dividend reinvestment, and depending on the time, that that's where the the friction was.
- 26:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So can I ask you another question? Like, you know, is your research only US-based? US based? Or is it like you have because you know, I think about the Russian market. right? Like the Russian market from 1850 up to Lenin was a dominant market, better than US. You know, the German market until 1947, dominant market, and
- 27:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then you know, had an 80% third Thanksgiving turkey chart. Like, so like what what is it like that backs this, or is it just that the US is a current empire, or like let's talk about that a little bit?
- 27:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, my my research is mostly on the US, but there's there's one kind of reason uh that does stand out distinguishing them. The notion that you would have stocks without dividends is really material, successful trillion-dollar companies, gushing profits and don't pay dividends or pay de minimis dividends is a US phenomenon.
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Mature or even developing markets in Europe, and you mentioned several of them, some of them came to you know ill ends. They were all about the coupon, all about the coupon. And um there were periods of speculation as there always are, but this dividend free culture that we currently inhabit is kind of unique to the United States. Now, you could
- 27:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the critics of dividends will also point out that the degree of productivity and success we've had is also unique to the to the US market. Can't argue with that. Uh, But from a research perspective, I'm kind of trying to merge the two together and understand: okay, in this very successful run we've had for a couple centuries,
- 28:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the last 30-40 years became dividend free. That's historically anomalous. It's anomalous from our own history, and it's also anomalous from uh other developed markets in the world. And that that's where I'm zigging when the rest of the world is zagging. And that you know, it's kind of my day job, but also my intellectual interest.
- 28:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 28:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Daniel,
- 28:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let me ask you this.
- 28:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let me ask you this real quick. Sorry, squirrel. Uh let
- 28:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me
- 28:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just give you the one and then I'll let you go. Uh is a class C share where you get 10 times voting and and like all these kind of things that they they've like played is like is it's like, hey, we went from dividends where like this was the level of respect we used to give you as a uh share. shareholder to now like here here you have like no like I still get to have all the voting
- 28:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): like rights without in you know what I mean? Like like is that like there's something to that?
- 29:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean
- 29:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): look
- 29:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the squirrel
- 29:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sold a lot of equity in his life. Like I'm asking both of you,
- 29:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 29:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): guess.
- 29:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I I we would not go anywhere near that. I mean, we take as business owners through the stock market, minority business owners through the stock market, minority business owners through the stock market very aware of agency costs. That we we elect the board, but we don't really because it's the large passive uh investors that elect the
- 29:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): board. There's an imperial CEO, he doesn't work for the company, the company works for him, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. Uh we are uh do as best we can with corporate governance and know no non- truly non-voting shares to invest in
- 29:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and some of the shenanigans that you see, the tech bros, forgive me, tech bros, these are much smarter people than any of us, and they're a trillion times wealthier. But no, I'm I'm not gonna sign on for what the tech bros are up to for our clients, our main street clients. I'm a main street kind of person. Uh I made fun of because I drive a Honda as a portfolio manager. What am I doing? in
- 30:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a Honda, et cetera, et cetera. But that's that's my thing. And uh no, uh no voting shares. I the there are point there's a point where the agency costs of that are just too high. And if that means missing SpaceX or Tesla or Broadcom or AMD, or name good, you know, not even politically
- 30:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): contentious companies, but just you know, very, very well-run companies where there's no what I would consider proper corporate governance. That means so what? That's fine. There are other fish in the sea.
- 30:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah. And like the thing in the front. Go ahead.
- 30:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Go, Squirrel. You go.
- 30:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So what you were talking about
- 30:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
- 30:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a modern US market effect, Dan, in terms of um, you know, the the the the SP of the of the early sixties 60s was a very different beast. And this is this is a chart that was in um your latest book, The Ownership Dividend, which I pulled out of here. And I I think it'd be helpful just to walk through the sort of market structure. People sort of
- 31:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): instinctively know this, but wow, it presents a bunch of challenges for running dividend mandates these days. There's just not many dividends around.
- 31:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and yeah, uh there it just was accepted that successful businesses, despite their capex, uh, would capital expenditures and investment. Remember, that period in the 60s was one of when we're still an industrial country and we had a lot of capex. And you can see that capex is a percent of sales is is pretty significant. You see it
- 31:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): coming down uh in the second period, the more modern period, and yet companies felt
- 31:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 31:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): minority shareholders, shareholders would participate. in the profit pool from said companies. The uh fast forward to our current period, and even my data is now out of date because we've had just a new round of crazy profitable companies. And yet there's there's minimal uh
- 31:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): inclination to have uh dividend payout, and it's all about buybacks or just buy other companies and so forth. So two very, very different worlds. And uh, you know, so that's that's fine. I just, from an agency cost perspective, from a sleep at night perspective, from a tangible real ownership of businesses through the stock market
- 32:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): perspective, we go in one direction. And there are a lot of folks, they dominate, they dominate the marketplace, go in the other direction where they are not interested in business ownership, they're interested in stock ownership, they're not interested in a tangible manifestation of a company. company's success. They're interested in a contingent manifestation of the company's success in the stock market. And that has been the path of tremendous wealth,
- 32:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): paper wealth, for uh thousands, millions of people, and real wealth if they manage to kind of sell successfully and turn those contingent returns into into um into uh cash returns. But it's just, it's just not the way that. that we feel or I feel is is appropriate.
- 32:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now, we do talk about, and I talk with a client saying, listen, this should never be 100% of your portfolio. Psychologically, you can't sit and watch your neighbor go on and talking about whatever's going on. And and it's they got gotta to scratch that itch. If you have discretionary income to put in the stock market, have in the stock market,
- 33:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you
- 33:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know.
- 33:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): f even even someone say my age or your age, Rupert, I'm not gonna guess, but we're we're roughly the same age, you know, should have 10 or 20 or even 30%
- 33:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of their whatever their equity allocation is, uh, in the shiny new objects. Because boy, those shiny new objects have done uh really well over the last couple of decades. But it's just a matter of degree. If you have someone our age who's a hundred 100% percent in the SP 500, excuse me for criticizing the SP 500 with a 1% yield,
- 33:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): overwhelmingly contingent returns, high risk, that isn't, I don't think, particularly prudent.
- 33:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And also what's what's so infrequently discussed is what kind of duration bet that you're taking with those, with that bet on deferred cash flows, right?
- 34:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 34:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I will check. chase away your remaining listeners. We went F from arithmetic and geometric. Let's get into duration and get the last few listeners uh off of
- 34:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh don't worry, we
- 34:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have
- 34:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): he doesn't
- 34:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): realize that I write essays about all that stuff. Like that's you're
- 34:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): endowing my world.
- 34:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 34:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): much wonkier audience than you would think.
- 34:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay, good.
- 34:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well then then And I love duration. I think Macaulay duration is wonderful. I think it's great. It suits me from an analytical. perspective, and it certainly suits from an investment perspective. You know, basically the time-weighted cash flows of something that has a 1% yield and something that has a 4% or 5% yield are just so
- 34:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dramatically different. It's a, you know, typically used in the bond world, and it's a very simple, you know, bond calculation, but you can apply it to stocks and dividends. You just get crazy. different math, which you have highlighted here about how crazy different the math is. And uh there you go, you know, 24 years versus 70 years. You know,
- 35:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some portion of the population is going to choose 24 years because they're gonna sleep better at night. And and that's the clientele we're serving.
- 35:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And
- 35:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like think about duration.
- 35:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Wait, wait, wait a second. sec. Like the duration thing is an interesting thing because like really what it you're coming down to. is the storytelling, right? Like, like Steve Jobs, one of the great CEOs of all time, said this quote about the storyteller rules the world. And you think about Elon Musk being the richest guy in the world, he's the greatest storyteller, right? And and like
- 35:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what you're really saying is, hey, show me, don't tell
- 35:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
- 35:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Again, in a high trust society. you maybe trust people. In a lower trust society, you want cash on the barrel. I'm not going to say we have a low trust society. Matter of fact, to have a complex stock market with uh you know, uh where you can have a discussion of duration, you actually have to have a high trust society because
- 35:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even at a 4% cash flow, you know, it's 24 years, whatever the number was. And so I like to think we're in a high trust. society, but there are, though I think the last decade, the level of trust has diminished dramatically. Uh, and that's reflected, I think, in interest rates topic for maybe another day. But uh there's a limit to
- 36:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that high trust society. And uh, you know, I a hundred years is well beyond the limit. You know, for some of those companies that are, speaking of duration, uh uh issuing a century bonds when interest rates were really, really low, the state of uh country of Austria did, and then Google.
- 36:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I I own those. I I I
- 36:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): own the strip to 2117 strip.
- 36:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
- 36:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): for
- 36:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Austria, you know, you're talking to a
- 36:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): guy who's the ultimate bond bull. Like I
- 36:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): own
- 36:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): those.
- 36:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay. So, you know, that's a lot of trust to to buy uh a hundred-year Hundred year bond from a corporation. You know, the US taxpayer, because of the tax deductibility of interest payments, and this is a topic of another article that just came out in American Affairs. The tax deductibility of interest means you and I, maybe not the squirrel, but Benny, you and I are
- 37:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): subsidizing Google and uh Meta and Oracle's uh build out of AI. I I I feel really proud about that. I'm giving them giving Oracle and Google and Meta and Microsoft money through a tax. subsidy so that they can build, so they can, you know, borrow money
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
- 37:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 40, 50, 100 years to build data centers. I feel really good about that. No, actually, I don't. I don't think that's a great use of my taxpayer dollars, but that's a separate topic.
- 37:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 37:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's interesting because you know, uh,
- 37:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think that AI is one of those things where like I don't think that gains like, and just so you know, Dan, I don't know if you know this, I'm a partner in AI. at company. Um I'm like, I'm kind of like an AI guy, also, is like I love AI, but I also realize how not great it is for the general, the median person, if you will.
- 37:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Like it's great for a small percentage, just like the stock market going up. Like, what is the distribution of of them the stock market? I think it's like 85% is by one 1% percent of the is owned by 1%. So
- 38:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's like that is it's just gonna accelerate that essentially the K economy. It just makes it like the alpha economy.
- 38:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're part of it. I don't know that I agree with that. Your part. We we own all of these main street companies, which are purchasers of your product. Now, among the vendors, yeah, it's gonna going to be 99% and 1%, they're winners and losers, but among the purchasers. of the product, the large main street enterprises that we tend to own
- 38:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): because they're in our dividend universe, et cetera, they are somewhat indifferent as to whether you fail or succeed. They're interested in is the technology going to uh generate the next iteration of uh productivity gains for we the widget maker or we the service company. And it's very early days. That's my concern.
- 38:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that it's early days among even the Main Street companies purchasing the technology, including my own firm, we're seeing how it's being applied. And it's more anecdotal so far to see the productivity gains. But remember, the Main Street companies aren't paying hundreds of millions or billions of dollars for these version 1.0 and 2.0 of technology. It's
- 39:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we're nibbling, dabbling, and getting anecdotal results. about productivity gains or not. And so I feel very comfortable. I want to thank you, Benny, for uh producing uh AI tools. And I hope you succeed from an investment perspective, though. As you probably point out, 99% of AI companies will fail. But the technology
- 39:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): will make its way into uh the real economy. I I think that's that's that's helpful. I I'm a little concerned about the Terminator stuff in Skynet as as anyone would be. But in terms of the, you know, I I look at the technology generations of um ERP systems, SAP. SAP came through my universe of
- 39:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): companies over the last 30 and 40 years. These are mainstream companies that provide goods and services every day to companies and revolutionized them, did a really, really great job. And now it's CRM systems, you know, another variant of ERP. Before that, it was the IBM 360 computer and all the various technology developments.
- 40:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It was uh rough riding, but it did it did ultimately improve uh output and and quality uh across the board. So I I'm I'm bullish on
- 40:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the reasonable implementation uh of this. new productivity enhancing technology into the economy, I want to have absolutely nothing to do with financing it. I'll let you
- 40:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and that
- 40:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and and I think that's the exact conclusion. I I wrote an essay about this, about like the 1840s railways. It's like, hey, the technology can be real, but the shareholders can get wiped out. And I think like your conclusion is exactly where I come out as like I love AI, I think it's great. but I think we're just gonna have to get to the other side first, like from a investing
- 40:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): standpoint.
- 40:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You you have just created guys, you've created the perfect segue because the biggest index in the world is one big best on financing AI right now. Um and let's talk about Dr. Frankenstein's benchmark, which you wrote a great essay on in um in in in which which which uh
- 41:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): American affairs. uh
- 41:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): last
- 41:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): autumn uh came out.
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 41:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it
- 41:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is a history, again, it's the history of and my my MO is incredibly consistent. I'm I'm sorry to say, uh the consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, in which case I I I am indeed uh consistent in a little mind. But it is where did this rule come from? What purpose did it serve at the time? Is it still fit for purpose? And wow.
- 41:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Does the SP 500 really light up all of those? The SP 500 was created in 1957 because nothing else was really good. And there is a history in a couple of my books in the various articles of the origins of indexes and so forth and so on. But this was a real breakthrough, it was a technology breakthrough. It was a really good technology
- 41:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): breakthrough. Daily pricing, market cap weighted, 500 stocks. That's that combination simply had not existed. And it was hard to measure things without that. So they they figure that out. They get a bunch of different entities, work at technology companies working with the exchanges to piece this all together. They flip the switch and wow, I think it originally was
- 42:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hourly. They would put out a number hourly. Huge, huge uh improvement over what had the prior technology had been created. in 1923, and it was like a weekly market cap-weighted total return. Uh, I'm not sure if it was total return or price, even. But the SP 500 is not total return. There is an SP 500 total return index uh created in 1988, but
- 42:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the 1957 one is just price index, but it was still a masterpiece of technology. So kudos, credit, yes, rah-rah. 60 years later, what is the SP 500? It is not a benchmark. It is not a measurement system. It is a growth-oriented investment vehicle, highly, highly
- 42:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): volatile. It long ago ceased to measure the market. It is now a really driver the market. So it fails as a benchmark. Uh, and it fails because people have created ETFs and index funds uh and and just put pushed money into it. And it uh it started naively as a benchmark that
- 43:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an active manager would manage against, but because active managers often are forced to or choose to have low, and again we'll we'll lose some of the wonks, uh you know, uh tracking error, standard deviation versus that benchmark, they end up looking a fair amount like the SP 500. My calculation, it's been challenged, but let's just put it out there for the sake of argument, is roughly 40 percent of. the
- 43:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): market cap of the SP 500 is in the SP 500. That adds up index funds,
- 43:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 43:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh uh ETFs, uh money that's closely managed, the SP 500, and uh derivatives that someone else on the other side of the derivative has to
- 43:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): be. So you're saying passive, passive
- 43:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): ownership? Is that what you're saying?
- 43:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Passive me meet the pat all the patches. patch.
- 43:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think it's closer
- 44:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to 55, but okay.
- 44:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, no, no, no. Of the market cap of the SP 500, not the participants in the market, but of the market cap of the SP 500, based on SP's own year-end releases in 19 uh in 2023 and 2024. They didn't do it last year. Uh, you can
- 44:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of stitch together that number. It's a little, it might be a little bit aggressive. Let's say it's not 40%, but 35, 33%, even 30%. In which case it is no longer measuring something. It is an investment vehicle. It fails the observer paradox, uh, you know, very, very clearly.
- 44:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Can you say that another way, Daniel? Just when you when you're talking about the market cap in the index, what can you just say that another way, just in case you
- 44:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can quite call it?
- 44:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Sure. So let's say the market, and I think from the SP press release in the end of 23, something like 40 billion, 40 trillion dollars in market cap at that time.
- 44:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): My claim, but I'm going to dial it back, but let's just say for the sake of simple math, 40%.
- 45:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you have out of that 40
- 45:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 45:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trillion, 16 trillion
- 45:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is in index funds or money closely managed. to the SP 500, which creates all of the issues of momentum because it's a market cap-weighted index where the the large get larger. I you've probably know or have had on your show Michael Green, who who really goes on about this at at a tremendous length. Uh he's not
- 45:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wrong. I mean, there And are other things that he says, but on this front, he he's not wrong. And it's become a momentum-driven growth. uh, growth investment vehicle. So again, at that time it was 40 trillion, uh, 16 trillion
- 45:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 45:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh was in the SP 500. You can't really measure something if you're participating in it. You know, imagine uh any type of measurement exercise in which the yardstick is also running along with the runners. It just doesn't work. So that that's really it is time for a new benchmark. I have
- 46:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh you've seen how confusing it got in the summer of 25 and 26 with the Russell 1000 uh rebalances, uh value and growth rebalances, we have things ping-ponging back and forth. It's it's there are construction issues with the Russell 1000 style indices that really accentuated that. They're now they're trying. to address those.
- 46:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But you saw how how
- 46:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): problematic this was.
- 46:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You've written on this recently. Um, you know, the the the whole I mean, and there's just a massive QIS industry, etc., built around these factor and style buckets. Um
- 46:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 46:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's just got so m it's got so messy. And and you've you've you've got you've had some interesting thoughts on where they've got it wrong. and potentially where they could fix
- 46:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 46:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so again for the nth time so bore Tabor, go back to the beginning. 1984 Russell introduces the the Russell one thousand. Perfectly reasonable. Why? Because the S P five hundred was too small and the Wilshire five thousand was too big. It's too many na illiquid Liquid names the S P five 500. hundred there were managers that Russell, Frank Russell and
- 47:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Company of Seattle was uh consultant, and there were managers investing outside the SP 500 to kind of get around the S P 500. So they introduced the Russell 1000 as a market cap-weighted large uh company uh index. They also introduced uh, you know, the Russell 3000 at that time. Perfectly reasonable. Three years later, they
- 47:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): introduced Introduce the R1V and R1G. And there, that's where my head explodes. They made a number of choices that I I
- 47:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would disagree with at the time, but certainly disagree with now. One is that R1V and R1G had to add up to R1. And for me, that is a conflation of two different types of things. Value is a price, uh, good price, bad price, whatever.
- 48:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Price versus
- 48:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): perception,
- 48:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): though. Price versus perception, right?
- 48:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Price versus perception. But price, value investing is about the price of the asset. Yes. Growth,
- 48:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 48:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): way it was defined at the time and now, is about the business itself. Again, it's a different cash returns and contingent returns. Growth is about how's the company doing.
- 48:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Value is about what's the price of said company. Could be company could be growing rapidly, but still be trading. trait great opportunity, or vice versa. And so I think the original sin of
- 48:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 48:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): R1 style boxes was conflating two separate ideas. Now it is true in the 1960s and 70s and 80s, the stock market really divided itself into two different camps: value investors, which is well known, and growth investors, particularly in the 1960s. There were a lot of famous growth investors who were. looking at all the equipment leasing companies.
- 48:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Those were the growth engines of the 1960s, computer leasing companies and so forth. The and also the Avons and the Xeroxes of the world. They were looking at the company results. I I don't necessarily consider
- 49:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the valuation of a company and the business situation of the company to be on a linear spectrum. They're unrelated. I don't know why they have to be juxtaposed to one another. And yet
- 49:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 49:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): style indices that dominates like 99% of the professional asset management industry makes that conflation. And you saw what happened this summer and last summer with your slide, by the way, is great there with everything all over the place. Just chaos, a 22% movement of positions back and forth. In 1995, uh the the You
- 49:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): want to just take that
- 49:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): down. I mean, the most, the most, just for people that don't know, you had members of the Mag 7 that were switching, switching and
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): forth,
- 49:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): flipping backwards and forwards between value and growth, just creating chaos.
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 50%, 50% of the market cap has to be in value, and 50% of the market cap of the R1 has to be in growth. Well, when the market became kind of under the business environment in this country is has become kind of uneven, very tech heavy, it meant they pushed a lot of growth companies into the value index, which just threw off the whole notion of what a discount of growth as a business characteristic
- 50:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): versus value as a valuation characteristic. Also, they were using at the time, let me just very quickly, they used a single measure in 1987, which was uh book to price, price to book, which is not very useful 40 years later. In 1995, they did add two economic other measures, not much better. One was uh uh uh sales per share
- 50:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): growth, which is absolutely legitimate. That's a business metric, really good for growth companies. That's or for measuring is a company growing or not. The third, uh, but the third metric was uh EPS estimates from the sell side, from the consensus set, which I has no business being in a benchmark. Uh they are now, as of after two years of
- 50:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): contortions, they are reconsidering a bunch of these metrics 40 years later, which is exactly what they should do. Because the technology and the conception, the theory of what they're doing from 1987, just doesn't describe today's world. And it's it isn't helping investors understand who's good at
- 51:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): making valuation calls and who's good at making business. calls that is growth companies.
- 51:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah. I mean, if you think about like the SP and the whole private, like the indexing of it, it's like it used to be 100 to 125 basis points to access unlevered beta, right? Like so you're talking about the market, like access to the market. Now it's two basis points. So people chase that. And then like in the hedge fund world,
- 51:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): which I've been in the hedge fund game. for a long time, is they all went to the best industrial version of it, which is Millennium
- 51:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Citizen.
- 51:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And like basically that's how what we have now. And you see 10% down Amazon and Google last week, right? Like, and you see like
- 51:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 51:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): market has just changed so much as a result of what you're talking. about and the the pod shop evolution. Like, and so like we don't live in the world of the 70s and 80s anymore. Like, like
- 52:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we don't live in the world of the 1930s. Uh if you think about what Warren Buffett was doing or Ben Graham, his mentor, it is a some at some sort of assumption that there is a marketplace place filled with choices and that individuals are making those a choices for good or for ill. In the world that you just described, which is all about quantitative
- 52:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investing and beta and pods and and uh milliseconds, uh there is, as I I put in one of the pieces, uh, you know, the the the the algos are trolling for a hundredth of a penny in a uh you know a quarter of a penny in a and a hundredth of a second, whatever it is, and without a fundamental care in the world. And I
- 52:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like that line. But the uh, you know, that that's not where the modern portfolio theory fits. That's not where PE fits. It's not where value investing fits. It's certainly not where the Russell 1000 value or the Russell 1000 growth fits, it's not where even market efficiency of uh FOM and French and the S P 500. Instead, you have a
- 53:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): marketplace that is dominated by non non-fundamental fundamental issues. There are the flows from the 401ks and the passive investments. You have the algos. I'm increasingly of the view that flows kind of drive things. It's no longer, we're taught the CFA program, MBAs, we're taught to make decisions. Best information, hear your choices, and make
- 53:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a decision, see the outcome. And the stock market is an arena for decision making under conditions of uncertainty.
- 53:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's that's what Harry Markowitz and Bill Sharp, the framework that they operated in, decision making under conditions of uncertainty. What do you do in this environment and how do you manage it? But that that that really isn't describing the market anymore because of passive, because of the algos, because of the flows.
- 53:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, I I would 100% a hundred percent agree with you that like and it it's weird because everybody grew up in the world that they grew up in and like you just have a situation where we all have to live in this and most of the theory that like has trained how we think is based on a world that doesn't exist anymore, essentially.
- 54:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I do, and you know, I it's not that I really truly resent the three years, the three springs that I spent about 25 twenty five years ago uh learning uh doing the C CFA, F A though. I'm I'm uh willing to admit it that it's sometimes still bothers me. But I I do think
- 54:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Me too, for
- 54:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what it's
- 54:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): worth. That was all that was miserable. But the uh yeah, I don't I don't know if we're serving investors very well by teaching them kind of an equilibrial model where rules apply about valuation and growth and and making choices and and so forth. and individual responsibility. That that
- 54:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I don't think that works as well as it as it used to to say the least.
- 54:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 54:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no kidding. No kidding. You can get fired from some funds for mentioning valuation these days. Listen, Dan, I wanted to take advantage of the fact that we've got a a Russian scholar on the show um for the first time and switch gears just to just at the end of this pod. and and and really sort of um draw on the other strand is well it one it's your
- 55:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): old job but um but but i i know that you think and write about it still a lot and and it's russia and i wanted to take a step back and you know the future of russia obviously front and center since the invasion of ukraine in in in in in 2022
- 55:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
- 55:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): talked before the show about near term predictions and we're not going to do that right now, but you said you've got a much clearer view of what Russia or what a what a what the next phase of Russia looks like on a five to ten year prism. And perhaps
- 55:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we can just
- 55:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so again as a historian I I I I look at Russia and I I look at the United States, my own society I look at Britain or France, and I see the rise and fall
- 56:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 56:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hegemons. Same with the Ottoman Empire, same with the Roman Empire, many, many other empires that maybe not are top of mind, but had the same rise and fall. It does appear to be a use a universal rule that empires rise and fall. And if you accept that, and it's pretty obvious why Paul Kennedy is kind of the major historian who
- 56:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): explains why that, but but it's pretty obvious, things become overextended, people become overextended, economically overextended, military overextended. You can see it in businesses because you know we have rise and fall of dominant companies. But it's the same thing with empires, it's just over a longer period of time. And uh
- 56:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Russia, if you look at it from that perspective,
- 56:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can argue peaked. as a hegemon, which is kind of the academic term, doesn't sound very good, but it's, you know, a power, a superpower, regional power, a significant power. As a hegemon, it peaked, depending on how you measure these things. And there are different ways of doing it, share of global economy, population, land mass, military strength, geopolitical strength,
- 57:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cultural strength, any uh Olympic medals. There are any number of ways of of of measuring a hegemon's strength. But by some of them, Russia peaked right before World War One. Which is a little extreme.
- 57:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But on a couple of the measures, it's before World War I. It's the their period of Benny, you referenced the strength of their market up until the revolution. Well,
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and then
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 57:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): went 75 years not being open. So
- 57:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think I think the the data would support what you're saying.
- 57:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. By other measures, more geopolitical measures. you're looking at the 60s and 70s, maybe the early 80s, but but sixties and seventies. And after World War II, stable, roughly stable economic environment, control of a buffer zone, second great power, military, and so forth.
- 57:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's been downhill ever since. And you could start to see the cracks actually in Eastern Europe, 56 and Hungary and 68 Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan 79, Poland, 1980, et cetera. But obviously 1991 is a big step down in a hegemonic decline. It just it's a huge
- 58:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): step change. And uh I was in Russia in the 1980s and 90s, it was very chaotic. Uh and um, but uh
- 58:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
- 58:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): stabilized. under Putin. Stabilized under Putin. You know, it was really a mess in the 90s. And
- 58:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he stabilized it, but he stabilized in a very Russian way, which is very authoritarian and much to the loss of many
- 58:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): support of many people from other societies who were hoping that Russia would go down a different path. But it did stabilize it. And then you look at Russia invading Georgia.
- 58:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2008, parts of Ukraine in 2014, and then Ukraine again in 2022.
- 58:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you see, I think, the effort of a hegemon in decline trying to hold back
- 59:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 59:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sands of time.
- 59:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The United States had just pulled out of Afghanistan. Ukraine's sort of a mess, and Putin thought. it would be an easy walk in to pick up at the time 40 million people, now 30 million people, which is a big deal. They are Slavs. They, you know, uh close in culture but uh and language and history, but not identical, as any Ukrainian will will tell you, that
- 59:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very much not identical, particularly for uh Western Ukraine. Um, but anyway, Putin thought it was uh managing, not so much the decline, he wouldn't have said it that. way, but I would say that managing the decline by quickly incorporating, reincorporating, putting parts of the band back together to use the Blues Brothers metaphor. Uh
- 59:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh, Ukraine, a lot of population and some important economic components to it, thought it would be easy. Ukraine's weak, Russia was on the upswing. Didn't work out that way. But that is, I I think, what the idea was. And Putin's very clear. he he has this historical obsession about putting the band back together and the role of his particular band. And um
- 1:00:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): whether that's correct or not, uh time will see. Uh but uh uh that effort failed and had the exact opposite effect. It has accelerated the process of hegemonic decline. If you measure that in terms of population, in addition to the losses in the war, uh out my migration, and the pariah state that
- 1:00:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Russia has with its new new friends of North Korea and Iran and its kind of vassal status to China. And so it's made, it was a gambit, and it it failed, and it's accelerating the process of hegemonic decline. That has interesting complic uh implications for Western policy, as to,
- 1:00:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, I believe it's an Napoleon, could be Klausus, but I think it
- 1:00:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
- 1:00:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Napoleon. You know, don't interfere with your your opponent when they're making a huge mistake. Um and but I I have strong views in regard to Ukraine. I'm I'm gonna not discuss them here to keep it keep it uh uh about uh uh Russia even though you you can't really separate but uh Russia made a uh a
- 1:01:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tragic tragic for Ukraine. and and tragic for itself uh error in uh a little bit like japan on december 7th japan lost world war two on december seventh it just took four years um that was the same gambit had the had Japan got all the aircraft carriers
- 1:01:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there's some chance that that war in the in the Pacific would have gone in a different direction not a 100%, hundred percent but some chance Had Russia succeeded in Ukraine in the first three days, as they imagined they would, there's a different world today. But that didn't happen. And instead, Japan and Russia doubled down, and Russia has been doubling down now
- 1:01:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): regularly and is so committed to this that they are, even if they succeed with some sort of off-ramp in the near term, it's a Pyrrhic victory. It's absolutely it's now it, you know, the word Pyrrhic victory is going to be replaced by Ukrainian if that happens that way. The cost to Russia, not to mention the the absolute human tragedy
- 1:02:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in Ukraine, is unforgivable. But uh it it's costing Russia so much to try to to incorporate this territory and it it is uh accelerated its decline. So I I I don't have, as I said, uh uh I don't have a clear map to the next couple of years about how this comes to an end, how this tragedy comes to an
- 1:02:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): end. Uh, but it it weakens Russia very, very significantly and accelerates its decline as a hegemon. In those articles that you reference, I imagine scenarios in which, like the Ottoman Empire and the Roman Empire, Russia gets smaller. Literally, its population and economic activity cannot support. support its
- 1:02:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): far-flung territories. A little bit like the British Empire, but the British Empire, once they couldn't afford it anymore, they could get on the ship and go go away. With Russia, because it's a contiguous empire, it's a more complicated process of shrinking. Kaliningrad is an interesting example because it's non-contiguous, it's uh outside
- 1:03:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the borders. But that's the basic, uh, that's the basic theme. thesis.
- 1:03:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I I think so. And and that this is let actually on that stuff, where you've written about this this this very distinct possibility of shrinking Russia is is in this um I'm gonna get the name rot and say do it.
- 1:03:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Engelsberg ideas. It's a uh it's a UK website uh uh that has emerged as a from my perspective as a a a very uh prime position to write on international uh geopolitics.
- 1:03:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah
- 1:03:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and you cover everything from a shrinking Russian landmass to tennis players and soft power soft power losses on that.
- 1:03:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So power of
- 1:03:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the US Open, yep.
- 1:03:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, exactly. So Dan, thank you so much for joining us. I I I um as I said, I will put um links to where to find all of these things um in the show notes. we haven't been um your compliance people won't let us talk about um your day job very much but you can you can you can hunt hunt down hunt down what dan
- 1:04:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gets up to in his j day job very very easily um with that I think we'll wrap things up um uh Dan Peres thank you very much again it's Benny and the squirrel and we're out
- 1:04:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): going to be able to do it.
- 1:04:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thank
- 1:04:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
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