Harley Bassman discusses MOVE index mechanics, fiscal deficit drivers of yields, and risks in MBS and Treasury basis trades.
Summary
Harley Bassman explains that the MOVE index reflects annual volatility and argues that rising Treasury yields are driven by fiscal deficits rather than inflation, citing stable TIPS break-evens. He characterizes leveraged ETFs as short convexity positions that erode value in volatile markets. Bassman opposes the re-IPO of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac due to moral hazard, noting their systemic importance. He highlights risks in the Treasury basis trade, particularly CTD bond shifts, and suggests that implied volatility trades at a premium to realized volatility due to fat-tail risks.
Key takeaways
- 1 The MOVE index range has compressed from a historical 80-120 to a recent 60-100 or 70-110, indicating a structural change in bond market volatility regimes.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 1:32
- 2 is 100, that means there's a 68% chance, one standard deviation, you'll be up or down 100 basis points a year from now.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 2:12
- 3 To derive the daily implied move from the MOVE index, divide the annual reading by 16 (technically 15.9, the square root of 252 trading days).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 2:32
Episode sections
- 0:01 – 3:31
Introduction and MOVE Index Mechanics
Harley Bassman introduces the MOVE index, explaining it as a real number representing annual volatility rather than a rebased index. He details how to convert the annual MOVE reading into a daily implied move by dividing by 16.
- 3:31 – 7:21
Convexity and Path Dependency
Bassman explains that volatility is difficult for most investors because it is non-linear and path-dependent. He uses the example of leveraged ETFs to illustrate how daily rebalancing creates a 'short convexity' position that erodes value over time.
- 7:21 – 11:55
Fiscal Deficit vs. Inflation as Rate Drivers
Bassman argues that rising Treasury yields are driven by fiscal malfeasance (a 6%+ deficit) rather than inflation, citing stable TIPS break-even rates around 2.35%. He contrasts this with nominal GDP growth, suggesting real rates are the primary driver.
- 11:55 – 17:22
Demographics and Inflation Persistence
Bassman predicts inflation will remain around 3% due to demographic shifts, specifically millennials entering their peak spending years for housing and household formation, unlike the boomers who bought from a smaller WWII generation.
- 17:22 – 27:36
Stock Market Dynamics and 401(k) Flows
The speakers discuss how passive flows from 401(k)s into index funds drive stock prices regardless of valuation. Bassman argues that stock market declines do not significantly impact the broader economy because wealth is concentrated at the top, whose spending habits are unchanged.
- 27:36 – 30:19
Credit Risks and Hyperscalers
Bassman expresses confidence in hyperscaler credits like Oracle, attributing credit spread widening to supply constraints rather than fundamental business deterioration. He dismisses the idea that a 20% stock drop would cause a credit crisis for these cash-rich firms.
- 30:19 – 32:07
Bond Bull Strategies
Bassman outlines strategies for investors wanting to be bond bullish without trading sovereigns, mentioning his previous product at Simplify which offered a seven-year call option on rates. He advises against short-dated options due to uncertainty.
- 32:07 – 35:14
MBS Market Opportunities and GSE Re-IPO
Speaker_0 asks Speaker_1 about opportunities in the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market given high mortgage costs for borrowers. Speaker_1 describes mortgage bonds as covered calls, noting they offer attractive coupons (100-110 bps) compared to investment grade credit, driven by a flat/inverted yield curve. Speaker_0 then asks about the potential re-IPO of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- 35:14 – 37:10
Opposition to GSE Re-IPO and Historical Context
Speaker_1 strongly opposes re-IPOing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, citing classic moral hazard where shareholders take gains and the public bears losses. He argues the government will never let them fail due to their systemic importance to the housing market and economy. He recalls their previous collapse was caused by them acting as hedge funds, hedging with derivatives while managers took massive bonuses.
- 37:10 – 40:00
Volatility Drivers and Swaption Volatility
Speaker_2 asks why mortgage spreads move with rate volatility. Speaker_1 explains that mortgage bonds behave like options, so implied volatility drives their pricing. He notes that while the MOVE index uses Treasury vol, the market has shifted to using swaption volatility because it is more liquid and easier to transact than Treasury options, which suffer from repo costs and liquidity issues.
- 40:00 – 44:39
Selling Volatility and Risk Management
Speaker_1 explains that implied volatility typically trades 8-12% above realized volatility due to fat tails and market gaps. He describes macro hedge funds selling volatility and delta-hedging daily, which is profitable over long periods but risky if positions are sized inappropriately. He warns against relying on historical backtests that ignore extreme percentage moves in volatility indices like the VIX.
- 44:39 – 51:03
Treasury Basis Trade and CTD Risk
Speaker_0 asks about the fragility of the Treasury basis trade (long cash, short futures). Speaker_1 explains that hedge funds provide liquidity by taking the other side of pension funds' duration needs. He highlights the risk of the Cheapest-to-Deliver (CTD) bond shifting during volatile markets, which can cause mark-to-market losses and force stop-outs. He warns that if yields approach 6%, the market will become 'jangly' due to uncertainty over which bond is deliverable.
- 51:03 – 58:14
Supply, Swap Spreads, and TIPS
Speaker_2 asks if there is a supply gap in the 7-10 year Treasury segment. Speaker_1 disagrees, stating there is ample supply and investors can use barbell strategies to match duration. He disputes the idea that swap spreads are persistently negative due to lack of demand, attributing it to balance sheet costs. He concludes by recommending TIPS, arguing that real yields of 2.75-3.5% are too high for risk-free assets and that inflation will likely exceed breakevens due to 'rigged' CPI calculations.
- 58:14 – 1:01:22
Fed Policy and Political Timing
Speaker_2 asks about the impact of a 100bp Fed hike. Speaker_1 predicts a deeply inverted yield curve and criticizes the Fed's 'drip drip drip' approach for creating uncertainty. He argues the Fed likely skipped a rate hike before the election for political reasons to avoid blaming the Fed for election outcomes, suggesting that rate decisions are influenced by realpolitik.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| SPDR S&P 500 ETF TrustSPY | etf | neutral | I I tell my kids, max out your four hundred one K, get the matching, which vests almost immediately now, eighty percent, seventy, eighty percent SPY, you know, twenty thirty into some five year IG fund, turn on reinvest, call To me in thirty 30 years. Right. |
| Gold | commodity | neutral | the hedge for that is gold, guns, and cancer tuna. |
| Silver | commodity | bullish | huge Bond bull, but I'm with you there. Silver bull. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The MOVE index was first published in 1994, with internal data extending back to 1988/89.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:32
How to verify: Check the CBOE website for the MOVE index launch date; verify internal data claims via Bassman's commentary on ConvexityMaven.com or SEC filings if he references specific backtests. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceA MOVE reading of 100 implies a 68% chance (one standard deviation) that rates will move plus or minus 100 basis points a year from now.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:12
How to verify: Verify the statistical definition of standard deviation and implied volatility calculation methodology published by CBOE for the MOVE index. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe daily implied move is calculated by dividing the MOVE index by 16 (square root of 252 trading days).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:32
How to verify: Mathematical verification: sqrt(252) ≈ 15.87, rounded to 16. Compare with CBOE methodology documentation for MOVE. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe 10-year TIPS break-even inflation rate has been about 2.35% for the last three years.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:13
How to verify: Calculate the difference between the 10-year nominal Treasury yield and the 10-year TIPS yield using data from the U.S. Treasury Department or Bloomberg for the period 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The U.S. is running a fiscal deficit of over 6% of GDP.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:43
How to verify: Check U.S. Treasury Department monthly treasury statements or CBOA budget reports for the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Nominal GDP is around 6.5%.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·12:14
How to verify: Retrieve nominal GDP growth data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The S&P 500 is at 7,800.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·17:07
How to verify: Check S&P 500 index levels on a financial data provider (e.g., Bloomberg, Yahoo Finance) for the date of the podcast (Nov 11, 2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The U.S. deficit went from 3.1 trillion in 2021 to 1.3 trillion in 2022.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·15:30
How to verify: Verify federal budget deficit figures from the U.S. Treasury Department or CBO historical tables for fiscal years 2026 and 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The 10-year Treasury yield fair value is 4.35%.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·25:11
How to verify: This is a subjective claim; verify by checking Bassman's commentary on ConvexityMaven.com for his specific valuation model or methodology. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Oracle's credit spread widening is due to supply of paper, not fundamentals.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·28:52
How to verify: Analyze Oracle's credit rating and bond issuance history via S&P Global Ratings or Moody's, and compare spread movements to issuance volumes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Mortgage bonds issued by Fannie, Freddie, or Ginnie Mae can be modeled as a straight-up covered call: buying the 10-year note at 100 and selling a 3-year call struck at 105.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:00
How to verify: Financial modeling of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) using option-adjusted spread (OAS) models; check CME Group documentation on mortgage bond pricing mechanics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Mortgage bond coupons are currently 100-110 basis points, compared to ~50 basis points for investment grade (IG) credit.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:35
How to verify: Check current yield data for Agency MBS (e.g., FNMA/ FHMA pools) and IG Corporate Bond indices (e.g., Bloomberg US Corporate Index) on Bloomberg Terminal or Refinitiv. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac account for 16-17% of the entire US economy.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·35:39
How to verify: Calculate the combined market capitalization or outstanding debt of Fannie/Freddie relative to US GDP, or review Federal Reserve financial accounts data (Z.1) for household sector exposure to mortgage debt. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Fannie and Freddie were previously 'government-sponsored hedge funds' that hedged with futures, treasuries, swaps, and options, leading to their collapse.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:32
How to verify: Review historical reports from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) or the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) report on the causes of the GSE failures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Implied volatility typically trades 8-12% above realized volatility.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·40:20
How to verify: Calculate the difference between implied volatility (e.g., VIX) and realized volatility (historical standard deviation of returns) for the S&P 500 over various periods using data from CBOE and Bloomberg. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The MOVE index uses 2-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 20-year Treasury options.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·38:48
How to verify: Review the methodology documentation for the MOVE Index published by CME Group. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceCPI was intentionally 'rigged' in the 1990s (specifically 1996-1998) by Alan Greenspan and Bill Clinton, involving healthcare cost adjustments.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·57:22
How to verify: Review Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) historical methodology changes for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 2026-2026, specifically the introduction of hedonic adjustments and changes in healthcare weighting. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Social Security and Medicare are tagged to CPI, giving the government an incentive to keep CPI low to control deficit growth.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·57:45
How to verify: Review the Social Security Act and Medicare legislation regarding COLA (Cost of Living Adjustment) calculations based on CPI-W. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Fed likely skipped a rate hike before the election for political reasons to avoid blaming the Fed for election outcomes.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·58:54
How to verify: Compare the timing of the Fed's rate decisions with the 2026 US Election date (November 5, 2026) and review Fed meeting minutes for stated economic vs. political considerations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
If Treasury yields approach 6%, the market will become 'jangly' due to Cheapest-to-Deliver (CTD) uncertainty in futures contracts.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·48:52
How to verify: Analyze historical Treasury futures volatility and CTD shifts during periods of high yields (e.g., 2026 Taper Tantrum, 2026-2026) using CME Group data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Trump and Democrats could work on 70-30 issues where both sides win.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:02
How to verify: Search for news reports or legislative records from late 2026 regarding bipartisan negotiations on '70-30' fiscal or policy issues involving the Trump administration and Democratic leadership. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Impeachment proceedings by Democrats would be a disaster.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:22
How to verify: Review political news coverage and market reactions during the 2026-08-12 to 2026-11-12 period for any impeachment motions or trials involving President Trump. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Trump engaging in 'nutty stuff' would be a disaster.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:22
How to verify: Monitor news archives from 2026-08-12 to 2026-11-12 for executive actions or statements by President Trump characterized as erratic or destabilizing by major news outlets. For recent events, verify 2026-08-12 through 2026-11-12. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify current MOVE index levels against historical ranges (80-120 vs 60-100) using CBOE data.
- Check the current 10-year TIPS break-even rate to assess Bassman's claim of 2.35% stability.
- Review Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's latest quarterly filings for their market share of US mortgages and balance sheet exposures.
- Analyze the current Cheapest-to-Deliver (CTD) bond in Treasury futures contracts to assess basis trade fragility.
- Compare implied volatility (MOVE) against realized volatility (historical price changes) to evaluate the 8-12% premium claim.
- Examine 401(k) flow data from sources like the Investment Company Institute (ICI) to verify passive flow impact on equity valuations.
- Assess the current shape of the yield curve (flat/inverted) to understand mortgage spread drivers.
- Review historical performance of leveraged ETFs during high-volatility periods to confirm short convexity erosion.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And we're live. Episode 103 of Benny and the Squirrel. We're recording on Wednesday evening, November the 11th, Veterans Day, lest we forget.
- 0:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Harley really needs no introduction, but we are d delighted to have um fixed income legend Harley Bassman join the pod.
- 0:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Quickly before we start, um, everything in this is not investment advice. Please guys do your own. homework and let us talk about tickers, which is what we love doing. Harley, thank you for joining us today. How are you? And
- 0:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): congratulations
- 0:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the new and congratulations on the new arrival.
- 0:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
- 0:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you very much. Yes, granthul number four.
- 0:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's great news. That's great news. Listen, I want to kick straight off, Harley, and talk about your your your your your your first sort of index child. Um for the those of you that don't know, um back in I think it was 2003, um Harley invented the move index, if you like the VIX for bonds. And I've often hear you
- 1:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): heard well, I've heard you talk in the past about the VIX
- 1:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and how to read it in terms of safe zones and danger zones. And way back when, I think maybe it was five, six years ago when I first heard you talking about it, you said that. you know, a triple-digit VIX was meltdown territory. Um, and here we've got a picture of it right now. We we've spent quite a lot of time in triple digits in
- 1:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recent years. Um were we melting down and we just didn't know? I mean, obviously 2022 was one thing, but since then it's been pretty elevated.
- 1:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I I'll say this. First off, the move was first published in 1994. It's just something. some places don't have the data. And I actually have data going back to 89. Um, actually 80 to 88. So if you if you look where to look, you can go pretty far back. Um the range used to be 80 to 120. Um, it
- 1:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): has come down since then for a lot of reasons. It's been more like kind of 60 to 100, maybe 70 to 110. Um, but the the the important thing is this. the move is actually a real number. It's not an index of something based at 100, it's a real number. And what it means is um if the move
- 2:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is 100, that means there's a 68% chance, one standard deviation, you'll be up or down 100 basis points a year from now. So if rates are 5% now, you'll be between four 4 and six 6%, percent. 60% of the time, 60% probability one year hence. And what's more important is this:
- 2:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's an annual number. You can deconstruct this into a daily number by dividing by 16. Actually, 15.9, but let's not go there. By 16, it's a daily number. That number is the square root of 252, number of trading days. Starting with technical on you. So if you take 100 divided by 16, you get
- 2:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): six and change. And that's what 100 kind of means is you're gonna move. The market thinks there's pricing in six basis points a day, every day up or down from close to close. Same thing, by the way, for the VIX. A VIX of 16 divided by 16 is one means a 1% move every day. Every day A a VIX victim of 32 thirty two would would mean be a a two 2% percent move move every every
- 3:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): day day um on uh on the SP. So all these numbers, all these balls, they're all basically if you took stat one oh one in ninth grade, you could be a a bond trader. It's just that simple. No, we we just chip put in Greek letters to make you s uh sound smarter and charge you higher fees, but it's all stat one oh one from ninth grade.
- 3:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, and and that's why it's like eighty 80 eighty 80 ball, vol five 5% percent daily move. You know, it's it's like not that hard, right? Like you go back to the early stage math. Like, and it's funny because why do you think, as the guy who's called the convexi maven and created an index that's famous, like why do you why do you think volatility is so
- 3:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): hard for the average market participant, you know, outside ball traders, outside bond traders, like you know, like I I've had run vol funds. So, but like I I always wonder this because it vol seems to be this thing that's like very ephemeral to a lot of participants.
- 4:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because it's not linear. That's why. So if you think about this, let's say you buy a bond at 100, goes to 110, goes back to 90, ends up at 101 a year from now. Okay, you made a point. That's it. In an option or a convex something or other, it's past. path dependent.
- 4:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It matters how you get there. So if you go, you know, from 100 to 105 to 95 back to 100, that's a different profile than 110 to 90, then back to 100 again. Um and it's very hard for people's brains to to process that because basically you're going to a three-dimensional concept as opposed to a two-dimensional concept. Um,
- 4:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and we're we're ordinarily we're not paid to think. this way or trained to operate this way. So that that's why convexity is so such a difficult uh risk vector to manage. Um it just doesn't pop into your head naturally.
- 5:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And and it's said
- 5:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 5:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): someone's been on the street for a long time. You know, I started my career at Fidelity, and I always said that it's is like, hey, the earnings estimates that are gonna blow out in year two, year three. FY two, FY3, like we underestimate, you know, what they could be, and we also underestimate on the downside. So that's really what Quebec
- 5:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): City is, right? Like on the equity side and on the bond side. So you think that's just humans are linear thinkers and like where the market actually prices is in this second second-order order math.
- 5:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'll give you a simple a simpler example.
- 5:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um, all these various uh funds, leverage funds that pay you two times or three times the daily move, that's a massive short convexity position, although no one actually realizes it. Why?
- 5:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
- 5:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I got something at 100, goes up 10% to 110. Next day it goes down 10%.
- 6:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now it's at 99, right? Because 10% of 110 is 11. So if you think about that, if you run this game up and down, up and up, you slowly grind that asset back down to zero. Um and and and that's that's kind of the concept there is that you know uh up and down 10% uh is not does not put you back at zero. And and and and that'd be
- 6:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the best way to think about convexity or or path dependency. as a concept.
- 6:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Go
- 6:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on. I was gonna say, well, Harley, bond traders have had a a real live lesson of that over the course of this year. I mean, I'm just gonna bring up a chart quickly here, which is you know, the trade, the year-to-date trading range across the treasury curve. Um, and we obviously have had a fun time in bond markets this week with what. Walla coming out
- 6:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in London ahead of the CPI. Um, saying something that you were saying earlier in the summer that um perhaps the Fed should be thinking about 50 basis points. Um
- 7:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think right about
- 7:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that.
- 7:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This this year has been a salutary lesson on path dependency, right? We've we've we we've been walked back up and down in in in rates markets. Um
- 7:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Where do you think the Fed is now?
- 7:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's a tough question. I mean, going, you know, so I I write a commentary. It's free. You can find it at CavextdyMaven.com. And uh one of my last commentaries was about what's driving the world. And the notion uh is that inflation is scaring everybody. and inflation is what's driven rates up. I
- 7:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would argue it is not inflation. And the reason why I say that is if you look at TIPS and back into the implied inflation rate. So you could have a 10-year treasury or a 10-year TIP, and you have to somehow make them equal risk-wise, or there'd be free money, Um, you could take this
- 8:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): TIPS yield. versus the 10-year nominal yield, and you get a break-even inflation rate. That break-even inflation rate for the last three years has been about 2.35%.
- 8:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
- 8:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): whole run of insanity, it's been 2.3%. That's kind of nutty when you think about it. I mean, I thought it was inflation that drove the Fed to take rates down, take tick rates back up again. Um,
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 8:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not sure I quite believe this because CPI is a is is not quite reality, and TIPS are a very small market, but nonetheless, they haven't moved. I think what's driven rates higher from over the course of this year is just the fiscal situation, which is just plain out of control. We're running a six and change percent fiscal
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): deficit in the U.S. with a 4-1 uh unemployment rate and um, you know, uh GDP. is pretty strong. This is this is crazy town. You shouldn't get a fiscal deficit this big unless you're in war or a recession. And if we ever did get a recession, for God's sakes, we're probably a 10% fiscal deficit. We're just borrowing too much money.
- 9:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um, and I think that's what we're seeing here is is is that uh the the bond markets just um are overwhelmed with with uh the supply of debt uh and also kind of the fear. of what's gonna happen. What what if we can't control um the this this you know m money spigot uh
- 9:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's going on. Um as far as you know if you add on to that the AI, which is really kind of challenging, um
- 9:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh we're we're gonna borrow government's gonna Go borrow what two trillion dollars net this year. Um AI is another seven eight hundred billion. So the so just these five guys are gonna go borrow one-third of the federal government's deficit. That that that's that's kind of crazy. I think that's why you're seeing all rates go up in the in
- 9:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the West, but in the US in particular, um, is is this fiscal malfeasance as opposed to inflation?
- 9:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, and so that's probably why real rates have been the driver, right? Like we
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): seen. you know, I mean, everyone wants to complain about inflation, but like you just said in your last chart, like it's been inflation expectations haven't gone that far. So, in essence, the duration supply, or whatever bucket you want to say, the five-year supply has been overwhelmed. And then, you know, Mike and I have
- 10:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): talked about this, like in a world of passive, like hey. there's sector like risk limits, right? Like you have been around long enough to remember, like, hey, we can only have this much of a sector. Well, if one sector is overwhelming everybody, then you have to reallocate to other areas, and you're starting to
- 10:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): see really bad credits trading at way too rich of levels. Like, is that like dynamic that you're seeing, independent of the basis part of it?
- 10:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, for your audience, uh, Benny's talking about Michael Green, my my friend and partner from from well back, uh who's the king of passive uh investing or passive analysis at least. Um is Mike right about that unclear. Um, you know, I mean there there is still some in the bond market in particular, there's
- 11:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh you still see um active managers beat the index. Um might might argue because the construction is improper, but I would say there's other reasons that drive it uh away from uh away from that. Um but I mean in general there's there's only so much money that can go around. And um and and and you have to go and um you know back up the truck a
- 11:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): little bit more and more until you can absorb it. I mean supply has to equal demand at some point, and uh and the federal government and everyone else is just borrowing a lot. Also, but uh away from that, um I'm U Chicago, kind of a monetarist, kind of a fundamentalist. Um a lot of guys think I'm nuts because of that, but you know, I think I've done I think I've been more right than wrong in the last
- 11:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): decade. Um and um
- 11:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the old rule was that tenure rates should equal roughly or somewhere in the zip code of nominal GDP. And the concept of that is that if nominal GDP is the profit, then I will borrow money. So if nominal is six, if I could borrow money at five,
- 12:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then I can make money. I borrow five, make six, that all works. Um and vice versa. If you have you know rates at at seven, well, I I can't borrow money at seven and make money at six, I'm not going gonna to borrow money. I'm my demand. for money goes down. We're running nominal at you know around six and change right now. So a tenure of five is not crazy town. I would
- 12:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tenure of three was was was the wrong number. Um I am an inflationist. I do think inflation is gonna stay at three and change for for quite a while for lots of reasons. Um uh I think I I think demographics play a big part of that. That we are in the world now where the millennials are in their growth
- 12:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): spending time. They're buying houses, they're they're buying, and once you buy a house, you have the kid, you get the washing machine, and then and everything else that goes along with there's there's a demographic demand. It's not quite the same as it was in the 70s and 80s when the boomers came in and really I mean the boomers were the pig of the python, right? Uh we we w we were coming in there and we're buying everything in
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sight and we're buying it from the World War II generation, which was very small. Okay. Um the millennials were actually bigger than the boomers by number, but smaller by percent of population. But I think you're seeing a kind of an echo. And you've seen this happen in um household formation, which 10 ten years ago was b
- 13:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): below trend because you know, people get married later. and then the guys stay in their in their mom's basement and play video games. But it's kind of all come back now, gotten back to trend as they get married in their early thirties as opposed to getting married, you know, in their mid twenties. So, um, you know, I mean, uh it's it's it's it's never different this
- 13:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): time.
- 13:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 13:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no. Fair fair fair enough. I mean, my my my issue with the it the the the fiscal cure, if you like, is that we're we live in a populist world with um politicians not prepared to tighten purse strings and tighten belts. So I mean uh i it's it's the sort
- 14:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of classic economist's problem where where you're you're you're assuming a spending slowdown. Um and I I I just don't see how how politically feasible that is. What what needs to crack for people to to to finally go actually, yeah, it's a fiscal project pro problem, not a not a rate problem?
- 14:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Look, whenever you have situations like this, you know, you could you have three variables and you can only control two of them. I mean, this is why in Japan, this is what happened there. I mean, they they controlled rates and and and and and other stuff, and the currency blew up, went from 80 to 160. Okay. Um the US is gonna be the same thing. I mean, we know
- 14:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what the problem is. You're right, they can't fix it. I mean, as a as a slight diversion, this is why I always thought modern monetary theory was was was nonsense. Uh, they were right, you could borrow as much as you want uh until you get inflation. And once you get inflation, you're supposed to go and either raise taxes or cut spending. My comment was that's a
- 15:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): great idea. but that's never gonna happen. They're not gonna go and cut spending or raise taxes because they're not paid to do that. Politicians are paid to get re-elected. And on the and in Congress, it's a two-year cycle. So I mean, it was it was never gonna work. Um, the theory was right.
- 15:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They did it in
- 15:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): 22, right? Like we went from a 3.1 trillion deficit to 1.3, one three and they raised rates pretty aggressively. So we've seen whether what that looked like. 22 is a pretty ugly year. So you mean you think that scared the shit out of them basically?
- 15:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I th I th I think that the solution is not going to be the government taking proper action. It's going to be inflation. And they love inflation. Inflation is the silent tax on the middle class right right down the middle. Um and um if you if debt is a number and you can inflate at a
- 16:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): higher uh rate than that, then you will burn that to GDP, right? So that's gonna be the answer. And that that's what after World War II, that's what happened, right? You you basically had massive growth.
- 16:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Gross of debt. So I I I I think they say they don't want inflation, but they actually do.
- 16:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oh of course. I mean, if you think I re I read a Barry Icking Green paper of like how we got out of the eighteen seventies, the eighteen nineties globalization and all the debt that like and it was like, you know, you had to basically keep real under nominal, like and
- 16:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): we did that until I guess what, seventy 78, eight, seventy 79, nine? something like that, and then we got out of it. But like it's inflating the debt away. But the thing about that is the distribution mechanism matters a rot, right? Like if we're inflating and Elon Musk and the data center guys and you know,
- 17:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): small segment get the inflation, but not the average person because we don't have labor unions or whatever. Like that does become a problem, right? Or the SP's at 7800. I mean, what do you think about that?
- 17:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think stocks are fine. As long as unemployment is uh below five percent, stocks are fine because the money is all coming from uh millennials recycling their 401ks four or one Ks into passive passive indices, and it's just it's buying that happens. irrelevant to price, irrelevant of PE, irrelevant to everything. You know, I mean
- 17:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I tell my kids, max out your four hundred one K, get the matching, which vests almost immediately now, eighty percent, seventy, eighty percent SPY, you know, twenty thirty into some five year IG fund, turn on reinvest, call To me in thirty 30 years. Right.
- 18:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): what you really meant was tier one. not not SPY.
- 18:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh, if you want to say that, that's fine.
- 18:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): We like to promote. Uh
- 18:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so
- 18:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and make a habit of not mentioning names keeps me out of jail.
- 18:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah,
- 18:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's a very good discipline. It's a very good discipline. So, Harley, I I reproduced the chart that you put, I think it was in your last note, which is the relation. relationship between stocks since we're there and and and consume consumer sentiment. And this this this you you you you were pointing out the jaws that opened up um at
- 18:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): around the time of the pandemic, right? And I mean I this is the S P in green on a log scale here just so that you can so that it just doesn't look like a parabola or a hockey stick from nineteen 1990. ninety. But the relationship is so clear in terms of um in terms of how those um how those two how those two indices
- 18:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interoperated until the pandemic. What do you think happened?
- 19:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh let's go back to uh ninth grade stat. It's just that simple. It's mean versus median and you can always you can alwa you can always prove your point with some statistics. statistic. So let's just say we have a village of 10 people.
- 19:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There we go. Yeah. You have one guy makes 500,000 and the other nine make 10,000. The average is 50K and the me and and and but the the median is uh is 10. That's what's happening right now is the politicians are right at the you know national level economy economy's is great. At the
- 19:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): individual level, it's terrible. Um, that's what's happening. Uh there's no no reason to go go go go go get a PhD somewhere. It's sim it's that that that's simple.
- 19:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Coming back to your point about um coming back to your point about employment, right? If the if if the median guy is r responsible for four 401ks oh one Ks and the future health of the stock market, you know. can that can can can is is that not a dichotomy that you could you that the the
- 20:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But why is that being any
- 20:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): guy responsible though? Like I I don't know why why would he be the responsible one?
- 20:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well just in aggregate you know in in aggregate the you know the the the th if if if if wealth is being concentrated at one corner of the village, right? Unless that unless unless he's unless he's doing all of the the legwork in terms of putting putting his four oh one K into stocks, you know, that's a that's that you know that that
- 20:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's a much less potent force.
- 20:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But I think if you think about it like how at Silicon Valley works, hey, like my little stock comp is
- 20:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): massive multiples of the average guy who works in of a factory in in Ohio. or my home state of Wisconsin or whatever, like that. I don't know if the median guy actually matters. I think it's still the average, and it's really just a skew. I mean, like, like that's kind of what the real trouble is here, and why I think a lot of it
- 21:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): traditional economists have trouble because like we have the a very, very skewed economy.
- 21:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think Mr. Squirrel's. right over here. I th I I I think your median person making sixty, seventy, eighty thousand a year at some place. There's no longer a defined benefit. It's now a defined contribution, and that goes into some four one K. And the government has basically said, um, unless you opt out, the money's gonna go to some passive vehicle, which by the way is as a
- 21:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): public policy concept I agree with. I don't think ordinary civilians should be picking stocks. And so you know, they're there they have some kind of contribution plan, and maybe it's smaller dollars than Elon's money, but if on the margin, these small dollars, as long as he's employed, are going into the stock market and buying the index.
- 21:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Okay, so let's talk about bonds for a second. So we're we're we're now in the rate raising, you know, it's funny. Our friend of the show, David Dredd. Dredge, he had this deja vu thesis a couple years ago, and he was like, hey, this is like mid-90s, you know, we had the rate raising,
- 22:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): then we cut, and we might have to rehike, which as you know as a bond aficionado, hasn't been In that many cycles like that, where you had like the the reversal. Where do you think we're at now?
- 22:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that you have to remember that uh the Greek tragedies and Shakespeare, uh, we still read them uh because they managed to capture the you know essence of human existence, which is hubris, ego. And um, you know, Jay Powell uh and and now uh Kevin Walsh, warsch
- 22:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they would they they they have nice egos. Nothing wrong with that. I got no problem with the. ego i i got a pretty big one myself um and and they all want to be vulker not not burns right they want to be the guy who goes and saves the world as opposed to the guy who sinks the ship um and so um they're gonna take actions accordingly um uh as long as you we inflation's
- 23:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): running hot and they're gonna keep taking rates up I suppose um until they resolve it now one could argue maybe it's not rates that drive the inflation, but nonetheless they're gonna keep it so I I think they're gonna they're gonna they got a couple more in them um to go. I mean are they gonna take it all the way back up to I don't know five or six? I
- 23:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't I don't think so. Um at some point you know rates will matter um if only because at some point um uh they become uh the the the return profile of a government guaranteed interest rate uh is better than a stock, you know, at a at a gigantic PE. Uh people will go in and just you're and you you'll probably see uh pensions at
- 23:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some point adjust. I mean, I I think I think a 30-year tip at three and change percent. I mean, I I I think it's uh for a pension or an insurance company, it why are you buying stocks at all?
- 23:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Totally Totally agree with you, Harley. Like, but I guess what I'm saying is what is the level? Like, you've been in the game longer than I am. I'm a sofa trader. Like, what is the level that shuts it down? You know, we've talked about the death shot. You know, I've done a lot of research over the history of the Fed. 1929, they did a 50 basis point
- 24:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): hike, late late 70s, Volcker did a big hike. You know, Greenspan's green spans 50 paces basis point hike in the summer of uh uh of June 2020 or 2000. Like there was always a that's what the Fed does. They're like the death chat. They almost raised rates in August of 08. Like they like to like shut
- 24:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it down. What what is the level, in your opinion, as the Bond Maven? Like what was the level that shuts it down? And
- 24:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But I'm
- 24:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): not trying to hold it to you, but just just what do you think? Like some give me a range. I guess.
- 24:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I mean I I I think it's I think it's very tough getting two years treasures about five percent. Uh and I think fair value for the tenure is 435, which I've written about you know endlessly. Um but I mean fair value is is just a number that you kind of circle around. So I mean I have no problem with with tens going up to five and change before they go back down again. Um
- 25:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 25:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it it it I it's a a lot has to do with with with with with the uh with the stock market. Um in terms of uh deflating that, people will move out of stocks into bonds. Um but we're not there yet.
- 25:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Do you think the stock market matters more now than it ever has in your career?
- 25:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No. I I mean, as I always say, it's never different this time. We always think that we're brand new people and we're making new history and and we we've created a something different. It's always the same nonsense. It's it's just that everyone forgets it. I mean the whole fourth turning uh book is really about the idea that after eighty years we've we've forgotten
- 25:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): everything. It's all a brand new population. We have to do the same thing over and over again. We all think it's new but it's not.
- 25:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But I what do
- 25:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you make what what would you but what do you make um make of the argument that the economy is much more financialized now. and therefore there is much more of a transmission mechanism directly from stock stock level stock price levels into the real economy in a way that wasn't the case in the in you know prior to the prior to
- 26:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the last ten, fifteen years.
- 26:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How
- 26:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how does stocks go down twenty percent change the economy?
- 26:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 26:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean
- 26:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 26:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think C CEOs CEOs look at their RSUs and go, I need to fire people. so that I can so that I can get my my f forward EPS numbers looking looking rosier.
- 26:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 26:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): suppose that's an idea. I I mean didn't we already say that most of the wealth in the stock market is owned by the top ten percent and their spending is not going to change one lick.
- 26:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I mean y yeah I I I I I think the stock market w i i i is um can be emotional for people, but I mean you know, I I don't see stocks down twenty percent making a difference in the economy. I mean it'll it'll it'll scare people, I I suppose, but it really I'm not sure why
- 26:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that matters. I
- 27:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, uh listen, I query whether, you know, the upper quartile or upper quintile of of of of of of of consumers, you know, I think their propensity to consume definitely goes down in correlation with the stock market, doesn't it?
- 27:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 27:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can live with that, sure.
- 27:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
- 27:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So it's I I think some it's a it's a mixture of employment, um, employment and top consumer propensity to spend. I think
- 27:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 27:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 27:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just hope that down 20% i i i i i is that impactful from where we are, where this market's priced right now.
- 27:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know, but if
- 27:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you think if you think about
- 27:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 27:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's a different animal entirely.
- 27:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): But if you think like a Murden model, right? Like, okay, asset prices versus credit, and like credit being a strike price, like if an asset price is goes down, like your credit goes up at a nonlinear rate, like beyond a certain Rubicon. So there is a level where like that matters. And so
- 27:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): if we have this credit boom, like the asset prices go. going down really has a real problem. I mean, core weave would be the perfect example of it, right? Like that was like very favored, then it kind of came out of favor. Now it like can't access corporate debt. And like, what happens if that goes?
- 28:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Oracle is now junk. Like, what if Oracle goes to 500? Or, you know, I mean, like, these things happen faster than people think. And we haven't seen a credit cycle. Like a lot of people on the street have never seen that credit cycle before.
- 28:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm not worried about the uh the hyperscalers. They they they all have real businesses underneath them that are making they're throwing off cash. Um so I I I I I think that I think that those credits are all fine. Um, I mean, Oracle's credit going up or widening out, I think more has to do with just the supply of Oracle paper.
- 28:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean, people have a limit of how much they could ask allocate to any single name. And I guess Oracle's finally have found their level.
- 29:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And to be fair, the Basel rules mean the banks have to then hedge. And so then it like in a in a much thinner CDS market than it was in the pre-GFC.
- 29:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): they have to then push against it. So then it creates a perception, maybe. Like that that is a fair, that is a fair thing. Um
- 29:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean
- 29:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you you you can go you can go and and and and buy puts on on Oracle stock, which is probably almost limitless uh if you if you have to go and do that. I mean if you think about it, I mean what what is a stock? You know, it's it stock's not a call in the company where the the value of the bonds is a strike spike price.
- 29:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Absolutely. Um, let me ask you another question, Harley. So I have a lot of guys come to me as like the Bond Bull resident, um, and they like are stock guys, right? Like guys who run 100 million to 500 million, maybe a billion, and they're not stock guys. They don't run Mesdas, isdas. they don't know how to trade
- 29:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): sofers, and they want to know how. do I be bond bullish? And I know you had a product at Simplify and you're the Bond Maven. Maybe you can explain that to us. Like, you know, and I know the scrolls on some of the products you created. So like give that little bit to these people who are listening
- 30:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): of like how if they want to be Bond bullish right now and they don't want to trade take sofers, they don't have an Isda, is the like what do they do?
- 30:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh well, I mean, I'm no longer at Simplify, but the product I created there uh was basically a seven year call option on interest rates on on on bonds, and that that gave you a lot of leverage and a lot of convexity, uh, where your loss was limited and your gain was unlimited. Um uh that th that that's kind
- 30:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kinda of I mean, you know, to I I guess to really go get leverage you I mean, where you don't use options is you're gonna go and buy zeros. The problem with zeros is it's a massive cur yield curve bet. Um and and more than actually a duration bet. So I mean a lot of things are really it's it's tough to make to make money on on on some of these things uh except for
- 31:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): buying short dated options, which I would not advise doing because
- 31:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 31:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): who knows what's gonna happen in the next you know three or six months.
- 31:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So that was the idea of that product. And um I suspect um I may offer a product like that again somewhere else sometime.
- 31:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 31:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah, and I'm a big fan of those products that you created there. Um really, really helpful tools. Um you know you've got you you you uh you had you had you had the duration on steroids and you also had the the mirror image of that which came out first. Um and what I've always noticed about when you brought new products to the market is you were always
- 31:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): about um a couple of months before it really happened. Yes. Um and and and you know, yeah, there's nothing like there's there's nothing like um good timing in this in in the w in the world of finance and and and and you pulled it off several times, uh Harley, so at that's tips. it to you on that front
- 32:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): thank
- 32:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you
- 32:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so um one of one of the one one of one of the other products that you brought um and and and one of the notes that you wrote about earlier this year is um goings on in the mortgage market right now and um you know it's quite it's it's quite an interesting follow-up topic from here since we you know we
- 32:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know we've got the we've got this sort of household formation issue, we've got the fact that the age of first-time home buyers is creeping up. Um, you know, mortgages look very expensive by hor historical standards. Um
- 32:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let's
- 32:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): talk about for
- 32:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): who,
- 32:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investors or for the borrower?
- 32:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 32:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for the borrower. For the borrower.
- 32:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
- 32:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): kind of opportunities do you see in the MBS market then?
- 32:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
- 32:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 32:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like mortgage bonds right now. Um
- 33:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think of a mortgage bond issued by Fannie, Freddie, or Jenny as a as a straight-up covered call. It's like buying the 10-year note at 100 and then selling a three-year call against it struck at 105.
- 33:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um, that's kind of how these things, if you model them up mathematically, um, that's how they kind of look. And of course, you know, the problem with that is that that you know, if rates go up, that tenure can go from 100 to 80 or whatever, go down a lot. Uh, and then on the upside, like once it goes to 105, you you you're capped out. Uh but
- 33:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the payment for that is right now a uh 100-110 100 110 basis points.
- 33:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's not a bad deal to go pick up that kind of uh that kind of coupon uh versus a credit at what 50 right now or so um for for IG um what's more interesting about mortgage bonds right now which is way too technical for most people but I'll just tell you that what drives
- 33:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mortgage uh bonds more than actual rate level and vol level is the yield curve. And right now with a flat inverted curve, uh mortgage bonds, uh the the rate of a mortgage bond um goes up versus treasuries. So maybe now we're at 110 over long-term average
- 34:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is 75. That's a lot of that is driven by uh the two-year two year note going up so much more than the 10-year tenure note in the last uh you know, three, four months. Um if you're a believer that rates are going to come down because we go into a recession, um and that the Fed will pull down
- 34:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the front rate, so the two year rate will come down faster than the ten year rate, uh owning a mortgage bond is not that bad a deal at all. Uh, because you could sleep at night. It's it's it's it's I it mean if Fanny or Freddie go down. um, you know, you got bigger problems than your bond portfolio. Uh the the hedge for that is gold, guns, and cancer tuna. Um, because it will be
- 34:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the civilization if Fannie goes under
- 35:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): what's your take just on just on the G S E's? Um have you have have you have you thought about have you dipped your toe into the debate about whether or not they they they they get they get they get they get re re-ipo'd. IPO'd?
- 35:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I wrote a very
- 35:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): long commentary about that uh earlier this year. I am totally
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): against
- 35:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): against doing that. Um this is this is classic moral hazard. Um the notion of of taking the gains and giving it to stockholders and the losses and giving it to the public, the government is totally nuts. And this notion they're going gonna to go and find some way to to to to make that work is preposterous. The government will always
- 35:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): back Fanny and Freddie. I mean the housing market, I mean housing makes up I don't know, sixteen, seventeen percent of the entire US economy. They are not going to go and let that go under. So um I I I I
- 35:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we're gonna be careful about what I say here because I don't want to get sued, but um if you look at who owns um GSE stock, um you kind of know what's going on here. Uh there's a little a little payback going on. Uh, but I'm totally against
- 36:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they're a noise,
- 36:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they're a noisy crew with quite a quite a large retail following as well. Um
- 36:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so they so they might be, but I but I I they they should not be at touching uh the mortgage market. And by the way, what killed Fanny and Freddie, you know, two decades ago was they were basically government-sponsored hedge funds. They were going out there, buying mortgage securities that they made, and then hedging them out with
- 36:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): futures and treasuries and swaps, buying some options to go hedge up the convexity, and then trying to earn this, you know, spread, risk spread, um, that drove the stock price up. And of course, the managers of Fannie and Freddie were paid handsomely in options, which they then cashed in for millions of dollars, and they would then have. when it blew up, where were they? Oh, they
- 36:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were off on their yachts, and the US government was owning Fanny and Freddie. Um, to I I'm not sure why a sane person would want to go and recreate those incentives again. That's classic moral hazard.
- 37:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 37:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think that makes sense. So I I I I did
- 37:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): go
- 37:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Going,
- 37:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on,
- 37:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Ben.
- 37:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): No, I actually was just thinking about like this concept of like, you know, the when the move. moves, like mortgage spreads move. Can you explain that for a second? Like, because I think that's a fundamental concept that I've had to like tell people, but like you know it better than I do. And like, why is it that mortgage spreads move on, you know, rate volatility?
- 37:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 37:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's that's that's just very easy. I mean, I mean, as I said, a mortgage bond could can be constructed by long the cash 10-year tenure
- 37:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 37:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shorter three-year three call-op. year call option. What drives a call option? Well, there's a lot of things, but implied vol is
- 37:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): one of the biggest. And so if implied vol goes up, the price of an option goes up. So let's just say that you buy the tenure at 100 and you sell a call option for for for uh for four points. So net net, this mortgage bond is is like worth 106, uh worth 96. Uh if vol ball goes up,
- 38:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and the
- 38:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): call option. is now worth five points, then the mortgage bond's now worth 95, right? 100 minus 5. It's just that simple. So yeah, the the the the move. The thing is, the move is not a very good um
- 38:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): uh vector to use for mortgages. It does work, but not great because of the move is one month 30-day volatility. whereas mortgages are priced off three-year, four-year X-Brie options.
- 38:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Isn't that the construction?
- 38:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh for the move, it's uh well not quite. I I um uh t twenty, 2020, twenty, 40 forty, and 20 twenty percent.
- 38:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 38:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): okay, okay.
- 38:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 38:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yes, uh and I so I I doubled up the tenure component because that tends that that that's the the most activity in the market is tenure is the benchmark for most things.
- 39:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So when you think about like rates ball, what what are you looking at as a market participant? Like what what is it like swap should involve or like what is it that you're really looking at? Well
- 39:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): swaption swapped involves vol is all you look at nowadays because yeah,
- 39:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Treasury
- 39:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Vall it doesn't trade. I
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
- 39:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I made my career on Treasury Vol, but everyone switched to swaption vol um, you know, in the early 2000s. Um Fanny and Freddie basically started using swaptions uh to do that. Uh and and and and it's you know global liquidity. Um and it's it's it's it's a rate we we kind of know. Whereas treasuries uh as as a um uh a A
- 39:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): qped QCIPT bond uh is tough because you have to then deal with the repo. the borrow costs, the fact that's a $40 billion issue as opposed to an infinite issue. So swap shoes are just a whole lot better at uh at transacting uh for the world. But the question you want to ask is what really drives this?
- 39:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And the answer is um the best guess of tomorrow's price is today's price.
- 40:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 40:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): best guess of tomorrow's vol is yesterday's. vol. And so what you'll see is uh usually um whatever realized vol is with last month, that's kind of close to where you're gonna be uh for the for the move. And you generally see implied volatility trade eight to twelve percent over realized vol. That's true
- 40:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for almost anything out there, and the reason why um
- 40:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is the reason that ball vol trades. a little higher than the realized volatility has to do with um uh
- 40:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the vol we use like is like a kind of bell curve, but that's not reality. They're usually the tails are a little fatter, so you gotta plump those tails up and that pushes up the implied vol. And also the small detail that the Black Shoals model um assumes that you can trade as much as you want. at any price at any time,
- 40:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which is not true because markets gap, right? So therefore that small problem, you walk in and swoosher down 2%, you could hedge all the way down. So that's why you see implied ball. And so you've seen many of the largest macro hedge funds uh operate uh a game of where every day they sell one
- 41:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): month, tenure. 10 year options uh one month options on on on everything could be gold could be could be spoos could be um uh bonds and they every day at four o'clock they delta hedge it and in theory if you're selling vol 10 over realized vol well you'll earn your 10% insurance premium uh the
- 41:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): problem with that is that um uh
- 41:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): pe
- 41:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): people are not very patient and they size it inappropriately. Because what happens in general with these implied vols or vols in general is you'll is you'll make a lot of money and then you'll give it all back in one day and earn it back slowly. Uh and so people are impatient about this. If you look over long periods of time, that's a winning trade to sell vol
- 42:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and del delta tension edge every day. Uh but it's usually so sized inappropriately and they get stopped out.
- 42:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Well, at the right price, though, right? Like Buffett always said that, like, you know, selling insurance at the right price is the key. So yeah, if I get 10 to 12% over realized, that's a good business. But like, yeah, you will lose occasionally, there's no question. But like, you know, that's a good margin. And so I always think of like implied vol versus
- 42:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): realized vol ball margin. as like that's a sign of these guys are still making money.
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well
- 42:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you gotta be really
- 42:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): careful about that
- 42:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): because like when
- 42:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): realized ball is is like six um the VIX might be at twelve so it's a six point spread there. That's huge. Is that a great trade? Uh probably not and when
- 42:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the VIX is at thirty
- 42:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): five you probably realized at you know so
- 42:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at 40 but you you're probably supposed to sell the VIX at 35. So you gotta be really careful about the location of where you are matters as much as the uh the absolute number matters as much as anything else. I mean, the reason why um if you remember the the the great VIX blow-up uh in 2018, where where our friend Mike Green you know kind of made his name in
- 43:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): predicting this thing, um, and the reason what what happened over there uh, because the guys who invented this um inverse VIS VIX product had back tested this thing and said it's impossible for this thing to blow up for various reasons. Uh the problem they had there was that um
- 43:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they were running this thing when the VIX is at 20-ish or 25-ish, so it might go from 20 to 25, which is uh it's a big move. but it's a small percentage change. What they didn't count on was what happens when you have the VIX at 12 and then it goes to 30 overnight. As a on a percentage basis, it's much
- 43:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bigger. See, it's it's one of these things, it's a mean, median kind of thing. It's absolute number versus percent number. You gotta account for both. And um that's what gets tricky with a lot of these things, is is they're dubbed done by percent as opposed to by absolute. And similarly, when you're trading, um you have to look at both percent and absolute.
- 44:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 44:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, it's it's it's it's another of the uh another of those those carry trades out there, which I've always said um, you know, carry trading is for for for people managing other people's money, right? It's um don't try don't try this at home. Um
- 44:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh you know selling. selling selling equ equity vol at uh at at twelve doesn't make any sense to the same same same in same in bond world. Um
- 44:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): can
- 44:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we can we move Harley just um
- 44:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know as a as a a closing topic um just in terms of the construction of the treasury market and the players in the treasury market, um which is has you just
- 44:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): changed night and day from when you first started in in the industry. And you've now got um you've got the you've got the treasury market dominated by the treasury basis trade, where people people are um you know short the futures and long the cheapest to deliver um under underlying cash bond.
- 45:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um
- 45:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this always feels to me like um something that could um could go horribly wrong.
- 45:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Are you talking about the Arini
- 45:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): situation? Are we talking about the Arini situation
- 45:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's credit. No, I'm talking about the Treasury basis trade. And where you know this isn't a bunch of several uh you know this is the market that's dominated by pr um
- 45:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by by by central bank central bank bank balance sheets by by pension funds. You know, you've got these jumbo jumbo hedge funds sitting in the middle right now. And I think I think you know you've written about some of the fragilities that that creates
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 45:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah yeah well I mean I mean the basis trade right now is kind of is kind of the um you know carrying water for the US government. Um they're they're they're using their balance sheets to go and and buy treasuries and then hedge that with it out futures. Um and you have lots of people who want futures. They they want risk exposure without putting it on their balance sheet. So a very
- 46:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): popular trade um for for like a pension fund is to buy a five year credit bond for the credit spread because that's most credit bonds are five years. Um, But they need duration because they're liabilities. People don't die tomorrow, they die in thirty 30 years. So they got to buy thirty 30 year risk. So they'll buy a 30 year swap or 30 year treasury future
- 46:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to give them a you know 1420 duration, um uh and and and then get the credit income from something else. Um so they're the buyers of futures contracts. Um, and uh, you know, the hedge funds But are you're sitting in between uh being the plumbing. Um what we what we put you have with that trade is. that
- 46:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you will be uh ignoring the the the cheap to deliver shift, I think it's where you want to go with this thing, but ignoring that small detail, um, you know, uh
- 47:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's it it's helpful to have these guys do it, but the problem they have is in a volatile market, these two things can kind of get crazy, and um you could have a mark-to-market mark to market problem over over a day or two or three, which could you know force. a stop out with various risk managers or or and this happened, I guess, a few years ago when the treasury stepped in to go and put in
- 47:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): liquidity into the market. The CTD is I wrote about recently, CT is cheapest to deliver. So if
- 47:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 47:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): look at like the 10 year futures contract or Uh, the 30 30-year year futures contract, what happens is a whole bucket of different securities that can be delivered in. So, like uh on the Chicago Exchange, there's a dozen different types of wheat that can be delivered into the futures contract. And each grade of wheat uh is priced at different levels. So the
- 47:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): futures contract might be $5 a bushel. If you deliver this in, they pay you know $5.50. They put this in, they pay you $4.50. Um, the whole thing. Same thing in treasury bonds, where they you have 10, 20 different. securities that can be delivered into the futures contract, and then there's a conversion factor. And what's tricky about it
- 48:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is that because of the construction of the way they create this conversion factor, different bonds can be deliverable. And all of a sudden, if you have you know bond A versus futures and the market moves, all of a sudden bond B is what pairs up easily. You're you have a problem. And I think when you saw uh that
- 48:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): big uh jump in rates uh a month or two ago, that I think was very much tied to uh a potential change in the delivery of 190 billion treasury futures. Um so if we ever get near six percent uh again uh on interest rates uh
- 48:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it will get
- 48:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): jangly. It will get very jangly because all of a sudden uh the people who own these futures contracts don't know what they own. So uh in particular, you can own like an 11 year or you could own a you know 19 year bond. Um that that changes your risk profile by an awful lot if that happens like over the course of a a few
- 49:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): weeks. Um so most civilians it's a don't worry about it. It doesn't matter to you at all. Uh except to the extent that if you're watching interest rates move around, it could get more volatile. But no one's got to fault. You know, everything's fine. Uh it'll just become a more volatile market.
- 49:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 49:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and this is it. I mean, this this capacity in the basis trade um is is governed by volatility because all of these risk models at these hedge funds will start tapping shoulders the moment the moment the the moment the treasury volatility becomes elevated. So just when you need the capacity to to absorb it gets taken
- 49:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): away by by the market participant. But you reckon
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
- 49:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can
- 49:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actually this last cycle the hedge funds were the winners because they were long the bond and short the future and the future all of a sudden extended the duration. So when the treasury bond went down by five points, the future went down by six points all of a sudden because it got longer duration. So they made money. I thought
- 50:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm gonna guess what happened is these guys had big profits and they started taking them. And that's when you saw treasuries kind of go down because the hedge funds were selling. Now, the if you have to trade trail on the other way, where your law. long futures and short treasury bonds,
- 50:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's a that's a that's a different animal entirely. And so all these trades, uh
- 50:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which way you go just depends upon many like internal market factors. Um uh the transmission mechanism, uh borrowing costs, everything else, which is way too too technical for this this podcast. Um but but uh I mean just being familiar with with that that there's there's
- 50:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): increased volatility if rates get near six percent if you know that little small detail you're good enough
- 51:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let
- 51:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): me ask you a question in 2002 Paul Neal ended the third year so is there a gap in supply now that's like that much longer and then seven the key seven to ten like part of the duration? I've talked to the squirrel about this a lot. So if we were to get rates to
- 51:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): come down, rate vol to come down, could you have a convex move? I'm asking the convexity Maven, like where everybody wants that, then they got a hedge with it, and then all of a sudden the 10 years at 275.
- 51:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh I have not looked at that. Um, I would say highly, highly unlikely. There are plenty of treasury bonds out there. Um
- 51:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and they've been issuing, you know, fives, tens, and twenties for for quite a while now. I think there's plenty of s uh of securities there. I don't think people need to buy the exact maturity date uh to get exposure to the market. There's lots of bonds up and down around it. Um if you want to get cute and buy a low coupon versus a high coupon, but that that's a hedge fund game. That's not an
- 52:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): insurance company or or someone else. Sure.
- 52:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Swap spread's been persistently negative since the GFC, right? Like persistently negative. And
- 52:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): swap spreads.
- 52:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Go on.
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 52:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'm we're just saying like swap spreads have
- 52:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): been
- 52:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): persistently negative. So if you wanted to like hedge longer dated, like it is expensive. And so I'm just wondering about that. Like, hey, it's not yeah, it's available. There's no question. The synthetic is available, but like you pay a dear price for
- 52:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 52:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Are you sure about that? There's a reason why swap spreads are negative. It has to do with the cost of balance sheet and everything else. I mean, clearly these things have been negative, not because people are stupid, they're there because. when you're running a business, um, you have limitations. The way the way the accounting works, uh the P
- 52:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): on an account.
- 52:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'm just saying it's hard as a like as a guy who's on the buy side my whole career, if I wanted to do that, it it is expensive versus going into the physicals. That's all I'm trying to say.
- 53:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
- 53:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's an opinion. I disagree.
- 53:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay.
- 53:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Fair enough.
- 53:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Fair
- 53:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): enough. I'll defer.
- 53:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This was this was about a a year and a half ago we were talking about this mind the gap trade. Um
- 53:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but um
- 53:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
- 53:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it it does strike me that there, you know listen, I I buy the argument that there are pen plenty of bonds. bot plenty of treasuries sloshing around the market and um, you know, people don't have to be super fussy about picking precisely the maturity that they need. I mean, but I I did work on the assumption that there there have to be some sort of, you know,
- 53:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): regulated pension markets that have to have the precise thing. Um, but maybe that's just not big enough.
- 54:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But you can create that. I mean, it doesn't say you have to buy the tenure. You could buy a seven year and a 13-year bar ballot and you'll get the result. I mean, the government does not say you have to buy the exact pinpoint uh paired off maturity. I don't think they do at least.
- 54:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know, I
- 54:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean they they they run one giant, you know, ALM model, right? Uh and and and you have to get, I mean, like the Netherlands, they kind of run run that where you have to have a certain window, and then they of course they lag the implementation of this. by by using you know moving average of
- 54:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rates. I mean, the government does not want to go and put insurance clubs out of business. They want to have them somewhere in the right area. I mean, the bigger problem is is these um uh private equity guys, you know, building their own insurance businesses and then shoving them full of uh of private credit that they created on their own. I mean
- 54:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that that's the trauma over here. It's it's it's it's it's it's done It's a lot. not a a lack of uh tenure bonds.
- 54:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay, so Harley, we're we're approaching um gift giving season um with Thanksgiving come up. And one of one of one of the notes that I look forward to most of all is your is your stocking filler note that comes around um around Christmas time. Well, one, will you be doing this doing one this year? Um and two, um, I was wondering what was sort of you
- 55:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know one of the one or two of the most exciting things that might potentially be on your stocking filler list
- 55:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I will be doing it and I'm glad you reminded me I guess I gotta start thinking about it now. Um I I I I I I think tips will be will be the first thing I recommend.
- 55:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I believe that inflation's gonna come higher than break evens. And um when you think about it like what
- 55:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what is the real rate? What is what it what what what should you be earning for you for your money? Um and you've seen T bills go negative in yield. Why is that? Because if you got $120,000, $50,000, whatever you could you could put it in your mattress, right? You really can. Of course you have the risk of of a of a of a fire in your house or being robbed,
- 55:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): but I mean you could you could put $50K, you know, if you wanted to, into a mattress. You can't put a big billion dollars into a mattress. So therefore, you gotta go and buy um a billion dollars of T bills or something if you want pure safety. And then and so basically, when you buy a T bill, you're really kind of looking at um
- 56:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
- 56:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): an insurance premium. And and and and and and you could pay it, you're willing to pay a negative rate to go be to have a billion dollars totally safe.
- 56:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 56:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): where's where should they? the the the the three month rate be? I mean I mean maybe half a percent over inflation? I mean you shouldn't you really shouldn't get much more you're taking no risk. There's no credit risk, no duration risk. Why should you get anything more than half a percent at best? So I kind of think real rates um uh of 275.3 Five
- 56:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): three in in in tips is is kind of the wrong number. Um will come combat back. Are you are going to gonna make money with it tightening up? Maybe, but it you just earn that. I I think that's not a bad return versus the risk you're taking. Um so I I I that'll probably be
- 57:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where I
- 57:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the question the question for me always with tips is yeah, you'll get that inflation back, right? You'll get that inflation return. Will you will you've you will you've protected your purchasing power though? Um
- 57:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that is probably true as you because CPI is a rigged number. Uh and it it was intentionally rigged 30 years ago uh by Greenspan and Clinton and
- 57:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the healthcare,
- 57:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): the whole healthcare thing, right? The healthcare thing was like where they really got after
- 57:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
- 57:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, no, they they they they redid it like ninety-six, ninety-seven, ninety-eight, I forgot the.
- 57:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well, the
- 57:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): ionic pricing, but the healthcare thing in the nineties 90s was like was really wild.
- 57:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 57:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): yes, I agree with you 100%. It's a rigged number.
- 57:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): No, because Social Security is tagged to uh CPI.
- 57:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Medicare,
- 57:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): all that all
- 57:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 57:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): all yes, agreed 100%. Like it
- 57:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they have
- 57:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): every incentive to make that number as low as possible.
- 57:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, which is another way to go and basically bring the deficit down over time by basically
- 57:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this giant expense go up more slowly than the real inflation economy. So I mean look, we have to go somehow close this fiscal gap. And um if they gotta do it by a little smoke and mirrors, I guess I could live with that. If only because plan B is worse.
- 58:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Let me ask you a last question. If the Fed was to do a hundred basis point hike, what would happen?
- 58:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 58:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you'd have a pretty damn inverted yield curve
- 58:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean, I mean, I I I thought that they were supposed to go and and and go 50 uh in July. Just one and done.
- 58:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So did I and I'm a
- 58:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): huge Bond bull, but I'm with you there. Silver bull. Like so just so you know, I I agree with you there. So keep going.
- 58:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean yeah, this this whole drip drip drip thing is just is just not helpful because because I mean what you just don't know what they're doing and also the uncertainty creates volatility, which creates unhappiness.
- 58:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Just you know get to where you want to be.
- 58:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean there's obviously politics involved here. I mean they they should have taken rates up another 25 in October, but I mean I mean the data was all there to to support it. But I mean right before the election, yeah I think they were right to not do it.
- 59:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We want a clean election. You know imagine if they had done that and then you know Trump was saying oh the Fed caused it uh caused a fake election. You know, sometimes you gotta go and actually bow to the real politic of the world. Um and and even though it's you don't feel good about it, sometimes you just gotta go and just do what you gotta do uh to to to accomplish what w
- 59:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what you want to do. So
- 59:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the counterfactual
- 59:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): on that is what if they would have cut rates? What would have the The would what have the Republicans done better? Like they obviously got their ass handed to them, like what would if if they would have cut fifty 50 basis points, you think that the GOP would have done better?
- 59:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think that rate had zero to do with the
- 59:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 59:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): agree. I agree. I just wanted to
- 59:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up or
- 59:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): down by 50
- 59:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): or 25, would have I mean this was not about rates. I mean, yeah,
- 59:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 59:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the the unhappiness was well cooked into people's minds uh before this.
- 59:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um
- 59:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that's
- 59:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bad.
- 59:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Look, I I think
- 1:00:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the good thing here
- 1:00:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is this. I mean I there is now a path to some sanity um because it is possible in theory for Trump and the Democrats to work on ideas on on the 70-30 issues. And we all know what they are. You know, um you do the 70-30 issues, both sides
- 1:00:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): win. Um and and and and that's possible now. Um if the if the Democrats the start to doing impeachments, that's a disaster. If Trump starts doing other nutty stuff, that's a disaster. And and they might. But there is a there is a path that actually is kind of okay and it might happen.
- 1:00:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 1:00:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's let's remain optimistic, Harley. Um, thank you so much. We're gonna wrap it up there as we just hit the hour mark. Um, thank you so much. You're a legend. Um enjoy your grandson.
- 1:00:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:00:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): congratulations.
- 1:00:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's wonderful.
- 1:00:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thank you very much. And and and the little crying in the background was the other one crying.
- 1:00:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I heard him. Uh his his his international debut. Fantastic. That's
- 1:01:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): it's like the squirrel, it's like the squirrel's dog like barking in the background, that which is a normal
- 1:01:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm amazing amazed we made it through a show without him letting off. Anyway, Hardy, Holly, thank you again. Thank
- 1:01:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you, Arnie.
- 1:01:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Benny the squirrel and the convex and
- 1:01:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the convexity Maven, and we're out.
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