Alpha Exchange

Meredith Whitney on K-Shaped Economy, Alternative Lending Vacuum, and Energy Market Risks

35 min Listen to the original Episode page
Banking RegulationAlternative LendingConsumer SpendingEnergy MarketsFederal ReserveMarket AnalysisHistorical AnalysisInflation

Summary

Meredith Whitney argues that post-crisis regulations have forced banks to retreat to prime borrowers, creating a vacuum filled by alternative lenders serving 50% of households. She highlights a K-shaped economy where consumers are cutting grocery spending to afford gas, signaling financial strain that may impact political outcomes. Whitney critiques the market's AI concentration and argues that energy stocks are undervalued due to ignored geopolitical risks and persistent inflationary pressures. She also draws parallels between current banking opacity and the pre-2008 era, emphasizing the importance of granular data analysis.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    Subprime firms used gain-on-sale accounting to recognize upfront gains, creating high operating leverage disconnected from cash flow.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 8:18

  2. 2
    Post-GFC penalties led banks to shrink lending pools, creating a vacuum filled by alternative lenders.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 19:33

Episode sections

  1. 0:23 – 3:54

    Introduction and Background

    Dean Curnutt introduces Meredith Whitney, highlighting her reputation for predicting Citigroup's dividend cut in 2007. Whitney discusses her background as a history major and her early career in oil and gas and specialty finance at Oppenheimer, emphasizing the importance of asking questions and understanding historical context.

  2. 3:54 – 9:49

    Specialty Finance and Securitization Data

    Whitney explains how covering specialty finance in the 1990s provided granular monthly data on delinquencies and losses, unlike traditional bank data. She describes the accounting practices of subprime companies, such as gain-on-sale accounting, and how detailed analysis allowed for precise investment theses.

  3. 9:49 – 15:09

    Enron and Banking Exposures

    Whitney recounts her analysis during the Enron collapse, noting that she identified Enron as a greater risk to banks than Argentina's default. She highlights the lack of transparency in bank exposures to Enron and the subsequent write-downs, such as JP Morgan's $5 billion loss, which were obscured by complex structures like SPVs.

  4. 15:09 – 19:13

    Post-Crisis Market Pivot and Thesis

    Whitney explains her pivot from bearish to bullish in early 2009, driven by the Fed's encouragement for banks to buy mortgage-backed securities (MBS). She argues that this allowed banks to write up the values of their MBS holdings, restoring capital, while rating agencies' late downgrades had previously destroyed capital.

  5. 19:13 – 22:30

    The Divided Consumer and Rise of Alternative Lending

    Whitney describes a K-shaped consumer economy where banks have retreated to prime and super-prime borrowers. She notes that 50% of households now rely on alternative lending, such as daily wage access products (e.g., Chime, Dave, Block/Square) and pawn lenders, because traditional credit is unavailable.

  6. 22:30 – 24:51

    Consumer Stress Indicators and Political Implications

    Whitney cites data showing that grocery spending is flat or negative while consumers prioritize gas, indicating severe financial strain. She argues that this economic reality, rather than polls or prediction markets, suggests a negative outcome for Democrats in the midterms, as most Americans are not better off financially.

  7. 24:51 – 28:28

    Fed Policy and Credit Spreads

    Whitney argues that the K-shaped economy complicates Fed policy because the rates charged by alternative lenders are already exorbitant and insensitive to short-term rates. She notes that while credit spreads are tight, the real pressure on consumers comes from gas and grocery prices, which the Fed cannot control.

  8. 28:28 – 35:10

    AI Capex and Energy Market Risks

    Whitney critiques the market's concentration in AI-related stocks and the assumption that oil prices will decline, calling the forward curve nonsensical given geopolitical risks and low inventories. She suggests that energy names are undervalued and that the market is underpricing the persistence of inflationary pressures.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
Crude oilcommodityneutralThis isn't my area of expertise, but these are just like the basics, which is I don't know. understand why the forward curve on oil assumes that oil will be lower next year than this year.

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Citigroup stock fell 99% from its highs after Whitney predicted a dividend cut in October 2007.

Dean Curnutt ·1:32

How to verify: Check historical stock price data for Citigroup (C) on NYSE for October 2026 and subsequent 12-month performance; verify dividend cut announcements in SEC filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Banks paid $70 billion in fees, penalties, and fines after the financial crisis.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·19:13

How to verify: Review aggregated regulatory settlement data from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Reserve, and Department of Justice for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

There was $9 trillion of equity in the credit market at the start of the crisis, compared to $35-36 trillion today.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·19:57

How to verify: Consult Federal Reserve Flow of Funds accounts (Z.1) for household and nonprofit sector assets/liabilities and equity values over time. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Iran War Cost website calculates that households have paid ~$1,100 more on gas/diesel/food/energy since February.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·27:27

How to verify: Visit the Iran War Cost website (iranwarcost.org) and verify the cumulative cost calculator for the specified date range. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

VIX reached an all-time high of 81 on November 20, 2008.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·18:15

How to verify: Check CBOE VIX historical data for November 20, 2026, to verify the closing level and compare with other high-volatility periods like March 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Whitney’s report on December 1, 2001, identified Enron as a bigger risk to banks than Argentina.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·10:41

How to verify: Search for archived research reports from Wachovia (now Wells Fargo) dated December 1, 2026, or Meredith Whitney’s personal website/library for the specific report. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Oil forward curves assume oil prices will be lower next year than this year.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:09

How to verify: Compare the current futures curve for WTI or Brent crude oil against the spot price and analyst consensus forecasts for the next 12 months. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify current bank lending standards for non-prime borrowers using FDIC or Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey data.
  • Check alternative lender growth metrics and regulatory scrutiny status via SEC filings for companies like Chime, Dave, or Block.
  • Analyze consumer spending trends using Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on grocery vs. energy expenditures.
  • Review energy market forward curves and inventory levels via EIA (Energy Information Administration) reports.
  • Assess bank exposure to Enron-style complex structures by reviewing recent bank 10-K filings for off-balance sheet entities.
  • Compare current AI capex spending trends with historical infrastructure booms using company earnings calls and analyst reports.
  • Investigate political polling methodologies versus economic indicators cited by Whitney for midterm predictions.
  • Check for conflicts of interest in Meredith Whitney Advisors' current holdings or client relationships with energy or fintech firms.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So what's happened is I would say 50% of households have to go to other means, have had to go to other means to get loans. Now, I'm not saying they're not banked. Banks will take deposits. They'll give you a debit card, but they're less and less going to give you a credit card. They're definitely not going to give you a home equity loan. And very rarely will they give you other
0:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): type of lending products.
0:23
Dean Curnutt: Hello, this is Dean Curnutt, and welcome to the Alpha Exchange. where we explore topics in financial markets associated with managing risk, generating return, and the deployment of capital in the alternative investment industry.
0:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
0:41
Dean Curnutt: guest today on the Alpha Exchange is Meredith Whitney. She is the founder and CEO of Meredith Whitney Advisors and someone who needs almost no introduction. Meredith, it's great to welcome you to the podcast today.
0:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, thanks for having me.
0:55
Dean Curnutt: Yeah, I'm really looking forward to this. We were introduced by our mutual friend Louis Gov. I'm very glad he made that introduction, and I'm glad you took up the invite.
1:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Louis could ask me for just about anything and I do it for him. He's just a force. There's no one like Louie and his group, and his father is the McJagger of finance.
1:12
Dean Curnutt: And just a tremendous thought process on. macro, very differentiated. I've always enjoyed the conversations with him as well. So let's just start with you and your background. So you're famous for a couple of things, but one of which is I want to say it's the last day of October in 2007, asking out loud, will City
1:32
Dean Curnutt: need to cut its dividend? And I just look back, I think the stock was down six 6% percent on the year, and it fell another 99%
1:40
Dean Curnutt: to its lows. But what was really interesting was that the SP was at an all-time high. Financials weren't, but the SP was at an all-time high in October of 2007. So you saw what was happening in city and then just the implications for the broader economy. Take us back even to Into the 90s. You grew up analyzing finance,
2:01
Dean Curnutt: specialty finance in the 90s. at Oppenheimer. Take us just back to the early parts of your career because what I want to do in this conversation is lean on some of that what you developed as a capacity to look around corners.
2:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's start out first with the fact that I was a history major from a liberal arts college, getting into finance. And I always assumed that everybody was smarter than me, that everybody had it in an engineering. engineering and math degree. I was smart enough to know early on that it didn't matter if I looked
2:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): smart, like a two-week, maybe just kind of like a month where I cared. I really was so nervous and I cared what I looked like. I was afraid to look dumb. And I quickly got over that because if you're not afraid to ask questions and appear dumb, you're never going to learn. And being smart is a moving target. I always
2:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think that I have such an uphill battle to climb in terms of getting information and learning in general. And I took that approach very early on. So being a history major, it's how I put things together. So I want to understand what came before an event, why things happened, what are the pieces that
3:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could allow things to happen again, or what are the pieces that could allow things not to happen again? What is so fantastic? So I worked in oil and gas for the first, I'd say, year. And the first thing I did was read Dan Jurgen's The Prize. Fortunately, the oil and gas industry wasn't that old at the time. I think it was 150 years at that time.
3:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And then I went into financial services because the oil Ireland and gas gas analyst I was working for thought I was too aggressive and that I wanted his job. I was 23. All of my friends were just working in investment banking and were working their tails off. That's what I thought you did. And in fact, that's what you can be smarter than me, but I'll I'll
3:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): work you every time. So says Mayor Michael Bloomberg. At any rate, then I'm falling to financial services. And what's important about that, especially specialty finance, there was bank analysts in the early 90s, and then there were the specialty finance analysts. And what that included was the brokerage firms, the asset management firms, the monolines, the
4:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit card companies, subprime. So subprime auto, subprime equity, subprime everything. And so what I loved about finance finances, is it's so data driven. Because it's so data driven, you can be really granular and really right. Now the timing's always the big if, but it takes more than just that. But it was
4:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fascinating. I never wanted to leave my seat to go get my MBA or anything because I felt so grateful and fortunate to have that seat at the table with what I thought were some of the smartest people and also some of the most suspect people. That's the background of how I started. And it was really just to get to
4:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the truth. This was before Dodd Frank where you could have analysts, analysts decided whether you were going to do an investment banking deal or not. It was my job to give my boss reasons not to do deals because it takes a lifetime to build a reputation and a moment to destroy it. And so
5:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the right and wrong aspects aspect I grew up with and it was allowed for under the team I worked for, which was fantastic. A lot of famously analysts did deals that were stinkers and that was just not something that was tolerated that would fly. So it was very fortunate
5:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that I love what I did. And then from a values perspective, there was such a strategic fit.
5:39
Dean Curnutt: It seems like there was an especially large amount of independence coming from that particular group at Oppenheimer at the time. There was just this investigation into a lot of these specialty finance companies. I was just going back. I was remembering, I think it was called Green Tree. I'm remembering the money store. I'm a big
5:58
Dean Curnutt: Yankees fan and grew up listening to Phil Rizzuto. And I was going back, he did. a commercial in 1984. It was all about second mortgage loan capital where you could borrow against your home. And he was presenting a great deal at 14.5%, which is just mind-boggling how high rates were back then. And you tell me if this is
6:18
Dean Curnutt: correct, but in studying things like subprime Prime autos and just the Byzantine of the capital structures and just the way in which the accounting goes, it seems like that sets you up very well for that period leading into the GFC that allowed you to just take a differentiated view to see things that clearly others
6:38
Dean Curnutt: weren't seeing at the time.
6:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In the same way, some things applied and some things were different. And I got my MBA on the job by covering subprime and non-subprime, because what happened in the 90s, right when I started, was that securitization moved beyond the mortgage-backed security into other asset classes like auto
6:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loans, like credit card loans, any type of commercial lease. It expanded the pie. And because of that, because it was cheap financing, comparable to banks, the pie of consumers that were catered to also. expanded. One of the things that you get with securitization data that
7:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you didn't get from banks at the time and others that didn't securitize was monthly data. And you have monthly pools that you can look at 30 day delinquencies and track where you think losses are going. Oh, and also losses. And then the size of the pools. And you could be so granular about who the winners were. and who the
7:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): losers were in ways that you could almost see the data's gotten out so perfect that the credit spreads move in tandem. But at the time, this was in a brand new world. The harder you worked and the more you dove into the data, the critical advantage you could have. I never would have imagined growing up
7:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that I would have so much fun with accounting. You know, accounting changes all the time. So it's like law. You've got to stay on top of things. And what was so interesting at the time was a lot of these companies, these subprime companies, did incredibly well. The stocks just blew up. They absolutely like did incredibly well because what they did was if they were
8:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): originating more and more and more, they would take what's called gain on sale accounting. So take a group of loans, take the upfront gains. and then amortize the expenses. So your operating leverage was huge because you were accruing your expenses, but then you would do these huge upfront gains. And obviously that didn't trickle through to the
8:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cash flows, but that ultimately changed. That was FAS 115 versus FAS 91. I'm such a dork. I can't believe I remember all of this. It was so long ago. But we knew this stuff. Like we took pride in this stuff. I remember the top analyst at the time. I was at a conference, and the MC, who is now one of my closest professional
8:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): friends, asked the analyst about FAS 91 and he didn't know what it was. And I was like, how can you? I mean, horrors. How can you not know what it was? But it was the math geeks' fantasy in terms of the data that was available and what was changing and how you could be precise. precisely right. And then from a timing perspective, you had
9:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to be precisely right.
9:20
Dean Curnutt: You mentioned just, of course, your background as a history major. I tend to think a lot about historical risk episodes. Jim Chainhouse is going to come on the podcast in a couple of weeks. And it's really to acknowledge, I wouldn't say the word is celebrate, but it's to acknowledge that we're coming up on 25 years of Enron and never before. and
9:39
Dean Curnutt: hopefully never after has there been that much accounting chicanery. You can do a lot of things with accounting, for sure.
9:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Very interesting that you bring up Enron because it was my first year in oil and gas that I went to all of the roadshows Shows and all the analyst meetings. And at the time, there was Enron Annie and Enron Oil and Gas. and both were big clients of Goldman Sachs. So I would go to Goldman Sachs and pay
10:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): very close attention. So they were very much part of my world. And I remember them expanding into India and I knew the stories. That's 92, 93. Fast forward to
10:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2001. I was at Well Wacovia Covey at the time. Here's the difference in disclosure. I knew that there were rumblings that something was going on with Enron. At the very same time, there was more attention paid to the fact that Argentina would default and what that would do to the banks. And I was covering the banks at
10:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the time. I moved on from just covering special finance. And I remember writing a report that came out on December 1st. first. This is a report that I have in my library on my website, which was that Enron would be a much bigger risk to the banking system than Argentina. And I had the
11:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exposures of every single bank to Enron because that was the type of disclosure that existed back then. I would argue disclosure has gotten so much worse. You probably have more pages of disclosure, but the actual disclosure has gotten worse.
11:14
Dean Curnutt: Interesting.
11:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I was able to see that. And sure enough, Emerald declared bankruptcy, I think, over the holidays. But sure enough, that was one of the big daggers for the banks. And then you got into tech media telecom write downs, of which I think JP Morgan took close to five billion dollars. That was huge at the time of a write
11:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): down associated with that. So it was an ugly time for the banks back then. But careful what you lend to because everybody got swept up in how fabulous and fast-paced Enron was what they didn't know what was going on below the surface. But there were SPVs all over the place, again, hiding in plain sight.
11:53
Dean Curnutt: Well, I took a spin out of your website and I'd love for you to just tell us what Meredith Whitney Advisory Group is doing for its clients, but I do want to read just something back. from the website because I think it's going to underpin a lot of this conversation. You wrote, there have been fewer than a handful of times in my career when the financial markets have been this
12:12
Dean Curnutt: exciting with so much uncertainty in the markets and in the health of the economy. My data has never served me better, being able to see around corners. Tell us your interactions with clients, what the value proposition you're offering for your clients, maybe in the context of what I just read back to you around an exciting period of markets and there being so much uncertainty.
12:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I have done the same thing for my entire career. So the ways I described it, I look at every industry and every company within that industry, none of that has changed. I just have more experience under my belt. So I'll get excited about something, a large theme, and then
12:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rabbit hole down the data and then break it down into a thesis where I can find names to play that theme and get the best names to play those themes, and then watch the data and have the themes evolve. So I have been throughout my career, usually early,
13:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and that's fine, but then you have to stay at it. and not to get discouraged. I'd rather be early than late. The clients that have known me for a long time, they know what to expect from me. And I always point out things that either they haven't seen, weren't thinking about, and then that they can track. The research that I've been doing is
13:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): very much the same. And I think clients have the relationship that we've had for those reasons. If something's a consent consensus, there's no point in me doing it. I've always worked at smaller firms. So I always figure that somebody at Goldman Sachs has 50 people doing what we're doing. They're doing a better job. So I
13:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): better pick something that's not unique for the sake of being unique, but special for someone going out of their way to use us versus a Goldman Sachs, to add us to their research. reading, essential reading. It's a privilege for me to be able to do that because my clients are unbelievably smart and I learned so much from them.
14:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But you got to provide something that's truly unique and special and additive and makes people money or saves people money at the end of the day.
14:20
Dean Curnutt: When we look back on major episodes like the GFC, I feel like we almost convince ourselves that we. understood the timing of things better because, of course, we're looking behind us. As I mentioned, your call on City, I think the stock was down maybe 7% just that day, but headed down another 98%,
14:40
Dean Curnutt: even from there. So your timing on that was incredible on the way in. I'm curious how you pivot from seeing the bearish. setup going in, the vulnerability of the financial system, but then, you know, at some point realizing that maybe it's enough had been done, whether it's government spending or
15:00
Dean Curnutt: the Fed stepping in on its first QE program, how does that pivot look from being right and early and bearish to something that's more constructive?
15:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think it'd be helpful to go back and see why I didn't get bearish earlier because people that did lost a lot of money. And I was very aware of what was going on in the mortgage market because I'd covered it. I wasn't covering it at the time, but you've got to have such a wide angle if you're covering financials. You look at everything.
15:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But specifically with going from bearish to neutral, I probably should have gone bullish, but at the time, but in February.
15:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of 2009, February, March, the first research paper I put out when I went on my own in 2009. It must have been March. It was right after the case came out, the bank case. And what you could see was that the banks were about to ride their equity back up through
15:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): write-ups on mortgage-backed security, securities, specifically Fannie Freddie. In the last part of 2008, the Fed encouraged the banks to go in and buy mortgage-backed securities. They would then be coming after them and buying up more mortgage-backed securities. By owning them, they would be able to write
16:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): up the values of their securities. In the same way they had written down the values of their security and their tangible values declined. That was my thesis throughout the whole credit crisis. Beyond the city call, some of my best work was looking at the rating agencies' control over the
16:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): regulatory capital of the banks, because when they downgraded securities, mortgage box securities, which they hadn't done, they were so late to the game to downgrade securities. When they downgraded those their securities, the banks had to put up more. capital against them. And so they were just destroying billions and billions of your capital. The opposite
16:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): happened with the Fed and the agency paper. Banks started to instead of writing down capital, they started to write up capital. And that was the turning point. So I got that turning point exactly right. I probably didn't go as bullish because they were still broken entities. And it took them
17:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years to ultimately ride out their junky assets. So I don't like to trade. I like fundamental moves that you can position yourself and invest in for extended periods of time. I'm good at getting out of those situations. I'm also good at getting into those situations. I'm really proud about getting it
17:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the downside. and getting it on the upside.
17:41
Dean Curnutt: Well, I was just listening to an interview that Ken Griffin did at Citadel's conference, and he was basically saying that if Morgan Stanley had not raised money from, I want to say it's Mitsubishi, that was like one of the pieces of the puzzle that needed to be solved. He's admitting he thinks that Citadel would have not made it, which is just an incredible thing. It's So a lot of
18:01
Dean Curnutt: humility, I suppose. What a wild time that was. You know, my daughter was born on November 19th, 2008. And the VIX was at 74. And I tell her, I say, Selena, you were the second all-time high in the VIX.
18:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Oh my gosh.
18:15
Dean Curnutt: And the all-time high, Meredith, was your birthday, November 20th, 81. That doesn't include COVID, but it was up until 2020. So what a wild time. Let's fast. forward to today because you've got a lot to say about what I think is an undercovered aspect of today's economy, which
18:35
Dean Curnutt: is the consumer. People throw out the K shape and it's real, it matters, but your process really dives into the implications of the K shape. You've talked about access to credit from boy, some of these micro lenders, which folks are having to access. You've
18:55
Dean Curnutt: talked about the trade-off between gas and groceries. Why don't you maybe start from 30,000 feet in terms of what you see from a US consumer standpoint? And of course, we'll ultimately bring in the AI part of the analysis, but start with the consumer.
19:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To carry a thread through this whole conversation, going back to the great financial crisis, the banks paid $70 billion in fees plus in terms of mortgage penalties and fines. Right after the crisis, they're like, never again. So they pulled back from
19:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lending to a wider group of people, right? They needed to lend to everybody to keep the party going in mortgage land, just shrinking that pool dramatically. And it took them a long time to do it because different states had different foreclosure rules and you had to work down the portfolio. I'll give you an example.
19:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 290 billion today. And you think about the level of equity at the credit. crisis, there was 9 trillion of equity. There's nearly 35, 36 trillion of equity today. So they've gotten out of lending to anybody who is less than prime. So they're doing crime, superprime.
20:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You hear about everybody going after the front end of the plane, American Express famously. So what's happened is I would say 50% of households have to go to other means, have had to go to other means to get loans. Now, I'm not saying they're not banked. Banks will take deposits. They'll give you a debit card. Less and less there are they going to give you a
20:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit card. They're definitely not going to give you a home equity loan. Very rarely will they give you other type of lending products. Maybe, maybe. I mean, subprime has been in the auto finance world. That's something that's has not gone away.
20:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It was
20:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a slow process of banks pulling back credit from this group. Before COVID, we were going into a recession. You get into COVID and you get stimulus checks. And what's important about that is for more than 50% of households, their after-tax income shot up because COVID checks were after
21:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tax, were non-tax events. Then you go after COVID. after tax income drop like a stone. Before COVID, a lot of companies were formed to take advantage of the void that banks were leaving behind. Some of these companies, you remember payday lenders. These aren't payday lenders, they're daily
21:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wage access companies. So you can pay a fee to access two days of work wages instead of waiting. two weeks for your income check. The biggest players are daily pay and pay active. They're private, but Chime, Dave, Block, or Square give these kinds
21:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of daily wage accesses. They're smaller, but it's the fastest growing loan product they have. The margins are through the roof. Not only are their margins expanding, it's becoming an increasing percentage of their revenue. revenues. It's like an ATM fee. The APR, if you were to treat it like a credit card, is close to 200%.
22:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Individuals are not using this in one time only. They get dependent upon these types of products. Now I focus on this. Almost nobody else is focusing on this. Analysts are recovering Covering these companies, but in total, it's a reflection of how strained so many. households are. Something else that is growing are you look at the
22:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): names within the financial sector, some of the names that have been the best performers this year are the pawn lenders. And what the pawn lenders are saying is even with tax refunds, big tax refunds, people aren't paying down their pawn loans. So they're losing their asset. The scrap metal values are high. So they're making money off of the fees, the
22:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loans. and the scrap metal values. Home equity extractions are the fastest growing loan lending product at banks. You look at this through this lens and then you look at what's going on spending. For the year, grocery spending has been flat to negative. And what that tells you is that people
23:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are choosing to put gas in their tank to get to work versus spending on groceries. This is why I think it's one of the things that just shocked me and the rest of the market recently was what happened in Brazil. The prediction markets got it so wrong. And it ended up being such a crowded criteria. But the prediction
23:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): markets people thought were better than polls, better than everything. And what the prediction markets are saying about the midterms, I would tell you from my perspective of the consumer, that Republicans have destroyed the midterms. Because what's the old question? Are you better off today than you were two years ago? And the answer is absolutely not. Consumers are not better off,
23:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): except for this very high end that owns stocks. And the idea that every American owns stocks, that's just an absolute fallacy. People are going into their retirement accounts and paying fees and taxes.
24:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just to have access to cash. It's not good out there.
24:06
Dean Curnutt: You mentioned in one of your pieces, you talk about Dave and Chime and XYZ, and these stocks are up a couple of them considerably. You look at the KRE, the regional banking index, that's down. It's an unfortunate rally in these stocks, or at least the reasons for the rally in these stocks. What do you think? I mean, we've got this incredibly
24:26
Dean Curnutt: K-shaped economy. I think you're implying there's kind of an unsustainability here. Certainly makes Fed policy really, really difficult because you're trying to fight inflation. You've got this tool to fight inflation called the short rate, and you're potentially making it even more difficult for those who have little access to credit
24:46
Dean Curnutt: already. How does the K-shape complicate Fed policy from your standpoint?
24:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
24:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know that it does necessarily because I think that how capital is being priced at the low end is already so exorbitant.
25:00
Dean Curnutt: They're not looking at the short rate. The Chime and Dave aren't looking at the short rate.
25:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. It's how Chime and Dave are funding themselves and credit spells are still very tight. So as long as banks and it's a lot of bank funding. So if it that goes up a little, I don't think that it moves the needle so much. What moves the needle is gas prices and grocery, and it just exacerbates things. So
25:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I always say it's extremely expensive to be poor because the rates you pay for whatever liquidity you can get are just obscene. That is very sad on one level. Someone on the other side or it of would be like, well, we're providing them liquidity that they wouldn't get otherwise. It's a death trap that's very hard
25:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to get out of. That said, if there's an emergency,
25:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
25:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): least there's something's there. It doesn't end well. Right now, losses across the board are very low. If anyone's looking to banks to tell you how the economy is, this is something that sort of sticks in my craw when everyone says, oh, the consumer's resilient. Well, their consumers are resilient. because their consumers prime and super prime. That consumers
26:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unaffected by increased expenses. However, there's one thing that I'm watching, which is again the data that I love. You can get great data, recency data. And if you look at it the right way, it will tell you things. Now obviously one week does not make a trend, but the Fed puts out weekly data on revolving debt, and primarily that's credit
26:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): card debt. It's credit card loan balances. Since the beginning of the war, the Iran war, it's tracked in line with the growth in gas prices. Prior to September, gas prices peaked in May, and growth in credit card balance peaked at that time. The movement was almost one for one. That
26:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): has started to break down recently. And what that tells me, so these are credit card balances, but that doesn't mean they're revolving balances. Primarily, they're not revolving balances because prime and superprime don't really revolve. So it's just where your balance is at a specific time in the month. When they're tracking one for one, that just means the consumer's absorbing it,
27:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): paying more, and their overall spending it gets higher. When that diverges, it means that some of these households are making. the very choices that the bottom of the K is making, deciding, okay, I will get this and I won't get that because my gas prices are so much more. There's a great resource, and I know
27:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm biased because I went to Brown, but a great resource called the Iran war cost. They calculate on a daily basis what households incrementally are paying more on gas and diesel related. costs, food and energy. And since the end of February, it's close to $1,100 per household. The
27:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): average household does not have $1,100 extra dollars. Famously, they barely have $400 for an emergency. So they have to make choices. That is going up the food chain. That is why I think the prediction. markets got Israel wrong too. They're showing Democrats win by a big
28:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): margin. We'll see next week. But the fundamentals to me, not looking at polls, tell me that it's going to be a bloodbath.
28:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
28:15
Dean Curnutt: we talked about the pre-GFC period, and that's a period where the economy is doing well, but in some ways, it's a house of cards built on mortgage derivatives and just continuing to extend current. credit to a dicier
28:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
28:28
Dean Curnutt: dicier set of folks in terms of paying it back. And I see no mortgage fraud right now or leverage in the banking system, but I do see an economy that has gotten very AI capex centric. So that if you were just to look at top line nominal GDP growth, you'd say, Oh, this isn't too bad. You're
28:48
Dean Curnutt: painting a picture underneath the surface that's really bad. And so what I'd love to do is just finish by soliciting some of your thoughts on this AI capex trade. I think in a recent appearance on Bloomberg, I saw you talk about the circularity and said something to the notion of it's all one trade. And so, in terms of looking
29:07
Dean Curnutt: around corners, and you look at this path-breaking path breaking technology, probably really matters for years to come. What do you see there when you look at just the big picture of the AI build-out?
29:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's telling when Larry Fink is going around and telling people if we slow down AI, we'll go into a recession. That may be absolutely true, but the concentration, just even looking at the market, you look at the indices and it looks like, oh great, this market, this has been a fairly decent year, but what's underneath the surface?
29:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): is stocks are down double digits. I mean, this has been a horrible year for active managers if they don't own the stocks. It's not even the Mag 7. It's the concentration is so intense. And I think that that's true in the capital markets as well. Again, it's very hard to note
29:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): timing. And this is inspiring me to actually do a little record. rabbit hole on the leverage of Quarry Weave was hiding in plain sight for a year. It'll be interesting to see how investors feel about the stocks that really grew based on stock buybacks. When they don't buy any stock back,
30:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they don't have excess cash flow. What happens to those names? And they're just issuing more and more equity. It's a reversal of what propels. propelled the Mag 7 three years ago.
30:30
Dean Curnutt: It's so interesting. I mean, it's sort of like this push and pull between debt financing and equity financing, and which one is more expensive as you just demand more and more capital? It's just so different than, you know, it seemed like once the system repaired itself and it took years, as you said, there was this sense of just excess capital and rates
30:49
Dean Curnutt: were not zero. but damn near close to zero. What are the risks that we ought to be thinking about? And where might they be underappreciated? And then where might there just be opportunity on the long side, you know, outside of Dave and Chime? Like what are some of the things that you think the market's just kind of missing from an investment perspective?
31:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This isn't my area of expertise, but these are just like the basics, which is I don't know. understand why the forward curve on oil assumes that oil will be lower next year than this year. That makes no sense to me because the presumption that the Strait of Hormuz will open up and everything will be fine. The
31:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): overpromising of a peace deal has been on rinse and repeat. It has disappointed every single time.
31:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
31:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact that oil is going down never. next year makes no sense to me whatsoever. These names have worked, but I don't think they've worked to the extent that they should work. I think Chevron reports this week or next week. I own a bunch of it. That's been a no-brainer for me, looking off of the assumption, again,
31:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): does not make any sense to me that oil will be down. Inventories and reserves are at all times low. You have to rebuild that. They'll be hoarding. That makes no sense. What that means then is the case shape gets wider and wider because this pressure continues. And so the names that we discuss, the chime, the Dave, the block, the the
32:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pond like all of that, sadly, those continue to do well. I see inflation being a very tough thing to tamp down. And this is nothing that the Fed can control. They can't control the cost of oil or diesel. That to me is the biggest head scratcher. You know something's gonna happen with the
32:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): neo-clouds. AI is not priced for risk at all. We'll see. The energy complex is the most obvious to me now.
32:44
Dean Curnutt: Some part of our conversation is, I would say maybe the song remains the same that, you know, it's never different. this time. So you can always kind of look back and have some appreciation for how these things tend to reboot themselves, maybe in different format. But at the same time, I think you said it earlier in the conversation, things evolve. You have to evolve your process as
33:04
Dean Curnutt: well. If you were to just big picture, think about your process today versus Is, I don't know, a decade ago, what's new? There's uh a new data, there's some new technology to analyze the data. How are you doing your craft today a little bit differently than maybe a decade ago?
33:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's go back when I first started. I would go to the library
33:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to research. And now everything's at your fingertips. I mean, AI gets a lot of things wrong, and you're arguing with it because the validation is so poor. From a search engine perspective, I have my own sources. but they perhaps will find sources different than I would necessarily. So the scope of research and
33:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): data sources is so much bigger, but you have to check every last thing because you can't assume, and this is the risk for younger people, you can't assume that what you're getting from AI is accurate, because I would say at least 75% of the time.
34:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's not. And it's early days, but it's just not. Over the years, data's just gotten better. The data out of the government's gotten worse and less reliable. And that's too bad. So you just adjust.
34:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
34:18
Dean Curnutt: I'm talking my own book here as someone who's been in this business for a long time. I do think the overlay of human judgment at the end of it. I don't see that going away. So it's all about perspective, and you've brought us a lot of that today. Meredith, I'm really glad we got a chance to do this. I'm going to thank Louie again for introducing us. Thanks for being a guest.
34:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
34:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we were great interviewers. So thank you so much. This was fun.
34:40
Dean Curnutt: You've been listening to the Alpha Exchange. If you've enjoyed the show, please do tell a friend. And before we leave, I wanted to invite you to drop us some feedback. As we aim to utilize these conversations to contribute to the investment community's understanding of risk, your input is valuable and provides direction on where we should focus. Please email
35:00
Dean Curnutt: us at feedback at alpha exchangepodcast.com. Thanks again and catch you next
35:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): time.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

More from Alpha Exchange

Alpha Exchange

Bruce Darringer, Founder BSD Strategic Advisors

Episode discussion: Bruce Darringer on scaling hedge funds, operational risk, and AI implementation

Speakers’ claims: Bruce Darringer, founder of BSD Strategic Advisors, discusses the evolution of operational risk management from the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse to the COVID-19 pandemic, emphasizing the need for robust infrastructure as firms scale. He argues that institutional allocators view operational due diligence as table stakes and warns that asset-liability mismatches are a primary cause of hedge fund failure during stress events. Darringer contrasts founder-led structures with multi-manager models, noting the significant retooling required for the latter. He also addresses scaling challenges, AI implementation strategies, and the operational risks introduced by faster settlement cycles like atomic settlement.

Operational RiskHedge Fund ScalingInvestor Relations
56 min1 assets15 claims to verify
Alpha Exchange

Lori Calvasina, Managing Director, Head of US Equity Strategy, RBC Capital Markets

Episode discussion: RBC's Calvasina sets S&P 500 fair value at 8,150, downgrades tech, upgrades healthcare amid AI capex concerns

Speakers’ claims: Lori Calvasina, Managing Director at RBC Capital Markets, outlines a proprietary valuation model placing the S&P 500 fair value at 8,150, derived from a 10% haircut to consensus EPS and base-case macro assumptions. She contrasts the current market with 2022, arguing that strong earnings tailwinds, particularly from the top 10 market-cap stocks, are sustaining equity gains despite rising yields. Calvasina highlights historical concentration in the S&P 500 but notes that net income shares justify current valuations compared to the tech bubble era. Consequently, RBC has downgraded the Technology sector to market weight and upgraded Healthcare to overweight, citing expensive tech valuations and healthcare’s low correlation to AI-driven volatility. The discussion also covers a 'tiers of fear' framework for market drawdowns, noting that aggressive Fed hiking cycles historically cause deeper losses than mild cycles.

S&P 500 ValuationAI CapExSector Rotation
50 min1 assets20 claims to verify
All insights