The Property Trio (formerly The Property Planner, Buyer and Professor)

France's Pinel scheme failed to boost housing supply, warning for Australia's new-build tax incentives

35 min Listen to the original Episode page
Housing PolicyTax IncentivesReal Estate InvestmentSupply ConstraintsProductivity

Summary

The hosts analyze France's Pinel tax scheme, which offered incentives for new builds but resulted in half of investments being unprofitable after nine years. They argue that buyer-side tax breaks fail to increase supply when structural constraints like labor shortages and planning delays persist. The episode highlights that Australia faces similar productivity issues in construction, making similar policies potentially ineffective. Treasury modeling cited suggests Australia's proposed tax changes could result in fewer dwellings than if no policy change occurred. The speakers warn investors that new builds often carry a price premium and higher depreciation, leading to lower returns than established properties.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    The Pinel scheme resulted in roughly 50% of investments being unprofitable after nine years, with investors paying a 40% premium for new builds that was largely offset by the tax break, leading to modeled returns 33% lower than established properties in Paris.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 3:27

  2. 2
    The French Court of Auditors could not reliably establish the number of genuinely additional dwellings produced by the Pinel scheme, highlighting the difficulty in measuring the incremental supply impact of buyer-side tax incentives.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) · 4:42

  3. 3
    Australia's housing construction productivity has fallen 12% over three decades while the broader economy grew 49%, meaning the sector produces half as many homes per hour worked as in 1995, indicating a structural efficiency problem rather than a demand problem.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 11:02

  4. 4
    the day you settle on it, it's now established property and it's now back competing in the established process. market. So it's probably going to actually mean there's a bigger differential between what you pay for it initially versus then what it ends up selling for. So probably the level of growth only r in terms of increase in values

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 14:46

  5. 5
    Treasury estimates that the tax changes will produce around 75,000 additional owner occupiers over ten years. Like that's obviously what they're focusing on. But it also models around thirty-five 35,000 thousand fewer dwellings per. being added over the decade than under a scenario with no tax policy change. So it's not really by their own measures going to fix the supply problems.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 19:25

Episode sections

  1. 0:54 – 2:55

    Introduction and France's Pinel Scheme Overview

    The hosts introduce the episode's focus on Australia's May Budget reforms limiting negative gearing to new builds, using France's Pinel scheme as a comparative case study. The Pinel scheme, active for over a decade until December 2024, offered tax reductions for buying new builds to boost supply and rental stock.

  2. 2:55 – 4:22

    Pinel Scheme Outcomes for Investors

    Dave Bakos cites a French government review stating roughly half of Pinel investments were unprofitable after nine years. Investors paid a 40% premium for new builds over established homes, and modeled returns in Paris were 33% lower than for established properties.

  3. 4:22 – 6:00

    Government Cost and Supply Impact

    Mike Mortlock notes the French Court of Auditors estimated the scheme's tax cost at €7.3 billion by 2023, with total costs reaching €10-12 billion by 2038. The auditors could not reliably determine how many genuinely additional dwellings were produced versus those that would have been built anyway.

  4. 6:00 – 8:20

    Supply-Side Constraints vs. Buyer Incentives

    The hosts argue the Pinel scheme failed because it incentivized buyers without addressing supply-side constraints like labor shortages, rising construction costs, and planning delays. They note these same constraints exist in Australia, making buyer-side incentives ineffective for increasing supply.

  5. 8:20 – 11:02

    Development Feasibility and Profit Sensitivity

    Mike Mortlock explains that while buyer demand can help marginal projects, development feasibility is sensitive to price and cost changes. He provides an example where a 5% drop in sale prices and a 3.2% rise in build costs halved a developer's profit, suggesting extra demand may just inflate land prices rather than increase supply.

  6. 11:02 – 12:27

    Productivity and Construction Efficiency

    Mike references a Productivity Commission 2025 report stating housing construction productivity has fallen 12% over three decades, while the broader economy rose 49%. This means Australia produces half as many homes per hour worked as in 1995, highlighting the need for efficiency gains over tax incentives.

  7. 12:27 – 19:05

    Risks of New Builds vs. Established Property

    The hosts discuss risks for investors in new builds, including lower land-to-asset ratios, rapid depreciation of the building structure, and oversupply in high-density areas. They argue that new builds often face higher outgoings and that capital growth may be lower than established properties due to the initial premium paid.

  8. 19:05 – 34:25

    Treasury Modeling and Political Context

    Mike cites Treasury modeling suggesting the tax changes would produce 75,000 additional owner-occupiers but 35,000 fewer dwellings over a decade compared to no policy change. He notes the decision was locked in only weeks before the budget, potentially limiting stakeholder consultation.

  9. 34:25 – 34:48

    Disclaimer

    The speaker states that the episode content is general in nature and not financial advice. They emphasize that while effort was made for accuracy, listeners should not rely on it for decisions and should seek independent specialist advice.

Claims worth verifying

The Pinel scheme in France ended on 31 December 2024.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:21

How to verify: French government legislation records or official scheme documentation confirming the end date of the Pinel tax incentive. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Roughly one in two Pinel investments would not be profitable if sold after nine years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:27

How to verify: French government review of the Pinel scheme outcomes, likely published by the Ministry of Economy and Finance or Court of Auditors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Investors paid around 40% more for new build property than for an equivalent established home under the Pinel scheme.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:46

How to verify: French government review or academic study comparing new build vs established property prices in Paris during the Pinel period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Modeled returns for new build investors in Paris were around 33% lower than for established property over the period.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·3:46

How to verify: French government review or financial modeling study cited in the Pinel scheme evaluation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The typical Pinel investment would lose around €16,000 over nine years in a flat market.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:02

How to verify: French government review or Court of Auditors report detailing financial outcomes of Pinel investments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The cumulative tax cost of the Pinel scheme reached €7.3 billion by 2023, with eventual costs of €10-12 billion by 2038.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_2) ·4:22

How to verify: French Court of Auditors report on the Pinel scheme, specifically the evaluation published around 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Housing construction productivity in Australia has fallen 12% over the last three decades, while the broader economy rose 49%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·11:02

How to verify: Productivity Commission 2025 report on housing construction productivity and broader economic productivity data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Australia produces about half as many homes per hour worked as in 1995.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·11:21

How to verify: Productivity Commission 2026 report data on housing construction output per hour worked. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Treasury estimates the tax changes will produce around 75,000 additional owner-occupiers over ten years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·19:25

How to verify: Australian Treasury Budget Paper No. 1 or related budget documents detailing the impact of the May Budget tax reforms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Treasury models around 35,000 fewer dwellings being added over the decade compared to a scenario with no tax policy change.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·19:44

How to verify: Australian Treasury Budget Paper No. 1 or related budget documents detailing the supply impact of the May Budget tax reforms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The episode content is general in nature and should not be considered financial advice.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:25

How to verify: Review the transcript text at the specified timestamp for the explicit disclaimer statement. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Listeners should not rely on the information to make a decision.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:25

How to verify: Review the transcript text at the specified timestamp for the explicit warning against reliance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Listeners should seek the help of a specialist for specific advice.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:25

How to verify: Review the transcript text at the specified timestamp for the recommendation to seek specialist help. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Advisors should be independent.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:45

How to verify: Review the transcript text at the specified timestamp for the statement regarding advisor independence. For recent events, verify 2026-08-09 through 2026-11-09. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify the French Court of Auditors' report on the Pinel scheme's cost and supply impact.
  • Review the Australian Productivity Commission's 2025 report on housing construction productivity trends.
  • Analyze the Australian Treasury's modeling assumptions regarding the May Budget's impact on dwelling supply.
  • Compare the price premiums and depreciation schedules of new builds versus established properties in target markets.
  • Assess local labor shortages and planning approval delays in specific Australian regions.
  • Check developer profit margins sensitivity to price and cost fluctuations in current market conditions.
  • Review the specific tax legislation details for negative gearing changes to new builds in the May Budget.
  • Consult independent financial advice regarding the suitability of new-build investments for personal tax situations.
Full transcriptexpand
0:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Welcome to Australia's Bearsly Independent Property Podcast.
0:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Residential property is the only asset class we live in. It's where we raise our families and it's our most expensive investment. Yet property advice remains unregulated.
0:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Listen to three pioneers of the property industry, each with diverse areas of expertise in property planning, buying, and quantity surveying.
0:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We'll distill the raw truth from the ill-informed.
0:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Join the property planner David Johnston, the property buyer Kate Bacos, and me, the quantity surveyor, Mike Mortlock, as we take you on a journey through the maze of property, mortgage, and money decisions to empower you to create your ideal lifestyle.
0:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Welcome back to the Property Trio, the podcast for the sophisticated property buyer. Today we're revisiting the budget reforms to ask how likely that they are to achieve their objectives. One of the stated aims of the reforms is to fix the housing supply problem. Now, by limiting negative gearing to new builds, the government is betting
1:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that investors. will pile into new construction and that the extra demand will translate into more homes on the ground.
1:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): while it's a reasonable idea on paper, it's also one that has been tried before. Dave, you've done some digging and you've discovered a decade ago France rolled out a very similar scheme. It ended on the 31st of December 2024, so now we have the benefit of hindsight from the French case study. We'll look at what happened here in France,
1:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): including what it cost investors and what it cost the government and what it could mean for our regime and our property market. And for investors weighing up a new build against an established property, we've got a lot to talk about in this show as well. So it's a pleasure to be host and looking forward to unpacking Making this one.
1:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Look at a really interesting case study, I think, of what happened in France. and ran for over a decade. And when we started researching and looking around at other countries to see if any may have set about policy changes similar to what our government did in the May budget, doing things such as curb the ability to claim
2:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interest on investment properties or the like to discover the outcomes, it was fascinating to discover that there had been a similar undertaking. You know, you may even call it an experiment run in France. So it just goes to show there's rarely anything new under the sun. And I think the results are worth understanding and
2:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sharing with our listeners as they've proven quite instructive, I think. And they'll provide us, I reckon, some clues as to how the policy settings are likely to play out here in Australia and and for investors.
2:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I'm intrigued. I think everyone will be. Tell us about France's experiment. What was it?
2:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): In twenty fourteen, the French government rolled out what was called the Panel Scheme. So they dangled a tax reduction of up to twenty one percent in front of investors who bought new build property and rented it out. Sound familiar?
3:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Like Australia's reforms, the goal was twofold. boost new housing supply and free up more rental stock for tenants who needed it. So pretty similar to what we've done here.
3:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, and how did it turn out for the investors?
3:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, the results were pretty sobering, it's fair to say, for the investors. So a French government review We found roughly one in two of the investments done within this scheme would not be profitable. if they were sold after nine years. And investors uh paid around 40% more for the new build
3:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): property than for an equivalent established home, a premium largely offset by the tax break. But in Paris, modeled returns for new build investors were around 33% thirty-three percent lower than for established property
4:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in the
4:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): same. city over that period of time. And in a flat market, the typical Panel investment would lose around 16,000 euro over nine years. That's not over twelve months or two years, a nine year investment.
4:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Not so great. Mike, what can you share about the broader cost of this game?
4:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Yeah, well that's where the evaluation becomes interesting. So Francis France's called Court of Auditors was what a fun place that sounds. They estimated the the cumulative tax cost had reached 7.3 billion euros by 23 with an eventual 10 billion to 12 billion as existing commitments uh run through
4:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): to 2038. But the state couldn't really uh reliably establish how many genuinely additional dwellings the scheme produce. produced. And that's the critical. missing piece. How much of this construction would have happened anyway, and how much of it was caused by the incentive. And to be fair, the French auditors also recognized that the scheme helped some developments
5:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): proceed or proceed earlier. And eligible tenants did receive modern energy efficient housing. So I wouldn't call the exercise a complete failure, but if we're spending billions on a tax concession in the name of supply we need to know how many extra dwellings we're buying with that expenditure and whether they're in the light the right locations. That's the problems that we've
5:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): got here as well, and whether the people who need housing can actually afford
5:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): them. Hey
5:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): podcast listener, we're so glad you're enjoying our show. We put a lot of work into making it great, and we'd really appreciate if you could take a moment to give us a five-star review on your preferred podcast platform. It helps reach more people like you and helps keep us motivated to keep creating great content. Also, if you turn on automatic downloads,
5:47
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5:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Dave, where do you think the French scheme went wrong and why is it relevant for us here in Australia?
6:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, so here's the flaw at the heart of the Panel scheme. The incentive sat entirely on the buyer side of the transaction. So it gave investors a reason to buy new, like we're trying to do the government's trying to do here, but it did nothing to touch what actually determines how many new homes get built in the first place,
6:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as Mike just referenced and you know, their own research after the scheme finished discovered. So for France's own housing slowdown was driven by things like soaring construction and material costs, genuine labor shortages in specialized trades, land scarcity in major cities,
6:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stricter building standards, they had rising interest rates as well, and a financing gap where the amount of buyer can borrow doesn't match what a developer needs to turn a profit. Sounds pretty familiar, right?
6:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Horrendously familiar. Yeah.
6:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Pretty much exactly what we're see what we see in Australia now. So the underlying lesson was a tax incentive aimed at buyers doesn't fix constraints sitting on the supply side, which obviously we've talked a lot about and dedicated an entire episode to.
7:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
7:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, supply is the issue governments need to tackle. And if you wanted to listen to our deep dive on this, which we did completely well before the budget, take a listen to episodes 119 to 121, our three-part episode series on how supply and demand dictates market movements. But I think we've also done another
7:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): episode not that long ago on how to fix supply. But the point is that this had no positive impact. discernible positive impact on uh supply because it was on the buyer incentive side. But not only that, the people that are trying to help get better returns had poorer
7:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): outcomes.
7:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you know, there's reasons for that, but we'll delve into that soon. Mike, what do those constraints look like here in Australia?
8:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Well, how long have you got? We've got planning delays, infrastructure bottlenecks, trade shortages, rising labor costs, expensive materials, taxes and development charges. They those things all really matter before a single dwelling is even completed. But if I can challenge one part of the argument, I wouldn't
8:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): say an investor incentive can never produce additional homes. A developer can have can have a project that is marginalized. marginally unviable and stronger pre-sales or slightly higher achievable prices might make the numbers work. But it's important to think about development feasibility. We start with what the completed properties will sell for, then we subtract the
8:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): land, the building works, the consultants approvals, infrastructure contributions, interest holding Building costs, marketing. And then of course you've got the development margin. So if the figures don't work, the project doesn't proceed. I'm doing a presentation tonight where I came up with a a little bit of a rough example. Let's think about a project that has a
8:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 1.65 gross realization at the end. If we've got $550,000 worth of land, $720 worth of construction, $150K 50K worth of fees and finance, we have an indicative profit of $230K. 230 K. Now, if selling values decline by 5%
9:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and build costs go up by 3.2%, the new profit goes from $230K to $124,000. So just with a decline of 5% on the sale price and a 3.2% increase in build cross costs, we're talking about 46% forty-six percent less. profit. And
9:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think that's a good way to think about the feasibilities. But more buyer demand can, of course, improve the revenue side of that equation. But if land is scarce and the labor and the approval systems already stretch, then the extra purchasing power can simply be absorbed by higher land prices and construction costs. And we might pay more for the same
9:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): amount of housing.
10:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. I mean, look, it's a good point. Incentivising investors to buy new, you'd think would have some impact on creating more demand, which can obviously help a developer. But it's as this has proven, like it again, it's not it's not the supply side. It's
10:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not tackling where the real issue lies. So it's maybe making a tiny movement of the needle when you know it's not really attacking it from the right direction. And so if you have a builder stuck in an 18-month planning queue, it doesn't magically speed up because more investors necessarily want to buy off the plan. You know, a
10:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): developer isn't handed cheaper materials or extra trade people because negative gearing hearing rules are shifted to incentivize new property. A tax incentive, you know, can redirect where investor money's flow, and we've just touched on established property versus new, but it can't manufacture the physical capacity to actually build more homes.
11:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): 100%. And as we've shared on this podcast before, where we looked at the Productivity Commission's 2025 report, Well that outlines a lot of the stark challenges like housing, construction, labor, productivity as has fallen 12% over the last three decades, while productivity across the border economy, as you've talked about before,
11:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Dave, rose 49%. So on a physical output measure, we're producing about half as many homes per hour hours worked as we were in nineteen ninety-five. I mean, that puts it in perspective. And why I keep coming back to the efficiency and cost of delivering a dwelling, we've got to be able to build homes more
11:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): productively, not merely offer just bigger and bigger incentives to get them built and purchased.
11:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, a hundred percent. That's exactly what needs to happen.
12:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Coming up on next week's podcast, the Property Trio sink their teeth into the latest property, finance, and economic data for new insights and trends in the real estate landscape. Stay tuned for our monthly market update.
12:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Mike, there's a second half to the Pennell story, and that's the risk for the investors themselves. What's happened there?
12:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Uh the warning from France is that the investors can focus so heavily on the tax concession that they overlook the price that that they're paying. Uh new build can, of course, be a really good investment, but its This value doesn't come from the incentive or the tax deductions as much as I would love that to be. uh that to be true.
12:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Look, we could talk about this particular facet of the Pennell story for hours and hours because it it harks back to a couple of things. You know, the risk to the investor is overpaying and poor performance, both of which you can often see in the new space. And I'm not suggesting that every new build is bad, but you're already up
13:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): against it with your land to add. asset ratio being lower. And there are some other concerns for investors when the timelines push out and they're not sure when their construction period will finish and they'll actually settle. And the risk there is that if their jobs have changed or they're no longer eligible for the for the
13:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): loan approval that they initially had when they signed the contract, you know, we we can be talking two, three years later. That is always a risk. But the the biggest inherent issue that I see is people paying an inflated price and having an asset that doesn't perform because it's facing headwinds. Namely, you've paid more for the dwelling
13:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): than for the land. And it's land that appreciates. And so if the rate of depreciation of the dwelling is rapid, you might get some tax benefits, but you're not going to get 100% of your losses back. It'll be a function of your income at your marginal tax rate. And people have to remember that when they're chasing these tax opportunities.
14:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Dave, are we seeing the same dynamic taking shape here in Australia?
14:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, look, I mean, as you've just sort of elucidated and, you know, we've talked about many times on the podcast and you know, for talking
14:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about it.
14:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): twenty plus years in my business, and you know, many years in your business, the the risk, there's many risks with new property, and ultimately what they've done here is given a bigger incentive for more people to buy new, which is likely to just, as you touch on, make it drive up the initial purchase price. But
14:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the day you settle on it, it's now established property and it's now back competing in the established process. market. So it's probably going to actually mean there's a bigger differential between what you pay for it initially versus then what it ends up selling for. So probably the level of growth only r in terms of increase in values
15:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will probably be less than it was prior to the May budget. So you know new builds still carry an immediate negative gearing benefit, and that does look appealing on paper, but they typically come as you know we've touched on many times, with a lower land to asset ratio than established property, meaning more of the purchase price is
15:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tied up in the depreciating building structure rather than the appreciating land. They carry genuine oversupply risk because generally speaking, where new builds go up, there is a large number of them. Now, whether that's high-density apartments or greenfield estates, you're generally obviously competing
15:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with a lot of the same type of property. And also you tend to, once those have been bought out, there a new apartment will go up once the level of supply has been reached, the level of demand has been reached for those. properties. And so you're constantly chasing your
16:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tail, in effect, because there's generally new land available for new greenfield estates or more rooms in room in the sky for more apartments to go up. So established property, on the other hand, doesn't carry that same baggage. Both the rental growth and capital growth are likely, as history suggests, to have more upside because you're not
16:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): paying. that premium for either at the point of purchase. And people often forget people are most willing to pay the highest rent when something's new and shiny and looks great. But it dates from there. And so the relative rent actually proportionately reduces, generally speaking. And and
16:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's it's a hard thing to articulate. So you've sort of got these competing. factors going in the opposite direction to what an investor wants, often with new purchases.
17:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We love hearing from our listeners and we'd love to tackle more of your questions. So please, if you have any on your mind, no matter how great or small, send us a message. You can email us info at the propertytrio.com.au or go to our website, Facebook page, Instagram, or simply click on the link in your podcast app under the play button and fill out our online
17:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): form.
17:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So, Dave, where does this leave investors?
17:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
17:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): look, I think. France's Panel scheme leaves us with two hard lessons. And I wouldn't necessarily they say they are um new to us, but it just reinforces the message of the risks with new purchases.
17:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
17:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, tax incentives aimed at investors are a poor substitute for fixing the structural constraints on new housing supply, and investors who chase a tax break into new build property can end up wearing real financial pain for little reward. As, you know, we've seen time and time again
18:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
18:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with our own experience prior to the May budget, but I think it'll only be exacerbated. And that's exactly what happened with the French investors. And they lived through that for a decade. So and Australia's reforms are built on very similar logic to this. to the Panel scheme in France. Unless the real constraints on supply, planning,
18:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): infrastructure, labour, and cost get addressed head on, redirecting investor demand alone won't move the needle. And in the meantime, investors chasing the new build tax perk may be taking on a lot more risk than it's worth. And different tax laws, same story. as we've been educating people
18:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on since you know, I started our business twenty two years ago and we've been doing it, you know, on this podcast now for we must be coming up to about seven years, I think.
19:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We are indeed.
19:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Anything you'd add to that, Mike?
19:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, look, I think it's a good idea to circle back at Treasury's own modelling, modeling, right? Treasury's of course got some other things on t on top of their modelling. modeling. They've announced a $2 billion local infrastructure fund, which they think will build 65,000 extra homes. But you know, if you look at budget paper number one, the
19:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Treasury estimates that the tax changes will produce around 75,000 additional owner occupiers over ten years. Like that's obviously what they're focusing on. But it also models around thirty-five 35,000 thousand fewer dwellings per. being added over the decade than under a scenario with no tax policy change. So
19:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's not really by their own measures going to fix the supply problems.
19:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We have so many challenges on our hand with this supply issue. And this is a federal government initiative that the tax changes, yet we've got planning and infrastructure running.
20:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): within the states and territories. And so we've now got to spread our focus across all of our states and territories and look individually at who's doing it well, which policies and planning changes are most effective. You know, as a perfect test case example, we've got Melbourne and our new activity centres,
20:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which, you know, Dave, you're in the heartland of bringing being close to one. that's had a lot of bad press from the locals.
20:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Got a strong NIMBY society here, community here.
20:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, the NIMBY's not in my backyard. I'm happy for progress and I'm happy for more supply, but I don't want to live next to it. And people generally don't want to be next to a multi-story building. How do you effectively do it and bring the community with you? It's a really tough ask. And then that's focusing only on the capital cities.
20:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Then we need to have a look at what's going on in our big regions and which regions are poised for growth and an influx of skilled migrants as well. All of this goes hand in hand. And I I don't know how effectively we can run this when it when legislation for tax relating to supply or well
21:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tax relating to housing. is coming from the federal angle.
21:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, absolutely.
21:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well that brings us to the end of today's episode. We've had a nice little short one this week. Thank you, Dave, and thank you, Mike, and particularly you Dave, for you and your team preparing this insightful case study. France ran this experiment for decades and the results should give anyone a case to to pause before jumping in. and buying
21:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): brand new. The big lesson is that a tax incentive aimed at buyers can't fix the constraints sitting on the builder's side. And for investors chasing a brand new build and looking for that tax break, it carries a lot more risk than it can be worth. As Dave said a few times on the pod, history doesn't always repeat, but it does
21:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): often rhyme. And the French experience gave us a good indication of where things are likely heading here in Australia. But reach out and let us know what you think. And don't go anywhere just yet. Our gold nuggets are on the way.
22:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Just
22:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a quick reminder: you can access our show notes, including links to all of the resources we talk about, on our website, which is thepropertytrio.com.au. PropertyTrio.com.au.
22:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
22:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's time for us to go mining for our gold nugget property tip of the day.
22:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
22:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): gold nugget is that we've got to stop confusing investment in housing with the production of housing. France doesn't prove that investor incentives never work. They can help projects get off the ground, but if we're going gonna to spend billions encouraging particular investment decisions, we'd better be confident. we're getting genuinely additional
22:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): homes in the right locations at prices people can afford afford and I apply the same thinking to an individual investment don't confuse a tax advantage with a good investment as Dave said. What did you pay? What's the underlying demand what's the cost to hold it and what are the prospects for growth? These are more important questions and than then what you're
23:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): getting up front as an incentive. A deduction can improve an investment's economics, but it can't rescue a fundamentally poor purchase. We need better homes, more homes, better investment decisions, and tax concessions alone won't guarantee any of those.
23:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Really well said, Mark. I'm going to jump in with a gold nugget, and it's just something for listeners to bear in mind. If you circle in on any given, you know. inner, inner or middle ring suburb where supply is a bit of a focus, and we've got government incentivising developers now to build. And as I mentioned, in
23:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Melbourne, we've got the activity centres. If you pick any of those suburbs where this kind of activity is starting to ramp up, and let's use a two-bedroom apartment as a perfect example, you'll be really hard-pressed to buy a brand. new off-the-plan two-bedroom apartment in an inner or middle ring suburb for less than 800,000.
24:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yet in the same suburb, you'll be able to buy an established one, probably with a better floor plan and definitely with a really attractive land-to-asset ratio, closer to 600,000. That's a really significant differential. And if you are going for the new because you're chasing tax benefits, or for whatever reason you
24:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): maybe you're looking at depreciation on top of that, be really, really clear that you're paying the right price because developers have an uncanny knack of hiding their sold results. And a lot of people who sign off the plan are going off what the introducer or the salesperson's told them and they don't really know what everyone else is paying.
24:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They can't see the sale. sales. That evidence isn't usually that visible. And sometimes they can find that they paid a lot more than the guy next door with the same apartment. So be very, very educated on price if that's the path that you're going to go down.
25:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, and look, it's a great example, you know, one we've used many times. And people need to think about what those two properties become more similar over time. You know, if they could be the same dimension. dimensions, similar street, you know, two bedrooms, etc., but one was new when they bought it and one was established. And let's say that example, one
25:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): starts at 800, the other starts at six. The investor's got to think as they become more similar, they both become established two bedroom units with the same dimensions. What are they both worth in seven to ten years? They're gonna merge towards being valued about the same. generally.
25:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
25:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you might find that the older, more classic one with the bigger floor plan might be worth more.
25:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Might not even go past.
25:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Absolutely. And I'm like 800 would be a very cheap price tag for a brand new build. You'd really be hard pressed and it would have to be a lower land value area, but it's a good example.
25:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
25:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so you play around, you might have capital growth of 5% per annum, let's say over 10 years at the 600,000.
26:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
26:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): let's assume the other ones worth similar in 10 years' time, and then do the numbers, and you can have a look at how much less capital growth you're going to receive, and then look at what the yields are, and you'll be able to calculate your financial return will be significantly smaller.
26:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
26:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's not to touch on the fact that most new builds in the apartment space are higher density now. It's very rare to find you know, a little block of eight apartments with stairs and no lifts. It's very rare. And the implication of of a higher rise, higher density property with lifts is that your outgoings are higher as well. So you have to factor all
26:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of that in.
26:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And look, you know, without getting too much off topic, but it I that's where, you know, councils and local governments should be looking more at those types of levels of developments. If they're trying to build them in areas where it's more established, there's perhaps more period features that you've got a lot of pushback from
27:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): NIMBY's. You know, consider like two, three level high apartment builds instead of pushing for six or ten or twelve stories that doesn't suit the location. You know, look at townhouses, just you know, common sense. But anyway, that's a
27:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's that's relative to this episode and tackling the supply side and want to make it easy to build. But anyway, that's a good that's a good one, Kate. My gold nugget is this. I can't stress enough how important it is to base your property decisions on your personal circumstances, your goals, and your long-term
27:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): plans. When a new incentive comes out or the rule changes, it's easy to think, oh, that's a great idea. You know, I'm gonna pivot into that because the government's incentivizing me with some tax breaks. But you know what I've found over 20 plus years in property advice is generally incentives are put in place because
27:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the asset itself is weak. Okay, and that's something investors just want you to sit with. You know, otherwise, why would we need the incentive? There are various examples over the years of where this has been the case. And I won't go through them right now, but we've been saying for a long, long time, unless you were developing
28:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): property, you know, a developer or trying to develop property, generally, if you're a one property at a time type investor, property is a get-rich slow scheme. And most people I've seen who try to speed it up, take shortcuts, follow tax incentives, get speed wobbles and lose control.
28:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
28:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): generally that means too much debt, trying to do it too quickly, buying poor quality assets that don't get returns because they've invested for the wrong reasons. An incentive is only worth chasing if it fits where you actually want to be heading, but it should be an added benefit. Invest, you know,
28:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): invest due to the quality of the asset, then maximize your tax deductions, not the other way around. If you wouldn't have bought the property without the tax break, the tax break probably isn't a good enough reason to buy it. So start with your plan and assess whether the property in and mortgage strategy aligns with your long term goals.
29:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
29:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're feeling stuck on your next decision or want any assistance with reviewing
29:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): your
29:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): plans, your mortgage strategy, Kate, Mike, or myself are all happy to help with our particular businesses, but that is my gold nugget for today.
29:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Nicely done, Dave. It was a great app, and I wish that we had heard more about the Pennell study and outcomes from our government. You'd like to think that this is something that they carefully reviewed.
29:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well, you know,
29:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if they had have taken some time to have dialogue and get feedback with industries and with stakeholders and with the community, like say the Hawk and Keating government did when they made major reforms. they would work through the considerations over many months rather than try and rush it through over a
30:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): few weeks and then find all the holes and have to fix it with legislation and yeah, so maybe if our government brought these things in and did it the right way, they might have heard about this scheme, Kate, but
30:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah,
30:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I fear they weren't aware of it.
30:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
30:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think Chalmers himself said that the decision to go to the budget with these changes was only really locked in about three weeks before, two or three weeks before the budget. So I mean that the the answers in there, I think.
30:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah.
30:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Short time, isn't it? Oh well, we live and we learn. Interesting times. Thanks,
30:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Doug.
30:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sure are.
30:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We look forward to to seeing you.
30:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): both next week, same time. We've got market update.
30:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
30:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we do. Should be interesting. Numbers
30:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): came out
30:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the last couple of days.
31:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What a
31:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): teaser. What a teaser,
31:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Dave.
31:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Stay They tuned. change.
31:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Back
31:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
31:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the back in
31:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the positive
31:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): territory. We called
31:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it at the start of the year.
31:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): didn't we?
31:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
31:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): did. We did.
31:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We did. Well,
31:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pound for Cup weekend. And you know what? There's just money flowing everywhere. I know that it was a bit of a holiday weekend, probably for a lot of Melbourne's, but my goodness, the offering has changed there. There's fancy restaurants and wine bars and cool places to spend money absolutely everywhere. And it it's definitely changing rapidly.
31:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
31:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well, there was plenty of that flowing around at the birdcage where I was. yesterday at Melbourne Cubs as well. The
31:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): lucky duck. Oh, sounds fun.
31:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Robbie Williams is great at the end of the day.
31:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh, fun. He's
31:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a good showman, that's for sure.
31:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
31:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is indeed.
31:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
31:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you two have a fabulous week. I'll see you next week.
31:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hi there, it's Anne Marie from Property Planning Australia here. If you've enjoyed this episode and would like to learn more about some of the topics discussed, take a listen to our two-part episode series on off-the-plan purchases,
32:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): episode 58 and 59. And episode 60: Why Established Properties Outperform. Our three-part episode series on how supply and demand dictate market movements. From episode 119, 120, and 110. 121. And episode 352, The
32:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Housing Supply Challenge: Why Australia Can't Build Homes Fast Enough.
32:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Hey
32:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): podcast listeners, it's Dave here again. If you're new to the Property Trio, welcome to the show. We highly recommend you go back to the original episodes and listen to the first 30, where we cover much of the gold and fundamentals of property success. Back then, the podcast even had a different name.
32:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It was called The Property Planner, Buyer and Professor. And you won't hear Mike's voice, you'll hear Peter the property professor Kalizos. So take a listen and all the best on your property journey.
33:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We've enjoyed hosting you on the Property Trio. Thank you for joining the property planner David Johnston, whose company at Property Planning Australia provides the only independent pure planning advisory in Australia. Recently awarded the Best Mortgage Business and Customer Service Award at the Mortgage and Finance Association. of Australia's Excellence Awards.
33:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And the property buyer, Kate Bacos, recently awarded Buyers Agent of the Year and the owner of a boutique independent buyers agency in Melbourne's Inner West.
33:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And of course, the quantity surveyor, Mike Mortlock, managing director of Australia's fastest growing quantity surveying firm, MCG Quantity Surveyor, Survey, a two two-time time award winner of the Australian Financial Review. Reviews Client Choice Awards.
34:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We've really enjoyed delivering this podcast, and we'd love you to join us on our podcast webpage at the propertytrio.com.au or our Facebook page. Feel free to send us any questions and Dave Mike and I will answer them for you.
34:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So until next time, remember that each property decision you make is leading you towards your ideal IBM lifestyle.
34:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Everything we talk about. in this episode is general in nature and should not be considered to be financial advice. We've put a lot of effort into making sure the information is accurate, but please don't rely on this information to make a decision. If you're looking for specific advice, please seek the help of a specialist and remember, it's important you determine your trusted
34:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): advisors are independent.
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