Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast

Marty Fridson argues high yield spreads are wide due to index quality shifts, not cheap valuation, with CCCs showing disproportionate stress.

1h 4m Listen to the original Episode page
High Yield BondsCredit SpreadsDefault RatesPrivate CreditTreasury YieldsCCC BondsMarket Valuation

Summary

Marty Fridson and a colleague argue that comparing current high yield spreads to historical averages is flawed because the ICE BofA US High Yield Index has shifted from fallen angels to original issues with higher secured debt and fewer CCC bonds. Their updated fair value model suggests the spread was moderately undervalued at the end of October, though rising Treasury yields have compressed spreads. The speakers note that CCC-rated bonds have seen disproportionate spread widening, reflecting hedging against economic weakness despite strong current indicators. They highlight a discrepancy between Moody's default forecast and market-implied rates, suggesting the distressed segment is not attractive. Finally, they discuss how private credit has capped high yield market growth and the potential impact of AI-related capital expenditures.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    use uh shows that the implied uh forecast of the market is for just a 1.8% default rate. So uh yeah, more than a percentage point below where uh Moody's is forecasting it.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 42:26

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 3:10

    Introduction and Speaker Background

    Marty Fridson introduces his background and the episode's topic on high yield valuation.

  2. 3:10 – 7:01

    Debunking High Yield Myths

    Fridson refutes myths about the origins of high yield and fallen angels.

  3. 7:01 – 11:51

    The Fallen Angel Myth

    Discussion on why pension funds do not create fire-sale undervaluation.

  4. 11:51 – 16:27

    Index Composition Changes

    Analysis of the shift from fallen angels to original issues and secured debt.

  5. 16:27 – 19:19

    Critique of Historical Spread Averages

    Argument that spread narrowing reflects quality improvement, not easier conditions.

  6. 19:19 – 25:53

    Fair Value Model Updates

    Description of the updated multifactor regression model variables.

  7. 25:53 – 28:30

    Current Market Valuation

    Comparison of model fair value (275bp) vs actual spread (344bp) at end of October.

  8. 28:30 – 34:43

    Treasury Yields and Spreads

    Explanation of the negative correlation between Treasury yields and high yield spreads.

  9. 34:43 – 37:03

    CCC Spread Widening and Economic Hedging

    Analysis of disproportionate CCC spread widening as economic hedging.

  10. 37:03 – 38:56

    Mechanism of Pressure on Lower Quality Credits

    Discussion on EBITDA cushions and binary risk for CCC companies.

  11. 38:56 – 41:54

    Holder Base and Liquidity Risks in CCCs

    Description of risk-oriented holders and redemption risks in mutual funds.

  12. 41:54 – 43:13

    Default Rate Forecasts: Moody's vs. Implied Market

    Comparison of Moody's 3.1% forecast vs 1.8% market-implied rate.

  13. 43:13 – 44:38

    Valuation Metrics Beyond Spread for CCCs

    Argument for using current yield and recovery rates for CCC valuation.

  14. 44:38 – 1:03:32

    Undervalued Bond Screen Performance

    Presentation of a screen identifying bonds out of line with model predictions.

Claims worth verifying

The Triple C and lower spread widened by almost 250 basis points, while the Double B to Single B spread widened by 45 basis points.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:20

How to verify: Check ICE BofA US High Yield Index spread data for CCC and BB/B segments over the relevant period; calculate the difference in basis point changes. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Triple C spread is close to 1100 basis points.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:48

How to verify: Check ICE BofA US High Yield CCC Index spread data for the current date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The gap between Triple C and Double B spreads is the widest since 2020.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:48

How to verify: Plot the spread differential between ICE BofA CCC and BB indices from 2020 to present and identify the maximum value. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Marty Fridson ran high yield strategy at Merrill Lynch for 13 years and wrote a book on high yield investing in 1989.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:15

How to verify: Check Marty Fridson's LinkedIn profile and bibliographic records for his 1989 publication. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The term 'high yield' was used by John Moody as early as 1919.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·6:04

How to verify: Search Moody's historical bond rating publications or archives for the term 'high yield' prior to 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In January 1997, Triple C or lower bonds accounted for 16% of the ICE BofA US High Yield Index face amount.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·13:32

How to verify: Access ICE BofA historical index composition data for January 1997 and calculate the weight of CCC-rated bonds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In January 1997, secured debt accounted for 12.5% of the ICE BofA US High Yield Index face amount; today it is 36%.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·13:48

How to verify: Access ICE BofA historical index composition data for January 2026 and current data to verify the percentage of secured bonds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The average high yield spread was 392 basis points since 2016 and 580 basis points in the 10 years prior.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·18:27

How to verify: Calculate the average spread of the ICE BofA US High Yield Index for the periods 2026-2026 and 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

At the end of October, the fair value model estimated the spread at 275 basis points, while the actual spread was 344 basis points.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·26:01

How to verify: Compare the ICE BofA US High Yield Index spread on the last trading day of October against the fair value output from the Fridson/Beta model. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 5-year Treasury yield is used in the model because it is closer to the average maturity of bonds in the high yield index.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·29:03

How to verify: Check the methodology section of the Fridson/Beta fair value model paper or article for the specific variable selection rationale. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The combined double B and single B spread widened by 45 basis points since the end of 2025, while the triple C and lower spread widened by almost 250 basis points.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·35:30

How to verify: Check ICE High Yield Index data for the period from end of 2026 to the interview date (Nov 2026) to calculate spread changes for BB/B and CCC tiers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Moody's is forecasting a 3.1% default rate on US speculative grade bonds over the next 12 months.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:54

How to verify: Access Moody's Investor Service default risk study or press releases from the verification window (Aug-Nov 2026) for US speculative grade default forecasts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The speaker's methodology implies a market forecast of a 1.8% default rate.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·42:26

How to verify: Review Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors' methodology papers or spreadsheets that calculate implied default rates from high yield spreads versus Treasuries. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The speaker's screen of undervalued bonds has an 85-90% success rate of beating the index over the following 12 months.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·44:38

How to verify: Request the performance record from Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors or the external firm that attested to the results, comparing the screen's returns to the ICE High Yield Index. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

There are 133 bonds classified as significantly undervalued out of approximately 1,800 in the index.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·47:29

How to verify: Compare the number of bonds in the Lehmann Livian Fridson Advisors' undervalued screen to the total number of bonds in the ICE US High Yield Index at the time of the interview. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The high yield market outstanding amount did not grow over the last five years, missing a 5% CAGR from 2011-2021.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·55:17

How to verify: Compare the total outstanding amount of US High Yield bonds at the start of the 5-year period prior to the interview with the amount at the interview date using SIFMA or ICE data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Paysafe Finance has a 14% bond due in 2029.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·46:36

How to verify: Check bond prospectuses or trading data for Paysafe Finance to confirm the existence of a 14% coupon bond maturing in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

FMC has a 5.65% bond due in 2033.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·46:54

How to verify: Check bond prospectuses or trading data for FMC Corporation to confirm the existence of a 5.65% coupon bond maturing in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Cogent Communications has a 6.5% bond due in 2032.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·47:01

How to verify: Check bond prospectuses or trading data for Cogent Communications to confirm the existence of a 6.5% coupon bond maturing in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Owens Corning has a 7.25% bond due in 2031.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·47:01

How to verify: Check bond prospectuses or trading data for Owens Corning to confirm the existence of a 7.25% coupon bond maturing in 2031. For recent events, verify 2026-08-04 through 2026-11-04. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Do your own research

  • Verify the current composition of the ICE BofA US High Yield Index for CCC and secured debt weights using the ICE BofA website.
  • Check the latest Treasury yield curve data to assess the inverse correlation with high yield spreads.
  • Review Moody's latest US Speculative Grade Default Rate forecast for comparison against the speakers' implied rate.
  • Analyze the Office of Financial Research Financial Stress Index to validate the low stress environment cited.
  • Examine the specific bond listings (Paysafe, FMC, ICON, Cogent, Owens Corning) for current yield and recovery estimates.
  • Assess the impact of private credit growth on high yield issuance volumes using SIFMA or similar industry reports.
  • Investigate the capital expenditure trends in the AI sector to evaluate the potential strain on high yield absorption capacity.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's uh wrong to say that the market is cheap simply because the spread is wider than its historical average. The spread is a risk premium, double B, single B spread widened up by 45 basis points. You would have expected the triple C and lower spread to widen by
0:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just a little over 100 hundred basis points, but instead the triple C and lower spread widened by almost 200. two hundred fifty basis points.
0:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Welcome to another episode of Fix and Floating. US high yield is currently sending very mixed signals. Index spreads are trading close to their tights, while beneath the surface, lower quality credits have been underperforming. Triple C spread are close to eleven 1100 hundred basis points and the gap to
0:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): double B's is the widest since 2020. Today we'll explore when high yield is truly mispriced and whether it is now. We'll also dig into why triple C credits have moved so far out of line with the broader market and where the most compelling pockets of undervaluation are today.
1:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm very pleased to welcome Marty Fritsen. Marty ran high-yield high yield strategy at Merrill Lynch for 13 years.
1:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and wrote one of the first books on high yield investing back in 1989. He's now CAO at Lehman Livian Fritson Advisors. Marty, welcome to the show.
1:28
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
1:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): great to be here with you.
1:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Marty, would you mind give listeners a bit of background on your experience?
1:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. I started out as a corporate bond trader now 50 years ago in 1976. And I then moved into credit research and got a CFA charter. Now the high yield market was starting to take off in the early 1980s. And that created a need
1:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for serious objective research rather than just the standard promotion of Wall Street finding a lucrative new. business and wanting investors to get involved in it. So I eventually headed research groups at Morgan Stanley and at Merrill Lynch. And along the way, I served as president of the Fixed
2:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Income Analyst Society and also as a director of the CFA Institute. Later on, I moved to the buy-side. buy side. At Lehman Layman Livy and Fridson Fritz and Advisors, we run separate. separately managed accounts consisting of a wide variety of income investments, with high yield bond ETFs representing just a small portion
2:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of that. My contributions to the field uh were recognized by my election to the fixed income analyst hall of fame. And for many years I've served as the book review editor for the CFA Institute.
2:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That
2:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sounds very uh very impressive. So it uh sounds to me that you're kind of the the Scotty Pippen of um Heil research. Um in our pre-call you have said that much of what has been written by others about the history of the Heil market is wrong. Could you give us some examples?
3:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Absolutely. Um the myth that uh was heard as the market was uh just getting going was that um the high yield universe consisted entirely of fallen angels. In other words, these are bonds that were rated investment grade triple
3:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): B or higher when they originally came to market, but were later downgraded below investment grade. And the supposedly there was no issuance of anything with less than a triple B rating before Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert started doing that in 1976.
3:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They were not, by the way, the first firm to do that in 1976. There were a small number of new issues each year during the 1970s. And
4:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when the new issue market got going, interestingly, Milken seemed to be interested mainly in refinancing distressed companies. The rising star idea, this was small companies that didn't qualify for investment grade ratings, but could now
4:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): issue bonds in the public market. That was really the idea of a fellow named Marty Berman, who had a lot of contacts with many of those small companies from his work
4:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the financial markets prior to getting involved in the high yield business at Drexel. The leverage buyout business uh financing of LBOs was really the idea of uh Leon Black, who was in the investment bank. banking department at Drexel at the time. Um another myth uh
4:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I I think really verges into uh propaganda was that uh Drexel's effort was democratizing capital as they put it. In other words there were companies that uh because they were small, out of favor, um in industries that weren't uh considered
5:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): respectable, such as casinos, or maybe there were uh leaders uh of those companies that were from minority groups, they were unable to get capital, completely blocked out. Well, the reality is that those companies I found consistently when I studied that question, they had in the years before they began
5:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): issuing high-yield high yield bonds, uh they raised
5:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
5:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money in the private placement market. Uh so they were not denied access to capital. But the attraction of high yield was that you they didn't have any covenants i in the early days. That changed over time, but there were no meaningful covenants on the early high yield deal. So of course that was much more attractive to the issuers, not
5:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as uh good a deal for the investors as the investors uh found out.
6:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Um
6:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even the term high yield uh supposedly was unknown before Drexel invented it, but the reality is that John Moody uh from the bond rating service was using that term as at least as early as nineteen nineteen, possibly earlier than that. I think it was independently coined at
6:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Drexel. They weren't aware of uh Moody and uh having used it, and later the uh uh researcher uh Harold Frain using the term high yield bonds in the nineteen thirties, uh but it was not uh and none of this was entirely new.
6:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So you just touched upon fallen angels, the claim that they should offer superior returns um as they m need to be sold upon downgrade to high yield. You are saying that this assumption is essentially not true.
7:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
7:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): To get trades done. And it sounded obvious and uh logical, But the idea was that oh yeah, um as soon as a bond gets downgraded to low investment grade, the institutional holders are forced to sell immediately. Uh and uh so
7:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in this fire sale
7:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
7:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): situation
7:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
7:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the fallen angels automatically become undervalued and of course they recover and you uh earn consistently superior returns in those bonds. Well uh that uh was a myth. I found that there was no
7:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
7:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unusual uh risk adjusted return on fallen angels. Some of them got worse. They continued until they became defaults. uh, continued deteriorating. Some rebounded, some eventually returned to investment grade, but there was no uh systematic
8:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): undervaluation. And one of the
8:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
8:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): factors in that was that I called up the three largest pension plan sponsors in the United States and I asked them what their actual policy was.
8:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
8:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if a whole if they they had a manager of investment grade corporate bonds who owned a bond that got downgraded to uh double B, what would happen then? And they said, Oh, well, the last thing we would want them to do would be to sell it immediately when everyone else is trying to sell it and get less than
8:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh the fair value for that fallen angel. bond. Uh so we say yes, because you have a mandate to run investment grade bonds, uh you should discard that uh high-yield bond. But you know, take your time to do it, uh sell when the
9:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market is uh in a good condition. And um uh that that was the answer throughout. So it really was uh one of a number of things. What when I star got involved in heading the research group at Morgan Stanley, I had to start looking beyond individual company
9:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): analysis at more general topics. And so I started with everything I had learned as a trader and said, yeah, I wonder if anyone has ever actually tested any of these supposed, you know, I call it market lore, but these supposed truisms about how the market operated. And I consistently found that uh no, they were just uh
9:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made up and uh convenient things. There was no empirical support for any of those things.
9:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Are there any other um
9:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): broscience um
10:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cases um
10:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, um
10:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
10:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the
10:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you
10:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know there was this idea that I heard
10:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
10:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was which was that oh um
10:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
10:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if a company cuts its dividend on its common stock, that's good. good for the bondholders because it means there's more cash available to
10:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
10:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pay for the interest on the bonds.
10:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
10:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and I thought, well, you know, I that sounds logical in one sense, but on the other hand,
10:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you know,
10:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): companies don't like to cut their dividends. You know, the
10:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
10:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): CEOs of these companies are often large shareholders. themselves. So do they really want to give themselves a pay cut by cutting the dividends on the stock that they own? So I said, well, let's find out. It's worth a test. And there again I found that there was um you know no
11:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tendency for the bonds to improve uh to be perceived as better credits because they cut the dividend. In fact, quite the opposite. Uh
11:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think in our pre-call we already talked a bit about how the um composition of the high yield index has changed dramatically over time. Could you tell listeners a bit more how the index looked like at the beginning of the high yield market, then evolved throughout the early
11:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 2000s, then changed again after the great financial crisis, and how it he looks like today?
12:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sure. Well, uh
12:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as uh uh you can imagine when the new issuance was really just getting started uh it was in the context of um
12:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): yeah
12:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a market that was mostly not a hundred percent but mostly fallen angels at that time so that was a big part of the index nowadays it's just four 4% percent
12:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): because there has been so much original issue, high-yield bond uh issuance uh that's uh come to market in the intervening years. Um it's uh
12:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
12:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): took a while before you were able to issue bond new bonds with ratings as low as triple C. Those were considered you know what
12:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thought of those bonds as having one foot in the grave. So it in the early years, let's say in the um you know early to mid-1980s, you didn't have a lot of bonds still rated triple C
13:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unless they had
13:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
13:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deteriorated to that point
13:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
13:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
13:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): already uh possibly has been having having Fallen Angels. Now it's a little hard to get too specific on this because the Ice B of A U.S High Yield Index, which is the one that I operate with primarily, it was not digitized until 1996. But in January of
13:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1997, bonds rated triple C or lower accounted for 16% of the total. face amount of the index. That is now down to just under 10%.
13:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And uh at the
13:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
13:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that time in January of 1997, about 30 years ago now, only 12.5% of the face amount was secured debt, a lot of that being debt issued by utilities. Now that has spread more widely and it's 36%
14:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the total face value is accounted for by secured bonds, which is quite a dramatic change.
14:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): When did this change to secured bonds occur? Was it gradual over time or was there a point of time where that it just started to increase?
14:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, it uh grew somewhat over. time, but there's been uh a very significant shift over just the last 10 years. And um I think I attribute some of that to the intensified competition uh for financing
14:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by below investment grade companies from both the leveraged loan market and more recently the private credit market, where it is typical to have secured debt. And as a result of that,
15:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the investors in the high-ield bonds
15:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want to
15:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): be sure that they
15:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
15:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will not be
15:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
15:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): junior to new debt that comes. in because particularly in uh private credit, uh a lot of their uh that business is done specifically by finding loopholes in existing covenants that get enable companies to issue debt uh the so-called priming the existing investors that issue uh
15:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh debts you know higher in the capital structure uh than they are. Uh one of the things that uh the result of that in just the last few years is that we now see gradations, uh companies with high yield bonds that are called secured, that used to be all you needed to say. You know, that was going to put you at
15:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the top among the bondholders, but there are actually some examples of four different levels of secured bonds. So there there have been has quite an evolution in the relatively recent past.
16:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
16:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think you're touching on um the increasing prevalence of liability management exercises. If we look about the long run average of spreads, does this long run average or also let's say the spread in the early 2000s, does this tell us anything? about the
16:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): credit quality and the risk profile of today's market?
16:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, it it definitely uh creates a problem because uh you're talking about a
16:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
16:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): substantially different universe and the
16:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
16:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): particularly the greater
16:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
16:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): concentration in in
16:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
16:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): security. secured debt
16:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
16:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lowers the risk of the index as a whole, combined with the reduced concentration in the triple C's and increased concentration in the double B's at the top of the quality spectrum with
17:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
17:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): within investment grade. Uh but even aside from that, you know, it's uh wrong to say that the market is cheap simply because the spread is wider than its historical average. The spread is a risk premium. So if the risk in financial markets is greater than average, the spread should be greater than average. It
17:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): doesn't demonstrate that uh the market at that time is cheap. So
17:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
17:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you have to come up with a way to quantify the prevailing risk in order to make that kind of a judgment.
17:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you like this episode, subscribe to Fixed and Floating. You won't miss anything, and it really helps the show. And now back to the conversation. If you would rebuild the 1989 or I think 1986 index on today's ratings mix, what would the average spread
17:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): approximately before be?
18:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Okay. Um
18:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): again it's uh somewhat difficult to be too specific because uh the
18:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
18:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): details of the index only exist on paper, so it would be very difficult to reconstruct that. I can tell you that um since the
18:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
18:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): since 2016
18:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the average spread has been 392 basis points. In the 10 years before that, it averaged 580. And now that is not because economic conditions have gotten easier in the last 10 years. Actually, uh by
18:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
18:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): testing some of the measures of risk in the environment, I found that if anything, risk has been greater. in the more recent period. So the only way to explain why spreads have been narrower in recent years is that the quality mix of the high yield universe has improved.
19:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Most analysts usually only look at the average of the index. You did create a multifactor regression model. I think you just recreated a model for a new article. What did the old version miss and what did you add?
19:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, our main motivation, uh this was in conjunction with my colleague uh Jack Beta, uh
19:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
19:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): main motivation was taken into account the substantial change in the index's quality mix in recent years, as I spoke about with the CCC and secured debt concentration. But in the process, we explored some new variables and we replaced one of them. So the new model brings in the Treasury
19:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield curve, which has to do with liquidity in the high-yield market as well as the economic outlook. We uh brought in the current default rate and uh the Office of Financial. Researchers Financial Stress Index.
20:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Which is the most important factor, which of the factors is are doing most of the explanatory work in the model?
20:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, the uh
20:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the
20:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
20:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit availability is a very powerful uh explainer. Um as far as the recent changes, I believe the uh adding the variables to represent the percentages represented by triple C bonds and secured debt, that is the percentage of the total face
20:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): amount, uh, have represented the most important changes.
20:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Why is credit availability so important?
20:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The
20:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
20:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the financial condition of companies is uh highly dependent on their ability to not only raise capital for
21:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh the
21:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expansion but also to
21:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
21:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): refinance maturing debt. Now companies
21:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
21:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): by and large are run intelligently from that standpoint and they will
21:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
21:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): refinance debt maturities before the wolf is at the door, so to speak. So uh you typically don't see a large percentage of their debt maturing just within the next 12 months. But
21:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
21:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the they also face the risk that uh they may have to refinance existing debt at higher levels, and the
21:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
21:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): their ability
21:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
21:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do that will be dependent on banks' willingness to lend and the standards that they set. Uh some of the lower quality companies may have to
22:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cross a very high bar in order to qualify.
22:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So it uh has proven to be uh an important uh factor in explaining uh the uh spread. Uh and of course if company if uh banks cut back on their financing that could uh cause disruption in the economy itself, which again
22:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will
22:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cause spreads to widen on on speculative grade bonds.
22:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Does the fair value come out very differently than in the old model?
22:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It's not a radical change, but uh there has have been periods where the implied investment action is different under the new model than it would have been under the old model. Um and beyond that, you know uh not every fixed income manager
23:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): frequently changes the high yield allocation in a
23:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in a general fixed income portfolio.
23:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): But uh for those who have a trigger point, like uh say if there's a one standard deviation divergence uh between the actual spread and fair value, uh I will increase or decrease my
23:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh high
23:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield allocation, according to which direction that divergence is in. Um there have been some specific points where
23:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the
23:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
23:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): change in allocation would have occurred under the new model, but it would not have been made under the old model. There would not have been that large a discrepancy uh between the actual and fair value spread using the old model.
24:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): When have been historically good times to invest in high yield, and when was risk just adequately compensated for?
24:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well,
24:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um
24:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the uh
24:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spreads have usually reached their widest during recessions. That doesn't mean it's automatically a good time to jump in, uh, because a lot depends on how long that recession is going to last. But
24:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
24:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you've had
24:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): some
24:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): very good opportunities as you get further along. Uh
24:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
24:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I wouldn't say you can pinpoint it to the month, uh, but uh you know, in other words, you that you'll do better the very next month after
24:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
24:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the
24:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh the
24:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): modeling indicates that it's a good opportunity. But
25:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over a longer period in measuring quarters or uh in in let's say over the course of the year,
25:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh the uh
25:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you'll have a good entry point there. Um but uh there are uh things that factors not as extreme as
25:17
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recessions that cause the high yield market to become
25:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cheap to the uh tune of uh one standard uh error which is now 116 basis points uh relative to the fair value, uh Um more related to supply-demand conditions, um just you know other types of factors that influence performance in
25:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh the financial markets in general.
25:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): To make things a bit more interesting for our listeners, where does the model put fair value at the moment?
25:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): At the end of October, the model's fair value estimate was just 275 basis points.
26:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
26:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's well below historical averages, but uh these the factors in the model indicate that risk is at a fairly low point at uh currently. So uh with the actual spread at the end of October at 344 basis points, the high-yield yield
26:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market was somewhat undervalued, although not extremely so.
26:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What were the key drivers at the moment, or what are the key drivers?
26:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well uh
26:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you have uh fairly um good
26:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um
26:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you
26:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know credit availability. The banks are
26:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
26:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): willing to lend. There have been some rumblings recently that you know even in some sectors they may be uh being too uh easy. Uh I I wouldn't say it's an extremely easy money kind of uh market, but that's a very uh positive factor. The
27:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): economy has been uh doing well, the um
27:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
27:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): economic indicators, you know, including uh the
27:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh Treasury
27:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh,
27:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the U.S.
27:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield curve are fairly positive in that respect. Uh and so investors are comfortable taking risk at this point, and we're not seeing uh
27:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pronounced uh financial stress
27:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
27:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in in the in the markets at this point. Uh also I should note that the uh Treasury yield is inversely correlated with the spread. Another example of something that I was taught uh the exact opposite and wrong lesson uh in my trading days, and only learned later that uh in fact
27:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
27:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when
27:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
27:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): treasury yields are high, the spread versus treasuries tends to be lower.
28:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
28:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and the rise in the treasury yield
28:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
28:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over the last uh several months has
28:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
28:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): added to that
28:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
28:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): contraction of the fair value spread to a fairly low uh point currently
28:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what's the in t economic intuition um between um that uh negative correlation between um treasury yields and spreads?
28:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, an excellent question. And uh I think that one of those is simply that uh if demand for capital is high, uh that's usually an indication that
28:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
28:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): corporations uh see good earnings prospects before they uh uh ahead they want to expand. and that's why they're out uh borrowing in the uh capital markets and that is going to push interest rates higher. Uh there are several factors that influence that
29:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um
29:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
29:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 10-year treasury yield. Uh really it's the five year that we use in the model because that's closer to the average maturity of the bond. bonds in the high yield index. But this year, contrary to what you may have read, it really has not been a rise in inflation
29:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expectations that has caused the
29:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): medium and long-term treasury yields to rise. So it makes sense that the risk premium would be smaller if the economic outfit
29:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is not a very important thing.
29:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): outlook and as a result the demand for capital is high. One other factor is that to some extent, particularly if you're managing liabilities such as
29:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the cost of life insurance policies that you've written, uh that what really matters is not so much the spread, but the absolute yield. that you're getting on your bond investments. So
30:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): those investors may be willing to accept a somewhat smaller premium
30:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
30:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if they are earning a higher
30:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
30:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield
30:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
30:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on their uh their high-yield high yield investments. So I think probably some combination of those. factors accounts for what strikes a lot of people as a counterintuitive intuitive
30:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
30:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): result. I it
30:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you know
30:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think I I actually had a um uh professor of finance uh very smart uh individual one time in my office saying that it was impossible that obviously the spread had to be proportional to the uh yield on the underlying treasury bonds, but uh empirically you'll find that's
30:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just not the case.
30:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Let me just stay with the first point for a moment. So you just said yields are negatively correlated with spreads, um and that especially this year, real rates have then been the driver of nominal uh yields um which
31:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): point
31:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): points towards a very healthy economy, high demand for capital. Um
31:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): but
31:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm curious here because it seems that this is very positive for let's say productive uses of capital, whereas other investments such as in real estate or fiber or other uses, they depend much more on lower real yields, right? That that really helps their business
31:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and their investment case. And those seem to be punished a bit more by the um market at the moment. Is that also your interpretation or I'm getting too far?
31:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
31:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no, I I think that's absolutely right. I mean uh mortgage REITs uh have had a terrible year. Their value has been hit very hard. That's not really um you know something that's meaningful meaningfully represented in the high yield market. So
32:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unfortunately, the most of the industries
32:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are doing fine. And one thing to keep in mind is that
32:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you read the media accounts, it will often say, well, oh, the uh the market is uh headed for a big fall because interest rates have gone up and borrowing uh costs. are rising. Well, that would be a real problem if companies were f doing all their borrowing at adjustable rates in the short-term market. Uh but
32:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that would all be very irresponsible from the standpoint of a chief financial officer to do that. So typically, if a company has to go to market to add to its total debt outstanding.
32:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Uh, yeah, it'll be paying a higher yield than it did a few years ago or even last year, but that's going to be averaged into its overall cost of debt rather than
33:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
33:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pushing up the total borrowing cost by the full amount of the rise in
33:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh real
33:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rate. rates, let's say since the beginning of the year. So you know over time w uh the company has uh the ability to adjust
33:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
33:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): possibly raising more equity capital to reduce the total amount of
33:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um of
33:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debt that it has to pay interest on, um getting some pricing relief from the market as the those borrowing costs get passed along to customers, ultimately to consumers. So it's not the um crisis that uh you often read about by reporters who understandably are
33:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): looking to generate a lot of hit hits on their stories, but it's um not really an accurate portrayal of uh how it affects the uh uh income statements of the companies.
34:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
34:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're looking for more credit related content, check out fixedandfloating dot com. And now back to the show. Yeah, very good point. And I think it brings us to our next part of the conversation. Triple C and Distress, I think they looked very cheap um at the beginning of the year and now they
34:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): underperformed massively. I personally attribute it um especially to the rising real rates. Why has in your view underperformed triple C so massively? And especially versus double B's and single Bs?
34:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Well
34:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh when the high yield spread widens um and it has very recently uh it's normal for the triple C and lower spread to widen more than the double B and single B. I I look at for some purposes look at that as a combined double B and single B spread, which ICE Indices
35:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): publishes an index on that combines those two. Well, based on the historical experience and
35:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this point for this discussion, I'm not considering the starting points of where the spreads were at the end of 2025. But since that time, the uh combined double B single B spread widened up by 45 basis points. And based on the
35:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): historically based modeling of that, uh you would have expected the uh triple CCC C and and lower lower spread spread to widen. to widen by just a little over a hundred basis points, but instead the triple C and lower spread widened by almost 250 basis points uh from that point. So this suggests
35:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that even though investors are accepting an overall high-yield spread
35:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
35:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that's It's considerably narrower than uh
36:00
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
36:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well, you know, somewhat uh
36:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): narrower than fair value at the moment. They are very concerned about the possibility of a weakening of the economy, even though the indicators aren't particularly pointing in that direction. Uh they
36:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
36:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are hedging their bets a bit and uh
36:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not uh
36:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): ta
36:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): taking the risk of getting hit in a big way by uh the weakest credits. uh
36:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): getting uh hurt by a softening of the economy. So at this point, the investors are skewing toward the medium to higher quality portion of the high yield market.
36:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You just mentioned that usually when um the the better quality or higher quality part of the high high-yield yield market is underperforming triple C Cs are underperforming even even stronger. What is the mechanism that puts so much pressure on lower quality credits in
37:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a downward cycle?
37:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, high uh triple C companies have a smaller cushion against an economic decline than double B or single B companies.
37:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
37:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if you have a drop in the economic outlook, that means that corporate earnings and cash flows will decline. Now, the interest coverage ratios will decline at the higher-end speculative grade companies, so their spreads will widen. But they'll still cover their interest by a comfortable margin, and they
37:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): won't be at risk of a near-term default. But a decline in uh EBITDA EBITDA will put a lot of CCC companies in the position of just barely covering their interest rate or possibly not fully covering it at all. So for those companies, the risk of a near-term default uh
37:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): suddenly becomes very real. And for this reason, it's natural that their spreads will widen out more than the spreads on double B's and single B's, which are still not at a uh high risk of default any time soon.
38:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So you're saying that uh concern about debt sustainability is the key driver in these cases.
38:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, that's
38:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): right.
38:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We talked earlier about um fallen angels and I think you mentioned the concept of risk transfer that some people are forced to sell. Um that creates opportunities for other investors. I think very recently we have seen articles citing um that Area UK based
38:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): hedge fund um um faced margin calls and had to sell some of their positions. Could you shed a bit of light about the holder base um in high yield and more towards the lower end of the credit spectrum and also the flows of
38:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these players and how this impacts credit returns.
39:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Certainly.
39:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They'll say, well, we might have uh a few if our analysts believe that those companies are underrated, but uh we're really not uh play uh players in that bottom tier of the market. And uh there are even some funds that concentrate entirely on double B's, that is you know, the highest
39:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): quality within the uh speculative grade range. So the natural holders of triple CCCs C's are more risk-oriented investors. Um and that would even include some
39:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): funds that specialize in distress debt. Now some of these uh CCC holders are bond mutual funds, and they're in competition with other bond mutual funds. And for many investors, the competition simply is well, who's got
40:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the highest yield? You know they're not necessarily sophisticated enough to say, well, what kind of risk are they taking to achieve that? And of course the fund manager will say, oh well, we have really smart analysts, so they find these companies that are underrated. So it's not like we're taking a lot of risk. We're getting really good deals. So
40:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when the
40:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market sells off,
40:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the nature of mutual funds, you have a lot of
40:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investors who, as I say, are renting that investment rather than buying it. And of course they have the ability to redeem Deem that same day. Very rarely we see mutual funds put gay gates on, you know, sort of limiting the ability to liquid uh to exit because that
40:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hurts them competitively down the road. Um so the uh funds that
41:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
41:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do have sell-offs because their values have fallen, their net asset values have declined suddenly, uh they they have runoffs, they have to liquidate by bonds to meet redemptions. And that creates very heavy selling pressure in issues that don't have uh deep markets
41:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): or good liquidity to begin with. So uh you can see some real gapping in the prices on those uh triple C securities.
41:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think you also back out the default rate, the market is pricing and then combine. it with the Moody's forecast.
41:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Where is that reading today?
41:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, currently Moody's is forecasting a 3.1% default rate, and that's on US speculative grade bonds. over the next 12 months.
42:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
42:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I use a methodology that's different from what you see elsewhere elsewhere because uh I I I've shown that you know looking at the spread versus Treasuries to get at the expected default rate is flawed in uh in several respects. But um the methodology I
42:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): use uh shows that the implied uh forecast of the market is for just a 1.8%
42:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): default rate. So uh yeah, more than a percentage point below where uh Moody's is forecasting it. So the distress market as a whole is not especially attractive right now, but I would hasten to say that. within the distressed market, there are always a few
42:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): individual situations that offer very good risk-reward trade-offs.
43:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you think about an individual triple C credit rather than the index, is a spread the right measure to
43:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): measure that, or how do you think about it?
43:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
43:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at a minimum. I'd say you would want to consider some other metrics along with the spread. So for example, what dollar price is the bond trading at relative to its expected recovery in the event of default? And what is the bond's current yield? That is the coupon
43:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rate divided by the dollar price. So that's important because in the worst case scenario of a default, you'll earn back more of your investment prior to the default, the higher the ratio is.
43:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the current yield where let's say, you know, I'm indifferent to whether the company defaults or not, because I'll earn such a high current yield that I'll be in good shape even if a year or two down the road the company uh defaults, I'll recover a portion of my investment. But and and in addition I'll made so much in current
44:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield that I'll have uh had a a very attractive outcome. So uh I I think the bottom line is I agree with you that the spread tells only part of the story about a lower rated bond's value, but I d I don't think there's a single measure that replaces the spread and tells you everything you'd need to
44:35
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know.
44:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Alongside the index you publish, you also run a screen that picks out severely undervalued issues. Um and I think the record is that eighty 85 to 90% of them beat the index over the following 12 months. How does the
44:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): screen exactly work?
45:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, the screen is uh based uh solely on data from the company's financial statements. Um now I am you know z certainly not someone that uh takes everything in financial statements. at face value. Uh I have actually uh a book called Financial Statement
45:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Analysis, a practitioner's guide, now in its fifth edition, that specifically points out the trickery that's used by companies in reporting their finances. But uh nonetheless, uh just using that financial statement uh data uh
45:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that tells us uh what sort of spread that the uh bond ought to have, if not for unusual factors such as irregularities in supply and demand or perhaps the lingering effect of a bad quarter a while back. And you know, we put together you know a score based on
45:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the financial uh data and uh I should mention that the uh spread uh the the bond could make the uh list whether it's a high-end or a low-end credit. Uh the qualification is simply that the actual bond uh spread is out of line with what the model predicts.
46:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What is on the list right now? Could you walk us through some of the most undervalued nature? names?
46:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes. Uh let me uh list uh five of those that are you know near the top of the list in terms of
46:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
46:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the degree of undervaluation. Uh first would be Paysafe Finance, which is a fourteen percent bond due in two 2029. thousand twenty-nine. Then there's FMC, five 5.65% point six five percent. due in 2033.
46:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The ICON Enterprises, 4 38%,
46:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): due in 2029.
47:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Cogent Communications, 6.5% due in 2002. And Uh Owens Brockway, seven 7.4% and a quarter percent due in 2031. two thousand thirty-one.
47:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Interesting. Is is there a coincidence why those are coming up? Is that due to industry or what are the drivers there?
47:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No, you know, uh th there are 133 bonds that
47:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
47:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we classify as um
47:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): significantly undervalued, that's uh about versus about eighteen 1800 hundred. in the index as a whole. And
47:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): they are spread across a variety of industries.
47:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The most heavily represented industry currently is financial services, so that would account for that. Or you know pay f pay say finance would be in that group. Uh but and after that come uh media and healthcare.
48:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
48:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but uh it really is a very company specific situation.
48:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
48:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the uh cheap bonds run the gamut from double B plus all the way to triple C minus. So uh I think it's um
48:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you know
48:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): an interesting
48:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh aspect.
48:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the market that the uh bonds really
48:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
48:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do perform while there there are some group effects, uh they're very company specific. And that's why I find that uh managers in the high yield space
48:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
48:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): really say that they you know they take into account some of these bottom or de top-down factors, but they really emphasize the bottom-up analysis with analysts who are specialized by industry and really know those businesses uh very well.
49:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you think that makes sense, the the bottom up approach, or do you think more the the the top down approach makes sense or is it a combination?
49:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I think that uh some managers uh do underestimate the impact of the top down factors uh because they're used to looking at uh companies uh typically the portfolio managers themselves work their way up from being
49:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
49:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): industry specialized credit analysts and uh they take great pride understandably in that in being able to say okay you know, this company is not going to do better or worse simply because that industry grows into favor or out of favor. And then you know there's a lot of uh
49:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): truth to that. But I think it's undeniably when you look at the data, there's no question that even a good credit in a bad industry will feel the effect of
50:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
50:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market.
50:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
50:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): losing uh interest in that uh industry or suddenly thinking that it's turning around and uh we'll look at the best and the worst companies within that industry to find where they can get the most mileage out of that change.
50:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's that's true.
50:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): What
50:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are they the key drivers usually revealing this under evaluation
50:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well uh if you're talking now at the uh the sector level or at the individual credit level
50:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at the individual level so I mean is it
50:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
50:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't know is it for example
50:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): assets? I heard that's for example a very widely used um indicator um for quantitative
51:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah,
51:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
51:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yeah. Well I I I have to say that our um
51:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh the details of this model are not disclosed. disclose Everything else that I do, I'm a 100% hundred percent transparent. transparent Um and and people can recreate the models themselves to satisfy themselves that they're valid. This is kind of a special case because there is a proprietary value in
51:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this model. So we've had um a company
51:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that uh
51:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): does Because ordinarily their focus is on validating performance records of management managers, but they we had them take a look at our results to uh
51:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
51:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): attest to that
51:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
51:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact that the the uh uh performance had been, as you stated earlier,
51:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um uh
51:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 85 to 93 percent, with the exception of periods where
51:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah. uh the
51:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): high-yield high yield market uh and financial markets in general are doing so terribly that. nothing works but under any other normal circumstances you have a very high success ratio. Um the I'd say the the factors that managers who are looking at that on a hands-on basis, you know, company by company, not
52:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): doing it on any kind of a formula basis, but you know, looking at various factors. They'll look at uh I think f free free cash cash flow flow. uh uh There I I run into analysts who say that's the you know the only important thing in the whole picture. You know, if the company has good you know free cash flow, uh everything else uh falls by the
52:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wayside. Um but uh traditionally uh l ratios of debt to uh cash flow, uh people would sometimes use EBITDA as their measure. It's not a perfect measure for. of cash flow, but they'll look at that. And then um
52:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the uh
52:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cash flow rather than earnings coverage of interest would be uh other
53:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
53:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): measures that people would put a lot of emphasis on.
53:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): In the ten to fifteen percent um which do not work, what is usually
53:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): or
53:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what usually went wrong?
53:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well uh l let me say about that that um
53:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh by definition at any
53:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): p
53:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh period
53:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh the
53:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um
53:31
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know
53:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): half of the companies in the index will underperform the median of the index. Uh And it's not to say that anything went wrong at those companies. It's just that there's only space for 50% in the top half and some are going to have to be in the bottom half.
53:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So
53:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
53:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know the for the 10 or 15% of cheap bonds that didn't get back to their fail fair values and outperform the index. Um, it's not clear that in every case something went wrong. Uh, it may have been that whatever was holding them back, causing them to be to be wider than their fair value uh
54:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spreads uh remained the case. The market didn't change its mind over that period, and uh it wound up not outperforming the market for that reason. Uh it could have changed. the month after that or six months after that. And yes, some of the bonds that out
54:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): underperformed the index did have a setback of some kind. That could have been for reasons that couldn't possibly have been foreseen. The company could have lost a major customer, it could have had an accident at a plant. Um
54:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): company could have encountered new competition uh that uh hurt their profit margins.
54:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Ten or fifteen years ago the leveraged finance market was largely a high yield market. Today it splits between high yield, leveraged loans and private credit. And private Five credit trade has taken most of its growth. What has that done to the market? you model?
55:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, the market has not grown in terms of amount outstanding over the last five years. By contrast, the total amount outstanding grew at about a 5% compound annual rate from 2011 twenty eleven to 2021. two thousand twenty one. If that growth
55:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): had continued. at the same rate, the market would now be a half a trillion dollars larger than it is today, which would make it larger by about one third than it currently is.
55:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So would would you say that uh public credit spreads still represent the asset class um when a lot of, let's say, the riskier borrowers have migrated towards private credit?
56:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, it's important to point out that an asset class is different from a universe of issuers.
56:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
56:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): high-yield spread represents this risk specifically in the public high-yield bond market. Now, some of the companies in that market also borrow in the private credit market. or in the syndicated bank loan market. There's quite a bit of overlap
56:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): between the two. And you know, the the high-yield bond issuers have not, certainly in every case, abandoned high-ield bonds and said we're gonna rely exclusively on private credit. Um and some of those high-yield bond
56:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
56:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): companies uh also
56:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
56:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): finance in the common stock market. or the preferred stock market. Uh each of those markets has measures of its particular risk. And those measures uh make them separate from the spread on high yield bonds because they represent other asset classes. So
57:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think the analysis we do on public high high-yield yield bonds is uh still valid Uh it's just that some of the capital they raise is now being done elsewhere, and that's perfectly fine. Those uh markets have their functions to serve. Uh and if the private credit market gets
57:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): through the next
57:29
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
57:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): recession, uh and I I think it will be necessary for the private credit market to make some changes after that event. in the way their contracts are written. But if they do that and you know survive and b remain an important part of the market, they'll serve a very useful function just as leverage loans and uh
57:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): high yield bonds do in their own ways.
57:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Absolutely. They diversify um funding sources. Um in the high yield market, um we do see new kinds of borrowers arriving, especially AI related bonds are about now four percent of the index and could get to seven to ten percent. Um and
58:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Paramount Sky Dance is also as we speak entering the the index as well. Um
58:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how do you think about that migration and new issues or new completely set of issues is um entering the market
58:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well uh the AI issuers uh clearly have a very large appetite for debt. You know the data centers in particular are very expensive and that's uh makes it possible that the new supply from that AI sector could eventually
58:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): strain the high-yield market's capacity to absorb it, at least in the short run. So that will not change the fundamentals for the rest of the high yield issues.
59:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So we might see an extended period of the high yield universe trading at a discount to its fair value because the um supply-demand factors have been very unusual for some period of time.
59:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
59:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we come towards the end of the interview, how do you separate a safer index from a more expensive one? Because I think that's the question we are trying to answer throughout the whole interview.
59:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right. Well, um you know there's only one high-yield universe, but at any given time there's some bonds that are more attractively priced than others. Uh there uh it it really comes down to uh the risk of the market
59:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh the universe itself, which is as I mentioned earlier, a lot different from it was a decade ago or certainly 30 years ago, but uh it's not going to change a lot from one year to the next. But over that
1:00:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
1:00:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 12 month period the financial conditions, uh the outlook for the economy uh can change. very significantly. So
1:00:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the safer market is one where
1:00:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the spread is compensating you adequately, as in other parts of financial markets, the bottom line really is risk versus reward.
1:00:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): A
1:00:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more expensive market. is one where the
1:00:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): risk is there.
1:00:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): It may be especially high, maybe especially low at a particular point. But if the market is not rewarding you appropriately for that risk, that is an expensive market and one where you're very vulnerable to
1:01:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the market. very suddenly finding the right level to price that risk at.
1:01:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): What are the indicators that favor a higher allocation into high yield?
1:01:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, I don't get involved in economic forecasting,
1:01:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but uh
1:01:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as a general statement, um you're likely to increase your high yield allocation from here if you think that GDP in corporate earnings will be even better in 2027 than the market currently believes.
1:01:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
1:01:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): now, as I mentioned earlier, energy is the largest component of the high yield index. Uh so if you think oil prices are going higher from here, uh that could be because you see the war in Iran worsening rather than coming to a resolution
1:02:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): soon. That would be an another factor in favor of a larger high yield allocation. But I would put out the caveat in that case that you think other companies will be able to pass along their higher energy costs cost to their customers.
1:02:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Martin, it was super interesting. The whole interview, where can people find you and understand more of the work you're doing?
1:02:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, uh, you can reach me on LinkedIn. Uh also uh I'm on Bloomberg, you can find me there. Uh I would caution that if you have high yield bonds. for sale,
1:02:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): save your time.
1:02:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Our money management business is involved in a variety of income investments, and we primarily use ETFs for some of those, including high-yield bonds. But you know, Yeah, absolutely Uh happy to hear from people if they have some thoughts, uh, you know, questions. about uh what I
1:03:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do.
1:03:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Marty, thank you very much for coming on the show. If you have enjoyed this one on high-ield spreads and the market in general, please follow and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts and see you next time.
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