Monetary Matters with Jack Farley

Laks Ganapathi warns of systemic private credit risks, citing misclassified defaults and insurance insolvency

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Private CreditBDCsInsuranceSystemic RiskBlue OwlFraudValuationConsumer Lending

Summary

Laks Ganapathi argues that private credit default rates are artificially suppressed through 'extend and pretend' practices and misclassified sectors, with healthcare and consumer goods showing worse deterioration than reported software risks. She highlights the collapse of 777 Partners and Atlantic Coastal Life as evidence of double-pledging collateral and severe solvency issues in affiliated insurance entities. Ganapathi contends that major firms like Blackstone and BlackRock may be using Blue Owl's redemption issues as a scapegoat to manage their own exposures. The episode details forensic analysis techniques to uncover true loan book quality and warns of systemic risks connecting private credit to the broader financial system.

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 0:32

    Introduction and Sponsor Read

    Host Jack Farley introduces guest Laks Ganapathi, founder of Unicus Research and Minerva Investment Management, noting Michael Burry's role as senior advisor. The segment includes a sponsor read for Sarmaya Partners' LENS ETF.

  2. 0:32 – 4:19

    Private Credit Growth and Retail Exposure

    Ganapathi explains that private credit grew quietly post-2008 but entered the mainstream around 2020 by penetrating consumer lending and commercial real estate. She notes her firm began detailed loan book analysis in 2021-2022 because equity-side narratives were insufficient.

  3. 4:19 – 14:33

    The $2,500 Trap and Wealth Manager Failures

    Ganapathi describes the '$2,500 Trap,' where wealth managers sold illiquid private credit funds to retail investors with low entry barriers without proper due diligence. She cites BlackRock's HPS Corporate Lending Fund gating redemptions on March 7, 2026, as a key example of this structural mismatch.

  4. 14:33 – 19:19

    Default Rates and 'Extend and Pretend'

    Ganapathi disputes Fitch's reported private credit default rate of 6.3%, arguing that 'extend and pretend' practices and 'payment in kind' (PIK) conversions mask true delinquencies. She claims the actual default rate is higher than reported.

  5. 19:19 – 29:35

    777 Partners Fraud and Atlantic Coastal Life Receivership

    The speaker details the collapse of 777 Partners, which double-pledged collateral, leading to the receivership of Atlantic Coastal Life. She notes that Bermuda canceled 777's reinsurance license for non-payment, not fraud detection, and highlights the massive shortfall in Atlantic Coastal Life's reserves for retiree payouts.

  6. 29:35 – 34:29

    Systemic Risk and Insurance Connections

    Ganapathi asserts that risks are systemic, connecting major firms like Apollo, Athene, BlackRock, and Blackstone to private credit exposures. She cites data showing 34% of invested assets in 122 Bermuda insurers are linked to these issues, prompting her firm to hire a forensic investigator.

  7. 34:29 – 38:31

    Blue Owl (OBDC) Portfolio Analysis

    Ganapathi argues that Blue Owl's redemption issues are not primarily driven by AI disruption in software, as the company claims. Her analysis of OBDC shows the largest markdowns are in healthcare, education, and consumer goods, with software ranking only 10th in deterioration.

  8. 38:31 – 41:48

    OBDC Sector Misclassification and Loan Book Forensics

    Speaker_0 notes that Blue Owl's OBDC markdowns are concentrated in healthcare, education, and consumer sectors rather than software, despite the book being 40% software. Speaker_1 explains their forensic process involves drilling through multiple layers of private equity firms and co-investors to identify actual exposure, often finding that 'healthcare' or 'education' labels mask software or consumer product risks.

  9. 41:48 – 43:10

    Private Credit Leverage and Insurance Affiliations

    Speaker_0 discusses how private BDCs use joint ventures or consolidated entities to increase leverage, a practice also seen in ARCC. Speaker_1 asserts that Blackstone and BlackRock are the largest private credit funds and own stakes in insurance companies they diversify into, suggesting they may be worse off than Blue Owl but are using Blue Owl as an example to clean up their own acts.

  10. 43:10 – 46:28

    Valuation Denial and Mark-to-Model Issues

    Speaker_0 observes that public BDCs like OBDC and ARCC have weakened as money left private BDCs, implying higher yields. Speaker_1 argues that neither public nor private BDCs are marking loans to actual value; private BDCs keep NAV at par to avoid triggering redemptions, while public BDCs may delay marking down to avoid signaling distress.

  11. 46:28 – 50:44

    First Lien Loan Quality and Recovery Concerns

    Speaker_0 highlights that some BDCs like CSLX trade at NAV despite owning first lien loans that are actually co-owned with banks where the BDC takes losses first. Speaker_1 questions how many first lien loans are truly first, citing Medallia's $5.1 billion equity write-off and subsequent capital injections by Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR as evidence of misaligned incentives.

  12. 50:44 – 56:09

    Extend and Pretend in Auto Loans and BNPL

    Speaker_1 describes 'extend and pretend' in auto loans, noting 90+ month terms and repos that are not taken because car values are underwater. They claim Ally Bank avoids repos to prevent showing losses on books, instead increasing originations to dilute default rates. BNPL is described as propping up the consumer economy, with private credit buying these loans and bundling them into ABS.

  13. 56:09 – 1:02:02

    Data Center Debt Exposure and Risks

    Speaker_0 asks about data center debt, noting it is increasingly funded by private credit rather than just equity. Speaker_1 identifies data center debt as the first area to crack due to macro issues, citing KKR's investments in Digital Bridge and Silver Lake's Vantage Data Centers, and Brookfield's exposure. They mention a report on Vantage Data Centers and an ING-led $500M data center loan sale.

  14. 1:02:02 – 1:04:42

    Short-Term Tactical Opportunities

    Speaker_1 outlines short opportunities in consumer retail, citing BNPL-driven sales for Airbnb and restaurants, and the rotation of consumers to discount retailers like Dollar Tree and Dollar General. They warn that BNPL loans held by private credit are being bundled and sold to ABS markets, creating a circular financing risk.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
Blackstone Inc.BXequityneutraldon't know if that answers correctly. Blackstone and BlackRock are the biggest The humangous
BlackRock, Inc.BLKequityneutraldon't know if that answers correctly. Blackstone and BlackRock are the biggest The humangous
AmazonAMZNequityneutralIncreasingly, it's being funded by debt. And a lot of that debt is just investment grade, bond issuance, Amazon, Alphabet,
AlphabetGOOGLequityneutralAmazon, Alphabet,
Meta PlatformsMETAequityneutralMeta, Oracle,
NVIDIANVDAequityneutralNvidia, SpaceX,

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Private credit started thriving after 2008 due to regulations and enforcement, growing quietly until penetrating consumer lending and commercial real estate around 2020.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:32

How to verify: Review historical data on private credit AUM growth from Preqin or PitchBook; check Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data for non-bank lending trends. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

BlackRock's HPS Corporate Lending Fund gated redemptions on March 7, 2026, after investors submitted $1.2 billion in requests, returning only $600 million.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:03

How to verify: Check BlackRock's investor communications or press releases from March 2026; verify via SEC Form N-PORT filings for the fund. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Fitch reported a private credit default rate of 6.3% for the trailing twelve months and 9.2% in 2025.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·9:59

How to verify: Search Fitch Ratings' published reports on private credit default rates for 2025 and the relevant trailing twelve-month period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

777 Partners double-pledged collateral, with over 1,600 assets worth $185 million appearing on both Lazard's and Cred G's collateral lists.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·22:09

How to verify: Review federal court filings from Lazard's lawsuit against 777 Partners in New York (filed May 2024); check news archives for Bloomberg or Reuters reports on the case. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Bermuda canceled 777 Partners' reinsurance license in October 2024 because they were not getting paid on time, not due to fraud detection.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·23:55

How to verify: Check Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) press releases or regulatory notices from October 2026 regarding license cancellations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Atlantic Coastal Life entered receivership in Utah with a $2.5 billion surrender liability against only $75 million in assets.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·25:17

How to verify: Search Utah Department of Insurance records for receivership filings; check news reports on Atlantic Coastal Life's collapse. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

34% of invested assets in 122 Bermuda insurers are linked to systemic private credit risks, according to SP data.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:15

How to verify: Verify the source 'SP' (likely S&P Global or similar); check Bermuda Monetary Authority data on insurer asset allocations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Blue Owl's OBDC portfolio showed the largest markdowns in healthcare, education, and consumer goods, with software ranking 10th in deterioration as of March 31.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:40

How to verify: Review OBDC's quarterly portfolio disclosures (SEC Form N-PORT or N-CSR) for the period ending March 31, 2026; analyze industry-level unrealized depreciation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Blue Owl attributed redemption concerns to AI disrupting software, but the speaker argues this is an excuse as software is not the primary source of losses.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·36:33

How to verify: Compare Blue Owl's public statements/earnings calls regarding redemption reasons with OBDC's portfolio breakdown by industry and markdowns. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Nearly 14% of general account assets in the insurance sector were in private placements in 2024, up from 10% in 2014.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:03

How to verify: Check NAIC (National Association of Insurance Commissioners) data on insurance company investments in private placements. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

OBDC markdowns are concentrated in healthcare, education, and consumer sectors, not software, despite the book being 40% software.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·38:35

How to verify: Review OBDC quarterly filings (SEC EDGAR) for portfolio composition and impairment tables; compare sector breakdowns to loan book data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Blue Owl uses joint ventures or consolidated entities to increase leverage, a practice also seen in ARCC.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·41:48

How to verify: Review OBDC and ARCC 10-K/10-Q filings for 'Consolidated Entities' or 'Variable Interest Entities' sections and leverage ratios. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Blackstone and BlackRock are the largest private credit funds and own stakes in insurance companies they diversify into.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·42:15

How to verify: Check Blackstone (BX) and BlackRock (BLK) 10-K filings for insurance subsidiary holdings and private credit AUM rankings from industry reports (e.g., Preqin). For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Private BDCs do not mark loans down to avoid triggering redemptions, keeping NAV at par.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·44:27

How to verify: Compare public BDC NAV trends against loan default data and redemption requests; review BDC valuation policies in 10-K filings. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

CSLX owns first lien loans that are co-owned with banks where the BDC takes losses first.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·46:56

How to verify: Review CSLX 10-K/10-Q filings for loan portfolio composition and subordination terms; check for 'first lien' vs 'second lien' or 'subordinated' classifications. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Medallia had a $5.1 billion equity write-off and received $150 million in capital injections from Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·47:54

How to verify: Search Medallia press releases and SEC filings (if public) or private transaction reports for equity write-downs and capital raises from these firms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Ally Bank avoids repossessing cars because car values are underwater, contributing to 'extend and pretend' in auto loans.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·51:38

How to verify: Review Ally Financial (ALLY) quarterly reports for repossession rates, used car inventory levels, and provisions for credit losses; compare with industry repossession data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

KKR invested in Digital Bridge and Silver Lake committed billions to Vantage Data Centers.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·59:34

How to verify: Check KKR and Silver Lake press releases or SEC filings for investments in Digital Bridge and Vantage Data Centers. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

ING led a $500M sale of data center loans.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:00:26

How to verify: Search financial news archives (e.g., Bloomberg, Reuters) for reports on ING-led data center loan sales in late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-08 through 2026-11-08. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Primary source

Do your own research

  • Verify BlackRock's HPS Corporate Lending Fund redemption gating details and asset composition via SEC filings (Form N-PORT) and press releases from March 2026.
  • Review Fitch Ratings' private credit default rate reports and compare them against internal data from major private credit managers or alternative data providers like PitchBook.
  • Investigate the 777 Partners receivership documents and Atlantic Coastal Life's financial statements filed with Bermuda's Insurance Authority to assess reserve adequacy.
  • Analyze Blue Owl (OBDC) quarterly portfolio disclosures (Form N-PORT) to compare sector-specific markdowns against the company's public narrative regarding AI disruption.
  • Check for 'extend and pretend' indicators in BDC loan books by examining the ratio of Payment-in-Kind (PIK) interest to cash interest and the frequency of loan restructurings.
  • Review the ownership structures of major private credit firms (Blackstone, Apollo, KKR) and their stakeholdings in insurance companies to identify potential conflicts of interest or cross-exposures.
  • Examine auto loan delinquency and repossession rates from major lenders like Ally Bank to assess the validity of 'extend and pretend' claims in consumer lending.
  • Assess data center debt exposure by reviewing investment disclosures from KKR (Digital Bridge) and Silver Lake (Vantage Data Centers) for signs of distress or refinancing difficulties.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This episode is brought to you by Sarmaya Partners, who manages the Return to Tangibles ETF Lens Ticker L E N S, the Sarmaya Thematic ETF, built for a return to tangibles. Learn more at SarmayaETF.com and see the show notes for disclosures. Let's get into it. My guest today is Lox Ganapathi, founder of Unicus Research and Minerva
0:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Investment Management, a short biased fund. Michael Burry has joined as a senior advisor, and her views are her own. Lox Locks welcome. to Monetary Matters.
0:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Thank
0:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you, Jack. Good to be back.
0:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You've been doing a lot of work on private credit.
0:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes.
0:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What drew you to the field of private credit and what's the source of your concern here? How worried are you and why?
0:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's important to understand the private credit and non-bank financial institutions. They started to thrive after 2008 when there were so much regulations and enforcement. And they've been growing quietly under the radar in the shadows, as I would like to say it. But over the past
0:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): since 2020, it has kind of gotten into mainstream when private credit started to penetrate into consumer lending and commercial real estate State lending. And that field is like a little bit beyond the their usual lending to small
1:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): businesses and such. So we have been observing private credit since 2008, but we started to focus keenly into the nitty-gritty of the loan book analysis of the private credit since 2021, 2022. One of the reasons is because equity
1:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): side was not telling us the story that we wanted to know. Equity Sides always says that it's all nice, it's all rosy picture, and we wanted to know what's the real picture. So there are two ways to get the real story if you wanted to understand what's the underlying
1:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): problem in a particular company or a particular loan book. And that would be either through loan book and analysis, which is what we've been doing on private credit, and the other one is speaking with sources, speaking with previous employees and doing surveys and boots on the ground kind of work, which is what we've been doing on the data
2:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): center as well. So the concern for me with respect to the private credit is mostly to do with how
2:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): from the point of view of democratic investing for all facade, they are
2:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): retirees, annuity holders, and all their
2:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): money is being used to invest in illiquid assets like private credit. And that is my concern. And that's what made us look more into private credit on the loan book analysis nitty-gritty side.
3:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think you were saying a lot of the analysts of the private credit stocks, the management firms, they are focused on fee growth and they're not really focused on credit underwriting and the credit work. And you have done that. So I want to get into the credit work you've done. I also note that within the fixed income world, duration and credit risk, like how much interest
3:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): rate risk you take versus credit risk, over the past five years, taking credit risk has been rewarded because defaults have been low. And taking duration risk has been brutally punished because we've been in a fixed income treasury bear market. Private credit has among the lowest duration and among the highest credit risk. And as a result, it optically has been the best performing sector and a ton of
3:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money had flooded into it. A lot of the LPs or investors in the space had built colleges and endowments, foundations, and they are quite aligned with the, you know, it's like, oh, we're gonna lend to build a bridge for 14 years. But the question is, in addition to that, a ton of retail money through wealth channels has come into that sector.
4:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And the question is, is there a mismatch there? Can they handle just how long duration these assets are? So yeah, tell us about your concern about the asset liability mismatch with with the retail clients, the new flood of hot money that's gone in, what's gone over there, as well as then we'll get into the assets.
4:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That was an interesting question because we did write on that in March of twenty 2026 twenty six called the twenty $2,500 trap, right?
4:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So BlackRock, Blackstone, and the likes, they have not done, we have heard from some sources that like obviously not like to be named that the the underwriting due diligence is not happening. The underwriting due diligence
4:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for some of the private credit funds that are well known are not happening. And that should scare everybody. So
5:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the institutional model works. Right? We did see, unfortunately, some of the pods and some of the funds blew up over the past week because everybody was piling on this AI trade. So this is something. which you can see. You can see that it's a huge amount of flush that happened over
5:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the past week. Tremendous selling going on. But what you're not seeing is how these are all connect on the underlying on the private credit side. And these are the risks that's been moving around, not only into the banks, but also on the insurance side. And that moved around to the reinsurance side, which
5:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and there are no enforcement, no auditing happening. And that should concern everyone. So the institutional model on the private credit side works because it was designed to work for institutions. So long long-duration duration capitals
6:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are locked up, deployed into illiquid. loans. The institutions were aware of the risks and they were handsomely paid in terms of the risk that they were taking. It has logic and it worked until it didn't. The problem is, and I have been
6:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): consistent in saying that private credit as an asset class is going to survive. It's going to survive this mess. It's going to be a tremendous bloodbath. We expect more private credit coming out with the redemption, capping redemptions. But private credit as an asset class is going
6:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to survive. It's built to survive. So
6:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the problem is it's a structural problem, and it was directed to what towards a retail crowd. We were told that
6:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the mediators and the wealth management channel, like you said, they were not doing due diligence. I was extremely naive to believe that the wealth managers have the responsibility to advise their clients.
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in a way that justifies their investment. I was under the assumption the wealth managers were reviewing the prospectus of the fund they want their clients to invest in, thoroughly.
7:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Guess what? They were not. We were told that the wealth managers were getting kickbacks. We were told that. no one reached the prospectus.
7:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that all they they told their clients was you will make a lot of money in
7:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
7:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You have to put twenty five hundred in, right? That's the entry
7:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): entry price investment for the BlackRock's HPS corporate lending fund. On March seventh, 7th, they gated
8:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for the first time in their four-year history. Investors submitted $1.2 billion in redemption requests. BlackRock returned roughly $600 million. They had a minimum series of tranche with a minimum investment of $2,500.
8:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that, when I read that, how could a wealth management
8:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): manager who has a responsibility to advise his or her clients that the risk that is involved, whether it is a liquid or illiquid, whether your money is locked or not locked, can you get the money out or not out? None of that was
8:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): told. Right? So
8:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
8:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): difference. comes in the for the private credit, the difference between the institution investors and the retail crowd is that
8:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when something goes wrong, the institutions have the cushion to take it. Whereas when there is a fear, the first one out of the gate would be the retail investors. For institutions to 2500 probably doesn't mean much, but for retail
9:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investors, you have a retail crowd. Jack, you have to understand people are using BNPL. Personal loan taken out of the banks have skyrocketed. People have credit card debt. The chances are the same crowd is putting their $2,500.
9:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in these private credit funds. So I think that's where they went wrong. And the private credit, we've been saying they are using the retail money as an exit liquidity. And when the redemptions were happening, at some point there was a private credit default rate hit 9.2%
9:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in 2025 by Fitch. but we don't trust that number is real. We think the number is higher than that, but that's where the private credit funds are making a mistake. And every single private credit fund they have their own arm of insurance
10:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): company. So all of these are Or going and sitting in there. So
10:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the risk
10:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
10:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not. diversified at this point. The risk is no one knows where the risks are. It's like everything is invested, everything is diversified, but it's a landmine and you have no idea where the risks are. It's a matter of if you make a wrong move, you're screwed.
10:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's where we are in. I didn't mean to scour scare anybody, but that's where we are in.
10:51
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
10:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's okay. I want you to share what you think and what you feel. Where is the greatest amount of concern that you have located? Is it about the underlying credit fundamentals, regardless of liquidity, inflows, outflows, or is it about those liquidity issues you just said that all this retail money has flooded in It and now it wants out, even though that
11:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): money is limited, how much they can get out?
11:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's a mixture of both. I have serious concern about the underlying credit on the private credit funds, the investment. We think most of the private equity firms are zombie companies, as and they are in deep red, or they should not be in business, and nobody knows
11:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): which is which. And the other aspect is that it's like a public. Ponsai financing. It's like uh Hyman Minsky's Ponsai Finance. It's what it is, is that yes, more money flowing in. Is more money flowing in is to boost the
11:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): existing organic investments, or is there more money flowing into in to the private credit funds so they can use that more money to check off the redemption and pay out the investors who are waiting in line. And that line is out there. So that's my concern. I refuse
12:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to believe unless one of those big funds invites me and gives my team a line by line how organically they have invested and what's their nav or return on investment or whatnot. Unless that happens, I refuse to believe the inflows coming into the private credit funds are
12:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): invested organically. Right now we think the money coming into the fund is used to in one way or other pay off the exit liquidity.
12:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hey everyone, hope you're finding value in my questions. I've got a quick question for you.
12:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How
12:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): much of your portfolio actually depends on the physical world?
12:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): If
12:52
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13:12
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13:32
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13:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): SurmayaTF.com. Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. The funds, investment objectives, risk charges, and expenses must be considered carefully before investing. This and other important information is contained in the prospectus, which may be obtained at SurmayaETF.com. Please read the prospectus. carefully before investing. Thanks for listening. Let's get back to today's interview.
14:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Lux, now let's talk about the fundamental
14:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit quality. You cited a default rate reported by Fitch, and you think it might be
14:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): higher.
14:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tell us what your work finds about the broad space, and then we can get into individual funds and perhaps even loans that you've done a lot of work on. But what does the interest industry say the default rate is? What does Fitch and the ratings agency say the default is? And what do you think it really is?
14:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So right now Fitch's private credit default rate reach a record high of six point three percent for trailing twelve months. We've been doing work on the equities for for a while, especially car dealerships. So what the extend and
14:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pretend concept does for car dealerships, consumer credit, commercial real estate, anything, the extend and pretend is pretty much what it does is to
15:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): readjust the portfolio to make sure your loan is current. So it's it's not on the default range. So the default rate, I believe, what Fitch is doing is when a payment moves from cash to peg. So
15:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I have a feeling that that conversion that they are considering as default.
15:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And also there is like a loosely held term of oh, there is a cash to pick and there is all pick. For me
15:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): payment
15:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in kind. Explain what payment in kind is.
15:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, pick is like a payment in kind. It's like writing I owe you and I might or might not owe you. So that's the fancy term. But
15:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
15:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know you got a credit card bill for twelve hundred dollars in instead of paying it in cash, you pay it in debt. So it's taxed on to the principal.
16:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So that conversion is where my questioning is. The numbers you have to understand. When we analyze the loan book, all we can see is at what value they got the loan, right? And what is the current value now. And it says if the loan is
16:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at par or if it's written down a little bit. That's why we are creating the private credit loan book because what we are doing is we are overlapping all the loan books and see if there are similarities of the same tranches across the loan book. So we have
16:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 150 private credit funds, give or take, and we are still working through the 20 or 30 funds in, and we are overlaying. it to see if there are similar tranches and if the similar tranches are there, but we have our programmer write a code to see if there are similar
17:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): tranches priced or marked differently or not,
17:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then we can, after we finish the 150, then we can deduce, okay, so this is full of junk, and this is probably. at par, but right now it looks like everything is at par unless it's not. Right. And one of the things
17:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I want everybody to understand is private credit is by design, it's private. It's getting complicated for them because they wanted to get into the commercial real estate, they are into the data center, they are into the auto loans and all of it. And they are coming out of the
17:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shadows, which means people like us are going to poke around here and there. And then you started to find that it listen, when JP Morgan's CEO, Jamie Diamond, said when you see one cockroach, there are probably more. We've been saying that. since the tricolor first
18:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): brands primal land, and the same people, whether it's Jamie Diamond or other talking heads, were like, Well, you know, it's it's an isolated incident. And we've been saying that, and we are saying it now, that it is not isolated. We started pulling one thread out, and we are looking into the loan
18:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): books, we are saying things. seeing we are not happy about. And it's leading us all the way to insurance where you have pension funds, you have enmities, and you have people relying on that. So it's all going and hiding there. So private credit funds are bundling all the tranches together, dumping it of the
18:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): insurance, and then that goes into the reinsurance. Private credit funds also. own their own reinsurance companies. This is as incestuous as you can get.
18:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that is what we are poking into. For instance, we recently published on Atlantic Coastal Life. I don't know if you had a chance to read that. This happened in 2024, but nobody knew about it. And recently, sometime this year or last year,
19:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have the state file for a receivership. That is a fancy way to say an insurance company is going bust. And technically, insurance companies don't file filed bankruptcy. They just the state takes over and pays pays the insurance. and
19:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): retirees. So that's what happened. So many of us haven't heard about even we didn't hear about 777 partners and they are 77 was a Miami investment firm run by Josh Wardner and Stephen
19:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pascoe. Their business was tremendously boring. What they did was they bought future payment streams from people who preferred cash today. You know how you in TV you see the advertisements of injury, lawsuit, settlement and if you want cash now you can get it.
20:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So these guys were doing
20:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): legal finance,
20:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): litigation finance.
20:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes, litigation finance.
20:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I see.
20:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So in September twenty twenty twenty-two, two. one of the seven seven seven's lenders, London-based Leadon Hall Capital Partners, got an anonymous tip. It said the asset backing the London Halls loan do not exist.
20:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I'll take you back. I don't know if you followed first brands.
20:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I did.
20:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So every loan needs to be backed by a collateral. So if you don't pay the loan, at least that they can salvage the collateral. So
20:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what happened in first brands? They double pledged it. You have 10 loans, but only five of them are collateralized, and they were collateralized over and over again. It should not happen in theory. This is value where people we have checks and balances, which we live in a land that nothing exists,
21:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nothing can be enforced. So we have a problem like first brands double double pledged or double collateralized. So coming back to Liedenhoe, some anonymous steps said to Liedenhoe leave and hold that hey, your loan does do not exist, right? The asset backing the loan. did not
21:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like exist. So if if your loans were not paid, there was nothing for you to go and scrape it off. So Wander had either never bought them or had already pledged them to another lender. Nobody knew. In March 2023, this guy reached out to a second lender,
21:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Kregy, Cred G, and shared its own collateral. list. Lee and Hall said more than 1,600 of the same asset
22:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): worth about 185 million. They appeared both on Leidenhall's list as well as Cred G's list. They were double pledged. So in 2024 of May, Leidenhall filed a federal lawsuit in New York.
22:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I looked it up, I could not find it. It was in some random newspaper or maybe in Bloomberg, but it was not on the front page. It should have been on the front page. So the lawsuit said that 777 pledged more than 350 million of collateral it did not
22:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): own or had already pledged elsewhere.
22:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
22:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what happened next was funny. In August 2024, Leiden Hall amended its lawsuit and decided to drag ACAP at the center. ACAP has a little list of, I believe, insurance companies, and one of them is Atlantic Coastal Life.
23:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
23:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then 2024, Bermuda. This is where we recently hired Jack. We recently hired a forensic investigator to go to Bermuda's and Cayman to poke around because all the reinsurers are over there. Okay. So the 2024
23:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): back
23:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is 777. 77, Bermuda cancelled canceled triple 777's seven's reinsurance license in October. Now, one I was again naive in asking, oh, they canceled the certificate license because they were aware of this in May,
23:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and then they did due diligence, they did
24:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): auditing, and out of obligation and responsibility, they canceled. No. We found out the only reason Bermuda canceled the certificate of license, reinsurance license, because they weren't getting paid on time. That's why they canceled. Not because it was like
24:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): double pledging, not in May, but they canceled because they were not getting paid. So then Utah. state of Utah, moved against ACAP insurance, and South Carolina tried to stop ACAPS, one of the Atlantic Coastal Live, from writing new businesses. They were like,
24:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you can't write any more business this month. So all of these happening, and recently the state started to file a lawsuit. for receivership. What's interesting in Atlantic coastal life was
24:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): majority, all of the retirees were more than 70 years old. There is a surrender ship coming in three years, and it's expected to be at the sum of $2.5 billion, and Atlantic. Coastal Life only has $75
25:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): million.
25:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So the lawsuit goes on. All these retirees will eventually get paid, but they have to wait for three years, two years. And this is one insurance company, Jack. We have tons of them. We found another one because we were like, okay, we have. had no
25:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): idea what's going on. No one was talking about it. It was not in the mainstream media. What else happened? And there was another, I think we were we published there was another insurance company that was having the same problem.
25:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And this,
26:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and this is like
26:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
26:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think Golden Gate Capital was indirectly involved. I don't know if you read that.
26:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes.
26:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
26:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): did.
26:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): We did a deep dive due diligence that whether this had happened before, because I work under the premise that
26:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
26:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): these guys are committing this kind of reckless behavior, this would have happened before. Whether it's Bernie Madoff, whether it's in the 18th century, 19th century, 20th century, it had happened before. And there has been precedence for this similar scenarios
26:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): over the years. You're welcome to share the link to your audience, and I think there was a scenario where a piano comes. company that bought annuity insurers and spent all the money on the company itself. There was an insurer that bought almost everything from a
27:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): junk bond desk. And
27:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there was a tremendous insurance fraud. They invented policies out of thin air and sold them all to the reinsurers. We are working on
27:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): an
27:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): insurance company as a potential short for our client, and I can't name that, but
27:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
27:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on the edge of my seat.
27:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm sorry, I have like
27:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): my attorney starring at me. But so if you were to remove the reinsurance concept in that, right? 50% they this particular company has more than 40 reinsurers. And out of which 50% of them are 100%
27:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): owned by the insurance company itself. And if the reinsurers were to just go away, 50% of their surplus is gone overnight. There was another insurance company called PSP PS and Peter or HLV. H L Variable. I haven't even heard of
28:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): them. They are in receivership,
28:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
28:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the lawsuit is ongoing. And there was, you know how I found that news? I found that news in a local newspaper, somewhere buried in. Why this is not in the mainstream? That's because no one wants to be the first one to spook anybody.
28:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Locks, this is you know excellent work that you've done. We will link to it. My question is: to what degree is this systemic? Because you know, you could argue that always, you know, one to 20 basis points of fraud is kind of always happening, but it doesn't set systemic crisis. So, like if you and I had an insurance company and we
28:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): did some things that we shouldn't have done and it was like 900 million policies, obviously that's a disaster. for us and for our policyholders. And you know, perhaps we should be uh punished severely, not just financially, but perhaps criminally as well. But you know, I feel like for it to be systemic, you have to get you got to get the real big, the big boys involved: Apollo, Aries, Blackstone, Blue Al,
29:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and the associated insurance companies. You know, whether it's Apollo's Athene, whether it's a literal captive insurer, or they have an you know a fun flow. fund agreement uh where basically they don't own the insurance company, but they have an agreement where they manage a lot of the assets. Have you done work on sort of these these much bigger and
29:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): better known companies? Do you think that there is a similar level, even to a smaller amount of um uh of issues there?
29:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yes. We are doing work on them, working on one insurance company it connects to tons of them there is a cancer right the cancer cells are spreading faster across you can do the chemo and everything but it's spreading everywhere at a
29:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): faster rate and yes Apollo Athene BlackRock Blackstone they all have problems. I can say systemic as we have been doing this work and continue to do this work.
30:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The reason is when we look at Athene,
30:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that connects us to something else we are looking at. That connects us to MetLife. Commercial mortgage, commercial real estate is all invested in MetLife. And then there is nearly 20 to 30 percent of insurance is exposed to investments is exposed to private credit. And then
30:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there is no single number. These guys are uh very
30:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for the lack of better words, mob-like, where nobody wants to say anything to anyone, no numbers are getting leaked. Nearly 14%, give or take, of general account assets were in private placements in 2024, roughly close to a trillion trillion
31:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): dollars, up from 10% in 2014. That is the number that we know. But here's the thing: 34%
31:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of 1.29 trillion in cash, give or take, and invested assets are invested across 122 Bermuda insurers. This is according to the SP, right? And then you have to go poke into
31:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Bermuda's insurance and
31:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): publicly available data, then you have to go to Bermuda's or Cayman to get the data, and that boils down to that's why we hired a private forensic investigator who's going to fly to Bermuda and Cayman's. So how can I say this as is systemic? That's because whatever we have
32:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): seen so far is connected to
32:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the big guys in a very, very intricate manner.
32:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And Locks, as you alluded at the beginning, there is tons of different types of private credit. There is direct lending, so lending to companies, most of whom are owned by private equity, so they have a quote unquote sponsor. Then there's asset-backed asset backed finance, lending against planes, making mortgages. Basically anything can be considered private credit. Is there an area that you
32:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): are the most concerned about
32:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): direct lending?
32:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Direct lending. That's okay. Well that's the m that's the majority of it, really. Okay.
32:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes.
32:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because I think direct lending is you have the buy now pay later. It's not only just for consumer credit, it's also for commercial real estate. So that is that's very where our concern is.
32:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
32:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so so direct lending, lending to companies, that is actually something
32:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
32:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I
32:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): have visibility into into the public business development companies that are trading at quite a severe discount.
33:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
33:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if there isn't a credit crisis, probably are quite cheap, in my view. Just what is the issue there? What is the degree of credit stress that you you've seen both in the public BDCs, which I'm sure you've done tons of work on, as well as the private BDCs, which is a lot harder to get access to. But I know you've been doing a lot of work on there. And by the way,
33:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I have a view, and it was expressed by Nick Nemeth, who, like you, is a private credit bear. He said it on my show, and I kind of agree with him that there's tons of negative press about Blue Owl, but really it's not like Aries
33:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): is
33:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not doing. what Blue Owl is doing.
33:40
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
33:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): like there are tons of allocators who respect Aries and Blue Owl. Oh, Blue Owl is red light and Aries green light. But I'm not really seeing a big difference in terms of the stuff. So I'm curious what your view, but go ahead.
33:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean, it's just obviously you would not expect Aries or anyone to come out and say, oh yeah, if but you're worse than Blue Owl, All. but Blue Owl is the weaker link. They can just let Blue All down just to see how it impacts others. And
34:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): whatever is Blue All doing, I'm sure they are doing tons of times worse than that, if that makes sense.
34:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Tell us about the Blue Owl BDCs, whether it's OTIC or OTIC. OTF. You've done some work on the on the private ones.
34:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, we we did publish on OBDC.
34:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So with respect to ODBC, I think as of March 31,
34:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): those healthcare providers and services. See, here's the thing. And when it comes to private credit, everybody assumed that majority of the exposures are in soft credit. software. And what we found surprising is
34:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): software is not that bad or it's not that exposed on private credit as we continue to look into them. But there are others. There are like internet software and services, but the top five has been healthcare providers and services, consumer goods. human
35:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): resource, support services, joint ventures, education, household debt, household products. In a top five is not even scratching the software. So is this in a weird way the narrative that the software deterioration is leading the private credit is kind of
35:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): misleading. Most of them are, yes, software is there. but most of them are healthcare or consumer products. Just depends on which BDCs you look into. Right. So in terms of OBDC as of March, in terms of industry deterioration, internet software and
35:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): services rank 10th, right? Net unrealized depreciation ran about like 10 to 12 million. right? It's not that big. The markdowns for the OBDC portfolio education was marked down as a loss as a
36:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): percent of cost as close to 52, consumer product 20%, and it's healthcare is not software is not even on the top nine. So
36:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
36:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that is something that we found really interesting. And Blue All
36:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): has been in the news all this year, and Blue All attributed the redemption's concerns to AI disrupting the software. But majority of the book and the laws that they have taken in OBDC are not even software. or not even AI.
36:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Blue all blamed AI software for its redemption. I'm not saying AI software is fine. I'm saying AI disrupting the software narrative is real and it has issues. But I think most private credit funds are using AI as an excuse
37:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when you look into their portfolio you have from consumer credit to healthcare to education to anything but the kitchen sink is on the top ten of their losses.
37:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
37:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you're saying it's not just software?
37:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's not definitely not just software. It's it's it's it's across the board. In some of the loan books,
37:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
37:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): say for instance, if you take
37:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you take black rock's beak cred for instance right that has software right so that has the the exposure is made into
37:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the software first and then the healthcare then Than the consumers and but not all of them were software so when blue all came out and said, oh, you know, our AI disrupting the software is the reason for our redemption, I'm like looking at the loan book for OBDC and I'm like, since
38:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): top nine is not software. So that made us to question: are they identifying the healthcare sector in some way as software? Education? is is are they tagging it differently? I don't know.
38:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes, you're saying that the majority of the markdowns
38:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
38:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for blue owl's OBDC are not in the software sector. I have heard a slightly different interpretation, which is not a more positive one, it's just a different explanation for the phenomenon that you're accurately describing, which is that there are actually, as you say, there's healthcare sectors, but they don't so really the book is 40% software, but that
38:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): would look bad because lending books are supposed to be diversified. So instead they say, oh, we're only 10% software. And then the other 30%, it's like healthcare software. It's educational software. So it really is software. They just don't call it software.
39:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And that's funny you mentioned that because we are like hiring engineers. Now, not only an analyzing the loan books, and it's so interesting because you analyze the loan book and they are attached to healthcare education consumer products. So in the worst cases,
39:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they also have whole co MICCO. So now we have two separate headaches. So not only the loan book analysis, now we have to drill into okay, who owns the whole code? And then it's probably two or three private equity firms. Then we have to look into okay, then what their
39:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): investments has been for the past decade. Is it all software? Is it all retail? Is it all consumer products? So then that drives into further who else is funding it. Then you will somewhere in the four or fifth. nesting, you would say, Oh, you
40:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have XAI, oh, there it is, you have Nvidia. So for us to go from the load book to drill down, it's like some cases five or ten steps to see who's actually exposed. And then there is another project
40:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that we are doing. in the loan book analysis, is to, like you said, okay, so get into the healthcare. Line by line, manually look into the companies to say, are they really healthcare or are they healthcare software? Are they education software or are they
40:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just pure education? They may make all these big companies.
40:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they get away with convincing investors to invest in their well-articulated PowerPoint presentations in a loaded pile of crap because no one has time to
41:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): drill into this mid-co whole co and then go into each and every hundreds of companies that are hiding into the healthcare to see if they are really healthcare or healthcare software. So it's easier to say, oh,
41:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Fitch is saying this is the default rate. But that's not really the default rate because does the switch Fitch has the some manpower to drill down? Do they care? So we are doing the dirty work and it's taking time. So I will definitely keep you posted as we get deeper into the
41:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): weeds.
41:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes. And as you accurately write about how OBDC has this thing called a joint venture or you know consolidated entity where it owns equity in this thing. But what does the thing do? It makes loans, and so it's a way to basically be more levered. That's what I was referring to, like air. Aries ARCC, which is the most respected business, does the exact same thing. So it's not as if
42:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's uh the like Blue Alley is unique in doing so.
42:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): They're all the same crap. It's branded differently.
42:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
42:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't know if that answers correctly. Blackstone and BlackRock are the biggest The humangous
42:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): funds in the world. Period.
42:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And they can do whatever they want, and they own the private credit funds, and the private credit funds also own stake in the insurance company that they are diversifying into. I would be inclined, based on the work that we have done, to say that they
42:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): might be a lot worse than blue. All. Blue All is the weaker link, and they can just make an example of to say that, hey, look, private credit fund is bad. Hey, look what they did. And we are not like that, while in the hindsight, try to clean up their act. And I bet you
43:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's exactly what they're doing now.
43:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, Locks, almost by definition, the private funds and the private business development. companies are almost always marked at par or marked at nav. The public business development companies that you can buy and sell in the market historically have traded at net asset value nav or often slightly above net asset value. So
43:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): certainly if you were saying this and public B E Cs were at or above net asset value, there would be a difference there. But it's no surprise that the public BDCs, OBDC, ARCC, are trading, they've had a bad year as money has pulled out of the private BDCs and they have cheapened and weakened the price action.
43:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So their implied
43:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yield from the loans is a lot higher. Do you think that accurately reflects the distress and the credit stress that you perceive or do you think that the sell-off hasn't gone far enough?
44:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): First, the ARCC we are working on to publish on our substack, so it should be any moment this week or next week. No, they're not. I don't think anybody is marking to the actual value in terms of public BDCs. I have to take a look what the current state is, but in private BDCs
44:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for definitely
44:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
44:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are not marking it down because it's private and they don't want to.
44:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So you have to look at your own books objectively and not in denial to say this is crap, this is crap, and mark it down. And what happens is if you are doing that, it's going to trigger that oh ARC. ARCC is doing it, so that must
44:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): be something bad. And the investors are going to pick up their phone and say, hey, you're marking down your nav, so you don't believe this values that much. What is the reason why you don't believe it? So either they don't have the answer and they think that this entire raft is going to make a turn and come back. So they are
45:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): keeping at par to see how far it goes. I don't know. I am waiting to see how the AI sell-off is going to echo into the private credit. And I don't know how this hire for longer because a lot of private equity funds are coming for refinancing
45:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): end of this year and into the next year. So we are yet to see
45:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): some news. from private equity and private credit into the tail end of this year. It's been very quiet, so that scares me.
45:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Locks, I have a view, and correct me if you think this is wrong, but my observation is that the greatest perceived weakness in the so-called private credit market has actually been in the jumbo-sized jumbo size deals that a approach or even can be included within the so-called leveraged loan market and the bank loan market. Like the bank
46:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loan market trades every single day, even if it is somewhat illiquid, and those loan values have gone down. And so the BDCs that own those have gone down, in my view, I think the most or among the most. And actually, it is the private credit purist BDCs that haven't gone down because they are they have higher
46:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): yields. So the market likes that. And they are not marking their books down at all. Would I might say a company like Sixth Street, their BDC is still trading at or above NAV, or at least it was a month or two ago. And their loan values have not gone down because it is so illiquid. They are the only lender to it. And they do have
46:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a on paper very good track record of low loss rate. rates. But just like CSLX is a ticker, I've looked into them and they basically
46:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
46:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): own first lean loans, but they aren't actually first lean loans. Basically they and the banks co-own first lean loans, but they take the loss first.
47:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
47:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I wonder your view on that. Not six three specifically unless you have views, but just the view that really the pain has been in the publicly traded broadly syndicated loan market.
47:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I didn't don't know
47:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): if you have seen OCSL.
47:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yes,
47:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I know that well. Oak tree, yeah.
47:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah.
47:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So
47:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so when you talk about first lane, it reminds me of the question that I keep asking my team and is that how many first lanes are actually first?
47:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Something about the entire private credit loan book, something about the tranches, the first lanes, it's kind of for me, it threw me off into a loop since Tamil Bravo's handed medallia to its lenders and wrote off like $5.1 billion
47:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of equity. And they just went to Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR, and they injected like further 150 million.
48:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I wanted to hear your thought on like how you see this whole wave of problem and then absolute quietness and then everybody is marked at Toribad Par.
48:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That it does not make sense to me, does it?
48:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. It's one of those things like the loan could be worth 100, a hundred, it could be worth 70, seventy, it could be worth literally zero. I think a lot of it depends upon the recovery value. And an argument that private credit has made is that historically their recovery has been higher. But if you're lending to a software company that is heavily indebted and has basically been one-shotted by AI, I
48:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): don't know if there is a lot of assets to recover.
48:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If there is any value, even if they recover something, is there a value to it? For my question is is there any clavic? collateral? How do you know the collateral is not double pledged? So there are a lot of things that are not aligning correctly, and it's insane how everything is fine. And when
49:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I say first lien loan and now market or above par,
49:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and who is saying that? And it's like, oh, you know, if I come out and say, like, oh, I'm doing great, I do splendid reports, and my clients are losing money, which they're not, so
49:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they're losing money, but I'm coming here and saying, Oh, it's splendid, it's like what I do is the best. That's how I feel. Like you have nav at or about par, but based on what? So can someone just explain to me with the facts? Make me sit in front of an
49:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Excel sheet, show me how you are doing that, then I will believe it.
49:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Locks, I've got a question for you, which is what stops us from two to three years from now, us sitting here, and you basically the situation is yes, credit quality was worse than perceived, and wasn't 100, but they kicked the can down the road and eventually things stabilized and were fine. Because I remember three to five
50:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years ago, I interviewed folks who were very worried about commercial real estate, particularly offices, how you know people were not going to the office because of COVID and the like, and it was quite indebted. I took those arguments very seriously. And obviously, there has been some idiosyncratic pain, but to the question of has there been massive losses in commercial? real estate, I would say the answer is quite clearly no.
50:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And it just goes to reflect like the institutional private market world moves very slowly and they can kind of just kick the can down the road. What do you think the odds are of that happening? Of basically you're somewhat right on the fundamentals, but just they just work it through.
50:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Okay, so this is extend and pretend. So we had extend and pretend, then we have double extend and double pretend. So you can keep doing that, but you have a higher for longer interest rate, and there is a huge wave of commercial real estate coming for refinancing, private equity coming for refinancing.
51:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Somebody clearly didn't have the guts to increase the rate right into the midterms. So they are going to increase the rate in December. They have to. So to answer your question, it we can see that in commercial real estate, you're absolutely right. There are people who are saying fundamentally everything
51:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is crappy, it's kingdom come, and nothing happened. And everything is fine. The same with car loan. Extend and protect. pretend You have 90 plus months car loan.
51:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Like
51:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are you taking a freaking mortgage or are you taking a car loan? You have a 90 90 plus months car loan. Extend and pretend. We know a wholesaler who went to auction, and he is one of the biggest wholesalers, and he told us that allied Ally guys come
51:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in, they do not want to buy the cars. We spoke with a couple of repo sources that we have. Allied bank should not be trading at what it is trading right now. And they are doing extend and pretend. We were told by the repo guys that the bank does not want to repo. Why?
52:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Because the manufacturers increased the prices, the value of the car is worse than what it is. Every single automobile that's out there are
52:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): upside down, negative equity. So we were told by one of the repo guys who hangs out with another repo guy who takes repo for ally that they were instructed not to throw good money after the bad. Does it
52:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mean the market says? Oh, look, there are no repos, so we must be doing fine? No, there are a bunch of cars that are piling up somewhere and nobody wants to touch it because if the banks take the repo, they have to show it in their books. Now,
53:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what happens if you show it in your book? If you show it in your book, then you have to increase your permission for credit line. losses or you have to take a charge off. Okay, so what do you do? We were told it's a denominator game. So when things go bad, whether it's commercial real estate or automobile,
53:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have to increase the originations. So the more originations you increase, the lesser the default looks and it doesn't look that bad. So you end up pushing vantage score instead of FICO, and you give it to loans to everybody and anyone
53:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): who has a heartbeat and extend it to as much as you can. So you don't need to show the provisions. You can reduce the provision for credit losses, your earnings go up, you don't need to take the charge off. offs, you look great. There are no repos on the book. It's fine. So if you ask
54:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): me the question, okay, two years ago, this was this, what's the guarantee? I don't know how long they could do. They could do for another one year, they could do for another two years. People are living in a car that they cannot afford in a 19-month 90-month loan. that the loans that they cannot
54:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): pay. People are putting everything in BN BNPL. Personal loans are skyrocketing over the past year. And
54:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we have been recommending AutoZone as a short from the north of 4,000. Do it your own business is completely down. My car mirror broke, and I'm not fixing it. because I got an estimate from an OEM, which is a VW,
54:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that it's $1,000 without labor. I got an estimate from another guy, it's just $500 with labor. So
55:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you have subprime consumers, you have consumers who are making six figures, and they choose to go to Dollar Tree and Dollar General. because that's what the management said two quarters ago.
55:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
55:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): live in Fairfield County. There are two Dollar Tree and Dollar General coming up. So consumers are rotating and they cannot afford it. So to answer your question on commercial real estate, how long they can extend and pretend, it depends how long the banks allow
55:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
55:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's the scenario we are in because they are kicking can't down the road. We thought that they would somehow have to face the music. And then there is a new fancy term. You have double extend and double pretend. So now we might be triple pretend and triple extend.
55:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I've got a question. So you talked about direct lending, a disproportionate disproportion of which is in the software sector. And I understand you so how actually in one BDC that a majority of these stated losses were not in the software sector, and that's really interesting. And okay, AI is going to kill software. But what about the actual AI debt? Core Weave, Nebius,
56:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Lambda, Terawolf, HUD8, QTS, APLD, RD, Michigan, Stargate, Hyperion, El Paso, Sopaipia. Yes,
56:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a
56:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lot of so the AI build. out used to be funded with free cash flow. Increasingly, it's being funded by debt. And a lot of that debt is just investment grade, bond issuance, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, Oracle, Nvidia, SpaceX, AMD. Okay, yes. But a lot of it is private credit and private credit like instruments. I've been trying to find, you know, I know where the loans are, but I'm trying to find
56:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who owns this stuff. It's not in any of the ETFs I see, it's not in the the the mutual funds. not in the public business development companies.
56:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes, there's convertible, the convertible bond market is chock full of these uh instruments. But other than that, I can't really find them. Where where
57:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): all is all this data center debt and what's your view on it?
57:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh my goodness. I'm honestly, it's nothing to you, but like honestly, time. tired of hearing that word data center is just so exhausting. They should rename it as like a natural resource guzzling monster. Like now we have Democrats, whether you're left, right,
57:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): center, Democrats are like bad for data centers. center So we expect a huge write-offs coming in. But it's the data center.
57:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): loans
57:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are hiding in
57:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's probably in black rock blackstone and other big companies big funds but
57:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we haven't seen a data center we haven't come across a data center specific loan book analysis if I do, I will definitely tell. But I can tell you is that it's all in the private credit funds.
58:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): The private ones.
58:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The private credit funds, yes.
58:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes, yes. There you flagged there's a tiny public BDC that owns some of this debt, but yeah, the vast majority of public BDCs have relatively small amount of this.
58:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
58:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): most of them are in private.
58:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes, yes. That's interesting. It's funny. I was, you know, to prepare for this, I read an Aries newsletter and they seem quite bearish about lending to data centers. And they're making the argument that when you're investing in AI, you want to focus on the right tail. And actually, like being a venture capitalist and investing in an anthropic is actually very aligned with the right tail. But for
58:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit, you want to harvest the extra hundreds of basis points and protect your downside. And for something that's so uncertain, it's not very well oriented to it. It's funny, Aries, I believe, is a huge lender to software and not the biggest lender to AI. Apollo is a very big lender against like GPUs and
59:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): chips, but they've public been public about how they think software is a big risk. So it's funny that both sides of the crut cr private credit playbook are kind of dooming on with their underweights, underweight, you know?
59:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): KKR private credit funds are investing in data centers. Right. There is Digital Bridge and Silver Lake. They have committed billions to scale Vantage Data Centers. We our team visited Vantage Data Centers when they went
59:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to Texas road trip. We are publishing the report shortly in another week or two. Brookfield, I believe they have a huge exposure in data centers. Blackstone, I think they own some data center platforms and they have invested through that. And
59:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): there are some AMD ventures that they have linked to data centers. So most of them are either directly invested. or created a private fund and invested through them. We are still looking into it, but most of them are private.
1:00:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yes, that is your most recent article called Fire Sale Season. We will link to that and there is a unnamed seller has put half a billion dollars of data center loans for bid at once. I believe that seller is ING.
1:00:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): ING.
1:00:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ING.
1:00:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, it's been reported.
1:00:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. What are you more bearish on? Data center debt or direct lending software, private credit debt?
1:00:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh man, that's tough.
1:00:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): The priority-wise, data center first, and then the direct lending, because private credit takes a little longer to deteriorate because it relies heavily on the investor asking for redemptions and then
1:00:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that will unravel a few issues, but data center debt would be the first one triggered by the macro.
1:01:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And the macro issues are the huge sell-off, Democratic sweeping the uh Senate and the House. And by having that macro flush out is going to make investors focus now more into the
1:01:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): underlying fundamentals. So investors were fine as long as it's making money. And now they're going to ask questions because now they feel like they have to grab a cup of coffee or scotch and start looking through the line items and that's why the data center debt would be
1:01:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the first priority. And then the private credit.
1:01:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So when you're looking at tactical opportunities on the short side, what types of bets do you prefer over others? Like so, obviously, there are the publicly traded alternative asset managers that do private credit. There are the publicly traded BDCs that, as I mentioned, are down quite severely.
1:02:02
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:02:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then there are the companies that people might not think of associate with private credit, but they have exposure in a way that people who haven't done the work you have might not be aware of. Where are you seeing the best kind of opportunity on the shorts right here right now?
1:02:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I cannot give names, but I can give an overview of sectors. Consumer retail could be a little stronger and it will deteriorate. well into 2027 beginning. That's because the B and PL is pretty much holding the economy together. Airbnb
1:02:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fundamentals are they have a huge regulation problem in Europe and across the world. And the reason they are doing well is because BNPL. BNPL is a reason why is doing well. BNPL is a reason why some
1:02:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): restaurants are doing well. So the consumer credit is being held by the BNPL. And who buys the BNPL loans from AFIM and Clorna and everything? Private credit. And what are they doing with those loans? They are bundling it up and through SRTs and dumping it on. asset backed securities
1:03:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): market or in the banks. So if you think AI trade as like a circle of financing, there's this entire loan buying and moving it around, it's a whole new issue.
1:03:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, Locks, it's been a pleasure. Could you sum up your views on private credit? What's your parting message for our audience here?
1:03:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Private credit is a very, very opaque instrument for a reason and it's disdained for institutional investors. And retail investors need to be very cautious and ask questions before they invest. And also know where your investments are when it comes to insurance
1:03:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): as well as when you
1:03:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): are
1:03:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): reaching out to the wealth managers, know where they are investing your money. Thank
1:04:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you, Locks. Thank you everyone for watching. Please leave a rating and review for Monetary Matters on Apple Podcasts and Spotify and subscribe to the Monetary Matters YouTube channel.
1:04:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thank you for having me, Chad.
1:04:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thank you. Disclosed the door.
1:04:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hope you enjoyed that. Want to say a big thank you to today's sponsor, Lens Ticker L-E-N-S, the Sarmaya Thematic ETF, which gives real acid asset experience. exposure and the potential to diversify a 60-40 portfolio. Read the perspectives at SarmayaETF.com. Disclosures in the show notes. Thanks for watching.
This page was produced automatically: the audio was transcribed with nvidia/parakeet-tdt-0.6b-v3+sortformer-v2.1 and interpreted by Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-UD-IQ3_S.gguf. Transcription and interpretation can contain errors; always confirm against the original episode. Nothing here is investment advice.

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