Moody’s Talks - Global Economy Unwrapped

Megan Greene argues UK monetary policy has been less restrictive than thought, citing resilient growth and stalled disinflation.

54 min Listen to the original Episode page
Monetary PolicyBank of EnglandInflationSupply ShocksUK EconomyAIInterest RatesGeopolitics

Summary

Megan Greene, external member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee, discusses the global economy's resilience to three major supply shocks: COVID, the Ukraine invasion, and the war in Iran. She asserts that the risk of failing to anchor inflation expectations outweighs the cost of over-tightening, noting that UK monetary policy has not been as restrictive as believed because inflation has not sustainably returned to target. Greene highlights that the neutral interest rate (R star) is likely higher than previously estimated due to geopolitical fragmentation and government borrowing. The discussion also covers AI's dual role as a short-term negative supply shock and a long-term productivity booster, emphasizing the need for scenario analysis in an era of persistent uncertainty.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    The global economy has faced three major negative supply shocks in five years (COVID, Ukraine invasion, Iran war), leading to missed inflation targets for over five years despite resilient growth.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 4:33

  2. 2
    Firms have become more adept at hedging energy contracts and consumers are smoothing consumption more aggressively in response to repeated supply shocks.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 5:12

  3. 3
    Household inflation sensitivity has increased; the threshold for noticing inflation has dropped from 4% to 3% due to recent high inflation experiences.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 11:27

  4. 4
    Approximately half of the movement in the UK gilt curve is now driven by US and Eurozone factors, highlighting the UK's vulnerability to global financial conditions.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 20:37

  5. 5
    The neutral real interest rate (R star) is unobservable and difficult to measure, leading to uncertainty about whether monetary policy has been sufficiently restrictive.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 30:49

Episode sections

  1. 0:22 – 4:11

    MPC Structure and Background

    Gorav Ganguli introduces Megan Greene as an external member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). Greene explains that the MPC consists of nine members, including four external members brought in from outside the Bank to prevent groupthink and provide diverse perspectives from the private sector and academia.

  2. 4:11 – 6:50

    Global Economic Resilience and Supply Shocks

    Greene attributes the global economy's resilience to adaptation after three major negative supply shocks: COVID, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the war in Iran. She notes that while inflation targets have been missed for over five years, growth has outperformed expectations due to better hedging by firms and consumption smoothing by consumers.

  3. 6:50 – 13:46

    Monetary Policy and Supply Side Shocks

    The discussion covers how central banks handle supply-side shocks, which traditional Keynesian models struggle to measure. Greene argues that while interest rates cannot fix supply issues like energy access, they are necessary to anchor inflation expectations and prevent wage-price spirals when shocks become persistent.

  4. 13:46 – 28:14

    Risk Asymmetry and Policy Stance

    Greene asserts that the risk of doing too little on inflation outweighs the risk of doing too much, citing that inflation has been above target for over five years. She explains that central banks must now consider second-round effects on wage and price setting, which are more sensitive to inflation than in the past.

  5. 28:14 – 32:25

    UK Economic Resilience and R Star

    Greene suggests the UK economy has been more resilient than expected, partly due to higher-than-anticipated productivity growth and a shift to shorter-term mortgage fixes. She posits that UK monetary policy may not have been as restrictive as thought, implying the neutral rate (R star) might be higher than previously estimated.

  6. 32:25 – 33:58

    Structural Changes and Future Shocks

    The speakers discuss the likelihood of persistent negative supply shocks due to geopolitical fragmentation, economic statecraft, and climate change. Greene notes that these factors, along with AI, will fundamentally reshape how central banks and economists view the supply side of the economy.

  7. 33:58 – 35:28

    Successive Supply Shocks and R Star

    Speaker 1 discusses the multiplicative implications of successive or concurrent negative supply shocks and increased government borrowing, which push up the neutral interest rate (R star). They argue that R star is higher in the UK and other developed economies than previously thought, evidenced by GDP and labor market data.

  8. 35:28 – 39:14

    UK Labor Market and Monetary Policy Stance

    Speaker 3 references a Financial Times piece by Speaker 1, arguing that UK labor market conditions are tighter than believed and wage growth is too high for the inflation target. Speaker 1 agrees, noting that while the labor market is weak, it is not as weak as assumed, and disinflation in wages has stalled. They contrast the UK with the Eurozone, suggesting UK policy has not been as restrictive as believed because inflation never sustainably returned to target.

  9. 39:14 – 43:27

    AI as Short-Term Shock vs Long-Term Supply Expansion

    Speaker 1 states that AI has already boosted UK GDP growth through investment but acts as a short-term negative supply shock due to rising input prices. While AI has the potential to expand the supply side and productivity, Speaker 1 believes this will take more than three years due to slow corporate restructuring and change management, potentially favoring new firms over large incumbents.

  10. 43:27 – 46:16

    AI, Dynamic Pricing, and Measurement Challenges

    Speaker 2 asks how AI affects pricing via dynamic pricing and whether it complicates inflation measurement. Speaker 1 argues that while AI could be inflationary (dynamic pricing) or disinflationary (consumer search tools), the challenge of measuring technology benefits is not new, citing smartphones replacing multiple devices. They conclude that measurement problems will persist but not necessarily worsen significantly due to AI.

  11. 46:16 – 50:01

    Managing Fundamental Uncertainty and Scenarios

    Speaker 0 asks how to handle deep uncertainty where probability distributions cannot be defined. Speaker 1 compares current uncertainty to 1968, emphasizing that central banks manage risk through scenario analysis. They describe the Bank of England's three scenarios (central, weaker economy, adverse) and state that while they cannot assign probabilities, they prioritize hitting the 2% inflation target to maintain credibility, though they avoid immediate aggressive tightening to prevent unnecessary economic losses.

  12. 50:01 – 53:38

    Advice for Junior Economists and AI Adoption

    Speaker 0 asks for advice for junior economists. Speaker 1 advises embracing AI tools, noting that juniors may have an edge in adoption. They emphasize that good judgment and understanding balance sheet interactions remain human domains that AI cannot usurp. They highlight the risk that models assuming mean reversion may fail under successive supply shocks, requiring human judgment to assess outcomes.

Claims worth verifying

The global economy has been hit by three major negative supply shocks in the past five years: COVID, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the war in Iran.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:33

How to verify: Check Moody's Analytics or Bank of England publications for references to these specific geopolitical events and their timing relative to the podcast date. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have missed their inflation targets for over five years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·4:52

How to verify: Review Bank of England Inflation Reports and Federal Reserve FOMC statements from 2026-2026 to compare actual inflation rates against the 2% target. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Household inflation sensitivity in the UK has dropped, with people now noticing inflation above 3%, whereas previously the threshold was 4%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·11:47

How to verify: Analyze Bank of England Inflation Expectations Survey data and Google Trends data for 'inflation' search terms in the UK. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Approximately half of the movement in the UK gilt curve is now driven by factors in the US and Eurozone, up from a third before the pandemic.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·20:37

How to verify: Review Bank of England research on monetary transmission and gilt curve decomposition, or analyze correlation data between UK gilts and US Treasuries/Euro Bunds. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The UK has shifted to shorter-term mortgage fixes (two or five years) compared to the typical 30-year fixed mortgage in the US.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·22:38

How to verify: Check UK mortgage market statistics from the Council of Mortgage Lenders or Bank of England credit conditions surveys. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

UK GDP data has consistently surprised to the upside all year, and the labor market has also surprised to the upside.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·27:19

How to verify: Compare actual UK GDP and unemployment data releases from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) against Bank of England forecasts for the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The Bank of England conducted a 'supply stock take' once a year in February when Megan Greene first joined, but now looks at the supply side more frequently.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·8:41

How to verify: Review Bank of England Monetary Policy Reports and internal documentation regarding the frequency of supply-side assessments. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

In 2011, the UK labor market was loose, resulting in small second-round effects from the oil price shock, whereas in 2022 it was tight, leading to large second-round effects.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·26:17

How to verify: Compare UK unemployment rates and wage growth data from 2011 and 2022 using ONS historical data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Megan Greene is an American citizen and an external member of the Bank of England's MPC.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·2:32

How to verify: Check the Bank of England's official list of MPC members and Megan Greene's professional biography. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The UK's productivity growth has been revised upwards by the ONS, though potential growth remains similar due to offsets in labor supply.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:50

How to verify: Review ONS revisions to UK productivity and hours worked data for the relevant period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

R star is higher in the UK and other developed economies than most thought, driven by peak globalization, fragmentation, and government borrowing.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·34:29

How to verify: Check Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee reports or speeches by Megan Greene for discussions on R star trends and structural factors like fragmentation. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

UK labor market conditions are tighter than widely believed, and wage growth is too high for the inflation target.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·35:57

How to verify: Locate the Financial Times article referenced by Speaker 3 summarizing Speaker 1's views on UK wage growth and labor market tightness. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Eurozone hit its inflation target before the war broke out, implying their interest rate was roughly neutral.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·38:28

How to verify: Check European Central Bank (ECB) press conferences or monetary policy statements from early 2026 regarding inflation performance relative to the 2% target. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

UK inflation did not sustainably return to target, so policy was not as restrictive as believed.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·38:48

How to verify: Review UK CPI data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for the period prior to the war in Iran to verify if inflation was sustainably at 2%. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

AI has already boosted GDP growth in the UK through investment.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·40:16

How to verify: Check Bank of England Quarterly Papers or GDP data releases for contributions from AI-related investment sectors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

AI acts as a short-term negative supply shock due to rising input prices.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·41:03

How to verify: Analyze semiconductor and energy price data alongside AI investment trends to assess inflationary pressure from input costs. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

AI productivity gains will take more than three years to materialize due to slow corporate restructuring.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·42:20

How to verify: Monitor corporate earnings reports and productivity data from major firms for evidence of AI integration timelines and productivity impacts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Bank of England has three scenarios: central, weaker economy, and adverse.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·48:24

How to verify: Access the Bank of England's Inflation Report or Monetary Policy Committee reports which outline these specific scenarios. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

UK has missed the inflation target for over five years.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·49:24

How to verify: Review UK CPI data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to verify the duration of inflation below or above the 2% target. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Jason Furman created an AI product that can do what he did as a junior economist.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·50:54

How to verify: Search for public statements or product launches by Jason Furman related to AI tools for economic analysis. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify the Bank of England's MPC composition and the specific voting records of external members like Megan Greene.
  • Check the Bank of England's Inflation Report for data on UK wage growth trends and the 'disinflation' stall mentioned.
  • Review the Financial Times article by Megan Greene cited regarding UK labor market tightness.
  • Compare UK mortgage product structures (2-5 year fixes) with US 30-year fixed mortgages using UK housing market data.
  • Assess the Bank of England's scenario analysis framework (central, weaker economy, adverse) in their latest Monetary Policy Report.
  • Look for independent estimates of the neutral interest rate (R star) from academic sources or other central banks to compare with Greene's assertions.
  • Examine UK GDP and productivity data to verify claims of resilience and higher-than-expected productivity growth.
  • Check global supply chain indices and energy hedging data to assess the extent of firm adaptation to supply shocks.
Full transcriptexpand
0:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Hello, and welcome to the Global Economy Unwrapped. I am Gorav Gorov Ganguli, head of International Economic. Economics at Moody's Analytics. And you're tuning in to yet another episode. And this time we are delighted to welcome Megan Green, an external member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, no less. Joining me today also Stefan Angrich, head of
0:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): forecasting for Asia Pacific, and Andrew Hunter, who is a senior economist in our European economics team, and a bit of a UK watcher. Megan, I believe you know Stefan, but I don't believe you had the pleasure of meeting Andrew. Andrew is really our go-to person when it comes to the UK and many things to do with Europe, and he has been really looking forward to talking to you today. I'm
1:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sure we'll all have a great time.
1:04
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
1:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just to kick us off,
1:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): our
1:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): listeners are quite broad and varied and scattered around the world. And many will have heard of you, no doubt, some may not, so there's a chance for them to get to know you. Um, you have a fairly extensive background, not just as a member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, but also as an international macroeconomist. And even from your recent speeches,
1:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I see that there's uh a lot of interest in looking at global economics, uh, structural, structural issues, supply-side Sight shocks, and all that sort of thing. So it makes it all the more relevant to have you on GEU. We're really delighted and we're hoping to talk. about some of the big picture things, not just the UK. But can I start with a very particular question? Because not everybody
1:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): will be familiar. You are an external member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. What does that mean?
1:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that's a great question. First of all, thanks so much for having me. It's nice to um speak with you guys. Um uh so an external member of the MPC reflects a slightly the different setup that we have on the MPC from most central banks. There are nine of us who vote on interest rates, so nine of us on the MPC. And five of those
2:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nine are so called internal members. And they more or less grew up at the Bank of England, not always, not strictly, but generally they're part of the bank machinery. There are four external members of the MPC, and we're brought in from outside somehow. So you can tell from my accent that um it sounds very American. That's because I am
2:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): American. I'm also British as it turns out, um, but I certainly sound an act American.
2:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But in addition to coming from the outside geographically, I also come from the outside by background. So most of my my career as you point out has been in the private sector with a foot in academia. And so that gives me a different perspective. I can look much more into kind of business operating environments given my experience.
2:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And I used to be kind of a central bank watcher, right? So I know exactly how central bank comms will go down with people like my former self. So the idea is to have people who can bring in a different perspective, can make sure that there's no group groupthink think on the MPC. And if you follow the MPC in recent years, you'll see how split our votes have been
3:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sometimes. So, you know, we've achieved that. There is no groupthink on the MPC. But the idea is just to have different perspectives to facilitate a better discussion and hopefully better decisions.
3:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And the UK, by virtue of being a small open economy, really does benefit from having people on the MPC that aren't just home. homegrown and can bring that international perspective. So that's that's that's that's sort of I I've always considered it a pretty vital piece of of the Bank of England's operation. We'll come back a bit later to
3:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh the lack of groupthink at the MPC when I hope we can come back to it later when we talk a bit about UK growth and inflation. But I thought, especially given your background that perhaps I could kick us off by taking a a broader look at the global economy and something that we've been talking about for quite some time, and as have our clients and all the people I speak to, I'm sure you've
4:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): been thinking about it too. The global economy has proven to be remarkably resilient, hasn't it? It's faced with so many shocks in recent years. Nonetheless, it keeps going. And um it's just all the more surprising. What what do you make of the of of global economic prospects right now? And in particular, in your view, what are the biggest risks facing the
4:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): global economy?
4:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so you're right. The global economy has been surprisingly resilient. So has the UK economy, for what it's worth. Um, and there are, I think, a couple of reasons for that. So the global economy has been hit by three major global negative supply shocks in a row over the past five years. So you had COVID, then you had the Russian invasion of
4:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Ukraine, now you have the war in Iran with its resultant energy shock. And the global economy has not sailed through these things. And both the Fed and the Bank of England have missed their inflation targets for over five years at this point. So we haven't sailed through it, but from a growth perspective, we've done better than I
5:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): would have guessed. Um, and part of that might be that we're learning to adapt to negative supply shocks a bit better. So after 2022-23, firms have just been a bit more adept in signing energy contracts, for example, they're hedging a bit more. Um, consumers are more
5:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): attentive to inflation and to the idea that we might have these supply shocks, so they're smoothing their consumption a bit more. So I think that is probably a piece of it, though it's very hard to measure specifically, right? That's a behavioral change. So it's hard to stick into our models. Moreover, I think uh a buoy for the global
5:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): economy has been AI. And I'm sure we'll talk about that later, because I can't get through a single conversation in my personal life or professional life without talking about AI. It seems I was at a dinner recently, and someone at the table decided to play a game and ban us all from mentioning AI. It was very difficult. I
6:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have to say, it was hard to get through a dinner without it coming up. So, you know, it's at the forefront of everybody's minds. But I also think, you know, the implications that we've already had for productivity and growth can be debated, but we've certainly seen a lot of investment. And that has been a buoy for the US economy, which is the largest economy in the
6:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): world. And so I think that that has also buoyed activity globally.
6:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You're absolutely right. It's incredibly hard to to spend even 10 minutes without bringing up AI these days. I'm sure I've been accused of actually waking up from a deep sleep and just shouting out AI from time to time.
6:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You're right. The global economy has proven to be quite adept, particularly dealing with energy shocks, but
6:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's not been plain sailing. But you used a couple of words that I was waiting for you to use, of course, supply side. You mentioned that. And that's quite different to those shocks are quite different to what I guess as a traditional central banker you'd be used to, which would be demand demand-side side management. The economy is booming, you know, more and more jobs, uh more and more jobs. are out there. Companies want to hire, there aren't
7:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enough people, wages go up, price pressures go up, interest rates go up to manage all of this, the economy cools, we get back to neutral, or something happens, we crash, and demand gets depressed, and built- we build it back up again. All that good old-fashioned demand side stuff we're so used to. And then slam bang, we have supply side shocks. Things happen to the supply side of the economy. There's a pandemic and we have to shut
7:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): everything down. There are wars and uh energy prices go up because you actually can't get hold of enough molecules of energy. And you've been talking a bit about this. So let me let me ask you what does raising interest rates do? Because raising interest rates in any country, not just the UK, will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz, of course. So,
7:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): how does monetary policy handle supply side shocks?
8:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so it's tricky. I would say it's not just central bankers who traditionally think about everything through a lens of demand. It's it's also economists writ large, right? We don't really know how to measure the supply side of the economy, certainly not in real time. But also, I think generations of economists at our very core are Keynesians of some sort. And
8:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, that is looking at the economy through a lens of demand. Um, I've had many economists say to me, look, any fluctuations in activity, in short-term activity, must be demand. That must be the case. And that's that's what we've all been taught. As it turns out, though, uh, we keep getting hit by supply shocks. When I first joined the Bank
8:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of England, um, we had a supply stock take. It happened once a year, every February. That was that was the time you really looked at the supply side of the economy. And the idea was that you know it shouldn't move around that much. It's driven by kind of long term transformational factors like demographics, things like that. And there certainly is still a
9:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): component of the supply side that is determined by things like that. But as as I've mentioned, we've had three negative supply shocks in the past five years. So we look at the supply side much more often now at the Bank of England. Our entire in our entire framework. for thinking about how to understand the economy is through this idea of an output gap, which is the
9:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): difference between growth and potential growth. And you know, the idea is if if potential growth is kind of steady as it traditionally has been, you really need to just focus on the demand side. And you can manage that with the only tool that we really have, our main tool, which is interest rates. You're right to point out
9:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that I can try as hard as I might to use my interest rate vote to open the Strait of Hormuz, and it just won't work.
9:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So, you know, central banks can't really do anything about wars or about pandemics. Um, but there is a point in central banks responding. Traditionally, central banks uh, you know, looked through negative supply shocks, in part because those shocks tend to be pretty temporary. So they fall out of the
10:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): year-on-year comparison in a year's time. And it takes so long for monetary policy to feed through into the economy that if you reacted by the time it hit the economy, the shock would have already passed. Also, there's just an assumption that inflation expectations are always anchored if we're doing our jobs. And interest rates
10:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): are a demand management tool. They can't do anything really about the supply side of the economy, not directly at least. But when you have successive supply shocks, I think that that can change behavior. And that affects inflation expectations. So what we saw even before the Iran War broke out was that household inflation
10:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): expectations, in particular in the UK, which is the case. I know the best these days, were already higher than what we could explain looking at the traditional relationship between inflation expectations and inflation. So they were already elevated. Both household and business expectations have been elevated for quite some
11:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): time, and certainly were more so after the war broke out. And so if inflation expectations aren't as well anchored as we thought, then actually central banks have a duty to make sure that they're anchored. If they become unanchored, then you could get runaway, sort of persistent inflation. That's a central
11:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): banker's worst nightmare. We've done a lot of work at how behavior has maybe changed through supply shocks. And we found that traditionally before the pandemic, for example, people tended not to really notice inflation as long as it was under 4%. Once it hit 4% or higher, then people were more sensitive
11:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): to it. That threshold has now dropped through the past couple of years, given the supply shocks that we've had, given inflation was over 10% in the US and the UK. And so now people notice when inflation is above 3%, which by the way, it is in the UK now. You see this also in sort of Google searches for inflation and
12:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): inflation related terms. They're much higher now than they were in 2022, even though the size of the shock was actually much bigger in 2022 than it is now. So if everybody's more sensitive to inflation, when inflation's a bit lower, so the threshold has fallen for this, then workers may well go and demand.
12:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): higher wages when they're noticing that inflation's going up and say, you know what, my costs are going up. You're going to need to pay me more. And employers might say, Well, okay, fine, we'll pay you more, but we're going to pass that cost on to the end user, raise prices. Then workers will say, Well, my costs have gone up even more. And you can see how this turns into a
12:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): self-fulfilling prophecy. So, you know, a way to truncate that is with interest rates to ground expectations, to say we're really getting inflation back to our 2% target.
12:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And then expectations will be grounded and you won't get this kind of spiral. You know, policy making has fundamentally shifted in this environment. So we do a lot of scenarios at the Bank of England. And in the past, I would have said, well, you know, we have a central projection, but actually my view of the world
13:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): looks more like this other scenario. And there are risks around it, and I'll consider those risks around it, but I'm mostly going to set interest rates for the state of the world that I think we're in. After three successive negative supply shocks, and given that so much is dependent on a war at the moment, I can't assign probabilities.
13:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): realistically to any of our scenarios. And then I need to think about setting policies so we screw it up the least.
13:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so at the moment, if we're looking at energy prices and how they propagate through the economy in terms of second round effects, so changing wage and price setting behaviors, if you think that there are going to be major second round effects, and you discover next year at some point that there aren't, so you think there are second round effects, you set
14:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): policy accordingly, you realize you were wrong, you course correct, then you get inflation to your target, and the hit to activity isn't that big. If you do the opposite and think there won't be any second round effects, and then find out next year you were totally wrong, there are second round effects, and course correct, you actually it's very difficult to get inflation to
14:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): target over the four. forecast period, though there's less of a hit to activity. To my mind, these aren't symmetric risks. We've had inflation above five percent, I'm sorry, above two percent for just over five years. Um, you know, I I think there's a risk to you know our credibility, but it's also the case for the Fed, who've Who also have faced
14:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): inflation above their target for a number of years. Um and so to my mind, the risk of not doing enough is bigger than the risk of doing too much. So and and that's all you know through in through interest rates, which can open the Strait of Hormuz, but they can manage expectations.
15:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I'd love to just fulfill up on that briefly because I take your point, Megan, that uh I guess you can make the case that when these sort of adverse supply shocks become the norm that you need to respond. We've had three no, now, so the hard they're hardly transitory anymore. They're sort of part of the baseline now. But I guess you could also sort of turn that around and say when that is the case, when you live in
15:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a world where global supply chains are just not as reliable as they used to be, where trading relationships fracture, where access to certain materials becomes harder, you know, all of these things that push up inflation in a structural way, you know, I guess you could argue that that would raise the case for strategic investment and things like supply chain resilience,
15:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): infrastructure, energy security. And couldn't it be argued that higher interest rates actually make that sort of investment harder? And how would how would you respond to that?
15:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So it certainly could if we're raising interest rates to address negative supply shocks, then borrowing costs go up. And so for example, if you look at the green transition, um then it makes it more expensive to do it. And you know, I think we're we're all pretty behind on all of our targets for the green transition. So
16:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for making it more expensive isn't helpful. Um, but I would say then you know, we're not the only actors as central banks. There, you know, there's a government that can also um provide incentives and should provide incentives, and so the first best solution to that is for the government to actually address
16:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that rather than a central bank.
16:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think there's a simpler variant of that criticism that I always ask people that are either in a central bank or central bank watches. And I kind of have my answer to that, and I appreciate why it's important to raise interest rates, but given that you're here, I'm going to ask. gonna ask you it anyway. So the simpler variant of this criticism is that um
16:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): households and firms are facing a big shock. Households in particular have to pay higher energy bills, and um that's gonna hurt that's hurting a lot of a lot of people. Um financial conditions are tightening anyway because interest rates right across the spectrum are going up. So that's feeding into personal finance costs, mortgage costs. Uh, for firms, it's feeding into debt costs. And
17:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then a policy rate goes up and hurts them. It feels like it could hurt them even more. So the general public might be quite unappreciative of such measures. Do you so how would you respond to that?
17:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I would say that interest rates are a pretty blunt tool. We can't kind of forensically go through the economy and choose a policy for some actors that benefits them. but a different policy for other actors to benefit them. So, you know, I think in the UK, for example, we're finding there's a difference between the experience of households and
17:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): businesses in this latest shock. But we can't set an interest rate for households and a different one for businesses. We just have bank rate that we can move. And so that is difficult. The other thing I will say is you mentioned that uh financial conditions are tightening in this scenario. that you point out. And they are, but um part of that is based on expectations
18:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): about interest rates. And so to some degree, um, when we go ahead and hike interest rates, then then uh you know, if if that's what is priced into the curve, then it's already priced into the curve, and so it shouldn't tighten financial conditions significantly more. Now, you know, we spend a lot of time talking about what part of the curve
18:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is based on interest rate expectations versus a risk premia.
18:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you know, I think economists like to think they can measure these things very precisely, and realistically, we can't. Not only can we not measure a risk premia precisely, but we certainly can't decompose it into its various components. And so you can speculate about what might lie underneath. that. But I don't think we really
18:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): have any definitive idea. So to my mind, you know, central banks often will say, or central bankers will often say, you know what, the curve can do our work for us. I just I just don't think that's a sustainable strategy. At some point, if a rate move is priced in and you don't do it, the curve will move.
19:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so you know. to your point, financial conditions are tighter, but that's because, you know, certain moves are already priced in. And so if you make those moves, then it doesn't shift financial conditions significantly, depending on how you communicate around
19:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
19:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): One uh related question that springs to mind when we're talking about this is I guess the a point a number of people raise nowadays that even sort of a aside from the influence of all these supply shocks, there's an argument that monetary policy maybe isn't as effective as it once was purely in the in the sort of
19:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): realm of demand management, because we're in a world where across the global economy, and I think including the UK, an increasing proportion of households have fixed-rate Fixed rate mortgages, for example, they don't respond as quickly to changes in policy rates as they did in the past. past. Also, I think probably increasingly
20:06
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
20:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in the UK for the Bank of England, it's it's perhaps increasingly less able to affect financial conditions in the way that it once was in an increasingly globalized world where,
20:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
20:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, in in many respects financial conditions are are mainly dependent on on what's happening in the US. Um how do you think about that? And I suppose is there is there an argument that that maybe means you have to do even more than you might have needed to do previously to to tamp down on inflation?
20:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so before the pandemic, um when we had moves in the guilt curve, uh about a third of them were actually just a result of things happening in other places, mostly the US and the Eurozone, a bit of Japan. Since the pandemic, that's actually increased to about half the move in our guilt curve.
20:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): If you decompose surprises and data releases and their implications for the guilt curve, the guilt curve is thankfully most responsive to UK inflation. So that's good news for us at the Bank of England because it means that you know moves in. the curve are something we can do about. Number
21:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): two is US non farm payrolls. You know, what what does the US jobs market have to do with the UK economy? Not a huge amount. Number three is also a US data point. So just to point out that the UK is a small open economy, and we are very affected by what's happening uh around us. A cell side analyst once said, and I'll
21:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just steal his line, we're all dragged around by the drunken dragon of the US Treasury market. And that is how it feels sometimes. And so there's nothing I as a rate setter at the Bank of England can do about the UK economy or the Eurozone economy or even Japan, which has gone through some transformational changes in recent years. But you know, I
21:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): certainly need to consider those things when I'm setting bank rate for the UK economy. So we start off most of our interest rate rounds by looking at financial conditions and how they've changed. And so that is a feed through. There is a read across quite a lot of it is a global component. We've seen that in the backup in
22:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rates over the past year or so. And some of it is specific to the UK economy, of course, as well. And then we have to consider how that's feeding through into the UK economy and set interest rates accordingly. We spent a lot of time looking at what we call the monetary transmission mechanism. So you mentioned changes in mortgage
22:38
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): markets can have big implications for how quickly or how strongly interest rates translate into the economy. In the UK, actually, we've gone in the opposite direction of what I think you suggested. So we have shorter term. fixes for mortgages now. But it's two or five years relative to, you know, in the US, a 30-year
22:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mortgage is quite typical. That does mean that, you know, even as bank rate is falling, for example, which it previously was, you know, it took there was a bit of a delay with which that actually fed through into people's own experience.
23:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So it does tend to delay the transmission relative to when everybody's on a variable mortgage. But um but uh we've you know taken a stock of the entire economy to look at how bank rate feeds through to the economy. Uh and you know, I have to think that it's a little bit slower because of a shift to two and five year
23:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fixes, but um, you know, I don't think it's material. materially so. Now there's no um way to specifically measure the monetary transmission mechanism. And so there is a debate amongst my colleagues on kind of whether it's gotten a bit faster, um, whether uh, you know, it's it's just as it used to be. There's no
23:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): definitive answer, but I don't think the change has been massive.
23:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
23:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): take you back to what you were just saying about um all the work that you you've been doing the um to discuss to understand people's behavior in response to all these various supply shocks that have been hitting the economy. I'm I'm thinking back to twenty eleven when the oil price went up and the Fed and the Bank of England didn't do anything. The ECB raised rates then reverse course and that was a bit of
24:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a it felt like a bit of a trial and error period. Um Central banks trying to each ECB E C B in particular trying to deal with A supply side shock. And it felt like the world has moved on a long way from there. Central banks have also moved on a long way from then. And certainly from your suggestion what you're saying here and what you you've moved on a long way and done a lot of work into things like
24:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): consumer behavior. How do people feel about current inflation? When does it matter? When does it not matter? Do you feel you have a cookbook now of dealing with supply side shocks? So is it still very much, you know, di very dependent on the broader backdrop of macro financial conditions at the time a supply supply side shock hits?
24:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I think we've learned a lot, excuse me, over the past couple of years. Um but I think there's a lot of work left to be done. I think most economists still don't really think uh as much about the supply side of the economy as they do the demand side. I think that will shift in part as a result of AI, right? So
25:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): excuse me, I brought up several negative supply shocks. The one positive supply shock that I think many developed economies are hoping will come and offset those negative supply shocks is is AI. So you know I think we'll be doing a lot more thinking about the supply side of the economy as a result of that. You know,
25:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): right now I feel that most economists tend to just pull 2022, 23 off the shelf when they're thinking about how to think about negative supply shocks, because it's the most recent one that we had. It's always pretty typical to fight the last war. But you're right to point out we also had one in 2011. The Eurozone was going
25:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): through its own crisis, so they were facing some idiosyncratic things. But you know, what I think is important is that the state of the economy really matters when a supply shock hits. And there, the comparison between 2011 and 2022 is quite useful because the labor
26:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): market was incredibly tight in 2022 in the UK at least. In 2011, the labor market was pretty loose in the UK and in most developed economies, actually. because we'd just been through the global financial crisis. In fact, the labor market was much looser than it is now by most standards for the UK at least. And
26:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so what we saw is that you had very small second round effects, not no second round effects, but small second round effects in 2011. Whereas and so the Bank of England didn't have to do much in order to keep inflation down. Whereas in 2022, you had huge second round effects. We had inflation peak at over
26:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): 11%, wage growth
26:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rose pretty significantly. And so the state of the economy that the shock hits really matters. What we're finding now in the UK and also I think in the US, going back to what we talked about at the beginning, which was the resilience of the global economy, is that we had some assumptions about how the economy should work in the face of these kinds of
27:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shocks. And actually, most economies have been more resilient than we thought. So in the UK, GDP data has consistently surprised to the upside all year for us. Also, the labor market has been surprising to the upside. So, uh, you know, we're trying to get a handle on how weak the labor market. actually is.
27:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Um, if it's weak, it can absorb some of the risk of second round effects in the face of a negative supply shock. But if it's not as weak, then you have to assume that the risk of second round effects is higher. And and that should affect your um rate setting behavior.
27:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Can
27:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I just note that I think we've we've gone through almost 30 minutes, a bit more than 30 minutes of this conversation before you mentioned AI. By the way, you mentioned it. not me. Um I'm gonna put that on the back burner because I do want to come back to AI, of course, and the possibility that it this will be a positive supply side shock, which is a great bit of news. But you also started to talk about the UK, which
28:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was something I was also itching to do then and the UK economy doing so surprisingly well. Um why do you think that is? Do you think the UK has just become a bit more agile? It's better able to handle these supply side shocks. Is there something about the UK economy? Now I'm torn between um the story that it's just a bit of sort of bit of luck and consumer
28:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): resilience, but also the fact that the nature of the shock is such that um the Eurozone, for instance, just gets more badly affected because it has so much more energy intensive manufacturing and the UK doesn't, and that explains better relative performance. But I'm keen to also get your view on how you think the UK is uh how how how strong UK resilience is and what the growth prospects for the UK are.
28:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so I think there could be a few things at play. One I mentioned as sort of a global factor, which is that this isn't our first rodeo, so we've all just gotten a bit more adaptable in terms of consumption smoothing, in terms of signing energy contact uh contracts. Um we hedge more, we're more aware that these shops.
29:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shocks can happen. That could be a piece of it. I spent a lot of time going around the country talking to businesses and asking them about this, and you know, it's annex data rather than actual data, so it's hard to measure this, but it does seem like um there's an increased awareness uh um about negative supply shocks, and so sort of more resilience planning as
29:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a result of that. Um, another factor uh is probably. that productivity growth has been a little bit higher than we had expected in the UK. And I have probably been amongst the most pessimistic about the UK's productivity growth
29:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just since the global financial crisis, it has fallen pretty significantly, so that the UK's productivity growth has looked more like the Eurozone's than the US's. We've had recent revisions by the ON. ONS that has raised productivity growth up a bit. For what it's worth, they've also
30:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): revised their assumptions about hours worked. So GDP growth hasn't shifted at all. That means that potential growth is probably in the same place. And so labor supply offsets an and increase in productivity growth, but that could account for some of the resiliences. resilience in the UK economy. To my
30:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): mind, you know, as a central banker, I have to think about our policy stance and sort of how restrictive we are, and that has to be relative to some idea of an equilibrium neutral rate, so R star, as we like to call it. And we can't measure R star. We
30:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): can't, you know, agree. observe it in real time. So, much like the supply side, this is a really thorny issue, and it's kind of one that's more useful in theory than it is in practice. But I do think that there's a question about sort of where R star is and how restrictive we've been. So there are two narratives to explain
31:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): why inflation has been above target for the over five years now in the UK. One is that, you know, uh several times we were getting inflation back to our target, and then we got unlucky and got hit by another negative supply shock. That's one narrative. Um, the other narrative is, you know, we just weren't as restrictive as we
31:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thought. Uh and so to my mind, I I'm more sympathetic to the latter view. Um, so growth has been resilient because monetary policy hasn't been leaning against inflation as much as we thought it was based on this kind of thorny, woolly concept of a neutral rate. I think you can't say, you know, we just got
31:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): unlucky for more than a certain period of time to my mind, five and a half years exceeds that period of time. So I think there is a good chance that um we just haven't been as restrictive as we thought we were. And so consequently, growth. has been a bit more resilient.
32:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, five and a half period years is a pretty long period of time to experience bad luck. Um some people talk about the poly crisis now, that we're just in a permanent state of crisis. Um and certainly events of this decade suggest that we've not only have we seen quite a few supply-side shocks and changes in geopolitics, but we're quite likely to continue to see these going forward. And we shouldn't
32:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think that we're just gonna going get to back to the world of the early 2000s. And you talked about RSA and what that might be and whether or not a central bank such as the one in the UK has been restrictive enough. Do you think that in this world, in this world of geopolitical fragmentation, with the possibility of not only persistent supply side shocks, but repeated
32:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): supply side shocks, central banks will simply need to raise their view of the long term. long-term rate of interest. It'll simply have to be more restrictive.
32:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so I'm with you on thinking that we're probably facing into more negative supply shocks. So if you think economic statecraft is here to stay, so using economic tools for foreign policy objectives, and that's things like tariffs or export controls, I think they're probably here to stay for a
33:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): while. It's quite hard to back down from those things. You need to extract something in exchange, and it's not clear what that might be.
33:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, these kinds of uh tools, they're all a negative supply shock for someone, right? So there will be more negative supply shocks from that. If you believe in climate change, and I do, then any manifestation of physical or transition risk, that's a negative. supply shock. I don't know if you tried to work through the heat waves this past
33:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): summer in Europe, but my productivity certainly suffered. It was so hot. We don't have air conditioning everywhere at the Bank of England, shockingly. So,
33:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you know, you can see how that, you know, is a very clear example of
33:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the supply side being hit. And so if we're going to have more supply. shocks, if they're going to be successive or actually even concurrent, possibly, you know, I think there's a lot of work to do on understanding the interaction of them. So the multiplicative implications of successive negative supply
34:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shocks. But I do think that this plus other factors, there's going to be more government borrowing going forward, I think, for a whole host of reasons. in different jurisdictions.
34:29
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, I think peak globalization may be behind us. There's more fragmentation that we're seeing. Um, these things all push up on R star. And so I have been of the view that R star was a bit higher than most of us thought in the UK, but also in other developed economies for a
34:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): while now. I think that's playing out in some of the GDP and labor market data, not just in the UK, by the way, also in the US. And so that might be evidence that our stars are a bit higher. But I think these trends that I've just mentioned point to that idea.
35:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So these supply shocks are obviously problems for central banks across the globe right now. But I think there does definitely seem to be a sense that in the UK we we seem to be really particularly suffering and and we seem to still have a bigger inflation problem than than many other economies around the world.
35:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And to go back to you you mentioned the labor market a couple of times, you of course published uh an interesting piece in the FT uh I think last week,
35:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
35:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): um correct me if I'm wrong miss summarising here, but I think you're essentially arguing that you know, trying to read the tea leaves through all the various sometimes conflicting labor market data we have in the UK, um overall conditions maybe aren't as loose as is widely believed, and the sort of current trend rate of wage growth is
35:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): probably already too high to be consistent with um the Bank of England's inflation. target. And one thing that struck me from that was it it seems like you're you're essentially arguing that even before we see any obvious pass-through from the jump in energy prices, there was already a case for for policy to be
36:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): tightened in the UK. And and that that seems pretty striking. So I guess to to go back more generally, do you think is is there something particularly about the UK that means we seem to be struggling more than certainly other economies in Europe with with these supply shocks and in terms of them having a a longer lasting, more
36:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): persistent impact on inflation? Or or maybe as you were mentioning earlier, is is it just a case that policy actually hasn't been tight enough?
36:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so um I will say that uh where you think we are now depends in part on where you thought we were when the war in Iran broke out, right? And I was um among the more concerned on the MPC that actually disinflation continued, that was clear, but that it was petering out and
37:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): slowing. Um and that's before we got this later latest Greatest negative supply shock. Um I think that the data, recent data in particular, um particularly around the labor market, bears bears that out. I would be quick to say my argument isn't that the UK labor market is strong. It's not.
37:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's weak. It's just maybe not as weak as we thought it was even before the war hit, but also now since it has hit. Um, And importantly, because I have to say set interest rates not based on where the economy is now, but where I think it will be in a year and a half to two years, because it
37:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): just takes a while for a bank rate to feed through financial markets to the the real economy and take holds, um, are forward-looking indicators for things like wage growth suggest that actually the disinflation process uh for wages has has roughly stalled out. Um Now, is there something specific about the UK
38:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): economy? There may be, based on our experience through the last couple of negative supply shocks, where you have sort of a wage catch-up dynamic that makes households quicker to say my costs have gone up, you've got to pay me more. I think that is certainly possible.
38:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But to my mind,
38:28
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a difference between us and the Eurozone, for example, is I just don't think we've been as restrictive as we thought. So the Eurozone, you know, before the war broke out, they had actually hit their inflation target and they had repeated that they were in a good place, which you know is it roughly was taken to mean that they felt like their interest
38:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rate was roughly neutral. Um, We never got to that place. Um, we kn we didn't get inflation sustainably to target. Um, we felt that our policy stance was restrictive, and I think it was. Um, I just don't think it was all that restrictive. Um, and I think that that's a big difference.
39:07
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
39:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): gonna tackle the elephant in the room. You've mentioned it already. I'm going to go for it head on now. AI.
39:13
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Great.
39:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): This
39:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could be positive. for a whole bunch of economies, not just not just the UK, of course. Um
39:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the problem is that we don't know how positive. And we're not very good at measuring things like productivity as well, in addition to not being very good at measuring a whole bunch of other things. Um, let's just throw this one into the mix. How do you see AI adoption in the UK? Now part of the growth story currently feels like it's also because the UK is quite good at business services and part of that is the AI story.
39:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Going forward, do you see AI being positive for the UK economy? How positive rather for the UK economy? And maybe in an international comparative perspective. Um
39:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): where
39:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): does where do you feel the UK stands vis-a-vis, say the Europe or got developed Asia?
39:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so um it's not only how positive it will be, it's also on on what time frame. Um I think. And depending on whether your your concern is very short term or longer term, I think you get different answers. So we're doing a lot of work on AI, as you can imagine. We've put together a bunch of groups of staff to um dig into various
40:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): aspects of AI. What we have found already is that AI seems to have already boosted GDP growth by a bit in the UK. So you could see it coming through in some of the activity data. And some of that, quite a lot of that, I think, is investment. So not on par with what
40:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you see in the US, but there's still quite a lot of investment going into AI in the UK.
40:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now I've mentioned that I'm particularly concerned about negative supply shocks and multiple uh sorry, successive negative supply shocks. Um, as it turns out, AI might represent one of these in the short term. So you can see very clearly that prices of inputs into AI have gone up, um, and that makes sense because there's so much demand
41:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for them, but that on balance is inflationary. Um, so that could be one of various negative supply shocks in addition to the war in Iran. We also have have El Nino. Um And that will affect behavior and prices going forward. So certainly through next year, some of this potentially
41:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): having knock-on effects to 2028 as well. So in the very short term, it could be a negative supply shock. But going forward, I think you know, if if you think that AI will make you more productive, and I'm not sure it's made me more productive for what it's worth in the short term.
41:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then it should expand the supply side of the economy. We still do a deep dive into the supply side of the economy. It happens once a quarter instead of once a year, just to make sure we're not missing anything. And over our three-year outlook, we don't have a specific judgment about AI in terms of how it might expand
42:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the supply side of the economy. Now, is that right? I'm not sure if you talk to an economist who says they know with any kind of certainty, you probably shouldn't listen to them. There's just so much uncertainty around this. I can believe it's right though. I think to really embrace the productivity gains that could be had from
42:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): AI, companies are going gonna to have to fundamentally restructure how they do everything to stick AI at the center of it. And I just think that kind of change management happens fairly slowly for most firms. So I think there's a case for AI feeding through into productivity growth and expanding potential growth faster than
42:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): previous technologies, but I still think it will take some time. So I believe it could take more than three years. And in fact, it's possible that lots of big firms just won't be able to make that transition. And what you've seen in some other
42:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): periods when you had disruptive technology, uh, that actually it was the bigger firms that had a hard time adopting, and it was the new firms who started up with this technology already available who were able to embed it into everything they did and and could be significant disruptors in different sectors. So, you know, we might have to wait for that. That could take
43:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): even longer, certainly more than three years. So I do think that there's great potential for expanding the supply side of the economy based on AI. I just think it will take a bit longer than some people seem to think.
43:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So we've talked about the impact on uh prices, and I love that you're up front about the uncertainty there because sitting in Asia Pacific, things look one way. That's certainly very difficult, different from what we see elsewhere in the world, right? And I think it's important to own up to that uh uncertainty. But I want to ask you about the impact not on prices, but on pricing,
43:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): because you've talked earlier about uh the transmission process of monetary policy. And something I've been thinking about increasingly and something that I've been getting more question on is how AI affects the pricing of goods and services, specifically things like dynamic pricing, right? So, for example, you go online, you look up
44:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): a flight to go somewhere, you set your computer aside, and you come back the next day, and suddenly it will be more expensive because the system now knows that you're interested. To my mind, it sort of complicates the job for central banks for two reasons. One would be that it arguably makes it harder to measure inflation because realized prices now differ.
44:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): across consumers in very, very specific ways that are probably very difficult to sample. But then also if it introduces a sort of upward bias in inflation in that it makes it easier to raise prices on consumers, uh you know, eroding the consumer surplus, as economists say, it could
44:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): arguably make it a little bit more difficult to manage uh inflation by way of the demand side. by way of slack in the economy. I was just curious what your thoughts are around that, or if you can give us a sense of how the central bank community is thinking about these things. The fact that inflation, even measuring that, is so much harder in a world where AI now plays such a big role.
45:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so you give an example of how it might be inflationary, but of course, if I had an agent and could tell it to just scour everything all the time, because I want to buy this thing and to strike when it's the cheapest, then actually that that could be disinflationary. I don't have time to scour the internet all the time looking for something like a flight, for example. So it could also
45:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): be disinflationary that way. To my mind, you know, how do we put AI in the inflation basket is a good question. So if you go and buy a MacBook laptop now, it has unbelievable. computing power, right? It has the competing power of a data center from year a few years ago. So we don't really know
45:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): how to measure that stuff. But this isn't a new problem, right? I mean, we we don't really know how to measure all the benefits we get out of our smartphone that used to be a separate calculator, maps, um, mobile phone, um, all kinds of things. So it's not new that we don't know how to measure technology. And I think there
46:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): will be measurement problems, inevitably. Um, but there have always been measurement problems, and I'm not sure that they'll get worse than they have been because of AI.
46:16
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Can
46:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I move on to a more philosophical question? Stefan always asks these very subtle, nuanced, difficult questions. Mine, mine, mine are sometimes basic and sometimes just very woolly and fuzzy. So I'm going to ask you a woolly and fuzzy question, okay? Um we talked about measurement error. Yes, there's always been measurement error in in any of the risks that we seek
46:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to capture, the numerous outcomes, but at least we have some view of a probability distribution. We have some view of whether that outcome is good or bad. But a lot a lot of what we face now, it feels like is it's very fundamental, deep uncertainty, um of the kind where we can't even describe a probability distribution. Is AGI good or bad? I don't know. Is it inflationary,
46:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): disinflationary? I don't know. How do we deal with this kind of fundamental uncertainty? And what does it mean for your job as a central banker? How difficult does it make your job?
47:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I think it's tempting to always think, gosh, we've never been through this kind of thing before. Um, whereas actually we always have some form of uncertainty. My job is all about uncertainty and risk and managing risks. Um 1968, that was a bad year. There was a lot of uncertainty then, is
47:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): now really so much more uncertain than then. Um, you know, I have some questions. As I said earlier though, there's always uncertainty, but I generally have a sense of the direction of a model in my mind at least. Um And so can set policy according to that sort of view of what the how the world operates. At
47:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the moment, it is quite difficult to be able to have a very robust view of the world and be totally sure that that's how things are gonna go. And so I do think that looking at different scenarios and baking in kind of different models. for how the world works into those
48:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): scenarios is useful so that you have a sense, well, if I'm wrong, then you know this is what the world will look like. And considering how you can set policy, as I mentioned before, to not screw it up, that needs to be your concern. At the moment, uh we we just put out three different scenarios at the Bank
48:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of England. Um, you know. a central projection, which is based on kind of energy futures curves. Another projection where we have a weaker economy, actually, and no second round effects. And then an adverse scenario where you have higher energy prices for longer and bigger second round effects. Now,
48:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I don't believe that we can have no second round effects. The labor market was much weaker in 2011. than it is now in the UK, and we had second round effects then. So I I think we probably will have some, at least now. But between the central projection and the adverse scenario, I couldn't give you a probability on either one of those
49:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): happening. And so then I have to think about, you know, how do I minimize the losses in the economy? And that is based on how much I prioritize hitting. our inflation target versus supporting economic growth. Given we've missed it for over five years, I put quite a high priority on
49:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): actually getting inflation down to 2%.
49:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Now we all put a high priority on getting inflation to 2%. That is our job. That's our only job, right? That's our mandate. Um, But there is a question about how quickly you feel you need to do that. um, and whether you can do that over a period of time. I think it's worth, you know, not uh trying to do it immediately. Uh that would
49:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cause unnecessary losses in terms of economic activity. Um, but I do think it's important that we get our target uh in order to, you know, shore up our credibility, because credibility at the end of the day is the currency of central banks.
50:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'd love to keep talking to you, but we have been at it for a while. So let me close and with a very different sort of question. You're a professional economist, we are all professional economists.
50:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I hire junior economists, I'm sure you do as well. What advice would you give an economist these days? I mean, especially as we've been talking about AI and we've talked about a changing world with numerous supply supply-side side shocks and sort of deep uncertainty. What advice would you give to a young person? starting out as an economist? What sort of skills should they acquire? Or as I sometimes feel, would you tell
50:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): them not to be an economist?
50:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, to my mind, the greatest uncertainty with AI is kind of what the implications are for the labor market. Um, you'll have seen Jason Furman, who used to be chair of the Council of Economic Advisors uh in the US, uh, sort of came out and said he's created an AI product and it can do what he did when he was really junior.
50:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so I do think that kind of thing really worries junior economists if they can be replaced by AI. I would say figuring out how to use AI is really important for a junior economist. And actually a junior economist might have an edge on that. Then, for example, someone like me. I don't
51:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): use AI hugely in my day-to-day job and feel like I'm probably falling behind, honestly, on that front. So figuring out how to embrace AI. I would also say that when it comes to coming up with a vision for what the world's going to look like, we have models. All models are broken, but some of
51:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): them are useful. And ultimately, a good forecast will come down to good judgments. And that can't really be usurped by AI. So trying to understand how different parts of a country's balance sheet sort of interact, that's still very important. Um, I'll give you an example. You know, our inflation
51:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): outcome in our central projection and our adverse scenarios aren't that different. One when the central projection has inflation getting to 2%. In a worse scenario, you know, it gets to 2.2% at the end of our forecast period. That's because our models assume some kind of mean reversion for inflation. But if we're being hit by negative supply
52:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): shocks successfully, successively, that might just not happen. And that's going to come down to a judgment. Um And so understanding how things interact, um, pursuing parts of the economy. that we don't understand very well, like the supply side, um, you know, I think that would be great if junior economists
52:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): could get excited about that because there are a lot of gaps to fill.
52:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, I I I think I agree with you. All my junior economists have the edge over me when it when it comes to AI for sure. But I like the way you put it, that's that good judgment is in the human domain. I just add for now. Thank you so much, Megan Green of the Bank of England, for joining us on this episode. You're you're you've been so generous with your time and so
52:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exhaustive in answering these questions. And we are really delighted to have had the opportunity to speak with you. Thank you, Andrew. Thank you, Stefan. And of course, thanks to you, our dear listeners, for tuning in and staying loyal to the global economy unwrapped.
53:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Thanks so much.
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