Perkins and Beamish debate AI market correction, forecasting Fed hikes and cycle end amid labor re-acceleration
Summary
Dario Perkins argues the current market dip is a 'fake down' preceding a breakdown, drawing parallels to the 2000 dot-com era where fundamentals remained strong initially. He warns that monetary policy impacts will eventually squeeze tech valuations despite current Capex strength. Freya Beamish counters that US resilience stems from tariff uncertainty removal rather than wealth effects, noting peak US earnings and suggesting rotation to global equities. Perkins forecasts 1.25 Fed hikes in 2027 due to labor re-acceleration, while Beamish highlights toxic margin compression. The speakers express skepticism about a soft landing, citing persistent inflation and an unprecedented investment boom.
Key takeaways
- 1 And now you've got a re-acceleration in the labour market. So the Fed can't, and not just the US labour market, labor markets everywhere are starting to re-accelerate and A look little more resilient. So central banks can't say, oh yeah, but even though we've got this inflation problem, we're going to focus on the labour market. because it's so weak and we're worried about a recession. That's gone too.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) · 33:49
Episode sections
- 0:03 – 1:01
Intro and Market Context
Host Andrew Slazenger introduces the episode, noting the NASDAQ has corrected while other markets hold up and the economy remains healthy. He poses three questions: can non-tech markets decouple from AI, how many Fed hikes in 2027, and why was the global economy resilient in 2026?
- 1:01 – 2:36
The 'Burkini' Crash and Sequel
Dario Perkins jokes about a 'Burkini crash' and announces a sequel to his previous market report, 'Burkini 2', which will be released exclusively to clients. He notes the sequel will focus on stress-testing the original analysis by addressing where they might be too bullish or bearish.
- 2:36 – 5:13
Dot-Com Parallels and Capex
Perkins argues this is a 'fake down' before a breakdown, citing the dot-com era where Capex plans remained strong despite market peaks. He notes that demand for compute and chip prices were still rising in early 2000, similar to today, and that it took months for bottlenecks to clear and supply gluts to emerge.
- 5:13 – 6:55
Monetary Policy and Consensus Errors
Perkins highlights that in summer 2000, the consensus believed interest rates didn't matter for tech, a view echoed today. He points to a May 2000 Fed study agreeing with this, noting low leverage. He warns that the initial rebound in 2000 was driven by a rotation into 'quality' tech, masking underlying fragility that eventually spread to the broader market.
- 6:55 – 8:14
Decoupling and Market Timing
Perkins explains that the decoupling between NASDAQ and S&P 500 in 2000 lasted six months because the macro outlook hadn't shifted. He suggests current decoupling offers limited comfort, as the broader market only followed tech lower once the macro environment deteriorated in the autumn.
- 8:14 – 12:01
Wealth Effects vs. Labor Market
Freya Beamish argues the labor market recovery is driven by tariff uncertainty removal, not wealth effects. She disputes Perkins' econometric findings, stating wealth effects are regime-dependent and visible in US data. She notes a drop in the savings rate was aided by tech asset price rises offsetting energy shocks.
- 12:01 – 18:22
Peak Earnings and Global Rotation
Beamish concludes US earnings are likely at peak, driven by fiscal tailwinds and tax refunds that won't repeat. She suggests investors look to global equities, specifically Germany and the UK, where profit and margin stories are entering healthier parts of the cycle, contrasting with US headwinds.
- 18:22 – 29:09
Fed Hikes and 2027 Outlook
Perkins forecasts 1.25 Fed hikes in 2027 (one in Dec 2026, four in 2027), arguing the labor market re-acceleration forces the Fed to raise rates until the AI boom ends. Beamish adds that rising unit labor costs and compression of margins, combined with Fed reaction, create a toxic mix for asset prices.
- 29:09 – 31:28
Global Growth Resilience and Energy Price Dynamics
Speaker 1 argues that global growth in 2026 was resilient due to underestimated fiscal impulses in Germany and a stop-start pattern in energy prices. The speaker notes that while US consumers smoothed consumption via savings, other regions did not, suggesting potential for catch-up growth as energy prices fluctuate.
- 31:28 – 33:49
Cycle End Forecasts and Soft Landing Skepticism
Speaker 1 states this is the first time in a long time the firm forecasts the end of the economic cycle, referencing the 'Purchini report' which assumed problems would arise late next year. The speaker expresses skepticism about a 'soft landing,' citing massive investment booms and hockey-stick charts in US Capex and Asian exports that typically do not end smoothly.
- 33:49 – 35:22
Labor Market Re-acceleration and Inflation Persistence
The speaker highlights that labor markets globally are re-accelerating, removing the justification for central banks to prioritize growth over inflation. They criticize the consensus view that inflation will return to 2% next year, arguing that the inflation problem is persistent and the cycle cannot continue indefinitely without a correction.
- 35:22 – 36:44
Bond Bear Market and Recession Outlook
Speaker 3 confirms a long-standing bear market call for bonds, noting that tactical buying opportunities arise during downward moments in a broader trend of higher yields. They predict a relatively short, self-correcting recession if the economy rolls over, driven by labor market weakness, rather than a prolonged downturn.
- 36:44 – 38:24
China's Role and Global Demand Dependency
Speaker 3 discusses China's economic situation, suggesting that complacency in reforms has been masked by global demand. If global demand weakens, China will be forced to accelerate reforms, which could provide a counterbalance to the global economy despite the slowdown.
Assets discussed
| Asset | Kind | Stance | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 | index | neutral | the decoupling thing is really interesting because the the I put a chart on Twitter earlier in the week showing um the the divergence that you have between the NASDAQ and the S P 500 in 2000. |
“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.
Claims worth verifying
The NASDAQ is back down to where it was at the last podcast, but other markets are holding up better.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·0:03
How to verify: Check NASDAQ Composite and S&P 500 index levels from the previous podcast's release date (2026-10-21) against current levels on a financial data provider like Bloomberg or Reuters. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Dario Perkins has a report called 'Burkini 2' coming out the next day for clients.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:01
How to verify: Check GlobalData TS Lombard client research releases for late November 2026 for a report titled 'Burkini 2' or similar. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
In the dot-com crash, Capex plans were not downgraded and demand for compute/chips was still rising at the peak.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·3:11
How to verify: Review historical SEC filings (10-K, 10-Q) of major tech companies from 2026-2026 for Capex guidance and revenue trends in semiconductor/compute sectors. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe Fed published a study in May 2000 stating that interest rates don't matter for the tech sector.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·5:33
How to verify: Search the Federal Reserve's historical publications or the Federal Reserve Bulletin for May 2000 for a study on monetary policy transmission to the tech sector. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The S&P 500 remained at all-time highs for six months after the NASDAQ crash began in 2000.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:15
How to verify: Plot NASDAQ and S&P 500 index levels from March 2026 to September 2026 to verify the divergence and S&P 500 performance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The savings rate dropped over the summer of 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·10:25
How to verify: Check US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Personal Income and Outlays reports for May, June, and July 2026 for the personal savings rate. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Dario Perkins' econometric analysis shows the wealth effect coefficient went to zero over the last decade.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·15:07
How to verify: Request the specific econometric model or paper from Dario Perkins/GlobalData TS Lombard detailing the rolling recursive coefficient on wealth effects. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Fed is expected to hike rates once in December 2026 and four times in 2027.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·18:24
How to verify: Check GlobalData TS Lombard's official interest rate forecast for 2026, or compare with CME FedWatch Tool expectations for December 2026 and 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Wage growth in the UK is surprising to the upside.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·28:13
How to verify: Check UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) labor productivity and earnings data for Q3/Q4 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
China was pulling back on fiscal policy in 2026 but may move towards expansionary policy in 2027.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·25:15
How to verify: Review China's Ministry of Finance budget reports for 2026 and 2026, or IMF Article IV consultations for China. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The consensus did not expect much growth in the rest of the world in 2026, whereas the speaker's firm was more bullish.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·29:09
How to verify: Check 2026 consensus growth forecasts for non-US economies (e.g., IMF WEO, OECD) against the firm's published 2026 forecasts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceFiscal impulses in Germany were underestimated, contributing to resilient growth.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:29
How to verify: Review German government budget filings and fiscal stimulus announcements from 2026-2026 and compare with pre-announcement economic forecasts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEuro area data surprises tracked energy prices closely via sentiment effects.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·29:49
How to verify: Correlate Euro area PMI sentiment indices and GDP surprise data with energy price indices (e.g., TTF, Brent) for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
US consumers absorbed energy price shocks by reducing their savings rate, a behavior not seen elsewhere.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·30:23
How to verify: Compare US personal savings rate trends with savings rates in the Euro area, UK, and Asia during 2026 energy price fluctuations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The 'Purchini report' assumes economic problems will start late next year (2027).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:23
How to verify: Access the 'Purchini report' (likely a misspelling of a specific research note) via the GlobalData TS Lombard platform or contact the firm for the document. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The firm forecasts the end of the economic cycle, which they claim is the first time in a long time they have done so.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·31:48
How to verify: Review the firm's historical research notes from the 2010s and 2020s to identify previous cycle-end forecasts. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
US Capex and Asian (Korean/Taiwanese) export shares of GDP are showing 'hockey stick' upward trends.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:11
How to verify: Plot US Gross Fixed Capital Formation as a % of GDP and Korean/Taiwanese Exports as a % of GDP for 2026-2026 using World Bank or national statistical agency data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The consensus forecasts inflation will return to 2% next year (2027).
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·33:31
How to verify: Check consensus inflation forecasts (e.g., Bloomberg, Refinitiv) for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The firm has called for a bear market in bonds for approximately five years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·35:36
How to verify: Search the firm's research archive for bond market outlooks dating back to 2026 to confirm the duration of the bearish call. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
China has become complacent regarding economic reforms because it relied on global demand.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·36:44
How to verify: Review Chinese government policy documents and economic reform announcements from 2026-2026 for evidence of delayed structural reforms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the 'May 2000 Fed study' on tech leverage and interest rate sensitivity via Federal Reserve archives or historical FOMC meeting minutes.
- Check current US savings rates and tariff impact data against the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to assess Beamish's claim on consumption smoothing.
- Review Dario Perkins' 'Burkini 2' report if accessible, or analyze recent S&P 500 and NASDAQ earnings guidance for signs of peak earnings.
- Monitor US unit labor cost trends and corporate margin compression data from earnings calls of major tech and industrial firms.
- Assess German and UK equity valuations and profit margin trends to evaluate the rotation thesis proposed by Beamish.
- Track Fed funds futures and labor market indicators (e.g., JOLTS, unemployment claims) to test the forecast of 1.25 hikes in 2027.
- Analyze China's economic reform announcements and global demand dependency metrics to assess the risk of forced reform acceleration.
- Compare current US Capex and Asian export-to-GDP ratios against historical 'hockey-stick' charts cited in the 'Purchini report' or similar firm research.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Right, okay. Now is this it? Is this it? Part two. NASDAQ is basically back down to where it was at the last podcast, but other markets are holding up a bit better. And the economy? Well, the economy has been fine. Healthy even. Eventually it will be it for the stock market. A bear market will come. But
- 0:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as ever, the timing is difficult. But not for these two extra. experts. So let's hear them answer. Number one, can the rest of the stock market decouple from tech AI? Number two, how many Fed hikes in 2027? And finally, why has the global economy been so resilient in 2026? Can this continue in
- 0:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2027? Dario, as one of our colleagues said, you've been nailing it recently. As I said last time on this podcast, you you're at fault for the market correction we're all suffering. It has nothing to do with Trump, NVIDIA, or AI over exuberance. So I'm just going to start with now is this it.
- 1:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 1:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Burkini crash. Yeah.
- 1:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 1:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think that's what we should call it. The
- 1:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Burkini crash. Yes, I like that.
- 1:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): But the important thing is like I've got this really big important announcement, which is that there's going to be a sequel. Like, what does every blockbuster critically accomplish? a caned movie need? It needs a sequel. And so Burkini 2 is coming. But this time it's restricted access. You know, it's just going to clients. Love it
- 1:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): even more,
- 1:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Dario. Come on. Preach.
- 1:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you know, you can send your foreign assets to try and convince me to give you access, but that's not going to gonna work. Not this time, I'm afraid.
- 1:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And with in terms of sequels, we're talking good sequels. We're talking like Godfather 2, not like Jaws the Revenge, the way you have to like resort to increasingly fanciful storylines to try
- 1:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 1:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): try and keep it together. This is gonna be good. This is stress testing the Purkini report. So it's all the client feedback we've got, which mostly it was like, This is amazing, well done, congratulations, how how are you so great?
- 1:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh-huh. But
- 2:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not everyone agreed with the analysis. So that's the bit that we're focusing on. Like, where are we too bullish? Where are we too bearish? Where there's a lot of stress surround it. So that's the Bikini report too. Coming soon, coming tomorrow, in fact.
- 2:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Coming
- 2:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): soon to clients only, let me reiterate. So I'm afraid you're gonna have to ask for a trial to our research. Get in touch with me. We also actually have a link in the show notes now, which is very exciting. You just need to click that and off you go.
- 2:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Progress.
- 2:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I was thinking actually, like we could do a movie, like if Netflix are listening or like they want to do a movie.
- 2:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Anyway,
- 2:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we've been saying no, which is sort of viral. But we've been saying this isn't it. Like mainly because like before every like breakdown, there's a sort of fake down. So like that breakdown, fake down,
- 2:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): does That's what that
- 2:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): works work too. We're
- 2:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): doing the raps wraps
- 2:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): now as
- 2:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): well, are we? You
- 2:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): get
- 2:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like a little, yeah, I could do you get a little taster like of what's to come. With Subprime, we had that like beginning of 08 before the big crash. With dot com you had it right at the beginning of 2000, whereas most of the crash happened in the autumn. And I think like the reasons we've been saying that, number one, like the Capex
- 3:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): plans still haven't really changed. Like these companies are still planning these big capex numbers for next year. They're not downgrading, they're not downgrading that. We're still seeing like the demand for compute. Like the chips prices are still going up, the rental rates are still going up. Uh, and like the Fed hikes, I mean, they've done one hike so far.
- 3:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So like it's a it's a bit of a stretch to say that monetary policy is really restricted at this point. The only thing that makes me worried is that. like, in a prequel to the Bikini sequel, if that makes sense, I did this study published this morning about like lessons from dot-com.
- 3:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 3:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 3:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the thing that makes me nervous is like all of the things that we're saying now for why this isn't it, people were saying right before it was it
- 3:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 3:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in 2000. So, and like the most alarming thing is like what's happening in the tech. sector, in like in terms of bottlenecks in the tech sector, in terms of the demand, in terms of the CapEx. Right. I I was looking through like Fed transcripts, I was looking through the data that we have on like order backlogs and stuff. That stuff
- 4:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): all took months and months to clear. So like the the the like the really nasty part of the dot-com dot com crash started in like September time and then it was just like straight down for months. And it was like at least three, four months after that that you began to see like people worrying about glutz of supply. So it takes a while
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): for those sorts of things to clear. And it was it was basically like December, January time that Greenspan made a joke in the transcripts about how tech executives were ringing him up, telling him uh how disastrous everything and suddenly was. And he didn't believe them, he thought they were just talking about. their personal wealth.
- 4:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 4:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so it does like, even though you like you still see the Capex, you still see the demand once the stock once the stocks have actually peaked, like you can just keep going down. It there isn't you there is there is only so much comfort you can take from the fact that the demand still seems to be there in terms of like the physical demand for this stuff. So that just makes me slightly
- 5:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): nervous. And with the fair. Fed, like the argument we're making now is that we haven't really had much for monetary tightening. Fine. And you know, until like very recently, the consensus among investors was very much like this doesn't matter, the Fed doesn't matter, interest rates don't matter. And like the alarming thing about 2000 is that was very much the consensus in
- 5:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the summer of 2000, like right before things got really nasty. And in fact, the Fed published a study. in May. This is like right at the market peak, saying there's this consensus out there. It says that interest rates don't matter for the tech sector. We agree. Like levels of debt are really low. There's not much leverage in the system. So like interest rates going
- 5:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): up shouldn't make much difference to the tech sector. There's like a K-shaped economy, like this, the same narratives we have today. So that makes me slightly nervous about this, that maybe we're underestimating. And the thing with dot com is that in that initial phase, so like you had the big you had a big correction in um in February, March time, mainly March actually. And then
- 6:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you had this massive rebound.
- 6:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 6:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): during that rebound, the narrative was all about like quality. So people were worried about the dot-com dot com side of the the boom. They thought that you know that side was finished, and they were rotating into companies that have real earnings, tech companies with real earnings. The issue was that because that um dot com the sort of dodgy
- 6:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fragile bit was being squeezed by monetary tightening, uh, it eventually fed through into the rest of the ecosystem. So the weakness started on the fringes and then spread to the core. And it just worries me that we could see something like that this time around. So
- 6:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
- 6:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): terms of decoupling you you don't think the market can probably decouple and remain firm.
- 6:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 6:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the decoupling thing is really interesting because the the I put a chart on Twitter earlier in the week showing um the the divergence that you have between the NASDAQ and the S P 500 in 2000. So the dot-com Dot com crash starts, you get a bit of a rebound, and then it the the crash resumes. And it was really like
- 7:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): six months until six months after that, the S P 500 was still at all-time highs. Why? Because the the and it's like now we've seen the same decoupling. Why? Because like the economic outlook hadn't really shifted. So for those first six months, it was all about tech, it was like a sectoral problem. It
- 7:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): didn't seem to be affecting the rest of the economy. The manufacturing demand was still there, the backlogs, all that stuff was still there. And it was only during the autumn that the macro outlook began to change. And that's when the SP then started to follow the NASDAQ lower. So that decoupling that we're seeing now between tech and the broader stock market, there's only so much
- 7:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): comfort you can take from that because we saw the exactly the same decoupling at the beginning of dot-com. dot com And it lasted for like six months. I
- 8:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): think to to get that timing right, we have to understand what is the catalyst for the labour market picking up. Is it just spillovers from tech,
- 8:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): or is it more to do with the removal of uncertainty around tariffs and the broader US economy just being less affected by energy? So we we know that. the market should be predicting the any sort of recession in in the economy, but how far
- 8:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): ahead is gonna be make or break for investors? Um I think if it's if it's the wealth effect that is driving um the economy, and if it's the capex per se that is driving the economy, um from from AI, then then we have more of an
- 8:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): immediate problem with the economy. But we've been saying that it's actually not so much the wealth effect. Darry and I have had a bit punch up about
- 9:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 9:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wealth effect's not real. We're finding
- 9:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that you're trying to paint me into a
- 9:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): corner with this. You're really trying to paint me into a corner with this. I have special specialized.
- 9:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We I had a meeting
- 9:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the other day like with a with a client and we argued about it in front of the client.
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, and
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I set out
- 9:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I set out very very clearly where I think wealth effects are important and I don't think they're pivotal in this environment. I think wealth effects are there in the data when you look at a net equity impulse and private consumption within
- 9:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the equity period of impulse. time.
- 9:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Like that's
- 9:34
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): just the correlation
- 9:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): between the stock market and the economy. Like that's just
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 9:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's not.
- 9:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And then you can compare that to to the effect on private consumption. So if you do that in the US, which is a more equity focused economy, um, then you you you can create a a net equity impulse where you're looking at household wealth, um and and there is a relationship there. When you're in a regime, there the the problem with it is that
- 10:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's a little bit like a kind of a Phillips curve. The Phillips curve works when you're established in a regime, but it changes from regime to regime. Can you stop making that face? It's really distracting.
- 10:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): magical thing that you can't see like the Phillips curve.
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay, so here's where I think it's
- 10:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): important. Here's where I think it's important. Over the summer we had a big drop in the savings rate. Um because the rest of the economy exactly because my God, could I get one word in any
- 10:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): letter?
- 10:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Where I let you speak for like so there's actually genuinely research on this. When women speak for like seventeen percent of the time, men perceive that as being more than fifty 50% percent of the time. So could I just
- 10:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have say that? to know when you
- 10:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): speak, it feels like you're talking for a really long time. Is that what you're saying?
- 10:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I'm saying there is stat you that is your perception. That is not any reflection of reality. Now let's go back to the reflection
- 11:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 11:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): reality with regards to the actual economy as well, and what I actually said about wealth effects over the course of this year. I think the savings rate was helped down in the context of that energy shock because the rest of the because the tech econom the tech economy and the and the tech asset prices were rising. I just think there was a bit of a
- 11:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): tailwind to the decline in savings rate because the rest of the economy was hit by the energy shock. The rest of the world was hit by the energy shock. But US investors were protected from that, even more so than anywhere else, because tech investments were were doing very well at that moment in time. The the stock price was rising. So it's a sort of a marginal tailwind
- 11:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): to growth this year. It doesn't really help you with the wider story on the recession, and it doesn't really help you in terms of knowing what's going to happen to private consumption when there's a big reset in asset prices. So coming back to what I was saying before Dario votes are So rudely interrupted, what we're looking at is the labor market and why is
- 12:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the labor market picking up. And I think the ultimate catalyst there is not the wealth effects or spillovers directly from the tech story. It's much more the removal of uncertainty from tariffs, which is what was holding the labor market back last year, uh, and then coming into this year. We already saw that um improvement in
- 12:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the labor market, early signs of of reacceleration in the labor market. And it's that that understand underpins the wider um recovery in uh in the economy and private consumption growth. So we see total earnings improving and we actually also see wage growth improving and bottoming out if you strip out um some of the sectors that that don't really give
- 12:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): us a a good a good kind of read on the on the cycle. That tells us that we're probably going to see a broadening out of CapEx, but that doesn't really help us in terms of the overall rate of growth of profits. And we, both of us from different angles, have come to the conclusion that we probably are at peak earnings for the US.
- 13:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): If we decompose that profit story down into what's happening with CapEx, what's happening with the savings rate, and what's happening with the fiscal story, it's hard to see a strong improvement in earnings in the aggregate. for the US at the moment. So you what you've got is at best a story of rotation. That tells us that we should be looking
- 13:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): into global equities and better cyclical profit stories for within a risk on narrative. Um and it also tells us that the economy probably is gonna start to to to slow and we are gonna going start to to see those headwinds for um for for profits more broadly in in the US. So coming back to sort of what's the
- 13:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the catalyst here. The catalyst, if it was just about wealth effects, um then this reversal would be very problematic and would probably like sow the seeds of the of the demise of of the economy as well. And then you really would be pushing towards a uh a a bear market, um, and maybe this would be it, quote unquote.
- 14:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Even in that environment, um, I still think because leverage hasn't had that long to pick up, that it wouldn't be particularly damaging and it would be a very sort of shallow recession. But we are we're we're not even going that far. Um, we're focusing more on the fact that the labor market is picking up, and so there is still some sort of um
- 14:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): expectation that you're gonna see a broadening out of profits and some of that uh um virtuous cycle um part of the expansion starting to to to kick off. So the economy i is more is a little bit more uh quartered from the from the the the story in in tech than if it was just about wealth
- 14:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): effects. Yeah. So your timing issue is is you're You
- 14:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): gonna be able to do that.
- 14:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): can't.
- 14:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You're right. That did
- 14:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): seem
- 14:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like a really long time.
- 14:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think basically like we agree
- 14:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You're saying that wealth effects
- 14:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't matter. Like I've shown with like very comprehensive econometrics that wealth effects don't matter. We agree, it's fine.
- 15:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 15:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you didn't look within regime. So
- 15:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): okay.
- 15:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I did a rolling effect.
- 15:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I did a
- 15:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rolling recursive coefficient on the wealth effect and it basically went to zero over the last decade. So there is no wealth effect. But never mind. We agree, like this isn't it. The economy will
- 15:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): probably
- 15:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): continue to re-accelerate next year. The labor market's tightening. What I think what I have the biggest problem with is this idea,
- 15:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): which
- 15:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think is the consensus for next year, is that we're going to get some amazing soft landing from all of this. I just can't see it. Yeah, Like either this happens now, and it just the news just gets progressively worse, and eventually the stock. market goes down properly. Or we rebound and then the labor market continues to reaccelerate, and then
- 15:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the Fed's got a problem because inflation is already too high. We're not going to get some immaculate disinflation next year that's going to solve this problem. And you know, they're starting from a position of full employment. So there's only so far that the the the cycle can really last. So either it happens now or happens in 12 months. But I think the end game is sort of written at this point.
- 16:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah, and you said that. And
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): either
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): way you want to get more exposure to other sectors and other
- 16:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exactly.
- 16:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): That's what
- 16:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I was gonna say. In terms of question one, it's it I guess decoupling whether you're safe from a bear market in other sectors or other countries is the question. And I and you're saying, Dario, yes, you you would be safer, but you wouldn't be safe, as in a bear market takes everything down. with it for a certain amount of time. But sure, absolutely, look for more defensive
- 16:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sectors, look for more defensive countries. Um, I guess in terms of is this it? That's a good point. So this could be it. Although as I as I would say,
- 16:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No,
- 16:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what I'm saying, right, is that I think you need to show a degree of humility because like we don't think this is it, but reading like learning the lessons from the past, people never think it's it until it is it. until
- 16:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's it yeah exactly very
- 16:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like we were
- 16:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like even like like 2000s like the like like the Fed starts to discuss like a slowdown in sort of late late 2000s um
- 17:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): like
- 17:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): September October time the staff are getting a little bit edgy about the economy and Greenspan's just like completely relaxed like still thinks productivity is accelerating and that's the linchpin of everything. He's like this massive productivity ball. And as long as productivity doesn't slow down, everything's going to be great. And it's only really, and even in like officially the
- 17:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): recession starts in March, I think, 2001. But like they're starting to use the R-word in December, January time. So it's already like a discussion. And Greenspan's Greenspan sort of saying, Well, he's telling the staff, like, your models wouldn't be able to capture this anyway, because we can't fork. forecast recessions. Even in like after, even in like May 2001, the
- 17:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they still think a recession can be avoided. And by that time, they're like three months into recession. So I just think you have to be a little bit humble about like because you don't always see things in real time, as obviously as you think when you look back. Because like the payroll numbers got completely revised, for example, in that period.
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Okay,
- 18:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well, let's move on. to what might trigger this bear market, whether it's now in six months or in twelve months, and that's the Fed. So I think well we as listeners know, due to my trumpet playing, we nailed the Fed, the Fed call in September, and now we're saying another hike in December and then quarterly hikes going forward. So Dario, how many do we end up? How many Fed hikes do we end up
- 18:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): with in twenty 2027? twenty seven?
- 18:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Uh I think we have one and a quarter in our forecast. Uh in the base, the base case Fay has got one per quarter. Um, so from here that's five. So one in December, four next year. But basically, I think they just keep going at that pace until this ends, until the AI boom ends. And it does come down to the the labor market.
- 18:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, the fact that we've got this reacceleration in the labor labour market, it just changes the whole story. I think if you were actually talking if you had Fed official like in your office now and they were willing to give you forward guidance like the old days, I think they would say in their minds, they're probably going to raise interest rates once in December and once at the beginning of next year. And
- 19:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then probably they're done because that reverses the last round of rate cuts from Power, which they obviously looking back, they think was a mistake or an overreaction to the labour labor market.
- 19:13
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 19:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): our view, because the labor market is still re-accelerating, I think that forces them to revise up their estimates of neutral, because you can't believe that monetary policy is restrictive genuinely if labor demand is picking up, if the labor market is re-accelerating, if very quickly you're beginning to see like either vacancy, unemployment ratio
- 19:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rising or the unemployment rate just coming down. It starts to feed wage pressures. And, you know, again, that's like a classic end-of-cycle dynamic. Like typically when the Fed starts raising its neutral estimate, that's when you need to start to worry. And it's an it's another sort of version of that discussion during dot com about interest rates don't matter anymore. Like
- 19:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you're raising interest rates, nothing's really happening. So you re rev you revise up your mutual neutral estimate. And then at some point something does happen and you end up causing the downturn. downtown.
- 20:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think it's that
- 20:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): combination of of um
- 20:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 20:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): labour market story and unit labour costs and compression of margins with the way that the Fed reacts to it. And that's the combo that becomes toxic for for asset prices. So if we have wage growth bottoming out now, which I think we we've made the argument on this podcast that that's that's the case
- 20:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): case. Potential kind of silver lining or the the sort of the upside with regards to the labour supply might be some slowdown in the de immigration plans. It's not clear kind of which way that's going to go. Um but part of the reason why we've been
- 20:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): convinced that wage growth is going to be picking up is because the the break-even rate for non-farm payrolls is is so much lower in the context of this de-immigration drive. So if that slows down, then you would expect less of a pickup in in wage growth. But it takes a while for those kinds of things to feed through. And the fact of the matter is that the
- 21:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): kind of the vacancy to unemployment ratio is already rising. Um, and as I've said, I think we already start to see wage growth picking up. And then kind coming back to productivity growth, if this is a labour market driven recovery, then that you you would expect to see productivity growth actually potentially
- 21:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): slowing from that artificially high base of of last year. Um and you put all that together and it's quite uh a h a headwind for for margins. And then the problem is that that headwind for margins is also a signal of um of uh of higher R star. That was another thing we had an argument with
- 21:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on a client with a client, but that's um how uh how central banks look at this. So not only have you got a headwind to margins from the labor market and from rising unit labor labour cost growth, central banks are also going to take that as a sign of inflation picking. up and react to it. So you've also got rising cost of capital at the same
- 22:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): time.
- 22:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I just looking at the mapping this out, and nothing's really changed in terms of our view from the last 12 months. We still think that AI over exuberance is a problem. Eventually inflation becomes a problem, which it's becoming. Uh the Fed starts to hike, hikes more and more and more, and that knocks over the equity market. I think it it's hard to kind of give some something
- 22:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): new, but I suppose the new thing is that what that this could be it. It could be happening before we we predicted exactly it was going to happen. I mean, it's pretty difficult to exactly predict exactly when a bear market's going to kick off. But I think the the idea about Fed hikes for Fed hikes next year, you said Daria, right? That it's hard to see that that doesn't knock over the equity market.
- 22:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So I think a high conviction view that we have is that the bear market is coming. A bit like Santa Claus, Father Christmas, he's coming. Bear market is coming in 2027. Is that fair? Or am I going over the top?
- 22:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I think
- 22:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Santa Claus is a little bit more predictable than the bear market, but yeah, the sentiment is is is there. I think we've always said that this would be the sort of the shape of the end of the cycle, and the end of the cycle would be the thing that knocks over the asset market. The problem is that the asset market would tend to come a little bit ahead, uh, that it would would
- 23:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): tend to happen a little a little bit ahead of that. So that's the sort of the timing problem. Um, but again, you don't want to sort of sit out of the market if there is another another sort of period of time in which we're sort of in limbo, um, and that's where we keep sort of coming back to you, okay. Well, within your risk asset part of your
- 23:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): portfolio, let's just be a little bit more um diversified. And then I I just that profit story that we've been telling, I think there are examples outside of the US where the the cyclical story is much better. If you look at um Germany, the profit and margin story
- 23:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is coming into excuse me, the right part of the cycle, the same with with um with the UK. So I think there are actually genuinely better um places to position um regardless of the the bigger risks that are associated now with the with the tech story.
- 24:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): There's more evidence of Santa than there is for wealth effects. Although this time of year the impulse effect from Santa is quite strong, admittedly.
- 24:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's crack on to question three.
- 24:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 24:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we've touched on the economy quite a lot already. It is amazing how resilient it's been in 2026. I mean we what have we had we've had oil
- 24:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): really because it was our forecast.
- 24:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's true. Not amazing.
- 24:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 24:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): just saying the Iran war, oil oil has what, been basically above ninety dollars a barrel for eighty percent, ninety percent of the year. So it's pretty, pretty resilient. Can that continue into twenty 2027? twenty seven?
- 24:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I think part of the tailwind this year possibly was in in the beginning of the year, at least for the US, um, and more broadly than that, fiscal policy. So that's something that is changing for next year. Like we're not gonna have that same degree of of fiscal tailwind of probably sort of reversal there. Um for China, you you should have had
- 25:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): this kind of synchronized fiscal policy for this year across the US, across Germany, um, and China was the sort of the outlier that was.
- 25:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): was sort of pulling back on fiscal policy. So you have a little bit of a reversal there with China probably uh moving towards more expansionary fiscal policy again um in contrast to this year and that can sort of play a bit of a counterweight there. Um but for the US we came into this year with the middle income section of the distribution we re
- 25:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): receiving this dollop of of tax refunds. Um and that's another part of of their ability, the consumer's ability to sort of just run down the savings rate um in in response to the energy shock of of this year. I don't think we have that to the same extent going forwards next year. We're much more
- 25:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): reliant on um private consumption growth and th the that broadening out of CapEx. So it's a bit of a handover from the the the fiscal catalyst at the beginning of the year to okay how much is the labour market going to pick up um and how much can we see that broadening out of of capex. I do think you know there's been a lot of d
- 26:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): debate around the Democrats coming in and was that a sign of fiscal greater fiscal tightening or maybe a sort of less of a of a a drag from um from fiscal policy. Um I would fall much more in the camp that this is less of a drag for fiscal policy if if anything, uh maybe there will be some reversal of
- 26:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the the tightening with regards to healthcare spending. Um and certainly when we look at the impact on on bonds just sort of tangentially, there was this big sort of story that came um around the midterms when yields were declining, um, that this was because the the the the fiscal uh story was was tightening as a result of of the the
- 26:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Dems taking uh Congress. That to me just didn't really hold any water, partly for what I've just said with regards to what I think they will actually do with fiscal policy, and partly because it was, again, just oil. And as soon as you see the the inflation data surprising to the upside again, then you saw the reversal of that. So I think going into next year's.
- 27:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): year and kind of tying this up and for what it means for for for profits again, we've got a broadening out of CapEx um but not a an increase. And certainly the second derivative is is slowing. So that's going to be a a headwind to um to profits. We've got a a reversal of you know from fiscal
- 27:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): impulse this year um to uh a a sort of a number no no further impulse next year, um we probably won't have further declines in the household savings rate. And that is declines in the household savings rate just by identity should boost um should boost profits. So the
- 27:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): profit story for the US, which is what I keep coming back to, looks like it is starting to slow and that should feed through into a a slower um a slowing of of of the economy. Um I think elsewhere, as I've said, I think we've got to the stage, let's say in the UK, um, let's say in Germany as well, where wage growth has sort of slowed
- 28:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): enough, um, and productivity growth in the UK is is actually surprising to the upside. So you're at the opposite end of the the spectrum with regards to to the positioning in the the cycle. Um and that's just a function of the fact that the the European economy has run behind the US economy in this process of AI build
- 28:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): out and just in the recovery in in general. And it's just coming into a healthier part of the of the of the cycle potentially. Now of course they've got all of your energy headwinds that hit the rest of the the world more so than um than the US um but short of there being a massive kind of escalation there um I think we're
- 28:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): still even accounting for that in a in a better place relative to expectations on on the outlook for for profits in the economy.
- 29:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mario economy next year and and I guess
- 29:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): maybe
- 29:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's an obvious question but if the Fed keeps hiking next year it can't be can't be good for the economy.
- 29:09
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): No
- 29:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I mean it doesn't it won't show up immediately. Um, I think that the the you know, the surprise this year wasn't so much to our forecast, it was to the consensus, because the consensus wasn't expecting um growth to do much in the rest of the world this year. It's very much like a US decoupling story. And we were much more bullish. And I think we would have had even stronger growth if it wasn't for the
- 29:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): fact that energy prices, because I think people were underestimating how big the fiscal impulse was, particularly in Germany and what effect that would have on sort of spillover effects. So the fact that we sort of maintained the same sort of growth that people expected before the energy crisis is probably a sign that they were sort of underestimating it. In terms of the energy price effect, I mean it like
- 29:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): oil prices have been high on average, but it's also been quite stop-start. So if you look at like data surprises in the euro area, they've been tracking energy prices really closely, particularly sort of via sort of sentiment effects. So you had that. um big rise in energy prices in the spring, which had quite a big negative effect on sort of European
- 30:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trajectory. And then we had a sort of reversal during the summer, energy prices came down quite a lot, and the economy seemed to reaccelerate. So we've had a like stop start pattern to growth. At the moment, we're back in a period of higher energy prices. Um
- 30:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
- 30:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we haven't had in the rest of the world, unlike in the US, is this sort. of consumption smoothing. So, you know, US consumers did absorb a big part of the energy price shock in their savings rate. And that hasn't really happened elsewhere. Like we're not seeing savings rates come down in other parts of the world. Maybe just there was too much negativity about what effect it would have.
- 30:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So I think, yeah, it's partly fiscal, it's partly the sort of stop-start nature of the energy crisis. Um, we get any sort of resolution. I think we're gonna see quite a strong reacceleration. Because if you believe that sort of consumption smoothing story in the US, and we haven't had that elsewhere, then you'd expect the rest of the world to catch up quite strongly to the US as energy
- 31:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): prices come down. Because in theory, US consumers should start to rebuild their savings, having sort of smooth smoothed their way through it. So I think there's still a lot of upside potential for the rest of the world. But it's just a question of how long the cycle lasts. Like, is this going to last for the whole of next year? As that very influential and critically
- 31:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): acclaimed Purchini report assumed, like it was very late next year.
- 31:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It was very late next year when we sort of assume that things would start to go wrong. So, you know, looking at the year next year as a whole, I think it's actually quite a bullish outlook for the globe. global economy. It's just a question of, I think we can see what the end of the cycle looks like. And we should point out that we don't make a habit of like forecasting the end of the cycle. Like
- 31:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is the first time in a very long time that we forecast the end of the cycle. And it's not like that hasn't been a question from investors because like all through the 2010s, it was literally the whole cycle. It was like the longest cycle in history. And all through it, people were saying, when is this cycle going to end? What's going to cause it? Like, what's the black swan? Is it Euro
- 32:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): breakup? Is it China? Is it like more Mageddon? Remember more Mageddon? Yeah. So there were always stuff that people were worrying about, but there was no reason why the cycle would end. Like there was no inflation, there was no credit cycle, there was no investment. The savings rate was really high, much higher than you would have expected based on wealth effects. that didn't work anymore.
- 32:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And you
- 32:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): can't let it go, can you?
- 32:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 32:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): then, like, we had COVID. And after COVID, like we were one of the very few people saying, like, there could be a soft landing. Like, this is like a conceivable path because the inflation is a big transitory element. Central banks will be happy if inflation settles above three rather than trying to force it all the way back down to two. There are all sorts of sort of supply problems that
- 32:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): could unwind. Like we were quite optimistic about the prospects of a soft landing in 2022, 2023, 2024. It's only now like that we can, it's becoming quite a tough sell to believe in the soft landing, because you've got like the biggest investment boom in history. Quite a brave assumption, just assume that that just sort of fizzes fizzles out in
- 33:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a really smooth way. You've got all these charts like. doing hockey hockey stick shapes, like US Capex, US tech capex as a share of GDP, uh, Korean or Taiwanese import export, sorry, as a share of GDP. Like all these things are like just doing all this crazy stuff on these charts. Charts like that
- 33:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): typically don't end in some sort of soft landing. We still have an inflation problem. The inflation problem's not going away. The consensus. now is doing what it's done every year for the last six years and say, don't worry, because this time next year we'll be back to two percent. Really? Are we still playing that game?
- 33:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah.
- 33:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And now you've got a re-acceleration in the labour market. So the Fed can't, and not just the US labour market, labor markets everywhere are starting to re-accelerate and A look little more resilient. So central banks can't say, oh yeah, but even though we've got this inflation problem, we're going to focus on the labour market. because it's so weak and we're worried about a recession. That's gone too. So like how does this
- 34:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): cycle just continue indefinitely?
- 34:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Just to be clear, we're
- 34:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): not one of those houses that just indefinitely says there's going to be a recession within eighteen months. This is the first time in a very long time.
- 34:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Exactly. I was about to say that we said that.
- 34:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah uh
- 34:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): some
- 34:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of our competitors who shall remain nameless kind of trot out a No,
- 34:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we should name them, right?
- 34:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Like I I'm all in
- 34:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for like
- 34:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): self-side wars, podcast wars. Let's find another podcast that we don't like and like attack them every
- 34:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): week.
- 34:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Because there's not enough like antagonism between us. We need to like have that spill over into like other podcasts. We can't
- 34:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): do that. I'm just saying certain competitors call for a
- 34:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bear market in US equities every twelve, 12, eighteen 18 months, call for a global recession. It's like we don't do that, as Dario and Freya have outlined. We don't, we're not constantly going for sensationalist headlines. But at the moment, we're nervous for next year.
- 34:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): That's not a sinister ending.
- 34:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, I know.
- 35:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): But I was gonna say, haven't we just said that we actually think that that the outlet
- 35:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of next year is good for global
- 35:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): growth?
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 35:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): economy. The economy, but like investors don't invest in the economy, they invest in asset prices. And I know we haven't really talked about bonds, but um certainly. equities we're we're nervous about next year. Or maybe then fair bonds. What what what is our sort of outlook for now and next year on bonds?
- 35:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, I mean we have again, like we uh to be clear on the history of this, we have said we're in a bear market for bonds now, um, pretty consistently several years. I think the this was would be
- 35:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): five
- 35:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): years, I think.
- 35:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah. Exactly. This year,
- 35:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, we had a big event in twenty twenty one, didn't we?
- 35:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Was it twenty twenty one we had a big event? Basically big bear market for bonds.
- 35:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, I think Charles was saying that and Dario was saying that. Yeah, so we've had that bear market call on on on bonds for for a while now. And I think the the pattern there is that you keep getting these kind of downward moments where you can sort of tactically tactic invest again. Um, but it sort of
- 36:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): bumps on the path to to higher yields. Um, I think this would be a moment if we do start to see the economy slowing, but bearing in mind that we're saying that the Fed has to continue is is likely to be continuing hiking for the moment. If the economy does then start to roll over, and particularly when the labor labour market does
- 36:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): then start to roll over, um then you have a a a more significant period of time where you can go back into bonds. But that does not mean that we're going back to a sort of pre-COVID environment. And I think it would be, as we sort of said elsewhere, a a relatively kind of short recession that would have a lot of kind of self correcting
- 36:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): mechanisms. I think we we talked about China we talked about housing, um Rory's also being been talking about how China has become perhaps a little bit complacent again in terms of its reforms and sort of pushing forwards just because they've been able to rely on global demand. So if global demand slows again, then then they'll have to
- 37:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): push forward with those reforms a little bit more. But that also gives us a little bit of a a counterbalance for um and for uh for for the global economy if China is gonna is gonna help out there if if global demand weakens again. Um so i a a relatively slow uh a relatively s short
- 37:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): recession um and a pickup in in in in uh yields as the economy recovers you're still trying to cut me off.
- 37:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): No, we're over time, I'm afraid. But
- 37:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): isn't that surprising?
- 37:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Oh my god. I think we actually need to do some AI analysis of how long we each talk for on this podcast.
- 37:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, I I think we do. I think you'll be surprised.
- 37:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Stress
- 37:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): testing the Purkini Report.
- 37:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Stress testing the Purchini
- 37:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): report. If you want to receive that, you need to register for a trial. Click that link in the show notes or email me, whichever you'd rather. do. Get yourself set up and you can uh read Dario's uh Burkini report part two. But that's all we've got time for. Thanks, guys. Thanks, Freya. Thanks, Dario. Thanks all for listening. Bye-bye.