Mike McGavick on Turnarounds, AI in Insurance, and Bridgewater's Radical Transparency
Summary
Mike McGavick, former Chair of Bridgewater Associates and former CEO of Safeco and XL Group, discusses his approach to corporate turnarounds, emphasizing the need to identify and return to a company's core strategic differentiator. He shares lessons from leading Safeco and XL Group through crises, highlighting the importance of leadership restructuring and cultural integrity. McGavick also addresses the insurance industry's evolving landscape, including the role of AI in reducing operational costs and the necessity of public-private partnerships for systemic risks. Finally, he reflects on his tenure at Bridgewater, contrasting its culture of radical transparency with the discretion required in politics.
Episode sections
- 0:00 – 17:06
Early Political Life and Ideology
McGavick discusses growing up in Seattle with a father who was a state legislator, influencing his early exposure to politics. He explains his evolution toward a belief in prioritizing private sector solutions over government intervention.
- 17:06 – 23:44
Transition to Private Sector via Superfund Reform
McGavick describes leaving politics for stability and being guided by advisor Eddie Mai to enter the insurance industry. He took a leadership role in a Superfund Reform project, which brought him into contact with insurance CEOs and led to his first corporate roles.
- 23:44 – 27:25
Motivating Employees vs. Volunteers
He shares an anecdote from his time at CNA where a leader stated employees only need to be paid, not motivated. McGavick contrasts this with his experience organizing volunteers, arguing that inspiring employees through a shared higher purpose is key to differentiated success.
- 27:25 – 31:39
Regulator-Company Symbiosis
McGavick argues that regulated companies should view regulators as partners necessary for public trust, rather than adversaries. He emphasizes that regulators serve the public, creating a tension that must be managed through transparency and understanding.
- 31:39 – 39:43
Safeco Turnaround: First 90 Days and Strategic Focus
Speaker_1 describes taking over Safeco in 2001 after it lost nearly $1 billion. He identified that the company had lost focus on its core mass-market lines of business by diversifying into unrelated areas like a Lloyd's syndicate, which required a different culture. The turnaround began by selling off the Lloyd's syndicate and refocusing on the disciplined, detail-oriented culture that originally made Safeco successful.
- 39:43 – 45:07
Leadership Team Restructuring and Communication
Speaker_1 outlines a 'third, third, third' rule for leadership teams: keep one-third of existing leaders, promote one-third from within, and hire one-third from outside to bring new perspectives. He emphasizes the importance of constant communication and a 'pincher movement' where leaders ask employees how they can help, bypassing middle management calcification to unlock workforce intelligence.
- 45:07 – 55:19
Political Campaign and Senate Experience
Speaker_1 left Safeco to run for the US Senate in 2006, losing to a Democrat due to the political climate in Washington State and his pro-choice stance within the Republican party. He notes that the Senate has become more partisan and less effective since the early 1980s, and he chose not to engage in negative campaigning, which he believes limited his appeal but preserved his reputation for future corporate roles.
- 55:19 – 59:23
XL Group Crisis and Credit Default Exposure
Speaker_1 became CEO of XL Group in May 2008, just before the Lehman collapse. He discovered XL was exposed to credit default swaps (CDS) to a degree similar to AIG, though without the credit-rating triggers that caused immediate liquidity crises. XL negotiated with counterparties to exit these contracts, leveraging regulatory support and its smaller size to avoid failure and restore capital market access.
- 59:23 – 1:04:40
Post-Crisis Strategy and Clean Energy Innovation
After resolving the CDS crisis, Speaker_1 and his team re-strategized XL's mission to attract top specialty underwriters. He highlights XL's innovation in clean energy insurance, creating warranty products for alternative energy projects to capitalize on European demand and improve the company's reputation, which contributed to its eventual sale to AXA in 2018.
- 1:04:40 – 1:06:23
Insurance Industry Pressure and Fiduciary Duty
Speaker 1 discusses resisting pressure to boycott legal industries like coal, arguing that insurers must fulfill fiduciary duties and provide necessary coverage rather than chasing political trends.
- 1:06:23 – 1:10:02
AI's Role in Insurance Underwriting and Cost Reduction
Speaker 1 explains that AI offers two main benefits: enabling deeper risk analysis for new insurance products and significantly lowering operational costs, which have historically remained stagnant at 35% of premiums.
- 1:10:02 – 1:12:31
AI Risk and Public-Private Partnerships
Speaker 1 argues that AI presents societal risks that insurers cannot cover alone, requiring partnerships with governments to share the burden of catastrophic events, similar to climate change strategies.
- 1:12:31 – 1:17:17
Bridgewater Transition and Board Role
Speaker 1 details his tenure as Chair of Bridgewater's board, tasked with facilitating Ray Dalio's transition and negotiating a buyout that concluded in the fifth year of his service.
- 1:17:17 – 1:28:46
Bridgewater's Culture of Radical Transparency
Speaker 1 describes Bridgewater's culture as using technology to enforce radical truthfulness, noting the cultural risks and the 'don't be an asshole' rule that mitigates potential toxicity.
Claims worth verifying
Joe McGavick was the only Republican elected to his Washington State legislative district since 1932.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·0:35
How to verify: Washington State Legislature election records for the relevant district; historical news archives from the 1970s. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Slade Gorton was one of only two senators in the last 60 years to lose a seat and then win it back.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·5:36
How to verify: US Senate election results from 2026 and 2026; historical analysis of Senate comeback races. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
McGavick was paid $100 a week driving Slade Gorton in the 1980 campaign.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·7:09
How to verify: Biographical accounts of Mike McGavick; Slade Gorton campaign records or memoirs. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Slade Gorton argued 14 times before the Supreme Court when he was the Washington State Attorney General.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·13:43
How to verify: US Supreme Court case records listing Slade Gorton as counsel during his tenure as WA Attorney General (2026-2026). For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
McGavick became CEO of Safeco in 2001.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·23:12
How to verify: Safeco Corp. SEC filings (e.g., 8-K or proxy statements) from 2026 announcing CEO succession. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMcGavick became CEO of XL Group in May 2008.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·23:12
How to verify: XL Group SEC filings or press releases from May 2026 announcing CEO succession. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceXL Group was sold to AXA in 2018.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·23:12
How to verify: AXA press releases or SEC filings regarding the acquisition of XL Group in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMcGavick served as Chair of Bridgewater’s board from 2021.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·23:12
How to verify: Bridgewater Associates board announcements or press releases from 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Superfund Reform project ended the tax that was funding lawsuits.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·21:55
How to verify: US Congressional records or IRS announcements regarding the repeal or modification of the Superfund tax/fee structure. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Politics in the US was historically run mainly by women volunteers.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·17:35
How to verify: Historical studies on political campaigning demographics; academic papers on the role of women in mid-20th century US political campaigns. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Safeco lost close to a billion dollars in 2001, the year Speaker_1 became CEO.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·31:39
How to verify: Safeco's 2026 annual report (10-K) filed with the SEC EDGAR, or historical financial news archives from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceEvery other serious insurance executive had turned down the CEO role at Safeco in 2001.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:03
How to verify: This is a subjective claim about market sentiment; verify via biographies of other insurance executives from that era or news reports from 2026 discussing the search for a Safeco CEO. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 ran the campaign that returned Slade Gorton to the Senate in 1988.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·32:50
How to verify: Public records of the 2026 US Senate election in Washington State and Slade Gorton's campaign staff records. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 became CEO of XL Group in May 2008.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·55:19
How to verify: XL Group press releases or SEC filings (Form 8-K) announcing the CEO appointment in May 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceXL Group was exposed to credit default swaps to a degree similar to AIG, potentially 10 times its balance sheet.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·57:47
How to verify: XL Group's 2026-2026 financial statements and regulatory filings (e.g., Form 10-K, 10-Q) detailing derivative exposures and risk management disclosures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceXL Group did not have credit-rating triggers in its CDS contracts that would have caused immediate payment upon downgrade, unlike AIG.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·58:07
How to verify: Review of XL Group's CDS contract terms and credit agreements filed with the SEC or available in legal/financial disclosures from 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceSpeaker_1 ran for the US Senate in 2006 against a sitting senator.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·45:13
How to verify: Federal Election Commission (FEC) records for the 2026 US Senate election in Washington State. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 was a pro-choice Republican.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·48:01
How to verify: 2026 Senate campaign statements, debate transcripts, and news coverage of Mike McGavick's 2026 campaign. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Speaker_1 served as Chair of Bridgewater's board from 2021.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:50
How to verify: Bridgewater Associates press releases or SEC filings (e.g., Form ADV) listing board members starting in 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceInsurance premiums typically allocate 65% to claims and claims adjustment costs, with the remaining 35% covering operations, brokers, agents, and profit.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:08:03
How to verify: Industry reports from the Insurance Information Institute (III) or National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) on loss ratios and expense ratios. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The speaker is chairman of a company in the AI insurance space.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:09:22
How to verify: SEC Form 4 or proxy statements for the speaker's disclosed holdings, or company press releases identifying board members. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBridgewater's board had rules imposed by an agreement with Ray Dalio that fell away after his buyout.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:14:35
How to verify: Bridgewater Associates' investor relations materials or press releases detailing the terms of the 2026/2026 transaction. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bridgewater's CEO is Nir Bardia.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:19:15
How to verify: Bridgewater Associates' official website or recent press releases identifying executive leadership. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Bridgewater's Managing CIO is Greg Jensen.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·1:19:15
How to verify: Bridgewater Associates' official website or recent press releases identifying executive leadership. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceRay Dalio stepped down from Bridgewater, and the speaker served as Chair from 2021 to January 2026.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·1:12:31
How to verify: Bridgewater Associates' press releases or SEC filings regarding board appointments and leadership transitions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-19 through 2026-11-19. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceDo your own research
- Verify Safeco's financial performance pre- and post-turnaround using SEC filings (e.g., 10-K) from 2001-2005.
- Review XL Group's (now AXA XL) credit default swap exposure and regulatory interactions during the 2008 financial crisis via SEC 8-K filings and annual reports.
- Analyze insurance industry expense ratios (operating costs as % of premiums) using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) or S&P Global Market Intelligence.
- Research Bridgewater Associates' governance structure and Ray Dalio's transition timeline through Bridgewater's public disclosures or reputable financial news archives.
- Assess the current state of AI adoption in insurance underwriting by reviewing case studies from major insurers or technology providers like Guidewire or Duck Creek.
- Check for conflicts of interest regarding McGavick's stated chairman role in AI-driven insurance platforms by reviewing his current board memberships and SEC Form 4 filings if applicable.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So, Mike McGavick, thank you t for joining me today on the Trinity Student Managed Fund Podcast.
0:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It's great to be with
0:07Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you.
0:08Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So to start, um, I know your father, Joe, has served in the Washington state legislature. Um and you really grew around with a with a passion for politics and you grew up around politics. What was it like kind of growing up around politics in Seattle?
0:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, yeah, at the time, you know, I was a little kid and it was wonderful. I mean, my dad was very determined to make a difference in his community and ran for the legislature in a in a stiffly Democrat district as a Republican. In fact, he was the only Republican elected in that district in the state legislature before or since the Depression. So he was he had a two-year stint. He got beat the next time for re-election, but he was the only Republican. to hold that seat since 1932. And uh kind of an amazing story. And uh, you know, it was it was pretty fun to work for him, but it did I remember experiencing that the kids of politicians can get pretty rough treatment. I mean, you know, everybody thinks that somehow because your dad's in the legislature, anything you do is a reflection of that instead of whatever you're up to. And I I remembered that lesson when I later ran for office. I remember I think maybe screen so on my kids was pretty hard. So it's a that's the other memory I
1:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): have.
1:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What really kind of got you into politics? Was there any specific maybe political arguments or beliefs you held growing up that really drew you
1:31Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in?
1:32Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I think I have to be honest, that at at the young age that I really got first into politics, it was simply, you know, what I grew up around. So, you know, I believed what I'd been told by my father and, you know, so on. Um, but over time I became more and more convinced of a central principle, and that is, at least historically in the US, the divide wasn't over the basic fundamentals of what the government should be like. It was really just the degree to which you first look to the private sector or the public sector for solutions.
2:05Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
2:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I really came to believe that you should always look to the private sector first, realizing that you may wind up with a government regulation, a need to use government, but government should be your last choice, not your first choice. And that that historically was the distinction between the parties when I was growing up.
2:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
2:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know you studied uh politics then when you went to the University of Washington for undergrad. Uh Um, and you obviously kind of had this political upbringing also. At the time, what did you see yourself doing after you graduated?
2:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Oh,
2:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yeah, when I was very idealistic about it all. I was convinced I was going to be in politics, that that that was the purpose to which I was born. And I was just working and trying to absorb everything I could about how that system worked. I will say, though, that political science. as taught in universities has almost nothing to do with what it's really like to be in politics. It's usually more oriented towards theoretical about how systems work or theoretical international relations. The reality of being in the room and making those decisions, it's totally different. I I feel like I learned almost nothing in terms of practical politics from my time at the University of Washington. even though I loved
3:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it.
3:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What would you say like the the kind of layman misunderstands about the practicalities of how politics really works in the US?
3:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. Politics, you know, first of all, it's a it's a pretty rough and tumble sport, right? People are trying to tear down others' reputations while building up their own. And you're trying constantly to feather between trying to be aspirational and how you're presenting yourself to people. and realizing that there's a reality that someone's trying to rip your face off and you might want to get around to ripping theirs off. So it's a very tough exercise. You have to have the skin of a rhinoceros, and you have to be very tough and very determined. And uh and it's it is as bad as people think in many ways.
4:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
4:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the early years when you were thinking about your career and and your decision making, um, what was it that was driving your decisions at that time? Was it kind of an ideological, political way you were thinking about things, or how much of an element of curiosity and ambition was was in there from the early days?
4:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
4:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): in the earliest days, I I I was more focused on just learning and learning and learning from from older people. I I you mean know I could just see that there were so many people around especially because my father was so intimately involved. And he had a rule. He if if there was a meeting in politics in our house, which there often was, that I was allowed to sit in that room as long as I didn't open my mouth. And so for years I got to sit in meetings, real grown grown-up up meetings about political activity in Washington State, that you you I don't know how you could replace the opportunity to sit in those rooms and just listen. And I bought I bet I didn't talk in one of those meetings until I was 19 or so. But I sat in those meetings from the time I was 10. So you just absorbed how these people were thinking about how to persuade Washingtonians to vote this way or that way and why. And it was amazing. I I was really very fortunate to be able to sit in. those rooms.
5:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You became then chief of staff to Senator Slade Gorton. Um, and I think you managed his 1988 campaign, which was a big success. I think one of only two senators uh in the last 60 years to lose a seat and then win his way back. Um kind of could you maybe explain a little bit of the background and how you engineered and helped engineer that that comeback?
5:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, it was a that's a it's a fairly amazing story. Say Gordon was a wonderful human being and certainly the most important adult relationship that I wound up having in my entire life. And it was so complicated and so interesting. But I'd known him since I was very young. He was one of the guys coming over to my dad's house to talk politics. So I grew up around him. And then as time went on, I got more and more complicated. comfortable with my own political instincts. And I worked in Slaves 1980 campaign. So actually I first worked in the Gorton campaign, taking the bus to his campaign office every day or every yeah, every day in the summer, back when I was a kid. So I first started working in his campaigns in 1972. I would have been 14 and I was going on the bus down to his campaign head closer, organizing volunteers. So I've been organizing volunteers since I was literally a kid. And so Slade and I developed our own relationship. And in in 1980, when he first ran for the Senate against Warren Magnusson, who was eighty, had been serving in the Senate since the Depression, uh, I was first his driver.
6:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
6:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it was the first job I ever got. had to wear a tie like you are right now. And I would get to work and drive him around the state. I was paid $100 a week, I remember. Literally with a crisp hundred dollar bill that had to go to the bank and break it into little bits. And I I I'll never ever forget what it was like to drive him around. As time went on, he started asking me to do special projects, and those went well. And then the campaign manager a wonderful, wonderful person, came to me and said,
7:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Why
7:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't you stop driving and why don't you go out and organize some of our counties? So Washington State is divided into three-nine counties. And I wound up by the end of that campaign, really fortunately, running twenty-two of them. And we won twenty 120 of the twenty-two 22 that I was running the campaign in. And when Slade won unexpectedly, um I'll never forget I walked into the office the next day all blurry. And he says, I want you to come back to Washington with me.
7:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
7:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I had dropped out of college to work on the campaign. Now I was delaying returning to college. My parents were furious, but I took the job and went back to Washington doing foreign policy and defense work, which is what I'd been studying in university. And it was an a incredible experience to be a young legislative aide. Well, after a couple of years of that, I went home, finished up college and and moved on to public affairs consulting, which was kind of a new advocacy back then was not that wasn't lobbying where you were trying to make the public believe something. And uh I loved that work. I mean just I loved that work. It was just like politics, but not but but for for corporations and and other entities in the community. And uh it was great work. I did that for a while. And then Slade lost in 1986. So I was part of I was a young staffer in the early 80s back in Washington. Then in 86 he lost that seat. And I was unable to be involved in the campaign, not that it would have mattered, um, because I was working for a not profit. not for profit at the time and couldn't be in political activity. Then the other senator decided uh to step down in 1988. And Slade decided to run again. And I was, I don't know, uh let's see, I would have been
9:0530 at the time. And he came to me and said, Look, I'm thinking about running again. I want you to run the campaign, and I want you to do it as my partner. I don't want you you're not gonna work for me. We're gonna work together to make this happen.
9:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
9:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he said, What do you think the odds are? I said, They're low.
9:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
9:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): and they're low for a simple reason. Once a campaign is conducted and the results come out, so nineteen eighty six, and Slade is rejected by the voters of the state. The first time he's ever lost a the statewide election in five trials. Okay.
9:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
9:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he's rejected. The community then kind of coalesces around the idea of no, we've thrown that guy out. I mean, that that and you know if you if you're in the United States, the big part of campaigning is bumper stickers on cars, right? Whoever you're partisan for, you put the sticker Around on your car. And as soon as you lose a campaign, every car that had your stick on it is ripping them off.
10:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Because
10:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the public is coalescing around their decision. And so you don't win when you've just lost and now you want to run again. People aren't very open to you. And I expressed this theory to Slade, and he said, I think there's a lot of truth in that. But I also know that we have the advantage that we're very well known that I have experience in the Senate. that I, you know, so on and so on. And I said, sure, but we have to really be open to why did why did you lose?
10:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
10:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what happened? And I was able to get get together a whole group of his old friends. And we held He a session where people literally tore into him about why they thought he'd lost. And the conclusion of the group was that it had gone to his head that when he went to the Senate, he stopped listening effectively to other people because he was so convinced in what he thought was right. And I remember I walked out of that meeting. I mean, it was like an hour and a half therapy session.
11:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
11:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I walked out of it, there, he was visibly shaking. And uh
11:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
11:16Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he turned to me and said, So, how do I fix this? I said, Well, you need to rethink, you need to relearn some basics about how to evidence that you are listening to people. Because I don't think it's actually that you weren't listening, it's just that you were you were no longer taking the time to display that you were listening.
11:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
11:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I think a few simple ideas, if you drill yourself on them, will reconnect you to the public. And so we run the whole campaign around that theory and around those behavioral modifications. Simple things. He had thick Coke bottle classes, you know, he was blind as a bat. We were able to get contacts that would work with
12:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the battery.
12:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): very thin glasses. And it changed his head posture from looking down at people to looking straight at people.
12:10Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
12:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was just that there was just something mechanical like that. Everything we did was around that listening concept. And uh it was very close, but sure enough, he was returned to the Senate, beating somebody who was later elected governor of the state. So it was a tough, tough race. And it worked out. And once again, he asked me to come back and uh be his chief of staff, which was, you know, at the age of well into thirty-one by then was an incredible experience.
12:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What do you think you did that kind of made him trust you enough to take you from being his driver to, you know, you then proving yourself and now becoming the guy who was like as you say, a partner in campaign, not even just a campaign manager.
12:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, you know well, first of all, I it it it it was lucky that the part of the state that I was assigned was more likely to win than not. So I was I I had the wind at my back in the jobs that he assigned me. And so, you know, you look pretty good when things win, when things go well.
13:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
13:11Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think the second thing is because I had grown up around him, I I I never understood why others were so intimidated by him. He super super slave was, I should say,
13:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): God
13:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): rest his soul. Slave was incredibly intimidated because he was wicked smart. I mean this is a guy who argued 14 times before the Supreme Court when he was the Washington State Intor To the General. I mean he is brilliant. But he also was like any of us. We all have our flat spots, not just our glowing spots, you know. And while he was wicked brilliant, he was terrible at making you feel good. You know, he just wasn't political in that way. He'd walk right. Even after I'd known him all those years and was his chief of staff, I was walking outside the US Senate one time with a friend of mine, and he walked right by me. Right. I I wait, in fact, I waited. until he went 10 more steps and turned around and said, Hey Gordon, are you gonna say hi or what? He was just he was just oblivious and and he had to be forced to be more kind and more empathetic and more aware of the people around him.
14:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
14:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, and and because I was lucky enough to grow up around him, I never understood what was intimidated about it. I made fun of him all the time. And he trusted that. He knew that I would tell him the truth and be authentic about it. And that leads to genuine trust. And once you're in a genuine trusted relationship and things keep working, your trust just deepens and deepens and deepens. And it went that way with Slade for the rest of our work together. It was one I I could never have been more fortunate in who I learned from and how we worked work together. It was really, really fun, really neat, special.
14:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What does uh chief of staff kind of understand about how a campaign works and about about kind of the strategy behind a campaign that the public doesn't see until the final product?
15:09Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, i I don't go I don't know that there's that much that is so wildly mysterious. I mean it is you know, it's it's two camps of people vying for the public's affection and trying to prevent the other from winning the public's affection. In that part everybody knows and you know, but all of the mechanics behind the scene are mostly what you would expect or what you'd see in some TV show. I mean, there's polling that gives you some sense of what people's attitudes are. There's using tools to develop new media strategies and whatnot to try and enhance what you can in terms of what makes you the choice and often to make sure that the other person is not as well regarded. I mean, th those things are as you think, but they are increasingly through time. So all the time I was growing up, having started working around politics. in the 60s, all the way through when I was running in eight running a campaign in 88, all the str all the technology kept changing how you do it.
16:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
16:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, the y you're now ta you're now down to where you can almost micro-target down to individuals. Like you already know that individual's bias, where they live, what their phone number is, how to contact them, how to motivate them. You're almost down to where it's literally person by person by person. And and when we were doing it, it was more, you know, precinct by precinct level data, which is, you know, a few hundred at a time and blocks at a time. So it just keeps getting more targeted, more specific. But the theories are exactly the same. There's there's no changing change in the theory. theories. It's just the capacity to be specific has radically changed.
16:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So what did your time kind of running these campaigns and then working then in the Senate teach you? Uh and kind of why then did you leave and take it to the private sector?
17:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know
17:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what I th I it's one of my favorite things. So I really loved motivating volunteers. From the time I was really young, I was asked to do that kind of work, as I mentioned again, kind of 14 years old. And people would come in. Mostly back then, by the way, politics was run mainly by women in the United States. This is rarely understood because politics didn't pay back then. It pays a lot. There's a lot of people spending money on politics. Back then, all these campaigns were largely run by volunteers. And the people who could volunteer the most in that old era were the ones that weren't the breadwinners in the house. Campaigns were largely run by women as volunteers. And how you organize and motivate a group of people who are literally just giving their time to do what used to be campaigning used to be a lot of difficult menial tasks, you know, putting mailings together, knocking on doors, putting up yard signs, all this stuff. So you learn
18:15that the way to do that is that how do you come to a shared higher purpose? You know, what is it we're trying to do in the world that's so important that we take our time and do these menial. tasks? And and how am I a part of making things successful? So show me what we're doing, why it matters, and why the big picture is so important. That's the way you motivate people and grow up. So all the way to when you're running campaigns in 1988, which was a big high-dollar high dollar campaign for the US Senate,
18:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): most
18:51Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of the campaigning is about organizing volunteers still.
18:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You've
18:54Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): got it, you've got a paid staff, yep, but they're not being paid much. They're really buying into the aspiration. So you're always going back to first principles. What is our motivating purpose? Why are we doing this? Why is it so important that we succeed? And how does my role in this, even if it's a menial task, matter, really matter? That's what causes. people to do great things. Well,
19:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when
19:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I got when I eventually,
19:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
19:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'd been doing that, living like that, kind of limb to limb, you know, because campaigns are episodic events and then they go away, or you're in the Senate staff for a while, and then you gotta go make some money. And I mean, it's just not a real stable way of life. And uh, you know, I had a young son, and it was time to have things. like health insurance. And you know, I've never, I mean, I just, you know, living outside the structure, going limb to limb. So I finally concluded um that uh it was just time for me to do something different. And so I wound up with a great friend of mine, a political advisor named Eddie Mai, who was just a genius,
20:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
20:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he had become great friends and worked. on lots of projects. And he'd helped me with slave skin pains and that kind of stuff. And he came to me and he said, Mike, I think, I think there's a a new route for you. Um that you need to think about being successful in a different field for a while. And then if you want to go back and run for office, do it later. But let's do something different. He said, look, the most admired class in America right now is the CEO class. right? Chief executives of public companies were very popular at the time. And he said, We got to figure out how to make you a CEO.
20:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I'm
20:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): like, Well, that's gonna be really hard because all I know is politics. That's all I've been doing all the years. And I was in my about the early 30s at this point.
20:45Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
20:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he says, Well, I think we can do it, and I'm gonna going to look for a project. that's political, but that will put you in front of CVOs. And I think as soon as they see you perform, they're going to want you to be successors in their businesses. I said, that sounds crazy to me. I think you're out of your mind. And he called later and he had he had been asked to work on a project called Superfund Reform, which was an environmental policy that was creating a lot of havoc in the insurance industry. And he had convinced the American Insurance Association to set up a project. So a kind of a trade association within a trade association, all devoted to super fund reform. And they were looking for a leader for that project. And I wound up getting that job. And
21:35Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
21:35Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): wound up with a board that was exclusive. exclusively CEOs in the insurance industry. And that project, well, at the very end, it didn't do it the main thing we wanted to do, but it ended the tax that was funding all these lawsuits. And that alone made it not so much of a crisis for the sector. So it was considered successful, but not as successful as I would have liked. In fact, one of these pictures. appears an article from when it failed, because I never want to forget failure, too, you know. And I I really remember being in front of those CEOs and we we wrapped up the project a couple of years later and said, okay, it wasn't totally successful, but but that was great. And four or five, I don't remember, of the CEOs called me to see if I'd come work in their company. But they all wanted me to do um government affairs work, right? So kind of lobbying and the stuff would be logical given what I'd done. And I had no interest in doing that. And I told everyone, look, I I'm only coming if I'm not doing government affairs. There's gotta be something else for me to do. And one guy, Dennis Casian, a very important figure in my life, Dennis was running a company called CNN. CNA at the time.
22:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
22:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): he said, Mike, I want you to come to CNA and we're going to start you off in strategy. I have a real strategic problem around how healthcare reforms are going to affect my company. I want you to figure out how it affects all these different aspects of our company and write a strategy for us like that. So I did. And that went really well. About a year later, he came to me and said, Well, that went good. Now you're gonna be the CFO of our largest and poorest performing business. Like
23:23Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
23:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): w
23:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh you
23:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, I'm I've never trained in finance. I don't I mean, I remember my brother in law getting your book Finance for Idiots or something like that. Which Was a perfect description of my state at the time. And uh once again it went well. But but the main thing I remember is that
23:44Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
23:44Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): said, well, I was meeting with one of the senior leaders of CNA,
23:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
23:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I said, Well, how do you motivate people? And he said, You don't need to motivate them, you're paying. And to this day, I believe that companies leave when they think like that, and many companies think like that, are leaving the most powerful form of motivation to the side. So all I've been trying to do is make employees inspired to do work. So I used the same toolkit that I've been using to do that with people who were paid.
24:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
24:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): ignored the fact that they were paid. I just said I've got to be able to motivate you to a higher purpose and to give more. to make a difference. And uh so those skills that I learned from the time I was 14 in organizing volunteers proved to be, I think, the thing that led to differentiated success in the companies I was involved with in the private sector.
24:45Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Do you think that um kind of heavily regulated industry? is kind of a natural home for people who are coming from a politics background? And could you maybe explain a little bit about how your background in politics can really help you in a role in a regulated industry where you can kind of translate and almost act as as an intermediary and and kind of empathize with both sides of the coin?
25:10Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, that so so a few things. And I really like that question because it's it's irrelevant. And this was the brilliance of Edward Mai. He's the one who figured out, Mike, you should be in insurance. Why? Because you're good at communications and insurance is thoroughly misunderstood.
25:25Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
25:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's a natural calling on one of your things you're comfortable with, public speaking or this kind of thing. Second, it's intensely regulated, and you understand the motivations of the politicians who oversend the regulators or oversend. overseeing the regulators. That's a perfect fit. And third, insurance is in essence an extension of society's commitments to the communities it serves. Right? Because what is insurance done? It's trying to rebuild from misfortune.
25:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): We
25:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): used to do that as a community. I mean, when we in the old days when barns were raised by the community when someone's barn had burned, that was in essence an insurance function, right? That was performed by the society. Um, but when communities get very large and less personal, you just have this constant thing going on whether society should take the risk or whether it should offload it to the private sector and in the insurance industry. And that's why it's so intensely regulated. You have Given no that it's hard to understand, it has to be trusted in order to function and in order to lay off that risk from the society at large to private insurance companies. That's a big leap of faith. And so insurance is a, as you said, a natural home for someone who has a knowledge of what society is trying to do in government and how government and that private sector can cooperate to create trust and to create instruments that really take risk out of the society. So, yes, it it for me, it proved shockingly to me, because I never really liked insurance when I was growing up. I wound up in love with the industry because I think it does really wonderful and poorly understood things for people.
27:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): What does working in a regulated industry teach you about kind of how the government really works and how that kind of policy and regulatory mechanism actually functions?
27:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, well, you know, I think one of the one of the things I learned was that most of the regulated companies don't appreciate their regulator as much as they should.
27:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): This
27:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sounds Cameron. counterintuitive, right? There's always a tension. But the problem with the tension is go back to the principle. The principle is we're doing work that the society wishes it could do for people, but we're doing it through a private mechanism. I like that. I prefer that we go to private mechanisms before public mechanisms. So I'm I'm cons intellectually consistent with that. But we have to appreciate if you're on one of the regulated industries, that the regulator has a job too. And it's two part. Number one, make sure it's working in a fair way so that they can give their stamp that this could be trusted. That means it actually has to be trustworthy. And you have to prove to the regulator it's being done in a trustworthy way. And then second, accept that they won't always see it the way you see it. because they're served, they're in service of the public, not your shareholder. So there's a tension. I'm working for my shareholder, but in order to do so, I have to be trusted. And to be trusted, I have to get the blessing of the regulator. So there's a symbiosis, even if there's a tension, right? And if you accept that, then you're much calmer in how you work with your regulator. You're more transparent. you're more open to what they need in order to create that stamp of approval. If you take it as an
28:57adversarial game, you're missing the point. It's not that they're against you, it's just that they're coming from a different point of view. And you need to win them over. Now, I've had some pretty tough dealings with regulators at times where we've where our misunderstanding is hurting the company or whatever. But the reality is if you have to, you know, kind of say the grace every day, I need that regulator to understand me in order to be trusted and by their stamp of approval gain the trust of the public. I I think that's a super hard mindset for people who've never been around government to grasp. And I the blessing for me was you know, that meant that every time there was a trade association around. that they wanted me to help with it because I had that political background and I could understand the regulator a little better than some of my my peers. That was wonderful for me because it enabled me to get to know everybody in the industry in a really profound way, know regulators all around the world. And it in in turn helped me make the companies I was leading, I think, have a little bit of an edge. So it was it was really cool.
30:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Most people, I suppose, would probably find insurance boring or think insurance is boring. And I know you said like initially, insurance is never an industry you thought you would end up in. Um what what do people miss kind of on the surface about the intricacies of how it really works?
30:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, I think that well, look, it's it it's it's the industry's own fault. Um We bring this on. ourselves. And and it's and it's partly a structural flaw. The only way we can create a promise is in legal ease, right? It has to be legally defined, it has to tie off to the legal system because it may be adjudicated eventually.
30:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
30:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we put our promises in the form of really complicated contracts, and they become complicated because so often insurers are sued and it lays down another rule that you got to pay attention to and you know really be clear in what it is you're promising, what you're not promising. And as a result, it winds up being totally opaque to the consumer. So the consumer has to turn to others to trust it. That's why you use brokers or agents, right? You're using an intermediary to make up for the fact that you're probably not as an individual, unless you happen to be a lawyer, going to understand the contractor's sign. So as a result, there's constant tension with the public believing that there's some kind of a trick going on that I'll never get actually a claim paid or that the insurer has a has a a um an opposite incentive. Their incentive is to not pay a claim, plane, but I want my claim. plane.
31:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So you became CEO of Safeco in in two thousand one, um a year in which the company had lost close to a billion dollars and much of the market had kind of uh bad feelings about the company, uh expecting it to kind of fail or even be broken up. Um what was the first ninety days like when you stepped
31:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in? Well
31:57Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): let let's start with being very clear.
32:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
32:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): didn't know this at the time. but every other serious insurance executive had turned it down. So I was just the dope that didn't know enough to realize that it was probably dead. And it was,
32:16Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
32:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a chance to go back to my hometown and work on an institution that I'd known growing up. So, you know, my my family was actually insured with Safeco when I was a kid. And I remember when I was a teenager,
32:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
32:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): might have had a habit of driving a little fast, you know. And I got my second speeding ticket that summer and Safeco called my dad and threatened to cancel our family's insurance. And so he made me cut my hair and shave and I had to go convince Since the underwriting at Safe Sa underwriter at Safeco that I was a worthwhile risk into the future. on the pain of never being able to drive again, as far as I knew. So I knew Safeco and they scared the hell out of
32:57Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): me.
32:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): So you can imagine how strange it was to walk in this big tall building right next to the university I'd studied in. From my office I could see my elementary school, my middle school, my high school, and my university. All of them from the office I was standing in. It was crazy. And uh, you know, the first 90 days were hectic, strange. And I I learned, I mean, it was it was a great experience in the end, but boy, the first 90 days were horrifying because the company was really performing poorly. It had, it had started to misunderstand what made it special. But it it I I came to believe very quickly that it was like a car that had been allowed to kind of break down and get a little rusty and but that the core to it was still really, really, really good. It had a great reputation in the agency and broker community. That's essential to that kind of business. And it had a cult culture that had two primary characteristics. Number one, people,
34:11you didn't have to check on whether they would do what they said they would do. They just were disciplined. They did what they said they would do. And that's a great thing. You don't need a lot of bureaucracy to govern a company where people can be trusted to just do what they said they would do. And they had the habit of doing all the little things extremely carefully.
34:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
34:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's in the in the lines of business they were in, which are mass market, auto, small commercial, and homeowners, that is the essential thing, is doing lots of little things repeatedly well. What they'd
34:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
34:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they had lost sight of was to stay focused on those lines of business. They decided that they were just really good at insurance in general back in the in the mid-90s. And as a result, they went and bought a syndicate at Lloyd's, which is the difference between totally disciplined activity and wild bets. Those are totally different businesses. They have totally different characteristics. of a culture that would be successful. They required different people. That's it's crazy. And so they made this strategic pivot, bought a big company in the Midwest that they really didn't understand a lot of the lines of business that were being written there. And so taking their eye off the ball had disabled their culture from performing its essential role. All we had to do. happily,
35:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
35:40Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this is, you know, kind of rule number one, in my opinion, in a in a turnaround, is what was the strategic differentiator that made it successful in the first place? And how do we get back to focusing just on that? And sure enough, just that simple thing. We sold off the Lloyd Syndicate. We or worked our way out of it. And we, you know,
36:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
36:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): did these things. and and the culture responded immediately. They they just saw, okay, we're back to what we know how to and and you know, the second thing was people had, you know, the prior leadership obviously just had not seen it that way. And as a result, the the workforce had lost confidence in leadership. And that's it's very sad because these these were wonderful well meaning well-meaning people. Do not get me wrong, they were good people. But they they just kind of taken their off the ball. And the workforce kind of knew it. And so as soon as you step, and because they knew it, they kind of didn't know what to do, and they were a bit paralyzed, not doing the jobs they knew how to do because they didn't know where things were going or how their role was supposed to work within where it was going.
36:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
36:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): sure enough, when our team got together and we started saying, okay, we gotta, you know, get back to basics and forget all this other stuff, but we have to modernize the basics because Safego was still using very old style underwriting and the world had moved on to analytics-driven underwriting, we needed to build models that were current so that we could really give our agents the best possible product. And we had to do it in a way that was super efficient for the agents, so the agents would prefer to do business with us than others. So at the same time that we were taking us past to basics, we were rebuilding the basics to a more modern platform. And sure enough, when those two things clicked in together, it just took off. So because the core looked rusty, all these other people got scared to work there, we came in and said, no, this is pretty simple. Let's get back to what we're really good at. Let's get out of these things we don't belong in. And and sure enough, it just took off. And it was it was wonderful. But I did learn one of my most important lessons on the negative side. Don't declare victory too early.
38:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
38:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): yes, it turned around rather quickly, but we underestimated how part it would, how hard it would be and how much money it would require to really rebuild the platform over time. So as soon as we started seeing the turnaround, we started saying, you know, this is great. Congratulations to the workforce. Well, then imagine you hear all that from some young CEO and you start saying, this is great. and then the next thing you do is you do more cost cuts because you still have to keep fixing stuff. That was terrible. And it took a year to to cure the distrust that that dissonance and message. Oh, great turnaround. Oh no, we're doing it again. That was that was a rookie mistake stake that that I take, I took all the I I I should and do have all the ownership of. So, you know, learning to realize it's it's don't over, don't overbelieve yourself, you know. Stay in the game, stay disciplined, perhaps never declare victory and just realize it's always a journey. But but yeah, it was cool. And it was because of
39:09generations of Safego leaders who had have built that culture that it all worked like it did.
39:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How do you kind of, when you come in, how do you create or um,
39:19Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
39:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you you say the culture story there. So maybe how do you craft this this kind of uh, I suppose almost like a siege mentality within the business that you are all kind of coalesced around this mission to bring it back to where it was and and you'll see there are like tough things you're gonna have to go through. You have to spin off this business, you have to make cost cuts, but how do you keep people kind of focused and keep their eyes on the prize?
39:43Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, there there's a few things that I learned that eventually became patterns for me. So there's a little bit of this pattern recognition. So when I was at CNA, I didn't realize it, but the part of the company that I was charged with turning around, I wound up with a I didn't realize at the time, but a pattern emerged. By the time I got to accept Excel, I knew I knew this rule. Basically, keep a third of your existing leadership team, promote a third of your existing leadership team from existing people, and bring in a third of your leadership team from outside.
40:18Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
40:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): why do you do that? First of all, in any leadership group, there are great people and so-so people. And generally, when a company's gone off the rails, you haven't attended to the leadership team sufficiently. So by retaining a few people, realizing, hey, they were really excellent. There's no reason to change these people, you get some continuity, right? You really know what worked in the past, you have the chance to make it work again, and you haven't just disrespected the culture. You haven't said there's no one here worth the a damn. The second thing is sometimes there are really good people trapped in the next couple of layers. So if you can find a few of those and realize they were trying to tell their boss, hey, this is dumb, and move them up to the team, they're all freshly energized and they have consistency too, right? But then don't fail to bring in two, three, four new people. who see the world totally differently, particularly people in this case who had understood technology-driven underwriting. Bring them in to really shape up to the modern standard what we were doing. That third or third pattern first emerged at CNA. I didn't recognize it as a pattern. Then it happened again To at get Safeco. I realized, okay, that was instead of
41:36now being an accident, when I got to Excel, I was focused on what's the third I'm keeping, what's the third I'm promoting, what's the third I'm bringing in, and why. And so it became if if I had to do a turnaround again, I would apply a third, a third, a third within weeks of being there. You know, I was learning it when I started it at Safeco. So that's you know, probably the biggest thing that makes the biggest difference, because of course, all of these things are about how strategy. culture, and people work together. And if you have the wrong leaders, you'll have the wrong people. So to get those three working in harmony, you got to reimagine what the company's going to be. You got to understand the core of why it's differentiated. That's the strategic part. You got to get the culture either repaired or engaged. Problem that the the culture was great at safe, except they had lost sight of only rewarding excellent performance.
42:30Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): They
42:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): were tolerating mediocrity all over the place. And so you had to stir that all up. As soon as you replaced a third of the leaders for the outside, that was a signal, hey, you better perform or you're gonna go, no matter how beloved you are. Um and then, you know, then communicate, communicate, communicate. And and communicate I can't under I can't underscore communication. enough. If you're gonna put people through a grinder where you're gonna have layoffs, some job insecurity and all that horrible stuff, you'd better be clear. Why are we doing this? What's the greater purpose? How's it going to all come together? And what's my role in it? And you've got to be able to say that constantly and train all of your leaders to be able to say that constantly. And then the final thing I think about is it's a bit, I don't like using military terms because business is not life and death, but it is a little bit of a pincher movement. You want your leadership going out there constantly saying, What can I do better
43:31to help you be more successful? Because that's the job of a leader. So you got to get a leadership team that behaves like that. So you pick those people. And then you travel all around the company, encouraging everybody, every single person to believe that their point of view on anything you're doing is relevant. So, you know, I got tired of saying it in all my CEO jobs, but if you really have if you see something you don't think makes sense, just send me an email. My email works just the same as yours. I probably get a little more traffic than you do, but I will. get back to
44:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you. Well,
44:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): this scares the hell out of middle managers, right? In the old industrial structures, it was all supposed to flow through the manager up and all flow down. Yes, we got our whole, our highest valued asset is the collective intelligence of the workforce. How do you get that unlocked and put into motion in a way? that doesn't threaten everybody? Well, what are you doing when you have leaders all going out and say, help me lead better? And when you tell the whole workforce, say whatever's on your mind. You know, be be nice, be, you know, civil, but what's on your mind? This creates a total pinch of movement on middle management. Middle management realizes pretty quickly I'm not going to get in the way of this game. I'm going with. it. I'm going to help be that person that's asking, How can I do better? And you get all the calcification of middle management out of the way. And I I that's kind of to me, that's the turnaround world in a nutshell, those handful of things.
45:07Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): After kind of you you left one of the top jobs in the Seattle business community
45:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): at
45:13Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Safeco to run. for the Senate uh against a sitting senator. Um why did you leave?
45:20Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, I felt that I had done all I was going to be able to do in a differentiated way at Safeco. You know, Safeco was all you know, we we would have eight hour meetings over to how to shave a penny off the cost, you know. I mean it w that was about lots of little things done repeatedly well. And that was great. But once we solved for reconnecting the culture and the strategy to the people and had that thing take off like that, to be honest, it no longer
45:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
45:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I didn't feel like I was the right person to carry it into the future. There was a whole bunch of very disciplined, granular insurance type stuff that needed to be done. And I'm not really a true insurance professor. professional. I've never been an underwriter, never been in claims. So my job was kind of more strategic and and just a different kind of thing. So I looked around and I said, man, I I'm no longer the right guy. I mean, they this just needs a man or woman who's totally into the discipline of this company. We had a strategic idea about how to make the company much bigger that we were just starting to execute on, but I realized there's a better person out there, I think, to do this. A. And B, you know, I'd come to my hometown because of the prominence of the Safeco job, I was invited to give speeches on lots of stuff. And I gave a particular speech that that kind of kinda lit up. I mean, I I remember a a columnist in the largest newspaper the next day
46:50had this. had headline, the spee the speech and what it meant. And it was all about, you know,
46:56Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
46:56Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): was very complimentary. And and instantly the political calls started coming. Run for governor, run for this, run for that.
47:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
47:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): at first I kind of ignored it 'cause I didn't think we were sufficiently done with the safe go job. And then it became really clear we were we had done everything that I'd set out to do as its leader. And I thought, well, you know, maybe I should consider going back to my original dream of being in politics. You know, I'd been a chief of staff in the Senate, so it wasn't like I was unfamiliar and had run campaigns. And
47:29Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
47:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): thought, well, maybe I just take a chance. And I knew that the state was moving and has moved ever since, more and more the opposite way in terms of politics. and ideology.
47:41Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
47:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I also thought it it was close enough to the last time a Republican had won that I could take a chance. And there was a second aspect. All all my life I've uh been the rarest of things, which is a in a in a back then the sign one of the signature issues of every campaign was abortion. And I was the rare pro-choice Republican. And I felt that this was one environment where I could win a nomination. And that in most environments, I couldn't win a nomination. So I figured, well, let's take a chance. And I thought it was going to be an anti incumbent year, but it turned into an anti Republican year. So for a while there, it was the closest Senate race in the country, literally. Uh we were within a few points and ever all the national press was showing up and it was awesome. And then it just it ju the the mood just shifted hard. Bush had a surge go W. Bush had a surge going in the Middle East. That was very
48:43unpopular. And in my home state, that was just deadly. And that's why I lost handily. So that was the end of that.
48:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I wanted to read uh your campaign statement. I thought it was quite interesting. You said the US Senate is broken. They spend their time bickering, pointing fingers, and fighting about who deserves credit for what little they accomplish. Their focus is on getting elected, not on solving the real problems facing our families and communities. Nothing will change if we just send the same people back to Washington, DC. The tenant needs new leaders who will actually solve problems. Twenty years on, how do you think the statement has aged?
49:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Pretty well. You know, and I the the weird thing is I loved being around the US Senate. I loved I felt it was such an honor to work there and Slade was so good at it and there was the
49:33Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): w
49:33Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the world was so much less partisan back then, seems a lifetime ago. So, you know, there's nothing that I've come to admire about how the Senate functions now compared to how it functioned when I first was around it back in the early eighties. And that makes me terribly sad. It it's it's a very important piece of the the structure of the US Constitution. institution And and were it better and filled with people more of the mind that was true in the kind of fifties and so on, I think we'd be a much better country. But I don't see it changing. And I don't see and I see now with hindsight that, you know,
50:15Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it
50:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it I I don't think I'd have had the impact that I dreamed of having anyway. So for my family it probably turned into a blessing that I lost because I doubt, no matter what I did, that I could have retained that seed into the future and made a big impact. So, you know, people made their choice, fine by me. And happily, one thing we did
50:40Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
50:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I'm really proud of, but it was it it was probably self-defeating, is we chose really not to go down the negative campaigning road. We really never attacked my opponent much. In fact, we only focused on policy stuff. We never did the big hardcore negative stuff. They did that to me, and I didn't do it back.
51:04Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
51:04Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I chose that. And I chose it for two reasons. One, I believed that that kind of campaigning is part of why the system's so distrusted. And two,
51:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
51:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): also knew that. if I lost, I didn't, I wouldn't have bettered my reputation if I played that game. And so we ran one of the most distinct positive slash only issue focused campaigns you've ever seen in modern electoral politics that I know of. And and I did stick with being pro-choice. I never thought about changing my view on that. Those two things combined really lessened the chance that I would win. Between five and ten percent of the Republican Party would never vote for me because of the abortion stand.
51:53Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
51:53Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): had to make up from the independents and Democrats. And and not pointing out the deficiencies of my opponent wasn't a very good way to motivate them.
52:03Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
52:03Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I put myself an advisor of the campaign once called it, Mike, you're in the civility cul-de-sac and you can't get out. And I said, Well, kind of so be it. But the good news was it made me,
52:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
52:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, there weren't a lot of people around, you know, at the time what the Senate campaign was in 06. So I was what, 48 or something like that? And older. Anyway, it it's just there weren't many people around who'd run publicly traded. companies successfully and turned them around. So to have one come back on the market, having not, you know, belittled himself by being a petulant campaigner, I was probably uh I probably had a better chance of re-entering corporate America, and it worked out that way. And the next journey was fabulous. It's So, you know, blessings come in lots of strange ways.
52:50Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): How
52:50Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): do you compare kind of failures in business versus failures in politics? One thing that I've always thought that's difficult with politics is business clearly kind of falls at your feet. But in politics, there are kind of these factors. If sentiment is against Republicans and you're running as a Republican, you know, it's just a difficult environment. And of course that can happen in business, but I feel like you have a bit more control. Is that something that you felt
53:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): kind of
53:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): looking back on it and assessing how you did?
53:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah. So well, first of all, no doubt. But I would say it's just as true in business. If you aren't adept in strategy terms at understanding the major forces that are going on around you, you cannot possibly succeed. You risk running heavy. headwung into them. So you've got to make sure, you know, the simple phrase for it, that you need to make sure the trend is your friend.
53:48Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
53:48Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): trend in Washington state politics has been going the wrong way for a person with my particular set of beliefs for a very long time. And it's just gotten worse consistently in the hyperpartisan era that exists today. Similarly, if you aren't focused on how technology reshapes the way your business functions, reshapes the way trust is created, especially in a product like insurance, if you don't understand those things and aren't harnessing them to put them at your back, you can't win. You practically can't win. win. And you And that's similar in how workforces are motivated. It's similar in how communication. works. Every aspect of how you create culture, of how you differentiate in winning with a strategy, if it isn't put through the prism of technology and people, and made sure that you are harnessing the best thinking and how to put those things to your back and propel you forward, you're missing the point. And so I don't think it's any different across either fear. It's the most important single thing.
54:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So the next stage after this campaign in 06 was that you became the CEO of XL Group in May 2008. Um only months before kind of the collapse of Lehman. Um what was the first period? to come into that role like and how did it differ from your time at Stafeco?
55:19Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, uh let's start with what was the same. Once again, I was thoroughly unqualified, but all the smart people wouldn't take the job. So I was lucky twice in that regard. And and it was much worse than I was able to perceive from the public documents.
55:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
55:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, it's only once you get hired in both the Safeco situation and in the Excel situation that they really show all the warts to you. And even though I was in a much better position to understand the Excel situation given the SafeCo experience, the lines of business were so different and the and the sophistication of Excel was at such a different level that still I didn't fully grasp
56:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
56:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): bad it was until. I was on the inside. And then it became very quickly very terrifying. The difference between the two is it was really evident at Safeco, as soon as we started assembling that team and and testing a couple things, it was pretty it was really clear how strong the franchise was underneath it all. And how much if we focused on that and modernized it, it'd be it would almost certainly work. At Excel, you had a different situation. Your underwriting side had historically been one of the great underwriting companies rooted in creativity, in business model creativity, product creativity. All of it was very, very important specialized work, but that had become overshadowed by a combination. of a governance failure between the chairman of the company and the CEO of the company. And second, a hyper move into very dangerous products that weren't very well understood. And that meant that Excel was exposed to a particular and specific point of point of failure. that that we were we were just a smaller version of what was going on at AIG at the time.
57:21And you know, to remember that in both cases, the companies were selling credit default projects, products that the Great Recession made extremely costly. Extremely costly.
57:37Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
57:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): think in fact we were exactly by multiple exposed to the same degree, like something like 10 times our balance sheet or something,
57:47Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was
57:47Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what our exposure was to those products alone. Similar to AIG. The problem the benefit for us that AIG had a problem we didn't have, and that was that so many of their products were triggered by their credit declines. So as they moved from AAA to AA or whatever, it triggered all these things for immediate payment. That creates a crisis. We didn't have those triggers in our contracts, but we still had the threat that they could play out. So we had a little more time. And we were so much smaller, right? We were we our whole balance sheet was again a tenth of theirs or something like that. that. So we our problem could be solved. And and the regulator had a desperate want to solve it because we were big enough to matter. If we had failed, we had an advantage. You had to come to Bermuda for the capital. Well, that was more complicated than you know, some s other insurer. And and second, we were small enough that you could solve it. So they the regulators were desperate to solve us, and we were large enough to be solved. So we worked with the regulator to create a negotiation with our counterparties and were able to negotiate our way out of those bad contracts. And then,
59:07by virtue of extinguishing that exposure, created enough trust that we could go back into the capital markets just before the capital market. markets window closed. So we were incredibly lucky to have been able to do
59:21Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that.
59:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So if you kind of look at how you managed
59:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to
59:27Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bring the ship through 08, and then eventually a decade later, XL was sold to AXEF Axev in 2018. And kind of how did you bring yourselves out of the crisis? And at what point did you think you had kind of weathered the storm?
59:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, so first of all, it was because there were a lot of other great leaders at the company. So, you know, Jenny Vechti, who ran our insurance operations, or Greg Hendricks, who eventually wound up running our insurance operations. You know, these were great leaders. And Dave Duclo, who was running insurance when I got there, I mean, they kept the businesses. working well, while I and a couple of experts in the credit default business and our general counsel created a team of advisors and went and solved and negotiated our way out of that crisis. If you don't solve the crisis, there's no Excel. So we, I kind of would call and All of them we'd have meetings, and I'd
1:00:22Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): say,
1:00:22Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I I hope you're doing a great job at the businesses, because I I have no, I don't even have time to. think about what you're doing. I'm gonna I'm gonna stay focused on this, you stay focused on that. And that was great. The only trouble was that when we got done,
1:00:38Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we
1:00:38Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of thought, well, and the businesses have been performing really well, they'll just continue to. And you started realizing that that some of the businesses weren't running as well as you thought. And so then you suddenly while you're exhausted and feeling elated, you're suddenly saying, you know, we gotta re, we got to re-strategize how these businesses are going to work into the future. And so we,
1:01:01Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:01:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, we really attacked the problem of how do we, in the Excel context of innovation and and higher purpose, how do we reinvent our mission so that the leadership team exists to cause all these little business units run by great underwriters and whatnot to actually thrive? And how do we create an attraction to the great clever specialty underwriting community to come work with us instead of somewhere else at Lloyd's or whatever? It was just a fascinating strategic set of exercises and really heavily communications again, like I described with the Safeco. But super fun and super creative and super global. And it was it was a wonderful run, just d and great leaders all over the place. It was something else.
1:01:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): How did your experience prior to that in the political world help you in kind of going forward in these negotiations?
1:02:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, definitely when well, as I s, you know, when when when you're in a regulated industry, you learn that the regulator and you are in common purpose to create trust in these products.
1:02:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:02:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): when you have a franchise that's in trouble reputationally, like Excel was at the time, first you have to really focus on keeping your people because good people have choices. So there was a big piece of that. But second, you had to realize you have to organize it. to satisfy the need of the regulator. The regulator needs you not to be a problem. How do I enable that? How do I create an environment in which these responsibilities can be satisfied in a way that doesn't break the bank so that the entire the entire economic system doesn't have to deal with your mess? And when you have that mindset at heart, it's pretty easy to work. with the regulators. I mean, they're they're going to be very demanding and counterparties are going to be mean and all that stuff, but you just got to set that up for success. And we were able to do that. But it certainly helped that by virtue of political training, I understood what the regulator had to do and just worked like hell to satisfy that need.
1:03:13Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to be aware of One the question.
1:03:14Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): thing the that was uh obviously a huge part of what Excel Group was is this innovation you made in in kind of uh clean energy insurance. Could you talk to me a little bit about kind of what you guys were doing in the space and kind of some of the big strides you made?
1:03:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, we had some super creative people around, um, people like Tom Hotton Hutton and I mean I did the list would take too long to go through, but we w kind of realized that there was a double payoff from being involved in products that were on beg given that we were a global operation and you know European attitudes toward climate change were much more aggressive than domestic influences. And we just said, you know, this this whole need is n under is is is we are not doing our job. We're not creating products that make this need for alternative energy more successful. How can we do it? And so we started studying all kinds of activities. And one that emerged that was really interesting was kind of how warranties worked in the new energy space.
1:04:20Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:04:21Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): we were will be able to create some warranty products that were really cool. I think we actually called it new energy. risk or something like that. We were able to work with reinsurers to create a a whole new field. And and those really worked out well. So and it really helped with reputation. It helped it helped with everything that we were engaged in. And it also emboldened us not to feel that we had to do dumb things. So for example, there was a lot of pressure on insurers. not to insure the activities of, you know, so called dirty energy. Well, you know, as long as it is, as long as the government says it's perfectly legal to have a coal plant, why would you not insure the workers through workers' comp in that coal plant? Who wins from not insuring those people? It it was nuts, but there was huge pressure to somehow become the point of disabling so-called dirty energy. That isn't the job of the insurance community. The job of the insurance community is to provide its tools where needed by the economy. And so we were braver in not doing dumb things, or things that I actually, in terms of investing strategy and stuff, would have viewed as literally not permitted. because of our
1:05:40fiduciary duties, because we were doing really good things to help with the problem, the actual problem of getting more clean energy into the system. And since we were doing that, we didn't feel obligated to chase the um
1:05:54Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
1:05:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): kind of mob that was trying to kill off perfectly legal industries. It didn't make any sense to us and we said so.
1:06:01Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So kind of two themes that people are are thinking will change the insurance industry at the moment is you have the climate theme, which has obviously been there for quite a few years now. Emerging is the kind of theme of risk created by AI. And how is this kind of affecting the way insurance firms and the industry at large is dealing with risk? And kind of what is being that do you think underestimated at the moment?
1:06:23Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, so there's there's there's several different parts. And I think I about I I wind up thinking about this a lot. You know, AI has the opportunity to help us dig deeper into understanding the opportunities for insurance to do more for the world, right? Because one of the ways we approach the world in the insurance community is if we don't really understand a risk, we can't do much to help.
1:06:52Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
1:06:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's not very useful for society when our whole job is to try and reduce risk and increase resilience across the society. So our constantly saying, Well, we don't get it, so we can't insure is not very helpful. We need to be looking for ways to make a difference. So if you have greater access to information, more profound ways to get at the information of collective human knowledge and dice it out to try and suss out things that are more insurable, this is a magnificent time to be an underwriter. You have more tools with which to get deeper and deeper in your thinking and potentially come up with solutions that'll make a big difference in the world. That is fantastic. There's a second thing that's true is whenever there's a new technology. one of the things we do is look for ways to make our products more affordable, to lower the cost. And it's been true throughout time that I've been around the industry that a huge portion of our cost goes to not very useful things from the client's point of view.
1:07:55Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
1:07:55Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): client's benefit to buying an insurance policy is the portion that comes back in claims, right? So if you look at a dollar that's spent on insurance, typically 65 cents of that dollar will go towards claims and claims adjustment costs, right? And then if you look at the other 35 cents, that's that's set aside whether there's a profit in there or not, but it's going towards paying brokers and agents, and it's going towards your cost of operations, right? And then it's going to profit if there's a profit to be made. So if we think about those, it's been true for so long that the cost of insurance has been about 15% of the dollar.
1:08:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:08:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it's been true forever. And we'd get new waves of great technology, you know, software platforms, all this stuff that was going to gonna lower lower costs. cost and it's stuck at the same amount. AI is an opportunity to change that, because it turns out that those old calcified systems that have chewed up all that money are now able to be replaced by a gentic activity. And I I full disclosure, I'm a chairman of a company in this space, so I I have a personal interest. in it. But I have a personal interest in because I've been working on that exact problem for all of my insurance career. Just finding it astonishingly frustrated that we can't get the cost of delivering this product to a lower cost. It's crazy. It's nuts. And I think, I'm hoping and I believe and I've seen it proven that these agenti agentic-centric centric um platform companies can really lower the cost of the system without replacing all the software, without doing all the maddening, crazy stuff we used to do. So that's that's got me a little bit excited. I'm really glad to be working on it. So first thing, we should be applying AI to underwriting and coming up with more solutions. Second thing, we should really be lowering our platform costs for the first time it's really possible. Third thing is more interesting, and that is the risk
1:10:02that AI it's itself presents. And here, as with climate, we have to remember that we live in a continuum with what the society should do, right? So if insurance is just a privatization of our social function in a regulated and trustworthy way, if that's what it is, we should be thinking how much of that AI risk can insurers take. off the table? And what would we need in partnership with government to make sure government's doing its job too?
1:10:34Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:10:34Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): that's the same thing with climate. Industry cannot guarantee the world against climate change. There's no amount of balance sheet that could be created without partnership with government. And the same thing is true here. And if we can come into an understanding about how, in some kind of colossal risk event, we're going to share the knowledge and the cost to recover or create a more resilient society against it, those are that's work that's going to have to be done in partnership and in common. You'll see entirely new things. Like, like I look at the data center problem and the insurance of data center problems, given the capital that's being pumped into that segment. And I say, you know, there's got to be a way to partner with local governments and give them some of the upside of what's going on here and make those governments more resilient at the same time. And that could be the insurer's job is to think through the risk profiles, take a piece off it, and make sure the that the governments understand how to take the other piece on.
1:11:35There's a lot of creativity that's going to have to come into this. And if I were still in the industry, that's what I'd be focused on. The mo the the funnest piece of what I just said is the first piece. We can finally come up with some new products because we have the ability to be so much smarter. And the second piece that we can get rid of cost in the system, like that's really cool. I it's not as sexy as the first problem. And then the third, the big, big thing is the risks AI adds to society and how the insurers can partner with governments to think through who takes what piece and in what way so that the whole system doesn't collapse.
1:12:11Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
1:12:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): moving kind of out of AI through your career and into um your time at Bridgewater, you joined the board in twenty twenty one and you stepped down in January of this year after five years. Um and you were co co-chair chair of the operating board throughout the firm's transition after Ray Darlio um step down. Um what what did the firm or what does the board do at a firm that's built around um the founders principles?
1:12:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Well, so uh a little bit of a uh
1:12:42Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh i
1:12:42Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): it was a bit different from that. So I was recruited to come in and, as you said, be co co-chair, chair, although I spent a couple of years as singular chair. The reason was that Ray Dalio and Bridgewater's leadership had been working through a transition for about, at that point, 10 to 12 years or something, and it hadn't been completed. So I was asked to come in and facilitate the completion of his whatever that future would be like. So that was the task I was assigned. While at the same time, building a credible fiduciary board to take over from Ray's control of the firm. So Ray wasn't gone when I got there. In fact, we were engaged in a negotiation to try and create a shared future between Ray and the next leadership of Bridgewater. with Because Ray wanted it to become an institution that lived through time and yet. he also had a lot of strong interests in how the firm that he had so singularly contributed to treated him at the end. So it was a big, complicated negotiation. About a year after I got there, we finished a
1:13:55negotiation on a very complex way to coexist that proved not terribly workable. And management chose eventually, uh, and it was in year five of my tenure on as as co-chairman to buy Ray out. And that transaction was made public, and Ray no longer has a a role other than you know being a hugely admired part of the history of the firm at Bridgewater. So the job. I was brought to do was really completed in the fifth year. And by then we had a a board, the operating board, as you describe it. And it had a lot of rules imposed on it by the agreement I referred to earlier with Ray. And obviously those rules fell away. And so there was a chance to redesign the board to make it even more fit for purpose for the future. of the company. And they made the decision, which I understood and liked, that they'd rather have one of their large shareholder be the chairman than. And so it was perfect timing for me to say, we got it done. You have a fit for purpose board, you have resolution with Ray, and I'm gonna going to get back to other things in my life. So it was a great journey. Met some other
1:15:14unbelievable people. It is a very special business in the world. I'm really proud to have been a part of it. But that was what I was doing there and that's how it played
1:15:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out.
1:15:25Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Wha why did you or why were you selected to come in?
1:15:30Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I have no idea. I don't it just I I there was a headhunter and I kept telling people I wouldn't be on any board. I I didn't want to do that kind of work. But then I was at, well, would you consider Bridgewater? And I go, why does Bridgewater even have a board? So I got curious, found out about Ray's transition. Thought, wow, that's a
1:15:51Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
1:15:52Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is an interesting and complicated problem. You know, understanding personalities at the highest orders amongst some of the most successful people in the world. And a culture that I'd always been curious. about, because this idea of radical transparency that they live by, radical truthfulness, radical transparency, and this profound understanding of how markets work and interrelate, you know, it doesn't get if you're into culture like I've always been, you know, how do I get this collection of people to work well together and have common rules? And,
1:16:24Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:16:24Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, uh it's such a powerful thing. I wanted to see how it worked. So I got to see how some of the smartest people in the world relate to markets and how they operate one of the really distinct and unique cultures ever imagined. And I got to work on a unbelievable problem that was very real and needed to be um addressed. It w it was tons of brain candy, but it was also tons of blood, sweat and tears. But it was in the end it w I learned a lot.
1:16:59Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:16:59Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know you mentioned the radical truthfulness and radical transparency. And for kind of people who've read uh principles, the the book, um how much uh and how actually in in practice, um, could you explain kind of how those principles are embodied inside the firm, how it works?
1:17:17Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): You know, it it it is the kind of maximum approach to actually enable everyone to say what they think and be heard and registered. So it it is the maximum example of that. I mean, I gave a small example of that at work in culture of creation at that some of the companies I was a part of leading. But man, this is the big deal. They use technology to enable people to comment on things. They use, and and they have a unbelievably high bar for the expectation that if you see something you don't think is right, you s you are obligated to say it, whoever you are, wherever you are, whenever it happens. And and you'd better, if you bring it up, you'd better be ready to defend it because we're going gonna to have a real adult conversation about it. in the moment. And uh it's very impressive. It's it it it has risks. Uh I think that there's a risk that they are very conscious of that it can encourage people to behave in ways that can be taken as mean or can be taken as not supportive of you, um, rather than just to search among people for the truth.
1:18:26Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:18:26Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so that there's cultural risk too. And you know, they tend to cover for that piece by just having a simple don't be an asshole rule. And I think that works to a point, but I think there's a constant tension. And you have to be, you know, it kind of self-selects to really, really smart people who can live with that kind of challenge all the time and who aspire to do incredible things by continuous self-improvement by never accepting that it's good enough. And that's a, you know, that's a hard standard to hold oneself to. And I think Bridgewater, I don't, I was never a part of the era when Ray was leading it, you know, in the way that he was. So I can't, I can't judge comparatively, but I I think in these last couple
1:19:14Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of years.
1:19:15Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): between the leadership of Nir Bardia, their CEO, and Greg Jensen, their managing CIO, and the team of CIOs they have, I think they have that working with a sense of urgency and purpose, probably as well as it's been done. But I think it's a constant challenge to keep it kind of in the rails and they have to work. very hard at it. But when it works, it it creates collective knowledge and wisdom as good as any system I could imagine.
1:19:49Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:19:49Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): think one thing that was like really interesting reading the book is the parallels between the ideas that kind of are talked about um and the principles and how they could, or I think maybe should be applied in the political. world and the political sphere and and in political dialogue. If you kind of look back at your time in politics, um, and then you kind of see how you saw these principles work, is there a particular principle or maybe some ideas that you would love to see applied in politics?
1:20:18Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): Yeah, uh you know, it's tempting to say of course we want radical transparency from our political leaders, but that I don't think that's a realistic expectation. You know, when you're trying to put together a governing covet coalition, or when you're trying to collect up votes to cause something to happen in the Senate, or when you're trying to win an election, there there the the complexity of the audiences involved and their motivation is such an important part of what you have to calibrate to cause a coalition to come together. And there's going to be people in that coalition that can't stand each other. And you have to walk that minefield in a way that creates sufficient trust for a majority to emerge.
1:21:06Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
1:21:06Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): don't think you can do that by being radically transparent about all those different differences differences amongst all those people. or they'll focus on their differences and never come together for the short-term purpose of moving something forward. So I think in the governance world, there's there's less to be learned than you wish. Because I think the art of creating momentary coalitions to get things done is very different from the art of radical transparency.
1:21:41Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Looking back now, um and and kind of looking at the learnings that you've had, and you'd said something interesting about um do you never want to forget a failure? Looking back and learning from these experiences, what do you wish you had known kind of at the beginning? Maybe in in that first role working with Slade or um your first kind of experience in the corporate world. with with Safeco.
1:22:05Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I so um I'm I'm not much for regret because I don't find it outside of learning a short term lesson so you don't bloody your nose again, um not sure what use it plays. But the the thing that I think about, I mean I'll give you an example, but it it's kind of I I was so lucky right, to have some people around me who were super smart and who for some interest took an interest in me. Helen Rasmussen, who was the campaign manager for Slade in 1980. Greeta Jean Butterworth, who was running the field operation for Slade in 1980. You know, these people, Ann Sandstrom, who was running some of the volunteer efforts, these women were amazing. people and took an interest in whether I would be successful or not and taught me things that I could never have learned another way. Slay Gorton, who was my dad's friend and became my friend and turned into this incredible, he would have said partner, I would have to admit, metor, you know. I mean, just just unbelievable people
1:23:11who let me learn and fumble and move. forward. And then Den Stasian says you should come to CNA and be in the insurance industry. What? You know. So Eddie Mai, who thought all that up, I I just it's so many fortuitous pieces of luck that I couldn't I can't say to you, oh gee, if I'd a have known this, I'd have done much different, because I was just being lucky and trying not to screw up over and over and over. And so there was no logic to the path that was very profound. If you reverse engineer it, you can say there were some patterns. I was constantly going into hopeless situations. No one thought Slade could be returned to the Senate. We did it. No one thought Safeco could be saved. We did it. No one thought XL could be saved. We did it.
1:24:02Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
1:24:02Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): noting that they were perfectly right that no Republican was going to win in Washington State, then I should have listened to that lesson too, and obviously didn't listen carefully enough. But the I just think,
1:24:12Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
1:24:12Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, there's there's no there's no thing. I, you know, with the with the advantages of knowing stuff now, I'd have got into hedge funds when I was 10, because geez, it's a much easier to to way make a living if you're willing to work at the level they were. work at. Um and and the living you can make is silly. And the other thing is, you know, if if I was to pick over on what part of the insurance tree industry I would work in, I would work in the broker side of the business. It's it's it's where the trust is really created. And as a result, communication is a big differentiating skill. And as a result, interpersonal skills are really highly valued. In in in making markets, is the we it's it's the riskiest part of being an insurance. So while I loved everything I did, I quickly realized, okay, most of the returns are going to go to the broker because they're creating the trust, and that's the essential thing. So, and sure, study insurance over 30, 40 years. That's where most of the returns went. So I didn't know, I didn't know enough about the sector to know that I was probably buying into the hardest part. So there's things you learn, but I wouldn't turn that into a lesson for anybody. You know, keep finding things that you find really interesting, work hard
1:25:31at understanding them, and constantly push yourself to learn it more deeply and more deeply. and more deeply until you come up with an insight that you think is useful for the group and then lead by helping the group see that insight. That's the thing. And the other stuff's you'll bounce to what you find interesting and keep working on things you find interesting or you won't work very hard.
1:26:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Throughout your career you you always um as you say, you like you jumped into these difficult situations quite often and you were always really kind of solving problems. I know you said there wasn't a grand plan that you'd set out initially for yourself, but um was it just curiosity that kind of helped you decide uh where to go and what to do? Was there ever, you know, what was what was the driving factors behind MicroGalaxic? Michael Galeic's decision making?
1:26:29Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): It w there wasn't. It it was more a matter of there's an expression I've always believed in, and this is terrible for your audience, but you know, a good politician can smell the shit hammer a mile away. By which I mean if you're in the wrong place, you can figure it out pretty quick. And you probably ought to get out of the wrong place. It it became clear to me at some point that the leaders that I had worked with at CNA weren't going to last. And so my brain went, I probably should be thinking of where I should be instead of here. And that's when the SafeCo opportunity showed itself and I wound up recruited to that job. So I left on good terms. I left for the right but I it was time for me to get out of there. Uh similarly, even back to when I was working at the Washington Roundtable as a staff guy, it became clear to me when it was time. Now that's that's a past part of your life. And so staying sensitive to your instincts that of of whether you're really on a track, where the wind's at your back, where you're contributing, where we you're trusted and you can provide real leadership.
1:27:36Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
1:27:37Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): you got to be constantly evaluating. that, and you got to be willing to take risk if you're if you're in a difficult or bad position. And because you you you just can't move forward without risk. So to me, it wasn't strange to take all these jobs no one else would take because I didn't have their pedigree, so I didn't have their opportunity for safety.
1:28:00Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
1:28:00Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, they they were gonna get good jobs because. they were highly skilled and proven. I was unproven, and so I was gonna have to take greater risk to move forward. And the same thing was true at Excel and Bridgewater was totally different because they could have picked anybody, and I still don't know the fortuity that led to me. I'm glad it did, but I don't know how. Um but all the other ones, I knew what was going on. I was I vaguely aware. that most of the industry experts was saying no. And I was looking for a reason to say yes. So it was it was super fortunate.
1:28:36Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mike, thank you for coming on the podcast today.
1:28:39Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
1:28:39Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I hope it was useful to somebody, and I've enjoyed being with you, Matthew. Always a treat. Take care.