Ian Cassel argues investors should find individual bull markets within bear markets by targeting specific sectors and stocks.
Summary
Ian Cassel uses historical examples to argue that broad market indices mask underlying growth opportunities during downturns. He cites Jesse Livermore's 1929 short, Homestake Mining's rise during the Great Depression, and Tractor Supply's performance in the dot-com crash as evidence that specific stocks can thrive when indices fall. Cassel suggests that optimism drives bull markets while fear drives bear markets, creating distinct sectors that benefit from each environment. He concludes that investors should focus on identifying these niche bull markets rather than making excuses for market downturns.
Key takeaways
- 1 Bull markets are paid for with optimism flowing to growth stories, while bear markets are paid for with fear flowing to cash flow and tangible assets.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 11:55
Episode sections
- 0:04 – 1:17
Introduction and Jesse Livermore's 1929 Trade
Speaker introduces the topic using Jesse Livermore's history, noting Livermore was a bull in the 1928-1929 market before shorting it. Livermore made over $100 million shorting the market during the 1929 crash, despite his family assuming he had lost everything again.
- 1:17 – 2:01
Jesse Livermore's Trading Strategy
Jesse Livermore was a 'raging bull' in the 1928-1929 market before becoming the 'Great Bear of Wall Street' by shorting the market, making over $100 million during the crash.
- 2:01 – 7:44
Livermore's Execution Method
Livermore probed the market with smaller trades to test breadth before going 'for the jugular,' using over a hundred brokers to disguise his short positions.
- 7:44 – 8:02
Homestake Mining During the Great Depression
Speaker highlights Homestake Mining, a gold producer, which rose 49% during the 1929-1932 bear market while the Dow dropped 89%. Earnings per share grew from $2 in 1926 to $32 in 1935 due to operational improvements.
- 8:02 – 9:23
Homestake Mining Performance Details
Homestake Mining, a gold producer, rose 49% during the 1929-1932 bear market while the Dow dropped 89%, driven by EPS growth from $2 to $32 between 1926 and 1935.
- 9:23 – 11:55
1973-1974 Bear Market Winners
Speaker discusses the 1973-1974 bear market where Nifty 50 stocks failed. WD-40 (IPO Jan 1973) quadrupled in three years, and Alexander & Baldwin rose 50% while indices fell 50%, driven by sugar price surges.
- 11:55 – 12:30
Market Dynamics: Optimism vs Fear
Bull markets are paid for with optimism flowing to growth stories, while bear markets are paid for with fear flowing to cash flow and tangible assets; these crowds rarely overlap.
- 12:30 – 13:14
Dot-Com Bubble and Tractor Supply
During the 2000-2002 dot-com crash, energy and discount retailers outperformed. Tractor Supply, a microcap, rose 264% while the Nasdaq fell 74%, and is up 12,000% from the bubble peak.
- 13:14 – 13:58
Hard Times Products
Hard times benefit businesses selling 'hard times products' like discount retailers (Dollar Tree, Ross Stores) as consumers trade down to lower price points.
- 13:58 – 14:05
Tractor Supply Performance Details
Tractor Supply rose 264% during the dot-com crash (2000-2002) while the Nasdaq fell 74%, demonstrating that microcaps can buck major bear market trends.
- 14:05 – 16:35
ZAG Protection During the 2008 Financial Crisis
Speaker details investing in ZAG Protection, a nanocap making phone screen protectors. The stock rose 297% from June 2008 to April 2009 while the S&P 500 fell 37%, benefiting from the iPhone 3G launch and lack of institutional ownership.
- 16:35 – 17:02
Institutional Ownership in Bear Markets
Great businesses with no institutional ownership perform better in bear markets because institutions reduce exposure, creating selling pressure on owned stocks but leaving unowned stocks free to rise.
- 17:02 – 21:38
BioAmerica and COVID Test Luck
Speaker recounts a lucky trade in BioAmerica, which announced a rapid COVID test in March 2020. The stock rose 500% in one day, saving the speaker's portfolio from a 30% loss.
Claims worth verifying
Jesse Livermore was a raging bull in the 1928-1929 market and made over $100 million shorting the market during the 1929 crash.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·1:17
How to verify: Biographies of Jesse Livermore (e.g., 'Reminiscences of a Stock Operator', 'The Great Crash 2026' by John Kenneth Galbraith) and historical market data for 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped 89% from its 1929 peak to 1932.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·7:16
How to verify: Historical Dow Jones Industrial Average data from Yahoo Finance or S&P Dow Jones Indices. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Homestake Mining's earnings per share grew from $2 in 1926 to $32 in 1935.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·8:30
How to verify: Historical financial reports of Homestake Mining (available via SEC EDGAR archives or historical financial databases like Compustat Historical). For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceWD-40 raised $350,000 in its January 1973 IPO.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·10:50
How to verify: WD-40 Company S-1 Registration Statement filed with SEC EDGAR in January 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceAlexander & Baldwin rose 50% during the 1973-1974 bear market while indices fell 50%.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·11:36
How to verify: Historical stock price data for Alexander & Baldwin (ticker: AB) and S&P 500 from 2026-2026 via Yahoo Finance or Bloomberg. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Sugar prices went up 600% during the 1970s bear market.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·11:30
How to verify: Historical sugar price data from the USDA or ICE Futures. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Tractor Supply rose 264% between March 2000 and October 2002.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·13:40
How to verify: Historical stock price data for Tractor Supply Company (ticker: TSCO) from March 2026 to October 2026 via Yahoo Finance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
ZAG Protection rose 297% from June 2008 to April 2009.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·15:55
How to verify: Historical stock price data for ZAG Protection (ticker: ZAGG) from June 2008 to April 2009 via Yahoo Finance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceBioAmerica stock rose 500% in a single day on March 17, 2020.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·18:03
How to verify: Historical stock price data for BioAmerica (ticker: BIOC) for March 17, 2026 via Yahoo Finance and press releases from the company. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The TSX Venture Exchange is down 12% over 26 years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·19:31
How to verify: TSX Venture Exchange Index (ticker: TSXV) historical performance data from the TSX Group or Yahoo Finance. For recent events, verify 2026-08-05 through 2026-11-05. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify Jesse Livermore's 1929 trading records and profit claims via historical financial archives or biographies like 'Reminiscences of a Stock Operator'.
- Check Homestake Mining's (now Newmont) historical stock price and EPS data from 1926-1935 using SEC EDGAR or historical price databases.
- Analyze Tractor Supply's (TSCO) stock performance against the Nasdaq Composite during the 2000-2002 period using Yahoo Finance or Bloomberg.
- Research the correlation between economic recessions and discount retailer performance (e.g., Dollar Tree, Ross Stores) using economic data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
- Review institutional ownership percentages for potential bear market candidates using filings like 13F or data providers like WhaleWisdom.
- Verify BioAmerica's (likely a misspelling or obscure ticker) March 2020 press releases and stock price movements via SEC filings or news archives.
- Assess the long-term performance of the TSX Venture Exchange using TSX official data to understand the risk-reward profile of Canadian microcaps.
- Look for counter-arguments regarding the sustainability of 'hard times products' by analyzing consumer spending trends during recent mild downturns.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Well, thank you, Paul. Thank you, Trevor, for inviting me to speak this year. I think this might be the third
- 0:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 0:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): speaking engagement I've had here over eight or nine years. It's crazy it's been that long. It's been a lot of fun. Uh and I also am known for trying to bring my A game for this event in particular. So I hope that the presentation I have for you this morning lives up to that higher expectation.
- 0:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): This is an event that's always been near and dear to my heart, you know, mainly because of Paul and Trevor's efforts to better the Canadian MicroCap ecosystem, bring quality investors, bring quality companies together, you know, take small companies public. And that's something that the MicroCap space is in dire need of. So I applaud their effort in doing
- 0:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so.
- 0:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): They
- 0:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they
- 0:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): were also kind enough to purchase a boatload of my book.
- 0:53
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 0:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so if you're a small cap discoveries member, I believe they have a copy for you. You know, if there's extra, please take two or three, because I'm not taking them home. But if you've enjoyed my my writings, uh my articles, my presentations over the years, I think you'll you'll enjoy the book as well. The presentation I have for you this morning is titled Find the
- 1:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Bull Market.
- 1:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'm
- 1:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sure many of you know who the gentleman is up on the screen.
- 1:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 1:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Jesse Livermore. You maybe have read the book, Reminisces of a Stock Operator. He's arguably the most famous stock speculator ever. He was known as the boy plunger. He was known as the Great Bear of Wall Street. And in spite of that name, Great Bear of Wall Street, from the winter of 1928 to the spring
- 1:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of 1929, Jesse Livermore was a raging bull in a runaway bull market. You can see up on the screen what the market did between 1925 and 1929. The market basically went straight up. It quadrupled. And Livermore made a lot of money on the long side, but by early 1929, he was looking for the market to
- 2:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): signal a turn. a turn that he knew was eventually coming. And his past experience taught him that it was always best to sell early in a strong market, especially given his substantial position sizes, needed to unwind his long positions. And by the early summer of 1929, Livermore finally sold out of those
- 2:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): long positions. And at the same time, he made a list of leading stocks of that era that were. that he believed were overextended, that were expensive, stocks trading at 30, 40, 50, 60 times earnings, stocks that he thought should only be trading at 10 to 12 times earnings. And on September 3rd, the market reached its peak. And no one
- 2:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): knew that it was actually the peak, but Livermore sensed that something had changed with the breadth of the market. But he also knew timing was very important, especially. when you're going short the market. He got nailed before going short too early. And so Livermore decided to probe the market, which was his way of testing the breadth of the market with
- 3:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): smaller trades. He was willing to lose a little bit of money to know for sure when to plunge. And when he when he finally gained that confidence, he went for the jugular. And over the course of a couple months, he placed trades with over a hundred different brokers to decide. disguise his moves. He didn't want anybody to know what he was doing.
- 3:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 3:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the time Black Thursday came on October 24th, 1929, Jesse Livermore was short $100 million. This was the pinnacle of Livermore's career. This was why he was called the boy plunger, why he was called the great bear of Wall Street, and he was ready to truly live up to this reputation.
- 3:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): On
- 3:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that day, known as Black Thursday, the markets dropped 9% intraday, but it actually only ended down 2% because New York City banks supported the market buying equities. On Friday, the next day, the markets actually rose 1%. But over the weekend, negativity and fear took hold, which led to Black Monday. The Dow
- 3:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dropped 13%.
- 4:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 4:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): next day after Black Monday, Monday, I guess. what? It's called Black Tuesday.
- 4:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 4:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Dow dropped another 12%, you know, down 25% in two days. And at the close of the market on Black Tuesday, the streets below were in panic and crowds assembled in the streets in horror. Hundreds of thousands of people lost everything. And most of these were middle class people that got hit with margin calls.
- 4:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Over around 44 or 45%. people actually committed suicide that week by putting a gun to their head or jumping off the roof of a building. Soon after the close on Black Tuesday, Jesse Livermore he just wanted to get out of town.
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 4:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so he quietly left his penthouse office on the 18th floor.
- 4:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He
- 4:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): took his private elevator, which he had installed, down to the street below,
- 4:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 4:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he got into his Rolls-Royce Rolls Royce slimazine that was waiting for him.
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): he rode home, he could see the panic and the fear on every street corner. He could hear the panic and fear on every radio station. Fear was everywhere.
- 5:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 5:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Jesse Livermore returned home to his 29 room mansion on Long Island, his family wasn't there. He searched the mansion and he couldn't find them and so finally he asked the butler, where is Mrs. Livermore and the boys?
- 5:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 5:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): butler responded, They have moved into the chauffeur's apartment, sir. We have all heard of the great crash. We are very sorry, Mr. Livermore. Livermore just kind of stared at the butler expressionless and then walked outside, then over to the apartment above the garages. And there he found his wife and two young sons sitting on the couch in the apartment.
- 5:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so Livermore asked his wife, What are you doing over here?
- 5:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 5:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): she responded to her husband, We heard that everybody has gone broke in the crash. It has been on the radio all day. Men jumping out of windows. I'm so sorry, Jesse.
- 5:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now
- 5:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you might be wondering why the house staff, and especially Mrs. Livermore, would assume Jesse lost everything in the crash, like everybody else.
- 5:59
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 5:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's because Mrs. Livermore knew her husband. She had watched him lose. everything twice before, and she knew the drill. She assumed this time was no different that he lost everything, including the house, and so she did what she did before. She went around the house getting all the jewelry, all the artwork, all the Persian rugs, anything that was small
- 6:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that held any significant value, and moved them out to the servants' quarters. The jewelry alone was worth over $4 million. Her husband could then take that jewelry into the city the next morning and sell it for one million, and that would be his capital base to start all over again.
- 6:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mrs.
- 6:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Livermore was used to this routine with her husband, and even though Jesse asked his wife what she was doing, he knew exactly what she was doing, and he was embarrassed by it.
- 6:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 6:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact that his wife assumed that he had failed again.
- 6:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 6:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): on this day, after one of the worst weeks the markets had ever seen, on this day, she was wrong. Livermore made over $100 million that week, covering half of his short positions. And on this day, Livermore smiled at his wife and said proudly, Today was the best day in the market in my life. We are fine.
- 7:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I won't be needing the jewelry. Let's go back in the main house.
- 7:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Now,
- 7:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for everyone else that week and for the coming years, they were a disaster. By 1932, the Dow Jones industrial average was a smoking crater. It had dropped 89% from its 1929 peak. 89%. You know, that wasn't some outlier stock that was down 89%. That's the market average was down 89%.
- 7:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Banks were
- 7:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): failing in waves, a quarter of the country was out of work, and the word stock was a four-letter slur.
- 7:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 7:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact, by 1934, Jesse Livermore himself would go bankrupt again.
- 7:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 7:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the irony with all of this is you didn't need to be short the market to make money in the crash. During this massive 89% drawdown, there was a stock that quietly rose 49%.
- 8:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): By
- 8:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1936, while the Dow was still down 59% from its high, that same stock was up 580%.
- 8:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Does anybody in this room want to guess which company or in what industry you know that company resided? Anyone want to take a guess?
- 8:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 8:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was a mining company called Home Homestake, Stake,
- 8:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
- 8:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was the largest gold producer in the United States. operating a deep underground mine in Leeds, South Dakota.
- 8:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 8:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): see, through the 1920s and into the Depression, Homestak's managers relentlessly improved recovery and efficiency, and earnings per share skyrocketed. Earnings per share went from $2 per share in earnings in 1926 to $32 in earnings in 1935, $2 in earnings to $32 in earnings in nine years.
- 8:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 8:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and this was operational excellence that was quietly compounding while the rest of corporate America watched their earnings evaporate. Homestake was mined for 126 years. From 1876 to 2002, 40 million gold ounces mined. In fact, until it closed in 2002, it was the
- 9:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): largest and deepest gold mine in the Western Hemisphere.
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's fascinating to think that even in the greatest bear market ever, you could still find a bull market. Let me give you a few more examples.
- 9:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 9:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1973-1974 bear market lasted 21 months. 48% peaked a trough drawdown. It was brutal. The popular stocks of that era were the Nifty 50, like Xerox, Polaroid, IBM. These were the Mag 7 or AI stocks of that era.
- 9:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Many of them traded at 50 to 60 times earnings. But when inflation tore through the economy in the early 1970s, those stocks cratered. And it was an awful time for the markets and especially small caps. Some of you maybe have heard of the name Chuck Royce. He's a legendary US small cap investor who started his career,
- 9:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): unfortunately, right at the beginning of this bear market.
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): He took
- 10:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): over the Pennsylvania Mutual Fund in May of 1973. That year his fund went down 48.5%.
- 10:10
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 10:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): next year, 1974, it lost another 46%.
- 10:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Chuck said of that period: for me, it was like the Great Depression. Everything we owned went down. It seemed as if the world was coming to an end.
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 10:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the interesting thing is the 1970s. 1973 bear market wasn't completely inactive of new IPOs.
- 10:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 10:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fact, everyone probably has a can of this in their house. WD40. Everyone owns a can and no one knows why. But WD-40 went public in January of 1973, right at the peak before the bottom went
- 10:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): out. The
- 10:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): company was a five million market cap,
- 10:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and they
- 10:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): raised this is comical, they raised $350,000 in their IPO.
- 10:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 10:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the stock went up 60% that day and then ended up falling with the rest of the market the rest of the year. But over the next three years, WD 40's stock quadrupled. You know, a tiny pico cap outperforming most of the market.
- 11:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But the
- 11:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): real poster child of About outperformance performance during the peak Detroit to trough crash was a 30 million market cap company named Alexander. and Baldwin.
- 11:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 11:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): company was this bizarre conglomerate of Hawaiian assets. They owned a shipping business that shipped goods from the US mainland to Hawaii. They also owned 70,000 acres of land in Hawaii, some real estate, and they owned a sugar plantation in Hawaii.
- 11:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 11:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): during the 1970s, the bear market, when commodities surged, sugar prices went up 600%.
- 11:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 11:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from peak to trough of the bear market, Alexander. and Baldwin would be the best performing stock on US stock exchanges, going up 50% while the indices fell 50%.
- 11:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 11:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here we find an interesting pattern. The thing that does well in the bear market is almost never the thing that did well in the bull market that preceded it.
- 11:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 11:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's not coincidence, it's mechanical. You know, we all know that bull markets are paid for with optimism, and optimism flows toward great. growth, story, and possibility. Bear markets are paid for with fear, and fear flows toward cash flow, necessity, and things you can touch. And those two crowds very rarely overlap. So the great trick of finding the bull
- 12:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): market is mostly a trick of looking in the opposite direction for from where everyone else looked last. And the point is you could still find bull markets during the 1970s bear market. You could still find microcontrollers. microcap stocks that outperformed.
- 12:30
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 12:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the dot-com bubble burst between 2000 and 2002, the Nasdaq fell 74% and the SP 500 dropped 36%, peaked to trough. It was a brutal drawdown, especially for technology.
- 12:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 12:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): spectacular winner was energy. Oil climbed from $20 per barrel to 35, and energy stocks turned positive. when technology was vaporized. Oil stocks were the bull market. The only two non-energy Dow stocks that were up were Walmart and McDonald's. Another bull market was discount retailers like Dollar Tree or Ross Stores.
- 13:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): When people get poorer, they don't stop eating or buying toothpaste. They trade down to lower price points. Hard times are good times for businesses that sell hard times products.
- 13:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But you could
- 13:14
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): still find individual microcaps in their own little bull markets.
- 13:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 13:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): absolute top of the internet technology bubble was March 10th of 2000, and the trough was October 9th, 2002. That is the time period shown on this chart up on the stream. And this time period, it's uh it's rather vicious, and it's hard to even tell because you see this blue line that just keeps on going up. and to the right, and that was tractor
- 13:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): supply. And it was a 100 million market cap micro cap at the peak of the bubble. Over the following 18 months, when the Nasdaq fell 74% and the SP declined 36%, you know, tractor supply wasn't aware of this bear market. It completely bucked the trend, moving up 264%.
- 13:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Fast forward to today, and tractor supply is up twelve 12,000% thousand percent from the dot-com bubble peak.
- 14:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 14:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): doesn't matter the market environment, you can always find great microcap stocks that will outperform.
- 14:12
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 14:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): global financial crisis ran from October 2007 to March 2009. The bear market lasted 17 months with a peak to trough drawdown of around 56% for both the SP and the NASDAQ. Anyone that invested through that time still remembers how brutal it was. I know I do. Right before the peak in January of
- 14:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 2007, Steve Jobs took the stage and announced the first iPhone. It was a technological marvel. The world was mesmerized. The screen was huge, it was glass, but it could scratch, it could break. How would you protect that screen?
- 14:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): A
- 14:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small nanocap named Zag made plastic screen protective. protectors for cell phones. You bought them by filling out a form online and paying for it, and they would ship it to your house. They were also distributing the product through mall kiosk and later through retail stores like Best Buy. I traveled to Utah to meet CEO Robert Peterson in May of 2008.
- 15:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Zag was a 65 cent stock of 15 million market cap. I started accumulating shares. In June 2008, the CEO
- 15:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): was a very good thing.
- 15:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second generation iPhone 3G came out, and consumers were now aware of their need to protect that screen. ZAG was positioned at the perfect place at the perfect time. ZAG earned one penny in Q2 of 2008 as the 3G got launched and those sales started racking up and people started ordering more screen protectors. They earned five
- 15:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): cents in Q3 of 2008. The stock barely moved. a 75 cent stock on a 20 cent earnings run rate. Everyone was too distracted by the financial crisis. ZAG was growing sales 200%, the bottom line 400%, and they were self-funding their growth. Finally, later that fall, institutions did take notice.
- 15:54
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 15:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): from June 2008 to April 2009, during one of the worst economic backdrops since the Great Depression, ZAG went up 297%.
- 16:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): while the SP went down 37%.
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
- 16:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ZAG experience was the most formative experience in my investing career because of when it occurred and what it represented.
- 16:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): My
- 16:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): first lesson was this. During bear markets, institutions reduce microcap Micro cap and small cap exposure. It's a giant risk-off environment. This puts constant selling pressure. on institutionalized larger microcap stocks and small caps. ZAG was too small and wasn't owned by any institutions.
- 16:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Great businesses with no institutional ownership do better in bear markets because institutions don't own them. They can only buy them.
- 16:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 16:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that is why I've always been drawn to the smaller sub-75 million market cap arena.
- 16:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 16:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): second lesson was this: bull market. bear market, sideways market. It doesn't matter. Like a moth to a flame, institutional capital is always attracted to undiscovered, fast-growing, profitable companies they don't own.
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 17:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): exact types of companies that we investors are trying to find, and I'm sure a few of them are here this week.
- 17:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): From February 19th, 2020 to March 23rd, 2020, basically. in one month,
- 17:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 17:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): S P 500 fell 34%, a gut-wrenching drawdown. I'm sure many in this room still remember it. Most portfolios were down 40% in a month.
- 17:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 17:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was down around the same. But toward the tail end of this drawdown, I got lucky. And I'll admit it was 100% luck. I stumbled into a bull market. I owned a 5% position in my fund in a company. called Bioamerica that was developing an irritable bowel syndrome diagnostic of all things. But on March 17th, a few
- 17:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): days before that COVID low was put in, the company announced they developed a rapid COVID test.
- 17:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 17:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it was one of the first companies to announce doing so, so you can imagine what happened next. Arnold Schwarzenegger said it best: there's nothing better than a pump.
- 18:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 18:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): stock went up 500% in a single day. I sold, and that stock bailed out my entire portfolio. I went from being down 30 to being down five. And now I was fully cashed up at the lows in the market. My investors thought I was a genius. I just got lucky.
- 18:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 18:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): luck is a funny thing. You know, when you're right for the wrong reasons, it's called luck.
- 18:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 18:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): sometimes you stumble into a bull market and get lucky. And you know, Lord knows all of us in this room have experienced our fair share of bad luck at times. So when good luck finally blesses you, you tip your cap to Mr. Market and accept the blessing.
- 18:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Many of us know this wonderful quote from Peter Lynch: far more money has been lost by investors trying to anticipate corrections than And lost in corrections themselves.
- 18:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You know,
- 18:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): we've been
- 18:48
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): sort
- 18:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of in this current bull market for a long time. at least in the SP.
- 18:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): You
- 18:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, led by technology, led by AI capital spending, defense spending, now infrastructure spending, everyone's unshoring resources.
- 19:01
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 19:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the truth is, no one knows when it will end, and quite frankly, it doesn't matter when it will end.
- 19:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 19:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bull markets, 50% of stocks go up. In bear markets, 2% of stocks go up. Let me say that again.
- 19:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In
- 19:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bull markets, 50% of stocks go up, and in bear markets, 2% of stocks go up.
- 19:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 19:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): point of this slide isn't the difference between 50 and 2. The point of this slide is 2% of stocks are having a bull market in a bear market.
- 19:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Here's a 26-year Six-year historical chart of the TSX Venture Exchange. It's down 12% over 26 years.
- 19:39
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Anyone looking at this chart will say this is a terrible market to invest in.
- 19:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 19:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): mean, just look at it. And yes, owning all 600 1,600 stocks in this exchange would produce a horrible outcome.
- 19:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): But
- 19:52
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here's a fascinating thing all of us in this room also know to be true. As horrible as this long-term chart looks, there have been hundreds and hundreds of winners hiding in this chart. hiding in the TSX Venture Exchange. At any point in time on this 26-year chart, where the index was going up or going down, you could have found a bunch of undiscovered
- 20:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): small companies quietly compounding, having their own little bull markets within this chart. At any point in time on this chart, you could have found entire industries, niches of industries, or themes that were in bull markets. And even though a majority of the 1600 stocks in this exchange are losers,
- 20:32
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 20:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could still find stretches where even the losers had winning seasons, where they did well for quarters or maybe even years. There are bull markets happening everywhere in this chart.
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 20:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): here's the main lesson of this presentation: you can always find a bull market hiding inside a bear. market. Always.
- 20:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): The
- 20:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): headline index is just an average, an average is a story about the middle.
- 20:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
- 20:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tells you nothing about the industries, the niches of industries, or individual companies where growth is still happening under the surface of the index.
- 21:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): When
- 21:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the next bear market eventually comes,
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
- 21:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): want you all to remember this presentation, remember the examples, remember that 50% of stocks go up in bull market. markets and 2% of stocks go up in bear markets. But more importantly, when the next bear market hits, don't make excuses. A stock picker's job isn't to make excuses. A stock picker's job is to find the
- 21:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bull market. Thank you very much.
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