Speakers argue hedge fund benchmarks are flawed and direct investing via SMAs is rising.
Summary
Jon Caplis and Paul Zummo argue that commercial hedge fund databases suffer from selection bias, leading to misleading benchmarks that understate industry performance. They contend that hedge funds represent a collection of distinct strategies rather than a single asset class, making aggregate indices methodologically flawed. Zummo notes that recent inflows are driven by sophisticated investors seeking superior liquidity and performance compared to private markets. Caplis presents data suggesting a specific relative value index outperforms broader measures by excluding directional strategies. The panel also discusses a shift toward separately managed accounts (SMAs) as investors seek direct access to talent and navigate capacity constraints.
Key takeaways
- 1 The PivotalPath Relative Value Index, covering ~200 funds and $650B AUM, generated ~9% annualized returns, 0.1 beta, 6.5% alpha, and ~2% volatility over the last three years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) · 15:30
Episode sections
- 0:02 – 2:03
Introduction and Data Integrity Issues
Julie Segal introduces the panelists Paul Zummo and Jon Caplis to discuss whether hedge funds are worth the cost. Jon Caplis argues that commercial databases lack trust among large institutional managers, leading to incomplete data and artificially low benchmark performance.
- 2:03 – 3:57
Capital Market Assumptions and Allocation Models
Caplis explains that hedge funds are a group of strategies, not a single asset class, making aggregate benchmarks misleading. He notes that missing alpha in these flawed benchmarks leads optimization models to recommend zero or low allocations to hedge funds.
- 3:57 – 7:38
Investor Demand and Flow Trends
Paul Zummo observes that demand for hedge funds has grown over the last five to six years, driven primarily by family offices, sovereign wealth funds, and sophisticated institutions, while pension plans have lagged. Caplis adds that consultants and rigid capital market assumptions have delayed adoption.
- 7:38 – 10:22
Liquidity and Performance vs. Alternatives
Zummo attributes recent hedge fund inflows to superior performance and liquidity compared to private equity and private credit. He highlights that hedge funds, particularly through Separately Managed Accounts (SMAs), offer more reliable liquidity than other alternatives.
- 10:22 – 14:45
Critique of Composite Indices and the 'Blender' Analogy
Caplis criticizes the use of broad composite indices that mix directional and non-directional strategies, comparing it to blending different cuisines into a single drink. He argues this masks the value of specific uncorrelated strategies like relative value.
- 14:45 – 18:22
Relative Value Index Performance Metrics
Caplis presents data for a PivotalPath Relative Value Index covering ~200 funds and $650B AUM. He claims it generated ~9% annualized returns, 0.1 beta, 6.5% alpha, and ~2% volatility over the last three years, with similar metrics dating back to 2000.
- 18:22 – 21:40
Methodology and Survivorship Bias
Caplis explains that his index avoids survivorship bias for post-2013 data by using point-in-time estimates. He contrasts this with transactional databases that resell data to competitors, creating selection bias, and client-driven benchmarks that only offer partial views.
- 21:40 – 28:04
Multi-Strat Trends and Blurring Lines
Zummo and Caplis discuss the complexity of multi-strat funds, noting they are often multi-manager pod shops. They highlight a 'blurring of lines' where traditional managers adopt hedge fund tactics and vice versa, requiring allocators to look through risk exposures rather than treating them as a monolithic category.
- 28:04 – 29:36
Shift from Multi-Strat to Direct Investing
Speaker_3 explains that large investors are moving away from co-mingled multi-strat funds to separately managed accounts (SMAs) to access emerging talent directly. This shift is driven by fee pushback, liquidity concerns, and the desire to build capacity for future allocations.
- 29:36 – 31:11
Capacity Constraints and Talent Acquisition
The primary driver for direct investing is capacity constraints within multi-strat funds. Large pension plans are building their own capacity by identifying and negotiating with emerging managers early, rather than relying solely on established multi-strat platforms.
- 31:11 – 32:35
Performance Data Discrepancies
Speaker_2 notes a two to three percent performance differential in comprehensive data compared to standard reports. This highlights misunderstandings in the industry regarding hedge fund performance metrics.
- 32:35 – 34:08
Leverage and Systemic Risk Concerns
Speaker_0 observes that while leverage is up dramatically, it is due to incremental capital flowing into leverage strategies rather than individual managers being careless. This concentration of leverage and similar risk systems poses potential unwind risks.
Claims worth verifying
Commercial databases have lost the trust of large institutional managers, leading to voluntary non-reporting and selection bias.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·1:18
How to verify: Review academic literature on hedge fund data bias (e.g., studies by Geczy, Sammon, or others on survivorship and selection bias in hedge fund indices). Compare PivotalPath's reported industry returns against major commercial indices (HFR, CISDM) to see if PivotalPath's are higher due to broader inclusion. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Hedge funds are a group of strategies, not a single asset class, making aggregate benchmarks misleading for capital market assumptions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·2:03
How to verify: Review the definition of 'asset class' vs 'strategy' in investment textbooks. Analyze the pairwise correlation matrix of hedge fund strategies (e.g., Equity Long/Short vs. Global Macro) to demonstrate high dispersion, contradicting the idea of a single homogeneous asset class. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Family offices, sovereign wealth funds, and sophisticated institutions have been the primary drivers of hedge fund inflows over the last five to six years, while pension plans lagged.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:23
How to verify: Consult Preqin or eFront data on alternative asset flows by investor type (Pension vs. Endowment/Sovereign vs. Family Office) for the period 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Hedge funds have performed as well as or better than private equity and private credit over the last few years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·9:20
How to verify: Compare annualized returns of the HFRX Hedge Fund Index against the Cambridge Associates Private Equity Index and a Private Credit benchmark (e.g., PIMCO or a private credit index) for the period 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The PivotalPath Relative Value Index covers ~200 funds, $650B AUM, and generated ~9% annualized returns, 0.1 beta, 6.5% alpha, and ~2% volatility over the last three years.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·15:30
How to verify: Request the methodology and performance report from PivotalPath. Verify the AUM and fund count via PivotalPath's public disclosures or third-party data providers. Calculate beta and alpha against a broad market benchmark (e.g., S&P 500) using the reported returns. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceThe PivotalPath Relative Value Index has shown similar performance metrics (9% returns, ~2 Sharpe) dating back to 2000.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·16:50
How to verify: Review PivotalPath's long-term historical performance data. Note that Caplis admits survivorship bias exists for 2000-2026, so verify if the 'identical' metrics claim holds for the post-2026 period specifically. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
PivotalPath was founded in 2013, and data prior to 2013 contains survivorship bias.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·18:27
How to verify: Check PivotalPath's corporate history or press releases for founding date. Review their methodology documentation for how they handle pre-2013 data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Blackstone, UBS, UTIMCO, and SWIB have added consistent and significant alpha over long-term capital market assumptions.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·6:49
How to verify: Review annual reports or public disclosures from these entities regarding their alternative asset allocations and performance relative to their stated benchmarks or capital market assumptions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceMulti-strat funds are increasingly acting as external allocators, blurring the line between manager and allocator.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_1) ·27:45
How to verify: Analyze the investment policies of top multi-strat funds (e.g., Brevan Howard, Millennium, Point72) to see if they allocate capital to external sub-strategies or pod shops, effectively acting as multi-manager platforms. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Multi-strat funds were previously the primary way for large investors to access emerging portfolio managers through co-mingled vehicles.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·28:06
How to verify: Review historical hedge fund industry reports from 2026-2026 regarding the dominance of multi-strat funds in institutional allocations. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
There is increasing pushback on hedge fund fees and pass-throughs, as well as on lockups that do not match underlying strategy liquidity.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·28:26
How to verify: Check recent institutional investor surveys (e.g., Preqin, HFR) for trends in fee negotiations and liquidity preference. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Multi-strat funds have spun out underlying portfolio managers over the last 1.5 to 2 years, creating opportunities for direct investing.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·28:56
How to verify: Search SEC Form ADV filings or press releases for spin-outs from major multi-strat firms between late 2026 and late 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Primary sourceLarge pension plans are building capacity by directly investing in emerging managers via SMAs to mitigate capacity constraints of multi-strats.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·29:36
How to verify: Review public pension fund allocation reports or press releases from large pension plans announcing direct investment mandates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
A very large pension fund recently approached the speaker's firm to build its own capacity for investing in emerging managers.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_3) ·30:16
How to verify: This is a specific anecdote; verify if the speaker's firm (J.P. Morgan Alternative Asset Management, per intro) has published case studies or press releases about this specific client engagement. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
There is a two to three percent performance differential in comprehensive data compared to standard reports.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·31:11
How to verify: Compare performance data from PivotalPath (mentioned in intro) against standard indices like HFRX or CISDM for the period 2026-08-06 to 2026-11-06. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Hedge fund manager closures to new capital are increasing.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:00
How to verify: Check HFR or Preqin data for the number of hedge fund closures (to new capital) in the verification period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Leverage in the hedge fund industry is up dramatically, driven by incremental dollars flowing into leverage strategies.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:35
How to verify: Review reports from Goldman Sachs or other prime brokers on leverage usage trends in the verification period. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Individual hedge fund managers are not necessarily using more leverage, but rather new capital is entering leverage-heavy strategies.
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·32:38
How to verify: Analyze strategy-level leverage data from prime brokers to distinguish between new capital allocation and existing manager behavior. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
The industry faces risk from homogeneous risk systems and increased leverage, requiring allocators to hedge against potential unwinds.
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·33:05
How to verify: Review academic or industry literature on systemic risk in hedge funds, specifically regarding risk model homogeneity and leverage concentration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-06 through 2026-11-06. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.
Do your own research
- Verify the methodology of the PivotalPath Relative Value Index against the PivotalPath website or whitepapers to confirm the ~9% annualized return and 0.1 beta claims.
- Compare the PivotalPath index performance against the HFRX Hedge Fund Index or CISDM to assess the validity of the 'selection bias' argument.
- Review recent capital allocation surveys from major consultants (e.g., Mercer, Willis Towers Watson) to validate claims about pension plan lagging behind family offices and sovereign wealth funds.
- Analyze the liquidity profiles of Separately Managed Accounts (SMAs) versus co-mingled multi-strat funds using fund offering memorandums (OMs) or term sheets.
- Investigate the leverage levels of major hedge fund strategies using SEC Form 13F filings or quarterly risk reports from platforms like eFront or AUM.
- Check for conflicts of interest: determine if the speakers have ties to PivotalPath or specific hedge fund platforms being discussed.
- Look for counter-arguments regarding the 'blurring lines' between hedge funds and private credit, specifically regarding liquidity mismatches during market stress.
- Review historical data on hedge fund closures to new capital to assess the 'double-edged sword' of extended liquidity mentioned by the speakers.
Full transcriptexpand
- 0:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Julie is the co-deputy editor of Institutional Investor. She has been with II since 1995. Julie, come on up, have a seat, and uh introduce your podcast panelists.
- 0:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well,
- 0:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): first of all, you don't have to be that quiet.
- 0:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So, well, I guess we're gonna disabuse you of the hedge fund. Uh hedge funds are not an asset class. Let's That's go. gonna be part of what we talk about.
- 0:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So hedge fund indices might sound uh mund mundane, basic, as my daughter would say, uh right, but they're so important, right? Uh in fact, one of the most important uh parts of the industry you could uh you could argue in terms of determining allocations, what
- 0:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): you're getting, etc. et cetera. So it all comes down to are hedge funds worth it?
- 0:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): John,
- 0:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): do you want to set the say stage for us?
- 0:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Sure. Uh I would say yes, absolutely. I'm a little biased to be clear, but um it really depends on what you're using to measure hedge funds, right? What are what are the measuring sticks? And so, you know, what's unfortunate is a lot of the commercial databases, in fact, all commercial databases. databases, um, have lost the trust if they
- 1:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): ever really had it with most asset man or many asset managers. And so, especially the large institutional quality ones, and we call them key performers. And so what ends up happening is whenever you have a database that is omitting uh many of the key performers, whatever index or peer group you create from it is always
- 1:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): going to underperform. And so unfortunately when investors where of course this has been improving in some ways over the last five years, but when investors look at hedge funds as a set of strategies and they try and think about them not just to compare a benchmark against a fund. That's what people typically think about when think about a benchmark.
- 1:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Does my fund outperform or underperform their peer group benchmark? But more importantly
- 2:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): um in terms of the background is it goes into asset allocation or capital market assumptions, right? Should I even allocate to hedge funds at all? If so, how much? And because hedge funds are not an asset class, they are a group of strategies that trade all asset classes. The only way to really understand the essence of a strategy and the
- 2:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): characteristics of a strategy is to have a complete set of data of the actual set of managers that are trading that strategy. And so unfortunately, because a lot of the commercial databases just don't have, it's not just they have a smaller sample size, it's that they haven't really been able to set up the incentive structure to incentivize
- 2:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): managers at large to report their data, right? They're not obligated.
- 2:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
- 2:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): voluntary, right? It's
- 2:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): voluntary. There there's no regulatory obligation. And so the promise has historically been that if you put your data on any commercial database, you'll likely get flows from it. And the reality is that most of the clients of commercial databases are other GPs looking for a competitive advantage and buying that data directly from those
- 3:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): databases. And so that has disincentivized managers over the years from reporting and therefore. the benchmarks are artificially lower, sometimes substantially lower. And so even if you feel like hedge funds have performed well for yourself through your manager selection, when you look at the benchmarks and input them into capital
- 3:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): in into capital asset pricing models, it's really hard to have the model spit out anything but a very low or or even no allocation to hedge funds simply because. the alpha in is missing
- 3:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): from the
- 3:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): equation. And
- 3:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so we could
- 3:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): go into more details, but I'll I'll pause there
- 3:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): to give you a
- 3:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): little overview.
- 3:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Talk about talk about that.
- 3:59
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Sure. Uh first thanks for thanks for having me and thanks for every everybody for joining.
- 4:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So yeah, look, I I I would certainly agree with John. I mean, like what w we've seen um over the last five or six years, I mean, certainly there's been like a pronounced um interest in hedge funds, money flows has definitely come in. It's I'd say come in, you know, uh somewhat across the board, but predominantly either in like the high net worth family office or I'd say the
- 4:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): more sophisticated like sovereigns and more sophisticated institutions. Where the lag it has really been is more like everything else that were like pension plans.
- 4:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): So
- 4:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): maybe said more broadly, I'd say the closer that end investors are, um, or the more wedded they are to using capital market assumptions in their, you know, in their asset allocation, um, many of which are kind of driven by consultants, I'd say they have been late to hedge funds. Um, and the reason why.
- 4:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): is because of a I mean a a couple things. I mean John mentioned it certainly data matters. You know, if you're using, you
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 4:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): if capital market assumptions are based on flawed data or incomplete data, then the outcome is going to be um, you know, suboptimal. Uh and, you know, the second thing I'd say, you know, oftentimes like the capital market assumption is, you know, one number. right? Or a return number involved numbering, maybe correlation number, but it
- 5:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): represents the entire hedge fund industry, right? And it's important. Remember, like the hedge fund industry is an industry, not an asset class, meaning if you look at the pairwise correlation across the 10,000 or 12,000 managers that are there, it's like point four. So like what are you really representing, right? So part of so in another way, like part of the
- 5:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): problem. is if you're looking at the aggregate industry, it gets kind of messy and it kind of masks some of the like core value of certain strategies within and of course certain managers, right? So you would kind of accurately conclude at the aggregate level, you know,
- 5:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): maybe this isn't that interesting, and then you know, fail to recognize that. again, big slices of it are extremely, extremely interesting, you know. And then last is is um,
- 6:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you know,
- 6:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): John mentioned it on like the alpha piece. And of course, on one hand, like capital market assumptions shouldn't include alpha, that's that's you know, would be, you know, like tr traditionally you don't, but again, the problem is in hedge fund land as opposed to large cap equities, alpha's alpha is just much, much, much more important, right? So in large cap equities, you're excluding alpha, you're
- 6:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): excluding, you know, a tiny piece of the puzzle, and hedge funds, you're excluding a lot. And if you look at like the large allocators out there, you know, certainly for us, but even you know our competitors, you know, Blackstone, UBS, UTIMCO, you know, SWIB, like they've added consistent and and significant alpha over these, you know, whether you want to
- 6:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): call them, you know, some of the benchmarks or long-term capital market assumptions. You know, so again, if you're not maybe digging deeper and thinking about and challenging some of the capital market assumptions that are out there, you've really kind of missed out on a on a great run of hedge fund performance over the last six years.
- 7:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): And you know, and not to oversimplify it, but I always think like if small cap, uh the small cap world like was missing like so much data. right? Like we're so used to uh like how would small cap be represented in an asset allocation, right? Like I think that's such a simple way to look at it. But so what has the result of
- 7:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): having these not so great benchmarks and data in allocators portfolio? So hedge fund under
- 7:33
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): allocation, you're saying. Um what where's that money gone instead?
- 7:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah I mean I'll I'll I'll start first. Um you know there there's
- 7:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a couple things going on there and I think Paul captured it um the first part is you know using a composite which is oftentimes what people use when they think about hedge funds.
- 7:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And
- 7:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's just an average of many different strategies. We track forty seven underlying strategies globally
- 7:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and
- 7:56
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Paul said
- 7:57
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): they're not you know they are not uniform. Um And so that doesn't really make sense. You don't hear about somebody tracking the average of all mutual funds, right? So
- 8:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um
- 8:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): when you think and hedge funds are much more idiosyncratic. And so that's part of it, just kind of using one number to capture hedge fund performance doesn't really make a lot of sense. And oftentimes those are exactly what go into optimization models to figure out what is the optimal allocation to hedge funds. So that's that's part number one. The second part is
- 8:29
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you were mentioning kind of, you know, why why are hedge fund flows coming now?
- 8:32
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): No, but go ahead.
- 8:33
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 8:34
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): no,
- 8:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): I think Paul definitely mentioned it, right? You've seen um an increase in flows since about, you know, for a couple of years. Yeah,
- 8:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mean so I'll
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'll
- 8:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): answer that question that wasn't asked. So you know, part of that is um, you know, we're seeing
- 8:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): it's
- 8:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not a zero zero-sum sum game. An alternative and alternatives are often lumped into one bucket. And alternatives consist, obviously, we we saw it on the board, private equity and private credit, which have both been extremely popular over the last decade plus, um, for many reasons, interest rate policy, overall performance.
- 9:06
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um but, you
- 9:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know,
- 9:07
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): some of that uh have obviously there have
- 9:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): been a number
- 9:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): of
- 9:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): issues which we won't address fully here, but because of that,
- 9:14
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh I think on a
- 9:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): relative basis, when you think
- 9:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): about
- 9:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): this zero-sum
- 9:18
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): game,
- 9:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): hedge
- 9:19
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): funds have
- 9:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): started to look
- 9:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): a lot more
- 9:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): enticing because number one, they've actually performed
- 9:23
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as
- 9:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): well or better, uh,
- 9:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): certainly over the
- 9:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): last few years than both
- 9:26
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): private
- 9:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): credit and
- 9:27
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): private
- 9:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): equity. And number two, it's liquidity that, for the most
- 9:31
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): part, uh you can actually count on, especially through SMAs, um, which is another area that we can talk about shortly where you actually own uh it's your portfolio.
- 9:39
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And so because of that, you're seeing a lot more, not just interest in hedge funds, but you're seeing money flow back into the hedge fund space. And part of it is better benchmarks and being able to look underneath the hood, not just look at composite, but break down into substrategies and actually figure out what it is that you're trying to invest in
- 10:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and come up with accurate forecasts. forecast to some extent, at least in terms of what are these strategies supposed to do? What types of exposures should they have? What is the distribution or dispersion among those managers historically? And then, you know, can I figure out um what environments certain strategies will thrive in and what environments may
- 10:20
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): get you
- 10:20
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know where
- 10:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): certain strategies
- 10:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): may not.
- 10:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And
- 10:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): so
- 10:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): again getting back to that
- 10:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): composite,
- 10:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you're lumping in a lot of very long biased strategies, directional strategies that kind of do a lot of things that maybe people don't traditionally think about. What's a hedge fund supposed to do? It's supposed to hedge
- 10:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): in a
- 10:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): meaningful
- 10:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): way. And there's a lot of strategies that don't by design.
- 10:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right. And
- 10:40
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so incorporating them into one number into an optimization model can be Yeah.
- 10:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): flawed. I mean true.
- 10:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Paul, how do you see that?
- 10:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah, so I mean taking a step back, so like um I mentioned hedge fund demand has been very strong. I'd say like 80% of demand is really around on uncorrelated solutions. So, you know, allocations principally to relative value as well as as well as macro.
- 11:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And um so John has developed a relative value index, you know, which again is a much better representation, I think, of what the consensus is concluded. has concluded as like the core value add of hedge funds is again uncorrelated, probably first and foremost. So that's a much better approximation
- 11:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): of the value add rather than using again the the broad-based indices.
- 11:28
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Those are more
- 11:28
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): traditional like hedge funds, right?
- 11:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yes. And and you know, tend to be uncorrelated. Again, it's and and it it serves as a much better proxy for um really what many clients are looking for from hedge funds. You know, it's almost if like if I were to give her an analogy,
- 11:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I don't
- 11:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know if it's a good analogy or bad analogy, I guess she tell me, but it like if if you were if you were like looking to have dinner and you're like, okay, I want maybe I want sushi from Nobu or maybe I want, you know, Italian or maybe I want Mexican. And you like I I can't decide so I'm gonna take it all together. put it in a blender and drink it, right? Like
- 12:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it's it's it's disgusting. It's un un unappealing, right? So if you kinda came away from that and said, you know what, like turns out I don't like dinner. I'm just gonna stick to breakfast and and lunch, like that's a ridiculous conclusion, right? It's a good conclusion that it's it's not the way to go, but it's a wrong conclusion, right? And that's right kind of what happened
- 12:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): with again with the capital market assumptions and the use of kind of broad a broad brush, given that it really masks a lot of the value within, right? So the you know again, it masks, you know, like turn turns out like Nobu is great, you know, or Zoom is great. Uh it's just you don't you don't just need it all together. So when you take
- 12:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the parts uh almost like tools in a toolkit and apply them um with intention input in from portfolio, you come out in a much happier place.
- 12:54
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So is there a story or an example you can talk about um with one of your clients and how they um what they're doing and you know the questions they had about that 'cause I mean we know r relative value funds, right? Um but we don't see the data in that way all the time.
- 13:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Yeah I think um You
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): don't
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): have to
- 13:15
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I don't know.
- 13:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): You know, no, no, no. I
- 13:17
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean
- 13:17
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I look I I just think again, not to you know, not to continue on a c capital market essential. I I just think more and more people have pushed back, right? So capital market assumptions like these issues have been have come to light a little more. I think generally capital market assumptions of the way m hedge funds are modeled has improved thanks to, you know, obviously good performance over the last six years,
- 13:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): but work that, you know, John has done. as well to kind of bring some of these issues to light. And, you know, we've actually seen some clients as well start modeling in like an alpha assumption, right? So the,
- 13:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you know, going back to what we said, where there's a you know, large number of prominent investors that have a you know 20, 30 year history, as we do, of outperforming the capital market assumptions. And again, rather than just take the indice, they're taking a a um, you know, a moderate but conservative alpha assumption over
- 14:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and above what maybe their consultant is giving them from a capital market assumption. And that makes a heck of a lot of difference, right? So if returns go up by a percent and a half and beta actually is zero because you're putting in a uncorrelated solution and you know, vol comes down a bit, that's gonna let look a lot better in a you know, in an optimizer. So we've seen
- 14:29
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): clients um at the margin kind of again, I mean, for sure, challenge some of the standing assumptions, but,
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 14:37
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, push people to put um, you know, use use better indices for sure. And then over and above um model things differently.
- 14:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I could
- 14:46
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): I could add, you know, a little bit of uh context around
- 14:49
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 14:49
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): relative value component. And again,
- 14:51
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): we're
- 14:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): not saying that you should ever summarize anything in one number. However, um
- 14:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): part of
- 14:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the reason we created a relative
- 14:57
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): value index was to do exactly what what Paul was saying is let's strip out all the directional strategies, right? So let's let's actually focus on the strategies that are relative value. So think of
- 15:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): multi-strads. So think of you know market neutral equity strategies, strategies that are designed. to be neutral to most factors, specifically equity and traditional factors. And so, you know, that's one thing that we created. And, you know, what's important, and I'll just give you some of the data first and then we can talk about kind of how we did it. But, you know, part of
- 15:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): it was again to kind of get the essence of what hedge fund strategies are trying to do and give it one number. And I will share some of the performance metrics just to give you an idea. So over the last three years, the relative value index, which has over roughly 200 funds, over 650 billion in assets, I mean it's a very large part of the industry.
- 15:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And um it has generated returns annualizing about nine percent. It's done it with a beta of about 0.1, so not quite zero, but certainly very low. And it's generated alpha of about six and a half percent. annualized per year. And it's doing all of this with volatility of about two. So think of a sharp ratio around two as well,
- 16:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): adjusting for the risk-free rate. And so those numbers are pretty compelling, number one. Number two, um, any optimizer, the most sensitive thing about whatever constraints you put in, if you're gonna going to run an optimization model, the alpha is going to drive your allocation. And it's very sensitive to even small, subtle movements in
- 16:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): alpha. And when you think about using an index that has zero alpha or very close to zero versus something that has 6.5% alpha, that's the difference between being in hedge funds, not being in hedge funds, how much I mean, all of those things that we discussed earlier. And so to give you an idea, I mean, this last three years, it's not an anomaly
- 16:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): at all. In fact, if you take the data back to 2000, it's almost identical to exactly the same performance metrics you've seen. You've seen it around 9%, a little bit about 8.7% annualized returns, sharp ratio of 2, alpha slightly higher of about 7.5%.
- 17:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And we could talk about how maybe some of the earlier periods are maybe less representative. Um, However, it tells you that there is now, you know, there's 27%.
- 17:15
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): years of data that is very consistent with the last three years of data, very close to the last five years of data. And so these are point-in-time estimates going back to 2015. Not point estimates, these are point-in-time data where it's what hedge funds existed at that time. We were running our business at that time. when You
- 17:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): have a set of transparent rules about hedge funds. need to be above a certain AUM threshold, they need to have a certain length of track record. If you set constituents once a year and we're need to go into the details, but the point is if you're transparent about that methodology and you're transparent about the underlying managers that actually capture a large swath of the industry,
- 17:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's going to completely change, if you want to summarize in one number, completely change how you think about hedge funds.
- 18:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So, but now those numbers. sound great. Um talk about the methodology just for a second, right? Like survivorship bias and um, you know, Paul, like what your experience has been over that time, too, right? You're building pat hedge fund portfolios with a lot of the components you're talking about. Um but uh yeah, if you could talk about those numbers
- 18:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): just for a sec.
- 18:22
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
- 18:22
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): so I'll try not to get too technical, but um, you know, we started the business in 2013.
- 18:27
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): So anything prior to 2013, we we to be fully transparent, we don't have funds that came and went, right? So um there is survivorship bias from 2013 back to 2000. Since then, however, it is a point-in-time estimate. And what I mean by that is we are capturing, and then it gets back to the incentive structure, and I don't want to
- 18:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): go into too much detail, but I'll give you kind of the way that the the different databases operate and then talk about kind of what's required to get a complete picture of what's happening. There's transactional databases that I mentioned earlier that are really there. Yes, it's kind of a bait and switch. They're building indices, but they're really reselling the underlying data to competitors. Right.
- 19:07
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So this is all about trust, right? This is all voluntary.
- 19:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And so that's when you talk about biases, the biggest bias that exists. is selection bias, meaning that funds do not report because they don't trust their data being part of that database. That's the biggest problem, and that's what accounts for huge underperformance historically, or or at least just inaccurate performance. It's not always under, usually is, but it
- 19:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): averages to much lower. But it's also just inaccurate. It's not representative. So that's number one, the transactional. And then there are um client-driven. client driven types of benchmarks. And you see whether it's prime brokers or admins. And there's nothing wrong with that, but they each have a slice of data. You know, some prime brokers have better data in equity, some have better
- 19:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): data in credit, and they're giving you their version, which is not the complete picture. It's a small sample of that picture. Right. And so when you think of those two things, that's why the numbers vary across the board. What is really important. is designing something that is informational, right? So unbiased, where you can build trust with managers that
- 20:10
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they actually see a benefit to not report to you, but you know, if you represent allocators that are using you to make decisions and you protect that data and you build those relationships over many, many years, then you can really start to get not it's not just the data that they send it to you, it's the trust of the underlying managers.
- 20:30
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And if you get that trust, then you can build indices that actually are reflective of what would have happened at that time. And that's so when I say things like point in time analysis, you shouldn't haircut these benchmarks. In fact, you could have done better through manager selection. And you know, people like Paul can give you examples of this. You know, certainly many of our clients have done way better than what
- 20:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): our industry. indices would represent. But if that's a starting point, that's a pretty good starting point. Um,
- 20:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): and Paul, let me stop you there for a second. Paul, do you does that jive with what you see? I mean, obviously you're collecting you have a lot of data internally. And does that uh Yeah,
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): no I think the
- 21:08
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): numbers
- 21:09
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): quoted are certainly quite credible. So if I I'm
- 21:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): best
- 21:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I recall what you said, like I would say our returns are are higher. A volume is two two two
- 21:18
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): chief. So a val is like three and a half, three and three quarters. Um because you're you know you're saying there's two hundred managers there, so that's re you
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): know,
- 21:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): that's reducing valve. We're not obviously not using two hundred managers. Um and our our beta zero. Um so but yeah, I I mean I think the point isn't,
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 21:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): know, uh uh, you know, like it's it's certainly very credible representative. Um uh numbers.
- 21:40
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right. Well, so if we get all this better data, comprehensive, let's talk about like a few categories here, trends. Like uh talk about multi-strats, right? Like how do you build that first of all into a portfolio, these these multistrats that are made up of of so many subsectors.
- 22:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Um, and there's so many changes in the in the multistrats. multisector world. A lot of innovation right started there. Yep. Um maybe you can tell us a little bit about what's going on, and and John, you could add to that.
- 22:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Um sure. Uh, you know, I mean, clearly there's a a love affair with multi-strats these days, and you know, for for good reason in in some cases, like the way um, you know, the the way we use multistrats. I
- 22:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): mean,
- 22:24
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): we we we think about multistrats as as both single decision maker multistrats, which are, you know, aren't as common these days, um, although we have some and they're and they've done quite well, uh, as well as you know, multi-manager kind of pod shop multistrats. Um we use the latter more for like tactical asset allocation
- 22:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): um in in our portfolio. So we like we look at it then not as competition, like as but as very complementary to what we can do. So we think we have certain advantages from an allocation standpoint. If I don't know, if reinsurance dislocates, like we're gonna be able to lean into reinsurance in a way that you're not gonna see that in a you know in a in a multi-strat
- 23:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): or most multistrats. By the same token, if you know, I don't know, in in March of 2020, um senior secured secure structure credit dislocates, corrects in two weeks. very difficult for me to capitalize on that, right? So it's complementary to what we do.
- 23:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
- 23:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): and we use them, you know, as a piece of the relative value allocation. You know, I guess the second thing I'd say is not, you know, obviously not all multistrats are the same, although that you know you have to kind of look through, you always have to look through, but I'd say with multistrats uh in particular, you have to look through what they're doing. So obviously multistrats on a look
- 23:41
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): through basis in terms of like risk exposures differ dramatically. Some are heavy in quant, some are you know very heavy in fundamental strategies, you know, others are more esoteric in nature. The way they manage risk is very different. You know, their ideo inequities is going to be different. The way they recruit people is very, very different. So you have to think about multistrats not
- 24:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): as a you know category but really kind of like look through those multistrats to understand obviously the risk uh overall, how it's being managed, but also risk from a risk allocation, like what exposures is that bringing into my portfolio and how do I
- 24:16
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): how
- 24:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): do I think about those? How do I manage those? How do I complement those with other man you know other managers and other strategies? So, you know, that's that's the way we're we're we're looking at it. And uh you know maybe last lastly, obviously given you know some of the news over the last year or so, it it really, you know, I really just emphasizes maybe a couple things. Like putting together a broad-based
- 24:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): multistrat is really, really, really difficult, uh, especially when you're kind of building it from scratch. And um, you know, I I think that certainly there could be, you know, large and mega multistrats kind of competing, but it's very difficult to. be a smaller multistrat unless you're really doing something
- 24:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): different in terms of, you know, you're you're running a book of business or or a book of strategies that are very different from what a traditional multistrat has. But it's it's a it's a tough business model. I think tougher than maybe people will appreciate, um, especially obviously when you're when you're starting up and putting it together from scratch.
- 25:13
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): So if it's tough, is it change? changing and kind of what have you seen? I mean obviously it represents the bulk of the money, right? Um
- 25:21
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Well, r a piece, yeah. Significant piece. Like
- 25:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): I I mean some of the yeah, like some of the maybe maybe taking a step back, like some of the broader trends that we see in the marketplace, if that's it's okay, like it's it's you know, I I'd call it like blurring of the lines. It's There's blurring of the lines everywhere. right? So you have kind of traditional, the traditional world developing
- 25:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): extension products and trying to kind of in in some way, shape, or form become hedge funds. You have obviously portable alpha and hedge fund land, which is trying to take money from the traditional side. That's like a blurring of the line, right? If you just go within the hedge fund, you have multistracts much more making third-party allocations.
- 26:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): And then you have, you know, end allocators setting up separately managed accounts who effectively, you know, use finance in their advantage. And, you know, I don't want to say build a multistrat, but it more replicate a multistrat, right? That's another like blurring of the line. And then, you know, maybe the last thing Um is it's, I don't know if it's a
- 26:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): blurring, but in a sense, it is like everybody wants to be a multistrat. So you see, you know, you see um macro managers more and more building out equity books, you see quant managers building out fundamental books for for certain reasons. And there's there's a, you know, like little, little by little, there's a convergence
- 26:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): as from an allocator standpoint, like the way you think about allocations, the way you think about risk has to change.
- 26:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): because of that. And in some cases pretty significantly, you know, especially in the case of like a traditional macro manager that maybe gave you blunt hedging characteristics in your portfolio. If they're investing in in equity, especially if it's like in a linear way, then you probably, you know, the that those blunt hedging,
- 27:12
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): you know, tail risk hedging characteristics probably have degraded, right? So you have to think about asset allocation and look through risk in a in a much different way.
- 27:23
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Right.
- 27:24
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah, I mean I would just
- 27:25
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): add, I mean, I agree with everything Paul said. I mean, it's pretty funny if you think about the questions. Uh, one of the first questions, you know, just asked, pulling the room today of asset manager, asset allocator, right? Let's take the top 20 multistructure. multistrats. If somebody from there is sitting in this
- 27:41
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): chair, what do
- 27:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): they even say? Which one do they
- 27:43
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): pick? They're both.
- 27:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): And so,
- 27:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 27:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): know, in fact, you know, some of the large multistrats are the biggest external allocators
- 27:50
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
- 27:50
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): today, as as Paul alluded to. And
- 27:52
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): so they're
- 27:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): definitely the blurring of the lines. Um,
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): one of
- 27:55
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): the biggest trends that we've seen, I mean, there's certainly
- 27:58
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh multistrats have been kind
- 28:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): of at the
- 28:00
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): cutting
- 28:01
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): edge of innovation
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
- 28:02
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): years.
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): what's really
- 28:03
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): interesting
- 28:04
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): is
- 28:04
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): over the years, there was
- 28:05
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_1): a time
- 28:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): where they were the ones that were really finding these emerging portfolio managers, swallowing them up. And so if you were a large investor who could only invest in a co-mingled vehicle, then the only way to get that type of talent in your portfolio was to go through a multistrat. And as Paul said, you know, that's changed for a number of reasons. I mean, one is there's always been pushback
- 28:26
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): on fees. and the pass-throughs. There's now even more pushback on some of the longer lockups that may not be commensurate with the underlying liquidity of the strategies.
- 28:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Part of it, but I think the biggest trend that we've mentioned, but the biggest part of that is uh the separately managed accounts. And the fact that that has become much more democratized through platforms. You don't no longer have to be just a huge investor with the infrastructure to set it up on your own. But either way, what's really interesting is multistrats in some ways are the victims of their own success, where
- 28:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): they've done so well over the years, and some of the underlying portfolio managers have done so well themselves that many of them over the last year and a half, two years, have been spinning out. And in spinning out, that creates more opportunities for everyone, including the multistrats who are now seeding many of these, but they're not exclusive anymore. They're investing in separately. managed accounts, and these
- 29:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): managers can launch their own co-mingled vehicles. And so there's some issues around that that we could talk about at another time. But the whole point is that the emerging manager, which no one really saw before, I mean, some places, um, but kind of the underlying talent is now sought after by not just the multistrats, but by asset allocators, large
- 29:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): pension plans that are maybe building their own. And the whole reason behind it, aside from some of those things I mentioned, it's not just uh to compete against the multistrats. That's not really it. So much of it is about capacity constraints. Right? So the multistrats, who knows whether they're at capacity or um or um or close to it. But a
- 29:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): lot of allocators are now thinking: if we're going to be allocating so much more to hedge funds over the coming years, and we have a number of clear examples. of this, then we need to create our own capacity. And the only way to really do that is to find talent early and negotiate that capacity, just like the multistrats are doing. Let me give you an example. Um, one in particular, a very large pension fund,
- 30:16
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): recently came to us and they said, Look, you know, we we are we still value investing in multistrats, but we'd really like to build our own capacity. to invest in emerging managers themselves. And so what that means is rather than having funds where they could, you know, typically invest in
- 30:36
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): the co-mingled vehicle with lots of very specific minimum criteria, they're able to look more for pedigree and new launches that are going to complement their own portfolio. And that's where they are really building. out capacity for the next three, five, and ten years is directly investing through SMAs and running
- 30:56
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): their own multistrat platforms to complement their portfolio on the other side. And so there's a lot of changes that are are coming out of the success of multistrats.
- 31:06
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): You have to be pretty big to do that. You know, Paul, just to end then,
- 31:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you
- 31:11
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): know, and we've talked, you know, you mentioned this earlier, right? Like the question questi about um your clients, but what are some of the biggest questions, you know, that you get? And, you know, I think maybe I don't know if it was so clear, but with, you know, there's a two to three percent performance differential overall, you know,
- 31:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): according to you guys, right? When you get that comprehensive data. So lots of misunderstandings perhaps over the years. But anyway, uh uh tell, you know, give me your experience.
- 31:42
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): In terms
- 31:42
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of what questions we're asking, or or uh
- 31:44
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Is that a question? Yeah, just uh what the questions that institutional investors are asking you and high net worth.
- 31:51
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Yeah. Um maybe I'll, if it's okay, I'll modify it a little bit to like, you know, what questions are we getting and what are we concerned about? You know, what's it's topical? Um
- 31:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That's a better way of saying that. You know that.
- 32:00
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So um, yeah, look the I mean the good news is the industry's had a lot of success flows have come in. The the challenge of that is you probably have more more hedge fund manager closures today than
- 32:11
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I mean, closures meaning close to new capital, not shutting down. You've had liquidity extended, which to me is a double edged sword. It it
- 32:19
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it's you know it's it's
- 32:21
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): challenging for the obvious reasons it's helpful helpful 'cause because theoretically, if nothing else changes, it should provide more. um stability overall. Um, but you know, and leverage is I mean you you see some of the uh some of the reports, you
- 32:35
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): know, Goldman
- 32:36
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and others, and you know, leverage is
- 32:38
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): up dramatically. I think that I think it overstates things. It's not as it's not as if individual managers are using more leverage, it's Is just that the incremental dollars going into more leverage strategies. Mm-hmm. Right. So I don't I don't think people are like, you know, being being careless. But if you have, you know, more dollars and more leverage in a system, you have to think about, you know, potential unwind a little
- 32:58
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): differently. Um, you have to think about risk systems a little, a little, you know, even more cautiously in terms of everybody's using the same risk
- 33:05
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): system, maybe that is the risk. So I'd say there's a lot a lot of, you know, again, it it's it's it's a high class problem, but like because you have more money. you've had again manager closes, you've had an evolution, um, and it brings, you know, certainly different types of risk or certainly a lot more uh issues to think about
- 33:25
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): as a as an allocator and ideally, you know, hedge against in some way, shape, or form.
- 33:31
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): That is a great place to end. Lots of you y you end on these great things that uh I think will elicit a lot of questions. Um Thank you. Oh, I see you have something more to say.
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): Not me.
- 33:43
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Not you? Okay.
- 33:45
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Well
- 33:45
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): thanks everybody. Thank you.
- 33:46
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And I can work
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_3): for everybody.
- 33:47
- Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Really
- 33:48
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): appreciate it.
- 33:53
- Unidentified speaker (speaker_2): Thanks for listening. I'm your host, Julie Siegel. A conversation with Julie Siegel is produced by Deanna Chapman. And always check out institutional. Investor.com for more.