Macroscopic Podcast

Thorsten Polleit argues ECB will monetize debt to save Euro, causing inflation and currency debasement

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EurozoneECBMonetary PolicyPublic DebtInflationGoldDigital EuroFiscal Dominance

Summary

Thorsten Polleit argues that the Eurozone is in a fiscal crisis where the ECB will prioritize government financing over price stability. He claims 'fiscal dominance' forces the ECB to suppress yields and monetize debt, particularly for France and Germany. Polleit predicts this will lead to significant currency debasement and inflation. He also criticizes the digital euro and highlights central bank gold accumulation as a hedge against fiat debasement.

Key takeaways

  1. 1
    France and Belgium have debt-to-GDP ratios of approximately 120% and 110% respectively, creating high refinancing risks as interest rates rise.

    Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) · 4:50

Episode sections

  1. 0:00 – 2:03

    Introduction and Eurozone Fiscal Rules

    Speaker_0 identifies the start of a fiscal crisis in the Euro area, noting manipulated interest rate markets. Alexei Doronov introduces guest Thorsten Polleit and questions the credibility of Eurozone rules given that countries like France and Italy exceed the Maastricht Treaty deficit and debt limits.

  2. 2:03 – 6:09

    Failure of Maastricht Rules and Fiscal Dominance

    Polleit explains that the Maastricht Treaty's fiscal rules (60% debt-to-GDP, 3% deficit) failed because countries had incentives to socialize debt costs. He diagnoses 'fiscal dominance,' where the ECB sets monetary policy to serve government financing needs, a trend also seen in the US, Japan, and UK.

  3. 6:09 – 10:10

    ECB Intervention Scenarios and Inflation Risks

    Polleit outlines three ECB intervention scenarios: verbal guidance to cap yields, direct bond purchases (monetization) which expands the money supply, or extreme intervention leading to hyperinflation. He argues the ECB will likely choose low interest rates to avoid recession, accepting higher inflation.

  4. 10:10 – 15:14

    Yield Spreads and Market Manipulation

    Doronov cites the France-Germany 10-year bond spread (~1.47%) as a crisis indicator. Polleit argues spreads are artificially low because markets price in expected ECB intervention, similar to the 2011 crisis, meaning spreads do not reflect true risk.

  5. 15:14 – 21:10

    Critique of Fiat Currency and Euro Design

    Polleit calls the 1999 Euro introduction a mistake, arguing that merging national fiat currencies into a single supranational fiat currency is economically unwise. He claims fiat currencies systematically cause inflation, wealth redistribution, and boom-bust cycles.

  6. 21:10 – 27:51

    German Debt Sustainability and 'Ponzi' Dynamics

    Polleit analyzes Germany's 2027 budget, noting a planned €1 billion debt increase raising the debt-to-GDP ratio from 67% to 80-90%. He calculates interest payments could rise from €30 billion to €80 billion by 2030, or €147-197 billion if rates hit 4-5%, calling the reliance on new debt to pay interest a 'Ponzi game'.

  7. 27:51 – 34:04

    Economic Growth and Competitiveness

    Polleit argues government spending crowds out private sector utility and is driven by political convenience rather than economic need. He highlights Germany's dismal potential growth (0.2-0.4%) compared to the US (2.25%), attributing this to high energy costs (€0.36/kWh in Germany vs €0.04 in China) and capital flight.

  8. 34:04 – 38:51

    Conclusion on Euro Debasement

    Polleit concludes that without policy changes, the ECB will monetize debt, debasing the Euro and destroying savings. He suggests that renationalizing currencies or introducing competition, as suggested by Hayek, might mitigate these issues, but predicts continued purchasing power loss for Euro savers.

  9. 38:51 – 43:23

    France's Debt Crisis and ECB Intervention

    The speaker identifies France as the primary risk to the Eurozone due to its €3.6 trillion public debt, warning that a haircut on French bonds would trigger a contagion crisis affecting Italy and Spain. He argues that preserving the Euro area will require the ECB to manipulate interest rates downward and monetize French debt, leading to currency debasement.

  10. 43:23 – 49:07

    ECB Leadership and Fiscal Dominance

    The speaker critiques ECB President Christine Lagarde for presiding over the highest inflation and stock market price inflation since 1999 among recent presidents. He asserts that fiscal dominance means the next ECB president will inevitably pursue inflationary policies to avoid government defaults, regardless of political changes.

  11. 49:07 – 54:12

    Digital Euro and Central Bank Digital Currencies

    The speaker strongly opposes the digital euro, citing potential for political misuse and the creation of a monopolized, 'tyrannical' monetary system that excludes cash and commercial bank money. He notes that the US prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing a digital dollar and argues that tokenized commercial bank money can achieve smart contract functionality without a CBDC.

  12. 54:12 – 1:00:11

    Central Bank Gold Accumulation and Gold Price Outlook

    The speaker explains that non-Western central banks are accumulating gold to diversify away from Western reserve currencies like the dollar and euro, which are increasingly used as geopolitical weapons. He predicts gold demand will outpace supply from mining and recycling, with the current price around $4,000 per ounce representing a pre-bull market phase.

Assets discussed

AssetKindStanceContext
GoldcommodityneutralCzech Republic, Hungary accumulating gold, buying gold, central banks buying gold, uh just like China is doing and other emerging markets are doing as well. And one could say that uh they see something coming, or they're at least preparing themselves for something. Um, how do you interpret that? This this uh this uh

“Stance” is how the speakers talked about the asset, not a recommendation.

Claims worth verifying

Euro area public debt is close to 90% of GDP and deficits are around 4% of GDP.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:15

How to verify: European Central Bank (ECB) Statistical Data Warehouse or Eurostat government finance statistics for the Eurozone aggregate. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

France has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 120% and Belgium has 110%.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·4:50

How to verify: Eurostat 'Debt/GDP ratio' dataset for France and Belgium, or national finance ministry reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The 10-year French-German bond spread is around 1.47% and topped above 1.5% recently.

Alexei Doronov ·10:49

How to verify: Bloomberg, Reuters, or ECB financial statistics for the 10-year OAT-Bund spread. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Portuguese yield spreads rose up to 12 percentage points during the 2011 Eurozone crisis.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·12:19

How to verify: ECB or ECB Historical Data on sovereign bond yields for Portugal vs Germany during 2026-2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Germany's 2027 budget plans €1 billion in net borrowing, raising debt-to-GDP from 67% to 80-90%.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·22:25

How to verify: German Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) 2026 Budget Bill (Gesetzentwurf zum Bundeshaushalt 2026) or German government fiscal reports. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Germany's public debt interest payments are currently €30 billion and will rise to €80 billion by 2030.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·23:16

How to verify: German Federal Ministry of Finance budget projections or Federal Bank (Bundesbank) financial statements of the federal government. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

If interest rates average 4%, German interest payments could reach €147 billion by 2034; at 5%, €197 billion.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·23:37

How to verify: Speaker's calculations based on German Federal Ministry of Finance debt maturity profiles and interest rate assumptions. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Germany's trend growth is estimated at 0.2% to 0.4% per year.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·24:46

How to verify: German Council of Economic Experts (Wirtschaftsweise) or Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) potential growth estimates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

US trend growth is 2.25% per year.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·34:44

How to verify: US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) long-term economic projections or Federal Reserve estimates. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Germany's electricity price is roughly €0.36/kWh vs China's €0.04/kWh.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·36:01

How to verify: German Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) or Eurostat electricity price statistics for households/industry vs China's National Bureau of Statistics. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

France has the biggest public debt in Europe with €3.6 trillion outstanding.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·40:54

How to verify: Check French Ministry of Finance or Eurostat public debt statistics for France's total government debt outstanding. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

France has not had a balanced budget for forty years.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·42:45

How to verify: Review French government budget records from 2026 to 2026 for annual budget balance status. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

France's deficit-to-GDP ratio is reaching six percent in 2026.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·42:45

How to verify: Check French Ministry of Finance or Eurostat forecasts and actuals for France's government deficit-to-GDP ratio for 2026. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Christine Lagarde produced the highest inflation of any ECB president since 1999.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·45:27

How to verify: Calculate average consumer price inflation and stock market index performance for the Eurozone during the terms of Wim Duisenberg, Jean-Claude Trichet, Mario Draghi, and Christine Lagarde using ECB and Eurostat data. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The US administration prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing a digitalized US dollar.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·51:37

How to verify: Review the Federal Reserve Act and US federal statutes for provisions regarding the issuance of digital currency by the Federal Reserve. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Gold is trading at around $4,000 per ounce.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·58:53

How to verify: Check spot gold price data from LBMA or COMEX for the period between 2026-08-18 and 2026-11-18. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Russia had reserve assets in dollars, euros, and Japanese yen that were confiscated.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·56:18

How to verify: Review reports from the US Treasury, European Central Bank, or Bank of Japan regarding the freezing of Russian sovereign assets following the 2026 invasion of Ukraine. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Non-Western central banks are increasing gold purchases to diversify from Western reserve currencies.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·56:44

How to verify: Check IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) or World Gold Council data on central bank gold reserves and foreign exchange reserves by region. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

The digital euro would push aside cash payments and commercial bank money.

Unidentified speaker (speaker_0) ·53:39

How to verify: Review ECB proposals for the digital euro design and legal framework regarding legal tender status and interoperability with commercial bank money. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Tokenized commercial bank money can connect with smart contracts, making a CBDC unnecessary for this function.

Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN) ·52:34

How to verify: Review technical whitepapers from commercial banks or fintech firms on tokenization of deposits and smart contract integration. For recent events, verify 2026-08-18 through 2026-11-18. Use another period only when the speaker explicitly names it.

Do your own research

  • Verify Eurozone aggregate debt-to-GDP and deficit figures using ECB Statistical Data Warehouse or Eurostat.
  • Check France and Belgium's current debt-to-GDP ratios and refinancing schedules via their respective Ministry of Finance or Treasury publications.
  • Review ECB bond purchase programs (APP/PEPP) and yield cap guidance statements for evidence of market manipulation.
  • Analyze German federal budget forecasts for interest payment projections and debt issuance plans via the German Federal Ministry of Finance.
  • Assess the feasibility of a French debt haircut by reviewing legal frameworks and contagion models for Italian and Spanish bond markets.
  • Compare current ECB inflation and stock market indices against historical data for Duisenberg, Trichet, and Draghi tenures using ECB archives.
  • Confirm US statutory restrictions on Federal Reserve digital currency issuance by reviewing US Code Title 12 and recent legislative acts.
Full transcriptexpand
0:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We are witnessing the starting point of an unfolding fiscal crisis in the Euro area. Interest rates markets in the Euro area are manipulated already. The consequence will be
0:17
Alexei Doronov: welcome to another episode of the Microscopic Podcast presented by Gold Republic. My name is Alexei Doronov, Jordanov and today is November twelfth, 12, twenty 2026. twenty six. My guest is a very special guest. today, is Professor Torsten Polit, a German economist, author, and one of the leading voices of the Austrian School of Economics. He is the president of the Ludwig von Mises
0:37
Alexei Doronov: Institute Germany and has spent decades studying monetary policy, financial markets, and the consequences of our Fiat money system. Torsten and I previously spoke on our German language podcast, which I invite everyone to look, especially if you're German-speaking. German speaking, which is the MacroBlick Podcast. And today I'm delighted to welcome him back for this time a conversation in
0:56
Alexei Doronov: English. Welcome back, Torsten. Good to have
0:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): you. Thank
1:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you very much, Alexei. It's a pleasure to be on your show.
1:04
Alexei Doronov: I for myself I'm I I can call myself really a European. I'm I'm a mix of French, German, Macedonian, Serbian, and living in the Netherlands. So it's a it's a embody kind of the Maastricht Treaty, which is kind of the segue to my question is if we look at the the situation today in Europe and the founding principles or at least the
1:24
Alexei Doronov: rules that this the Eurozone and the European Union has been built on, um the creation of the Euro came with the Maastricht fiscal Score rules and the government deficit that we see today are exceeding those rules, the above 3% of GDP, the public debt that should remain below 60%. And today we see countries like
1:44
Alexei Doronov: France, Italy, Belgium well above the threshold. And some are subjects to really excessive uh deficit procedures as well. And the question then is:
1:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um,
1:56
Alexei Doronov: if so many countries cannot meet the rules they agreed upon, what does that tell us about the credibility of the Eurozone?
2:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's a very interesting question, Alexei, and a very important question. And I think there are different perspectives you could take. Back then, when the the Euro was devised, so to speak, you know, to replace the national fiat currencies, it
2:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): was said that it would help to become the European economic area to become more competitive, that it would be good to have a single currency compared to a variety of different national currencies, that it would become more transparent as far as
2:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): price setting in the goods and labor and input markets was concerned. And the idea or the big promise was that the euro would actually help prosperity in Europe, that it would help to increase prosperity, lead to higher growth in the
3:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): countries joining the single currency area. And right from the beginning, there was the concern, especially from economists coming from Germany,
3:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
3:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): most countries won't play by the rules as far as fiscal policy is concerned. Because they saw there is an incentive for each individual country to take on as much debt as possible. Because, as you know, the politicians like to run the system into debt. But the
3:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): consequences of ramping up the debt level. levels in the national economies would then be socialized across other member states. And so they devise a so-called growth and
3:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fiscal pact. And the idea was to limit
3:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the amount of debt countries could take on in terms of the debt level. In the Maastricht Treaty, there it states that debt has uh to be no no higher than sixty percent of GDP and uh running deficits should not exceed three percent. And as you say, Alexei, um
4:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it it it hadn't worked. It didn't work, it does not work. Uh we find ourselves in a situation where uh public debt for the euro area as a whole is close to ninety 90%, percent.
4:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and the deficit uh levels are around running at 4% of uh GDP in the euro area. And it's fair to say that um
4:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um a
4:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fiscal crisis is unfolding already before our eyes. You mentioned uh France and Belgium, they have become
4:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh they have
4:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): maneuvered. themselves into a situation where the debt level is now up to 120%, as is the case in France. For instance, Belgium has a debt to GDP ratio of 110%.
5:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And now interest rates start rising, and that makes it very, very costly for these countries to finance their outstanding debt. Financial markets become increasingly concerned about the stability of the uh economies in question. And as I said, I think we we are
5:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): witnessing the starting point of an unfolding fiscal crisis in the euro area.
5:33
Alexei Doronov: And if you would look lock uh look, I mean more broadly in in um let's say on more of a a macro view, um if we combine what you just mentioned about the fact that we have rising sovereign bond yields and the persistent fiscal deficit, and also a renewal, a renewal, renewed having problems with this word
5:53
Alexei Doronov: today, renewed inflationary uh pressure.
5:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
5:58
Alexei Doronov: where is then Europe um and the Eurozone then heading? Is it something though that those pressures can be solved or where do you see this develop?
6:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): There is a phenomenon economists call uh fiscal dominance, and that means that the fiscal situation has got out of hand and the central bank has actually
6:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): pursued pursue a monetary policy that serves the fiscal situation of the government. And I think that is what we have to diagnose in the euro area. The European Central Bank basically is meant to provide cheap funding for
6:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): financially
6:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for for all these countries that run themselves into financial difficulties. Fiscal dominance can also be diagnosed in the United States of America, for instance, as well as in Japan or Great Britain. And I just mentioned
7:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
7:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): these uh issue uh and I mentioned the
7:05
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the the
7:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the the problem of fiscal dominance is not just um centered in Europe, it's is actually a worldwide problem or a problem in the Western world.
7:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so
7:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the European Central Bank basically
7:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I wouldn't describe it as a dilemma, but as a policy choice. It could either
7:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
7:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): keep inflation low by raising interest rates, by making credit more expensive, but that would actually lead some uh economies in the euro area into recession. It would ramp up the cost
7:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of debt for many countries in the euro area. And that is, of course, politically not viable. And the alternative is to let inflation run its course and to keep funding or keep providing funds at low income. interest rates,
8:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at affordable interest rates, to public sector borrowers. And I think that is what can be expected. Sooner or later, the European Central Bank will take action trying to limit the rise in interest rates that can be done in various ways. It can start by
8:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): verbal action, actually letting capital markets know that the European Central Bank is not willing to let say
8:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 10-year yields for French government bonds to exceed 5%. And that may calm down markets. If it doesn't calm down markets, the second step would be that the ECB starts buying bonds, thereby pushing up bond prices. and lowering interest rates. And that would
8:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): require an expansion of the money supply because whenever a central bank buys a bond, it has to pay the purchasing price with newly issued money. So the quantity of money in the euro area would rise. If markets calm down, accept except the determination of the
9:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ECB in terms of keeping. interest rates low, the damage would be limited, inflation would go up, but it wouldn't spin out of control. And the extreme scenario would be the European Central Bank intervenes and sell off in the bond market follows. The ECB has to buy a great
9:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): deal of bonds by issuing ever more m newly created euro, and the result would be high inflation or uh hyperinflation in the extreme case.
9:44
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
9:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I mentioned that because the solution to the problem really is with euro area governments. If they don't succeed, if they if they don't show the willingness to rein in deficit spending,
9:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
9:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think the scenarios we uh just uh touched upon are very likely to unfold in the euro area in the years to
10:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): come.
10:10
Alexei Doronov: And obviously, I mean the most important countries in the in the euro area are France and Germany. Those are, let's say, the carrying forces of the European economy. And in the case of France, we've seen obviously this is nothing new either. It's been for a couple of years. Uh fiscal spending that's been off out of control, a country
10:30
Alexei Doronov: that is irreformable, and um in in most uh in what we can see in Australia markets lately is especially also the spread between the bonds the German bonds the and the and the the Bund and the the the OAT uh uh ten year French bonds which is around one point four seven percent which
10:49
Alexei Doronov: decrease decreased a bit from the past weeks, which topped, I think, above one point five percent. Um, is what would be for you the biggest indicators that we are then approaching a sovereign debt crisis if we look then at let's say the spreads or other metrics?
11:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): That's also uh Alexei a very uh interesting uh question and normally you would look or take a look at uh how yield spreads develop. As you say, you would look at, let's say, the difference between 10-year French government bonds and 10-year German government
11:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): bonds. And if the spread goes up, that's an indication that there's stress in the market, that investors increasing become increasingly concerned that, for instance, France wouldn't
11:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): meet.
11:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): its payment obligations in the future. The problem with that is that interest rates markets in the Euro area are manipulated already. If you compare, for instance, the current yield spreads with the yield spreads we saw in 2011
11:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): when the first Euro government bond. crisis and Euro bond crisis unfolded, you will see that the yield spread rise is very is fairly limited. Back then, spreads rose, like in the case of, for instance, Portugal,
12:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): up to 12 percentage points. So what it tells me is that markets already expect the ECB to stand ready to step in and intervene in the euro area bond market to prevent the next funding crisis for especially the big
12:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): governments. And so Alexei, taking a look at the yield spread does not give you the full picture because
12:48
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the expectation has already been price. priced in that the ECB will take action. So, as I said earlier, the scenarios we just discussed I consider very likely.
13:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Whatever the details, whatever the timetable, personally, I expect at some point the European Central Bank to do what it has done already in 2011. namely starting, buying or monetizing government debt, thereby ramping up the euro
13:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): area money supply. And
13:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the consequence will be an increase in inflation, a debasement of the purchasing power of the Euro, and that will hit people within the Euro area in terms of rising. goods prices, higher consumer prices, higher producer prices, and
13:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): especially also the external value of the euro will come under pressure, in particular against the US dollar. That is my take when I look at the uh fiscal situation and its potential consequences.
14:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh in the euro area
14:09
Alexei Doronov: and
14:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): this
14:11
Alexei Doronov: this is a bit also a bit of a paradox right because um I mean some say and it kind of stuck with me is that the ECB is applying a policy of um every size fits none kind of uh policy which is what you described also earlier about the different countries wanting to have different incentives about uh getting the
14:31
Alexei Doronov: deficit on their own side and spending for their own country without having the regard for then the union as a whole. So there's always a a a balance that uh is needs to be stricken, which in a country like the US can be done on a national level, which is not the case in the Eurozone because it's a supranational level and that the fiscal uh regulation.
14:50
Alexei Doronov: regulations and rules are not in place and put in place from uh the the European Union perspective on their respective countries. Every country needs to do it on their own. And then the question is how long can this go on? This contradiction go on until something really breaks to the point where this union and this monetary experiment, let's call it this
15:10
Alexei Doronov: way, totally fails.
15:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It
15:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): can still go on for quite a while, I'm uh afraid to say.
15:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um,
15:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think the uh introduction of the Euro back in January 1999 was a huge mistake. I think it was economically speaking very unwise to merge national fiat currencies into a single into a a single single fiat currency.
15:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and to hand over monetary sovereignty to a supranational institution like the European Central Bank. For instance, if people would have decided back then to introduce a euro which is backed by gold or by silver, I think we would have a completely different uh
15:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): situation. But a fiat currency uh is a currency. is
16:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that will and is to be manipulated politically. And as we know from economics, fiat money
16:11
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): and
16:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the US dollar, as well as the Japanese yen or the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the euro, they are all fiat currencies. Fiat currencies suffer from a number of severe economic and ethical defects. We know that. the expansion of the fiat money supply leads to boom
16:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and bust cycles. It causes overconsumption and malinvestment. We also know that fiat currencies systematic or chronically lead to inflation, so a debasement of the currency, which makes it very hard for people to make ends mean, to meet ends,
16:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and also, for instance, destroys savings in a very subtle way. It leads to a redistribution of income and wealth through which just a few people benefit, but the majority of the people suffer. It leads also the issuance of fiat currencies to
17:12
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ever great amounts of debt. We just we just discussed the the problem as far as the um euro area member states are concerned, and it makes funding of wars much more uh much cheaper, and thereby it makes uh wars more frequent. And um you see that
17:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fiat money brings a number of very bad things into this world, and the euro area is
17:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): actually
17:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): made or built on a single fiat currency. And
17:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I doubt that it will take
17:50
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): that
17:50
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it will lead to a good end.
17:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): We see the problems already, like for instance, slowing economic growth. Just look at Germany, for instance, the membership.
18:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the Euro area was not accompanied by higher economic growth, but exactly the opposite unfolded. Economic growth declined. The same can be observed in Italy as well as in France. So I think it's a dil it was right from the beginning, it was an illusion to
18:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expect that the introduction of the Euro would increase. prosperity for the member states joining the single currency area. However, there are
18:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): measures and policies that can keep the Euro project going. And we just talked about a very important
18:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): intervention, namely uh the downward manipulation of interest. rates. If you keep interest rates low, you make you know you can't the euro area can continue for quite a while. Governments will keep uh their deficit spending, debt will rise. The European
19:06
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Central Bank will start to monetize outstanding government debt, inflation will go up, and all the bad things that uh come with inflation will unfold. And then it is a question how severe the damage will be. And I think uh Alexei, it would require
19:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a decision of people in member states to leave uh the euro, to, for instance, renationalise their currencies or to introduce an additional currency. so people have a choice in currency, as Friedrich August von Hayek suggested in the
19:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 1970s, to at least mitigate the problems that come with the Euro single currency. There's no easy solution to the the the problem. I should emphasize that many economists have already thought about how. to solve the the
20:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): problem that comes with the single currency in the euro area and um
20:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): there
20:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there are always hard choices that have to be made and um alexey at the end of the day I think the takeaway from our uh discussion on this issue is really that um the the purchasing power of the euro will be debased in the course of
20:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): keeping the Euro in place. Inflation will
20:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): go up, it may come in waves, but over the years, the purchasing power of the Euro and all the savings that are denominated in the Euro will lose their purchasing power.
20:52
Alexei Doronov: Yes. And as we all know, um all the face value of any fiat currency will go back to its initial value, which is zero. And um if we look now in the case of Germany, because we're we're both German, and you've recently appeared in the German Bundestag, as I saw, and uh to
21:12
Alexei Doronov: discuss the government's 2027 budget. And Germany is planning around uh I think 120 billion uh in net borrowing in its core federal budget. And you've described the country's financing practices as increasingly like a Ponzi-like structure. And I was wondering, maybe could you um explain what do you mean by
21:31
Alexei Doronov: that?
21:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alexei, I'm I'm I belong to a camp of economists
21:38
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
21:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): who consider uh public debt, the ramping up of public debt a bad thing. I should mention that right at the beginning of my answer. Uh I doubt that uh by increasing government uh
21:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
21:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debt increase prosperity or generate economic growth. I think that's that's an illusion.
22:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Now when it comes to the budget uh twenty uh twenty seven,
22:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): indeed I did a
22:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh I
22:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): did take a closer look at the numbers, at the underlying maths.
22:18
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
22:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the key points are really that from twenty 2026 twenty six to twenty 2030, thirty
22:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
22:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debt level of the federal government in Germany should be increased by 1 billion euro. And that would bring the debt to GDP ratio from
22:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
22:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Germany as a whole from around about 67%
22:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): towards 80 or 90%. And that is, of course, a huge increase in uh
22:47
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
22:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debt uh in deficit spending. And the major concern for me is really the consequence on interest payments on that public debt. I did some calculation and currently with low interest rates,
23:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): still relatively low interest rates,
23:10
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
23:11
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the interest payment on public debt amounts to roughly
23:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
23:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): 30 billion euro, and that will go up
23:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to 80 billion euro in 2030, and so it's a massive increase. And I also did some calculation with under The various uh interest rate assumptions. So
23:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): if
23:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): interest rates go up, let's say to 4% on average, then uh the funding costs will go up to roughly 147 billion in 2034. And the reason is that rising interest rates uh actually creep
23:57
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): into the interest payments because the average maturity, for instance, for the German public debt is seven years. So it takes seven years for the
24:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
24:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for the effect of higher interest rates showing up in the budget, and that would be twenty thirty-four. And if interest rates would go to say five percent, and historically speaking that wouldn't be too uh
24:26
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
24:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): dramatic. uh an estimation. Uh interest uh interest payments would go up to 197 billion. So what I'm saying is that Germany is no longer growing, the trend growth is estimated to be just point two up to 0.4 point four percent
24:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): per year on average, and ramping up the government debt. uh by such a magnitude is really irresponsible and raises concerns about
24:58
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
24:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debt sustainability. Because the last point in in in my answer to your question is that since round about twenty twenty,
25:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the German
25:09
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
25:10
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): budget shows a primary deficit, and that means spending is already higher than regular
25:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): tax revenues, even before accounting for interest payments. In other words, interest payments at the moment are financed through additional debt. And that is indeed the so-called called Ponzi Poncy game. I mean, the the the Ponzi Poncy game uh applies apply the the Ponzi Poncy game. idea
25:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): applied to public finances is a complicated issue and um but it it's really it boils down to the problem that once you get stuck in a situation in which you have to finance your interest payments by taking up new loans then it bec the the
25:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): whole debt to GDP uh ratio becomes exposed. explosive over time. We are not yet there, but uh the situation I found uh is of quite some concern, and that is why uh I was even more critical of the idea of ramping up uh the the debt level as is
26:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): um as is forecast cast in in in the budget.
26:27
Alexei Doronov: So it's it's kind of like a a matter of uh permit scheme in that sense. And we already I mean Germany is obviously not the only example. The US is one, France is one. It's a global phenomenon in the West, as you just also pointed out at the very beginning of our conversation. And now the argument is from the German
26:47
Alexei Doronov: government side that um even if Berlin and Germany has been kind of the the fiscal anchor of the the European Union for all those years, that it is now time for Germany to uh release the bremse, the Schulden Bremse, and uh what we call like as the the
27:07
Alexei Doronov: the debt ceiling limit as they have in the US, for example, that's been released and it was already back then already kind of a shocker, right, for German people. who are quite fiscally conservatively driven uh people, I would say. Um, that this would be needed for very much needed infrastructure investment, like uh building bridges, uh, for defense, uh, for war,
27:27
Alexei Doronov: prepared preparedness of war uh uh because of the Russian uh threats and so on and so forth, and economic modernization. Um, the government is saying that there's this is an argument for. then better growth and to restore growth and security. Do you believe that this approach could then really make Germany
27:47
Alexei Doronov: um weaker than stronger, or the opposite?
27:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alexei, as you know, they are always uh or politicians are always uh good at coming up with um
27:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): promises and uh uh arguments why is a certain policy is to the benefit uh of certain groups of people or for the economy as a whole. And there's certainly no shortage of such promises when it came to uh increasing uh Germany's uh public
28:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): debt by one billion euro as is uh as it is now uh forecast in the twenty twenty seven budget.
28:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I said earlier uh there are different uh views among economists about public uh deficit spending. You find the Keynesians, the more communist socialist oriented uh economists who see it as a beneficial measure on the part of the government to increase prosperity. I
28:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): belong to a camp who doesn't see any value.
28:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in increasing uh public debt for whatever reason.
28:56
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
28:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh just to give you an example or an explanation, Alexei, whatever is spent by the government must be taken from the private sector. So the the government is actually a mechanism to take from Peter and give it to Paul. The government does not produce anything. And
29:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if it starts, for instance, uh buying a new uh highway or spends more uh funds on
29:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
29:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): armament,
29:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): then it has to take the resources from private people who would have wished to use the resources, the scarce resources, for other purposes. So uh on a utility-oriented basis, the outcome is certainly less favorable once the government takes resources
29:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): via, for instance, taxation or absorbs it via issuing new debt, compared to a situation where people can freely decide what to do with their funds. And another aspect needs to be mentioned. in this context. For instance, if a government
30:07
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): builds new roads, it has to use the resources,
30:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): current resources, the current workforce, the current intermediate goods, the current
30:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): input factors, and not input factors from the future. It always happens
30:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): in the present,
30:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
30:32
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the present time, not in the future. And then the question is who pays for it? And here, government debt is, of course, much more favorable from the viewpoint of politicians. Uh It's much easier to issue a new
30:48
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
30:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): loan, to issue a new bond, which is voluntarily bought by some investors, and get hold of the funds and spend the money on political projects, than ramping up taxes. Because taxes that is is something most people don't like, and it's become it becomes quite visible
31:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that the government uh takes
31:12
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
31:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): resources from the private people.
31:16
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and uses these resources for political projects.
31:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): So,
31:22
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): what
31:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I'm saying is really you could finance a highway via tax financing as well as debt financing.
31:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
31:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even if you finance
31:37
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
31:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): infrastructure. by raising uh people's tax burden,
31:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
31:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it would be possible and you would have to make future uses of the, let's say, highway to pay for the outlays you incur in the presence. So there is no uh rationale uh and no economic reason to say you need to.
32:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh finance infrastructure and other political projects um with debt because it wouldn't be possible with taxes. It's just a political convenience. And this political convenience leads to and we talked about it earlier to this increase in public sector debt relative to
32:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): GDP, which we can observe not only in Europe but also in the United States of America. And coming back to what I said earlier,
32:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): public ramping up public debt, having public debt is no good for the economy as a whole.
32:46
Alexei Doronov: And there's also the the fact that um in in general, when we look at also at the the competitivity of of Germany as an industrial powerhouse, that this also has been affected in the last years, and namely so with the the restriction and the almost depletion, total depletion of cheap Russian energy,
33:06
Alexei Doronov: which now we pay the price of, I think in some cases now double. That is as that that is ex exacerbed uh exacerbed by the war in Iran with oil prices almost doubling. I talked to my grandma, she had to pay twice what they used to um pay in just in fueling for heating, which now like the the winter's coming. So
33:26
Alexei Doronov: obviously, this will have a big um heavy um load on most households, not just in Germany but in in the whole of Europe. And to the fact that now you've uh we haven't talked about the euro as a currency and uh as its purchasing power versus other currencies as well. This also adds a pressure if let's say
33:45
Alexei Doronov: then the uh sovereign debt problem in Europe doesn't get solved that I guess the euro would also take a hit and lose its its purchasing power vis-a-vis other currencies. Um What as an investor in Europe can you even do at this point to protect yourself?
34:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): You rightly point out in particular the dismal economic situation in Germany. Earlier I mentioned that the so called potential growth rate, that is basically the economic expansion rate you can achieve under normal conditions.
34:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Uh
34:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): under normal conditions has gone down to an estimated point 0.2% two or up to 0.4%
34:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): per year. And that is very, very low. Just to put that number into perspective, the the American economy has a trend growth or potential growth rate of two point
34:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): two
34:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and a quarter percentage points.
34:47
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And that means that the Americans will double their income. after around about 32 years. If you have a if you have a potential growth rate of just 0.4%,
34:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it takes 174 years to double your income. And this is the situation and I call it a dismal situation you find as in in in Germany. And as you know, Germany is the largest economy in the euro area, accounting for roughly uh twenty-eight percent of
35:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): GDP.
35:20
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
35:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): if Germany goes down, it sucks the rest with it. And uh the the the the problem really is um the anti economic growth policies we see in various uh countries in Europe, uh in Germany as well as in Great Britain, as well as in France, namely by
35:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): putting a halt to cheap energy imports from Russia, from imposing additional taxes and levies on energy. Just to give you a number, in Germany the uh
35:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): electricity
35:57
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh per uh
36:01
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): the
36:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): electricity price is roughly uh uh thirty-six euro cents uh per kilowatt hour. Uh in China you have four euro cents per kilowatt hour. Of course the competitiveness of the whole euro area of the German economy is actually going down the
36:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): drain because of political, domestic political decisions. Also we see capital moving out of Germany, out of the Euro area, seeking you know investors actually employ their capital in regions
36:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): where the return on investment is higher or the highest. And as far as the Euro area is concerned, it it lags competitiveness. and so it loses capital. We see a number of countr uh companies that do no longer invest in Germany or in Europe, but um make new
37:01
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): investments in, say, Latin America or in the United States of America. And also young people, talents leave uh regions in which the tax rates are simply too high and they move to places. where they can have a better life and lower taxes. So the situation
37:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I would say is quite severe and without changing course, and given the high debt levels in many euro area countries and the unfavorable demographics, um we all too easily conf could find ourselves in a the situation situ in in this the situation. situation or the scenarios we
37:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): already outlined, namely in which the European Central Bank basically starts the electronic printing press and um pays uh and monetizes uh outstanding debt. And uh that would of course, we talked about it already, lead to a debasement of the currency,
38:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the destruction uh of savings. and the outcome would be an impoverishment of the people in the euro area.
38:11
Alexei Doronov: And if we now uh look at because I've I've mentioned uh Belgium, France, Italy, Greece used to be the the Sigman of Europe, but actually once it uh reforms got through, and of course it went through a lot of pain and still in some cases a lot of pain, was able to now show actually great um well
38:31
Alexei Doronov: recovery in general and even one of the best uh growth in Europe at the moment. Whereas it's not the case for France, and France is in this case also compared to a bit of the moment that we had at the beginning of the 2010s of the Euro crisis, but France is not the same size of Greece. So for if we look at all the let's say the sick patients of
38:51
Alexei Doronov: Europe here, um would you say that France is the beginning of the biggest domino to four, or is it maybe another country, or how do you see this unfold?
38:59
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Yeah,
39:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alexei, I think a return to economic growth and prosperity is possible. No doubt about that. That uh requires a change in policy making. It uh change it it requires a change in how people vote. and think about economic issues. From an economic point of view, uh
39:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I think the recipe is pretty clear and obvious that is required for me getting back into economic expansion and that is lowering taxes, slashing spending, shrinking the states, freeing up markets,
39:36
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
39:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): providing all the uh doing away with red tape, uh doing all the things that make investment more attractive. And uh that is actually what is required and could
39:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): br
39:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): you know bring uh prosperity back to
39:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
39:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): to to to to most countries uh in the euro area. But so far there's little interest in uh discussing these issues and in mainstream economics still the prevalent uh dogma is uh government spending
40:13
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): must be increased to
40:15
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
40:17
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): avoid recession and new money printing will help to
40:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
40:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): avoid crises and so actually a a pretty uh serious change in thinking in this in the ideas that are
40:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh that
40:35
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that are in in people's heads so to speak is required for
40:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
40:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): for for avoiding a big disaster in the euro area. Now you were talking about Greece. Greece is a fairly small country and the outstanding debt of Greece was uh round around about uh three hundred
40:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh uh
40:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): billion. When we talk about France, France has the biggest public debt uh in Europe with uh three point six trillion euro outstanding. So it's uh it's very it's very difficult to see that you could do a haircut to uh to French bonds or French debt. I think that would
41:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): lead to an explosion. That would be a credit default contagion effect uh affecting uh Italy and and and Spain.
41:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
41:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so if it comes to that, if if if a severe fiscal crisis unfolds uh in the euro area and the political uh decision will be made to preserve the Euro area, uh at least for the time being. There's no other way than to downward manipulation of interest rate and starting
41:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): monetizing French debt. I don't see any any other
41:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): plausible scenario as far as France is concerned.
41:55
Alexei Doronov: And what levels are you are you then going to look at when you say okay the situation now is severely
42:03
Alexei Doronov: I mean, we've talked about the spreads. You've said that they were already kind of priced in from the market, knowing that the ECB would take some measures to balance out the spreads too much. Um, what are you looking at exactly then? And what which levels would you say absolutely this is uh heading and and uh and and really like
42:23
Alexei Doronov: uh yeah point of no returns to say?
42:25
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): As I
42:26
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): said, the information. value of let's say um bond spreads is fairly limited. Uh as you rightly pointed out, it's um manipulated. Actually I look at what's really happening uh in fr in uh f French politics at the moment.
42:45
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I'd
42:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alexei, like say uh France is a country that has never had a balanced budget for forty years. And now uh the deficit to GDP ratio is I think reaching towards six percent in twenty twenty six. So if there's not really uh a change in in policy making, namely
43:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): reining in the deficit, I think we are
43:08
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
43:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): very likely moving towards the the scenarios we already discussed, namely uh uh monetization of French uh debt one way or the other and the debasement of the of the euro currency.
43:23
Alexei Doronov: Clear. And now let's talk about the ECB. Uh Christine Lagarde, uh a French lady, is um stepping down. Um I think about seven or nine months month before the official end of her term, there's speculation and uh this is uh bit of a disclosure here, it is speculation that she's stepping down for a few
43:42
Alexei Doronov: reasons. One of the reasons is maybe she will be presented as the candidate of the middle to kind of rein in a bit the the political divide that we see in France by being kind of another centrist, just like Macron in a way, uh to give people the options between the extreme right and extreme left, which are let's say leading in the opposed poll at the moment. But also
44:03
Alexei Doronov: which is joining the other political question is not letting any governing uh party, which in the case of France would be most likely the extreme right, the Rassemble National or another party of the right side of the spectrum, or um in the case of Germany, which the IFD might also have uh the the the power by
44:23
Alexei Doronov: by by that time to let none of those parties decide who the next ECB president is, which is usually done in in unison for the leading uh countries of the Eurozone. What what do you think of that? And and this is one question and then in another question as a follow up question is how do you look back at her let's say
44:43
Alexei Doronov: results as a as a president of the ECB in her in her last uh in in her term in general?
44:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Let's start with uh the the last part of your question uh the performance of Mrs Lagarde in my latest uh boom and bust report I uh produced a quite interesting graph I may say uh showing the uh inflation and stock market
45:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): performance under the presidents namely Wim Deusenberg
45:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Mrs
45:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mr. Trichet, Mr. Draghi, and
45:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Mrs. Lagarde. And by far, Mrs. Lagarde produces produced the highest inflation
45:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the four presidents.
45:31
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Her term
45:32
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
45:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): at the
45:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
45:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): ECB brought the highest inflation, namely consumer price. inflation plus uh stock market price inflation
45:43
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
45:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): since nineteen ninety nine. So
45:46
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
45:46
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): wouldn't I wouldn't I wouldn't say she did a great job as far as um
45:52
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
45:52
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as far as um the interests of uh the broader population in the euro area uh is concerned. Now the first part of your question
46:03
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): let
46:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): me say, Alexei, I know the debate about who's becoming uh ECB president uh sounds to be a very to be a very interesting one. And to some extent is uh it helps you know to come up with different uh speculations and stories and uh
46:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
46:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but I but but I may say it's it's not that important as. people think it is. Uh we earlier talked about the issue of uh fiscal dominance. So the European Central Bank uh is meant to finance uh financially overstretched uh uh governments
46:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): anyway. And I think uh whoever uh gets at the helm of the ECB following Mrs. Lagarde will be a person.
46:51
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that subscribes to the idea that
46:55
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): in
46:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the case of emergency inflation inflating monetising uh euro area uh debt is a better solution than letting uh governments or even banks default. So even the next uh ECB president will fully subscribe uh to the inflationist view.
47:15
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so that is why I'm less excited about the debate who's going to be the next ECB president. And let me add or emphasise again
47:30
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the playbook has been rewritten Britain because uh w we already talked about the increase in the public uh public public debt uh situation in the euro area, and that has led to fiscal dominance. The ECB has hardly any room for
47:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): manoeuvring to uh to bring inflation down.
47:54
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
47:55
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it may raise interest rates in December a little bit, but I doubt that uh interest rates will stay long, stay for long at elevated levels.
48:08
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Maybe as the war activity dies down in
48:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the Middle East, oil prices and energy prices will come down, especially when there will be a settlement as far as the Ukraine-Russia war is concerned, and then energy prices come down, and then the official inflation numbers will drop like a stone. And in this
48:33
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): scenario, the uh European Central Bank will be very quickly lowering interest rates
48:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
48:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): again.
48:41
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): And
48:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that may happen under Mrs. Lagarde, which uh who is still in office until the seventh of February next year, or it will be done by her successor.
48:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): Um
48:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): but again monetary policy making as far as the ECB is concerned is or has to deal with fiscal dominance.
49:07
Alexei Doronov: So now now I'm um also attempt tempted to to ask you about what you how do you perceive then the the trend or the plan, the architecture of the development of the Euro, meaning the C B D C Euro. That's kind of the Euro 2.0. It's kind of building this some would
49:27
Alexei Doronov: say in the harshest way a digital cage that would basically give the ECB even more power over monetary decisions by intuitive. introducing a programmable euro that uh defines who spends what, when, and how. Um, do you see
49:47
Alexei Doronov: this as a an actual uh in the first case, even a feasible project? Looking at the history of how governments and bureaucrats are able to handle things and policies is one thing, but then to develop a whole infrastructure that actually uh also involves a product, which would be the interface of the C B D
50:07
Alexei Doronov: C and this digital euro and all the things that go with it in terms of security and management and all these things, and then what it will actually mean for the Eurozone as a whole.
50:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Alexei, I I'm very much uh
50:22
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): against uh the introduction of a digital euro. which is basically a central bank digital currency. Weighing the pros and cons of such a new kind type of money.
50:45
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And so my recommendation would be don't do it, don't introduce it, don't use it. I personally see that the
50:56
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): potential for misuse is
51:00
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so huge, and so many people are so uninformed about these potentials of misusing Using a digitalized central bank currency that then my my recommendation really is to stop the whole project before launching
51:19
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it. In this context, I may mention that the US administration prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing a digitalized US dollar. This is uh or this has been uh
51:37
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): written into the
51:39
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
51:40
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): so-called constitution in the statutes of the US central bank. Maybe it hasn't been reported uh in Europe, but obviously the US administration, because of the uh potential of misuse, uh considers uh the authority for
51:58
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): central bankers to decide on whether or not issuing a digital currency
52:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as being
52:05
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): not good. In Europe and in China,
52:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): central bankers want to go ahead with the project.
52:14
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): I
52:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): expressed my concern uh in terms of political misuse already, and I may add
52:21
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
52:21
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): that even from
52:23
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
52:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): a convenience point of view.
52:27
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): uh
52:27
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): uh central bank digital currency uh is not needed. For instance, for
52:33
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
52:34
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): for
52:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): making possible uh smart um or connecting smart contracts with uh a digital currency,
52:42
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
52:43
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there's the possibility of tokenizing Organizing commercial bank money. So there is no real really a need for having a centralized digital currency as it is envisaged by the European Central Bank. Also, from the viewpoint of monetary sovereignty,
53:02
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): I find it not at all convincing to argue that Europe would need a single digital Of currency. And we could go through other uh arguments in favor of a digital euro. None of them, from my point of view, is really convincing. And uh just uh as a final
53:23
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): note,
53:24
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
53:25
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the danger really is that um that the digital euro will then evolve into some kind of tyrannical money. Because what will happen is once the euro, the digital euro will be accepted.
53:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): it will push aside cash payments. That should be clear. And it will also push aside commercial bank money. So
53:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): even private banks will be pushed out of business over time, and you would have a totally monopolized monetary system. And this is what I call a tyrannical monetary system. And uh the bottom line really, Alexei, is it's not a good idea for the great majority
54:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of the people in Europe.
54:12
Alexei Doronov: And there's also and this we haven't talked about uh a lot, but maybe we can discuss this in uh in the next uh follow-up interview is the fact that the EU is trying to create this joint debt union as well by um well putting uh bundling all the sovereign debts into into one big one uh big bundle, a basket.
54:32
Alexei Doronov: Um and that the move towards like this digital euro is to facilitate that as well and to more centralization overall of the different uh participants of the of the Eurozone. And then there's then the an anti-movement, anti movements so to say in them in in parallel where you see countries like Poland.
54:51
Alexei Doronov: Czech Republic, Hungary accumulating gold, buying gold, central banks buying gold, uh just like China is doing and other emerging markets are doing as well. And one could say that uh they see something coming, or they're at least preparing themselves for something. Um, how do you interpret that? This this uh this uh
55:11
Alexei Doronov: rise of purchasing of of gold reserves from the central banks and in Europe and particularly in the east part of the European Union?
55:19
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): It's
55:20
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): fair to say the US dollar is still the world's reserve uh currency. It's um the most widely distributed currency. The dollar is used in financial transactions in the commodity markets uh as far as uh foreign reserve holding is uh is concerned. But um in the in the last
55:39
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): years you can see that uh a number of especially non-Western countries have become increasingly concerned about um the the role of the dollar and also the role of the euro or the British pound or the Canadian dollar in their reserve portfolio. And the reason is that America has
55:59
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): increasingly used the dollar as a weapon.
56:03
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): as far as the US geopolitical
56:09
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): policy making is concerned. Those countries that don't comply with American standards must fear that they become, let's say,
56:18
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): decoupled from the US dollar-based payment system, or in the case of Russia, that their reserve currencies. the reserve assets in dollar and euro or in Japanese yen will be confiscated. And a reaction of
56:36
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the reaction is really that especially central banks and other large
56:44
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): non Western investor institutions really seek a diversification of their reserve holdings, getting away steering clear, so to speak, from the dollar or from the euro or from the British pound. And the natural
57:04
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): choice really is gold, because gold, as you know, and as your viewers know, is um the primary currency. It's the it's the currency of humankind, so to speak. Gold has always been served as money, as a safe haven, and um it protects,
57:24
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): of course, against the risks we just outlined from the viewpoint of especially non Western uh countries, people in non-Western non Western countries. Uh gold cannot be debased by central bank. banks running the printing press,
57:41
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): and it cannot uh lose its value. It doesn't have uh or because of uh payment defaults,
57:49
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
57:49
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): there is simply no such thing for gold that
57:53
Unidentified speaker (UNKNOWN): um
57:54
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): could lead to a payment default, and there are other uh advantages that come with gold, and that it explains to me why. uh in particular uh central banks from uh non-Western countries have stepped up their gold purchases in recent years, and I think that will continue.
58:14
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): And it will also um become an issue for an increasing number of private individuals and investors in Europe. I think the demand for gold will increase substantially in the years to come, clearly outpassing any
58:34
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): increase in gold in terms of mining or recycling gold. And so my take at the moment really is that the gold price, we trade at around about $4,000 four thousand uh dollars per ounce as we speak. Um we have seen a little correction, but
58:53
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): the bull market has not yet really started.
58:58
Alexei Doronov: That's a beautiful conclusion, Torsten. Uh on this uh almost one hour long interview, we've we've made it. Thanks a lot for joining us in the in this English uh version of the podcast. To all the viewers and listeners, uh please also check out if you're d Dut if you're German. speaking or German channel, which is the Gold Republic Deutschland
59:18
Alexei Doronov: YouTube canal. And to the viewers and listeners who are not subscribed yet to this English Gold Republic Global channel, please do and make sure to like and subscribe to not miss any of the other interviews we are having with quality guests like Torsten. Thanks for watching and viewing this episode. Thanks Torsten for joining us
59:38
Alexei Doronov: today. and I wish you a great evening.
59:42
Unidentified speaker (speaker_0): Thank you very much for the invitation, Alexei. Keep on doing your great job and hope to see you soon.
59:49
Alexei Doronov: Thank you, Torsten.
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